Hubbry Logo
Paper candidatePaper candidateMain
Open search
Paper candidate
Community hub
Paper candidate
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Paper candidate
Paper candidate
Paper candidate
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Part of the Politics series
Elections
Ballot box
Basic types
Terminology
Subseries
Lists
Related
icon Politics portal

In a representative democracy, a paper candidate (also known as a no-hope candidate) is a candidate who stands for a political party in an electoral division where the party in question enjoys only low levels of support. Although the candidate has little chance of winning, a major party will normally make an effort to ensure it has its name on the ballot paper in every constituency. In two-party systems, a paper candidate may also be known as token opposition. In Dutch-speaking countries, the last candidate on a party list is called a lijstduwer and is usually a well-known non-politician such as an artist, celebrity or sports person, chosen to attract more votes for the party.

A dummy candidate is similar to a paper candidate in that both types do not expect to win their race; however, they differ in that a dummy candidate typically has an ulterior motive for being in the race, such as to dishonestly divert votes away from more legitimate candidates or to take advantage of benefits afforded to political candidates. Another related concept is the stalking horse candidate, a junior or little-known politician who challenges an incumbent to test the support for a more serious challenge from someone else.

United States

[edit]

Paper candidates may be local party members, or members from neighbouring areas or from central office depending on the laws of the jurisdiction; most U.S. states, for example, require all candidates for state and local office to reside in the district they intend on representing for a certain length of time. The main purpose of fielding paper candidates is to maintain or improve the profile of a political party and, in two-party systems, to provide at least nominal opposition to a seemingly unassailable incumbent. Another potential use for paper candidacy is to allow a candidate who wants off the ballot of another race to do so by running for something else, a race they cannot possibly win (such as Rick Lazio, who lost a Republican primary for New York Governor in 2010 but still had a third-party ballot line; in order to disqualify himself from the gubernatorial election Lazio was nominated for a judicial seat in the Bronx that was so heavily Democratic that he could not have possibly won if he wanted to, and he did not).[1] The paper candidates themselves typically do little or no campaigning and neither incur nor claim any expenses.

There are circumstances where a paper candidate can win an election, often when the opposing candidate is unexpectedly embroiled in scandal; for example, then-27-year-old American Chris Smith, who ran as a token opponent to New Jersey congressman Frank Thompson in 1978 and 1980, won the latter contest after Thompson was embroiled in the Abscam scandal.[2] Another example is Michael Patrick Flanagan, a little-known Republican attorney who defeated longtime Democratic incumbent Dan Rostenkowski, the onetime powerful Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, in a heavily Democratic Chicago-based district after Rostenkowski was indicted on charges of mail fraud. The victory occurred in 1994 as part of a national Republican wave.[3]

In jurisdictions with strict campaign finance and spending laws governing elections, it is often a legal necessity to run the maximum number candidates permitted (or close thereto) in order to spend the maximum amount of money otherwise permitted by law. In such cases, parties will run paper candidates, but will usually endeavour to use the extra spending allowance afforded (at least to the extent that it may be permitted in the jurisdiction) to campaign in districts where they have a realistic chance of winning.

In Puerto Rico, every party has to run candidates thus paper candidates can occur when parties form alliances.[4]

United Kingdom

[edit]

In the United Kingdom, major parties often find it difficult to field a full list of candidates for all council seats up for election, especially in the case of councils with "all-up" elections. Parties find it desirable to persuade people to stand as paper candidates so that:

  • Supporters have an opportunity to vote for the party
  • The total vote obtained across the council and the nation is maximised
  • All seats are contested so there is no risk that candidates from other parties can be declared elected unopposed

In Britain, being nominated as a local election candidate simply involves signing some forms, with no deposit required. A paper candidate will often do no campaigning at all and so be able to submit a zero return of election expenses, simplifying the paperwork for the election agent. Paper candidates are commonly fielded in different locations by all the major parties in both local and national elections.

Some paper candidates stand in order to help their party but do not wish to be elected to the post in question. In fact, some paper candidates only agree to stand after receiving assurances that there is no "risk" of them getting elected. Following the Scottish National Party's landslide in Scotland in the 2015 general election, when they went from 6 to 56 seats (out of 59 Scottish seats), it was reported that some candidates were so surprised at winning they considered resigning immediately after the election.[5] In the 2019 general election, some Conservative candidates were selected just weeks prior to the election and won seats in the Labour "red wall" in northern England and Wales, which were previously considered unwinnable by the party.[6] After joining Reform UK in 2024, James McMurdock won South Basildon and East Thurrock in that year's general election after the party—without enough people to run for available seats—asked him to serve as a paper candidate.[7]

In Belfast North at the 2017 election, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) were criticised for standing Martin McAuley as a "paper candidate" — a deliberately weak candidate, a 26-year-old with little experience, on the assumption that nationalist and Catholic voters would instead vote for Sinn Féin, instead of the unionist candidate Nigel Dodds (DUP). McAuley rejected the label of "paper candidate".[8] Dodds narrowly won the election. In 2019, the SDLP did not field a candidate in Belfast North and Sinn Féin won the seat.[9][10] The SDLP were also accused of standing a "paper candidate," Mary Garrity, in Fermanagh and South Tyrone in 2017, in order to help Sinn Féin win the seat from the UUP.[10]

