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Operation Tonga
Operation Tonga
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Operation Tonga
Part of the Normandy landings

British pathfinders of the 22nd Independent Parachute Company synchronising their watches in front of an Armstrong Whitworth Albemarle
Date5–7 June 1944
Location
Caen, Normandy, France
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
 Germany
Commanders and leaders
United Kingdom Richard Nelson Gale
Strength
8,500 men[1] Approx 16,000[2]
Casualties and losses
800 dead and wounded[3]
  • estimated 400 dead
  • estimated 400 captured

Operation Tonga was the codename given to the airborne operation undertaken by the British 6th Airborne Division between 5 June and 7 June 1944 as a part of Operation Overlord and the D-Day landings during the Second World War.

The paratroopers and glider-borne airborne troops of the division, commanded by Major-General Richard Nelson Gale, landed on the eastern flank of the invasion area, near to the city of Caen, tasked with a number of objectives. The division was to capture two strategically important bridges over the Caen Canal and Orne River which were to be used by Allied ground forces to advance once the seaborne landings had taken place, destroy several other bridges to deny their use to the Germans and secure several important villages. The division was also assigned the task of assaulting and destroying the Merville Gun Battery, an artillery battery that Allied intelligence believed housed a number of heavy artillery pieces, which could bombard the nearest invasion beach (codenamed Sword) and possibly inflict heavy casualties on the Allied troops landing on it. Having achieved these objectives, the division was then to create and secure a bridgehead focused around the captured bridges until they linked up with advancing Allied ground forces.

The division suffered from a combination of bad weather and poor pilot navigation, which caused many of the airborne troops to be dropped inaccurately throughout the divisional operational area causing a number of casualties and making conducting operations much more difficult. In particular, the 9th Parachute Battalion, which was assigned the task of destroying the Merville artillery battery, was only able to gather up a fraction of its strength before it had to attack the battery, with the result that the depleted force suffered heavy casualties. However, the battery was successfully assaulted and the guns inside it disabled. The division's other objectives were also achieved despite the problems encountered.

A small force of glider-borne troops, from the 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, secured two bridges over the Caen Canal and River Orne in a coup de main operation. The other bridges were destroyed by the division, and a number of villages were occupied. A bridgehead was formed by the division, and it successfully repulsed a number of German counter-attacks until Allied ground forces from the invasion beaches reached its positions. The actions of the division severely limited the ability of the German defenders to communicate and organise themselves, ensuring that the seaborne troops could not be attacked during the vital first few hours after landing when they were most vulnerable.

Background

[edit]
Lieutenant-General Frederick E. Morgan, the original planner of Operation Overlord.

Operation Tonga originated in the planning of Operation Overlord, the Allied plan for the eventual invasion and liberation of German-occupied France. Invasion planning begun in May 1943, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met during the Washington Conference.[4] The two Allied leaders decided that all available Allied forces should be concentrated in the United Kingdom, and that planning for the invasion of North-Western Europe should begin. A provisional target date of May 1944 was set with the code-name 'Overlord' decided upon. A joint Anglo-American planning staff was created under lieutenant-general Frederick E. Morgan, who was given the title of Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC).[4]

Early drafts of Overlord called for the commitment of airborne forces to support the ground forces and protect their landing areas. Operation Skyscraper, for example, called for the deployment of two airborne divisions to support the beach landings that would be made by five infantry divisions. One airborne division would land near Caen, and another on the east coast of the Cotentin Peninsula.[5] "Plan C", an ambitious proposal put forward by General George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, would have involved a large airborne drop on the River Seine, aiming to cut the German forces in half during D-Day itself.[6][7] Morgan and his staff finally decided that the invasion should take place along a thirty-mile front from the River Orne westwards.[8] The final plan would utilise three divisions in the first assault, with airborne forces being dropped onto the town of Caen early on the first day to seize the first breakout route.[9]

Following the appointment of General Sir Bernard Montgomery to the command of the 21st Army Group and overall command of all ground forces to land in Normandy, the plan underwent a number of further revisions. On 21 January 1944, a revised Overlord plan was presented to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had been chosen as the Supreme Allied Commander for the invasion. Montgomery's revised plan widened the landing area to include all of the coastline between the River Orne and the eastern coast of the Cotentin Peninsula; five divisions would land on the beaches, and supported by three airborne divisions to land on either side of the landing areas to secure their flanks and protect the landing troops from counterattack. The British airborne forces were assigned to the eastern flank, and the American airborne forces the west.[10]

Prelude

[edit]

British preparation

[edit]

The 6th Airborne Division, which was under the command of Major-General Richard Gale, was chosen to conduct the airborne operations on the eastern flank of the invasion area.[11] The division was new, having been activated in April 1943, and Operation Overlord would be its first experience of combat.[12] The division was the first to be established for the sole purpose of undertaking division-level airborne operations rather than contributing to a range of smaller operations, and there was considerable debate over what the unit should do.[13]

Major-General Richard Gale, commanding the 6th Airborne Division, addresses his men (4–5 June 1944)

As late as January 1944, Gale noted that he had "no indication as yet of a definite airborne task" for his unit and continued to keep all options open,[14] reflecting the ongoing discussions at the strategic level over the wider plan for D-Day. On 17 February 1944, Major-General Frederick Arthur Montague Browning (commander of all British airborne forces) arrived at the 6th Airborne Division's headquarters to brief Gale on what the division was expected to achieve during the invasion; their role codenamed Operation Tonga.[11]

The original plan for Tonga did not involve the entire division, instead only called for a single parachute brigade and an anti-tank battery to be attached to the British 3rd Infantry Division. This force would be tasked with seizing bridges over the Caen Canal and the River Orne near the towns of Bénouville and Ranville.[15] Gale objected to this small-scale operation, arguing that a single brigade would not be able to achieve these objectives with such limited manpower, and asked for the entire division to be deployed. After consultation with his superiors, Browning agreed to the request and ordered Gale to begin planning for the operation.[16]

The division was allotted three specific tasks to achieve as a part of Tonga, apart from protecting the eastern flank of the Allied seaborne landings and taking control of the areas of strategic importance to the east of Caen. First, it was to capture intact the two bridges over the Caen Canal and the Orne River at Bénouville and Ranville. The bridges then would be defended against counterattacks. Gale knew that the capture of the bridges would be critical for the resupply and reinforcement of his division, but he did not know that the bridges were incapable of supporting tanks. Second, the division was to destroy the heavily fortified Merville coastal artillery battery located at Franceville Plage, to ensure that it could not shell the British forces landing in the area codenamed Sword. The third mission was to destroy several bridges which spanned the River Dives, located near the towns of Varaville, Robehomme, Bures and Troarn. The division would then hold the territory that it had seized, until it could be relieved by advancing British ground forces.[16]

Men of 22nd Independent Parachute Company being briefed, in preparation for Tonga

Detailed planning for Tonga began in February, starting with the number of transport aircraft assigned to the operation being expanded rapidly to accommodate the entire division. Two Royal Air Force (RAF) air groups were provided for the operation to ensure that the division could be deployed in just two airlifts. The pilots and crew of these transport aircraft then began formation flying training and specialised aircrew training to ensure that they were as familiar with what the operation required of them.[17] The 6th Airborne Division carried out several large-scale airborne exercises, using them to find the most efficient way to deploy a brigade group on one or multiple landing-zones.[18]

On 6 February, the 3rd Parachute Brigade undertook an exercise in which the entire brigade was dropped by 98 transport aircraft. At the end of March, 284 aircraft were used in Exercise 'Bizz II' in which the entire division was deployed by parachute or glider. Between 21 April and 26 April, Exercise 'Mush' utilised approximately 700 aircraft to deploy the British 1st Airborne Division and the Polish 1st Parachute Brigade against the 6th Airborne Division, who moved by road, in a simulation of a full-scale airborne operation.[18]

