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Capture of Oppy Wood
The Capture of Oppy Wood was an engagement on the Western Front during the First World War on 28 June 1917. The Battle of Arras of 1917 ended with the Germans in possession of a fortified wood to the west of the village of Oppy, which overlooked British positions. The wood was 1 acre (0.4 ha) in area and contained many German observation posts, machine-gun nests and trench mortars. New German defensive tactics adopted after the Battle of the Somme of defence in depth and rapid counter-attack, had been enforced on the German 6th Army after the disaster of 9 April, the first day of the Battle of Arras.
The British attack of the Third Battle of the Scarpe (3–4 May), was defeated everywhere bar Fresnoy, which was captured by the 1st Canadian Division. The attack on Oppy Wood by the 92nd Brigade of the 31st Division, was a costly failure. The area was defended by the 1st Guard Reserve Division and the 15th Reserve Division, which did not need the support of specialist Eingreif (counter-attack) divisions.
A second attack took place on 28 June, as part of a series of feints, intended to simulate a threat to the cities of Lens in the First Army area and Lille in the Second Army area. The attack was conducted by the 15th Brigade, 5th Division and the 94th Brigade, 31st Division, which advanced on a front extending from Gavrelle in the south to the north of Oppy Wood. After a hurricane bombardment, the objectives were captured with few British losses and German counter-attacks were defeated by artillery-fire.
An attack at the same time by the 4th Canadian Division and the 46th (North Midland) Division, astride the Souchez river, also succeeded. Operations to continue the encirclement of Lens by an attack by the Canadian Corps on Hill 70 to the north were postponed until August due to a shortage of artillery. The feint attacks failed to divert German attention from Flanders, which included the transfer of ten divisions to the 4th Army, despite claims by the 6th Army command that the British were preparing an offensive towards Lens; the operations did divert German attention from the French front further south.
Before the Third Battle of the Scarpe, the cancellation of the French part in the Nivelle Offensive seemed certain. A continuation of British attacks towards Cambrai would be pointless in the absence of French operations to the south and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig decided to continue operations on the Arras front to reach a good defensive line, then to conduct surprise attacks to keep German troops in the area. Preparations were made to begin operations in Flanders, with the attack at Messines to begin in early June. Despite uncertainty about the French attack on the Aisne, which was due from 4 to 5 May, a plan for an attack by the British Fifth Army, Third Army and the First Army on a 14 mi (23 km) front, went ahead and the First Army objectives were given as Oppy and Fresnoy.
The move of the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to Flanders in late May and June, left the First Army with twelve divisions to hold a 34 mi (55 km) front from Arras northwards to Armentières on the Lys river. During the period needed to prepare the offensive at Ypres after the Battle of Messines (7–14 June), threats to Lens and Lille were planned for the end of June. The First Army was to operate on a three-corps front, in which XIII Corps was to advance 200–500 yd (180–460 m) between Gavrelle and Oppy on a 2,300 yd (2,100 m) front, while to the north the Canadian Corps and I Corps was to attack on both banks of the Souchez river towards Avion.
Experience of the 1st Army in the Somme Battles, (Erfahrungen der I Armee in der Sommeschlacht) was published by Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, the supreme command of the German armies) on 30 January 1917. During the Battle of the Somme in 1916, Colonel Fritz von Loßberg (Chief of Staff of the 1st Army) had been able to establish a line of "relief" divisions (Ablösungsdivisionen), with the reinforcements from Verdun which had begun to arrive in September. In his analysis of the battle, Loßberg opposed the granting of discretion to front trench garrisons to retire, as he believed that manoeuvre did not allow the garrisons to evade Allied artillery fire, which could blanket the forward area, making evasion futile and also invite Allied troops to occupy vacated areas unopposed. Loßberg considered that spontaneous withdrawals would disrupt the counter-attack reserves as they deployed and further deprive battalion and division commanders of the ability to conduct an organised defence, which the dispersal of infantry over a wider area had already made difficult. Loßberg and others had severe doubts as to the ability of relief divisions to reach the battlefield in time to conduct an immediate counter-attack (Gegenstoß) from behind the battle zone. Loßberg wanted the Somme practice of fighting in the front line to be retained and authority devolved no further than the battalion, to maintain organisational coherence, in anticipation of a methodical counter-attack (Gegenangriff) by the relief divisions after 24–48 hours. Erich Ludendorff, the Generalquartiermeister (First Quartermaster General) of the German armies was sufficiently impressed by the Loßberg memorandum to add it to the new Manual of Infantry Training for War.
The British training manual Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action (SS 143) of February 1917, marked the end of attacks made by lines of infantry with a few detached specialists. The platoon was divided into a small headquarters and four sections, one with two trained grenade-throwers and assistants, the second with a Lewis gunner and nine assistants, carrying 30 drums of ammunition, the third section comprising a sniper, scout and nine riflemen and a fourth section of nine men with four rifle-grenade launchers. The rifle and hand-grenade sections were to advance in front of the Lewis-gun and rifle-grenade sections, in two waves or in artillery formation, which covered an area 100 yd (91 m) wide and 50 yd (46 m) deep, with the four sections in a diamond pattern, the rifle section ahead, rifle grenade and bombing sections to the sides and the Lewis gun section behind, until resistance was met. German defenders were to be suppressed by fire from the Lewis-gun and rifle-grenade sections, while the riflemen and hand-grenade sections moved forward, preferably by infiltrating round the flanks to overwhelm the defenders from the rear.
