Recent from talks
Second Battle of El Alamein
Knowledge base stats:
Talk channels stats:
Members stats:
Second Battle of El Alamein
The Second Battle of El Alamein (23 October – 11 November 1942) was a battle of the Second World War that took place near the Egyptian railway halt of El Alamein. The First Battle of El Alamein and the Battle of Alam el Halfa had prevented the Axis from advancing further into Egypt.
In October 1942 Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery, commander of Eighth Army, opened his offensive against the Axis forces. In a 13-day battle the Axis Panzerarmee Afrika was crushed and forced to retreat from Egypt and Libya to the borders of Tunisia. The Allied victory at El Alamein was the beginning of the end of the Western Desert Campaign.
The battle ended the Axis threat to the Middle East and Iran and revived the morale of the western Allies, being their first big success against the Axis since Operation Crusader in late 1941. The end of the battle coincided with the Allied invasion of French North Africa in Operation Torch on 8 November, which opened a second front in North Africa.
Panzer Army Africa (Panzerarmee Afrika/Armata Corazzata Africa Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel) composed of German and Italian tank and infantry units, subordinated to the new Italian command structure Delease (North African Command Delegation, Lieutenant-General Curio Barbasetti) had advanced into Egypt after its success at the Battle of Gazala (26 May – 21 June 1942). The Axis advance threatened British control of the Suez Canal, the Middle East and its oil resources. General Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Command and in tactical command of Eighth Army, withdrew the Eighth Army to within 50 mi (80 km) of Alexandria where the Qattara Depression was 40 mi (64 km) south of El Alamein on the coast. The depression was impassable and meant that any attack had to be frontal; Axis attacks in the First Battle of El Alamein (1–27 July) had been defeated.
Eighth Army counter-attacks in July also failed, as the Axis forces dug in and regrouped. Auchinleck called off the attacks at the end of July to rebuild the army. In early August, Winston Churchill and General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), visited Cairo and replaced Auchinleck as Commander-in-chief Middle East Command, with General Harold Alexander. Lieutenant-General William Gott was made commander of the Eighth Army but was killed when his transport aircraft was shot down by Luftwaffe fighters; Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery was flown from Britain to replace him.
Lacking reinforcements and depending on small, underdeveloped ports for supplies and aware of a huge Allied reinforcement operation for the Eighth Army, Rommel decided to attack first. The two armoured divisions of the Afrika Korps and the reconnaissance units of Panzerarmee Afrika led the attack but were repulsed at the Alam el Halfa ridge and Point 102 on 30 August 1942, during the Battle of Alam el Halfa; the Axis forces retired to their start lines. The short front line and secure flanks favoured the defensive and Rommel had time to develop the Axis fortifications, sowing minefields with c. 500,000 mines and miles of barbed wire. Alexander and Montgomery intended to establish a superiority of force sufficient to achieve a breakthrough and exploit it to destroy Panzerarmee Afrika. Earlier in the Western Desert Campaign, neither side had been able to exploit a local victory sufficiently to defeat its opponent before it had withdrawn and transferred the problem of over-extended supply lines to the victor.
Until June 1942 Rommel had been receiving detailed information about the strength and movement of British forces from reports sent to Washington by Colonel Bonner Fellers, the U.S. military attaché in Cairo. The American code had been stolen following a covert operation by Italian military intelligence at the American Embassy in Rome the previous year. Despite British concerns, the Americans continued to use the code until the end of June. Suspicion that the code was compromised was confirmed when the 9th Australian Division captured the German 621st Signal Battalion in July 1942.
The British gained the intelligence advantage because Ultra and local sources exposed the Axis order of battle, its supply position and intentions. A reorganisation of military intelligence in Africa in July had also improved the integration of information received from all sources and the speed of its dissemination. With rare exceptions, intelligence identified the supply ships destined for North Africa, their location or routing and in most cases their cargoes, allowing them to be attacked. By 25 October, Panzerarmee Afrika was down to three days' supply of fuel, only two days' of which were east of Tobruk. Harry Hinsley, the official historian of British intelligence, wrote in 1981 that "The Panzer Army... did not possess the operational freedom of movement that was absolutely essential in consideration of the fact that the British offensive can be expected to start any day". Submarine and air transport somewhat eased the shortage of ammunition and by late October, there was sixteen days' supply at the front. After six more weeks, the Eighth Army was ready; 195,000 men and 1,029 tanks began the offensive against the 116,000 men and 547 tanks of the Panzerarmee.