As the date of the operation approached, training became more intensive. Glider units spent hours aloft every day circling over airfields as they practiced the manoeuvers required to land the airborne forces next to the bridges over the Orne River, the Caen canal, the Dives, and the Merville battery. Once the pilots had practiced this sufficiently during the day, they were then switched to night operations. In the landing grounds used by the division for their operations, dozens of poles similar to those in Normandy were erected, with engineering units then timed on how fast they could demolish the obstacles.[18]

The battalion assigned to neutralising Merville spent two weeks at a special camp, where they built a replica of the battery and carried out several rehearsal exercises in and around it. The force assigned to the coup-de-main operation, to capture the bridges over the Orne River and Caen canal, were transferred to Exeter. There, they conducted intensive exercises around the River Exe and the nearby canal that stood in place for their real objective.[19]

The pilots of the gliders and transport aircraft were also constantly briefed with thousands of maps and photographs of the landing zones and the surrounding areas, as well as dozens of scale models of the zones and the primary objectives, such as the bridges and the Merville battery. A coloured film was produced from aerial reconnaissance photographs which, when played at the correct speed and height over the scale models, realistically simulated the paths the glider pilots would take towards their landing-zones.[20]

German preparation

[edit]
An example of Rommel's asparagus, an obstacle aimed at damaging gliders and injuring the occupants

The 6th Airborne Division would be opposed by German Army (Heer) formations stationed in the area around Caen and the River Orne. By June 1944, this consisted of the 711th and 716th Infantry Divisions; both of which were static formations whose manpower consisted of medically downgraded troops and conscripts recruited from the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe.[11] Both divisions also had a miscellaneous collection of anti-tank guns and artillery pieces, as well as a small number of German and French tanks and self-propelled guns.[21]

Neither division was rated as being highly efficient, with Allied intelligence rating them at a forty per-cent efficiency compared to a first-class line infantry division in a static role, and fifteen per cent in a counter-attack role. Allied intelligence also indicated that two companies of armour were in the area, as were a number of ad hoc infantry formations formed from training establishments.[21] Based near Caen, in support of the static divisions, was the 21st Panzer Division. The 125th Panzergrenadier Regiment was billeted at Vimont, just east of Caen, and the 2nd Battalion, 192nd Panzergrenadier Regiment was based at Cairon to the west of the Caen canal and the River Orne bridges.[22][23][24]

Although a new formation equipped with an assortment of older tanks and other armoured vehicles, the core of the division were Afrika Korps veterans. [25] Further afield was the Panzer Lehr Division, based at Chartres, which was less than a day's march from the area.[26] Also considered a threat to the airborne forces was the Waffen SS 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, based at Lisieux and believed capable of arriving in the vicinity of the airborne landings within twelve hours. The division possessed a large number of tanks and self-propelled guns, including the Panther.[21][26]

Under the orders of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, German forces had constructed a large number of static defensive positions and obstacles. Rommel had been appointed Inspector General of Coastal Defences and commander of Army Group B, in November 1943, by order of Adolf Hitler. On his arrival he had assessed the existing defences in the region and immediately began the process of improving them, particularly those situated inland as he believed no more than thirty per cent of the German defences were adequate.[27] These anti-airborne measures consisted of planting a large number of mines to create minefields, as well as the erection of so-called Rommel's asparagus; a system of wire-braced poles up to two metres in height, a great many of which were laced with mines or other booby-traps aimed at destroying gliders and killing or wounding airborne troops.[28]

Rommel noted in his diary, following an inspection of one area, that a division had placed over 300,000 stakes in the ground to deter airborne landings, and a corps had erected over 900,000.[29] The Merville artillery battery was a particularly heavily fortified position. From the beach, it was protected by two strongpoints that included approximately thirty bunkers as well as an observation post, and the battery itself consisted of a bunker containing the battery's command post, two blockhouses, a light flak emplacement and four casemates able to contain artillery pieces up to dimensions of 150 mm. The entire battery covered an area roughly four hundred metres in diameter and was surrounded by an inner perimeter of barbed wire, a minefield, and an outer perimeter of barbed wire as well as an anti-tank ditch.[30]

Battle

[edit]

Fly-in

[edit]
Handley Page Halifax glider-tugs along with Horsa and Hamilcar gliders waiting RAF Tarrant Rushton to take off for Normandy

Operation Tonga began at 22:56 on the night of 5 June, when six Handley Page Halifax heavy bombers took off from RAF Tarrant Rushton towing six Horsa gliders carrying the coup-de-main force; this consisted of D Company, 2nd Battalion Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (part of the 6th Airlanding Brigade, but attached to the 5th Parachute Brigade for the initial invasion) reinforced with two extra platoons from B Company and a party of Royal Engineer sappers under the overall command of Major John Howard, who were tasked with capturing the bridges over the Caen Canal and the River Orne.[31]

A few minutes later, between 23:00 and 23:20, six Armstrong Whitworth Albemarle transports took off carrying pathfinders of the 22nd Independent Parachute Company, who were to mark the three drop-zones to be used by the airborne troops of the division.[32] Another sixteen Albemarles followed the transports carrying the pathfinders, these transported elements of the 9th Parachute Battalion, 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion, and 3rd Parachute Brigade Headquarters.[33]

Thirty minutes later, the remainder of the transports carrying the division began to take off. This wave was divided into three groups. The first consisted of 239 Douglas Dakota and Short Stirling transports as well as seventeen Horsa gliders, carrying the bulk of the 3rd and 5th Parachute Brigades and their heavy equipment. These forces were due to land in their respective drop-zones at 00:50. The second group was destined to land at 03:20, and consisted of sixty-five Horsa and four Hamilcar gliders transporting the divisional headquarters and an anti-tank battery. The final group was formed of three Horsa gliders carrying sappers and men from the 9th Parachute Battalion, who were to land atop Merville Battery at 04:30.[33]

Capture of the Caen canal and Orne river bridges

[edit]
The Caen Canal Bridge, June 1944; it was renamed Pegasus Bridge, after the mythical winged horse utilized as the formation sign of the British airborne forces[34]

The first unit of the 6th Airborne Division to land in Normandy, was Howard's coup-de-main force.[35] The coup-de-main force landed in six gliders, over a five-minute period (00:15–00:20); three landing near the Caen canal bridge and two near the Orne River bridge and the third destined for the Orne River bridge some seven miles away due to a navigational error.[36][37] Once on the ground, the troops emerged and assaulted the German positions. At the Caen canal bridge, troops assaulted German trench positions, attacked sentries, and threw grenades into a concrete bunker believed to hold the triggering equipment for the bridge demolition charges.[38]

At the Orne River bridge, a machine-gun nest was suppressed with mortar fire but no other defenders were found, and the two platoons captured the bridge before radioing Howard and informing him of their success. Both bridges had been secured within fifteen minutes, at the cost of only a small number of casualties.[39] It was also discovered that the bridges had not been rigged with explosives as believed.[38]

While the force waited for the rest of the division to land, and for the 7th Parachute Battalion to arrive to reinforce their position, they had to repel several spontaneous attempts by the Germans to re-take the bridges. At 01:30, two German tanks attempted to drive onto the bridge, but were repelled with the loss of one tank to a PIAT anti-tank weapon.[40]

Pathfinders

[edit]

The coup-de-main force had been followed closely by the pathfinders of the 22nd Independent Parachute Company, tasked with marking out the drop-zones and landing-zones to be used by the rest of the division. However, due to a combination of heavy cloud cover and poor navigation, only one pathfinder team was dropped correctly. The aircraft carrying the remainder had to make between two and three runs over their respective drop-zones before their teams jumped.[41] Pathfinders assigned to DZ N were dropped wide, and did not manage to get to the drop-zone for thirty minutes.[42]

