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2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive
In early June 2023, during the Russo-Ukrainian war, Ukraine launched an offensive (commonly, although technically incorrectly, referred to as a "counteroffensive") against Russian forces occupying its territory with a goal of breaching the front lines. Efforts were made in many directions, primarily in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. In total, Ukraine recaptured 14 villages in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, with a total pre-war population of around 5,000. The counteroffensive was widely regarded as a crucial moment in the war.
Planning for a major Ukrainian counteroffensive had begun as early as February 2023, with the original intention being to launch it in the spring. However, various factors, including weather and late weapon deliveries to Ukraine, delayed it to summer, as it had not been deemed safe to progress. Russia had begun preparing for the counteroffensive since November 2022 and had created extensive defensive infrastructure, including ditches, trenches, artillery positions, and landmines intended to slow the counteroffensive. Ukraine met well-established Russian defenses in the early days of the counteroffensive and after that slowed their pacing in order to assess the extent of Russian defenses, demine territory, save troops, and exhaust Russia's military resources. They made incremental gains by capturing over 370 km2 of territory, less than half of what Russia captured in all of 2023.
Almost five months after its start, prominent Ukrainian figures and Western analysts began giving negative assessments of the counteroffensive; statements by Ukrainian general Valerii Zaluzhnyi in early November 2023 that the war was a "stalemate" were seen by observers as an admission of failure. Rigorous assessments made by analysts followed, especially with regard to operational success, from several weeks earlier. That same month, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated the war would be entering a new phase. Ukrainian forces did not reach the city of Tokmak, described as a "minimum goal" by Ukrainian general Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, and the probable initial objective of reaching the Sea of Azov to split the Russian forces in southern Ukraine remained unfulfilled. By early December 2023, the counteroffensive was generally considered to be stalled or failed by multiple international media outlets.
Following the Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives in late 2022, fighting on the front lines largely stagnated, with fighting mostly concentrated around the city of Bakhmut during the first half of 2023.
Russian fortifications in Ukraine had been described as the most "extensive defensive works in Europe since World War II" by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Construction to create military infrastructure had begun as early as November 2022 in order to entrench Russian troops into Ukrainian territory. By April 2023, Russia built an 800 km (500 mi) long defense line in preparation for a Ukrainian counteroffensive. The final lines of fortifications established by Russia prior to the counteroffensive amounted to being nearly 2,000 km (1,200 mi) long, extending from the border with Belarus to the Dnieper delta. Defenses primarily consisted of ditches, dragon's teeth, trenches, artillery positions, anti-vehicle barriers, and prepared firing positions for vehicles. Russia had also created extensive minefield regions across the frontline regions with anti-tank mines. An estimated 170,000 km2 (66,000 sq mi) of territory had been mined, which also included Ukrainian mines laid in the Donbas region during the War in Donbas. In early May, Russian forces had constructed a dam and moat around the captured city of Tokmak which is located near the frontline of the counteroffensive.
In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Russia constructed roughly three lines of defense: a 150 km (93 mi) long frontline from Vasylivka to Novopetrykivka on the Zaporizhzhia–Donetsk oblasts border, a 130 km (81 mi) long second line of defense from Orlynske to just north of Kamianka, and "a constellation of disconnected fortifications surrounding larger towns". The first line contains multiple counter-mobility barriers and infantry trenches backed by artillery positions located 30 km (19 mi) nearby. The second line is similar to the first, allowing Russia to set up a new front while also offering protection against flank attacks. The third line contains strategically positioned fortifications meant to serve as a contingency to preserve Russian positions in case of a Ukrainian victory. It was predicted to be the most heavily fortified frontline region. In Kherson Oblast, defenses were created in order to protect Crimea and the Dnieper, while trenches in the road are located every few kilometers. The purpose was to prevent amphibious warfare. In Donetsk Oblast, Russian forces constructed field fortifications 5 km (3.1 mi) apart, combined with the urban terrain. Approximately 76% of the fortifications observed were estimated to have been created pre-2022, with the quality of them being doubted due to relative disuse over time. These fortifications center around Olhynka, Donetsk, Makiivka, and Horlivka.
Planning for a 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive began in autumn 2022, shortly after the Ukrainian victories in Kherson and Kharkiv. The prevailing wisdom among Ukrainian and Western officials was reportedly that this counteroffensive would bring about the end of the war, either by resulting in a decisive Ukrainian victory or by forcing Russian leadership to pursue a peace agreement. Ukrainian commander-in-chief Zaluzhnyi came to the meetings with Western commanders insisting on an offensive on Melitopol in order to cut the so-called "land bridge" between Crimea and mainland Russia. He had earlier advocated that this be the main Ukrainian offensive effort in 2022, instead of the more limited operations in Kherson and Kharkiv, but it was determined by the Americans and the British that the Ukrainian military had insufficient manpower and resources to carry it out at the time. Once again, there was pushback from Ukraine's western partners; the Pentagon was unsure whether it could supply enough weapons, and U.S. general Chris Donahue expressed doubt that the Ukrainians could break through the extensive trenches the Russians were digging.
By January 2023, the plans called for a counteroffensive on two fronts. Ukrainian general Oleksandr Syrskyi would command a secondary offensive in Bakhmut, which would involve a feint towards the Luhansk Oblast. This maneuver was intended to "tie up" the Russians in the east while the Ukrainians launched their main effort, the attack against Melitopol. The operation was scheduled to be launched on 1 May.
