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Battle of Moscow
Battle of Moscow
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Battle of Moscow
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II

Soviet anti-aircraft gunners on the
roof of the Hotel Moskva
Date2 October 1941 – 7 January 1942
(3 months and 5 days)
Location
Result
  • Soviet victory
Belligerents
 Germany Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Units involved
Strength
As of 1 October 1941:
As of 1 October 1941:
  • 1,252,591 men[11]
  • 1,044[12]–3,232 tanks
  • 7,600 guns
  • Initial aircraft: 936 (545 serviceable);[8] at time of counteroffensive: 1,376[10]
Casualties and losses
German strategic offensive: (1 October 1941 to 10 January 1942)
  • October: 62,870
  • November: 46,374
  • December: 41,819
  • January: 23,131

German estimated: 174,194 KIA, WIA, MIA (see §7)[13]

Soviet estimated: 581,000 killed, missing, wounded and captured.[14]
Moscow Defense:[15] (30 September 1941 to 5 December 1941)
  • 514,338 killed or missing
  • 143,941 wounded
Moscow Offensive:[15] (5 December 1941 to 7 January 1942)
  • 139,586 killed or missing
  • 231,369 wounded
Total: 1,029,234 (see § Casualties)

The Battle of Moscow was a military campaign that consisted of two periods of strategically significant fighting on a 600 km (370 mi) sector of the Eastern Front during World War II, between October 1941 and January 1942. The Soviet defensive effort thwarted Germany's attack on Moscow, the capital and largest city of the Soviet Union. Moscow was one of the primary military and political objectives for Axis forces in their invasion of the Soviet Union.

The German Strategic Offensive, named Operation Typhoon, called for two pincer offensives, one to the north of Moscow against the Kalinin Front by the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armies, simultaneously severing the Moscow–Leningrad railway, and another to the south of Moscow Oblast against the Western Front south of Tula, by the 2nd Panzer Army, while the 4th Army advanced directly towards Moscow from the west.

Initially, the Soviet forces conducted a strategic defence of Moscow Oblast by constructing three defensive belts, deploying newly raised reserve armies, and bringing troops from the Siberian and Far Eastern Military Districts. As the German offensives were halted, a Soviet strategic counter-offensive and smaller-scale offensive operations forced the German armies back to the positions around the cities of Oryol, Vyazma and Vitebsk, and nearly surrounded three German armies. It was a major setback for the Germans, and the end of their belief in a swift German victory over the USSR.[16] As a result of the failed offensive, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch was dismissed as supreme commander of the German Army on 19 December, with Hitler replacing him in the position.

Background

[edit]

Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion plan, called for the capture of Moscow within four months. On 22 June 1941, Axis forces invaded the Soviet Union, destroyed most of the Soviet Air Force (VVS) on the ground, and advanced deep into Soviet territory using blitzkrieg tactics to destroy entire Soviet armies. The German Army Group North moved towards Leningrad, Army Group South took control of Ukraine, and Army Group Centre advanced towards Moscow. By July 1941, Army Group Centre crossed the Dnieper River, on the path to Moscow.[17]

On 16 July 1941, German forces captured Smolensk, an important stronghold on the road to Moscow.[18] At this stage, although Moscow was vulnerable, an offensive against the city would have exposed the German flanks. In part to address these risks, and to attempt to secure Ukraine's food and mineral resources, Hitler ordered the attack to turn north and south to eliminate Soviet forces at Leningrad and Kiev.[19] This delayed the German advance on Moscow.[19] When that advance resumed on 30 September 1941, German forces had been weakened, while the Soviets had raised new forces for the defence of the city.[19]

Initial German advance (30 September – 10 October)

[edit]

Plans

[edit]
The eastern front at the time of the Battle of Moscow:
  Initial Wehrmacht advance – to 9 July 1941
  Subsequent advances – to 1 September 1941
  Encirclement and battle of Kiev to 9 September 1941
  Final Wehrmacht advance – to 5 December 1941

For Hitler, the Soviet capital was secondary, and he believed the only way to bring the Soviet Union to its knees was to defeat it economically. He felt this could be accomplished by seizing the economic resources of Ukraine east of Kiev.[20] When Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, supported a direct thrust to Moscow, he was told that "only ossified brains could think of such an idea".[20] Franz Halder, head of the Army General Staff, was also convinced that a drive to seize Moscow would be victorious after the German Army inflicted enough damage on the Soviet forces.[21] This view was shared by most within the German high command.[20] But Hitler overruled his generals in favor of pocketing the Soviet forces around Kiev in the south, followed by the seizure of Ukraine. The move was successful, resulting in the loss of nearly 700,000 Red Army personnel killed, captured, or wounded by 26 September, and further advances by Axis forces.[22]

With the end of summer, Hitler redirected his attention to Moscow and assigned Army Group Centre to this task. The forces committed to Operation Typhoon included three infantry armies (the 2nd, 4th, and 9th)[23] supported by three Panzer (tank) Groups (the 2nd, 3rd and 4th) and by the Luftwaffe's Luftflotte 2. Up to two million German troops were committed to the operation, along with 1,000–2,470 tanks and assault guns and 14,000 guns. German aerial strength, however, had been severely reduced over the summer's campaign; the Luftwaffe had lost 1,603 aircraft and 1,028 had been damaged. Luftflotte 2 had only 549 serviceable machines, including 158 medium and dive-bombers and 172 fighters, available for Operation Typhoon.[8] The attack relied on standard blitzkrieg tactics, using Panzer groups rushing deep into Soviet formations and executing double-pincer movements, pocketing Red Army divisions and destroying them.[24]

Facing the Wehrmacht were three Soviet fronts forming a defensive line based on the cities of Vyazma and Bryansk, which barred the way to Moscow. The armies comprising these fronts had also been involved in heavy fighting. Still, it was a formidable concentration consisting of 1,250,000 men, 1,000 tanks and 7,600 guns. The Soviet Air Force had suffered appalling losses of some 7,500 to 21,200 aircraft.[25][26] Extraordinary industrial achievements had begun to replace these, and at the outset of Typhoon the VVS could muster 936 aircraft, 578 of which were bombers.[27]

Once Soviet resistance along the Vyazma-Bryansk front was eliminated, German forces were to press east, encircling Moscow by outflanking it from the north and south. Continuous fighting had reduced their effectiveness, and logistical difficulties became more acute. General Heinz Guderian, commander of the 2nd Panzer Army, wrote that some of his destroyed tanks had not been replaced, and there were fuel shortages at the start of the operation.[28]

Battles of Vyazma and Bryansk

[edit]
German offensives during Operation Typhoon

The German attack went according to plan, with 4th Panzer Group pushing through the middle nearly unopposed and then dividing its mobile forces north to complete the encirclement of Vyazma with 3rd Panzer Group, and other units south to close the ring around Bryansk in conjunction with 2nd Panzer Group. The Soviet defenses, still under construction, were overrun, and spearheads of the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups met at Vyazma on 10 October 1941.[29][30] Four Soviet armies (the 16th, 19th, 20th, 24th and part of the 32nd) were encircled in a large pocket just west of the city.[31]

The encircled Soviet forces continued to fight, and the Wehrmacht had to employ 28 divisions to eliminate them, using troops which could have supported the offensive towards Moscow. The remnants of the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts retreated and manned new defensive lines around Mozhaisk.[31] Although losses were high, some of the encircled units escaped in small groups, ranging in size from platoons to full rifle divisions.[30] Soviet resistance near Vyazma also provided time for the Soviet high command to reinforce the four armies defending Moscow (the 5th, 16th, 43rd and 49th Armies). Three rifle and two tank divisions were transferred from East Siberia with more to follow.[31]

The weather began to change, hampering both sides. On 7 October, the first snow fell and quickly melted, turning roads and open areas into muddy quagmires, a phenomenon known as rasputitsa in Russia. German armored groups were greatly slowed, allowing Soviet forces to fall back and regroup.[32][33]

Soviet forces were able to counterattack in some cases. For example, on 6 October the 4th Panzer Division fell into an ambush set by Dmitri Leliushenko's hastily formed 1st Guards Special Rifle Corps, including Mikhail Katukov's 4th Tank Brigade, near the city of Mtsensk. Newly built T-34 tanks were concealed in the woods as German armor rolled past them; as a scratch team of Soviet infantry contained their advance, Soviet armor attacked from both flanks and savaged the German Panzer IV tanks. For the Wehrmacht, the shock of this defeat was so great that a special investigation was ordered.[30] Guderian and his troops discovered, to their dismay, that the Soviet T-34s were almost impervious to German tank guns. As the general wrote, "Our Panzer IV tanks with their short 75 mm guns could only explode a T-34 by hitting the engine from behind". Guderian also noted in his memoirs that "the Russians already learned a few things".[34][35] In 2012, Niklas Zetterling disputed the notion of a major German reversal at Mtsensk, noting that only a battlegroup from the 4th Panzer Division was engaged while most of the division was fighting elsewhere, that both sides withdrew from the battlefield after the fighting and that the Germans lost only nine tanks; six completely destroyed, and three damaged. For German commanders like Hoepner and Bock, the action was inconsequential; their primary worry was resistance from within the pocket, not outside it.[36]

German armored column advances on the Moscow front, October 1941.

