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The Third Front (Arabic: الجبهة الثالثة, romanized: al-Jabhah al-Thālithah), known as Tamazuj (تمازج), is a claimed rebel group based in the Darfur and Kordofan regions of Sudan.

Key Information

History

[edit]

Apparently formed during the leadup to the Juba Peace Agreement for the purpose of signing the agreement as a rebel group, the Third Front/Tamazuj was widely accused of being inserted into the process by the government of Sudan as a false rebel group. It claimed to be a former part of the SPLM-N rebel group, but this was denied by both major factions of that group. A UN investigation found that the Third Front / Tamazuj was possibly led by Arab militiamen who had served under Riek Machar in both the Second Sudanese Civil War (as part of the SPLA) and the South Sudanese Civil War (as part of the SPLA-IO), having spent the time between those two wars as part of the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), a paramilitary group under the government of Sudan. They were said to have been allowed to join the peace process at Machar's urging.[1]

Tamazuj was one of the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement signed in October 2020,[2] after which it grew quickly in strength and power, recruiting new fighters from Darfur and opening offices across Sudan.[1] In 2021, they won two seats in the legislative council, including the head of a parliamentary committee and a commission.[3]

On August 17, 2023, Tamazuj declared its formal alliance with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the ongoing conflict against the Sudanese Armed Forces.[4] On March 12, 2023, Tamazuj stormed a police station in Khartoum, believing the security forces there assaulted one of their leaders. According to the group, a group of police officers had severely beaten a Tamazuj general Hussein Jaqud Wadi and broken his leg in an apparent dispute over the seizure of one the groups vehicles. In retaliation, the group stormed the station and freed the arrested general and his bodyguards.[5]

Tamazuj is reportedly present in border areas with Chad, Central African Republic and Sudan. 4 of June, 2024 United Nations accused Tamazuj of recruiting children and using them as child soldiers. UN also supported the release of 122 children which were recruited by Tamazuj.[6]

Etymology

[edit]

The name Tamazuj came from the Juba peace agreement, in which the Darfur was divided to six different groups. One of the groups was named Tamazuj (تمازج) corresponding to the border regions of Darfur and South Kordofan.[7]

References

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Tamazuj

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Tamazuj (: تمازج), also known as the Third Front (الجبهة الثالثة), is a Sudanese rebel group operating primarily in the region that emerged in the lead-up to peace negotiations. Formed to participate in efforts, it signed the Peace Agreement in October 2020 as one of several armed factions seeking integration into Sudan's transitional framework, though its role was framed as a bilateral component to broader peace processes. Despite this involvement, Tamazuj has maintained a marginal presence, described as isolated and lacking widespread support among other rebel entities or local populations. In August 2023, amid the escalation of Sudan's civil war between the and the (RSF), Tamazuj formally aligned itself with the RSF, positioning the group within the paramilitary's coalition against the central government. This decision drew scrutiny, as it contrasted with the group's earlier peace commitments and highlighted its limited military footprint, with no major independent operations documented post-alliance. By 2022, Tamazuj had publicly advocated for revisions to the Juba Agreement, arguing it disproportionately benefited select signatories at the expense of others, underscoring ongoing factional tensions in Darfur's fractured armed landscape. The group's activities reflect broader challenges in Sudan's dynamics, where smaller outfits often pivot alliances for survival amid ethnic and resource-based conflicts.

Background and Name

Etymology and Claimed Origins

The term Tamazuj (Arabic: تمازج) originates from the Arabic noun tamāzuj, denoting "mixing," "blending," or "intermingling," which underscores the group's asserted role as a fusion of disparate armed elements from Sudan's western regions. This etymological choice aligns with the multilingual context of border areas between and , where similar terminology has been applied to describe cultural and ethnic overlaps, though the militia's adoption emphasizes tactical unification rather than broader societal integration. Known alternatively as the Third Front (al-Jabhah al-Thālithah), Tamazuj claims origins as a coalition of rebel factions from and , formed to counterbalance the (SAF) and other dominant powers while advocating for power-sharing and security sector reform. The group surfaced publicly on October 3, 2020, as one of 21 signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement, brokered in , where it pledged to integrate approximately 2,000 fighters into national structures and participate in a unified military. Its leadership, headed by Chairman Mohamed Ali Taha, traces back to pre-existing local militias that had clashed with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) in and , positioning Tamazuj as a "third way" independent of major alliances like the or the SPLM-N. However, the group's claimed multi-ethnic composition and pre-2020 cohesion remain unsubstantiated and elusive, with no prior operational history documented before its Juba endorsement; analyses describe it as predominantly comprising Arab tribal militias previously backed by Sudanese government forces against non-Arab insurgents. This has fueled doubts about its origins as a genuine alliance, suggesting instead an opportunistic assembly facilitated by the 2020 to secure political leverage and resources, amid Sudan's fragmented rebel landscape. Subsequent actions, including its 2023 alignment with the (RSF) and reported participation in ethnically motivated violence in , further contradict assertions of inclusive representation.