One of the teams assigned to DZ K accidentally dropped onto DZ N without realising their error, and set up radio beacons and markers that caused a number of airborne troops to drop in the wrong area. The Pathfinders 'stick' on DZ K commanded by Lt Bob Midwood were successful. A pathfinder team belonging to 9th Parachute Battalion, assigned to mark out the drop-zone area for the unit tasked with destroying the Merville artillery battery, was all but wiped out when an air-raid by RAF Avro Lancaster heavy bombers missed the artillery battery itself and bombed the area the team was in.[42]

5th Parachute Brigade

[edit]

Due to the above factors, Brigadier Nigel Poett's 5th Parachute Brigade was scattered and dropped incorrectly. The constituent units of 7th Parachute Battalion were so badly scattered that, by 03:00, the battalion's commander could only command around 40 per cent of the battalion, although more men arrived throughout the night and day. Relatively few supply containers had been found by the airborne troops, meaning that they possessed few heavy weapons or radio sets.[43] However, the 7th Battalion managed to rendezvous with 2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, and establish a defence against German counter-attacks. The first organised German responses to the capture of the bridges came between 05:00 and 07:00, and consisted of isolated and often uncoordinated attacks by tanks, armoured cars, and infantry that grew in intensity throughout the day.[44][45] At 10:00, the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) attempted to destroy the Caen bridge. A lone aircraft dropped a 1,000 lb (450 kg) bomb, which failed to detonate. Furthermore, two German coastal craft attempted to attack the bridge and were repelled.[44][46]

As the day progressed, the 2nd Battalion, 192nd Panzergrenadier Regiment counterattacked in the Bénouville area in an attempt to get through to the bridges. The coup-de-main force and the 7th Parachute Battalion held their position, knocking out 13 of the 17 tanks trying to get through. The British troops moved forward into Bénouville and cleared the Germans in house to house fighting. By midday, most of the missing men from the 7th Parachute Battalion had arrived at the bridges.[24] Despite the ferocity of the attacks, the battalion and the coup-de-main force were able to hold the bridges until 19:00, when the leading elements of the British 3rd Infantry Division arrived and began to relieve the airborne troops, a process that was completed around 01:00 7 June.[44]

Paratroopers guarding a road junction near Ranville

The brigade's other two battalions, the 12th and 13th, were also badly scattered when they were dropped at 00:50. When both units moved away from their rendezvous points neither had more than sixty per cent of their strength, although individual airborne troops and small groups would join the battalions throughout the day.[47] Both of the battalions had been tasked with securing the area around DZ N and the two bridges captured by the coup-de-main force, a task which was made much more difficult by being scattered throughout the area. The 12th Parachute Battalion's mission was to secure the village of Le Bas de Ranville, which it did so by 04:00. The 13th Parachute Battalion was to capture the town of Ranville, which it achieved around the same time albeit against heavier resistance than that encountered by the other battalion.[48]

One company from 13th Parachute Battalion was detailed to remain at the battalion drop-zone in order to provide protection for a company of sappers. The latter were to demolish the poles and explosives that were present in the area, so that the 6th Airborne Division headquarters could land safely.[49] The two battalions held their respective areas until relieved by ground forces advancing from the beaches. The 12th Parachute Battalion was bombarded with heavy mortar and artillery fire, and repelled two German counter-attacks by the 125th Panzer Grenadier Regiment; the first was defeated after destroying a tank and taking a number of prisoners, and the second was repulsed with the help of an air-landed anti-tank battery which had recently arrived.[50]

3rd Parachute Brigade

[edit]

The 3rd Parachute Brigade (Brigadier James Hill) began to land at the same time as the main elements of 5th Parachute Brigade, and suffered from the same problems. All of its constituent units were scattered throughout the area due to poor navigation, heavy cloud cover, and several of the drop-zones either not being marked correctly or marked correctly but incorrectly positioned due to pathfinder error.[51]

The 8th Parachute Battalion, tasked with destroying two bridges near Bures and a third by Troarn, was widely scattered with a number of its paratroopers landing in the operational area of 5th Parachute Brigade.[52] When the commanding officer, Alastair Pearson, arrived at the battalion rendezvous point at 01:20, he found only thirty paratroopers and a small group of sappers with a Jeep and trailer. By 03:30, this number had increased to just over 140 paratroopers yet there were still no sign of the sappers who would be required to demolish the bridges.[53]

Pearson therefore decided to send a small force to demolish the bridges at Bures, and lead the rest of the battalion to a crossroad north of Troarn where it would await more reinforcements before it attacked. The force sent to Bures discovered that the two bridges had already been demolished by a group of sappers, who had reached the bridges a few hours earlier, and so rejoined the battalion near Troarn that had now increased in numbers after another fifty men had arrived.[53] A reconnaissance party, and a party of sappers, was sent into Troarn to ascertain the status of the bridge. These troops came under fire, from a German-occupied house near the bridge.[54]

After a brief fire-fight, the paratroopers captured a number of Germans from the 21st Panzer Division. The airborne troops then made their way to the bridge, which they discovered had been partially demolished already. Once the sappers had widened the length of the bridge demolished, using their explosives, the reconnaissance force withdrew back to the rest of the battalion at the crossroad.[54] Having achieved its objective, the battalion then moved north and took up positions near Le Mesnil to widen the airborne bridgehead formed by the division.[52]

3rd Parachute Brigade paratroopers

The 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion was allotted, as its primary task, the demolition of two bridges: one at Varaville and another at Robehomme.[52] Much like the rest of the units in the division, the battalion was scattered throughout the operational area. One group of paratroopers landed 10 miles (16 km) away from their drop-zone, and another landed only a short distance from the invasion beaches. A number were dropped in flooded areas around Varaville, and several drowned when they were dragged under the surface of the water due to the weight of their equipment.[54]

A group of paratroopers moved towards the Robehomme bridge, encountering and gathering together several other groups of airborne troops and sappers en route, before reaching the bridge where they discovered it was still intact. By 03:00, the sappers tasked with the demolition of the bridge had failed to arrive, and so the paratroopers gathered together the small amount of explosives they possessed and set them off, weakening the bridge. The sappers finally arrived at 06:00, and completed the demolition of the bridge whilst the paratroopers protected them.[41]

Meanwhile, another company of the battalion had been attempting to complete the tasks it had been ordered to fulfill; it was to clear the enemy garrison from Varaville and destroy a gun emplacement, demolish a bridge over the River Divette, and also destroy a radio transmitter near Varaville. However, the company was severely understrength, with only a fraction of its 100 men available.[55]

A small group, led by the company commander, assaulted the fortifications outside Varaville that were manned by approximately ninety-six Germans supported by several machine-gun nests and an artillery piece. The artillery piece inflicted a number of casualties on the small Canadian force, killing the company commander, and a stalemate ensued until 10:00 when the enemy garrison surrendered after being subjected to mortar bombardment. The paratroopers were then relieved by British Commandos from the 1st Special Service Brigade.[56]

Battle of Merville Gun Battery

[edit]
An aerial view of the Merville Gun Battery, after an air bombardment circa May 1944

The 3rd Parachute Brigade's 9th Parachute Battalion was assigned a number of objectives: the destruction of the Merville artillery battery, the capture of the village of Le Plein, block the roads leading to that village, and capture a German Navy (Kriegsmarine) headquarters at Sallenelles near the River Orne.[51] However, the battalion was scattered throughout the area with a number of paratroopers landing a considerable distance from the designated DZ. Lieutenant-Colonel Terence Otway, the commander of the battalion, landed with the rest of his stick 400 yards (370 m) away from the drop-zone in a farmhouse being used as a command post by a German battalion. After a brief fire-fight and helping other scattered paratroopers, Otway arrived at the drop-zone at 01:30.[57]

