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Operation Torch
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Operation Torch
Operation Torch (8–16 November 1942) was an Allied invasion of French North Africa during World War II. Torch was a compromise operation that met the British objective of securing victory in North Africa while allowing American armed forces the opportunity to begin their fight against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on a limited scale.
The French colonies were aligned with Germany via Vichy France but the loyalties of the population were mixed. Reports indicated that they might support the Allies. The American General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied forces in Mediterranean theater of the war, approved plans for a three-pronged attack on Casablanca (Western), Oran (Centre) and Algiers (Eastern), then a rapid move on Tunis to catch Axis forces in North Africa from the west in conjunction with the British advance from Egypt.
The Western Task Force encountered unexpected resistance and bad weather but Casablanca, the principal French Atlantic naval base, was captured after a short siege. The Centre Task Force suffered some damage to its ships when trying to land in shallow water; Oran surrendered after bombardment by British battleships. The Eastern Task Force met less opposition and were able to push inland and compel surrender on the first day.
The success of Torch caused Admiral François Darlan, commander of the Vichy French forces, who was in Algiers, to order co-operation with the Allies, in return for being installed as High Commissioner, with many other Vichy officials keeping their jobs. Darlan was assassinated by a monarchist six weeks later and the Free French gradually came to dominate the government.
When the United States entered the Second World War in December 7, British and Americans met at the Arcadia Conference to discuss future strategy. The principle of Europe first was agreed upon, but British and Americans had different views on how to implement it. Americans favoured a direct approach with first a limited landing in 1942 (Operation Sledgehammer), and then a follow-up main thrust in 1943 (Operation Roundup). The British pressed for a less ambitious plan. They realized the build-up of American forces (Operation Bolero) would take time, and there was not enough shipping available for large operations. Winston Churchill proposed to invade North Africa. The head of the United States Army, General George Marshall and the head of the US Navy, Admiral Ernest King strongly opposed that plan, and were inclined to abandon the Germany first strategy if Churchill persisted. But President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to support the Russians and as any Pacific operation would be of no help to them, he agreed to the North-African operation. On 14 August 1942 Lt. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed as Commander in Chief Allied expeditionary Force, and he set up his headquarters in London.
Planners identified Oran, Algiers and Casablanca as key targets. Ideally there would also be a landing at Tunis to secure Tunisia and facilitate the rapid interdiction of supplies travelling via Tripoli to Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps forces in Italian Libya. A compromise would be to land at Bône in eastern Algeria, some 300 miles (480 km) closer to Tunis than Algiers. Limited resources dictated that the Allies could only make three landings and Eisenhower, who believed that any plan must include landings at Oran and Algiers, had two main options: either the western option, to land at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers and then make as rapid a move as possible to Tunis some 500 miles (800 km) east of Algiers once the Vichy opposition was suppressed; or the eastern option, to land at Oran, Algiers and Bône and then advance overland to Casablanca some 500 miles (800 km) west of Oran. He favoured the eastern option because of the advantages it gave to an early capture of Tunis and also because the Atlantic swells off Casablanca presented considerably greater risks to an amphibious landing there than would be encountered in the Mediterranean. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, however, were concerned that should Operation Torch precipitate Spain to abandon neutrality and join the Axis, the Straits of Gibraltar could be closed cutting the entire Allied force's lines of communication. They therefore chose the Casablanca option as the less risky since the forces in Algeria and Tunisia could be supplied overland from Casablanca in the event of closure of the straits.
The Morocco landings ruled out the early occupation of Tunisia. But with British forces advancing from Egypt, this would allow the Allies to carry out a pincer operation against Axis forces in North Africa by mid-January 1943.
The Allies believed that the Vichy French Armistice Army would not fight, partly because of information supplied by the American Consul Robert Daniel Murphy in Algiers. The French were former members of the Allies, and US troops were instructed not to fire unless they were fired upon. The Vichy French Navy were expected to be very hostile after the British Attack on Mers-el-Kébir in June 1940, and the Syria–Lebanon campaign in 1941.
