The Battle of Praga or the Second Battle of Warsaw of 1794, also known in Russian and German as the Storming of Praga (Russian: Штурм Праги) and in Polish as the Defence of Praga (Polish: Obrona Pragi), was a successful Russian assault on Praga, the easternmost community of Warsaw, during the Kościuszko Uprising in 1794. It was followed by a massacre (known as the Massacre of Praga) of the civilian population of Praga.

Praga was a suburb ("Faubourg") of Warsaw, lying on the right bank of the Vistula river. In 1794 it was well fortified and was better strengthened than the western part of the capital, located on the left bank of the Vistula. Historian and professor Friedrich Christoph Schlosser labelled Praga as "the key to Warsaw". The Praga battle marked the collapse of moral and material strength of insurgent Poland.

Russian commander Alexander Suvorov inflicted a series of defeats on the rebels: the Battle of Krupczyce on 17 September, where Suvorov's 12,000 soldiers were opposed by 4,000 Polish; the Battle of Brest on 19 September,—9,000 Russians fought here against 16,000 Poles; and the Battle of Kobyłka on 26 October, with 10,000 Russians ran into 4,500 Polish forces. After the Battle of Maciejowice, General Tadeusz Kościuszko was captured by Russians. The internal struggle for power in Warsaw and the demoralisation of the city's population prevented General Józef Zajączek from finishing the fortifications surrounding the city both from the east and from the west. At the same time, the Russians were making their way towards the city.

The Russian forces consisted of two battle-hardened corps under Generals Alexander (Aleksandr) Suvorov and Ivan Fersen. Suvorov took part in the recent Russo-Turkish war, then in the heavy fighting in Polesie. General Lieutenant Baron Fersen fought for several months in Poland but was also joined by fresh reinforcements sent from Russia. Each of them had approximately 11,000 men.

The Polish-Lithuanian forces consisted of a variety of troops. Apart from the rallied remnants of the Kościuszko's army defeated in the Battle of Maciejowice, it also included a large number of untrained militia from Warsaw, Praga and Vilnius, a 500-man Jewish regiment of Berek Joselewicz as well as a number of scythemen (2,000 men) and civilians, plus 5,000 regular cavalry. The total number of irregulars was to be about 12,000 and the regular troops about 18,000. One of the sources, Suvorov's report dated 28 October [O.S. 17 October], claims 15,000 regular infantry and only 2,500 cavalry (17,500 regulars altogether) – according to the Poles–Lithuanians themselves. The forces were organised in three separate lines, each covering a different part of Praga. The central area was commanded directly by General Józef Zajączek, the northern area was commanded by Jakub Jasiński and the southern by Władysław Jabłonowski. In general, the forces defending Praga should be estimated at 22,000 to 26,000 men, although together with the townspeople involved, Praga was defended by 30,000 men, which is also indicated by Suvorov, and had 104 cannons. There is also a closer figure of 28,000 men. Suvorov came to the walls of Praga from his camp at Kobyłka with 16,000 to 18,000 footsore troops (regulars) and 86 cannons. Suvorov also had 4,000 regular cavalry and 2,000 irregular Cossack cavalry at the assault. The total number of regular troops was up to 25,000 with as many as 7,000 regular cavalrymen; Cossacks were up to 5,000 – these were the corps of Derfelden (first and second columns; 4,600 men), Potemkin (third and fourth columns; 5,800 men), Fersen (fifth, sixth, and seventh columns; 7,000 men), and General Major Shevich's reserve (4,000 men). That is, the forces may have been roughly equal overall, however, largely due to the declining morale of the Varsovians, they put up just 2,000 men — irregular soldiers — to defend the ramparts. The main force, the regular troops, stood behind fortifications as a reserve on the vast field according to Kościuszko's plan. After a reconnaissance by the Russian side, up to 24,055 men, inclusive of 41 infantry battalions and 81 cavalry squadrons, would come out for the storming together with reserve units; in the village of Okuniew a wagenburg was stationed.

The Russian forces reached the outskirts of Warsaw on 2 November 1794, pushing back Polish-Lithuanian outposts with bayonets, launching the reconnaissance and declaring the disposition. Immediately upon arrival, they started erecting artillery batteries and in the morning of 3 November started an artillery barrage of the Polish-Lithuanian defences. This made Józef Zajączek think that the opposing forces were preparing for a long stay there; the Russians disguised the forthcoming attack in order to give the rebels reason to expect a siege. The Polish artillery responded with vigour. However, Suvorov's plan assumed a fast and concentrated assault on the defences rather than a bloody and lengthy siege.

At 3 o'clock in the morning of November 4, the Russian troops silently reached the positions just outside the outer rim of the field fortifications. The defenders did not expect an attack on this day. First and second columns began preparations; besides, the Polish general fatigue and the low spirits of their leaders contributed to the fact that the Russian advance was noticed too late. The Polish forward posts, who stood at the back of the trous de loup, fled as soon as the attacker approached. Two hours later started an all-out assault.

General Wawrzecki arrived in Praga at 4 a.m. on 4 November and was talking with Zajączek. Suddenly shots rang out. Wawrzecki rushed to the left flank, where Jasiński commanded, and Zajączek to the right. Then Wawrzecki also went to the right flank. There were no orders for the reserves to operate in the inner field, and the battle turned into a random fighting, very persistent on the ramparts, but completely disorderly.