Ireland

[edit]

In Ireland, the single transferable vote system is used, so paper candidates are less common and more seats are up for grabs. However, there have been cases of unexpected surges for certain parties (such as Labour in 1992 and Sinn Féin in 2020) that led to many paper candidates being unexpectedly elected. This was epitomised in 1992 with Moosajee Bhamjee, Ireland's first Indian and first Muslim TD, who only stood in Clare because no one else in the local Labour party wanted to.[11][12][13] In 2020, many inexperienced Sinn Féin candidates won, such as Claire Kerrane (Roscommon–Galway) and Violet-Anne Wynne (Clare), both of whom had never held an elected office before and were the first Sinn Féin TDs in those counties since the 1920s.[14] On the other hand, the success of the Social Democrats in the 2020 election was attributed to their lack of paper candidates: they fielded candidates in just 20 out of 39 constituencies and won 6 TDs.[15]

Canada

[edit]

In Canada, paper candidates may exist at both the federal and provincial / territorial levels, while the term does not apply in municipal elections as official parties do not exist at the city council level. As in Great Britain, they most commonly exist to allow the main political parties to field candidates in as many constituencies as possible. From 2004 to 2011, parties at the federal level had a financial incentive to draw as many votes as possible due to a per-vote subsidy, paid to all parties with at least 2% of the total popular vote regardless of the number of seats actually won.[16] This payment, enacted under a Liberal government, was fully eliminated in 2015 under a Conservative government.

Nevertheless, even without per-vote subsidies, parties have other strong incentives to maximize their overall popular vote. In particular, even though winning the popular vote in itself conveys no special rights or privileges in the Canadian electoral system, there have been multiple instances (especially at the provincial level) where a party that has won the popular vote but not a plurality of seats has attempted to claim a mandate to govern, often using its popular vote victory to justify such claims. Political parties therefore have an incentive to ensure at all costs that the entire electorate can at least vote for them.

Paper candidates are sometimes used if the party is not seriously contesting the election but must run candidates so it can either get registered or stay registered for some other purpose. In such cases, paper candidates will usually run in districts where ideologically like-minded parties are seen to have little chance of winning to minimize the risk of any nominal support they might receive proving to be the decisive margin in a close local election under Canada's first-past-the-post electoral system.

An example of this scenario in action was found in Saskatchewan, where the Progressive Conservative Party withdrew from public presence in the late 1990s but continued to run at least ten candidates, all in urban ridings where the then-governing Saskatchewan New Democratic Party was dominant at the time, in the province's general elections until the relevant law was amended so as to keep its registration with Elections Saskatchewan, largely to avoid losing control of what at the time was believed to be a substantial amount of money. (Most of the PCs' former politicians and grassroots members formed or joined the Saskatchewan Party.) The Progressive Conservative Party has since attempted to "revive" itself and no longer considers its nominees to be paper candidates. However, they have only achieved modest levels of support with candidates affiliated with the national Conservative Party typically running under the banner of the Progressive Conservative Party in provincial elections.

In neighbouring Alberta, the United Conservative Party formed from a "merger" of the Progressive Conservative and Wildrose parties. However, as Albertan electoral law did not permit the parties to merge officially, both parties continue to exist on paper under the UCP leadership team. Albertan electoral law only requires a party to nominate one candidate to maintain its registration, so in the 2019 provincial election, each party ran one candidate in Edmonton-Strathcona, the riding represented by the incumbent New Democratic premier, Rachel Notley, which is widely seen to be the NDP's safest seat. The PC candidate polled enough votes to finish in fourth place, ahead of candidates for parties running serious campaigns such as the Alberta Liberal Party.

Paper candidates in Quebec ("poteau" in Canadian French, suggesting that the candidate will only be seen on utility poles), particularly of the name-on-ballot variety, can sometimes provide unwanted attention for the candidate's party, particularly if they become viable prospects for elections. For example, in the 2011 federal election, a sudden increase in opinion-poll support, particularly in Quebec, for the New Democratic Party, which historically had a minimal presence in that province, led to greater scrutiny of some of that party's lower-profile Quebec candidates. One such candidate, Ruth Ellen Brosseau, was working as a bartender hundreds of kilometres away from the riding of Berthier—Maskinongé where she was on the ballot. She won even though she had never been in her riding, claimed no expenses for her campaign, and spoke its dominant language (Canadian French) poorly.[17][18] However, Brosseau successfully shook off the label by the time of the 2015 election, having become recognized as a hard-working MP who had built a significant base of popularity in her district.[19] She was narrowly defeated in the 2019 and 2021 elections.

The federal Progressive Conservative Party also had several paper candidates who won election in the party's historic landslide victory in the 1984 election, such as Thomas Suluk in Nunatsiaq.

