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Panzer Leader (book)
Panzer Leader (original German: Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, literally "Memories of a Soldier") is an autobiography by German General Heinz Guderian, written during his imprisonment by the Allies after the Second World War.
The most prominent English language version is the 1952 translation by Constantine Fitzgibbon published in the United Kingdom by Michael Joseph and the United States by E. P. Dutton, with a foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart. The Da Capo Press editions have an additional introduction by Kenneth Macksey. Panzer Leader and its subsequent editions sold over 180,000 copies worldwide by the 1970s. It eventually reached its 18th printing in Germany in 2003.
Panzer Leader acted as a memoir for Guderian to provide insight to various events that Guderian was involved in before and during the Second World War, providing his own comments and thoughts for each event. The most prominent themes discussed by Guderian are his involvement in the creation of Germany's armoured forces in the 1930s and subsequent operations on the Eastern Front. The topics discussed by Guderian in Panzer Leader include:
The majority of Panzer Leader was written on the Eastern Front since Guderian's wartime service and command were mainly against the Soviet Union, focusing primarily on German armoured formations and operations. Guderian's time as Acting Chief of General Staff in the German Army High Command (from July 1944 to March 1945) was also documented where he worked to prevent a total collapse of the Eastern Front, lamenting the fact that the front was "tottering on the edge of an abyss".
Another prominent period discussed in Panzer Leader is November-December 1941, detailing the failures and setbacks faced by the German Army in their advancements during Operation Barbarossa. These included Army Group South's failure in capturing Rostov-on-Don, and the stalling of Army Group Center (which Guderian was a part of) before Moscow. Guderian describes the cold winter faced by the German army in 1941 where German equipment and machinery were rendered inoperable and increasing casualties due to freezing conditions, and the inability of contemporary German anti-tank guns to counter the newly deployed Soviet T-34 tanks.
Amid his recounts of the war, Guderian in Panzer Leader also critiques the way Adolf Hitler conducted the war and how Guderian and other German generals opposed Hitler on grounds of his "wastefulness and impulsive methods".
Guderian offers his thoughts and attitudes with regards to the assassination attempt of Adolf Hitler by several senior German officers and generals. Guderian wrote in Panzer Leader that he "'refuses to accept murder in any form. Our Christian religion forbids it in the clearest possible terms. I cannot therefore approve of the plan of assassination. Apart from this religious reason, I must say also that neither the internal nor the external political situation was conducive to a successful coup d’etat". Guderian also wrote comments on several of the co-conspirators of the plot: he reprimanded Dr Carl Friedrich Goerdeler for his "security carelessness"; referred to Generalfeldmarschall Erwin von Witzleben as "a sick man"; criticised Generals Ludwig Beck, Erich Hoepner and Friedrich Olbricht on their inability to properly organise and cope with the "special circumstances"; and remained ambivalent in his views of General Friedrich Fromm and the "impulsive" Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg.
In the 1950s, less attention was placed on the recent history of the defeated Wehrmacht by German historians and scholars, leaving the responsibility of the Wehrmacht's history and subsequent recounting to former German generals under the guidance of the American Historical Division. In doing so, original Wehrmacht sources were closed off to the public and only made accessible to American researchers and German generals in hopes of restricting German military knowledge only for the United States. Such efforts were also directed in hopes of creating a positive public image of German soldiers and subsequently garner support for the rearmament of Germany as an ally of the United States.
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Panzer Leader (book)
Panzer Leader (original German: Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, literally "Memories of a Soldier") is an autobiography by German General Heinz Guderian, written during his imprisonment by the Allies after the Second World War.
The most prominent English language version is the 1952 translation by Constantine Fitzgibbon published in the United Kingdom by Michael Joseph and the United States by E. P. Dutton, with a foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart. The Da Capo Press editions have an additional introduction by Kenneth Macksey. Panzer Leader and its subsequent editions sold over 180,000 copies worldwide by the 1970s. It eventually reached its 18th printing in Germany in 2003.
Panzer Leader acted as a memoir for Guderian to provide insight to various events that Guderian was involved in before and during the Second World War, providing his own comments and thoughts for each event. The most prominent themes discussed by Guderian are his involvement in the creation of Germany's armoured forces in the 1930s and subsequent operations on the Eastern Front. The topics discussed by Guderian in Panzer Leader include:
The majority of Panzer Leader was written on the Eastern Front since Guderian's wartime service and command were mainly against the Soviet Union, focusing primarily on German armoured formations and operations. Guderian's time as Acting Chief of General Staff in the German Army High Command (from July 1944 to March 1945) was also documented where he worked to prevent a total collapse of the Eastern Front, lamenting the fact that the front was "tottering on the edge of an abyss".
Another prominent period discussed in Panzer Leader is November-December 1941, detailing the failures and setbacks faced by the German Army in their advancements during Operation Barbarossa. These included Army Group South's failure in capturing Rostov-on-Don, and the stalling of Army Group Center (which Guderian was a part of) before Moscow. Guderian describes the cold winter faced by the German army in 1941 where German equipment and machinery were rendered inoperable and increasing casualties due to freezing conditions, and the inability of contemporary German anti-tank guns to counter the newly deployed Soviet T-34 tanks.
Amid his recounts of the war, Guderian in Panzer Leader also critiques the way Adolf Hitler conducted the war and how Guderian and other German generals opposed Hitler on grounds of his "wastefulness and impulsive methods".
Guderian offers his thoughts and attitudes with regards to the assassination attempt of Adolf Hitler by several senior German officers and generals. Guderian wrote in Panzer Leader that he "'refuses to accept murder in any form. Our Christian religion forbids it in the clearest possible terms. I cannot therefore approve of the plan of assassination. Apart from this religious reason, I must say also that neither the internal nor the external political situation was conducive to a successful coup d’etat". Guderian also wrote comments on several of the co-conspirators of the plot: he reprimanded Dr Carl Friedrich Goerdeler for his "security carelessness"; referred to Generalfeldmarschall Erwin von Witzleben as "a sick man"; criticised Generals Ludwig Beck, Erich Hoepner and Friedrich Olbricht on their inability to properly organise and cope with the "special circumstances"; and remained ambivalent in his views of General Friedrich Fromm and the "impulsive" Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg.
In the 1950s, less attention was placed on the recent history of the defeated Wehrmacht by German historians and scholars, leaving the responsibility of the Wehrmacht's history and subsequent recounting to former German generals under the guidance of the American Historical Division. In doing so, original Wehrmacht sources were closed off to the public and only made accessible to American researchers and German generals in hopes of restricting German military knowledge only for the United States. Such efforts were also directed in hopes of creating a positive public image of German soldiers and subsequently garner support for the rearmament of Germany as an ally of the United States.