Formation and Objectives

Establishment and Stated Goals

Tamazuj, also known as the Third Front (al-Jabha al-Thalitha), was established in 2020 as an armed group representing rebel factions primarily from Sudan's and regions, specifically to participate as a signatory in the Juba Peace Agreement. The group, led by Mohammed Ali Qureshi, emerged during the negotiation phase of the agreement, which sought to consolidate various non-signatory holdout movements into the transitional framework following the 2019 ouster of . Its formation appears engineered to expand the roster of compliant armed actors, with documented affiliations to Sudanese military intelligence, raising questions about its independence as a genuine rather than a state-aligned entity. The Peace Agreement, signed on October 3, 2020, in , , formalized Tamazuj's entry into the peace architecture, committing it to broader Sudanese transitional objectives such as ending hostilities, restructuring security forces, and achieving power-sharing among civilian and military elements. Tamazuj's stated goals aligned with these provisions, emphasizing the integration of its estimated forces—deployed across and —into national institutions, including the and police, alongside demands for equitable representation of its constituent communities in governance and resource allocation. However, implementation stalled amid the 2021 military coup, leaving Tamazuj's integration partial and its operational autonomy intact, which later facilitated shifts in allegiances during escalating conflicts. Critics, including rival Darfur movements, have portrayed Tamazuj's objectives as opportunistic, prioritizing elite access to state patronage over substantive reforms for marginalized non-Arab populations, evidenced by its post-agreement involvement in localized tribal clashes rather than unified rebel coordination. The group's charter and public declarations, as a Juba signatory, nominally pursued "just peace" through demobilization and constitutional reforms, but empirical outcomes suggest a focus on securing territorial footholds and economic leverage in resource-disputed areas.

Ideological Foundations

The Third Front, known as Tamazuj, articulates its ideological foundations in the Juba Peace Agreement of October 3, 2020, drawing explicit inspiration from the Sudanese December Revolution (2018–2019), a popular uprising against Omar al-Bashir's regime that demanded freedoms, peace, and justice. The agreement's preamble for Tamazuj emphasizes building a national democratic and inclusive state, rooted in just peace, equal citizenship without discrimination, and comprehensive security arrangements to address conflicts in regions like . This framework prioritizes integration of armed forces into national structures, , , and reintegration (DDR) processes, with specific commitments to a permanent ceasefire within three days of implementation and force integration within 12 months, alongside goals of enabling the safe return of internally displaced persons and refugees while combating poverty through equitable economic development. Tamazuj claims roots in dissident elements of the (SPLM), echoing broader liberation-era principles of multi-ethnic unity against Khartoum's centralization and , though without a distinct delineating unique doctrines. Its name, derived from the Arabic term for "blend" or "fusion," suggests an implicit emphasis on transcending ethnic divisions—potentially bridging Arab and non-Arab Sudanese identities—in contrast to tribal or sectarian fragmentation. However, assessments and independent analyses portray Tamazuj as potentially opportunistic, with leadership possibly comprising Arab militiamen who previously fought under South Sudan's in earlier civil wars, undermining claims of authentic southern or liberationist ideology and indicating pragmatic alignment with state processes rather than ideological purity. This has led to perceptions of Tamazuj as a minor, government-facilitated entity inserted to bolster peace agreement signatories, prioritizing security integration over transformative political vision. Subsequent alignment with the (RSF) in August 2023 further highlights tactical motivations, adopting elements of RSF's secular-tribal pragmatism amid Sudan's civil war, rather than rigid ideological adherence.