An extreme version of a paper candidate is a "Name on Ballot", often referred to by the acronym "NoB". Many NoBs (Names on Ballot) will only place campaign signs, and some do not even campaign at all. In most cases, the only requirement is that the candidate show up at the returning officer's headquarters for a few moments to take an oath and pay the required nomination deposit. In a more extreme example, in Alberta, candidates do not need to show up to talk to a returning officer, as long as someone on behalf of the party drops off the required paperwork and funds. Many smaller parties, such as the Prince Edward Island New Democrats, will field most of their candidates in any given election as NoBs. The term is often worn as a badge of pride in one's loyalty to the party. PEI New Democrat, Dr. Bob Perry, who has been a NoB many times in the past, often calls himself "Dr. NoB" at election time.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Paper candidate

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

A paper candidate is an individual nominated by a to contest an in a constituency where the party anticipates negligible voter support, primarily to secure the party's name on the official ballot paper with minimal campaigning or . This practice enables parties to maintain visibility across electoral districts without diverting substantial efforts from winnable seats, often involving candidates who fulfill basic filing requirements but engage little in active solicitation of votes. In systems like the United Kingdom's first-past-the-post, paper candidates serve to prevent voter disenfranchisement perceptions among party loyalists and to gather baseline data on potential future support, though they rarely influence outcomes. Critics view the strategy as tokenistic, potentially eroding public trust in electoral participation, while proponents argue it upholds democratic pluralism by ensuring diverse options on ballots. The term underscores the tactical calculus of party organization, balancing comprehensive coverage against efficient resource deployment in asymmetric competitive landscapes.

Definition and Characteristics

Core Definition

A paper candidate, in the context of representative democracies, refers to an individual nominated by a to contest an electoral division where the party holds negligible prospects of success, serving chiefly to place the party's name on the for purposes such as symbolic representation or compliance with procedural norms, rather than with intent to secure victory. This practice entails minimal personal or partisan investment beyond basic requirements, distinguishing it from actively contested candidacies. Key attributes include negligible campaign expenditures, often approaching zero, and the absence of dedicated local organizational structures or outreach efforts, as the candidate's role prioritizes maintaining the party's broader electoral footprint over localized mobilization. Such nominations typically involve no substantive voter engagement, with the candidate functioning primarily as a nominal placeholder to fulfill standing obligations without for , events, or . This phenomenon emerges from the structural incentives of first-past-the-post electoral systems, wherein parties nominate candidates across all constituencies to preserve national brand visibility and qualify for entitlements like media allocations or broadcast time, thereby mitigating the risk of diminished overall recognition in districts beyond their competitive strongholds. In these plurality-based frameworks, failing to field entrants forfeits opportunities for aggregate vote tallies that influence future funding or airtime, compelling even low-viability placements despite improbable outcomes.

Distinctions from Similar Concepts

Paper candidates are distinguished from dummy candidates primarily by intent and function: while dummy candidates are frequently deployed to deceive voters through name similarity or vote-splitting tactics, as seen in instances where parties field names to support from rivals, paper candidates fulfill a compliant, non-deceptive by simply enabling a party's nominal presence on the without misleading strategies. This neutral placement often involves minimal effort, such as submitting basic nomination s to meet legal thresholds, rather than active manipulation. In contrast to write-in or independent candidates, who must rely on individual voter initiative without pre-printed ballot access or party infrastructure, paper candidates benefit from official party endorsement and nomination processes that secure their automatic inclusion on ballots once regulatory hurdles like signature thresholds or fees are met. Write-in candidates, for example, do not appear on standard ballots and require voters to manually enter names, often succeeding only in niche or protest contexts, whereas paper candidates leverage established party mechanisms for placement in constituencies where victory is improbable but participation is required for broader electoral compliance. Independents similarly operate without party affiliation, facing steeper solo barriers to ballot access compared to the streamlined party-backed route for paper candidates. Unlike token opposition in authoritarian regimes, where candidates serve as facades to simulate pluralism without genuine contestation, paper emerge in competitive democratic systems to satisfy procedural mandates, such as the United Kingdom's £500 deposit—refundable only if securing over 5% of votes—or rules demanding party-filed candidacies to retain minor-party status via vote-share thresholds. These practices incentivize parties to field low-investment nominees in unwinnable races to preserve organizational eligibility, distinct from coerced or symbolic roles in non-competitive environments.

