Hubbry Logo
Abu NidalAbu NidalMain
Open search
Abu Nidal
Community hub
Abu Nidal
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Abu Nidal
Abu Nidal
from Wikipedia

Sabri Khalil al-Banna (Arabic: صبري خليل البنا; May 1937 – 16 August 2002), known by his nom de guerre Abu Nidal ("father of struggle"),[1] was a Palestinian militant. He was the founder of Fatah: The Revolutionary Council (Arabic: فتح المجلس الثوري), a militant Palestinian splinter group more commonly known as the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO).[2] Abu Nidal formed the ANO in October 1974 after splitting from Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).[3]

Key Information

Abu Nidal is believed to have ordered attacks in 20 countries, killing over 300 and injuring over 650 while acting as a freelance contractor.[4][5][6] The group's operations included the Rome and Vienna airport attacks on 27 December 1985, when gunmen opened fire on passengers in simultaneous shootings at El Al ticket counters, killing 20. At the height of its militancy in the 1970s and 1980s, the ANO was widely regarded as the most ruthless of the Palestinian groups.[7][8][4][9] Palestinian leadership long suspected that Israeli Mossad had infiltrated the ANO, with Abu Nidal himself allegedly having been on the CIA payroll.[10][11][12][13]

Abu Nidal died after a shooting in his Baghdad apartment in August 2002. Palestinian sources believed he was killed on the orders of Saddam Hussein, while Iraqi officials insisted he had committed suicide during an interrogation.[14][15]

Early life

[edit]
photograph
Abu Nidal was born in Jaffa, where he was raised in a large stone house near the beach.

Sabri Khalil al-Banna was born in May 1937 in Jaffa, on the Mediterranean coast of what was then the British Mandate of Palestine. His father, Hajj Khalil al-Banna, owned 6,000 acres (24 km2) of orange groves situated between Jaffa and Majdal (now Ashkelon in Israel).[16] The family lived in luxury in a three-storey stone house near the beach, later used as an Israeli military court.[17] Muhammad Khalil al-Banna, Abu Nidal's brother, told Yossi Melman:

My father ... was the richest man in Palestine. He marketed about ten percent of all the citrus crops sent from Palestine to Europe—especially to England and Germany. He owned a summer house in Marseille, France, and another house in İskenderun, then in Syria and afterwards Turkey, and a number of houses in Palestine itself. Most of the time we lived in Jaffa. Our house had about twenty rooms, and we children would go down to swim in the sea. We also had stables with Arabian horses, and one of our homes in Ashkelon even had a large swimming pool. I think we must have been the only family in Palestine with a private swimming pool.[18]

The kibbutz named Ramat Hakovesh has to this day a tract of land known as "the al-Banna orchard". ...My brothers and I still preserve the documents showing our ownership of the property, even though we know full well that we and our children have no chance of getting it back.

— Muhammad al-Banna, brother of Abu Nidal[19]

Khalil al-Banna's wealth allowed him to take several wives. In an interview with Der Spiegel, Sabri stated his father had 13 wives, 17 sons and 8 daughters. Melman writes that Sabri's mother, an Alawite, was the eighth wife.[20] She had been one of the family's maids as a 16-year-old girl. The family disapproved of the marriage, according to Patrick Seale and, as a result, Sabri Khalil's 12th child, was apparently looked down on by his older siblings, although in later life the relationships were repaired.[21]

In 1944 or 1945, his father sent him to Collège des Frères de Jaffa, a French mission school, which he attended for one year.[19] When his father died in 1945, when Sabri was seven years old, the family turned his mother out of the house.[21] His brothers took him out of the mission school and enrolled him instead in a prestigious, private Muslim school in Jerusalem, now known as Umariya Elementary School, which he attended for about two years.[22]

1948 Palestine War

[edit]

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations resolved to partition Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state. Fighting broke out immediately, and the disruption of the citrus-fruit business limited the family's income.[22] In Jaffa there were food shortages, truck bombings, and an Irgun militia mortar bombardment.[23] Melman writes that the al-Banna family had had good relations with the Jewish community.[24] Abu Nidal's brother told Melman that their father had been a friend of Avraham Shapira, a founder of the Jewish defense organization, Hashomer, stating, "He would visit [Shapira] in his home in Petah Tikva, or Shapira riding his horse would visit our home in Jaffa. I also remember how we visited Dr. Weizmann [later first president of Israel] in his home in Rehovot." However, these relationships did not help them weather the war.[24]

Just before Israeli troops took Jaffa in April 1948, the family fled to their house near Majdal, but Israeli troops arrived there too, and the family fled again. This time they went to the Bureij refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, then under Egyptian control. Melman writes that the family spent nine months living in tents, depending on UNRWA for an allowance of oil, rice, and potatoes.[25] The experience had a powerful effect on Abu Nidal.[26]

Move to Nablus and Saudi Arabia

[edit]

The al-Banna family's commercial experience, and the money they had managed to take with them, meant they could re-establish themselves, Melman writes.[25] Their orange groves were gone, now part of the new state of Israel. The family moved to Nablus in the West Bank, then under Jordanian control.[20] In 1955, Abu Nidal graduated from high school, joined the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party,[27] and began a degree in engineering at Cairo University, but he left after two years without a degree.[28] In 1960, he made his way to Saudi Arabia, where he established himself as a painter and electrician, and worked as a casual laborer for Aramco.[29] His brother told Melman that Abu Nidal would return to Nablus from Saudi Arabia every year to visit his mother. It was during one such visit in 1962 that he met his wife, whose family had also fled Jaffa. Their marriage produced a son and two daughters.[30]

Personality

[edit]

Abu Nidal was often in poor health, according to Seale, and tended to dress in zip-up jackets and old trousers, drinking whisky every night in his later years. He became, writes Seale, a "master of disguises and subterfuge, trusting no one, lonely and self-protective, [living] like a mole, hidden away from public view".[31] Acquaintances said that he was capable of hard work and had a mind for finances.[32] Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), the deputy chief of Fatah who was assassinated by the ANO in 1991, knew him well in the late 1960s when he took Abu Nidal under his wing.[33] He told Seale:

He had been recommended to me as a man of energy and enthusiasm, but he seemed shy when we met. It was only on further acquaintance that I noticed other traits. He was extremely good company, with a sharp tongue and an inclination to dismiss most of humanity as spies and traitors. I rather liked that! I discovered he was very ambitious, perhaps more than his abilities warranted, and also very excitable. He sometimes worked himself up into such a state that he lost all powers of reasoning.[33]

Seale suggests that Abu Nidal's childhood explained his personality, described as chaotic by Abu Iyad and as psychopathic by Issam Sartawi, the late Palestinian heart surgeon.[34][35] His siblings' scorn, the loss of his father, and his mother's removal from the family home when he was seven, followed by the loss of his home and status in the conflict with Israel, created a mental world of plots and counterplots, reflected in his tyrannical leadership of the ANO. Members' wives (the ANO was an all-male group) were not allowed to befriend each other, and Abu Nidal's expected his wife to live in isolation without friends.[36]

Political life

[edit]

Impex, Black September

[edit]
photograph
King Hussein of Jordan in 1997

In Saudi Arabia, Abu Nidal helped found a small group of young Palestinians who called themselves the Palestine Secret Organization. The activism cost him his job and home: Aramco fired him, and the Saudi government imprisoned, then expelled him in 1967.[27] He returned to Nablus with his wife and family, and joined Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction of the PLO. Working as an odd-job man, he was committed to Palestinian politics but was not particularly active until Israel won the 1967 Six-Day War, capturing the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Melman writes that "the entrance of the Israel Defense Forces tanks into Nablus was a traumatic experience for him. The conquest aroused him to action."[37]

After moving to Amman, Jordan, he set up a trading company called Impex, which acted as a front for Fatah and served as a meeting place and conduit for funds. This became a hallmark of Abu Nidal's career. ANO-controlled companies controlled made him a rich man by through legitimate business, and functioned as cover for arms deals and mercenary activities.[33]

