The Brandenburg class consisted of four pre-dreadnought battleships built for the German Kaiserliche Marine (Imperial Navy), the first modern battleships of the fleet. The four ships of the class—Brandenburg, Wörth, Weissenburg, and Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm—were the first ocean-going capital ships built for the German fleet in nearly two decades, owing to reluctance in the Reichstag (Imperial Diet) to fund large projects. They followed a series of small coastal defense ships, and though in retrospect they anticipated the buildup that created the High Seas Fleet, they were ordered as part of a construction program that reflected the strategic and tactical confusion that affected many navies in the 1880s. The design process that resulted in the Brandenburg class was very lengthy, with proposals that ranged from outdated casemate ships to versions with two twin-gun turrets placed side by side. The designers ultimately settled on ships that were armed with an unusual main battery of six 28 cm (11 in) guns at a time when all foreign battleships were built with four or fewer heavy guns.

All four ships served with I Squadron of the German fleet for the first several years of their careers, with Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm the squadron flagship. During this period, they conducted routine training exercises and visited foreign countries, frequently in company with Kaiser Wilhelm II aboard his yacht. In 1900, they were deployed to China to help combat the Boxer Uprising, but they arrived after the bulk of the fighting was over and thus saw little action there. After returning to Germany they were modernized beginning in 1902, thereafter resuming their peacetime activities. Brandenburg and Wörth remained in service with the German fleet until 1912, when they were laid up. In 1910, Kurfürst Friedrich Wilhelm and Weissenburg were sold to the Ottoman Navy and were renamed Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis. The now-Ottoman ships saw extensive service during the First Balkan War, providing fire support to Ottoman ground forces fighting in Thrace, as well as engaging the Greek fleet at the Battles of Elli and Lemnos in December 1912 and January 1913, respectively.

Following the outbreak of World War I, the German ships were reactivated for use as guard ships protecting the German North Sea coast. The Ottoman vessels meanwhile were used to support the fortresses guarding the Dardanelles during the Dardanelles campaign against British and French forces. Barbaros Hayreddin was torpedoed and sunk by the British submarine HMS E11 in April 1915, though the other members of the class survived the war. Brandenburg and Wörth were disarmed and reduced to secondary duties, eventually being broken up in 1919, while Turgut Reis lingered on as a training ship until 1933. She became a barracks ship until 1950 when she was sold for scrap, and was slowly dismantled over the following decade.

In March 1883, General Leo von Caprivi became the Chef der Admiralität (Chief of the Admiralty) following Albrecht von Stosch's resignation. Caprivi was required to submit a memorandum to the Reichstag on his plans by March 1884. A general of the Imperial German Army, he was inexperienced in naval matters and he convened a council with senior naval officers on 16 January 1884 to gather opinions on future naval construction programs. At the time, he was constrained by the fleet plan of 1873 that had been created under Stosch's direction and had been approved by the Reichstag. The plan governed the size and composition of the German fleet, calling for fourteen ocean-going ironclad warships, a total that was reached with the launching of the casemate ship Oldenburg in 1884. The nominal completion of the 1873 plan further restrained Caprivi, as in the view of many members of the Reichstag, naval budgets could be reduced, since no new ships would be needed until the oldest ironclads began to reach thirty years of age in the mid-1890s. At the January council meeting, Caprivi emphasized the need for careful consideration of new designs, noting that the navy could not afford "the luxury of failed experiments", owing to parliamentary refusal to authorize funding for new ships.

Concerns with a two-front war against France and Russia dominated Caprivi's thinking, which resulted in his decision to opt for a strategy of coastal defense in the memorandum; he noted that without a powerful battle fleet, the sea-going ironclads would have little utility against the numerically superior French fleet. He also pointed out that at the time, shell designers and armor manufacturers were competing to defeat each other, which necessitated spiraling costs for navies that attempted to keep pace with the latest technological developments. He also saw that the torpedo could be used to easily sink large armored warships and would be an effective weapon for coastal defense. As a result of these considerations, Caprivi recommended building a large number of smaller coastal defense ships and torpedo boats to defend Germany's coastline in the event of war. Aware of parliamentary objections to increased naval spending, he avoided plans for the construction of expensive battleships. Coincidentally, the French Navy, then at the height of the dominance of the Jeune École (Young School), came to the same conclusions with respect to their competition with the British Royal Navy. Indeed, the 1870s and 1880s marked a period of tactical and strategic confusion in naval thinking in the world's major navies for the same reasons that Caprivi had highlighted in his memorandum.

Despite the memorandum submitted to the Reichstag that eschewed capital ship construction, Caprivi secretly discussed new ironclads at length with senior naval officers. He instructed Konteradmiral (KAdm—Rear Admiral) Max von der Goltz, then the Director of the Admiralty's Naval Department, to prepare a list of thirteen questions concerning the characteristics of a new capital ship and then to circulate them among naval officers to gather views on the topic. The questions included requirements for speed, cruising radius, maximum draft, whether sailing rigs should be included, the number, type, and arrangement of main battery guns, and the armor type and layout. Goltz met with several other officers, including Hans von Koester, August von Thomsen, Hans Sack, Wilhelm Büchsel, Carl Barandon, Conrad von Bodenhausen, Gustav Schmidt, and Curt von Maltzahn on 20 October 1885 to discuss the questions. They settled on a ship armed with four 30.5 cm (12 in) guns arranged in the lozenge pattern favored by contemporary French capital ship designers, a thick armored belt and armored deck, and an ability to steam for 5,000 nautical miles (9,300 km; 5,800 mi). Other questions, including the speed and crew size, were left unanswered.

At the same time, Caprivi requested design proposals from the Naval Construction Office, which submitted plans for ships that ranged in size from small 2,500 t (2,500-long-ton) coastal defense ships armed with a battery of two 21 cm (8.3 in) guns to heavily armed 10,000 t (9,800-long-ton) ocean-going battleships equipped with seven 30.5 cm guns. The Reichstag still refused to authorize expensive new ships, especially in light of the cost of creating the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, though Caprivi was able to convince enough members that the entrances of the canal would be vulnerable to attack and that coastal defense ships would be necessary to guard them. The Reichstag accordingly approved funds for ten such vessels, which ultimately became the six Siegfried- and two Odin-class coastal defense ships; the last two vessels were later cancelled in 1893. The first ship, SMS Siegfried, was authorized for the 1887–1888 budget year. In early 1887, Kapitän zur See (Captain at Sea) Friedrich von Hollmann, who was now Caprivi's chief of staff, presented plans for the 1889–1890 budget year that included the construction of one of the sea-going battleships requested by Goltz's committee, with a second vessel scheduled for the 1892–1893 year. Caprivi replied that funding would have to be approved by the Reichstag, and that there was still testing necessary to determine what type of armor they should carry.

In 1888, Kaiser Wilhelm I died and his successor, the terminally ill Kaiser Friedrich III, remained on the throne for just 99 days before dying as well. The new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, was an ardent supporter of the navy, which was to have profound impacts on the future of the service. Shortly thereafter, Caprivi resigned and was replaced by Vizeadmiral (Vice Admiral) Alexander von Monts in July; in March 1889, Wilhelm II reorganized the naval command structure, creating the Reichsmarineamt (RMA), which was now in control of naval construction. The navy initially requested a pair of battleships in line with Hollmann's projected budget, but Wilhelm II intervened to demand four new ships for the 1889–1890 budget. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck secured funding for the ships through the larger army expansion bill, though the Reichstag delayed funding for the latter three members of the class.