Motivations for Fielding Paper Candidates

Strategic Party Objectives

Parties deploy paper candidates in constituencies where victory is unattainable to safeguard national brand recognition and mitigate vote leakage to rival parties. By ensuring the party's name appears on every , even with negligible local effort, these candidates capture residual support from ideologically aligned voters who might otherwise abstain or defect, thereby stabilizing the party's aggregate vote share across the electorate. In the , for example, minor parties routinely secure 2-5% of votes in safe seats held by major opponents through such nominal candidacies, as observed in general elections where targeted campaigning is absent, preventing a zero-return that could signal organizational decline and erode long-term viability. A core objective involves qualifying for institutional perks tied to national performance metrics, such as party election broadcasts and public funding. Consistent fielding of candidates, including paper ones, accumulates vote totals that determine allocations under rules like those for short money—opposition funding scaled to prior election shares—or broadcaster criteria for airtime, which prioritize parties with demonstrated nationwide presence over isolated strongholds. Smaller outfits, including the , leverage this by nominating minimally active candidates to inflate overall percentages, meeting thresholds that larger parties attain via seats alone; without broad contestation, their effective vote share would plummet, disqualifying them from these resources essential for scaling operations. Furthermore, paper candidacies support infrastructure by enabling localized and volunteer mobilization without proportional expenditure. The mere placement prompts supporter identification through vote patterns, turnout analysis, and inquiries, yielding insights into regional loyalty that inform future targeting; this low-cost mechanism counters in party networks, as absent any contender, potential activists disengage, perceiving irrelevance, whereas a token effort sustains pipelines and benchmarks for incremental gains. In jurisdictions employing first-past-the-post systems, such as the , parties face no statutory minimum for the number of constituencies contested, but broad fielding enables aggregation of national vote shares qualifying for public funding or broadcaster status under criteria like the 5% threshold in recent elections. The £500 deposit per candidate, mandated under the Parliamentary Elections Rules, is forfeited unless at least 5% of votes are obtained, imposing a financial filter against purely vexatious entries while remaining affordable for strategic nominations. In Ireland's system, a €500 deposit applies to Dáil candidates, refundable only if the candidate reaches one-quarter of the electoral quota in their constituency, incentivizing minimal viability tests that paper candidates can satisfy through basic filing without campaigning. This aligns with proportional allocation rules requiring multi-constituency participation to optimize preference transfers and seat distribution. United States ballot access statutes in many states tie party recognition to nominating candidates across districts to gather required petition signatures or meet vote thresholds for continued status, often leading parties to deploy paper candidates solely for compliance. For example, minor parties like the Libertarians nominate placeholders to secure and maintain multi-office ballot lines without resource-intensive efforts. Spending limits introduced via reforms, such as the UK's per-candidate caps around £11,000 in smaller constituencies under the , render paper candidacies cost-effective by bounding outlays while allowing full-slate fielding to pursue reimbursements for qualifying expenditures—up to the limit for candidates exceeding 5%—as seen in major parties contesting all 650 seats to leverage aggregate performance metrics.

Advantages and Benefits

For

Fielding paper candidates permits to optimize resource allocation by directing financial and organizational efforts toward competitive constituencies, while securing in unwinnable seats at negligible cost. This approach minimizes expenditure on campaigning in safe seats held by opponents, allowing parties to preserve funds for , volunteer mobilization, and ground operations where victory is feasible. In the United Kingdom's 2024 , deployed candidates across nearly all 650 constituencies, with many functioning as paper candidates lacking local infrastructure; this garnered over 4 million votes (14.3% of the national share), providing data to refine future investments without spreading resources thinly. Similarly, the Liberal Democrats have relied on low-effort nominations—often secured via signatures from existing members—to maintain presence in marginal areas, avoiding the full costs of active contention. For smaller or emerging parties, paper sustain long-term viability by fulfilling legal and regulatory thresholds for national recognition, funding eligibility, and institutional access. In , the Elections Act requires registered parties to endorse at least one per general election to avoid deregistration proceedings, while broader participation unlocks quarterly allowances, vote reimbursements (up to 60% of qualified expenses), and access to voters' lists from contested ridings for database building. Failure to field sufficient , as seen with the of Canada's limited slate in the lead-up to the 2025 federal election, resulted in exclusion from leaders' debates—a criterion tied to representation or candidacy in a of the 343 ridings—highlighting how minimal candidacies preserve status without exhaustive national campaigns. In the UK, standing in over one-sixth of seats qualifies parties for broadcast allocations under rules, and achieving modest vote thresholds enables "short money" opposition funding (£44.53 per 200 votes, plus per-seat allotments). Such strategies also cultivate voter databases and ideological continuity, enabling parties to harvest even small vote hauls for supporter identification and loyalty cultivation in first-past-the-post systems that otherwise discourage minor-party participation. Consistent appearances allow fringe or ideologically distinct groups—such as conservative outliers or environmental advocates—to register dispersed support, countering dominant-party entrenchment by preventing total erasure from electorates and laying groundwork for occasional breakthroughs without compromising focus on core strongholds. The in the UK has explicitly recruited paper candidates for local elections to embed ideological markers nationwide, yielding incremental data on sympathizers that informs targeted growth over electoral cycles. This persistent low-investment presence mitigates the "wasted vote" perception, fostering habitual allegiance among niche bases and averting organizational atrophy.

For Voters and Electoral Participation


In electoral districts dominated by a single party, paper candidates fielded by opposition parties ensure voters have at least one alternative on the ballot, preventing uncontested races that empirical research associates with significantly lower turnout. Studies of U.S. congressional and local elections demonstrate that contested races, even those with minimal competition, exhibit higher voter participation rates than uncontested ones, with competitiveness serving as a key driver of engagement. For example, an analysis of midterm elections found that districts with multiple candidates saw turnout increases linked to perceived electoral stakes, though the effect diminishes in highly safe seats. The presence of candidates allows voters in such areas to express preferences through labels, facilitating comparative evaluation of national platforms without reliance on resource-intensive local campaigns. This mechanism exposes electors to diverse policy positions, as opposition nominees typically align with their party's established ideologies, enabling informed choices based on broader ideological contrasts rather than candidate-specific appeals. on parliamentary systems, including the , indicates that even nominal opposition in safe seats supports this informational role, contributing to sustained participation by validating votes as signals of discontent or alignment. By maintaining a full slate of candidates, paper nominations counteract perceptions of electoral inevitability propagated in media coverage of seats, where is empirically lower due to beliefs that individual votes lack impact. This provision fosters a more realistic understanding of systemic districting incentives, encouraging participation as a means to register national-level preferences amid structural limits on local competition. Data from general elections show that while seats generally record reduced —around 5-10% below marginal seats—the consistent fielding of opposition figures helps mitigate absolute rates compared to scenarios without any challenger.