1970 Echo newsreel about the situation in Jordan

When Fatah asked him to choose a nom de guerre, he chose Abu Nidal ("father of struggle") after his son, Nidal.[1] Those who knew him at the time said he was a well-organized leader, not a guerrilla; during fighting between the Palestinian fedayeens and King Hussein's troops, he stayed in his office.[38] In 1968, Abu Iyad appointed him as the Fatah representative in Khartoum, Sudan. Later, at Abu Nidal's insistence, he was appointed to the same position in Baghdad in July 1970. He arrived two months before "Black September", when more than 10 days of fighting King Hussein's army drove the Palestinian fedayeens out of Jordan, with the loss of thousands of lives. Abu Nidal's absence from Jordan at a time, Seale writes, when it was clear that King Hussein was about to act against the Palestinians, raised suspicion within the movement that Abu Nidal was interested only in saving himself.[39]

First operation

[edit]

Shortly after Black September, Abu Nidal began accusing the PLO, over his Voice of Palestine radio station in Iraq, of cowardice for having agreed to a ceasefire with Hussein.[39] During Fatah's Third Congress in Damascus in 1971, he joined Palestinian activist and writer Naji Allush and Abu Daoud (leader of the Black September Organization responsible for the 1972 Munich Massacre) in calling for greater democracy within Fatah and revenge against King Hussein.[40]

photograph
Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, in 2014

In February 1973, Abu Daoud was arrested in Jordan for an attempt on King Hussein's life. This led to Abu Nidal's first operation, using the name Al-Iqab ("the Punishment"). On 5 September 1973, five gunmen entered the Saudi embassy in Paris, took 15 hostages, and threatened to blow up the building if Abu Daoud was not released.[41][42] The gunmen flew to Kuwait two days later on a Syrian Air flight, still holding five hostages, then to Riyadh, threatening to throw the hostages out of the aircraft. They surrendered and released the hostages on 8 September.[43][44] Abu Daoud was released from prison two weeks later; Seale writes that the Kuwaiti government paid King Hussein $12 million for his release.[43]

On the day of the attack, 56 heads of state were meeting in Algiers for the fourth Non-Aligned Movement conference. According to Seale, the Saudi Embassy operation had been commissioned by Iraq's president, Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr, as a distraction because he was jealous that Algeria was hosting the conference. One of the hostage-takers admitted that he had been told to fly the hostages around until the conference was over.[45]

Abu Nidal had carried out the operation without Fatah's permission.[46] Abu Iyad (Arafat's deputy) and Mahmoud Abbas (later President of the Palestinian Authority), flew to Iraq to reason with Abu Nidal and explain that hostage-taking harmed the movement. Abu Iyad told Seale that an Iraqi official at the meeting said, "Why are you attacking Abu Nidal? The operation was ours! We asked him to mount it for us." Abbas was furious and left the meeting with the other PLO delegates. From that point on, the PLO regarded Abu Nidal as under the control of the Iraqi government.[45]

Expulsion from Fatah

[edit]

Two months later, in November 1973 (just after the Yom Kippur War in October), the ANO hijacked KLM Flight 861, this time using the name Arab Nationalist Youth Organization. Fatah had been discussing convening a peace conference in Geneva and the hijacking was intended to warn them not to go ahead with it. In response, in March or July 1974, Arafat expelled Abu Nidal from Fatah.[47]

In October 1974, Abu Nidal formed the ANO, calling it Fatah: The Revolutionary Council.[3] In November that year, a Fatah court sentenced him to death in absentia for the attempted assassination of Mahmoud Abbas.[48] It is unlikely that Abu Nidal had intended to kill Abbas, and just as unlikely that Fatah wanted to kill Abu Nidal. He was invited to Beirut to discuss the death sentence, and was allowed to leave again, but it was clear that he had become persona non grata.[3] As a result, the Iraqis gave him Fatah's assets in Iraq, including a training camp, farm, newspaper, radio station, passports, overseas scholarships, and $15 million worth of Chinese weapons. He also received Iraq's regular aid to the PLO: around $150,000 a month and a lump sum of $3–5 million.[49]

ANO

[edit]

Nature of the organization

[edit]

In addition to Fatah: The Revolutionary Council, the ANO called itself by many names:

  • Palestinian National Liberation Movement
  • Black June (for actions against Syria)
  • Black September (for actions against Jordan)
  • Revolutionary Arab Brigades
  • Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims
  • Egyptian Revolution
  • Revolutionary Egypt
  • Al-Asifa ("the Storm," a name also used by Fatah)
  • Al-Iqab ("the Punishment")
  • Arab Nationalist Youth Organization.[2]

The group had up to 500 members[50] chosen from young men in the Palestinian refugee camps and in Lebanon who were promised good pay and help looking after their families.[51] They were sent to training camps in whichever country was hosting the ANO at the time (Syria, Iraq, or Libya), then organized into small cells.[50] Once they had joined the ANO, As'ad AbuKhalil and Michael Fischbach write, they were not allowed to leave again.[52] The group assumed complete control over the membership. One member who spoke to Patrick Seale was told before being sent overseas, "If we say, 'Drink alcohol,' do so. If we say, 'Get married,' find a woman and marry her. If we say, 'Don't have children,' you must obey. If we say, 'Go and kill King Hussein,' you must be ready to sacrifice yourself!"[53]

Recruits were asked to write out their life stories, including names and addresses of family and friends, then sign a paper saying they agreed to execution if they were discovered to have intelligence connections. If the ANO suspected them, they would be asked to rewrite the whole story, without discrepancies.[54] The ANO's newspaper Filastin al-Thawra regularly announced the execution of traitors.[52] Abu Nidal believed that the group had been penetrated by Israeli agents, and there was a sense that Israel may have used the ANO to undermine more moderate Palestinian groups. Terrorism experts regard the view that Abu Nidal himself was such an agent as "far-fetched".[9]

Committee for Revolutionary Justice

[edit]

There were reports of purges throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Around 600 ANO members were killed in Lebanon and Libya, including 171 in one night in November 1987, when they were lined up, shot, and thrown into a mass grave. Dozens were kidnapped in Syria and killed in the Badawi refugee camp. Most of the decisions to kill, Abu Daoud told Seale, were taken by Abu Nidal "in the middle of the night, after he [had] knocked back a whole bottle of whiskey".[55] The purges led to the defection from the ANO in 1989 of Atef Abu Bakr, head of the ANO's political directorate, who returned to Fatah.[56]

The "Committee for Revolutionary Justice" routinely tortured members until they confessed to disloyalty. Reports of torture included hanging a man naked, whipping him until he was unconscious, reviving him with cold water, then rubbing salt or chili powder into his wounds. A naked prisoner would be forced into a car tyre with his legs and backside in the air, then whipped, wounded, salted, and revived with cold water. A member's testicles might be fried in oil, or melted plastic dripped onto his skin. Between interrogations, prisoners would be tied up in tiny cells. If the cells were full, they might be buried with a pipe in their mouths for air and water; if Abu Nidal wanted them dead, a bullet would be fired down the pipe instead.[57]

Intelligence Directorate

[edit]

The Intelligence Directorate was formed in 1985 to oversee special operations. It had four subcommittees: the Committee for Special Missions, the Foreign Intelligence Committee, the Counterespionage Committee, and the Lebanon Committee. Led by Abd al-Rahman Isa, the longest-serving member of the ANO—Seale writes that Isa was unshaven and shabby, but charming and persuasive—the directorate maintained 30–40 people overseas who looked after the ANO's arms caches in various countries. It trained staff, arranged passports and visas, and reviewed security at airports and seaports. Members were not allowed to visit each other at home, and no one outside the directorate was supposed to know who was a member.[58] Abu Nidal demoted Isa in 1987, believing he had become too close to other figures within the ANO. Always keen to punish members by humiliating them, he insisted that Isa remain in the Intelligence Directorate, where he had to work for his previous subordinates who were told to treat him with contempt.[59]

Committee for Special Missions

[edit]

The Committee for Special Missions' job was to choose targets.[60] It had started out as the Military Committee, headed by Naji Abu al-Fawaris, who had led the attack on Heinz Nittel, head of the Israel-Austria Friendship League, who was shot and killed in 1981.[61] In 1982, the committee changed its name to the Committee for Special Missions, headed by Dr. Ghassan al-Ali, who had been born in the West Bank and educated in England, where he obtained a bachelor's degree and a master's degree in chemistry, and married (and later divorced) a British woman.[62] A former ANO member said that Ali favoured "the most extreme and reckless operations".[60]

Operations and relationships

[edit]

Shlomo Argov

[edit]
photograph
Shlomo Argov was shot in the head as he left the Dorchester Hotel, Park Lane, London.