Leadership and Organization

Key Leaders and Structure

Tamazuj, formally the Third Front, operates under a hierarchical military structure led by Mohammed Ali , who directs overall operations and strategic decisions across its areas of influence in and . , appointed as the top leader, has issued directives to subordinate units, including instructions for alignment with allied forces and mobilization orders to fighters in border regions. Key supporting figures include Uthman Abdulrahman Suleiman, serving as the official spokesman responsible for public communications, and General Nour Hassan Hamdan, who advises the leadership on security and military affairs. Regional command is decentralized into sectors, such as the sector (El Geneina) under General Yaqoub Idris Isaac, allowing for localized operations while maintaining central oversight. Sector commanders, as noted in directives from , manage tactical engagements and tribal militias in specific and areas. The organization comprises primarily nomadic Arab fighters drawn from tribal groups, functioning as a signatory to the 2020 Peace Agreement with demands for akin to other movements. This structure enables coordination with allies like the , to which Tamazuj pledged forces in August 2023 under Qarshi's command.

Pre-Civil War Activities

Involvement in Darfur Conflicts

Tamazuj, formally the Third Front (al-Jabhah al-Thālithah), emerged as a signatory to Sudan's 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, representing nomadic Arab fighters primarily from and regions. Prior to the 2023 civil war, the group's activities drew scrutiny for involvement in localized violence, including accusations of attacks and looting in during early 2022, prompting the Sudanese government to redeploy its forces to . In , Tamazuj was implicated in ongoing tribal clashes between nomadic groups and non- indigenous communities, such as the Ma'aliya-Rizeigat conflicts in East and broader inter-communal tensions exacerbated by resource competition and historical grievances from the 2003 conflict. (RSF) leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemetti, publicly accused Tamazuj of fueling these tribal violences in July 2022, claiming the group contributed to instability amid RSF efforts to mediate or counter such disputes; these allegations aligned with patterns of militia involvement in 's cyclical ethnic fighting, though Tamazuj denied direct responsibility and positioned itself as aligned with peace processes. The relocation and subsequent accusations highlighted Tamazuj's role as a tribal-aligned rather than a major insurgent force in 's earlier rebel wars, with its operations focused on securing integration benefits under the Juba Agreement while navigating alliances in a region marked by fragmented loyalties and proxy influences from . No large-scale battles or territorial gains were attributed to Tamazuj in pre-2023, but its presence intensified local security concerns, reflecting broader challenges in disarming and integrating Juba signatories amid persistent communal rivalries.

Participation in Juba Peace Agreement

Third Front-Tamazuj signed the Juba Peace Agreement on October 3, 2020, as one of the "other parties" committing to the comprehensive peace process in , particularly through a dedicated bilateral security arrangements protocol with the Transitional Government. The agreement, negotiated in , , aimed to integrate non-signatory Darfur groups and address ongoing conflicts in peripheral regions, with Tamazuj representing armed elements along 's western borders. Under Title 7 of the agreement, Tamazuj pledged a permanent effective within 72 hours of signing (D-Day +3), covering territories under its influence, alongside requirements to submit detailed reports on combatants, weapons, and equipment by the same deadline. Combatants were to assemble in designated areas starting D-Day +45, with full verification, training, and integration into the or other security services targeted for completion within 12 months (D-Day +360); unfit personnel would undergo , , and reintegration (DDR) processes. To oversee , the parties agreed to establish a high-level monitoring committee in (four representatives each) and a sub-committee in Babanusa (six representatives each) by D-Day +7. Tamazuj, a faction aligned with Sudan People's Liberation Movement elements and previously obscure in public records, emerged during pre-agreement negotiations to secure representation, enabling its forces' formal incorporation into national structures rather than exclusion from power-sharing. However, by September 2022, the group voiced dissatisfaction with stalled security arrangements, including delays in assembly and integration timelines, which hindered broader agreement fulfillment. In October 2022, Tamazuj advocated revising the accord, contending that it favored select signatories—such as Darfur-based movements—while marginalizing others like itself in resource allocation and political quotas. These positions underscored tensions in equitable implementation, though Tamazuj remained a formal signatory without reported withdrawal.

