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Summerland disaster
The Summerland disaster occurred when a fire spread through the Summerland leisure centre in Douglas on the Isle of Man on the night of 2 August 1973. 50 people were killed and 80 seriously injured. The scale of the fire has been compared to those seen during the Blitz.
Summerland was opened on 25 May 1971. It was a climate-controlled building covering 3.5 acres (1.4 ha) on Douglas's waterfront, consisting of 50,000 sq ft (4,600 m2) of floor area constructed at a cost of £2 million. The building's exterior and the interior were designed by two architects who did not coordinate their planning with each other and thereby created a venue with significant fire risks.
Summerland was designed to accommodate up to 10,000 tourists and consisted of a dance hall, five floors of holiday games, a rollerskating rink, restaurants and public bars. It was an example of Modernist architecture incorporating advanced controlled internal climate, built with novel construction techniques using new plastic materials. The street frontage and part of the roof was clad in Oroglas, a transparent acrylic glass sheeting.
The fire started at around 7:30 p.m. on 2 August 1973 when approximately 3,000 people were inside and was caused by three boys who were smoking in a small disused kiosk on the centre's miniature golf course, and who told police it was likely started by a carelessly discarded match or stub. The burning kiosk collapsed against the exterior of the building. This part of the building was clad in a material called Galbestos: profiled steel sheeting with asbestos felt on both sides coated with bitumen, with no fire-resistant qualities. The fire spread to the wall's interior soundproofing material, which was highly combustible, causing an intense fire that ignited the flammable acrylic sheeting that covered the rest of the building. The fire quickly spread across the sheeting on the leisure centre walls and roof and through vents which were not properly fireproofed. The acrylic material melted, allowing more oxygen to enter and dropping burning molten material, both starting other fires and injuring those trying to escape. The building's open-plan design included many unblocked internal spaces that acted as chimneys, adding to the conflagration.
There was no attempt to evacuate the 3,000 people present until the visible evidence of the flames prompted a panic-stricken mass rush for the exits. The fire was contained in an internal space within the walls until it penetrated the interior, destroying the wiring of the fire alarm system in the process. One survivor (who was a child at the time) remembered her father noticing smoke coming from the ventilation shaft and had started to attempt to evacuate when the whole area erupted in flames. The survivor and her mother were separated from her father and sister and stuck in the venue before being rescued through a window by firemen.
Because of the locked fire doors, many people headed to the main entrance, which caused a crush.
The fire services were not called for over 20 minutes, and even then the call did not originate from Summerland. Instead, the first call came from a passing taxi driver, while another came from the captain of a ship 2 miles (3.2 km) offshore who radioed HM Coastguard and said, "It looks as if the whole of the Isle of Man is on fire". The Coastguard immediately called the fire brigade. The first responding fire crews realised additional resources would be required, and almost every resource available to the Isle of Man Fire and Rescue Service was mobilised to the incident (93 of its 106 firefighters and all 16 of its engines).
The fire killed 50 people, eleven of them under the age of twenty. Around 80 people were seriously injured in the resulting crush and fire and received physical and mental scars. The fire brigade's provisional total of 51 deaths at the scene was subsequently revised down to 48, and two others died in hospital, one in Douglas on 11 August and the other in Scotland on 29 September; the latter is excluded from the Isle of Man coroner's list of 49 deaths. Ian Phillips of Birmingham University suggests these reporting discrepancies explain why some sources have given incorrect death tolls of 49, 51, or 53. The inscription on the 1998 disaster memorial did not give a death toll; its 2013 replacement lists all 50 names.
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Summerland disaster
The Summerland disaster occurred when a fire spread through the Summerland leisure centre in Douglas on the Isle of Man on the night of 2 August 1973. 50 people were killed and 80 seriously injured. The scale of the fire has been compared to those seen during the Blitz.
Summerland was opened on 25 May 1971. It was a climate-controlled building covering 3.5 acres (1.4 ha) on Douglas's waterfront, consisting of 50,000 sq ft (4,600 m2) of floor area constructed at a cost of £2 million. The building's exterior and the interior were designed by two architects who did not coordinate their planning with each other and thereby created a venue with significant fire risks.
Summerland was designed to accommodate up to 10,000 tourists and consisted of a dance hall, five floors of holiday games, a rollerskating rink, restaurants and public bars. It was an example of Modernist architecture incorporating advanced controlled internal climate, built with novel construction techniques using new plastic materials. The street frontage and part of the roof was clad in Oroglas, a transparent acrylic glass sheeting.
The fire started at around 7:30 p.m. on 2 August 1973 when approximately 3,000 people were inside and was caused by three boys who were smoking in a small disused kiosk on the centre's miniature golf course, and who told police it was likely started by a carelessly discarded match or stub. The burning kiosk collapsed against the exterior of the building. This part of the building was clad in a material called Galbestos: profiled steel sheeting with asbestos felt on both sides coated with bitumen, with no fire-resistant qualities. The fire spread to the wall's interior soundproofing material, which was highly combustible, causing an intense fire that ignited the flammable acrylic sheeting that covered the rest of the building. The fire quickly spread across the sheeting on the leisure centre walls and roof and through vents which were not properly fireproofed. The acrylic material melted, allowing more oxygen to enter and dropping burning molten material, both starting other fires and injuring those trying to escape. The building's open-plan design included many unblocked internal spaces that acted as chimneys, adding to the conflagration.
There was no attempt to evacuate the 3,000 people present until the visible evidence of the flames prompted a panic-stricken mass rush for the exits. The fire was contained in an internal space within the walls until it penetrated the interior, destroying the wiring of the fire alarm system in the process. One survivor (who was a child at the time) remembered her father noticing smoke coming from the ventilation shaft and had started to attempt to evacuate when the whole area erupted in flames. The survivor and her mother were separated from her father and sister and stuck in the venue before being rescued through a window by firemen.
Because of the locked fire doors, many people headed to the main entrance, which caused a crush.
The fire services were not called for over 20 minutes, and even then the call did not originate from Summerland. Instead, the first call came from a passing taxi driver, while another came from the captain of a ship 2 miles (3.2 km) offshore who radioed HM Coastguard and said, "It looks as if the whole of the Isle of Man is on fire". The Coastguard immediately called the fire brigade. The first responding fire crews realised additional resources would be required, and almost every resource available to the Isle of Man Fire and Rescue Service was mobilised to the incident (93 of its 106 firefighters and all 16 of its engines).
The fire killed 50 people, eleven of them under the age of twenty. Around 80 people were seriously injured in the resulting crush and fire and received physical and mental scars. The fire brigade's provisional total of 51 deaths at the scene was subsequently revised down to 48, and two others died in hospital, one in Douglas on 11 August and the other in Scotland on 29 September; the latter is excluded from the Isle of Man coroner's list of 49 deaths. Ian Phillips of Birmingham University suggests these reporting discrepancies explain why some sources have given incorrect death tolls of 49, 51, or 53. The inscription on the 1998 disaster memorial did not give a death toll; its 2013 replacement lists all 50 names.