On 3 June 1982, ANO operative Hussein Ghassan Said shot Shlomo Argov, the Israeli ambassador to Britain, once in the head as he left the Dorchester Hotel in London. Said was accompanied by Nawaf al-Rosan, an Iraqi intelligence officer, and Marwan al-Banna, Abu Nidal's cousin. Argov survived, but spent three months in a coma and the rest of his life disabled, until his death in February 2003.[63] The PLO quickly denied responsibility for the attack.[64]

Ariel Sharon, then Israel's defence minister, responded three days later by invading Lebanon, where the PLO was based, a reaction that Seale argues Abu Nidal had intended: the Israeli government had been preparing to invade and Abu Nidal provided a pretext.[65] Der Spiegel put it to him in October 1985 that the assassination of Argov, when he knew Israel wanted to attack the PLO in Lebanon, made him appear to be working for the Israelis, in the view of Yasser Arafat.[66] Abu Nidal replied:[66]

What Arafat says about me doesn't bother me. Not only he, but also a whole list of Arab and world politicians claim that I am an agent of the Zionists or the CIA. Others state that I am a mercenary of the French secret service and of the Soviet KGB. The latest rumor is that I am an agent of Khomeini. During a certain period they said we were spies for the Iraqi regime. Now they say that we are Syrian agents ... Many psychologists and sociologists in the Soviet bloc tried to investigate this man Abu Nidal. They wanted to find a weak point in his character. The result was zero.

Rome and Vienna

[edit]

Abu Nidal's most infamous operation was the 1985 attack on the Rome and Vienna airports.[67] On 27 December, at 08:15 GMT, four gunmen opened fire on the El Al ticket counter at the Leonardo Da Vinci International Airport in Rome, killing 16 and wounding 99. In the Vienna International Airport a few minutes later, three men threw hand grenades at passengers who were waiting to check into a flight to Tel Aviv, killing 4 and wounding 39.[68][69] The gunmen had been told the people in civilian clothes at the check-in counter were Israeli pilots returning from a training mission.[70]

Austria and Italy had both been involved in trying to arrange peace talks. Sources close to Abu Nidal told Seale that Libyan intelligence had supplied the weapons. The damage to the PLO was enormous, according to Abu Iyad, Arafat's deputy. Most people in the West, and even many Arabs, could not distinguish between the ANO and Fatah, he said. "When such horrible things take place, ordinary people are left thinking that all Palestinians are criminals."[71]

Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal's biographer, wrote of the shootings that their "random cruelty marked them as typical Abu Nidal operations".[72][68]

United States bombing of Libya

[edit]
photograph
48th Tactical Fighter Wing F-111F aircraft takes off from RAF Lakenheath in England to bomb Libya, 14 April 1986.

On 15 April 1986, the US launched bombing raids from British bases against Tripoli and Benghazi, killing around 100, in retaliation for the bombing of a Berlin nightclub frequented by US service personnel.[73][74] The dead were reported to include Hanna Gaddafi, the adoptive daughter of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi; two of his other children were injured.[75] British journalist Alec Collett, who had been kidnapped in Beirut in March, was hanged after the airstrikes, reportedly by ANO operatives; his remains were found in the Beqaa Valley in November 2009.[76] The bodies of two British teachers, Leigh Douglas and Philip Padfield, and an American, Peter Kilburn, were found in a village near Beirut on 17 April 1986; the Arab Fedayeen Cells, a name linked to Abu Nidal, claimed responsibility.[77] British journalist John McCarthy was kidnapped the same day.[78]

Hindawi affair

[edit]

On 17 April 1986—the day the teachers' bodies were found and McCarthy was kidnapped—Ann Marie Murphy, a pregnant Irish chambermaid, was discovered in Heathrow airport with a Semtex bomb in the false bottom of one of her bags. She had been about to board an El Al flight from New York to Tel Aviv via London. The bag had been packed by her Jordanian fiancé Nizar Hindawi, who had said he would join her in Israel where they were to be married.[79] According to Melman, Abu Nidal had recommended Hindawi to Syrian intelligence.[80] The bomb had been manufactured by Abu Nidal's technical committee, who had delivered it to Syrian air force intelligence. It was sent to London in a diplomatic bag and given to Hindawi. According to Seale, it was widely believed that the attack was in response to Israel having forced down a jet, two months earlier, carrying Syrian officials to Damascus, which Israel had supposed was carrying senior Palestinians.[81]

Pan Am Flight 73

[edit]

On 5 September 1986, four ANO gunmen hijacked Pan Am Flight 73 at Karachi Airport on its way from Mumbai to New York, holding 389 passengers and crew for 16 hours in the plane on the tarmac before detonating grenades inside the cabin. Neerja Bhanot, the flight's senior purser, was able to open an emergency door, and most passengers escaped. Twenty died, including Bhanot, and 120 were wounded.[82][83] The London Times reported in March 2004 that Libya had been behind the hijacking.[84]

Relationship with Gaddafi

[edit]
photograph
Muammar Gaddafi

Abu Nidal began to move his organization out of Syria to Libya in the summer of 1986,[85] arriving there in March 1987. In June that year, the Syrian government expelled him, in part because of the Hindawi affair and Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking.[86] He repeatedly took credit during this period for operations in which he had no involvement, including the 1984 Brighton hotel bombing, 1985 Bradford City stadium fire, and 1986 assassination of Zafer al-Masri, the mayor of Nablus (killed by the PFLP, according to Seale). By publishing a congratulatory note in the ANO's magazine, he also implied that he had been behind the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger disaster.[87]

Abu Nidal and Libya's leader, Muammar Gaddafi, allegedly became great friends, each holding what Marie Colvin and Sonya Murad called a "dangerous combination of an inferiority complex mixed with the belief that he was a man of great destiny". The relationship gave Abu Nidal a sponsor and Gaddafi a mercenary.[88] Libya brought out the worst in Abu Nidal. He would not allow even the most senior ANO members to socialize with each other; all meetings had to be reported to him. All passports had to be handed over. No one was allowed to travel without his permission. Ordinary members were not allowed to have telephones; senior members were allowed to make local calls only.[89] His members knew nothing about his daily life, including where he lived. If he wanted to entertain, he would take over the home of another member.[90]

According to Abu Bakr, speaking to Al Hayat in 2002, Abu Nidal said he was behind the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December 1988; a former head of security for Libyan Arab Airlines was later convicted.[91] Abu Nidal reportedly said of Lockerbie, "We do have some involvement in this matter, but if anyone so much as mentions it, I will kill him with my own hands!" Seale writes that the ANO appeared to have no connection to it. One of Abu Nidal's associates told him, "If an American soldier tripped in some corner of the globe, Abu Nidal would instantly claim it as his own work."[85]

Banking with BCCI

[edit]

In the late 1980s, British intelligence learned that the ANO held accounts with the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in London.[92] In July 1991, BCCI was closed by banking regulators in six countries after evidence emerged of widespread fraud.[93] Abu Nidal himself was said to have visited London using the name Shakar Farhan; a BCCI branch manager, who passed information about the ANO accounts to MI5, reportedly drove him around several stores in London without realizing who he was.[94] Abu Nidal was using a company called SAS International Trading and Investments in Warsaw as cover for arms deals.[95] The company's transactions included the purchase of riot guns, ostensibly for Syria, then when the British refused an export license to Syria, for an African state; in fact, half the shipment went to the police in East Germany and half to Abu Nidal.[96]

Assassination of Abu Iyad

[edit]

On 14 January 1991 in Tunis, the night before US forces moved into Kuwait, the ANO assassinated Abu Iyad, head of PLO intelligence, along with Abu al-Hol, Fatah's chief of security, and Fakhri al-Omari, another Fatah aide; all three men were shot in Abu al-Hol's home. The killer, Hamza Abu Zaid, confessed that an ANO operative had hired him. When he shot Abu Iyad, he reportedly shouted, "Let Atef Abu Bakr help you now!", a reference to the senior ANO member who had left the group in 1989, and whom Abu Nidal believed Abu Iyad had planted within the ANO as a spy.[97] Abu Iyad had known that Abu Nidal nursed a hatred of him, in part because he had kept Abu Nidal out of the PLO. However, the real reason for the hatred, Abu Iyad told Seale, was that he had protected Abu Nidal in his early years within the movement. Given his personality, Abu Nidal could not acknowledge that debt. The murder "must therefore be seen as a final settlement of old scores".[98]

Death

[edit]
photograph
Iraq's chief of intelligence, Tahir Jalil Habbush shows reporters photographs of Abu Nidal's body during a press conference on 21 August 2002.

