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Air raid on Bari AI simulator
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Air raid on Bari AI simulator
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Air raid on Bari
The air raid on Bari (German: Luftangriff auf den Hafen von Bari, Italian: Bombardamento di Bari) was an air attack by German bombers on Allied forces and shipping in Bari, Italy, on 2 December 1943, during World War II. 105 German Junkers Ju 88 bombers of Luftflotte 2 surprised the port's defenders and bombed shipping and personnel operating in support of the Allied Italian Campaign, sinking 27 cargo and transport ships, as well as a schooner, in Bari harbour.
The attack lasted a little more than an hour and put the port out of action until February 1944. The release of mustard gas from one of the wrecked cargo ships added to the loss of life. The British and US governments covered up the presence of mustard gas and its effects on victims of the raid.
In early September 1943, coinciding with the Allied invasion of Italy, Italy surrendered to the Allies in the Armistice of Cassibile and changed sides, but the breakaway Italian Social Republic in central and northern Italy continued the war on the Axis side. On 11 September 1943, the port of Bari in southern Italy was taken unopposed by the British 1st Airborne Division. The port was used by the Allies to land ammunition, supplies and provisions from ships at the port for Allied forces advancing towards Rome and to push German forces out of the Italian peninsula.[citation needed]
Bari had inadequate air defences; no Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter aircraft squadrons were based there, and fighters within range were assigned to escort or offensive duties, not port defence. Ground defences were equally ineffective.
Little thought was given to the possibility of a German air raid on Bari, because it was believed that the Luftwaffe in Italy was stretched too thin to mount a serious attack. On the afternoon of 2 December 1943, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, commander of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force, held a press conference in Bari where he stated that the Germans had lost the air war. "I would consider it as a personal insult if the enemy should send so much as one plane over the city". That was despite the fact that German air raids by KG 54, KG 76, and other units, had hit the port area of Naples four times in the previous month, and attacked other Mediterranean targets.
Thirty ships of American, British, Polish, Norwegian and Dutch registry were in Bari Harbour on 2 December. The adjoining port city held a civilian population of 250,000. The port was lit on the night of the raid to expedite the unloading of supplies for the Battle of Monte Cassino and was working at full capacity.
On the afternoon of 2 December, Luftwaffe pilot Werner Hahn made a reconnaissance flight over Bari in an Me 210. His report reached Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram von Richthofen—who commanded Luftflotte 2. With the support of Albert Kesselring, Richthofen ordered a raid; Kesselring and his staff had earlier considered Allied airfields at Foggia as targets but the Luftwaffe lacked the resources for such an attack. Richthofen had suggested Bari as an alternative. Richthofen believed that crippling the port might slow the advance of the British Eighth Army and told Kesselring that the only aircraft available were his Junkers Ju 88A-4 bombers. Richthofen thought that a raid by 150 Ju 88s might be possible but only 105 bombers were available, some from KG 54. Most of the aeroplanes were to fly from Italian airfields but Richthofen wanted to use a few from Yugoslavia in the hope that the Allies might be fooled into thinking that the mission originated from there and misdirect any retaliatory strikes. The Ju 88 pilots were ordered to fly east to the Adriatic Sea, then swing south and west, since it was thought that the Allied forces would expect any attack to come from the north.
The attack opened at 19:25, when two or three German aircraft circled the harbour at 10,000 ft (3,000 m) dropping Düppel (foil strips) to confuse Allied radar. They also dropped flares, which were not needed due to the harbour being well illuminated. The German bomber force surprised the defenders and was able to bomb the harbour with great accuracy. Hits on two ammunition ships caused explosions which shattered windows 7 mi (11 km) away. A bulk petrol pipeline on a quay was severed and the gushing fuel ignited. A sheet of burning fuel spread over much of the harbour, engulfing undamaged ships.
Air raid on Bari
The air raid on Bari (German: Luftangriff auf den Hafen von Bari, Italian: Bombardamento di Bari) was an air attack by German bombers on Allied forces and shipping in Bari, Italy, on 2 December 1943, during World War II. 105 German Junkers Ju 88 bombers of Luftflotte 2 surprised the port's defenders and bombed shipping and personnel operating in support of the Allied Italian Campaign, sinking 27 cargo and transport ships, as well as a schooner, in Bari harbour.
The attack lasted a little more than an hour and put the port out of action until February 1944. The release of mustard gas from one of the wrecked cargo ships added to the loss of life. The British and US governments covered up the presence of mustard gas and its effects on victims of the raid.
In early September 1943, coinciding with the Allied invasion of Italy, Italy surrendered to the Allies in the Armistice of Cassibile and changed sides, but the breakaway Italian Social Republic in central and northern Italy continued the war on the Axis side. On 11 September 1943, the port of Bari in southern Italy was taken unopposed by the British 1st Airborne Division. The port was used by the Allies to land ammunition, supplies and provisions from ships at the port for Allied forces advancing towards Rome and to push German forces out of the Italian peninsula.[citation needed]
Bari had inadequate air defences; no Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter aircraft squadrons were based there, and fighters within range were assigned to escort or offensive duties, not port defence. Ground defences were equally ineffective.
Little thought was given to the possibility of a German air raid on Bari, because it was believed that the Luftwaffe in Italy was stretched too thin to mount a serious attack. On the afternoon of 2 December 1943, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, commander of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force, held a press conference in Bari where he stated that the Germans had lost the air war. "I would consider it as a personal insult if the enemy should send so much as one plane over the city". That was despite the fact that German air raids by KG 54, KG 76, and other units, had hit the port area of Naples four times in the previous month, and attacked other Mediterranean targets.
Thirty ships of American, British, Polish, Norwegian and Dutch registry were in Bari Harbour on 2 December. The adjoining port city held a civilian population of 250,000. The port was lit on the night of the raid to expedite the unloading of supplies for the Battle of Monte Cassino and was working at full capacity.
On the afternoon of 2 December, Luftwaffe pilot Werner Hahn made a reconnaissance flight over Bari in an Me 210. His report reached Generalfeldmarschall Wolfram von Richthofen—who commanded Luftflotte 2. With the support of Albert Kesselring, Richthofen ordered a raid; Kesselring and his staff had earlier considered Allied airfields at Foggia as targets but the Luftwaffe lacked the resources for such an attack. Richthofen had suggested Bari as an alternative. Richthofen believed that crippling the port might slow the advance of the British Eighth Army and told Kesselring that the only aircraft available were his Junkers Ju 88A-4 bombers. Richthofen thought that a raid by 150 Ju 88s might be possible but only 105 bombers were available, some from KG 54. Most of the aeroplanes were to fly from Italian airfields but Richthofen wanted to use a few from Yugoslavia in the hope that the Allies might be fooled into thinking that the mission originated from there and misdirect any retaliatory strikes. The Ju 88 pilots were ordered to fly east to the Adriatic Sea, then swing south and west, since it was thought that the Allied forces would expect any attack to come from the north.
The attack opened at 19:25, when two or three German aircraft circled the harbour at 10,000 ft (3,000 m) dropping Düppel (foil strips) to confuse Allied radar. They also dropped flares, which were not needed due to the harbour being well illuminated. The German bomber force surprised the defenders and was able to bomb the harbour with great accuracy. Hits on two ammunition ships caused explosions which shattered windows 7 mi (11 km) away. A bulk petrol pipeline on a quay was severed and the gushing fuel ignited. A sheet of burning fuel spread over much of the harbour, engulfing undamaged ships.