Other counterattacks further slowed the German offensive. The 2nd Army, which was operating to the north of Guderian's forces with the aim of encircling the Bryansk Front, had come under strong Red Army pressure assisted by air support.[37]

According to German assessments of the initial Soviet defeat, 673,000 soldiers had been captured by the Wehrmacht in both the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets,[38] although recent research suggests a lower—but still enormous—figure of 514,000 prisoners, reducing Soviet strength by 41%.[39] Personnel losses of 499,001 (permanent as well as temporary) were calculated by the Soviet command.[40] On 9 October, Otto Dietrich of the German Ministry of Propaganda, quoting Hitler himself, forecast in a press conference the imminent destruction of the armies defending Moscow. As Hitler had never had to lie about a specific and verifiable military fact, Dietrich convinced foreign correspondents that the collapse of all Soviet resistance was perhaps hours away. German civilian morale—low since the start of Barbarossa—significantly improved, with rumors of soldiers home by Christmas and great riches from the future Lebensraum in the east.[41]

However, Red Army resistance had slowed the Wehrmacht. When the Germans arrived within sight of the Mozhaisk line west of Moscow on 10 October, they encountered another defensive barrier manned by new Soviet forces. That same day, Georgy Zhukov, who had been recalled from the Leningrad Front on 6 October, took charge of Moscow's defense and the combined Western and Reserve Fronts, with Colonel General Ivan Konev as his deputy.[42][43] On 12 October, Zhukov ordered the concentration of all available forces on a strengthened Mozhaisk line, a move supported by General Vasilevsky of the General Staff.[44] The Luftwaffe still controlled the sky wherever it appeared, and Stuka and bomber groups flew 537 sorties, destroying some 440 vehicles and 150 artillery pieces.[45][46]

On 15 October, Stalin ordered the evacuation of the Communist Party, the General Staff and various civil government offices from Moscow to Kuibyshev (now Samara), leaving only a limited number of officials behind. The evacuation caused panic among Muscovites. On 16–17 October, much of the civilian population tried to flee, mobbing the available trains and jamming the roads from the city. Despite all this, Stalin publicly remained in the Soviet capital, somewhat calming the fear and pandemonium.[30]

Mozhaisk defense line (13–30 October)

[edit]
Moscow women dig anti-tank trenches around their city in 1941.

By 13 October 1941, the Wehrmacht had reached the Mozhaisk defense line, a hastily constructed set of four lines of fortifications[23] protecting Moscow's western approaches which extended from Kalinin towards Volokolamsk and Kaluga. Despite recent reinforcements, only around 90,000 Soviet soldiers manned this line—far too few to stem the German advance.[47][48] Given the limited resources available, Zhukov decided to concentrate his forces at four critical points: the 16th Army under Lieutenant General Konstantin Rokossovsky guarded Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk was defended by 5th Army under Major General Leonid Govorov, the 43rd Army of Major General Konstantin Golubev defended Maloyaroslavets, and the 49th Army under Lieutenant General Ivan Zakharkin protected Kaluga.[49] The entire Soviet Western Front—nearly destroyed after its encirclement near Vyazma—was being recreated almost from scratch.[50]

Moscow itself was also hastily fortified. According to Zhukov, 250,000 women and teenagers worked building trenches and anti-tank moats around Moscow, moving almost three million cubic meters of earth with no mechanical help. Moscow's factories were hastily converted to military tasks: one automobile factory was turned into a submachine gun armory, a clock factory manufactured mine detonators, the chocolate factory shifted to food production for the front, and automobile repair stations worked fixing damaged tanks and military vehicles.[51] Despite these preparations, the capital was within striking distance of German tanks, with the Luftwaffe mounting large-scale air raids on the city. The air raids caused only limited damage because of extensive anti-aircraft defenses and effective civilian fire brigades.[52]

Anti-tank obstacles in a Moscow street, October 1941

On 13 October 1941 (15 October, according to other sources),[which?] the Wehrmacht resumed its offensive. At first, the German forces attempted to bypass Soviet defenses by pushing northeast towards the weakly protected city of Kalinin and south towards Kaluga and Tula, capturing all except Tula by 14 October. Encouraged by these initial successes, the Germans launched a frontal assault against the fortified line, taking Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets on 18 October, Naro-Fominsk on 21 October, and Volokolamsk on 27 October after intense fighting. Because of the increasing danger of flanking attacks, Zhukov was forced to fall back,[30] withdrawing his forces east of the Nara river.[53]

In the south, the Second Panzer Army initially advanced towards Tula with relative ease because the Mozhaisk defense line did not extend that far south and no significant concentrations of Soviet troops blocked their advance. However, bad weather, fuel problems, and damaged roads and bridges eventually slowed the German army, and Guderian did not reach the outskirts of Tula until 26 October.[54] The German plan initially called for the rapid capture of Tula, followed by a pincer move around Moscow. The first attack, however, was repelled by the 50th Army and civilian volunteers on 29 October, after a fight within sight of the city. This was followed by the counter-offensive by the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps whose flanks were secured by the 10th Army, 49th Army and 50th Army who attacked from Tula.[55] On 31 October, the German Army high command ordered a halt to all offensive operations until increasingly severe logistical problems were resolved and the rasputitsa subsided.[citation needed]

Wehrmacht advance towards Moscow (1 November – 5 December)

[edit]

Wearing down

[edit]

By late October, the German forces were worn out, with only a third of their motor vehicles still functioning, infantry divisions at third- to half-strength, and serious logistics issues preventing the delivery of warm clothing and other winter equipment to the front. Even Hitler seemed to surrender to the idea of a long struggle, since the prospect of sending tanks into such a large city without heavy infantry support seemed risky after the costly capture of Warsaw in 1939.[56]

Parade by Soviet troops on Red Square, Friday, 7 November 1941, depicted in 1949 painting by Konstantin Yuon vividly demonstrating the symbolic significance of the event[43]: 31 

To stiffen the resolve of the Red Army and boost civilian morale, Stalin ordered the traditional military parade on 7 November (Revolution Day) to be staged in Red Square. Soviet troops paraded past the Kremlin and then marched directly to the front. The parade carried a great symbolic significance by demonstrating the continued Soviet resolve, and was frequently invoked as such in the years to come. Despite this brave show, the Red Army's position remained precarious. Although 100,000 additional Soviet soldiers had reinforced Klin and Tula, where renewed German offensives were expected, Soviet defenses remained relatively thin. Nevertheless, Stalin ordered several preemptive counteroffensives against German lines. These were launched despite protests from Zhukov, who pointed out the complete lack of reserves.[57] The Wehrmacht repelled most of these counteroffensives, which squandered Soviet forces that could have been used for Moscow's defense. The only notable success of the offensive occurred west of Moscow near Aleksino, where Soviet tanks inflicted heavy losses on the 4th Army because the Germans still lacked anti-tank weapons capable of damaging the new, well-armoured T-34 tanks.[56]

From 31 October to 13–15 November, the Wehrmacht high command stood down while preparing to launch a second offensive towards Moscow. Although Army Group Centre still possessed considerable nominal strength, its fighting capabilities had been vitiated by wear and fatigue. While the Germans were aware of the continuous influx of Soviet reinforcements from the east as well as the presence of large reserves, given the tremendous Soviet casualties, they did not expect the Soviets to be able to mount a determined defense.[58] But in comparison to the situation in October, Soviet rifle divisions occupied a much stronger defensive position: a triple defensive ring surrounding the city and some remnants of the Mozhaisk line near Klin. Most of the Soviet field armies now had a multilayered defense, with at least two rifle divisions in second echelon positions. Artillery support and sapper teams were also concentrated along major roads that German troops were expected to use in their attacks. There were also many Soviet troops still available in reserve armies behind the front. Finally, Soviet troops—and especially officers—were now more experienced and better prepared for the offensive.[56]

By 15 November 1941, the ground had finally frozen, solving the mud problem. The armored Wehrmacht spearheads, consisting of 51 divisions, could now advance, with the goal of encircling Moscow and linking up near the city of Noginsk, east of the capital. To achieve this objective, the German Third and Fourth Panzer Groups needed to concentrate their forces between the Volga Reservoir and Mozhaysk, then proceed past the Soviet 30th Army to Klin and Solnechnogorsk, encircling the capital from the north. In the south, the Second Panzer Army intended to bypass Tula, still held by the Red Army, and advance to Kashira and Kolomna, linking up with the northern pincer at Noginsk. The German 4th Field Army in the centre were to "pin down the troops of the Western Front."[43]: 33, 42–43 

Failed pincer

[edit]
German soldiers tend to a wounded comrade near Moscow, November–December 1941.