After Libyan intelligence operatives were charged with the Lockerbie bombing, Gaddafi tried to distance himself from terrorism. Abu Nidal was expelled from Libya in 1999[99] and, in 2002, he returned to Iraq. The Iraqi government later said he had entered the country using a fake Yemeni passport and false name.[100][101]

On 19 August 2002, the Palestinian newspaper al-Ayyam reported that Abu Nidal had died three days earlier of multiple gunshot wounds at his home in Baghdad, a house the newspaper said was owned by the Mukhabarat, the Iraqi secret service.[88] Two days later, Iraq's chief of intelligence Taher Jalil Habbush handed out photographs of Abu Nidal's body to journalists, along with a medical report that said he had died after a bullet entered his mouth and exited through his skull. Habbush said Iraqi officials had arrived at Abu Nidal's home to arrest him on suspicion of conspiring with foreign governments. After saying he needed a change of clothes, Abu Nidal went into his bedroom and shot himself in the mouth, according to Habbush. He died eight hours later in hospital.[100]

The Janes reported in 2002 that Iraqi intelligence had found classified documents in his home about a US attack on Iraq. When they raided the house, fighting broke out between Abu Nidal's men and Iraqi intelligence. Amid this, Abu Nidal rushed into his bedroom and was killed; Palestinian sources told Janes that he had been shot several times. Janes suggested Saddam Hussein had him killed because he feared Abu Nidal would act against him in the event of an American invasion.[101]

"He was the patriot turned psychopath", David Hirst wrote in The Guardian on the news of his death. "He served only himself, only the warped personal drives that pushed him into hideous crime. He was the ultimate mercenary."[35]

In 2008, Robert Fisk obtained a report written in September 2002, for Saddam Hussein's "presidency intelligence office," by Iraq's "Special Intelligence Unit M4". The report said that the Iraqis had been interrogating Abu Nidal in his home as a suspected spy for Kuwait and Egypt, and indirectly for the United States, and that he had been asked by the Kuwaitis to find links between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Just before being moved to a more secure location, Abu Nidal asked to be allowed to change his clothing, went into his bedroom and shot himself, the report said.

He was buried on 29 August 2002 in al-Karkh Islamic cemetery in Baghdad, in a grave marked M7.[15]

See also

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Sabri al-Banna (1937–2002), better known by his nom de guerre Abu Nidal, was a Palestinian militant who founded and led the (ANO), also called the Revolutionary Council, an international terrorist group that splintered from the (PLO) in 1974 over ideological opposition to any compromise with . The ANO, structured with political, military, and operational committees, conducted attacks across approximately 20 countries, resulting in around 900 deaths, targeting primarily Israeli diplomats, Jewish civilians, Western interests, and even PLO personnel deemed insufficiently radical. Notable operations included the 1985 and airport massacres, which killed 19 people including , and assassinations such as those of three Israeli diplomats in 1986. Backed variably by state sponsors including , under , and , the group functioned as a mercenary network, shifting allegiances based on financial and political support while pursuing a rejectionist stance against peace processes. In his later years, marginalized and in poor health, Abu Nidal relocated to ; he was found dead in on 16 August 2002 from multiple gunshot wounds, with Iraqi authorities claiming suicide, though forensic evidence and reports from associates suggested possible by Iraqi intelligence amid suspicions of his disloyalty or external ties.

Early Life and Background

Birth and Family Origins

Sabri Khalil al-Banna, later known by the nom de guerre Abu Nidal, was born in May 1937 in , within the Mandate of Palestine. His family belonged to the local Arab elite, distinguished by relative affluence uncommon among many future Palestinian leaders who hailed from rural or lower-middle-class backgrounds. Al-Banna's father, Khalil al-Banna (sometimes referred to as Khalil), was a prosperous landowner who owned a large orange plantation on the coastal plain south of , capitalizing on the region's renowned exports. The family resided in a spacious three-storey stone house near the beach in and maintained a summer residence in northern . His mother, an Alawite from , had initially served as a household servant before becoming Khalil's second wife at age 16; she bore Sabri as the couple's , making him the twelfth overall in a large family with eleven half-siblings from the first marriage, who reportedly treated him with disdain due to his mother's status. Khalil's death in 1945 left the family vulnerable, exacerbating internal tensions and foreshadowing their later displacement. The al-Banna lands, including the orange groves, were confiscated by Israeli authorities following the family's flight during the 1948 Arab- War.

Displacement During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War

Sabri Khalil al-Banna, who later adopted the nom de guerre Abu Nidal, was born on May 1, 1937, in the Baqqara neighborhood of , then under the British Mandate for Palestine, to a prosperous family; his father, Khalil Ibrahim al-Banna, owned extensive orange groves and other properties. As the 1948 Arab-Israeli War escalated, Jewish paramilitary forces under the launched on April 27, capturing much of by April 30 amid intense urban fighting and shelling from nearby positions, which prompted panic among the Arab population. Al-Banna's family fled the city during this period, joining the mass exodus of roughly 70,000 of Jaffa's Arab residents who departed primarily by sea to Gaza or in late April and early May 1948, driven by combat, fear of atrocities following events like the massacre earlier that month, and direct expulsion orders in some areas. The al-Banna family initially resettled in a in the , then under Egyptian administration, where conditions were harsh, marked by overcrowding, limited resources, and makeshift shelters typical of the camps established for the approximately 200,000 displaced to Gaza during the war. This displacement severed the family's ties to their properties, which were subsequently seized and repurposed under , contributing to al-Banna's later grievances against both Israeli authorities and Palestinian perceived as insufficiently militant. Sources documenting this phase, such as Palestinian historical archives, emphasize the familial upheaval but vary in detail due to the chaotic nature of the flight and potential ideological framing in refugee narratives; however, the relocation to Gaza aligns with broader patterns of evacuations verified in contemporaneous military records.

Residence in Saudi Arabia and Formative Influences

Following the family's displacement to in the after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Sabri al-Banna relocated to around 1957, initially working as an electrician and housepainter in . He later secured with Aramco through connections via a brother, gaining exposure to the expatriate Palestinian labor community amid the kingdom's oil-driven economic expansion. This period, lasting until his expulsion in 1967, marked a phase of economic self-sufficiency but also deepened his engagement with radical Arab nationalist ideologies. In , al-Banna affiliated with the , which he had joined around age 18 prior to his move, reflecting an early commitment to secular emphasizing and unity against perceived Zionist and Western threats. He co-founded the Secret Organization, a Ba'athist faction among Palestinian workers, organizing clandestine activities that drew Saudi authorities' attention for subversive politics. Some accounts indicate he also initiated contact with during this time, blending Ba'athist influences with emerging , though his primary radicalization stemmed from the Ba'athist focus on revolutionary struggle and rejection of compromise with . These experiences fostered a worldview prioritizing armed resistance and intra-Arab , unmoderated by religious orthodoxy, as evidenced by his later opportunistic alliances across secular regimes. Expulsion by Saudi police in 1967 for political agitation forced his return to , where prior annual visits to family in had maintained ties to Palestinian grievances. The combination of manual labor hardships, exposure to ideological networks, and suppression of reinforced his distrust of conservative monarchies and commitment to militant autonomy.