Hub AI
Second Battle of El Alamein AI simulator
(@Second Battle of El Alamein_simulator)
Second Battle of El Alamein
The Second Battle of El Alamein (23 October – 11 November 1942) was a battle of the Second World War that took place near the Egyptian railway halt of El Alamein. The First Battle of El Alamein and the Battle of Alam el Halfa had prevented the Axis from advancing further into Egypt.
In October 1942 Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery, commander of Eighth Army, opened his offensive against the Axis forces. In a 13-day battle the Axis Panzerarmee Afrika was crushed and forced to retreat from Egypt and Libya to the borders of Tunisia. The Allied victory at El Alamein was the beginning of the end of the Western Desert Campaign.
The battle ended the Axis threat to the Middle East and Iran and revived the morale of the western Allies, being their first big success against the Axis since Operation Crusader in late 1941. The end of the battle coincided with the Allied invasion of French North Africa in Operation Torch on 8 November, which opened a second front in North Africa.
Panzer Army Africa (Panzerarmee Afrika/Armata Corazzata Africa Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel) composed of German and Italian tank and infantry units, subordinated to the new Italian command structure Delease (North African Command Delegation, Lieutenant-General Curio Barbasetti) had advanced into Egypt after its success at the Battle of Gazala (26 May – 21 June 1942). The Axis advance threatened British control of the Suez Canal, the Middle East and its oil resources. General Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Command and in tactical command of Eighth Army, withdrew the Eighth Army to within 50 mi (80 km) of Alexandria where the Qattara Depression was 40 mi (64 km) south of El Alamein on the coast. The depression was impassable and meant that any attack had to be frontal; Axis attacks in the First Battle of El Alamein (1–27 July) had been defeated.
Eighth Army counter-attacks in July also failed, as the Axis forces dug in and regrouped. Auchinleck called off the attacks at the end of July to rebuild the army. In early August, Winston Churchill and General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), visited Cairo and replaced Auchinleck as Commander-in-chief Middle East Command, with General Harold Alexander. Lieutenant-General William Gott was made commander of the Eighth Army but was killed when his transport aircraft was shot down by Luftwaffe fighters; Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery was flown from Britain to replace him.
Lacking reinforcements and depending on small, underdeveloped ports for supplies and aware of a huge Allied reinforcement operation for the Eighth Army, Rommel decided to attack first. The two armoured divisions of the Afrika Korps and the reconnaissance units of Panzerarmee Afrika led the attack but were repulsed at the Alam el Halfa ridge and Point 102 on 30 August 1942, during the Battle of Alam el Halfa; the Axis forces retired to their start lines. The short front line and secure flanks favoured the defensive and Rommel had time to develop the Axis fortifications, sowing minefields with c. 500,000 mines and miles of barbed wire. Alexander and Montgomery intended to establish a superiority of force sufficient to achieve a breakthrough and exploit it to destroy Panzerarmee Afrika. Earlier in the Western Desert Campaign, neither side had been able to exploit a local victory sufficiently to defeat its opponent before it had withdrawn and transferred the problem of over-extended supply lines to the victor.
Until June 1942 Rommel had been receiving detailed information about the strength and movement of British forces from reports sent to Washington by Colonel Bonner Fellers, the U.S. military attaché in Cairo. The American code had been stolen following a covert operation by Italian military intelligence at the American Embassy in Rome the previous year. Despite British concerns, the Americans continued to use the code until the end of June. Suspicion that the code was compromised was confirmed when the 9th Australian Division captured the German 621st Signal Battalion in July 1942.
The British gained the intelligence advantage because Ultra and local sources exposed the Axis order of battle, its supply position and intentions. A reorganisation of military intelligence in Africa in July had also improved the integration of information received from all sources and the speed of its dissemination. With rare exceptions, intelligence identified the supply ships destined for North Africa, their location or routing and in most cases their cargoes, allowing them to be attacked. By 25 October, Panzerarmee Afrika was down to three days' supply of fuel, only two days' of which were east of Tobruk. Harry Hinsley, the official historian of British intelligence, wrote in 1981 that "The Panzer Army... did not possess the operational freedom of movement that was absolutely essential in consideration of the fact that the British offensive can be expected to start any day". Submarine and air transport somewhat eased the shortage of ammunition and by late October, there was sixteen days' supply at the front. After six more weeks, the Eighth Army was ready; 195,000 men and 1,029 tanks began the offensive against the 116,000 men and 547 tanks of the Panzerarmee.
Recent media