On 15 November 1941, German tank armies began their offensive towards Klin, where no Soviet reserves were available because of Stalin's wish to attempt a counteroffensive at Volokolamsk, which had forced the relocation of all available reserve forces further south. Initial German attacks split the front in two, separating the 16th Army from the 30th.[56] Several days of intense combat followed. Zhukov recalled in his memoirs that "The enemy, ignoring the casualties, was making frontal assaults, willing to get to Moscow by any means necessary".[59] Despite the Wehrmacht's efforts, the multi-layered defense reduced Soviet casualties as the Soviet 16th Army slowly retreated and constantly harassed the German divisions which were trying to make their way through the fortifications.[citation needed]

The Third Panzer Army captured Klin after heavy fighting on 23 November, Solnechnogorsk as well by 24 November and Istra, by 24/25 November. Soviet resistance was still strong, and the outcome of the battle was by no means certain. Reportedly, Stalin asked Zhukov whether Moscow could be successfully defended and ordered him to "speak honestly, like a communist". Zhukov replied that it was possible, but reserves were urgently needed.[59] By 27 November, the German 7th Panzer Division had seized a bridgehead across the Moscow-Volga Canal—the last major obstacle before Moscow—and stood less than 35 km (22 mi) from the Kremlin;[56] but a powerful counterattack by the 1st Shock Army drove them back.[60] Just northwest of Moscow, the Wehrmacht reached Krasnaya Polyana, little more than 29 km (18 mi) from the Kremlin in central Moscow;[61] German officers were able to make out some of the major buildings of the Soviet capital through their field glasses. Both Soviet and German forces were severely depleted, sometimes having only 150–200 riflemen—a company's full strength—left in a regiment.[56]

In the south, near Tula, combat resumed on 18 November 1941, with the Second Panzer Army trying to encircle the city.[56] The German forces involved were extremely battered from previous fighting and still had no winter clothing. As a result, initial German progress was only 5–10 km (3.1–6.2 mi) per day.[62] Moreover, it exposed the German tank armies to flanking attacks from the Soviet 49th and 50th Armies, located near Tula, further slowing the advance. Guderian nevertheless was able to pursue the offensive, spreading his forces in a star-like attack, taking Stalinogorsk on 22 November 1941 and surrounding a Soviet rifle division stationed there.

German mechanized forces move through a hamlet towards Moscow, December 1941.

On 25 November 1941, the German 2nd Panzer Army under Guderian began advancing towards Kashira that lay 120 kilometres south-southeast of Moscow and 80 kilometres north-northeast of Tula. Kashira was of paramount importance, considering that it was the headquarters of the Soviet Western Front, one of the three main groups of resistance against the Nazi storm. The Germans were capable of seizing Venev and pushing towards storming formidably towards Kashira. Should Kashira fall, the road to Moscow would be open for the 2nd Panzer Group. In an attempt to halt the onslaught of the 2nd Panzer Group, the STAVKA High Command hurled Major General Pavel Belov's 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, General Andrei Getman's 112th Tank Division, an armoured brigade and a battalion of BM-13 Katyusha rocket launchers along with support from the air force against the Wehrmacht. The cavalrymen of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, which was primarily armed with the SVT-40 semi-automatic battle rifle and Cossack shashkas, as well as the mechanized troops possessing T-34 and KV-1 tanks, battled relentlessly against Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group. After much vicious fighting, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps was able to repel the armoured forces of Guderian and subsequently drove them back by 40 kilometres to the town of Mordves.[63]

The Germans were driven back in early December, securing the southern approach to the city.[64] Tula itself held, protected by fortifications and determined defenders mostly from the 50th Army, made of both soldiers and civilians. In the south, the Wehrmacht never got close to the capital. The first stroke of the Western-Front's counter-offensive on the outskirts of Moscow fell upon Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army.

Because of the resistance on both the northern and southern sides of Moscow, on 1 December the Wehrmacht attempted a direct offensive from the west along the Minsk-Moscow highway near the city of Naro-Fominsk. This offensive had limited tank support and was directed against extensive Soviet defenses. After meeting determined resistance from the Soviet 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division and flank counterattacks staged by the 33rd Army, the German offensive stalled and was driven back four days later in the ensuing Soviet counteroffensive.[56] On the same day, the French-manned 638th Infantry Regiment, the only foreign formation of the Wehrmacht that took part in the advance on Moscow, went into action near the village of Diutkovo.[65] On 2 December, a reconnaissance battalion came to the town of Khimki—some 30 km (19 mi) away from the Kremlin in central Moscow reaching its bridge over the Moscow-Volga Canal as well as its railway station. This marked the closest approach of German forces to Moscow.[66][67]

Red Army ski troops in Moscow. Still from documentary Moscow Strikes Back, 1942.

The European Winter of 1941–42 was the coldest of the twentieth century.[68] On 30 November, General Fedor von Bock claimed in a report to Berlin that the temperature was −45 °C (−49 °F).[69] General Erhard Raus, commander of the 6th Panzer Division, kept track of the daily mean temperature in his war diary. It shows a suddenly much colder period during 4–7 December: from −36 to −38 °C (−37 to −38 °F), although the method or reliability of his measurements is not known.[70] Other temperature reports varied widely.[71][72] Zhukov said that November's freezing weather stayed only around −7 to −10 °C (+19 to +14 °F).[73] Official Soviet Meteorological Service records show that at the lowest point, the lowest December temperature reached −28.8 °C (−20 °F).[73] These numbers indicated severely cold conditions, and German troops were freezing with no winter clothing, using equipment that was not designed for such low temperatures. More than 130,000 cases of frostbite were reported among German soldiers.[47] Frozen grease had to be removed from every loaded shell[47] and vehicles had to be heated for hours before use. The same cold weather hit the Soviet troops, but they were better prepared.[72] German clothing was supplemented by Soviet clothing and boots, which were often in better condition than German clothes as the owners had spent much less time at the front. Corpses were thawed out to remove the items; once when 200 bodies were left on the battlefield the "saw commandos" recovered sufficient clothing to outfit every man in a battalion.[74]

The Axis offensive on Moscow stopped. Guderian wrote in his journal that "the offensive on Moscow failed ... We underestimated the enemy's strength, as well as his size and climate. Fortunately, I stopped my troops on 5 December, otherwise the catastrophe would be unavoidable."[75]

Some historians have suggested that artificial floods played an important role in defending Moscow.[76] They were primarily meant to break the ice and prevent troops and heavy military equipment from crossing the Volga river and Ivankovo Reservoir.[77] This began with the blowing up of the Istra [ru] waterworks reservoir dam on 24 November 1941. On 28 November 1941, the water was drained into the Yakhroma and Sestra Rivers from six reservoirs (Khimki [ru], Iksha [ru], Pyalovskoye [ru], Pestovskoye [ru], Pirogovskoye [ru], and Klyazma [ru] reservoirs), as well as from Ivankovo Reservoir using dams near Dubna.[76] This caused some 30–40 villages to become partially submerged even in the severe winter weather conditions of the time.[76][78] Both were results of Soviet General Headquarters' Order 0428 dated 17 November 1941. Artificial floods were also used as an unconventional weapon of direct impact.[79]

Soviet counter-offensive

[edit]
Soldiers transferred from Siberia on a troop train bound for Moscow, October 1941

Although the Wehrmacht's offensive had been stopped, German intelligence estimated that Soviet forces had no more reserves left and thus would be unable to stage a counteroffensive. This estimate proved wrong, as Stalin transferred over 18 divisions, 1,700 tanks, and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East after learning that Imperial Japan had no plans to invade the USSR in the near future from Richard Sorge.[80] The Red Army had accumulated a 58-division reserve by early December,[47] when the offensive proposed by Zhukov and Vasilevsky was finally approved by Stalin.[81] Even with these new reserves, Soviet forces committed to the operation numbered only 1,100,000 men,[71] only slightly outnumbering the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, with careful troop deployment, a ratio of two-to-one was reached at some critical points.[47]

On 5 December 1941, the counteroffensive for "removing the immediate threat to Moscow" started on the Kalinin Front. The North-Western Front and Western Fronts began their offensives the next day. After several days of little progress, Soviet armies retook Solnechnogorsk on 12 December and Klin on 15 December. Guderian's army "beat a hasty retreat towards Venev" and then Sukhinichi. "The threat overhanging Tula was removed".[43]: 44–46, 48–51 [82]

