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Air War Plans Division
The Air War Plans Division (AWPD) was an American military organization established to make long-term plans for war. Headed by Harold L. George, the unit was tasked in July 1941 to provide President Franklin D. Roosevelt with "overall production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies." The plans that were made at the AWPD eventually proved significant in the defeat of Nazi Germany.
The AWPD went beyond offering basic production requirements and provided a comprehensive air plan which was designed to defeat the Axis powers. The plan, AWPD-1, was completed in nine days. The plan emphasized using heavy bombers to carry out precision bombing attacks as the primary method of defeating Germany and its allies. A year later, after the United States became directly involved in World War II, AWPD delivered a second plan—AWPD-42—which slightly changed the earlier plan to incorporate lessons learned from eight months of the war. Neither AWPD-1 nor AWPD-42 were approved as combat battle plans or war operations; they were simply accepted as guidelines for the production of materiel and the creation of necessary air squadrons. Finally, in 1943, an operational aerial warfare plan was agreed in meetings between American and British war planners, based on a combination of British plans and those from the AWPD, to create the Anglo-American Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO).
On 20 June 1941, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) were established as a way to combine and streamline two conflicting air commands: GHQ Air Force and the Army Air Corps. Major General Henry H. Arnold commanded the USAAF and formed an Air Staff to lead it; within the Air Staff, the Air War Plans Division was established with Lieutenant Colonel Harold L. George at its head. George was to coordinate his planning efforts with the War Plans Division (WPD) of the War Department.
Up to this point, the WPD was responsible for planning all aspects of Army and Army Air Corps expansion in the U.S. George was challenged by WPD, which contested AWPD's and Air Staff's authority to make strategic plans. WPD recommended that AWPD should be limited to tactical planning, and that the Air Staff, in a subordinate role, should advise the WPD rather than make its own operational or strategic plans. George pushed for greater autonomy—he wished to prepare all plans for all air operations.
On 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt asked Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, and Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, for an exploration of the total war production required for the United States to prevail in case of war. The WPD, in order to project long-term numbers, realized that the Rainbow 5 plan would be used as a basis for production quantities, but it lacked detailed air power figures. Stimson requested of Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, that the USAAF be tapped for their ideas about production numbers. After some bureaucratic delay, the AWPD received the request.
In early 1941, American, Canadian and British war planners convened in Washington D.C. for a series of secret planning sessions called the American–British Conference, or ABC-1, to determine a course of action should the United States become a belligerent in the war. An overarching strategy of Europe first was agreed to, where American energies would primarily be directed against Germany, Italy and their European conquests, during which a secondary defensive posture was to be held against Japan. Royal Air Force Air Vice-Marshal John Slessor and other airmen present at the conference agreed on the general concept of using strategic bombing by both British and American air units based in the United Kingdom to reduce Axis military power in Europe. Incorporating this work in April 1941, the joint U.S. Army-Navy Board developed Rainbow 5, the final version of general military guidelines the U.S. would follow in case of war.
At the beginning of August 1941, the AWPD consisted of only four officers: Harold L. George, Orvil Anderson, Kenneth Walker (each one a lieutenant colonel), and Major Haywood S. Hansell. To help answer the urgent need for planning, George could have sent a couple of his air officers to WPD to assist them, following the standard Army policy since air warfare first arose in World War I. An air plan would have been made emphasizing tactical air coordination with ground forces, one which targeted Axis military formations and supplies in preparation and support of an invasion. George wished to implement the strategic bombing theories that had been debated and refined at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) during the preceding decade, but was sure that the Army and the War Department would not accept a strategy that assumed air attack would prevail alone. Instead, he intended to implement a middle path which began with strategic air attack but contained allowances for the eventual support of a ground invasion. In requesting autonomy to make his own plans, George gained approval from General Arnold and from General Leonard T. Gerow, head of the overworked WPD, who approved as long as AWPD held to the guidelines of ABC-1 and Rainbow 5.
George sought out men he knew were bombing advocates. He obtained temporary help from five more air officers: Lieutenant Colonels Max F. Schneider and Arthur W. Vanaman, and Majors Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Laurence S. Kuter, and Samuel E. Anderson. All but Samuel E. Anderson had passed through ACTS, where precision bombing theories were ascendant. Orvil Anderson was assigned to continue with ongoing projects while the rest of the men concentrated on the new request. On 4 August 1941, the augmented AWPD set to work.