Criticisms and Controversies

Ethical and Democratic Concerns

Critics contend that fielding paper candidates erodes democratic integrity by introducing nominally committed individuals who lack genuine interest in constituency matters, potentially fostering superficial participation and misleading voters about available local representation. Such practices, often decried in left-leaning commentary as emblematic of party detachment from grassroots concerns, prioritize elite-driven national strategies over authentic competition, raising questions about accountability in representative systems. However, empirical patterns reveal voter discernment, as paper candidates in unwinnable districts seldom garner substantial support absent coordinated party efforts, typically aligning with baseline partisan loyalty rather than candidate-specific appeal, thus preserving competitive dynamics without widespread deception. Data from recent elections indicate these candidates often meet only minimal thresholds like deposit retention (e.g., 5% of votes), underscoring that voters calibrate choices based on realistic prospects, not illusory local promises. Concerns that full slates via candidates subordinate local representation to national imperatives overlook causal links between comprehensive fielding and enhanced legitimacy; incomplete slates signal organizational weakness, correlating with diminished overall electoral credibility and in affected races. From foundational democratic reasoning, expanding options through party-wide participation bolsters choice without dilution, challenging assertions of "wasted" votes that implicitly favor entrenched majorities over pluralistic expression, as evidenced by sustained functionality in systems permitting such tactics.

Resource and Voter Confusion Issues

Fielding paper candidates imposes modest but accumulating financial burdens on political parties, particularly smaller ones with limited budgets. In the , candidates must pay a £500 deposit to parliamentary elections, which is forfeited unless the secures at least 5% of the vote share. Paper candidates, often placed in unwinnable constituencies with minimal campaigning, frequently fail to meet this threshold, resulting in unreclaimed deposits that can total thousands of pounds across multiple seats. For instance, minor parties contesting dozens of seats as paper runs may lose £10,000 or more per election cycle, diverting funds from targeted efforts in competitive areas and exacerbating resource constraints without proportional electoral gains. Additional minor costs, such as nomination filings and basic administrative compliance, compound this strain, though they remain secondary to deposit forfeitures. Voter disillusionment arises from perceptions of disengaged paper candidates who conduct little to no local , potentially eroding trust in the electoral when voters encounter seemingly perfunctory campaigns. Critics contend this fosters cynicism, as constituents in safe seats may view such candidacies as tokenistic, contributing to lower engagement in districts where outcomes are predictable. However, from safe-seat dynamics indicates widespread voter awareness of these realities; turnout in highly secure constituencies averages 5-10% below national levels, reflecting informed rather than confusion or widespread alienation. Surveys and polling further show that a of voters recognize entrenched major-party dominance in such areas, mitigating disillusionment through realistic expectations of limited . Concerns over ballot clutter from additional candidates potentially overwhelming voters have been raised, with some arguing it dilutes clarity and invites errors in selection. Empirical studies on design and length, however, reveal negligible increases in voter errors or undervotes in high-literacy electorates like the and , where party affiliations provide strong cues for decision-making amid typical field sizes of 4-7 candidates per race. Choice fatigue effects, where extended ballots lead to reliance on heuristics or , are documented but minimal in single-winner systems with clear partisan labels, as voters prioritize familiar parties over parsing numerous names. In practice, spoiled or invalid ballots remain low (under 1% in recent elections), underscoring that paper candidates do not meaningfully exacerbate confusion in informed populations accustomed to multiparty contests.

Usage in Specific Countries

United States

In the , paper candidates are frequently employed by minor parties to satisfy state-specific ballot access requirements under the country's federalist system, where each of the 50 states imposes distinct thresholds such as petition signatures, filing fees, or minimum vote shares in prior elections. These requirements often necessitate fielding candidates in a sufficient number of congressional districts, state legislative races, or local contests to qualify the party for automatic placement in future cycles, particularly for presidential or statewide races. For instance, the Libertarian Party has utilized paper candidates—nominees with minimal active campaigning—to complete full slates in districts where victory is improbable, such as safely Democratic-leaning areas, thereby securing the requisite filings without diverting resources from competitive opportunities. This practice allows parties to maintain lines while focusing efforts on ideological messaging rather than localized wins. State laws prohibiting fusion voting, in effect in 48 states since the late 19th and early 20th centuries, further incentivize the use of paper candidates by barring multiple parties from nominating the same individual, compelling minor parties to run independent slates to accumulate votes independently. Similarly, sore-loser statutes in 48 states prevent primary losers from major parties from switching to independent or third-party bids in the general election, limiting the pool of viable recruits and reinforcing reliance on nominal party loyalists for ballot fulfillment. During the 2020 and 2024 election cycles, third parties like the Libertarian and Green parties fielded candidates across numerous down-ballot races with subdued efforts, often prioritizing national visibility and access preservation over district-specific mobilization; for example, Green Party affiliates gathered signatures and filed minimally to retain qualified status in states like Missouri. Federal Election Commission records illustrate the nominal nature of many such candidacies, with hundreds of third-party congressional and state-level contenders reporting total expenditures below $1,000 in the cycle, reflecting campaigns centered on compliance filings rather than or outreach. This approach underscores a strategic emphasis on sustaining infrastructure amid structural barriers, enabling minor parties to appear on ballots in subsequent elections without substantial financial outlays, though it occasionally yields unexpected local successes from low-effort entries.