The Soviet winter counter-offensive, 5 December 1941 – 7 May 1942

On 8 December, Hitler had signed his directive No.39, ordering the Wehrmacht to assume a defensive stance on the whole front. German troops were unable to organize a solid defense at their initial locations and were forced to pull back to consolidate their lines. Guderian wrote that discussions with Hans Schmidt and Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen took place the same day, and both commanders agreed the current front line could not be held.[21] On 14 December, Halder and Günther von Kluge finally gave permission for a limited withdrawal to the west of the Oka, without Hitler's approval.[83][84] On 20 December, during a meeting with German senior officers, Hitler cancelled the withdrawal and ordered his soldiers to defend every patch of ground, "digging trenches with howitzer shells if needed".[85][86] Guderian protested, pointing out that losses from cold were actually greater than combat losses and that winter equipment was held up by traffic ties in Poland.[87][88] Nevertheless, Hitler insisted on defending the existing lines, and Guderian was dismissed by 25 December, along with generals Hoepner and Strauss, commanders of the 4th Panzer and 9th Army, respectively. Bock was also dismissed, officially for "medical reasons".[89] Brauchitsch had been removed even earlier, on 19 December.[43][90][91]

Meanwhile, the Soviet offensive continued in the north. The offensive liberated Kalinin and the Soviets reached Klin on 7 December, overrunning the headquarters of the LVI Panzer Corps outside the city. As the Kalinin Front drove west, a bulge developed around Klin. The Soviet front commander, Konev, attempted to envelop any German forces remaining. Zhukov diverted more forces to the southern end of the bulge, to help Konev trap the 3rd Panzer Army. The Germans pulled their forces out in time. Although the encirclement failed, it unhinged the German defenses. A second attempt was made to outflank Army Group Centre's northern forces, but met strong opposition near Rzhev and was forced to halt, forming a salient that would last until March 1943. In the south, the offensive went equally well, with Southwestern Front forces relieving Tula on 16 December 1941. A major achievement was the encirclement and destruction of the German XXXV Corps, protecting Guderian's Second Panzer Army's southern flank.[92]

The Luftwaffe was paralysed in the second half of December. The weather, recorded as –42 °C (–44 °F) though not officially substantiated[by whom?], was a meteorological record.[93] Logistical difficulties and freezing temperatures created technical difficulties until January 1942. In the meantime, the Luftwaffe had virtually vanished from the skies over Moscow, while the Red Air Force, operating from better prepared bases and benefiting from interior lines, grew stronger.[93] On 4 January, the skies cleared. The Luftwaffe was quickly reinforced, as Hitler hoped it would save the situation. The Kampfgeschwader (Bomber Squadrons) II./KG 4 and II./KG 30 arrived from refitting in Germany, whilst four Transportgruppen (Transport Groups) with a strength of 102 Junkers Ju 52 transports were deployed from Luftflotte 4 (Air Fleet 4) to evacuate surrounded army units and improve the supply line to the front-line forces. It was a last minute effort and it worked. The German air arm was to help prevent a total collapse of Army Group Centre. Despite the Soviets' best efforts, the Luftwaffe had contributed enormously to the survival of Army Group Centre. Between 17 and 22 December the Luftwaffe destroyed 299 motor vehicles and 23 tanks around Tula, hampering the Red Army's pursuit of the German Army.[94][95]

In the centre, Soviet progress was much slower. Soviet troops liberated Naro-Fominsk only on 26 December, Kaluga on 28 December, and Maloyaroslavets on 2 January, after ten days of violent action. Soviet reserves ran low, and the offensive halted on 7 January 1942, after having pushed the exhausted and freezing German armies back 100–250 km (62–155 mi) from Moscow. Stalin continued to order more offensives in order to trap and destroy Army Group Centre in front of Moscow, but the Red Army was exhausted and overstretched and they failed.[96] In any case, the outcome of this battle put an end to Hitler's hope of a fast victory.[97]

Aftermath

[edit]
German soldiers surrender: still from the documentary Moscow Strikes Back, 1942
Red Army soldiers celebrating after the successful Soviet counteroffensive, December 1941

Furious that his army had been unable to take Moscow, Hitler dismissed Brauchitsch on 19 December 1941, and took personal charge of the Wehrmacht,[90] effectively taking control of all military decisions. Hitler surrounded himself with staff officers with little or no recent combat experience.[98]

The Red Army's winter counter-offensive drove the Wehrmacht from Moscow, but the city was still considered to be threatened, with the front line relatively close. Because of this, the Moscow theater remained a priority for Stalin.[Note 2]

On 5 January 1942, during a meeting in the Kremlin, Stalin announced that he was planning a general spring offensive, which would be staged simultaneously near Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, and the Crimea. This plan was accepted over Zhukov's objections.[100]

A documentary film, Moscow Strikes Back, (Russian: Разгром немецких войск под Москвой, "Rout of the German Troops near Moscow"), was made during the battle and rapidly released in the Soviet Union. It was taken to America and shown at the Globe in New York in August 1942. The New York Times reviewer commented that "The savagery of that retreat is a spectacle to stun the mind".[101] As well as the Moscow parade and battle scenes, the film included images of German atrocities committed during the occupation, "the naked and slaughtered children stretched out in ghastly rows, the youths dangling limply in the cold from gallows that were rickety, but strong enough".[101]

Legacy

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2001 Russian stamp for the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow

The defense of Moscow became a symbol of Soviet resistance against the invading Axis forces. To commemorate the battle, Moscow was awarded the title of "Hero City" in 1965, on the 20th anniversary of Victory Day. A Museum of the Defence of Moscow was created in 1995.[102]

In Moscow, an annual military parade on Red Square on 7 November is held in honor of the October Revolution Parade and as a substitute for the October Revolution celebrations that have not been celebrated on a national level since 1995. The parade is held to commemorate the historical event as a Day of Military Honour. The parade includes troops of the Moscow Garrison and the Western Military District, which usually numbers to close to 3,000 soldiers, cadets, and Red Army reenactors. The parade is presided by the Mayor of Moscow who delivers a speech during the event. Prior to the start of the parade, an historical reenactment of the Battle of Moscow is performed by young students, volunteers, and historical enthusiasts.[103]

Soldiers dressed in Red Army uniforms carrying the standards of the military fronts of the Eastern Front on Red Square, 7 November 2018

The parade commands are always given by a high ranking veteran of the armed forces (usually with a billet of a Colonel) who gives the orders for the march past from the grandstand near the Lenin Mausoleum. On the command of Quick March! by the parade commander, the parade begins with the tune of Song of the Soviet Army, to which the historical color guards holding wartime symbols such as the Banner of Victory and the standards of the various military fronts march to. Musical support during the parade is always provided by the Massed Bands of the Moscow Garrison, which includes various military bands in the Western Military District, The Regimental Band of the 154th Preobrazhensky Regiment, and the Central Military Band of the Ministry of Defense of Russia.[104][105]

Casualties

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Both German and Soviet casualties during the battle of Moscow have been a subject of debate, as various sources provide somewhat different estimates. Not all historians agree on what should be considered the "Battle of Moscow" in the timeline of World War II. While the start of the battle is usually regarded as the beginning of Operation Typhoon on 30 September 1941 (or sometimes on 2 October 1941), there are two different dates for the end of the offensive. In particular, some sources (such as Erickson[106] and Glantz[107]) exclude the Rzhev offensive from the scope of the battle, considering it as a distinct operation and making the Moscow offensive "stop" on 7 January 1942—thus lowering the number of casualties.