By 02:35, only 110 paratroopers had assembled with only a single machine-gun and a small number of Bangalore torpedoes recovered. This was a significant set-back for the battalion, as the plan to assault the artillery battery relied on having the entire battalion present with a number of sappers, as well as a large quantity of heavy equipment.[58] Under strict orders that the battery was to be destroyed no later than 05:30, Otway felt that he could no longer wait for any more men to arrive and set off for the battery with 150 paratroopers (following the arrival of another small group of stragglers at 02:45).[59]

The battalion arrived at the battery at 04:00. They linked up with the survivors of the pathfinder group, who had been earlier hit by an RAF raid against the battery, and began readying for an assault whilst the pathfinders marked out areas for the bangalore torpedoes to be placed.[58] The battalion was divided into four assault groups, one for each of the casemates of the battery, and was ready by 04:30, when the gliders carrying the sappers arrived over the battery.[60]

Of the three gliders assigned to the operation, only two arrived in Normandy; one having to abort and land in England. The remaining two were hit by anti-aircraft fire on their run-in. One landed around 2 miles (3.2 km) away, the other at the edge of the battery's minefield. The troops from this glider became involved in a fire fight with German troops heading to reinforce the battery garrison.[61][62] Otway launched the assault as soon as the first glider overshot the battery, ordering the explosives to be detonated to form two paths through the outer perimeter, through which the paratroopers attacked. The defenders were alerted by the explosions and opened fire, inflicting heavy casualties.[63]

Only four men assigned to assault Casemate Four survived long enough to reach it, which they disabled by firing into apertures and throwing grenades into air vents. The other casemates were cleared with fragmentation and white phosphorus grenades as the German crews had neglected to lock the doors leading into the battery.[63] A number of prisoners were taken by the paratroopers, and explosives were then readied to disable the artillery pieces inside the battery. It was discovered that the pieces were not modern 150 mm calibre weapons, but were instead Czechoslovak First World War-era 100 mm field howitzers.[62]

The paratroopers did the best with the explosives they had, using Gammon bombs to disable one gun and jamming shells into the muzzles of the others. However, the job was less than thorough as at least one gun went back into action when the Germans later re-occupied the battery.[63] Having completed the assault, the paratroopers gathered the German prisoners and their wounded and withdrew, having no wish to remain by the battery. The battalion possessed no radio and if no signal were received by the light cruiser HMS Arethusa, by 05:30, it would begin shelling the battery as a contingency.[64]

The paratroopers had achieved their primary objective, but at a heavy cost, with fifty dead and twenty-five wounded; a casualty rate of exactly fifty per cent. The battalion then attacked Le Plein, securing the village by expelling the platoon-sized German garrison.[64] The survivors retired to a planned rendezvous point at 05:30, the battalion too understrength to achieve its other objectives.[63]

Divisional HQ, Operation Mallard, and days end

[edit]
Horsa gliders near Landing Zone N

At 03:35, the 6th Airborne Division headquarters landed by glider in the landing-zone cleared by sappers. Only a few gliders missed the landing-zone, due to the poor weather and errors in navigation. Once the headquarters staff and accompanying airborne troops had been gathered together, the headquarters was moved to the Le Bas de Ranville area and set up there. Contact was established with the headquarters of 5th Parachute Brigade at 05:00, and with the headquarters of 3rd Parachute Brigade at 12:35, and the division linked up with 1st Special Service Brigade as it advanced from the invasion beaches at 13:53.[52]

At 21:00, Operation Mallard began. Mallard was the final wave of the 6th Airborne Division's landings and consisted of 220 Horsa and Hamilcar gliders, carrying the 6th Airlanding Brigade and other units. The gliders arrived at their landing-zone, coming under heavy small-arms and mortar fire from nearby German positions as they landed. Casualties were light and within ninety minutes the glider-borne troops had gathered at their rendezvous points.[33][65] By 00:00 7 June, the entire 6th Airborne Division had been fully deployed on the eastern flank of the invasion beaches (with the exception of 12th Battalion, Devonshire Regiment – part of 6th Airlanding Brigade – that was due to arrive by sea on 7 June).

Hamilcar gliders of 6th Airlanding Brigade arrive on DZ 'N', bringing the division's Tetrarch tanks

The division ended the day with the 3rd Parachute Brigade holding a 4 miles (6.4 km) front, with 9th Parachute Battalion at Le Plein, 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion at Le Mesnil, and the 8th Parachute Battalion in the southern part of the Bois de Bavent. The 5th Parachute Brigade had the 12th Parachute Battalion occupying Le Bas de Ranville, and the 13th Parachute Battalion holding Ranville while the 7th Parachute Battalion had been moved into reserve. The 6th Airlanding Brigade was poised to commit its two battalions to extend the bridgehead. The 1st Special Service Brigade, which had temporarily came under the command of the division, was holding villages to the north and north-east of DZ N.[66]

Aftermath

[edit]

Analysis

[edit]

Operation Tonga was a success, with all of the tasks allotted to 6th Airborne Division being achieved within the time limits imposed on the individual units of the division. These tasks had been achieved despite the problems caused by a large number of the airborne troops being scattered throughout the operational area assigned, due to a combination of bad weather and poor navigation on the part of the pilots of the transport aircraft carrying them. Glider-borne airborne troops also suffered from navigational errors, with ten of the eighty-five gliders assigned to the division landing more than 2 miles (3.2 km) from their landing-zones. However, an unintended but beneficial result of these scattered drops was that the Germans were greatly confused as to area and extent of the airborne landings.[67]

Casualties

[edit]

The 6th Airborne Division suffered a total of 800 casualties between 5 June and 7 June, out of the 8,500 men deployed.[3] German losses are estimated to be estimated 400 dead and a further 400 captured.[citation needed] In addition, fourteen tanks were lost during counterattacks around the Orne River and Caen canal bridges. Other losses include one gunboat on the Caen canal.[68]

Subsequent role

[edit]
The 6th Airborne Division, positions June 1944

Between 7 June and 10 June, the 6th Airborne Division repulsed a number of German attacks.[69] The division retained control of the area between the Rivers Orne and Dives until 14 June, when the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division took over the southern part of the Orne bridgehead.[35]

On 10 June, the decision was taken to expand the bridgehead to the east of the River Orne, with 6th Airborne Division tasked with achieving this. However, the division was deemed not to be strong enough to achieve its objective; the 3rd Parachute Brigade was reinforced with the 5th Battalion, Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment). On 11 June, the 5th Black Watch launched an attack on the town of Bréville, but was met with extremely heavy resistance and was repulsed after suffering a number of casualties. The next day, the 3rd Parachute Brigade's entire front was subjected to fierce artillery bombardment and assaults by German tanks and infantry, with the Germans particularly focusing on the positions held by 9th Parachute Battalion.[70][71]

Both the 9th Parachute Battalion and the remnants of the Black Watch defended Chateau Saint-Côme, but were gradually forced to retreat. However, after Lieutenant-Colonel Otway stated that his battalion would be unable to defend its position for much longer, Brigadier Hill gathered together a number of paratroopers from 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion and led a counter-attack that forced the Germans to withdraw.[72][73]

In the weeks that followed, the 6th Airborne Division was reinforced with the Dutch Princess Irene Brigade and the 1st Belgian Infantry Brigade.[35] On 7 August, following a period of static warfare, the division began preparations for offensive operations. On the night of 16/17 August, the division began to advance against stiff German opposition. This advance continued until 26 August, when the division reached its objective – the mouth of the River Seine. In nine days of fighting, it had advanced 45 miles (72 km)[74] despite, as Gale put it, the infantry units being "quite inadequately equipped for a rapid pursuit".[75] The advanced resulted in the liberation of 400 square miles (1,000 km2) of German-occupied France, and the capture of over 1,000 German soldiers.