United Kingdom

In the , paper candidates are routinely nominated by for Westminster parliamentary and local elections under the first-past-the-post system, which encourages contesting all or most constituencies to maintain national visibility and meet regulatory thresholds, even in safe seats dominated by opponents. Major parties such as the Conservatives frequently field them in Labour strongholds, while Labour deploys them in Conservative-leaning areas, allowing ballot presence with minimal active engagement. In the 2024 held on 4 July, Labour nominated candidates across all Scottish constituencies, including long-held SNP seats, supporting their win of 37 seats from a previous low of one. Smaller parties like expanded their slate dramatically for the 2024 election, nominating over 400 candidates—many operating as paper candidates with limited resources focused on winnable targets—to satisfy criteria for party election broadcast allocation, which considers seats contested alongside past performance. This approach enabled Reform to secure airtime despite polling below major parties initially. Under the Representation of the People Act 1983 as amended, candidates must pay a £500 deposit to the returning officer by nomination deadline, refundable only if they receive at least 5% of valid votes; spending is capped at a notional amount calculated per constituency (e.g., £11,394 plus 7.3p per registered elector in 2024). Paper candidates commonly report zero or near-zero expenses in post-election returns to the Electoral Commission, reflecting compliance-driven rather than competitive efforts.

Ireland

In Ireland's (PR-STV) system for elections, multi-seat constituencies (typically electing 3 to 5 members) and voter preference transfers diminish the imperative for candidates compared to single-member plurality systems, as surplus votes and eliminations facilitate intra-party vote pooling. Nonetheless, smaller parties nominate them to maintain national visibility across all 39 constituencies and to aggregate first-preference votes toward the 2% national threshold required for eligibility as a "qualified party" under the Electoral Act 1997, which determines funding allocations based on prior election performance. Parties such as People Before Profit-Solidarity have employed paper candidates in numerous constituencies primarily to achieve this funding threshold, with minimal campaigning in winnable seats to conserve resources while ensuring broad presence. Similarly, , during periods of limited support, has fielded candidates in electorally challenging areas to signal ideological consistency and build long-term voter familiarity, even where election prospects are remote. This approach persists despite PR-STV's transfer dynamics, as national vote totals directly influence state reimbursements and party sustainability. In the February 2020 , major parties like and calibrated candidate numbers conservatively in select constituencies—often limiting to the seat quota equivalent—to maximize transfer efficiency and avert unnecessary fragmentation of their vote base, a informed by historical STV showing diminished returns from over-. Smaller entities, conversely, prioritized coverage over concentration, nominating token entrants to capture residual support without diluting core campaigns. The low nomination deposit of €500, unchanged since 2002 adjustments, lowers the financial risk of such tactics, permitting independents and minor groups to participate widely absent substantial investment.

Canada

In Canada, smaller political parties utilize paper candidates to maintain their registered status under the Canada Elections Act, which requires ongoing demonstration of electoral participation through candidate endorsements in general elections. Failure to field candidates risks deregistration or loss of benefits such as donor tax credits and access to certain public funding mechanisms. Parties like the and the (PPC) nominate individuals in numerous ridings, particularly unwinnable urban districts dominated by Liberals or New Democrats, to establish a national footprint without diverting resources from competitive areas. This strategy aligns with the first-past-the-post system, where victory hinges on plurality in individual ridings rather than . In the September 20, 2021 federal , the PPC endorsed 312 candidates across 338 ridings, including many in urban seats with historically low support for its platform emphasizing reduced government intervention. The similarly fielded candidates in over 200 ridings despite organizational challenges and polling below 5% nationally. financial returns for that document hundreds of small-party candidates reporting expenses under CAD 1,000, often limited to deposits and basic filings, indicative of nominal involvement focused on compliance rather than promotion. These low expenditures—contrasting with averages exceeding CAD 50,000 in contested races—highlight the pragmatic deployment of volunteers to preserve party viability amid resource constraints. Ahead of the April 28, 2025 federal , smaller parties encountered difficulties in select ridings due to volunteer fatigue and internal divisions, prompting reliance on committed individuals for token candidacies to meet endorsement thresholds. Such roles, often filled by local activists without campaign , ensure regulatory adherence while minimizing fiscal exposure in a where minor parties averaged under 2% vote shares in prior contests. This approach underscores the administrative imperatives of multipartisan competition, where candidates enable survival against larger incumbents.

Other Jurisdictions

In , minor parties including have utilized paper candidates—often termed "ghost candidates"—in safe seats held by Labor or Liberal parties to secure and facilitate preference flows benefiting quotas. These nominees typically reside outside the electorate, engage in negligible campaigning, and serve strategic roles such as maintaining party visibility or directing voter preferences toward outcomes in the . During the 2022 federal election, One Nation fielded dozens of such candidates across multiple states, drawing complaints to the Australian Electoral Commission regarding their lack of local engagement and prompting demands for clarification on compliance with electoral rules. In Germany's mixed-member proportional system, small parties routinely nominate nominal candidates in single-member constituencies where victory is improbable, focusing instead on bolstering the party vote (Zweitstimme) essential for overcoming the 5% national threshold and securing proportional seats. These placements fulfill statutory requirements for comprehensive candidacy while mobilizing localized turnout that translates to support, as evidenced by consistent patterns in federal elections where district nominees from minor parties prioritize party-wide proportionality over individual wins. Analogous practices appear in jurisdictions with deposit requirements, such as , where regional or fringe parties occasionally field minimally active candidates to contest seats and avoid forfeiting security deposits outright, thereby preserving resources for viable races while sustaining broader opposition networks through nominal presence. Similar dynamics occur in under proportional systems, where low-intensity candidacies by emerging parties help meet participation thresholds amid deposit-linked disincentives, empirically aiding ecosystem maintenance for non-dominant groups despite limited individual success rates.