There are also significant differences in figures from various sources. John Erickson, in his Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, gives a figure of 653,924 Soviet casualties between October 1941 and January 1942.[106] Glantz, in his book When Titans Clashed, gives a figure of 658,279 for the defense phase alone, plus 370,955 for the winter counteroffensive until 7 January 1942.[107] The official Wehrmacht daily casualty reports show 35,757 killed in action, 128,716 wounded, and 9,721 missing in action for the entire Army Group Centre between 1 October 1941 and 10 January 1942.[108] However, this official report does not match unofficial reports from individual battalion and divisional officers and commanders at the front, who record suffering far higher casualties than was officially reported.[109] As noted by historian Vladimir Litvinenko, with reference to another researcher Christopher Russ, the losses of German troops according to 10-day reports are significantly underestimated, the normal accounting system was organized only in the middle of 1942.[110]

On the Russian side, discipline became ferocious. The NKVD blocking groups were ready to shoot anyone retreating without orders. NKVD squads went to field hospitals in search of soldiers with self-inflicted injuries, the so-called 'self shooters' - those who shot themselves in the left hand to escape fighting. A surgeon in a field hospital of the Red Army admitted to amputating the hands of boys who tried this 'self-shooting' idea to escape fighting, to protect them from immediate execution via punishment squad.[111]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Battle of Moscow was a decisive military campaign on the Eastern Front of , consisting of the German offensive Operation Typhoon from 2 October to 5 December 1941 and the ensuing Soviet counteroffensive through January 1942, in which Army Group Center advanced to within 5 miles of the capital before being halted and driven back, inflicting the Wehrmacht's first major strategic reversal. Launched amid the broader , the German effort under aimed to seize Moscow as a political and logistical hub to compel Soviet collapse, achieving initial encirclements that captured over 600,000 Soviet troops near and but straining supply lines across vast terrain. Soviet defenses, bolstered by reserve armies totaling around 4.2 million men including Siberian units, exploited German exhaustion, 65% tank attrition, and severe weather to launch a counteroffensive on 5 December, repelling invaders 80 to 150 miles and underscoring the Red Army's capacity for mass mobilization despite prior purges and losses. This clash highlighted causal factors in German failure—overextension, logistical collapse, and underestimation of Soviet depth—shifting the war toward prolonged attrition that eroded Axis prospects for quick victory.

Prelude to the Battle

Strategic Objectives of Operation Barbarossa

Adolf Hitler conceived as a crusade to eradicate , secure Lebensraum (living space) for the German , and exploit the Soviet Union's vast resources, viewing the invasion not merely as a but as a racial against perceived Jewish-Bolshevik influence and inferior Slavic masses. This ideological imperative overshadowed conventional strategic aims like decapitating Soviet leadership, with Hitler prioritizing the destruction of forces in border battles over immediate advances on key cities, as outlined in Führer Directive No. 21 issued on December 18, 1940. German planners envisioned the operation culminating in a defensive line from Archangelsk to the Volga River, enabling the economic integration of conquered territories into the Grossdeutsches Reich. The offensive divided into three army groups to achieve parallel but uncoordinated objectives: Army Group North, under Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb, was to seize the Baltic states and Leningrad to cut Soviet access to the Baltic Sea and secure northern flanks; Army Group Center, commanded by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock with 50 divisions including two panzer groups, targeted the central corridor toward Moscow via Minsk and Smolensk, aiming to shatter Soviet command structures; and Army Group South, led by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, focused on Ukraine's agricultural and industrial wealth, advancing to Kiev, the Don River basin, and eventually the Caucasus oil fields. This dispersal of over 3 million Axis troops, 3,600 tanks, and 2,500 aircraft reflected an ambitious bid for total victory within a single campaigning season, but it diluted focus on any single decisive point like Moscow. Hitler and his generals operated under flawed premises of Soviet fragility, assuming the —weakened by Stalin's 1937-1938 purges that executed or imprisoned over 30,000 officers—would disintegrate within eight to ten weeks upon the "kicking in the door," triggering internal collapse akin to the 1917 Revolution. They discounted the USSR's manpower reserves exceeding 14 million mobilizable personnel, the logistical challenges of vast distances and poor infrastructure, and the potential for Soviet industrial relocation eastward, prioritizing instead the perceived ease of conquering "Asiatic" expanses with tactics proven in . These assumptions facilitated that emphasized encirclements for mass destruction of Soviet units rather than sustained advances, setting the preconditions for later diversions, such as Army Group Center's panzer forces redirected southward in August 1941 to capture Ukraine's grain and coal, delaying the Moscow thrust despite its designation as a nominal objective.

Soviet Military Vulnerabilities and Preparations

The Great Purge from 1937 to 1938 decimated the Red Army's officer corps, resulting in the repression of approximately 35,000 officers through executions, gulag sentences, or dismissals, which left the military leadership predominantly inexperienced and doctrinally rigid. This purge, driven by Stalin's paranoia over potential disloyalty, eliminated key commanders such as Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and 81 of 103 army generals, fostering a culture of caution and poor initiative that hampered tactical flexibility during the German invasion. The resulting command deficiencies contributed to catastrophic early defeats in Operation Barbarossa, where Soviet forces, lacking effective coordination, fell into multiple large-scale encirclements and suffered over 2.5 million casualties in the first five months alone. Stalin's dismissal of repeated intelligence warnings about the impending German attack—originating from Soviet spies like , British , and even deserters—stemmed from his adherence to the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and fear that mobilization would provoke Hitler prematurely. He viewed such alerts as Western disinformation aimed at drawing the USSR into conflict, ordering border troops to avoid "provocative" actions even as German forces amassed over 3 million men along the frontier by June 1941. This denial, combined with the pact's illusion of security, prompted the forward concentration of some 2.9 million Soviet troops in exposed salients near the border, without robust rearward defenses or mobile reserves, making them prime targets for German armored breakthroughs and pincer movements that annihilated entire armies in weeks. Despite these vulnerabilities, Soviet authorities initiated frantic emergency measures post-invasion to reconstitute forces and sustain the . Industrial evacuations relocated over 1,523 major defense enterprises and approximately 10-12 million workers and civilians eastward to the Urals, , and between July and December 1941, often under duress with machinery dismantled and shipped by rail amid advancing German armies. These relocations preserved critical production, enabling the output of tanks and artillery that equipped newly formed divisions from the Reserve, totaling around 75 formations deployed to the Western Front by autumn. Conscription swelled the to over 8 million by October, supplemented by transfers of about 14 seasoned divisions from the —many acclimated to winter warfare—providing fresh, unbloodied units capable of stiffening defenses as German forces neared .

German Offensive Operations

Launch of Operation Typhoon

Operation Typhoon, the German offensive aimed at capturing , was launched on October 2, 1941, by Army Group Center under , following preliminary attacks by the 2nd Panzer Group on September 30. The operation's primary objective was to encircle and annihilate Soviet forces west of through converging pincer movements by panzer groups, thereby clearing the path to the Soviet capital before winter set in, rather than a direct assault on the city itself. In the opening days, German forces achieved rapid tactical successes by exploiting weaknesses in Soviet defenses, with the 2nd Panzer Group under General advancing over 200 kilometers southeast toward Orel and the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups pushing northward and westward to create encirclement pockets. These penetrations succeeded despite the prior diversion of Center's panzer forces to the Battle of Kiev in , which had delayed the Moscow thrust but allowed partial refitting of units. Infantry divisions followed the panzers, securing flanks amid favorable autumn weather that initially supported mobility. However, early strains were evident from the Wehrmacht's unrelenting campaign since the invasion's start on , with troops experiencing cumulative from three months of continuous combat and minimal rotations. Equipment maintenance lagged, as panzer divisions reported rising breakdown rates—up to 30-50% non-operational in some units due to wear from prior operations and inadequate spare parts—while supply lines stretched over 1,000 kilometers relied heavily on vulnerable rail conversions and horse-drawn logistics. These factors, though not yet halting momentum, foreshadowed vulnerabilities in sustaining the offensive's pace against determined Soviet resistance.

Encirclements at Vyazma and Bryansk

The German encirclement at formed as part of Operation Typhoon's northern pincer, executed by the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups of Army Group Center, which advanced rapidly through gaps in Soviet defenses between 2 and 7 October 1941. Converging east of on 8 October, these forces severed Soviet supply lines and isolated the 19th, 20th, 24th, and 32nd Armies, comprising roughly half a million troops in a confined pocket spanning approximately 50 kilometers. This tactical success stemmed from German armored spearheads' superior mobility and coordination, outpacing Soviet reinforcements redeployed from the front per directives, which inadvertently exposed flanks to envelopment. In parallel, the Bryansk encirclement developed southward, where the 2nd Panzer Army under Guderian hooked northward from its Desna River bridgehead starting 3 October, linking with the 2nd Army's eastern thrust by 6 October to enclose the Soviet 3rd, 13th, and 50th Armies in a pocket south of the main Moscow axis. German maneuver warfare here emphasized deep penetration by panzer divisions, bypassing strongpoints to achieve operational surprise against fragmented Soviet commands still recovering from earlier summer defeats. The resulting twin pockets trapped over 600,000 Soviet personnel, underscoring Army Group Center's proficiency in large-scale cauldron battles honed since Barbarossa's outset. Soviet escape efforts revealed systemic inefficiencies in command and mobility, with Stalin's insistence on holding positions preventing timely withdrawals, though isolated breakouts occurred—such as remnants of the 32nd Army under General Vishnevsky pushing northwest through German flanks amid heavy fighting from 10 to 13 . German overextension, however, precluded airtight closures, as panzer units prioritized linkage over consolidation, allowing some 100,000 Soviet troops to filter out before infantry divisions arrived for reduction. The pockets' liquidation, completed by 14 at and 20 at , demanded sustained commitment of follow-on forces, diverting mechanized elements from exploitation toward and compressing the offensive timeline amid autumn rains. This phase highlighted causal trade-offs in German : victories yielded decisive tactical gains but imposed operational pauses that eroded momentum against a resilient adversary.