Radicalization and Initial Militant Activities

Entry into Fatah and Ideological Alignment

Sabri al-Banna, who adopted the nom de guerre Abu Nidal, joined Yasser Arafat's organization in 1967 shortly after returning from employment as an electrician in , motivated by the displacement and losses inflicted on Palestinians during the . His entry into the group was sponsored by Abu Jihad (), a co-founder of Fatah and its military commander, who recognized al-Banna's commitment to militant action. At the time, al-Banna aligned ideologically with Fatah's foundational principles of secular , which prioritized armed against Israeli targets as the primary means to achieve the liberation of historic , rejecting reliance on Arab states or international diplomacy. , established in 1959, viewed the Zionist enterprise as an imperialist imposition requiring direct confrontation, a stance that resonated with al-Banna's personal experiences of refugee life in Gaza and economic migration. This alignment positioned him within Fatah's rejectionist framework, which opposed any recognition of and emphasized self-reliant operations independent of pan-Arab ideologies. Al-Banna's early involvement in Fatah focused on organizational and logistical support rather than frontline combat, reflecting his administrative aptitude; by the early 1970s, he had advanced to head the movement's office, coordinating activities amid growing tensions over Fatah's evolving political moderation. His ideological commitment remained rooted in uncompromising militancy, though Fatah's leadership under Arafat began exploring broader alliances, foreshadowing al-Banna's later dissent. In the early 1960s, following his relocation to Saudi Arabia, Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal) initially worked as a painter and electrician in Riyadh before taking up employment as a casual laborer with Aramco. These positions provided financial stability amid his growing political activism, during which he founded the Palestine Secret Organization to advocate for reclaiming Palestine; however, his radical activities resulted in dismissal from Aramco and expulsion by Saudi authorities after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. After joining in the mid-1960s, al-Banna leveraged business ventures as operational fronts for the organization. He established the Impex trading company in , , which served to launder funds, procure supplies, and host covert meetings for Fatah militants, thereby blending legitimate commerce with clandestine support for armed resistance. This model of economic activity masking militant logistics persisted as he ascended within , including roles as its envoy to and later in 1970. Al-Banna's links to , the Fatah-affiliated militant faction responsible for operations like the 1972 Munich Olympics attack, were indirect but marked by opportunistic associations and later appropriation. Absent from during the September 1970 clashes between Jordanian forces and —known as —he broadcast denunciations of leaders like Abu Iyad on Baghdad Radio, criticizing their handling of the crisis and raising suspicions of disloyalty or self-preservation. In September 1973, al-Banna directed an unauthorized siege of the Saudi embassy in on September 5, holding diplomats hostage; contemporary media reports attributed the attack to , though it proceeded without endorsement from Fatah's central command, exacerbating internal rifts that led to his expulsion from the group in 1974. Subsequently, the he founded adopted as an alias alongside others like the Fatah Revolutionary Council, enabling it to claim or obscure responsibility for attacks in a manner echoing the original faction's tactics.

Early Violent Operations Leading to Expulsion

In late 1973, Sabri al-Banna, operating under the nom de guerre Abu Nidal, directed unauthorized militant actions that contravened 's strategic directives under . On September 5, 1973, five gunmen affiliated with his Al-Iqab group seized the Saudi Arabian embassy in , taking 11 hostages and demanding the release of , a operative imprisoned in for plotting against King Hussein. This operation, publicly attributed to —a -linked faction responsible for high-profile attacks like the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre—was conducted without approval from Fatah's leadership, including Abu Iyad (Khalil al-Wazir), highlighting Abu Nidal's independent pursuit of escalation against Arab regimes perceived as conciliatory toward . Compounding tensions, in , Abu Nidal orchestrated the hijacking of a airliner by members of the Arab Nationalist Youth Organization, a front he controlled, to Fatah's participation in an international peace conference. The action aimed to derail any diplomatic overtures, reflecting his rejection of Arafat's emerging pragmatism, including the PLO's 1974 proposal for a national authority in the and Gaza as a interim step toward statehood. These rogue operations strained Abu Nidal's position within , where he had risen to represent the group in since July 1970, using his import-export firm as a cover for fundraising and logistics. The cumulative effect of these insubordinate acts, coupled with Abu Nidal's public criticisms of 's ceasefires—such as broadcasts on Iraqi radio decrying a 1970 truce with —culminated in his formal expulsion from in March 1974. Arafat's decision stemmed from Abu Nidal's ideological intransigence against any compromise with and his willingness to target Arab states and internal PLO moderates, positioning him as a threat to unified command. This rift marked the transition from operative to renegade, paving the way for the formation of the Fatah Revolutionary Council later that year, dedicated to unrelenting violence over .

Formation of the Abu Nidal Organization

Founding in 1974 and Core Ideology

The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), formally the Fatah Revolutionary Council, was founded in 1974 by Sabri al-Banna, who adopted the nom de guerre Abu Nidal. This formation followed his split from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), specifically Fatah, amid deepening rifts over strategic direction. Abu Nidal had been expelled from Fatah in late 1973 after allegations of plotting against Yasser Arafat and other leaders, prompting him to establish a rival faction committed to unyielding militancy. The core catalyst for the break was Abu Nidal's vehement rejection of the PLO's tentative moves toward diplomatic engagement, including proposals for establishing a Palestinian national authority in the and Gaza as a precursor to statehood. He branded such initiatives as capitulation, accusing Arafat's leadership of diluting the armed struggle by entertaining compromise with . Relocating initially to , where he received backing from Saddam Hussein's regime, Abu Nidal positioned the ANO as the authentic vanguard of Palestinian resistance, free from what he saw as treacherous moderation. Ideologically, the ANO espoused a hardline rooted in total opposition to Israel's existence, advocating its eradication via sustained terrorist operations and a broader revolutionary uprising. Unlike the increasingly pragmatic PLO, the group dismissed peace negotiations, targeting not only Israeli and Western interests but also moderate , PLO officials, and states perceived as conciliatory, such as and . This rejectionist stance framed the PLO as betrayers, justifying intra-Palestinian violence to purge perceived and enforce revolutionary purity. The ANO's principles lacked a formal but manifested in a secular, nationalist framework emphasizing functional committees for political, military, and financial operations to perpetuate global attacks.

Organizational Structure and Specialized Units

The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) maintained a secretive, centralized hierarchical structure under the absolute authority of its founder, Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal), who served as the strategic apex and exercised autocratic control over all major decisions. This command chain featured a Political Bureau of five senior members for high-level policy, a of ten directorate heads for operational oversight, and a Revolutionary Council that integrated these bodies with representatives from substructures to deliberate on directives and missions. The organization's adhoc-cellular design emphasized compartmentalization to enhance security and operational flexibility, with self-contained cells forming temporary matrices for specific terrorist actions, rendering infiltration challenging due to limited internal knowledge sharing. Specialized units within the ANO included the Intelligence Directorate, responsible for planning and executing terrorist operations such as assassinations and bombings, staffed by approximately 100 personnel including highly trained operatives, assassins, and bomb makers organized into dispersed, inefficient yet adaptable cells. The People's Army, based in , functioned as a semi-autonomous guerrilla force of around 500 fighters, self-supporting in tactics but reliant on central leadership for funding and strategic guidance, focusing on conventional militant engagements rather than international . Supporting these were functional directorates: the Directorate for managing assets and state sponsorship funds, the Membership Committee for vetting and record-keeping, and the Secretariat for communications and command dissemination, bolstered by auxiliary support staff handling logistics, transportation, and security. This divisional hybrid model, blending corporate-like headquarters with covert cellular elements, allowed the ANO to produce diversified outputs like intelligence gathering and high-profile attacks while minimizing vulnerabilities, though its reliance on Abu Nidal's personal paranoia contributed to internal purges and inefficiencies. State sponsors, such as and , influenced operations by providing training camps and safe havens but did not alter the core internal hierarchy, which remained insulated to prevent external co-option.