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Capture of Oppy Wood
The Capture of Oppy Wood was an engagement on the Western Front during the First World War on 28 June 1917. The Battle of Arras of 1917 ended with the Germans in possession of a fortified wood to the west of the village of Oppy, which overlooked British positions. The wood was 1 acre (0.4 ha) in area and contained many German observation posts, machine-gun nests and trench mortars. New German defensive tactics adopted after the Battle of the Somme of defence in depth and rapid counter-attack, had been enforced on the German 6th Army after the disaster of 9 April, the first day of the Battle of Arras.
The British attack of the Third Battle of the Scarpe (3–4 May), was defeated everywhere bar Fresnoy, which was captured by the 1st Canadian Division. The attack on Oppy Wood by the 92nd Brigade of the 31st Division, was a costly failure. The area was defended by the 1st Guard Reserve Division and the 15th Reserve Division, which did not need the support of specialist Eingreif (counter-attack) divisions.
A second attack took place on 28 June, as part of a series of feints, intended to simulate a threat to the cities of Lens in the First Army area and Lille in the Second Army area. The attack was conducted by the 15th Brigade, 5th Division and the 94th Brigade, 31st Division, which advanced on a front extending from Gavrelle in the south to the north of Oppy Wood. After a hurricane bombardment, the objectives were captured with few British losses and German counter-attacks were defeated by artillery-fire.
An attack at the same time by the 4th Canadian Division and the 46th (North Midland) Division, astride the Souchez river, also succeeded. Operations to continue the encirclement of Lens by an attack by the Canadian Corps on Hill 70 to the north were postponed until August due to a shortage of artillery. The feint attacks failed to divert German attention from Flanders, which included the transfer of ten divisions to the 4th Army, despite claims by the 6th Army command that the British were preparing an offensive towards Lens; the operations did divert German attention from the French front further south.
Before the Third Battle of the Scarpe, the cancellation of the French part in the Nivelle Offensive seemed certain. A continuation of British attacks towards Cambrai would be pointless in the absence of French operations to the south and Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig decided to continue operations on the Arras front to reach a good defensive line, then to conduct surprise attacks to keep German troops in the area. Preparations were made to begin operations in Flanders, with the attack at Messines to begin in early June. Despite uncertainty about the French attack on the Aisne, which was due from 4 to 5 May, a plan for an attack by the British Fifth Army, Third Army and the First Army on a 14 mi (23 km) front, went ahead and the First Army objectives were given as Oppy and Fresnoy.
The move of the bulk of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to Flanders in late May and June, left the First Army with twelve divisions to hold a 34 mi (55 km) front from Arras northwards to Armentières on the Lys river. During the period needed to prepare the offensive at Ypres after the Battle of Messines (7–14 June), threats to Lens and Lille were planned for the end of June. The First Army was to operate on a three-corps front, in which XIII Corps was to advance 200–500 yd (180–460 m) between Gavrelle and Oppy on a 2,300 yd (2,100 m) front, while to the north the Canadian Corps and I Corps was to attack on both banks of the Souchez river towards Avion.
Experience of the 1st Army in the Somme Battles, (Erfahrungen der I Armee in der Sommeschlacht) was published by Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL, the supreme command of the German armies) on 30 January 1917. During the Battle of the Somme in 1916, Colonel Fritz von Loßberg (Chief of Staff of the 1st Army) had been able to establish a line of "relief" divisions (Ablösungsdivisionen), with the reinforcements from Verdun which had begun to arrive in September. In his analysis of the battle, Loßberg opposed the granting of discretion to front trench garrisons to retire, as he believed that manoeuvre did not allow the garrisons to evade Allied artillery fire, which could blanket the forward area, making evasion futile and also invite Allied troops to occupy vacated areas unopposed. Loßberg considered that spontaneous withdrawals would disrupt the counter-attack reserves as they deployed and further deprive battalion and division commanders of the ability to conduct an organised defence, which the dispersal of infantry over a wider area had already made difficult. Loßberg and others had severe doubts as to the ability of relief divisions to reach the battlefield in time to conduct an immediate counter-attack (Gegenstoß) from behind the battle zone. Loßberg wanted the Somme practice of fighting in the front line to be retained and authority devolved no further than the battalion, to maintain organisational coherence, in anticipation of a methodical counter-attack (Gegenangriff) by the relief divisions after 24–48 hours. Erich Ludendorff, the Generalquartiermeister (First Quartermaster General) of the German armies was sufficiently impressed by the Loßberg memorandum to add it to the new Manual of Infantry Training for War.
The British training manual Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action (SS 143) of February 1917, marked the end of attacks made by lines of infantry with a few detached specialists. The platoon was divided into a small headquarters and four sections, one with two trained grenade-throwers and assistants, the second with a Lewis gunner and nine assistants, carrying 30 drums of ammunition, the third section comprising a sniper, scout and nine riflemen and a fourth section of nine men with four rifle-grenade launchers. The rifle and hand-grenade sections were to advance in front of the Lewis-gun and rifle-grenade sections, in two waves or in artillery formation, which covered an area 100 yd (91 m) wide and 50 yd (46 m) deep, with the four sections in a diamond pattern, the rifle section ahead, rifle grenade and bombing sections to the sides and the Lewis gun section behind, until resistance was met. German defenders were to be suppressed by fire from the Lewis-gun and rifle-grenade sections, while the riflemen and hand-grenade sections moved forward, preferably by infiltrating round the flanks to overwhelm the defenders from the rear.