Historical Development and Evolution

Origins in Electoral Systems

The nomination of paper candidates, nominal figures fielded primarily to secure a party's presence on ballots without substantial campaigning, emerged in the during the 19th century as parliamentary reforms expanded suffrage and compelled emerging national parties to demonstrate viability across constituencies. The marked a pivotal shift by abolishing 56 , redistributing 143 seats toward urban and industrial areas, and extending the vote to middle-class male householders, thereby enlarging the electorate from roughly 435,000 to 652,000 qualified voters. Prior to this, elections in many districts were uncontested or controlled by local patrons, with national alignments loose; afterward, parties such as the Whigs and Tories, reorganizing into more structured entities, increasingly contested even marginal seats to avoid signaling regional confinement and to aggregate vote totals for claims of broad legitimacy under the first-past-the-post system. This incentive was rooted in the causal mechanics of winner-take-all districts, where abstaining from a contest handed victory to opponents unchallenged, potentially eroding party morale and organizational cohesion while allowing rivals to portray dominance. The 1867 Reform Act amplified the pattern by enfranchising urban working-class males, doubling the electorate to over 2 million and heightening competition in previously safe seats, prompting parties to field systematically nationwide despite limited resources in hopeless areas. Such practices predated later mandates like candidate deposits (introduced in ), arising instead from the electoral logic of maintaining a full slate to tally national support and prevent concessions that could undermine post-election narratives of parity. Parallel developments occurred in the United States following the Civil War, as Reconstruction-era party machines in Northern cities filed placeholder nominees to safeguard amid the transition to state-printed official ballots in the 1880s and 1890s. Urban organizations like New York's nominated local loyalists in unwinnable races to ensure party tickets remained intact, preserving machine patronage networks and averting opponent monopolies in voter choice under rules. This mirrored FPTP dynamics, where minimal candidacies prevented vote suppression for the party label and sustained infrastructure for future contests.

Changes Due to Reforms

In the United Kingdom, the 1981 split from Labour that formed the Social Democratic Party (SDP), culminating in the SDP-Liberal Alliance's broad candidacy in the 1983 general election, marked an uptick in paper candidates as new alliances sought to contest numerous seats with minimal localized efforts to build national recognition. The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 imposed candidate spending limits of £5,483 plus 6.2 pence per elector in the constituency (adjusted periodically for inflation), alongside the £500 deposit retained unless 5% of votes are secured, which incentivized minor parties to rely on low-expenditure paper candidacies for ballot presence while adhering to caps that constrain full-scale local campaigns. Canada's electoral landscape shifted following the Supreme Court's 2003 Figueroa v. Canada ruling, which struck down the Canada Elections Act provision requiring parties to nominate candidates in at least 50 ridings for full registration and benefits like tax credits for contributions, reducing the threshold to one candidate for initial registration but preserving incentives for broader fielding to qualify for ongoing status or donor rebates. Subsequent amendments via Bill C-3 in 2004 formalized easier entry but entrenched paper candidates among small parties aiming to distribute efforts across ridings for visibility or to meet practical thresholds like 12 candidates for certain fiscal advantages, as evidenced by patterns in and others' nominations post-reform. In the United States, state reforms during the 2010s—such as New York's 2012 requirement for party lines to be filled via primaries or write-ins, and California's Proposition 14 in 2010 shifting to top-two primaries—increased nominal candidacies by minor parties to secure lines or petitions without campaigning, as "paper candidates" filled slots to avoid defaults while complying with distribution rules for statewide access. Post-2010 advancements in digital campaigning have diminished the physical demands on candidates, enabling parties to achieve nominal presence through low-cost coordination rather than traditional materials, though empirical from jurisdictions with deposits (e.g., UK's £500 or Canada's $1,000 per , forfeited without 5-10% vote share) show small parties facing sustained barriers, with deposit losses correlating to reduced minor-party entries in high-stakes races.