Between 6 June and 26 August, casualties amounted to 4,457 men of which 821 were killed, 2,709 wounded, and 927 were reported missing.[76][77] The division was finally withdrawn from the frontline on 27 August, and embarked for England at the beginning of September.[76]

References

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Further reading

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from Grokipedia
Operation Tonga was the codename for the British airborne assault phase of , the Allied invasion of during , conducted by the 6th Airborne Division on the night of 5–6 June 1944 to secure the left flank of the invasion beaches. The operation's primary objectives included capturing intact the bridges over the Caen Canal and River Orne at Bénouville and Ranville (later known as and Horsa Bridges) to prevent their destruction by German forces, destroying five bridges over the River Dives to block counterattacks from the east, and neutralizing the heavily fortified , which threatened Allied landings on . Commanded by Major-General Richard Gale, the 6th Airborne Division comprised approximately 7,000 paratroopers and glider-borne infantry from the 3rd and 5th Parachute Brigades (including the ), the 6th Airlanding Brigade, and supporting units such as the 22nd Independent Parachute Company and the Glider Pilot Regiment. Execution began shortly after midnight on 6 June, with pathfinder teams from the 22nd Independent Company marking drop zones using Eureka beacons to guide the main force, transported by approximately 328 RAF aircraft including Dakotas, Stirlings, and Albermarles, along with Horsa and Hamilcar gliders towed from bases in . A glider assault led by Major John Howard's D Company, 2nd , landed at 00:16 and captured the canal and river bridges within minutes, holding them against initial German counterattacks until relieved by ground forces later that day. Concurrently, the 9th Battalion assaulted the Merville Battery with around 150 men after heavy scattering of drops, overrunning the position by 04:30 despite severe losses from misdrops and defensive fire; the 1st and 8th Battalions then destroyed the Dives bridges by 15:00. Despite challenges such as high winds, anti-aircraft fire causing aircraft losses and widespread dispersion of paratroopers—resulting in only about 60% landing on target—Operation Tonga achieved all major objectives, securing a bridgehead that protected the eastern flank of and diverted German reserves away from the site. The division suffered approximately 800 casualties during the initial fighting of Operation Tonga (5–7 June), yet its success enabled the rapid link-up with seaborne forces and contributed significantly to the campaign's early momentum.

Background

Strategic Context

By early 1944, the Allied powers faced a strategic landscape shaped by ongoing advances in multiple theaters while prioritizing the defeat of . In the Mediterranean, the invasion of in July 1943 and the subsequent landing in mainland in had led to the Italian armistice, though progress northward was arduous against German defenses, culminating in the Anzio operation in January 1944 and the liberation of in . In the Pacific, U.S. forces were engaged in amphibious campaigns such as the Gilbert and Marshall Islands operations, but resources were largely redirected to Europe per the "Germany First" policy established at the 1942 . To open a decisive second front and relieve pressure on the Soviet Union, which had borne the brunt of the ground war, the Allies committed to a large-scale cross-Channel invasion of occupied France, codenamed Operation Overlord. This decision was formalized at the Tehran Conference in November 1943, where U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin agreed to launch the assault by May 1944, coordinated with a Soviet offensive on the Eastern Front. Within the Overlord plan, airborne forces played a critical role in securing the invasion's flanks, disrupting German communications and reinforcements, and creating chaos behind enemy lines to protect the amphibious beachheads. The British sector focused on the eastern flank near Caen, selected for its relatively flat, open terrain east of the Orne River, which was ideal for parachute drops and glider landings, and its proximity—approximately seven miles inland from Sword Beach—to enable rapid linkage with seaborne troops. This area was also strategically vital to block potential counterattacks from the German 21st Panzer Division, stationed nearby in the Caen region, which could otherwise threaten the left flank of the Allied landings. Overlord's execution was overseen by key Allied commanders: General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force; General Bernard L. Montgomery as commander of the directing ground operations; and Major-General Richard N. Gale as commander of the British 6th Airborne Division, tasked with leading the airborne assault known as Operation Tonga. These leaders emphasized the airborne element's integration to ensure the invasion's initial success and the establishment of a secure lodgment in .

Operational Objectives

Operation Tonga, the airborne assault phase of the Normandy invasion, assigned the 6th Airborne Division the critical task of securing the eastern flank of Sword Beach to prevent German reinforcements from counterattacking the Allied landings. The primary objectives centered on capturing intact the bridges spanning the Caen Canal at Bénouville and the Orne River at Ranville—later known as Pegasus and Horsa Bridges, respectively—to enable rapid Allied advances inland while denying their use to German forces. The capture of the bridges formed the core of Operation Coup de Main, a glider assault emphasizing surprise and speed. The division was also tasked with destroying the heavily fortified Merville Gun Battery, whose 75mm guns posed a direct threat to the seaborne assault on Sword Beach. Secondary objectives included disrupting German communications and reinforcements by destroying five bridges over the Dives River and its tributaries at sites such as Varaville, Robehomme, Troarn, and Bures, thereby establishing blocking positions to isolate the invasion area. The division was also required to secure landing zones for the follow-up glider-borne reinforcements of Operation Mallard, which would deliver the 6th Airlanding Brigade and additional support units to consolidate positions. Furthermore, the paratroopers were to link up with advancing seaborne forces from the 3rd British Infantry Division by dawn on D-Day, ensuring the left flank remained protected amid the broader campaign. The 6th Airborne Division's structure was tailored to these aims, with the 5th Brigade responsible for securing the bridges and establishing a defensive perimeter around Ranville and Bénouville, while the 3rd Brigade targeted the Merville Battery and Dives River crossings. Special units included the 22nd Independent Company as pathfinders to mark drop zones and the to secure the areas for the destruction of bridges at Varaville and Robehomme. The 6th Airlanding , comprising glider infantry like the 2nd , was held in reserve for to reinforce the airborne bridgehead. Overall command fell to Major-General Richard Gale, with brigade leaders such as Brigadier Nigel Poett (5th ) and Brigadier James Hill (3rd ) directing parachute operations. The operation unfolded over the night of 5–6 June 1944, beginning with pathfinder drops around 23:20 on 5 June to prepare zones K, N, and V, followed by main parachute drops at approximately 00:50 on 6 June. All initial objectives were to be achieved before sunrise at 05:58, with Mallard gliders scheduled as a contingency for the afternoon of 6 June if needed to bolster the division's positions east of the Orne River. This timeline aligned with the seaborne landings at 07:25, ensuring airborne forces could hold key terrain until relief arrived.

Prelude

British Preparations

The 6th Airborne Division was officially established on 23 April 1943 as Britain's second airborne formation, drawing on lessons from earlier units to integrate paratrooper elements from the 3rd and 5th Parachute Brigades with glider-borne infantry from the newly formed 6th Airlanding Brigade. This included the 1st Battalion, , alongside the 2nd and the 7th , creating a balanced force capable of rapid seizure and holding of key objectives. Training emphasized airborne assault tactics, with units conducting mass parachute jumps using RAF Dakota aircraft and glider landings to build cohesion between paratroopers and glider infantry. Intensive exercises, such as Operation Mush from 21 to 25 April 1944 in , simulated brigade-level operations including drop zone clearance of simulated anti-glider obstacles like poles and mines. Equipment for Operation Tonga centered on airborne delivery systems, with the bulk of the force transported in approximately 98 gliders (capable of carrying 28 troops or light vehicles). These were towed by a mix of IV bombers for drops, bombers, and transports, drawn from RAF Nos. 38 and 46 Groups. Specialized gear included folding bicycles for post-landing mobility across the Norman bocage, anti-tank projectors for close defense, and 6-pounder anti-tank guns for heavier threats, all adapted for parachute or glider deployment to minimize weight. Pathfinder teams from the 22nd Independent Parachute Company relied on Eureka radio beacons and Holophane lights to mark drop zones (DZs K, N, and V), but challenges arose from beacon malfunctions—such as breakage during hard landings or incorrect placement due to enemy fire and low cloud—compounding navigation difficulties from limited ground aids and unfamiliar terrain. Security protocols were stringent to preserve operational surprise, with mission details compartmentalized so that most troops remained unaware of the Normandy target until the final stages; lower ranks knew only general airborne roles to prevent leaks. Broader deception efforts, including Operation Fortitude South, featured fake radio traffic, dummy equipment, and phantom units to convince German intelligence that the main Allied assault would target Pas de Calais rather than Normandy. The division concentrated at transit camps in early June 1944, culminating in comprehensive briefings at RAF Tarrant Rushton airfield on 4 and 5 June, where maps, models, and aerial photos revealed the full plan to officers and key personnel. Approximately 8,200 troops, including around 500 pilots from the Glider Pilot Regiment who doubled as infantry post-landing, were committed to the operation, but poor weather—high winds and low visibility—forced a 24-hour postponement from 5 to 6 June, allowing final adjustments before takeoff.