Execution of Terrorist Operations

Assassination Attempts on Israeli Diplomats

The (ANO), under Sabri al-Banna's leadership, systematically targeted Israeli diplomats and embassy personnel in the late 1970s and early 1980s as part of its broader rejection of Palestinian Authority moderation and its commitment to armed struggle against . These operations often involved small teams using firearms for precise hits, reflecting the group's emphasis on high-profile assassinations to sow fear and disrupt Israeli foreign relations. On July 27, 1980, ANO gunmen murdered an Israeli commercial attaché in , executing a targeted killing outside diplomatic premises to strike at Israeli economic representation abroad. The most consequential attempt occurred on June 3, 1982, when three ANO operatives shot Israeli ambassador to the in the head as he exited a hotel after a dinner event; Argov survived but was left permanently paralyzed and requiring lifelong medical care, dying from complications in 2003. Although Israel initially attributed the attack to the (PLO), intelligence confirmed ANO responsibility, with the group aiming to sabotage emerging Palestinian-Israeli dialogues; the incident prompted Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee invasion of hours later, escalating regional conflict despite ANO's opposition to PLO leadership. Another effort took place on June 5, 1984, in , , where ANO assassins targeted an Israeli in a bid to undermine post-Camp David diplomatic ties between and ; the attempt failed, with no fatalities reported, but highlighted the group's operational reach into Arab states normalizing relations with . These attacks, totaling at least three documented cases against Israeli diplomatic targets, underscored ANO's tactical focus on individuals symbolizing Israeli state presence, contrasting with the group's later mass-casualty operations, and contributed to its designation as a premier terrorist threat by Western intelligence agencies.

Mass Casualty Attacks in Europe and Beyond

On December 27, 1985, gunmen affiliated with the (ANO) launched coordinated assaults at check-in counters in 's Leonardo da Vinci–Fiumicino Airport and 's Airport. In , three attackers used grenades and submachine guns, killing 13 civilians—including five children—and injuring 74 others before Italian security forces killed one perpetrator and arrested the others. In , a lone gunman fired on passengers, resulting in four deaths and 46 injuries; Austrian police shot and wounded the attacker, who later died. The operations, involving Palestinian militants trained in , targeted Israeli-linked sites during the holiday season, yielding a total of 17 civilian fatalities and over 120 wounded across both locations. Extending operations to , ANO operatives struck the in Istanbul's district on September 6, 1986, during services. Two assailants, armed with automatic weapons and grenades, entered the sanctuary and opened fire on approximately 30 worshippers, killing 22—mostly elderly congregants—and wounding six before perishing in the ensuing blaze from incendiary devices. Turkish authorities identified the attackers as ANO members, linking the incident to the group's anti-Zionist campaign against Jewish targets in urban settings. These attacks exemplified ANO's tactic of synchronized, high-impact strikes on soft to maximize deaths and international attention, often in coordination with state sponsors providing and havens. Beyond Europe, similar patterns emerged in ANO-linked operations, such as the September 5, 1986, assault on the Israeli embassy in , , where a killed a police officer and injured 28, though attribution remains tied to splinter elements under ANO influence. The group's European campaigns subsided after intensified measures post-1985, including Italian and Austrian raids on ANO cells.

Aviation Hijackings and Bombings

The (ANO), led by Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal), conducted several high-profile attacks targeting between 1983 and 1986, aiming to maximize casualties and coerce political concessions from Western and Arab governments. These operations included mid-air bombings and hijackings, often involving explosives concealed in luggage or onboard assaults with firearms and grenades, reflecting the group's tactical emphasis on spectacular violence against civilian targets. ANO publicly claimed responsibility for most incidents, using them to publicize demands such as the release of imprisoned militants or attacks on perceived enemies of . On September 23, 1983, ANO operatives bombed , a en route from to with 107 passengers and five crew aboard. The explosion, triggered by a device in the baggage compartment, caused the aircraft to crash into the approximately 30 miles northeast of , killing all 112 people on board; investigations confirmed the blast severed critical flight controls. ANO attributed the attack to efforts pressuring for financial protection payments, though no such ransom was confirmed paid. In a bid to free jailed ANO members, the group hijacked on November 23, 1985, shortly after takeoff from en route to Cairo. Three hijackers, including , stormed the carrying 92 passengers and six crew, diverting it first to Luqa Airport in ; they executed at least 60 hostages, primarily and , by shooting them in the head after separating them based on nationality and religion, before Maltese forces stormed the plane, killing two hijackers and capturing the third. ANO explicitly claimed the operation, which highlighted the group's intra-Palestinian vendettas by targeting flights with Israeli passengers. The ANO escalated aviation sabotage with the bombing of Flight 840 on April 2, 1986, as the descended into from with 115 passengers and seven crew. A barometric fuse-activated , hidden under a seat, detonated at 12,000 feet, creating a hole in the that ejected four victims—a nine-month-old Greek-American and three American women—leading to their deaths from exposure and impact; the pilots safely landed the damaged with no further fatalities. The group claimed responsibility, linking the attack to retaliation against U.S. policy, though forensic analysis pointed to a sophisticated device. Later that year, on September 5, 1986, four ANO hijackers seized at Karachi's , a bound for and New York with 366 passengers and 19 crew. Holding the aircraft for 16 hours, the militants demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners in and ; they executed 20 hostages, including Americans and Indians, via gunfire during a that enabled Pakistani commandos to storm the plane, resulting in over 100 injuries from gunfire and grenades. ANO justified the assault as retribution against U.S. support for , with the hijackers trained in camps linked to Libyan sponsorship.

State Sponsorship and Operational Support

Alliance with Libya and Gaddafi's Regime

The (ANO) forged a close operational alliance with under in the mid-1980s, following its expulsion from in 1983. By summer 1986, ANO leadership relocated key operations to Tripoli, establishing a there by 1987, which served as a primary base for training and planning. Gaddafi's regime extended safe haven, financial funding, weapons supplies, and logistical assistance, employing ANO operatives as proxies for sensitive terrorist activities that Libya preferred to conduct indirectly. This partnership enabled ANO to maintain momentum after earlier setbacks, while aligning with Gaddafi's ideological commitment to anti-Western and anti-Israel militancy through exported revolution. Libyan support facilitated several high-impact operations during this period, particularly in retaliation for the U.S. airstrikes on Tripoli and on , 1986, which killed dozens including Gaddafi's adopted daughter. ANO received Libyan-supplied weaponry for attacks such as the and airport massacres on December 27, 1985—conducted just prior to the full relocation but indicative of emerging ties—and the hijacking of in , , on September 5, 1986, where four hijackers held over 400 passengers hostage for 16 hours, killing 20 in the eventual assault. These actions underscored Libya's role in bolstering ANO's capacity for mass-casualty strikes against civilian and diplomatic targets in and beyond, with estimates of Libyan funding contributing tens of millions annually to ANO's budget during peak collaboration. The alliance provided mutual strategic benefits: Gaddafi gained a reliable non-Libyan surrogate to obscure direct involvement in global , while ANO accessed state-level resources including specialized camps in Libya's desert regions for recruits in , , and hijacking techniques. However, intra-Arab rivalries and ANO's independent targeting of Palestinian moderates occasionally strained relations, though Gaddafi tolerated this to leverage the group's ruthlessness against shared foes like and U.S. interests. Declassified assessments from U.S. highlight Libya's use of ANO for deniable operations, such as assassinations of Libyan exiles and disruptions in . Tensions escalated in the late 1980s amid mounting on for , exacerbated by the December 1988 bombing of over , . Following U.S. and indictments of Libyan agents in 1991, Gaddafi distanced himself from overt sponsorship, expelling Abu Nidal and core ANO elements around 1990, prompting a return to for refuge. Residual ANO presence lingered until fully closed offices and expelled remaining members in 1999, as part of Gaddafi's bid to normalize relations with the West and secure sanctions relief. This shift marked the effective end of the alliance, contributing to ANO's operational decline.