Push to the Mozhaisk Defense Line

Following the successful encirclements at and in early October 1941, elements of German Army Group Center, including the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups, resumed their eastward push toward Moscow's outer defenses as part of Operation Typhoon. The under General advanced from the south, aiming to outflank Soviet positions and seize key road junctions. A critical engagement occurred south of Mtsensk on October 6, 1941, where the Soviet 4th Tank Brigade—deploying T-34 medium tanks and KV-1 heavy tanks for the first time in concentrated numbers—ambushed advancing units of the German 4th Panzer Division. The Soviet tanks' sloped armor and 76 mm guns proved resistant to German Panzer III and IV fire, while their mobility disrupted coordinated blitzkrieg assaults, forcing the panzer division to halt for several days amid heavy casualties. Guderian personally observed the action and reported the T-34's technical superiority, noting it outmatched existing German designs in protection and firepower, which compelled tactical adaptations like emphasizing anti-tank guns over tank-on-tank combat. Further north, the 4th Panzer Group encountered stubborn resistance at Borodino and other approach points, where Soviet anti-tank rifles, 45 mm guns, and improvised defenses inflicted attrition on German armored spearheads between October 7 and 13. These battles eroded the momentum of rapid encirclement tactics, as Soviet forces, though outnumbered, leveraged terrain and tank quality to delay advances and contest every village and crossroads. German divisions, lagging behind the panzers due to foot marches and horse-drawn , faced mounting exhaustion from continuous fighting without full . The onset of in mid-to-late exacerbated these challenges, as autumn rains transformed unpaved Russian roads into deep , bogging down trucks, artillery, and even tracked vehicles that sank axles-deep in the quagmire. Motorized supply columns averaged only 20-30 kilometers per day, starving forward units of and , while divisions became vulnerable to flanking attacks during prolonged exposure on open fields. Initial snowfalls around 15-20 froze the surface temporarily, aiding traction but introducing that strained tires and tracks unprepared for sub-zero conditions. By October 18, 1941, panzer elements of the 10th Panzer and SS Das Reich Divisions had penetrated and captured Mozhaisk itself, approximately 110 kilometers west of , fracturing the eponymous and placing German forward within sight of the capital's spires on clear days. However, the attacking forces were severely understrength, having suffered over 40,000 casualties in the prior encirclements and dozens of tanks lost to Soviet countermeasures, with panzer divisions operating at 50-60% of their establishment levels. This positioned Center for a final lunge but highlighted the cumulative toll of extended supply lines and environmental factors on operational tempo.

Soviet Defensive Operations

Redeployment and Fortification Efforts

In early October 1941, amid disarray following the German encirclements at and , appointed General to coordinate the Western and Reserve Fronts, tasking him with organizing the overall defense of . Zhukov immediately initiated troop redeployments, shifting surviving units from shattered formations and less threatened sectors to bolster the front lines, prioritizing the consolidation of unrouted elements into coherent defensive groups despite ongoing leadership disruptions and command purges. On October 16, 1941, Stalin ordered the evacuation of government offices, foreign embassies, and non-essential personnel to Kuibyshev (now Samara), while he remained in the capital to signal resolve; this measure aimed to reduce administrative burdens and safeguard continuity, even as partial panic ensued among civilians. Concurrently, Soviet authorities mobilized over 200,000 Moscow residents—including women, adolescents, and factory workers—for fortification labor, directing them to construct anti-tank ditches, trenches, and barricades along key approaches. Central to these efforts was the Mozhaisk defense line, decreed by on July 18, 1941, and hastily built as a multi-layered barrier extending approximately 120 kilometers from the Moscow-Volga Canal in the north through Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, and Maloyaroslavets to the upper Upa River in the south. This improvised network of fieldworks, including double rows of trenches and obstacles, relied on rapid reinforcements from redeployed divisions under General Pavel Artemev's oversight, though actual manning fell short of planned 25-division strength due to prior losses. To enforce cohesion amid retreat risks and straggler influxes, units formed blocking detachments behind forward positions, arresting deserters, rallying disorganized troops, and compelling adherence to "no step back" orders, as documented in internal reports from the period. These measures reflected high command's acute awareness of Moscow's as the Soviet Union's political-symbolic core and primary rail-logistics hub, necessitating a strategy of incremental, position-by-position resistance to exhaust German momentum and permit reserve buildup.

Battles Along the Approaches to Moscow

Following the encirclements at and , German Army Group Center pressed toward the Mozhaisk defense line, encountering fortified Soviet positions manned by hastily redeployed units from the Western and Reserve Fronts. The Mozhaisk-Maloyaroslavets Defensive Operation, spanning 10 to 30 October 1941, saw the German 4th Army and 4th Panzer Group clash with elements of the Soviet 5th Army under Ivan Koniev. German forces captured Maloyaroslavets on 18 October after fierce combat, but Soviet counterattacks delayed further advances, restricting gains to narrow corridors amid entrenched defenses. To the north, the Volokolamsk sector became a focal point of attrition, where the Soviet 16th Army, commanded by , anchored defenses along the Volokolamsk-Moscow highway with divisions like the 78th Rifle Division. German III Motorized Corps of the 3rd Panzer Group assaulted these positions from late , engaging in house-to-house fighting that yielded only incremental progress; Volokolamsk fell on 27 , yet Soviet rearguards inflicted heavy casualties through close-quarters engagements and ambushes. Gains here measured mere kilometers daily, as depleted German panzer units struggled against resolute resistance bolstered by fresh Siberian divisions trickling into the line. In early November, as mud from autumn rains hampered mechanized advances and grounded much of the , reducing effective air superiority, German probes continued but faltered short of breakthroughs. The Klin-Solnechnogorsk sector witnessed the 3rd Panzer Group's push from 15 November, capturing Klin on 23 November after bypassing Soviet strongpoints, yet overall advances stalled at 25 kilometers in key phases due to overextended supply lines and mounting Soviet firepower. Soviet defenders employed harsh measures, including the integration of Gulag prisoners and early penal companies into regular units for high-risk assaults and holding actions, alongside scorched-earth directives issued in mid-November to demolish bridges, depots, and crops, denying resources to pursuers and exacerbating German logistical strains. These tactics, combined with tenacious stands, imposed disproportionate attrition on attackers, preventing of Moscow despite local tactical successes.

Emergence of Stalemate

German Logistical Exhaustion and Command Errors

The German advance during Operation Typhoon strained supply lines extending over 1,000 kilometers from initial staging areas in and eastern , where inadequate rail and road infrastructure compounded vulnerabilities. The Soviet Union's tracks (1,520 mm) necessitated time-consuming conversion to standard European gauge (1,435 mm), with German units managing only limited throughput; by October 1941, captured rail lines operated at barely one-quarter of scheduled capacity due to the poor condition of infrastructure and conversion delays. Partisan sabotage further eroded this network, with Soviet-organized groups targeting rails, bridges, and convoys in rear areas, disrupting fuel and deliveries essential for mechanized forces; by late 1941, such attacks had escalated into systematic interference, forcing German units to allocate troops for security rather than frontline duties. These factors left panzer divisions critically short of fuel and spares beyond the Mozhaisk line, halting momentum independent of seasonal conditions. Command decisions exacerbated these material constraints through strategic diversions and tactical interference. In August 1941, ordered Panzer Group 2 under —originally part of Center's drive toward —to redirect southward for the Kiev , a move Guderian protested as it delayed the central thrust by over a month despite yielding 600,000 Soviet prisoners. , commanding Center, advocated prioritizing to exploit vulnerabilities there, but Hitler's insistence on southern gains fragmented forces and fatigued panzer units before Typhoon's launch on October 2. During Typhoon itself, Hitler overruled field commanders by mandating panzer support for infantry consolidation rather than rapid exploitation, as evidenced in disputes between Guderian and Bock over timings at and , which dispersed armored strength and allowed Soviet forces to regroup. German planning further faltered from misjudging Soviet resilience, particularly the rapid relocation of industrial assets. Intelligence assessments anticipated collapse of Soviet production following territorial losses, yet the USSR evacuated over 1,360 major factories eastward beyond the Urals by October 1941, sustaining output of tanks and artillery despite early captures of depots. This underestimation—rooted in overreliance on initial successes—led to persistent Soviet equipment availability, as German forces encountered fresh tanks and artillery in quantities exceeding expectations, straining already depleted without corresponding Axis gains.