References

  1. https://www.yourdictionary.com/paper-candidate
  2. https://theferret.scot/why-do-parties-run-paper-candidates/
  3. https://www.markpack.org.uk/151981/paper-candidates/
  4. https://southnorfolk.greenparty.org.uk/2020/10/24/our-guide-to-being-a-paper-candidate/
  5. http://nanovio.blogspot.com/2016/03/paper-candidates-you-know-who-they-are.html
  6. https://nfgp.org.uk/why-be-a-green-party-paper-candidate-at-a-local-election/
  7. https://www.definitions.net/definition/paper%2Bcandidate
  8. https://nfgp.org.uk/faq-for-elections/
  9. https://southnorfolk.greenparty.org.uk/our-councils/paper_candidate/
  10. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/what-s-in-a-name-dummy-candidates-confuse-voters/story-yScvUemzrQQ2prAdhztRlO.html
  11. https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/candidates/frequently-asked-questions/write-candidates
  12. https://www.usa.gov/write-in-candidates
  13. https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_access_requirements_for_political_parties_in_the_United_States
  14. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/guidance-candidates-and-agents-uk-parliamentary-elections-great-britain/nominations/submitting-your-nomination-papers/deposit
  15. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/guidance-acting-returning-officers-administering-a-uk-parliamentary-election-great-britain/nominations/forms-nomination/deposit-stand-election
  16. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN03354/SN03354.pdf
  17. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/lost-deposits/
  18. https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/government-in-ireland/elections-and-referenda/running-for-office/election-expenses/
  19. https://lpaction.org/candidate-recruitment/
  20. https://assets.nationbuilder.com/lpnc/pages/2098/attachments/original/1652705127/LP_Candidate_Recruitment_Manual.pdf?1652705127
  21. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/e-2.01/
  22. https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol&dir=pol/reg&document=index&lang=e
  23. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/leaders-debate-commission-green-party-removed-1.7511447
  24. https://cedar.wwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=wwu_honors
  25. https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/competitive-elections-raise-voter-participation-uncontested-elections-hinder-democracy/
  26. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2023.2246148
  27. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/news/13-05-24-the_impact_of_a_safe_seat_on_voter_turnout_and_opinion_polls/
  28. https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/54221/1/Chris%2520Terry%2520democraticaudit.com-In_Britains_first_past_the_post.pdf
  29. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn01663/
  30. https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/reports/more-parties-better-parties/2-the-case-for-political-parties-why-modern-mass-democracy-needs-political-parties-and-cant-operate-without-them/
  31. https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Penny-for-your-vote-costs-of-fptp.pdf
  32. https://www.democraticaudit.com/2013/10/14/rules-on-election-deposits-create-an-uneven-playing-field-and-protect-the-interest-of-the-largest-parties/
  33. https://electoral-reform.org.uk/do-you-live-in-a-safe-seat/
  34. https://lims.minneapolismn.gov/Download/FileV2/26909/Ballot-Position-and-Voter-Behavior.pdf
  35. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/common-ballot-design-flaws-and-how-fix-them
  36. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/how-us-states-make-it-tough-third-parties-elections-2024-01-18/
  37. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/election_law/american-democracy/our-work/reviving-american-tradition-fusion-voting/
  38. https://news.ballotpedia.org/2025/08/01/which-states-let-primary-losers-run-in-the-general-election/
  39. https://www.gp.org/ballot_access
  40. https://www.fec.gov/data/browse-data/
  41. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10009/
  42. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/article/2024/may/24/reform-uk-forced-to-remove-more-than-100-general-election-candidates-in-2024
  43. https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-guidance/programme-guidance/election-guidance/general-election-digest-2024.pdf
  44. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckvgl9kzwzjo
  45. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/2021-12/Local-government-elections-in-England-and-Wales-Candidate-spending-return-Excel-Version-FINAL%25202022.pdf
  46. https://www.sipo.ie/en/publication/6fb3a-state-financing/
  47. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/E-2.01/
  48. https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol&document=index&lang=e
  49. https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=ele&dir=pas/44ge/can&document=index&lang=e
  50. https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=fin&dir=oth/can/rem/rem_44ge&document=table&lang=e
  51. https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=pol
  52. https://vancouversun.com/news/politics/election-2021/election-2021-results-green-party-delivered-setback-at-ballot-box-losing-mp-in-faltering-of-support
  53. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-05/pauline-hanson-one-nation-asked-to-explain-invisible-candidates/101039240
  54. https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/post/max-opray/2022/05/05/ghost-candidates-haunt-one-nation
  55. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-05-06/federal-election-what-is-a-ghost-candidate/101041342
  56. https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/27944/chapter/211887744
  57. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/zweitstimme-model-a-dynamic-forecast-of-the-2021-german-federal-election/3BF2DA3841C15602D7EA31B3872FD975
  58. https://www.studyiq.com/articles/electoral-system-in-india/
  59. https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/houseofcommons/reformacts/overview/reformact1832/
  60. https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/what-caused-the-1832-great-reform-act/
  61. https://www.laetottenham.org.uk/_site/data/files/users/12/files/C6B090E5C972842105BDD95A1CEBC799.pdf
  62. https://www.history.com/articles/voting-elections-ballots-electronic
  63. https://www.liberalhistory.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Candidates-Scotland.pdf
  64. https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/news/liberalism-in-power-watching-the-titanic.pdf
  65. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/notes
  66. https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/electoral_commission_pdf_file/Variations_15470-11493__E__N__S__W__.pdf
  67. https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/2069/index.do
  68. https://www.constitutionalstudies.ca/2010/06/figueroa-v-canada-2003-the-right-to-vote-and-registered-party-status/
  69. https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/LegislativeSummaries/373LS461E
  70. https://www.nyccfb.info/PDF/per/2009_PER/2009PostElectionReport.pdf
  71. https://independentpoliticalreport.com/2017/08/nationwide-libertarian-voter-registration-now-above-500000/
  72. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17457289.2021.2009484
  73. https://aceproject.org/main/english/pc/pcc05b.htm
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.