German Defenses

The German defenses relevant to Operation Tonga were organized under the Seventh Army, commanded by General Friedrich Dollmann and part of Army Group B led by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who served as Commander-in-Chief in the West with a focus on fortifying the Normandy coast. Rommel's strategy emphasized rapid counterattacks by armored reserves positioned close to the beaches to defeat Allied landings before they could consolidate, contrasting with higher command preferences for holding panzer forces inland; this approach aimed to bolster the morale of static infantry units manning the Atlantic Wall. The Seventh Army's order of battle in the eastern Normandy sector included the understrength 716th Static Infantry Division, responsible for coastal defense duties stretching approximately 50 miles from the Vire River to the Dives River east of Caen. This division, under Lieutenant General Wilhelm Richter and headquartered in Caen, comprised the 726th and 736th Grenadier Regiments, the 1716th Artillery Regiment, and auxiliary units such as the Ost-Battalion 642 (composed of former Soviet prisoners of war with questionable loyalty), along with elderly personnel and wounded Eastern Front veterans, making it ill-equipped for sustained combat. In reserve near Caen were elements of the 21st Panzer Division, one of only three panzer formations under Rommel's operational control in Normandy, intended for immediate deployment against seaborne or airborne threats. Fortifications in the operational area formed key segments of the Atlantic Wall, which Rommel had accelerated since January 1944 through increased construction of concrete bunkers, beach obstacles, and minefields extending inland to counter potential airborne incursions. The Merville Gun Battery, a prominent feature east of the Orne River estuary, housed four 100 mm Czech howitzers in reinforced concrete casemates (Types H611 and 669), defended by about 80 artillerymen from the 1st Battalion of the 1716th Artillery Regiment and 50 combat engineers from the 736th Grenadier Regiment; Rommel personally inspected the site twice in March and May 1944, urging faster completion of its defenses. The battery was ringed by a 100-yard-deep minefield, multiple layers of concertina wire up to 15 feet thick and 5 feet high, machine-gun bunkers, trenches, an anti-tank ditch, and a single 20mm anti-aircraft gun, with surrounding marshes deliberately flooded to hinder infantry approaches. Near the critical Caen Canal and Orne River bridges, defenses included similar minefields, wire obstacles, and artificially flooded lowlands created by German engineers to impede glider or paratroop movements, guarded by a company from the 736th Grenadier Regiment. Anti-aircraft protection was sparse, relying on light flak units, while radar coverage was minimal, limited to a small coastal station at Sallenelles serving as a secondary detection point for incoming aircraft. German intelligence assessments severely underestimated the airborne threat due to successful Allied deception operations, particularly Operation Fortitude South, which convinced Hitler, OKW, and Rommel that the Pas de Calais region—opposite Dover—remained the primary invasion target, with viewed as a diversion. This misdirection, reinforced by double agents and fictitious formations like the First U.S. Army Group, led to fragmented and low expectations for the scale of any assault, including airborne operations; early reports of drops around 0100 hours on were initially dismissed as isolated or weather-related errors, with no immediate alarm raised across commands. Command disruptions compounded these failures: Rommel was absent in celebrating his wife's birthday, while Dollmann was engaged in a scheduled war game exercise in that morning, leaving corps and division commanders scattered and delaying coordinated responses until midday.

Battle

Fly-in and Pathfinders

Operation Tonga commenced with the departure of from bases in , beginning around 23:20 on 5 June 1944, involving approximately 5,250 paratroopers from the 3rd and 5th Parachute Brigades transported in 266 , alongside 98 gliders carrying 611 troops and equipment. The and glider combinations, including types such as the Douglas C-47 Dakota, , and , followed a low-level route across the to evade German radar detection, maintaining altitudes of 500 to 1,000 feet where possible to minimize exposure. The flight encountered significant navigation challenges due to thick obscuring , combined with the nighttime conditions and anti-aircraft , which disrupted formation cohesion and pilot orientation. These factors led to widespread scattering of the paratroopers, with estimates indicating that only about 40% landed within their designated drop zones or were able to form up initially, as pilots relied heavily on pre-mission aerial photographs and limited visual cues for guidance. En route, the formation faced intermittent encounters with German flak and night fighters, resulting in the loss of eight aircraft and gliders to anti-aircraft , though the majority pressed on to reach the coast. Leading the operation, pathfinders from the 22nd Independent Parachute Company, organized into teams of about 20 men each, were the first to deploy at approximately 00:20 on 6 June 1944, parachuting onto drop zones K, N, and V east of the Orne River. Despite suffering casualties from flak during their approach and interference from German patrols on the ground, the surviving pathfinders established marking aids including Holophane beacons for visual guidance, Rebecca/Eureka radar reflectors for electronic homing, and colored parachutes or smoke signals to delineate landing areas. Their efforts proved partially successful, with full markers deployed on zones K and V, while only two teams managed to set up equipment on zone N amid the adverse conditions.

Capture of Caen Canal and Orne River Bridges

Operation Deadstick was the glider-borne coup de main assault conducted by D Company, 2nd Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry (Ox and Bucks), part of the British 6th Airborne Division, to seize intact the bridges over the Caen Canal (Pegasus Bridge) and the Orne River (Horsa Bridge) in the early hours of 6 June 1944. The mission, critical to securing the eastern flank of the Allied beachhead and preventing German reinforcements from reaching Sword Beach, involved six Airspeed Horsa gliders towed by Handley Page Halifax bombers from RAF Tarrant Rushton, Dorset. Commanded by Major John Howard, the force comprised approximately 180 men, including two reinforcing platoons from B Company and sappers from the 249th (Airborne) Field Company, Royal Engineers, tasked with neutralizing demolition charges. The gliders were released at 22:56 hours and achieved remarkable landing accuracy, with five touching down between 00:16 and 00:20 hours within 47 yards (43 meters) of the target near Bénouville, while a supporting glider landed approximately 1.5 kilometers from Horsa Bridge at Ranville. Under cover of darkness and aided by prior pathfinder marking, Howard's men exited the gliders and launched a surprise assault on the lightly guarded bridges, defended by elements of the German 716th Static Division. The first three gliders' troops, led by Den Brotheridge's 25 , stormed using submachine guns and grenades, overwhelming the sentries and capturing the structure in just 10 minutes despite resistance from a machine-gun post. Brotheridge, leading the charge across the bridge, was mortally wounded by German fire, becoming the first Allied officer killed on D-Day. Simultaneously, the remaining platoons secured Horsa Bridge shortly thereafter, with engineers rapidly disabling the explosive charges wired for demolition on both spans. With the bridges under control by 00:26 hours, Howard's force repelled initial German probes and counterattacks from nearby units, including armored vehicles, using captured weapons, anti-tank projectors, and defensive positions in adjacent buildings and ditches. The defenders held the perimeter through the night against sporadic assaults, inflicting casualties on the attackers while suffering only two killed and 14 wounded overall. At approximately 03:00 hours, elements of the 7th Parachute Battalion, 5th Parachute Brigade, linked up with the glider troops at dawn, providing reinforcements to consolidate the position until further seaborne forces arrived later in the day. Howard's decisive leadership and the operation's precision exemplified the effectiveness of airborne tactics in securing vital objectives.