Soviet Accumulation of Reserves

In the autumn of 1941, Soviet intelligence, particularly reports from agent in confirming Japan's intent to avoid a two-front war, enabled the to redeploy approximately 20 divisions from the Far Eastern Front to the region without fear of Japanese invasion. These units, including rifle divisions like the 78th, 239th, and 316th, arrived battle-hardened from border clashes with and bolstered the Western and Kalinin Fronts with over 200,000 troops, providing a numerical edge in manpower density despite their limited mechanization. Beyond Siberian transfers, the Soviet Union mobilized more than 1 million reinforcements overall for the Moscow defenses through accelerated conscription from the interior reserves, drawing on a population base exceeding 190 million to offset prior losses of nearly 4 million personnel since June. This included forming 25 divisions of the Moscow People's Militia in July-August from urban volunteers and inductees, supplemented by 14 new rifle divisions and additional tank brigades raised by Stalin's direct orders in October, emphasizing quantity over quality amid raw recruit training deficits. Conscription drives prioritized sheer volume, with classes from 1905-1923 called up en masse, though effectiveness was hampered by inadequate equipment and morale issues, including desertion rates estimated at 10-20% in some formations due to harsh conditions and command purges. Soviet logistical superiority stemmed from shorter , facilitating rail transport of reinforcements from the Urals and to in days rather than weeks, with the Red Army's rail repair teams restoring over 10,000 kilometers of track by to sustain supply flows. However, this advantage was undermined by fragmented command structures, where directives often clashed with front-level improvisation, leading to duplicated efforts and supply bottlenecks; for instance, ammunition shortages persisted despite 40 new artillery regiments arriving, as coordination failures delayed integration into defensive lines. These reserves, while numerically overwhelming, relied on human wave tactics rather than doctrinal innovation, reflecting the regime's emphasis on endurance over refined operational art.

Soviet Counteroffensive

Initiation and Phases of the Counterattack

The Soviet counteroffensive against Army Group Center began on 5 December 1941, initiated by the Kalinin Front northwest of Moscow at approximately 3:00 a.m. amid severe winter conditions, with temperatures reaching -22°F (-30°C). This assault was coordinated by General , who directed the efforts of the Western Front, Kalinin Front, and Southwestern Front to exploit the German forces' exhaustion following the stalled Operation , including depleted supplies, frostbite casualties, and dispersed positions without adequate winter preparations. The attacks caught German commanders off-guard, as Field Marshal and had issued a defensive halt order on the same day, unaware of the scale of Soviet reserves amassed from Siberian divisions. Initial strikes by the Kalinin and Western Fronts achieved rapid penetrations, with Soviet supported by and limited armor breaking through German lines in multiple sectors, advancing up to 20–30 km in the first days and extending to over 100 km within the opening week. Massed assaults enabled the recapture of key towns such as Istra west of by elements of the Western Front's 16th and 5th Armies, while in the south, the Southwestern Front's operations contributed to relieving pressure on Tula through counterthrusts that pushed back the German . These gains disrupted German cohesion, forcing improvised withdrawals amid ammunition shortages and inadequate entrenchments. The operation unfolded in planned phases, with the first emphasizing immediate repulsion of the threat to Moscow by driving Center remnants 100–250 km rearward across a 600-km front, followed by a second phase aiming to encircle and annihilate exposed German salients. However, Soviet forces lacked sufficient operational-level panzer reserves for deep exploitation, relying instead on infantry-heavy attacks that prioritized territorial recovery over complete destruction of encircled units, limiting the counteroffensive's scope despite early momentum.

Key Engagements and German Withdrawal

The Soviet counteroffensive commenced on December 5, 1941, with the Kalinin Front recapturing Krasnaya Polyana and adjacent towns, initiating a series of engagements that targeted German salients around Moscow's northern and southern approaches. On , the Western Front's 16th advanced west of Krasnaya Polyana, while the 30th threatened Klin, severing key German supply lines by and leading to the liberation of Klin between December 15 and 26. Further south, Soviet forces assaulted on December 26, capturing it amid intense fighting in Moscow's western suburbs, where ski-equipped units from Siberian divisions exploited deep snow to outflank frozen German infantry positions lacking winter mobility. T-34 tanks played a pivotal role in these clashes, leveraging their wide tracks for traction in snow and compressed-air starters to operate reliably in sub-zero temperatures, enabling penetrations against German defenses ill-equipped for the terrain. By late December, advances reached on and Maloyaroslavets on , 1942, with the 43rd breaching lines between Borovsk and Maloyaroslavets to create a 15-kilometer gap, forcing German units into fragmented retreats. German responses involved ordered withdrawals to consolidate lines, as seen on December 7 when the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups fell back, abandoning 15 tanks, three howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, and numerous trucks due to mechanical failures in the cold. The similarly discarded vehicles and artillery east of Tula on , with hasty evacuations amplifying losses as immobilized equipment was left behind to evade . Hitler's "stand-fast" order on curtailed broader retreats but exacerbated equipment attrition, as troops prioritized survival over salvage. Amid these pressures, Fedor von Bock, commander of Army Group Center, was replaced by General on December 19, 1941, following Bock's health issues and the escalating crisis, with Kluge immediately authorizing limited pullbacks such as the 4th Army's 15-kilometer repositioning on January 7, 1942. The Soviet momentum waned by early January 1942, as overextended forces depleted reserves and encountered stiffened German defenses, mirroring earlier German logistical overreach; the offensive formally halted on January 7 after advances of 100-250 kilometers, constrained by harsh weather, supply strains, and tactical German countermeasures.

Immediate Aftermath

Territorial Recalibrations

The Soviet counteroffensive, launched on 5 December 1941, compelled German Army Group Center to retreat, resulting in territorial displacements of up to 240 kilometers (150 miles) in key sectors northwest and west of by mid-January 1942. This advance eliminated the direct peril to the Soviet capital but fell short of annihilating significant German formations, as Army Group Center executed phased withdrawals that preserved its primary combat elements despite severe attrition. German forces reestablished a defensive posture along the Rzhev-Vyazma line, forming a salient protruding eastward toward that anchored their central front position through early 1942. This configuration, spanning roughly 100 kilometers in depth at points, allowed the to retain operational viability in the region, though it exposed flanks to subsequent Soviet probing attacks without yielding to complete liquidation during the initial counteroffensive phase. Concurrently, partisan operations in German rear areas escalated markedly following the Moscow front's stabilization, with Soviet irregulars disrupting supply lines and garrisons across occupied territories east of . German records documented persistent ambushes and that winter, undermining control over bypassed enclaves and necessitating diversion of troops from frontline duties, though partisan efficacy remained uneven due to coordination challenges and harsh weather.

Morale and Command Repercussions

The German Army's failure to capture Moscow represented its first major defeat of , profoundly undermining the confidence in rapid, decisive operations that had characterized earlier campaigns. Troops, expecting a swift victory before winter, faced unprecedented hardships as temperatures plummeted to -30°C (-22°F) or lower in late November 1941, leading to widespread cases by early November due to insufficient and equipment not designed for extreme cold. Soldiers resorted to improvising with captured Soviet gear or civilian donations, but these measures proved inadequate, fostering resentment toward high command for logistical oversights and eroding the sense of superiority over Soviet forces. Hitler's intervention in operational decisions intensified amid the crisis, with his , 1941, order to Chief of the Army General Staff explicitly forbidding retreats and mandating defense of every position, regardless of conditions. This directive, born from the panic of the Soviet counteroffensive starting , marked the genesis of Hitler's rigid "stand fast" policy, prioritizing willpower over tactical flexibility and signaling a doctrinal pivot toward prolonged . Such commands strained relations between Hitler and field commanders like and , contributing to Brauchitsch's dismissal on December 19 and foreshadowing broader command discord. In contrast, Soviet morale, though initially fragile after summer retreats, was rigidly sustained through enforcement mechanisms that penalized desertion with execution or penal battalions, pausing but not eliminating the legacy of pre-war purges. Stalin's regime emphasized patriotic defense of the capital, with blocking detachments deployed from October 1941 to halt unauthorized withdrawals, coercing compliance amid high casualties. Georgy Zhukov's appointment as commander of the Western Front on October 10, 1941, and his orchestration of the counteroffensive elevated his prestige, positioning him as a symbol of redemption for the decimated officer corps while underscoring Stalin's selective trust in proven leaders over purged rivals.