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Air War Plans Division
The Air War Plans Division (AWPD) was an American military organization established to make long-term plans for war. Headed by Harold L. George, the unit was tasked in July 1941 to provide President Franklin D. Roosevelt with "overall production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies." The plans that were made at the AWPD eventually proved significant in the defeat of Nazi Germany.
The AWPD went beyond offering basic production requirements and provided a comprehensive air plan which was designed to defeat the Axis powers. The plan, AWPD-1, was completed in nine days. The plan emphasized using heavy bombers to carry out precision bombing attacks as the primary method of defeating Germany and its allies. A year later, after the United States became directly involved in World War II, AWPD delivered a second plan—AWPD-42—which slightly changed the earlier plan to incorporate lessons learned from eight months of the war. Neither AWPD-1 nor AWPD-42 were approved as combat battle plans or war operations; they were simply accepted as guidelines for the production of materiel and the creation of necessary air squadrons. Finally, in 1943, an operational aerial warfare plan was agreed in meetings between American and British war planners, based on a combination of British plans and those from the AWPD, to create the Anglo-American Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO).
On 20 June 1941, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) were established as a way to combine and streamline two conflicting air commands: GHQ Air Force and the Army Air Corps. Major General Henry H. Arnold commanded the USAAF and formed an Air Staff to lead it; within the Air Staff, the Air War Plans Division was established with Lieutenant Colonel Harold L. George at its head. George was to coordinate his planning efforts with the War Plans Division (WPD) of the War Department.
Up to this point, the WPD was responsible for planning all aspects of Army and Army Air Corps expansion in the U.S. George was challenged by WPD, which contested AWPD's and Air Staff's authority to make strategic plans. WPD recommended that AWPD should be limited to tactical planning, and that the Air Staff, in a subordinate role, should advise the WPD rather than make its own operational or strategic plans. George pushed for greater autonomy—he wished to prepare all plans for all air operations.
On 9 July 1941, President Roosevelt asked Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, and Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, for an exploration of the total war production required for the United States to prevail in case of war. The WPD, in order to project long-term numbers, realized that the Rainbow 5 plan would be used as a basis for production quantities, but it lacked detailed air power figures. Stimson requested of Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, that the USAAF be tapped for their ideas about production numbers. After some bureaucratic delay, the AWPD received the request.
In early 1941, American, Canadian and British war planners convened in Washington D.C. for a series of secret planning sessions called the American–British Conference, or ABC-1, to determine a course of action should the United States become a belligerent in the war. An overarching strategy of Europe first was agreed to, where American energies would primarily be directed against Germany, Italy and their European conquests, during which a secondary defensive posture was to be held against Japan. Royal Air Force Air Vice-Marshal John Slessor and other airmen present at the conference agreed on the general concept of using strategic bombing by both British and American air units based in the United Kingdom to reduce Axis military power in Europe. Incorporating this work in April 1941, the joint U.S. Army-Navy Board developed Rainbow 5, the final version of general military guidelines the U.S. would follow in case of war.
At the beginning of August 1941, the AWPD consisted of only four officers: Harold L. George, Orvil Anderson, Kenneth Walker (each one a lieutenant colonel), and Major Haywood S. Hansell. To help answer the urgent need for planning, George could have sent a couple of his air officers to WPD to assist them, following the standard Army policy since air warfare first arose in World War I. An air plan would have been made emphasizing tactical air coordination with ground forces, one which targeted Axis military formations and supplies in preparation and support of an invasion. George wished to implement the strategic bombing theories that had been debated and refined at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) during the preceding decade, but was sure that the Army and the War Department would not accept a strategy that assumed air attack would prevail alone. Instead, he intended to implement a middle path which began with strategic air attack but contained allowances for the eventual support of a ground invasion. In requesting autonomy to make his own plans, George gained approval from General Arnold and from General Leonard T. Gerow, head of the overworked WPD, who approved as long as AWPD held to the guidelines of ABC-1 and Rainbow 5.
George sought out men he knew were bombing advocates. He obtained temporary help from five more air officers: Lieutenant Colonels Max F. Schneider and Arthur W. Vanaman, and Majors Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Laurence S. Kuter, and Samuel E. Anderson. All but Samuel E. Anderson had passed through ACTS, where precision bombing theories were ascendant. Orvil Anderson was assigned to continue with ongoing projects while the rest of the men concentrated on the new request. On 4 August 1941, the augmented AWPD set to work.