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Operation Torch
Operation Torch (8–16 November 1942) was an Allied invasion of French North Africa during World War II. Torch was a compromise operation that met the British objective of securing victory in North Africa while allowing American armed forces the opportunity to begin their fight against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy on a limited scale.
The French colonies were aligned with Germany via Vichy France but the loyalties of the population were mixed. Reports indicated that they might support the Allies. The American General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied forces in Mediterranean theater of the war, approved plans for a three-pronged attack on Casablanca (Western), Oran (Centre) and Algiers (Eastern), then a rapid move on Tunis to catch Axis forces in North Africa from the west in conjunction with the British advance from Egypt.
The Western Task Force encountered unexpected resistance and bad weather but Casablanca, the principal French Atlantic naval base, was captured after a short siege. The Centre Task Force suffered some damage to its ships when trying to land in shallow water; Oran surrendered after bombardment by British battleships. The Eastern Task Force met less opposition and were able to push inland and compel surrender on the first day.
The success of Torch caused Admiral François Darlan, commander of the Vichy French forces, who was in Algiers, to order co-operation with the Allies, in return for being installed as High Commissioner, with many other Vichy officials keeping their jobs. Darlan was assassinated by a monarchist six weeks later and the Free French gradually came to dominate the government.
When the United States entered the Second World War in December 7, British and Americans met at the Arcadia Conference to discuss future strategy. The principle of Europe first was agreed upon, but British and Americans had different views on how to implement it. Americans favoured a direct approach with first a limited landing in 1942 (Operation Sledgehammer), and then a follow-up main thrust in 1943 (Operation Roundup). The British pressed for a less ambitious plan. They realized the build-up of American forces (Operation Bolero) would take time, and there was not enough shipping available for large operations. Winston Churchill proposed to invade North Africa. The head of the United States Army, General George Marshall and the head of the US Navy, Admiral Ernest King strongly opposed that plan, and were inclined to abandon the Germany first strategy if Churchill persisted. But President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to support the Russians and as any Pacific operation would be of no help to them, he agreed to the North-African operation. On 14 August 1942 Lt. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed as Commander in Chief Allied expeditionary Force, and he set up his headquarters in London.
Planners identified Oran, Algiers and Casablanca as key targets. Ideally there would also be a landing at Tunis to secure Tunisia and facilitate the rapid interdiction of supplies travelling via Tripoli to Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps forces in Italian Libya. A compromise would be to land at Bône in eastern Algeria, some 300 miles (480 km) closer to Tunis than Algiers. Limited resources dictated that the Allies could only make three landings and Eisenhower, who believed that any plan must include landings at Oran and Algiers, had two main options: either the western option, to land at Casablanca, Oran and Algiers and then make as rapid a move as possible to Tunis some 500 miles (800 km) east of Algiers once the Vichy opposition was suppressed; or the eastern option, to land at Oran, Algiers and Bône and then advance overland to Casablanca some 500 miles (800 km) west of Oran. He favoured the eastern option because of the advantages it gave to an early capture of Tunis and also because the Atlantic swells off Casablanca presented considerably greater risks to an amphibious landing there than would be encountered in the Mediterranean. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, however, were concerned that should Operation Torch precipitate Spain to abandon neutrality and join the Axis, the Straits of Gibraltar could be closed cutting the entire Allied force's lines of communication. They therefore chose the Casablanca option as the less risky since the forces in Algeria and Tunisia could be supplied overland from Casablanca in the event of closure of the straits.
The Morocco landings ruled out the early occupation of Tunisia. But with British forces advancing from Egypt, this would allow the Allies to carry out a pincer operation against Axis forces in North Africa by mid-January 1943.
The Allies believed that the Vichy French Armistice Army would not fight, partly because of information supplied by the American Consul Robert Daniel Murphy in Algiers. The French were former members of the Allies, and US troops were instructed not to fire unless they were fired upon. The Vichy French Navy were expected to be very hostile after the British Attack on Mers-el-Kébir in June 1940, and the Syria–Lebanon campaign in 1941.
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