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2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive
In early June 2023, during the Russo-Ukrainian war, Ukraine launched an offensive (commonly, although technically incorrectly, referred to as a "counteroffensive") against Russian forces occupying its territory with a goal of breaching the front lines. Efforts were made in many directions, primarily in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. In total, Ukraine recaptured 14 villages in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, with a total pre-war population of around 5,000. The counteroffensive was widely regarded as a crucial moment in the war.
Planning for a major Ukrainian counteroffensive had begun as early as February 2023, with the original intention being to launch it in the spring. However, various factors, including weather and late weapon deliveries to Ukraine, delayed it to summer, as it had not been deemed safe to progress. Russia had begun preparing for the counteroffensive since November 2022 and had created extensive defensive infrastructure, including ditches, trenches, artillery positions, and landmines intended to slow the counteroffensive. Ukraine met well-established Russian defenses in the early days of the counteroffensive and after that slowed their pacing in order to assess the extent of Russian defenses, demine territory, save troops, and exhaust Russia's military resources. They made incremental gains by capturing over 370 km2 of territory, less than half of what Russia captured in all of 2023.
Almost five months after its start, prominent Ukrainian figures and Western analysts began giving negative assessments of the counteroffensive; statements by Ukrainian general Valerii Zaluzhnyi in early November 2023 that the war was a "stalemate" were seen by observers as an admission of failure. Rigorous assessments made by analysts followed, especially with regard to operational success, from several weeks earlier. That same month, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated the war would be entering a new phase. Ukrainian forces did not reach the city of Tokmak, described as a "minimum goal" by Ukrainian general Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, and the probable initial objective of reaching the Sea of Azov to split the Russian forces in southern Ukraine remained unfulfilled. By early December 2023, the counteroffensive was generally considered to be stalled or failed by multiple international media outlets.
Following the Kherson and Kharkiv counteroffensives in late 2022, fighting on the front lines largely stagnated, with fighting mostly concentrated around the city of Bakhmut during the first half of 2023.
Russian fortifications in Ukraine had been described as the most "extensive defensive works in Europe since World War II" by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Construction to create military infrastructure had begun as early as November 2022 in order to entrench Russian troops into Ukrainian territory. By April 2023, Russia built an 800 km (500 mi) long defense line in preparation for a Ukrainian counteroffensive. The final lines of fortifications established by Russia prior to the counteroffensive amounted to being nearly 2,000 km (1,200 mi) long, extending from the border with Belarus to the Dnieper delta. Defenses primarily consisted of ditches, dragon's teeth, trenches, artillery positions, anti-vehicle barriers, and prepared firing positions for vehicles. Russia had also created extensive minefield regions across the frontline regions with anti-tank mines. An estimated 170,000 km2 (66,000 sq mi) of territory had been mined, which also included Ukrainian mines laid in the Donbas region during the War in Donbas. In early May, Russian forces had constructed a dam and moat around the captured city of Tokmak which is located near the frontline of the counteroffensive.
In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, Russia constructed roughly three lines of defense: a 150 km (93 mi) long frontline from Vasylivka to Novopetrykivka on the Zaporizhzhia–Donetsk oblasts border, a 130 km (81 mi) long second line of defense from Orlynske to just north of Kamianka, and "a constellation of disconnected fortifications surrounding larger towns". The first line contains multiple counter-mobility barriers and infantry trenches backed by artillery positions located 30 km (19 mi) nearby. The second line is similar to the first, allowing Russia to set up a new front while also offering protection against flank attacks. The third line contains strategically positioned fortifications meant to serve as a contingency to preserve Russian positions in case of a Ukrainian victory. It was predicted to be the most heavily fortified frontline region. In Kherson Oblast, defenses were created in order to protect Crimea and the Dnieper, while trenches in the road are located every few kilometers. The purpose was to prevent amphibious warfare. In Donetsk Oblast, Russian forces constructed field fortifications 5 km (3.1 mi) apart, combined with the urban terrain. Approximately 76% of the fortifications observed were estimated to have been created pre-2022, with the quality of them being doubted due to relative disuse over time. These fortifications center around Olhynka, Donetsk, Makiivka, and Horlivka.
Planning for a 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive began in autumn 2022, shortly after the Ukrainian victories in Kherson and Kharkiv. The prevailing wisdom among Ukrainian and Western officials was reportedly that this counteroffensive would bring about the end of the war, either by resulting in a decisive Ukrainian victory or by forcing Russian leadership to pursue a peace agreement. Ukrainian commander-in-chief Zaluzhnyi came to the meetings with Western commanders insisting on an offensive on Melitopol in order to cut the so-called "land bridge" between Crimea and mainland Russia. He had earlier advocated that this be the main Ukrainian offensive effort in 2022, instead of the more limited operations in Kherson and Kharkiv, but it was determined by the Americans and the British that the Ukrainian military had insufficient manpower and resources to carry it out at the time. Once again, there was pushback from Ukraine's western partners; the Pentagon was unsure whether it could supply enough weapons, and U.S. general Chris Donahue expressed doubt that the Ukrainians could break through the extensive trenches the Russians were digging.
By January 2023, the plans called for a counteroffensive on two fronts. Ukrainian general Oleksandr Syrskyi would command a secondary offensive in Bakhmut, which would involve a feint towards the Luhansk Oblast. This maneuver was intended to "tie up" the Russians in the east while the Ukrainians launched their main effort, the attack against Melitopol. The operation was scheduled to be launched on 1 May.