Actions of 5th Parachute Brigade

The 5th Parachute Brigade, comprising the 7th, 12th, and 13th Parachute Battalions under Brigadier Nigel Poett, was airlifted east of the Orne River to establish a defensive perimeter around the captured bridges and disrupt German reinforcements during the initial phase of Operation Tonga on 6 June 1944. The brigade's drop zones were concentrated on DZ-N north of Ranville, but intense flak from German defenses caused widespread scatter, with paratroopers landing up to several miles from their objectives amid flooded fields and obstacles like Rommel's asparagus. In the 7th Battalion, for example, only about 150 of its 600 men assembled near the target area initially, forcing survivors to form improvised units to press forward. The 7th Battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Pine-Coffin, prioritized reinforcing the glider-borne Ox and Bucks Light Infantry at the Caen Canal and Orne River bridges, crossing to the west bank to clear German outposts in Bénouville and Le Port while fending off reconnaissance probes from the 716th Static Infantry Division. These actions helped consolidate control over the vital crossings, with scattered elements navigating swamps and using carrier pigeons to relay messages when radios failed due to water damage and interference. Meanwhile, the 12th Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Melvin Murphy, targeted gun emplacements near Varaville and sought to block routes along the Divette River, destroying several artillery positions and holding the village against early counter-thrusts despite heavy mortar fire and incomplete assembly. The 13th Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Peter Luard, rapidly secured Ranville by 0230 hours, capturing light resistance from elements of the 21st Panzer Division and coordinating with the 591st Parachute Squadron Royal Engineers to clear landing obstacles, enabling glider reinforcements to arrive safely. Facing ongoing challenges from dispersed troops, terrain inundated by prior bombing, and sporadic attacks by the 716th Division, the brigade nonetheless achieved its core objectives by 0500 hours, effectively sealing off Dives River crossings and delaying German maneuvers toward until seaborne forces could link up later that day.

Actions of 3rd Parachute Brigade

The 3rd Parachute Brigade, commanded by James Hill, consisted of the , 8th Parachute Battalion, and 9th Parachute Battalion, and was tasked with securing the western flank of the airborne landing zone during Operation Tonga. The brigade's paratroopers dropped around 00:50 on 6 , following the initial fly-in of the 5th Parachute Brigade, but encountered severe scatter due to navigational errors, flak damage, and poor visibility, with elements dispersed over several miles. For instance, Hill himself landed approximately three miles from his intended near Cabourg in the flooded Dives valley, where he assembled a small force of 42 men after four hours using toggle ropes for signaling. The , dropping on Drop Zone Victor about five miles east of Ranville, had the primary mission to protect destroying bridges over the Rivers Divette and Dives at Varaville and Robehomme to prevent German reinforcements from advancing eastward, while securing nearby woods; a secondary objective was to neutralize a heavy battery at Longueval as an alternative threat to coastal shipping if the primary battery assault failed elsewhere. The 8th Parachute Battalion, landing on Drop Zone King four miles south of Ranville, was responsible for escorting engineers to demolish bridges at Troarn and Bures, protecting the brigade's left flank through patrols, and holding the ridge line from the Bois de Bavent woodland to Le Plein and Le Mesnil against potential counterattacks. The 9th Parachute Battalion, also on Drop Zone Victor, was to link up with elements of No. 1 Special Service Brigade (Commandos) and clear the Le Plein area of German forces after completing its initial tasks. Despite the scatter, small groups engaged in skirmishes with German outposts of the 716th Static Infantry Division, overcoming light opposition at rendezvous points—such as killing one defender and capturing a cyclist sentry—and destroying minor enemy positions, including small arms caches encountered during advances. By mid-morning, the 1st Canadian Battalion had rallied about 300 men to capture a German headquarters and secure the Le Mesnil crossroads, while the 8th Battalion mustered around 280 paratroopers to hold positions two miles from brigade headquarters. The brigade also repelled reconnaissance probes from the 21st Panzer Division, which tested the western perimeter without breakthrough. Brigadier Hill exercised improvised command from a forward position, directing operations personally with a pistol and walking stick after losing most signallers, relying on verbal runners and ad hoc patrols to maintain cohesion. Coordination proved challenging, with delayed link-ups between battalions attributed to darkness, flooded terrain, and personnel losses from the scatter, preventing full assembly until scattered stragglers began arriving. Nevertheless, the brigade consolidated its positions by morning, securing the assigned ridge and flank against immediate threats, with the 9th Battalion reaching Le Plein by 09:30 to establish defensive lines at the Château d'Amfreville and a nearby road junction, where it linked with 45 (Royal Marine) Commando and repelled an enemy counterattack through the orchards, killing 12 Germans at close range with machine guns. This consolidation enabled the brigade to hold the , supporting the overall divisional objectives by late afternoon.

Battle of Merville Gun Battery

The assault on the was a critical objective within Operation Tonga, assigned to the 9th Parachute Battalion under Terence Otway to neutralize a fortified coastal position equipped with four 100mm guns that posed a direct threat to Allied landings at . Otway's detailed planning called for a force of approximately 750 paratroopers, with 600 designated for the main assault group, to drop at 02:30 on 6 June 1944 and execute a multi-phased attack involving diversionary fire, minefield breaches using Bangalore torpedoes, and of the casemates housing the guns with support from engineer gliders carrying heavy explosives and flamethrowers. The battalion had undergone extensive rehearsals in , including full-scale mock assaults on a replica battery, to ensure coordination despite the inherent risks of a night operation. The parachute drop, however, suffered catastrophic dispersion due to heavy anti-aircraft fire, navigation errors exacerbated by the scattering of the 3rd Parachute Brigade's pathfinders, and low , resulting in only about 150 men rallying at the designated rendezvous point by 02:00—far short of the planned 600. Pre-landing losses from flak and accidents accounted for around 40% of the , with most support gliders failing to arrive, depriving of vital equipment such as mortars, mine detectors, radios, and sufficient explosives. Undeterred, Otway reorganized the diminished group into four assault teams armed primarily with guns, grenades, and a handful of Bangalore torpedoes, pressing forward with the mission despite the severe shortages. At approximately 04:00, the assault commenced as the paratroopers advanced through dense minefields and barbed wire obstacles under intense machine-gun fire from the battery's 200-man German garrison, scaling the perimeter walls in a coordinated push that breached two gaps with the limited torpedoes. Hand-to-hand combat erupted inside the casemates, where British troops used grenades and bayonets to overpower defenders in close-quarters fighting, while others spiked the guns by removing breech blocks and stuffing explosives into barrels—though the lack of heavy charges meant some destruction was incomplete. The battery fell after about 30 minutes of fierce resistance, with the guns silenced by 04:30, but the action inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers, reducing the effective force from 150 to 65 survivors. In the immediate aftermath, Otway's leadership proved pivotal in consolidating the position against potential counterattacks, with the battalion holding the battery until relieved by elements of the later that morning, having taken around 20 German prisoners and confirmed the neutralization of the immediate threat to . Despite the shortages of explosives and supporting arms, the operation succeeded in diverting the battery's fire and preventing it from engaging the landings effectively, though German records later indicated that at least three guns may have fired sporadically before being fully disabled. The 9th Battalion then withdrew eastward to link up with divisional units, leaving the site secured for Allied forces.