Alliance with Rapid Support Forces

Declaration of Alignment

On August 17, 2023, the Third Front—operating under the name Tamazuj—formally declared its alignment with the (RSF) during the early stages of Sudan's civil war, which erupted on April 15, 2023, between the (SAF) and the RSF. This public announcement marked Tamazuj's shift from its prior status as a signatory to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, which had aimed to integrate various armed groups into Sudan's transitional framework, toward active support for the RSF-led coalition against the SAF. The declaration was issued by Tamazuj's leadership, emphasizing coordination in military operations and shared objectives to counter SAF advances, particularly in regions where Tamazuj held influence. The alignment bolstered the RSF's tribal and militia networks, providing additional fighters and local intelligence in western Sudan amid intensifying battles. Reports indicate this move followed initial post-war contacts, with Tamazuj's forces integrating into RSF command structures for joint engagements, though specific operational details of the pact remain limited in public statements. This development reflected a broader pattern of armed groups realigning along the SAF-RSF divide, complicating peace efforts and exacerbating ethnic tensions in .

Strategic Motivations and Agreements

The Tamazuj movement formally declared its alignment with the (RSF) on August 18, 2023, announcing its commitment to engage in combat alongside the paramilitary group against the (SAF) and elements of the former regime. This decision was driven by longstanding grievances over marginalization following the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, to which Tamazuj was a signatory; despite participation in the accord aimed at integrating armed groups into Sudan's transitional structures, the movement reported persistent exclusion from equitable power-sharing and resource allocation compared to other signatories. Strategically, the alliance provided Tamazuj with operational support to counter SAF advances in and other conflict zones, where shared opposition to the military's dominance—exacerbated by the 2021 coup and ensuing —aligned their interests in challenging central authority and securing territorial influence. In April 2024, Tamazuj deepened its integration by joining the Tasis alliance, an RSF-led formalized to establish parallel governance institutions rivaling SAF control. The movement's political secretary, Mokhtar Fadel, emphasized demands for inclusion in all Tasis bodies, citing their Juba-derived legitimacy and contributions to the anti-SAF effort as justification for institutional roles. This step reflected broader motivations to leverage RSF's battlefield gains for post-war political leverage, including potential ministerial positions and security sector integration, amid fears of being sidelined in any SAF-favoring resolution. No was publicly detailed beyond the alignment declaration and Tasis charter signature, but coordination reportedly extended to joint military operations and for RSF-backed administrative structures in RSF-held territories. The partnership underscored Tamazuj's pragmatic shift from Juba-era negotiations toward armed opposition, prioritizing survival and influence in a fragmented where SAF exclusionary policies post-2021 alienated former partners. Analysts note that such alignments often stem from resource competition and ethnic mobilization in , with Tamazuj viewing RSF ties as essential for defending communal interests against perceived Arab-centric SAF strategies. However, this has raised concerns over diluted , as Tamazuj's demands for parity within Tasis highlight tensions in balancing ideological with dependence on RSF command. By mid-2025, Tamazuj reiterated warnings against exclusion from RSF parallel government plans, reinforcing the alliance's role in sustaining their relevance amid stalled national efforts.

Role in the 2023–Present Sudanese Civil War

Military Engagements

The Tamazuj movement, formally aligning with the (RSF) on August 17, 2023, instructed its forces across and border regions to converge on RSF positions, marking its operational entry into the against the (SAF). This alliance integrated approximately 34,000 Tamazuj fighters into RSF structures, enhancing the paramilitary coalition's manpower in western Sudan. Tamazuj forces demonstrated early involvement in West Darfur clashes, maintaining a heavy presence near the Sudanese-Chadian Joint Force headquarters in El Geneina on April 24, 2023, amid initial fighting between RSF-aligned groups and local defenses. By June 5, 2023, Tamazuj elements participated in looting operations in the al-Shati neighborhood of El Geneina, where a Tamazuj colonel was identified among the actors. On June 6, 2023, Tamazuj commander Musa Angir directed RSF forces in an assault on a shelter housing around 200 Massalit families at the al-Gandoul Center's al-Thawra section in El Geneina. Escalation followed on June 7, 2023, when Angir led a joint Tamazuj-RSF attack on the al-Gandoul Center itself, deploying about 30 RSF fighters and resulting in at least 30 deaths among Massalit activists and displaced families. Two days later, on June 14, 2023, Tamazuj contributed to a coordinated offensive targeting nine Massalit-controlled neighborhoods in El Geneina, deploying roughly 250 vehicles alongside RSF and allied militias to overwhelm defenses and secure RSF dominance in the city. The following day, June 15, 2023, Tamazuj manned checkpoints along the A5 road near Ardamata, exchanging fire with Massalit fighters during a operation that facilitated attacks on civilians fleeing toward . Tamazuj commanders, including Angir, also operated checkpoints intimidating humanitarian personnel, such as Sudanese Red Crescent staff near the Kajja River in Um Duwein, amid visible civilian casualties. These engagements in El Geneina contributed to the RSF's consolidation of control over by mid-June 2023, though Tamazuj's broader operations remained concentrated in Darfur-Kordofan border areas with limited documented independent offensives beyond RSF coordination. By June 2024, reports noted Tamazuj's recruitment of child soldiers in , indicating sustained mobilization for potential further combat roles.