Shifting Ties to Iraq, Syria, and Other States

The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) initially established close ties with Iraq in the late 1970s, receiving training, logistical support, and funding that enabled its expansion and operations against Palestinian moderates and Israeli targets. Iraq utilized ANO as a proxy to advance its regional interests, including countering Syrian influence within Palestinian militancy. This relationship positioned Iraq as ANO's primary patron until 1983, when Saddam Hussein's regime expelled ANO operatives to improve prospects for U.S. diplomatic and military assistance during the ongoing Iran-Iraq War. Following the rift with Iraq, ANO relocated its base to , where it enjoyed sanctuary and material aid from 1983 to 1987, facilitating attacks intended to sabotage emerging Arab-Israeli peace efforts and undermine Yasser Arafat's PLO leadership. Syrian backing aligned with Damascus's strategy to weaken rival Palestinian factions and maintain leverage in , though ANO's autonomy allowed it to conduct independent operations. The alliance ended in 1987 when expelled ANO, attributed to U.S. diplomatic pressure amid broader efforts to isolate terrorist networks. Iraq resumed limited support for ANO elements after the 1988 ceasefire in the Iran- War, inviting groups back as part of efforts to rebuild proxy networks before the 1990 Kuwait invasion. By December 1998, Abu Nidal himself relocated to , where he received protection from Iraqi intelligence under , marking a partial restoration of ties despite ANO's diminished capacity. ANO also maintained peripheral operations in other states, including bases in Sudan's Bekaa Valley-equivalent refugee areas and , though these lacked the depth of Iraqi or Syrian patronage. These shifts reflected pragmatic adaptations to state sponsors' geopolitical calculations, with ANO serving as a tool traded between regimes seeking deniability for proxy violence.

Financial Mechanisms Including BCCI

The (ANO) derived the majority of its funding from patronage by Arab states, which supplied direct cash subsidies, arms supplies, and operational resources in exchange for terrorist activities aligned with their geopolitical interests. , under , provided millions of dollars to ANO and other militant groups as part of broader support for anti-Western operations during the and . offered similar financial backing during periods of alliance in the early to mid-, including safe havens and logistical aid that facilitated and . extended funding and sanctuary, particularly in the and later years, leveraging ANO for assassinations and attacks against shared rivals. These state contributions enabled ANO to maintain training camps, recruit operatives, and execute high-profile operations without reliance on grassroots donations or criminal enterprises to a significant degree. In parallel, ANO employed international banking networks to launder funds, procure arms, and execute transfers, often evading sanctions through shell companies and falsified documentation. The organization maintained accounts for commercial fronts involved in arms smuggling, such as SAS Foreign Trade and Investment Company, which brokered deals worth millions. Protection payments from Arab benefactors were routed through these channels to obscure origins and destinations. Such mechanisms allowed ANO to acquire weapons like riot guns, , and armored vehicles, sometimes diverting shipments intended for legitimate buyers. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) played a central role in ANO's financial operations during the , processing millions of dollars in illicit transactions to finance arms acquisitions and demonstrate alignment with Arab clients amid the Iran-Iraq War. In 1980, BCCI accepted an initial $50 million deposit into an ANO-linked account at its Sloane Street branch, establishing a conduit for subsequent dealings under aliases like Shakar Farhan. The bank issued letters of credit and facilitated transfers via cash in suitcases and deposits in , , and the , often coordinated by BCCI officer Ghassan Qassem, who also spied for Arab intelligence. A notable 1985 transaction involved financing a British shipment of weapons—originally destined for —that was diverted to with forged export papers, part of which reached ANO operatives. BCCI also arranged a failed 1987 deal for six armored vehicles equipped with hidden rocket and grenade launchers. In 1988, the bank disbursed $4 million from ANO funds to train Peru's guerrillas, highlighting extensions beyond Palestinian militancy. These activities, exposed in BCCI's 1991 collapse, underscored the bank's utility in enabling terrorist financing through opaque global networks.

Intra-Palestinian Conflicts and Assassinations

Targeted Killings of PLO Moderates

The (ANO), after splitting from the (PLO) in 1974 over ideological opposition to any form of compromise with , systematically targeted Palestinian figures perceived as moderates who advocated dialogue or political solutions. This intra-Palestinian violence aimed to undermine Yasser Arafat's leadership and prevent shifts toward negotiation, with ANO operatives conducting assassinations in and the . The group claimed responsibility for several such killings, viewing them as necessary to maintain revolutionary purity against "traitors" within the movement. On June 1, , Naim Khader, the PLO's representative to the European Community, was shot dead by gunmen outside his home in , . Khader, a engaging with European institutions, was targeted as part of ANO's campaign against PLO envoys promoting international legitimacy for the Palestinian cause. The assassination, involving multiple shots to the head and chest, was attributed to ANO operatives, though Belgian authorities initially described it as unsolved. A prominent case occurred on April 10, 1983, when Issam Sartawi, a cardiologist and leading PLO advocate for two-state negotiations, was gunned down at a socialist conference in Lisbon, Portugal. ANO explicitly claimed responsibility, issuing prior death threats against Sartawi for his contacts with European leftists and Israeli peaceniks, framing the act as punishment for deviating from armed struggle. The killing, executed with silenced pistols during a break in proceedings, served as a public warning to other PLO members against moderation. In January 1991, amid the , ANO was linked to the assassination of (Abu Iyad), Arafat's deputy and a key Fatah security figure, along with Hayel Abdel Hamid (Abu Hul), in their safehouse. The gunmen, reportedly ANO members possibly backed by Iraqi intelligence, shot the victims at close range, reflecting ANO's alignment with anti-Arafat factions during regional upheavals. This operation targeted high-level PLO operatives enforcing loyalty to Arafat's evolving diplomacy. Palestinian sources widely attributed the attack to Abu Nidal's network, marking one of its last major intra-movement strikes. These assassinations, numbering at least a dozen claimed or linked incidents against PLO personnel between and , contributed to factional strife but failed to derail Arafat's strategy, instead isolating ANO as a rogue splinter. U.S. intelligence assessments noted ANO's efficiency in such operations, often using small teams for deniability.

Broader Rivalries Within Palestinian Militancy

The (ANO), founded by Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal) after his expulsion from in 1974, emerged amid deepening factional divisions within Palestinian militancy, primarily accusing Arafat's (PLO) of abandoning revolutionary principles in favor of pragmatic diplomacy. Abu Nidal publicly charged the PLO with "deviating from the Palestinian course" by tolerating contacts with Western powers and , positioning the ANO as a purist alternative committed exclusively to armed struggle without compromise. This schism reflected broader tensions between rejectionist factions, which viewed any negotiation as betrayal, and the PLO's mainstream, which sought broader Arab and international legitimacy despite its own militant operations. These rivalries manifested in violent competition for resources, recruits, and patronage from Arab states, where the ANO aligned with regimes like and that opposed Arafat's growing influence. , in particular, provided financial and operational support to the ANO as a proxy to undermine the PLO, exacerbating intra-Palestinian strife by enabling attacks on loyalists and other groups perceived as insufficiently radical. The ANO's operations targeted not only Israeli interests but also rival Palestinian entities, including s of PLO representatives in —such as the 1978 killing of a official in and a Cyprus-based PLO figure—framed as eliminating "collaborators" but serving to discredit Arafat's leadership. Such actions contributed to a cycle of retribution, with the PLO expelling ANO members and occasionally clashing militarily, as in the 1983 Sudanese confrontation where Arafat's forces repelled an ANO attempt against him. In the wider landscape of Palestinian militancy, the ANO's hardline stance distinguished it from Marxist-leaning groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which prioritized ideological alliances over total rejectionism, though both competed for Syrian backing at times. The ANO's estimated 200-300 killings of fellow —surpassing its Israeli casualties in some periods—underscored how these rivalries prioritized internal purification over unified resistance, fragmenting the movement and allowing state sponsors to exploit divisions for regional leverage. U.S. intelligence assessments noted the ANO as the most organized radical Palestinian splinter, its effectiveness in inter-factional violence stemming from disciplined cells rather than mass appeal, ultimately isolating it as Arafat consolidated PLO dominance by the late 1980s. Suspicions persisted of ANO involvement in high-profile PLO losses, including the 1991 of deputy chief Abu Iyad (Khalil al-Wazir), though attribution relied on patterns of amid denials from all sides.