Casualties and Losses

German Personnel and Equipment Losses

German forces incurred approximately 250,000 during the Battle of Moscow, encompassing killed, wounded, and missing personnel, with some estimates extending to 400,000 when accounting for the full scope of the operation from 1941 to January 1942. These figures derive from operational summaries and after-action reports compiled by the (OKH), which documented daily increments such as 62,870 in , 46,374 in , 41,819 in , and 23,131 in early January for the strategic offensive phase alone. Non-combat losses, particularly from amid temperatures dropping below -30°C, affected tens of thousands of soldiers, exacerbating the strain on as inadequate winter preparations led to widespread amputations and permanent disabilities. The attrition disproportionately impacted experienced officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), whose loss disrupted command chains in forward units; OKH records indicate elevated rates among mid-level leadership due to prolonged exposure and close-quarters fighting. Elite formations, including panzer divisions and motorized infantry like the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich, suffered heavy tolls in key sectors, with individual engagements claiming hundreds from veteran cadres whose tactical expertise was central to tactics. This irreplaceability stemmed from Germany's limited pool of trained panzer crews and commanders, as new recruits lacked the proficiency to match the proficiency of those lost, a factor compounded by memoir accounts from figures like that underreported such qualitative deficits relative to quantitative tallies from Allied intelligence cross-verifications. Equipment losses further compounded the crisis, with Army Group Center abandoning or destroying over 800 tanks and assault guns during the Soviet counteroffensive retreat, alongside thousands of motor vehicles crippled by mechanical failures, fuel shortages, and deliberate sabotage to deny capture. Panzer units reported net losses exceeding 1,400 armored fighting vehicles across the campaign, including irrecoverable hulks from combat and winter attrition, outpacing limited replacements that arrived in scant numbers. These shortfalls, drawn from OKH ledgers, eroded the mechanized edge that had propelled earlier advances, as production bottlenecks prevented full reconstitution of operational strength.

Soviet Losses and Data Reliability Issues

Official Soviet archival data compiled by G. F. Krivosheev indicate approximately 581,000 irrecoverable losses (killed, missing, or captured) for the during the Moscow defense phase from 30 September to 4 December 1941, excluding the subsequent counteroffensive. Independent estimates by military historian place total Soviet casualties for the broader battle, including both phases, at over 685,000, with ranges extending to 700,000–1,000,000 when accounting for wounded and incomplete records from encirclements like and , where hundreds of thousands were captured. These figures reflect disproportionate attrition, with Soviet-to-German casualty ratios in the 1941–1942 period averaging around 5:1, driven by repeated mass infantry assaults lacking coordinated artillery or armor support—often involving minimally trained conscripts funneled forward under blocking detachments—contrasting with German emphasis on maneuver and firepower concentration. Reliability of these data is compromised by systemic issues in Soviet record-keeping, particularly in 1941's chaotic retreats, where up to 20% of units failed to submit reports, leading Krivosheev to extrapolate rather than fully capture missing personnel presumed dead. Declassified post-1991 archives exposed Stalin-era manipulations, including deliberate underreporting of losses to evade purges for command failures and to sustain narratives of inevitable victory, with incentives aligned toward concealing the human cost of attritional tactics amid purges that decimated experienced officers. Demographic analyses suggest overall fatalities exceeded Krivosheev's aggregates by millions when cross-referencing population censuses, implying potential undercounts for due to unrecorded desertions, executions, and POW deaths not repatriated. Civilian impacts were mitigated by preemptive evacuations, relocating over 1.5 million residents and 1,000+ factories eastward by October 1941, averting the scale of urban devastation seen in Leningrad and limiting Moscow's non-combat toll primarily to aerial bombings and stray artillery. This archival opacity persists, as Russian state control over military records post-2014 has restricted access, fostering debates over whether adjusted figures could reveal even higher Soviet expenditures in stemming the German advance.

Strategic and Historiographical Analysis

Factors in German Operational Failure

German planners for assumed a swift campaign lasting no more than three to four months, underestimating the Soviet Union's vast territorial depth and industrial relocation capacity, which allowed to remain a viable operational hub despite early encirclements. This miscalculation stemmed from ideological overconfidence in the Wehrmacht's superiority and expectations of Soviet collapse after initial defeats, leading to inadequate preparations for prolonged operations beyond . Nazi racial doctrines, mandating brutal treatment of Slavs as subhumans, alienated potential anti-Bolshevik collaborators in Ukraine and Belarus, who initially viewed Germans as liberators but turned hostile due to atrocities like mass executions and forced labor. Chief of the Army General Staff recorded in his diaries the counterproductive effects of such policies, noting by late August 1941 that German conduct was forfeiting Ukrainian goodwill essential for securing rear areas and supplies during the advance on . Logistical breakdowns exacerbated these issues, as supply lines stretched over 1,000 kilometers relied on Soviet rail infrastructure incompatible with German due to differing gauges and loading standards. Conversion efforts lagged severely, with engineering units undermanned and prioritizing repairs over full regauging, achieving only partial functionality that restricted daily supply throughput to 10-20 trains per major line—far below the 40-50 needed for sustained mechanized offensives toward . Fuel and ammunition shortages intensified in October 1941, halting panzer mobility as divisions advanced on foot amid and early frosts, without winter planned for the assumed short war. The decision to divert Center's Panzer Groups southward for the Battle of Kiev in September 1941, capturing over 600,000 Soviet prisoners and securing Ukraine's grain and industry, delayed the Moscow axis by five critical weeks, per post-war accounts from generals like who prioritized the capital's capture for decisive psychological and logistical gains. justified the maneuver for economic imperatives like oil and resources over the generals' focus on Moscow, but it dissipated offensive momentum as autumn rains turned roads impassable, allowing German forces to reach Moscow's outskirts depleted and uncoordinated.

Evaluations of Soviet Resilience

The Soviet Union's resilience during the Battle of Moscow derived substantially from its immense manpower reserves, supported by a pre-war exceeding 170 million, which facilitated the absorption of approximately 4 million military casualties by the end of without precipitating national collapse. This demographic scale enabled the rapid mobilization of over one million reinforcements, including fresh Siberian divisions, to reinforce Moscow's defenses by late , sustaining amid staggering losses. Geographical vastness and climatic severity amplified defensive capabilities, as the expansive extended German supply lines beyond sustainable limits, while sub-zero temperatures from November 1941 onward immobilized vehicles and exacerbated attrition; however, the "General Winter" is critiqued as a minimizing Soviet agency, since German troops received winter uniforms and gear by mid-December, with operational halts attributable more to depletion and logistical breakdowns than unpreparedness for cold. Industrial continuity was preserved via the evacuation of roughly 1,500 factories eastward to the Urals and from July to December 1941, relocating machinery, workers, and output capacity to evade capture and maintain armament production; initial phases relied heavily on pre-invasion stockpiles and German matériel seized in counteractions, as deliveries in 1941 totaled negligible volumes, under $1 billion approved but with minimal actual shipments until 1942. These elemental advantages—population depth, territorial scale, and dispersed industry—primed Soviet endurance, tempering interpretations that overascribe outcomes to leadership prowess alone.

Debates on Decisiveness and Myths

Historians continue to dispute the Battle of Moscow's role as a decisive engagement, with some maintaining that its capture would have severed Soviet rail networks, decapitated central command, and triggered political implosion, potentially ending resistance in the European theater. Counterfactual analyses by David Stahel, drawing on German operational records, counter that Barbarossa had devolved into strategic bankruptcy by late summer 1941, as Army Group Center grappled with irreparable losses in personnel, vehicles, and fuel—exceeding 50% of initial panzer strength—alongside disintegrating supply chains stretched over 1,000 kilometers, rendering any seizure logistically unfeasible and strategically hollow given the USSR's dispersed governance and evacuated industries east of the Urals. The narrative of "General Winter" as the primary arbiter of German failure persists in popular accounts, implying unpreparedness for seasonal conditions alone blunted the Wehrmacht advance. Empirical reviews of weather logs and logistics reports reveal this as overstated; mud from autumn and chronic deficits in motor transport—compounded by 70% of German trucks failing under rough terrain—had already immobilized forward units by mid-October, with daily rations dropping below 20 liters per division, independent of snowfall that intensified only after initial halts. Hitler's December 6 halt order, directing panzer groups to consolidate rather than press isolated probes toward Moscow's suburbs, draws traditional blame for squandering momentum when the lay 30 kilometers distant. Revisionist examinations, informed by fuel depot inventories and troop diaries, assert the directive's irrelevance, as spearheads operated on fumes—reserves under 10% capacity—and lagged formations, numbering over 100 kilometers behind, precluded or sustained assault irrespective of Hitler's intervention. Post-2010 historiography shifts emphasis from Soviet heroic improvisation to intrinsic German flaws, including overreliance on assumptions of enemy disintegration after border battles, which masked vulnerabilities like undivided across three army groups and neglect of partisan threats eroding rear security. This perspective frames the Moscow operations not as a pivot via Red Army tenacity but as exposure of hubristic planning, where early victories inflated expectations of total collapse, prolonging the conflict through attritional deadlock that eroded Axis quantitative edges without yielding qualitative Soviet breakthroughs.

References

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