Coordination with RSF and Tribal Militias

Following its formal alliance declaration with the (RSF) on August 17, 2023, Tamazuj engaged in coordinated military operations with the RSF, particularly in , where joint efforts targeted Massalit-held areas. This coordination included the integration of approximately 34,000 Tamazuj fighters into RSF structures by September 18, 2023, enabling shared command and logistics for offensives against (SAF) positions and non-Arab communities. Tamazuj commanders, such as Musa Angir, directed RSF units during assaults and manned joint checkpoints to control movement and enforce territorial gains. Tamazuj's operations often involved mobilizing and coordinating with allied Arab tribal militias, leveraging its composition of nomadic Arab fighters from Darfur-Kordofan border regions to amplify RSF capabilities. As early as April 24, 2023, Tamazuj participated alongside RSF and local tribal militias in initial attacks on majority-Massalit neighborhoods in El Geneina, using coordinated vehicle convoys for penetration and control. Figures like al-Tijani Karshoum, a Mahamid tribal leader affiliated with Tamazuj, mobilized militias along the al-Jabal block prior to the war's outbreak on April 15, 2023, facilitating joint recruitment and deployments. Key joint actions included the June 6-7, 2023, assault on the al-Gandoul center in El Geneina, where Tamazuj forces under Angir's direction, supported by RSF and tribal militias, killed at least 30 individuals, including Massalit activists and civilians. On June 14-15, 2023, these groups deployed around 250 vehicles to attack a of fleeing Massalit civilians en route to Ardamata, breaching nine neighborhoods and contributing to a exodus. Similar coordination extended to operations in Ardamata suburbs and an assault on Sirba in July 2023, where tribal militias enhanced Tamazuj-RSF firepower and local intelligence. These efforts aimed at securing RSF dominance in but drew scrutiny for patterns of ethnically targeted violence.

Controversies and Criticisms

Questions of Legitimacy and Activity

Tamazuj, a Sudanese armed group that signed the Peace Agreement in October 2020, has faced scrutiny over its origins and independence, with reports suggesting it was established as a proxy linked to Sudanese prior to the agreement. The group was largely unknown before the 2020 accord, emerging amid efforts to integrate holdout militias into the transitional framework, which raised doubts about its grassroots legitimacy as a rebel movement rather than a state-affiliated entity derived from remnants of popular defense forces. These ties have led analysts to question whether Tamazuj functioned more as an instrument of regime elements than an autonomous actor seeking political inclusion. Post-agreement, Tamazuj's isolation within Sudan's political and security landscape underscored concerns about its representativeness and viability. Despite its status as a signatory, the group remained unpopular and marginalized among other factions, failing to gain broad tribal or insurgent support even after the deal's implementation. This lack of traction fueled skepticism regarding its ability to mobilize fighters or enforce commitments, with some observers viewing it as a nominal participant in the rather than a substantive force. In July 2022, leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo () publicly accused Tamazuj of instigating tribal violence in , contradicting its peace obligations and highlighting inconsistencies in its adherence to the Juba framework. Tamazuj's alignment with the RSF in August 2023, amid the ongoing , intensified debates over its legitimacy by appearing to undermine the Agreement's integration goals, as it positioned itself against elements that had backed the accord. Critics argued this shift exposed the group's opportunistic nature, potentially prioritizing short-term alliances over long-term stability, though Tamazuj leaders framed it as a response to marginalization. Operational activities, such as the March 2023 storming of a , have been cited as evidence of limited but disruptive capacity, yet without verifiable large-scale deployments, questions persist about the extent of its active combat role versus rhetorical posturing. These factors collectively portray Tamazuj as a contested whose legitimacy hinges on unresolved ambiguities in its formation and fidelity to peacemaking pledges.

