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Hoverspeed
Hoverspeed was a ferry company that operated on the English Channel from 1981 until 2005. It was formed in 1981 by the merger of Seaspeed and Hoverlloyd. Its last owners were Sea Containers; the company ran a small fleet of two high-speed SeaCat catamaran ferries in its final year.
Hoverspeed played a part in developing the hovercraft, and ran six SR.N4 Mountbatten class hovercraft and one SEDAM N500 Naviplane. Hoverspeed last operated hovercraft on its Dover to Calais service. They were withdrawn on 1 October 2000 and Hoverspeed continued to use Seacat catamarans built by Incat.
During the early 1970s, when both Hoverlloyd and Seaspeed were struggling to return a profit, the two operators had been in negotiations on a partnership to amalgamate operations. However, management at Hoverlloyd was not convinced the UK government would sanction any form of arrangement between Seaspeed and a foreign company. The situation was exacerbated when discussions became public knowledge and plans for a consortium were quickly abandoned.
In late 1981, when the two companies eventually merged, the situation was dire. Despite a valuation at £110 million, combined losses were £8 million with ticket prices 25 to 30% higher than the ferries. Under the terms of the merger, Hoverspeed was also under obligation to accept the two French hovercraft in exchange for a 10% participation in share capital by French state-owned SNCF. The new company was spearheaded by Gerry Draper, new Chief Executive and a former marketing director at British Airways. Draper had been involved in filling empty passenger seats aboard the new Boeing 747 jumbo jets in the early 1970s when IATA regulations prohibited discounting. He was also successful in turning Concorde services profitable.
Nevertheless, a number of early decisions plagued the new company. First, Hoverspeed inherited an antiquated reservation system which was inadequate, resulting in potential travellers having great difficulty in contacting Hoverspeed and many being told crossings were fully booked when they were not. This necessitated the reversion to a very basic manual reservation system to try to cope with demand. In 1982, loss income was estimated at between £3 million and £4 million. Second, excess capacity drove profit margins down. The most damaging mistake was to increase the number of crossings operated, over 10,000 in 1982, which did not match demand and the decision to briefly re-open the Ramsgate route for the summer season which was counter-productive. Third, parity pricing continued with ferry operators, even during peak season. This was a source of concern since 70% of the turnover (and traffic) was generated during the summer season between mid-June and mid-September.
Despite carrying 2.5 million passengers and 400,000 vehicles, a 21% market share, with 35% fewer flights and 250 staff made redundant, the new entity continued to register losses with £5.5 million for the year 1982, £3.5 million in 1983. The new French hovercraft, the N500, achieved only 60% reliability and did not meet ride comfort or control standards. It was eventually broken up for spares and scraps. The SR.N4 craft, moreover, could not accommodate the recently introduced double-deck and one-and-a-half deck coaches and this part of the market was lost. By 1984, the company was near collapse.
In February 1984, the UK government refused to provide further guaranteed loans, British Rail sold its 50% ownership which it had retained in the company (and its losses) for a nominal sum of £1 to a syndicate consortium of 5 directors. Thus, Hoverspeed was effectively given away to its own management and was wholly owned within the private sector backed by merchant bank Kleinwort Benson providing guarantees and underwriting the cash needed to operate via NatWest.
The company immediately adopted premium instead of parity pricing, justified on the grounds that a faster service was expected to be more expensive. An aggressive advertising campaign was mounted against the ferries and more effort was made to target fares accurately. For 1984, the company made a loss of £621,000. Its performance went up with a pre-tax profit of £194,000 for 1985 with an increase in US passengers. This figure rose to £625,000 in 1986.
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Hoverspeed
Hoverspeed was a ferry company that operated on the English Channel from 1981 until 2005. It was formed in 1981 by the merger of Seaspeed and Hoverlloyd. Its last owners were Sea Containers; the company ran a small fleet of two high-speed SeaCat catamaran ferries in its final year.
Hoverspeed played a part in developing the hovercraft, and ran six SR.N4 Mountbatten class hovercraft and one SEDAM N500 Naviplane. Hoverspeed last operated hovercraft on its Dover to Calais service. They were withdrawn on 1 October 2000 and Hoverspeed continued to use Seacat catamarans built by Incat.
During the early 1970s, when both Hoverlloyd and Seaspeed were struggling to return a profit, the two operators had been in negotiations on a partnership to amalgamate operations. However, management at Hoverlloyd was not convinced the UK government would sanction any form of arrangement between Seaspeed and a foreign company. The situation was exacerbated when discussions became public knowledge and plans for a consortium were quickly abandoned.
In late 1981, when the two companies eventually merged, the situation was dire. Despite a valuation at £110 million, combined losses were £8 million with ticket prices 25 to 30% higher than the ferries. Under the terms of the merger, Hoverspeed was also under obligation to accept the two French hovercraft in exchange for a 10% participation in share capital by French state-owned SNCF. The new company was spearheaded by Gerry Draper, new Chief Executive and a former marketing director at British Airways. Draper had been involved in filling empty passenger seats aboard the new Boeing 747 jumbo jets in the early 1970s when IATA regulations prohibited discounting. He was also successful in turning Concorde services profitable.
Nevertheless, a number of early decisions plagued the new company. First, Hoverspeed inherited an antiquated reservation system which was inadequate, resulting in potential travellers having great difficulty in contacting Hoverspeed and many being told crossings were fully booked when they were not. This necessitated the reversion to a very basic manual reservation system to try to cope with demand. In 1982, loss income was estimated at between £3 million and £4 million. Second, excess capacity drove profit margins down. The most damaging mistake was to increase the number of crossings operated, over 10,000 in 1982, which did not match demand and the decision to briefly re-open the Ramsgate route for the summer season which was counter-productive. Third, parity pricing continued with ferry operators, even during peak season. This was a source of concern since 70% of the turnover (and traffic) was generated during the summer season between mid-June and mid-September.
Despite carrying 2.5 million passengers and 400,000 vehicles, a 21% market share, with 35% fewer flights and 250 staff made redundant, the new entity continued to register losses with £5.5 million for the year 1982, £3.5 million in 1983. The new French hovercraft, the N500, achieved only 60% reliability and did not meet ride comfort or control standards. It was eventually broken up for spares and scraps. The SR.N4 craft, moreover, could not accommodate the recently introduced double-deck and one-and-a-half deck coaches and this part of the market was lost. By 1984, the company was near collapse.
In February 1984, the UK government refused to provide further guaranteed loans, British Rail sold its 50% ownership which it had retained in the company (and its losses) for a nominal sum of £1 to a syndicate consortium of 5 directors. Thus, Hoverspeed was effectively given away to its own management and was wholly owned within the private sector backed by merchant bank Kleinwort Benson providing guarantees and underwriting the cash needed to operate via NatWest.
The company immediately adopted premium instead of parity pricing, justified on the grounds that a faster service was expected to be more expensive. An aggressive advertising campaign was mounted against the ferries and more effort was made to target fares accurately. For 1984, the company made a loss of £621,000. Its performance went up with a pre-tax profit of £194,000 for 1985 with an increase in US passengers. This figure rose to £625,000 in 1986.