Divisional Headquarters and Operation Mallard

The divisional headquarters of the 6th Airborne Division landed by glider near Ranville at approximately 03:30 on 6 June 1944, shortly after the initial parachute drops had secured key objectives including the Caen Canal and Orne River bridges. Major General Richard Gale, the division's commander, quickly assembled his staff in the vicinity of Landing Zone N and assumed control of the operation, navigating the challenges posed by units scattered across several kilometers due to adverse weather and anti-aircraft fire during the night drop. Coordination was maintained through a combination of wireless radio sets, such as the SCR-300, and dispatch runners, as many radios had been lost or damaged in the descent, enabling Gale to rally forward elements and direct defensive preparations against anticipated German counterattacks. As the morning progressed, the headquarters focused on consolidating the nascent around Ranville, with establishing a temporary command post in a local chateau to oversee and liaison efforts. This setup allowed for the integration of reports from brigades, facilitating the division's shift from isolated assaults to a cohesive defense of the eastern flank. By midday, the headquarters had begun directing the movement of captured German equipment and prisoners, while preparing for the afternoon reinforcement phase to expand and fortify positions. Operation Mallard, the glider-borne reinforcement operation, commenced in the late afternoon of 6 June, with tug aircraft releasing gliders starting around 21:00 to deliver the bulk of the and supporting divisional elements to Landing Zones N and W near Ranville and Bénouville. Of the 246 gliders dispatched—comprising Horsa and Hamilcar types—most achieved accurate landings despite flak and navigational hazards, ferrying approximately 4,000 troops along with critical supplies including anti-tank guns, jeeps, and Tetrarch light tanks from the 6th Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance . These arrivals immediately strengthened the Ranville , with the 2nd Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery deploying its 17-pounder guns to key defensive points along potential German approach routes. The influx of reinforcements under Operation Mallard enabled the rapid repulsion of minor German counterattacks probing the perimeter from the east and south, as the fresh troops dispersed enemy probes with coordinated fire support. By evening, elements of the 6th Airlanding Brigade linked up with advancing commandos from the 3rd Infantry Division's 1st Special Service Brigade, who had come ashore at Sword Beach, solidifying the connection between the airborne bridgehead and the main invasion force. At the close of D-Day, the 6th Airborne Division maintained control over a perimeter encompassing roughly 60 square kilometers, having incurred about 600 casualties while preventing significant Axis interference on the left flank.

Aftermath

Casualties and Losses

During Operation , the British 6th Airborne Division incurred approximately 800 casualties between June 5 and 7, 1944, representing about 10% of the 8,500 troops deployed via and glider. These losses encompassed killed, wounded, and missing personnel, with significant contributions from the widespread scattering of paratroopers due to flak, navigational challenges, and strong winds, which dispersed units and exposed isolated groups to German fire. Aircraft and glider losses were relatively light, with two bombers shot down by anti-aircraft fire during the initial drops, though most of the 266 and 90 glider combinations returned safely. Over the three-day operation, the 6th Airborne Division's total casualties reached around 1,200, including reinforcements from Operation Mallard (estimates vary, with around 800 for the initial assault and additional losses from Mallard), but remained notably lower than the seaborne assault's toll of over 10,000 on D-Day alone. German losses were lighter and more fragmented, primarily affecting elements of the 716th Static Infantry Division and the Merville battery garrison, with estimates of 200–300 killed or wounded across the airborne landing zones. At the Merville Gun Battery, the assault resulted in 22 Germans killed and 22 captured, with the remainder of the 160-man garrison fleeing into the dunes after the guns were destroyed using captured ammunition and explosives. Minimal armored units were engaged initially, limiting German counterattacks and material commitments. Material losses underscored the operation's tactical successes: all four 150mm guns at Merville were neutralized or demolished, preventing naval fire on Sword Beach, while the key Caen Canal and Orne River bridges were secured intact against demolition attempts. The 6th Airborne captured significant German equipment, including artillery pieces from the 716th Division, anti-tank guns, vehicles, and ammunition dumps, which bolstered defensive positions east of the Orne River.

Tactical Analysis

Operation Tonga achieved several key tactical successes that secured the eastern flank of the Allied invasion beaches. The glider-borne coup de main force successfully captured the Caen Canal and Orne River bridges intact shortly after midnight on June 6, 1944, preventing their demolition and enabling the rapid reinforcement of the airborne positions. The neutralization of the Merville Gun Battery by elements of the 9th Parachute Battalion, despite operating with far fewer troops than planned, eliminated a potential threat to Sword Beach and demonstrated effective close-quarters assault tactics. Overall, these actions, combined with the destruction of bridges over the River Dives, effectively blocked German armored counterattacks from the east, maintaining the integrity of the landing zones. Despite these accomplishments, the operation faced significant shortcomings that diminished initial combat effectiveness. Paratrooper drops were widely scattered due to adverse weather conditions, including cloud cover and strong winds, coupled with navigation errors by pilots unfamiliar with night operations over enemy territory, resulting in only a fraction of the 9th —around 150 men—reaching the Merville rendezvous point. Glider landings were more accurate but still incurred losses, with two aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft fire. Communication breakdowns further complicated coordination, as radio sets often failed in the damp conditions and units took hours to regroup, reducing the division's ability to execute synchronized maneuvers. Tactical innovations played a crucial role in mitigating these challenges and enabling rapid adaptation. The deployment of pathfinder teams equipped with Eureka beacons and Aldis lamps successfully marked key drop zones, facilitating precise glider insertions—such as the Horsa gliders landing within 50 meters of the objective. Brigade commanders, including at the bridges and Terence Otway at Merville, demonstrated effective improvisation by launching assaults with incomplete forces and using prearranged signals, like the coded radio message "Ham and Jam," to confirm objectives despite the chaos. In comparison to contemporaneous American airborne operations by the 82nd and 101st Divisions, Operation Tonga proved more effective at the tactical level, with British forces experiencing similar scattering but achieving higher rates of small-unit success in securing primary objectives and incurring fewer instances of friendly fire due to tighter operational control and a more contained drop area.

Strategic Impact and Subsequent Role

Operation Tonga achieved its primary objectives by securing the eastern flank of the Allied landings at Sword Beach, capturing intact the crucial bridges over the Caen Canal and River Orne near Ranville, which provided the only viable crossing points between Caen and the sea. By destroying five bridges across the Dives River, the 6th Airborne Division effectively delayed German reinforcements, including elements of the 21st Panzer Division, preventing an immediate counterattack that could have threatened the beachhead until late afternoon on D-Day. Additionally, the neutralization of the Merville Gun Battery eliminated a key threat to naval forces supporting the Sword Beach assault, contributing significantly to isolating Caen as a German strongpoint and stabilizing the left flank of the British sector. Following D-Day, the 6th Airborne Division transitioned to a defensive infantry role, holding the Orne bridgehead and eastern perimeter against repeated German assaults through June and July 1944. In the Battle of Bréville Ridge from 8 to 12 June, the division repelled attacks by the German 346th Infantry Division, securing vital high ground with support from Canadian artillery and incurring heavy casualties but inflicting significant losses on the enemy. During Operation Epsom (26–30 June), the division maintained the eastern flank, preventing German forces from redeploying westward and enabling the main British offensive toward Caen. In Operation Goodwood (18–20 July), it reinforced the bridgehead, supporting armored advances by absorbing pressure from German reserves and facilitating the eventual encirclement of Caen. The operation's success demonstrated the viability of for securing and protecting flanks, influencing doctrines on vertical and rapid deployment, as seen in the evolution of the British Parachute Regiment. While no major historiographical revisions have emerged in recent decades, publications in the , such as accounts of glider pilot experiences, have emphasized their underrecognized contributions to the campaign's execution. The division remained in continuous action until relieved in late August 1944 following the Allied breakout from during Operation Paddle, having sustained approximately 4,457 casualties over the 82-day period from 5 June to 3 September.

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