Associations with Atrocities and Human Rights Abuses

Tamazuj forces, operating in alliance with the , participated in a coordinated campaign against non-Arab communities, particularly the Massalit, in West Darfur's region from April to June 2023. This involved systematic killings, rapes, and , constituting and widespread war crimes, as documented through survivor testimonies, satellite imagery, and forensic analysis. identified Tamazuj commanders, alongside RSF leaders, as bearing for these acts, which resulted in an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 deaths in alone during this period. In Ardamata camp near El Geneina, Tamazuj militias joined RSF units in deliberate shelling followed by house-to-house searches in April 2023, targeting and executing young Massalit men suspected of opposing RSF control. Witnesses reported Tamazuj fighters looting homes and abducting women for , exacerbating the displacement of over 300,000 Massalit from the area. These operations aligned with broader RSF directives to eliminate perceived threats from non-Arab groups, with Tamazuj providing local tribal support to facilitate the violence. HRW assessments indicate the pattern met thresholds for , with intent to prevent Massalit return through destruction of neighborhoods and infrastructure. The involvement has drawn international scrutiny, with HRW characterizing the Tamazuj-RSF actions as potentially genocidal due to the scale of targeted killings and dehumanizing rhetoric against Massalit civilians. No prosecutions specific to Tamazuj members have occurred as of October 2025, amid ongoing impunity that perpetuates cycles of militia violence in . United Nations reports highlight how such allied groups amplify RSF capacity for atrocities, including arbitrary detentions and torture of suspected SAF supporters.

Current Status and Impact

Recent Developments

In May 2025, the RSF-allied Tamazuj movement issued a statement warning against its exclusion from the formation of a parallel administration planned by the Foundational Sudan Alliance in RSF-controlled territories. On July 23, 2025, Tamazuj demanded a formal role in the emerging RSF-backed parallel government, with its leader Fadel announcing the group's withdrawal from the rival United Civil Forces Alliance "Qimam" to prioritize alignment with RSF structures. Concurrently, on July 2, 2025, the RSF and associated armed and political factions formalized the "Tasis" coalition in , appointing RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemetti) as leader and Abdelaziz Adam al-Hilu of the SPLM-North as deputy, with the stated aim of establishing governance mechanisms in RSF-held areas to address marginalization and post-war needs.

Broader Implications for Sudanese Conflicts

Tamazuj's alliance with the (RSF), formalized in mid-2023, has intensified ethnic polarization within Sudan's ongoing civil war, particularly in , where the group has participated in operations targeting non-Arab communities such as the Massalit. documented Tamazuj commanders' involvement in campaigns in , including house-to-house killings and forced displacements during assaults on Massalit neighborhoods in El Geneina in 2023. This alignment embeds longstanding tribal rivalries—often between Arab militias and indigenous non-Arab groups—into the broader SAF-RSF confrontation, transforming a primarily inter-military power struggle into a multifaceted that risks reigniting patterns of genocide-like violence seen in since 2003. The proliferation of groups like Tamazuj, which draw on tribal structures for recruitment and operations, fragments the Sudanese opposition landscape and complicates mediation efforts. As a signatory to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, Tamazuj initially positioned itself as a stakeholder in national reconciliation, but its shift to RSF support has undermined those accords by bolstering a parallel governance coalition that excludes the (SAF) and demands territorial control. This dynamic encourages other ethnic militias to align opportunistically, perpetuating a cycle of localized warfare that evades centralized ceasefires and prolongs the conflict, with over 150,000 deaths and 10 million displacements reported by mid-2025. Beyond , Tamazuj's role exacerbates regional instability by fueling cross-border militia networks and flows into and , where shared ethnic ties could import violence. The group's coordination with RSF-aligned tribal forces has strained neighboring states' security, as arms proliferation and displaced fighters contribute to heightened tensions in border areas prone to communal clashes. Overall, such non-state actors like Tamazuj hinder prospects for a unified Sudanese state, entrenching warlordism and that prioritize militia autonomy over national governance reforms.

References

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  3. https://en.bab.la/dictionary/arabic-english/%25D8%25AA%25D9%2585%25D8%25A7%25D8%25B2%25D8%25AC
  4. https://www.radiotamazuj.org/en/about-us
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  25. https://sudantribune.com/article/271779
  26. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-darfur-rsf-massacres-possibly-genocide
  27. https://www.hrw.org/feature/2025/04/14/sudan-conflict-2-years/des-millions-de-vies-brisees-des-dizaines-de-milliers-de
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  29. https://acleddata.com/update/april-2024-one-year-war-sudan
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