Final Years, Death, and Surrounding Mysteries

Decline and Refuge in

By the 1990s, the (ANO) had largely ceased major terrorist operations, a decline attributed to internal purges, including the of officers such as Abed in in May 1990, and the erosion of state sponsorship from previous patrons like and . Sporadic incidents persisted, such as the January 1991 of PLO official Abu Iyad in and the 1994 killing of Jordanian diplomat Naeb Imran Maaytah in , but these marked the tail end of activity amid financial strains and defections that reduced membership and operational reach. Libya, under international pressure from sanctions related to events like the bombing, closed ANO offices and expelled the group in the late 1990s, exacerbating Abu Nidal's isolation after prior ousters from in 1983 and in 1987 due to shifting alliances and betrayals. Following a brief detention in in August 1998, Abu Nidal transited through before arriving in in late 1998, where he secured refuge under Saddam Hussein's protection, renewing ties with Iraqi intelligence that had lapsed during the Iran-Iraq War. In , Abu Nidal resided with an estimated 200-300 followers but maintained a low profile, with no evidence of ANO conducting attacks on behalf of the regime, though U.S. intelligence assessed the arrangement as enabling potential future threats given Hussein's history of harboring militants. The relocation underscored the ANO's marginalization, as broader geopolitical shifts, including the PLO's engagements, diminished support for unreconstructed rejectionist factions.

Official Death in 2002 and Alternative Theories

Abu Nidal, whose real name was Sabri Khalil al-Banna, was discovered dead on August 16, 2002, in his apartment in , , from multiple gunshot wounds to the head. Iraqi officials initially reported the death without specifying a cause, but on August 19, intelligence chief announced that Abu Nidal had committed suicide by shooting himself twice in the mouth after security forces confronted him over suspected collaboration with foreign intelligence services against the Iraqi regime. Deputy Prime Minister confirmed the death on August 21, reiterating the suicide narrative and noting Abu Nidal's prior health issues, including heart disease and diabetes, though emphasizing the self-inflicted wounds as the direct cause. The official account faced immediate skepticism due to the improbability of suicide by multiple self-inflicted gunshots to the head, a method atypical for such acts. Israeli security officials dismissed the suicide claim, asserting that Abu Nidal had been murdered, possibly by i authorities who viewed him as a liability amid shifting alliances and impending international pressure on Saddam Hussein's government. Analysts noted that Abu Nidal's long residence in under regime protection, combined with reports of his declining influence and potential disloyalty, made a plausible alternative to eliminate a compromised asset or prevent revelations about . No was independently conducted, and Iraqi statements provided limited forensic details, fueling theories that the regime staged the death to tie up loose ends before the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. Some Palestinian sources and observers speculated as the actual cause, masked by the gunshot narrative to avoid admitting regime involvement in his care or custody. However, the consensus among Western intelligence assessments leaned toward foul play by , given the controlled environment of his residence and the regime's history of liquidating inconvenient allies.

Impact, Assessments, and Viewpoints

Quantifiable Casualties and Operational Scale

The (ANO) conducted terrorist operations across approximately 20 countries, primarily between the mid-1970s and late , encompassing hijackings, shootings, bombings, and targeted assassinations against Western, Israeli, and moderate Palestinian targets. Estimates attribute nearly 900 total casualties—killed or injured—to the group during this period, though assessments vary, with some sources specifying around 300 deaths and hundreds of injuries. The ANO maintained a core membership of 200–300 operatives, supported by additional affiliates, organized into specialized committees for military actions, , and , enabling a global reach despite its Palestinian origins. Key operations included high-profile attacks with significant casualties, as detailed below:
DateLocationIncident DescriptionCasualties
November 23, 1985Malta (EgyptAir Flight 648 hijacking)ANO gunmen seized the plane, executing passengers and clashing with security forces.60 killed
December 27, 1985Rome and Vienna airportsSimultaneous machine-gun and grenade assaults on check-in counters targeting El Al flights.18 killed, 111 injured
September 5, 1986Karachi, Pakistan (Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking)Prolonged standoff ending in gunfire after lights failed; passengers executed.20 killed, numerous injured
September 6, 1986Istanbul, Turkey (Neve Shalom Synagogue)Grenade and gunfire attack on worshippers during Sabbath services.22 killed
July 11, 1988Aegean Sea, Greece (City of Poros cruise ship)Bombing of tourist vessel.9 killed
Post-1980s activities shifted toward assassinations, such as the 1991 killings of PLO officials Abu Iyad and Abu Hul in , and the 1994 murder of Jordanian diplomat Naeb Maaytah in , reflecting a decline in large-scale operations but sustained targeted violence. No major attacks against Western targets occurred after the late 1980s, correlating with internal purges and state sponsor pressures that reduced the group's operational capacity.

Strategic Evaluations and Long-Term Consequences

The (ANO) demonstrated tactical proficiency in executing high-profile attacks during the 1980s, claiming responsibility for operations that killed approximately 300 people and wounded hundreds across 20 countries, positioning it as one of the most lethal Palestinian militant groups of the era. However, strategic assessments highlight its limited ; by prioritizing rejectionist violence over negotiation, ANO failed to advance core Palestinian objectives like statehood, instead exacerbating fragmentation within the broader movement through targeted killings of PLO figures such as Abu Iyad in 1991, which aimed to sabotage diplomatic overtures but ultimately isolated the group from mainstream support. Over half of ANO's documented attacks targeted Arab states, Palestinian rivals, or Western interests rather than Israeli military assets, diverting resources from direct confrontation with and undermining potential Arab-Israeli rapprochement, as evidenced by operations disrupting Jordan-Egypt ties under state patrons like and . This proxy role for authoritarian sponsors yielded short-term disruptions but no enduring territorial or diplomatic gains for , with analysts noting that such intra-Arab and anti-moderate violence hindered unified resistance and alienated international sympathy. Post-Cold War shifts, including UN sanctions on in 1992 and the withdrawal of patronage from and , accelerated ANO's operational decline, rendering it marginal by the mid-1990s as diplomatic initiatives like the 1993 marginalized rejectionist factions. Long-term consequences included the reinforcement of global counter-terrorism norms, with ANO's designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. in 1997 exemplifying heightened scrutiny on state-sponsored militancy, though its inactivity since the early 2000s—following Abu Nidal's 2002 death—poses negligible ongoing threat. The group's emphasis on spectacular, indiscriminate violence contrasted with the later rise of ideologically driven Islamist networks like , underscoring how ANO's secular, state-dependent model proved unsustainable amid shifting geopolitical priorities and the PLO's pivot to governance. Ultimately, empirical outcomes affirm that ANO's campaigns, while tactically formidable, strategically entrenched divisions and foreclosed diplomatic pathways, contributing to the eclipse of Fatah splinter extremism in favor of negotiated frameworks despite their imperfections.

Contrasting Perspectives on Effectiveness and Morality

The Abu Nidal Organization's (ANO) tactics have been critiqued by security analysts for their limited strategic effectiveness, as the group's attacks—spanning over 20 countries and claiming approximately 900 lives—primarily sowed discord among Palestinian factions rather than advancing territorial or political gains. By assassinating PLO moderates and rival militants, Nidal's operations deepened intra-Palestinian rifts, enabling mainstream groups like to consolidate power while the ANO became increasingly isolated and dependent on state sponsors such as and , whose agendas often diverged from . Morally, Western and Israeli assessments frame Nidal's endorsement of civilian-targeted violence, including airport massacres and hijackings, as inherently unjustifiable, arguing that such methods violated principles of just war by indiscriminately endangering non-combatants and eroding any claim to legitimate resistance. This view posits that terrorism's psychological impact fails causally to compel policy shifts, instead provoking measures that hardened opposition to Palestinian aspirations. In contrast, some rejectionist Palestinian voices initially defended Nidal's absolutism as a principled refusal to compromise with , viewing his rejection of PLO diplomacy as morally superior to what they termed surrender, though empirical outcomes—such as the ANO's post-1990s decline and failure to build enduring alliances—undermine claims of efficacy. Critics within nationalist circles, however, portrayed Nidal as having morphed from ideologue to proxy, his moral posturing serving like more than the Palestinian struggle, thus exemplifying how unchecked violence devolves into self-defeating opportunism.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.