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Extended Validation Certificate
Extended Validation Certificate
Extended Validation Certificate
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An example of Extended Validation Certificate, issued by GlobalSign

An Extended Validation (EV) Certificate is a certificate conforming to X.509 that proves the legal entity of the owner and is signed by a certificate authority key that can issue EV certificates. EV certificates can be used in the same manner as any other X.509 certificates, including securing web communications with HTTPS and signing software and documents. Unlike domain-validated certificates and organization-validation certificates, EV certificates can be issued only by a subset of certificate authorities (CAs) and require verification of the requesting entity's legal identity before certificate issuance.

As of February 2021, all major web browsers (Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge and Apple Safari) have menus which show the EV status of the certificate and the verified legal identity of EV certificates. Mobile browsers typically display EV certificates the same way they do Domain Validation (DV) and Organization Validation (OV) certificates. Of the ten most popular websites online, none use EV certificates and the trend is away from their usage.[1]

For software, the verified legal identity is displayed to the user by the operating system (e.g., Microsoft Windows) before proceeding with the installation.

Extended Validation certificates are stored in a file format specified by and typically use the same encryption as organization-validated certificates and domain-validated certificates, so they are compatible with most server and user agent software.

The criteria for issuing EV certificates are defined by the Guidelines for Extended Validation established by the CA/Browser Forum.[2]

To issue an extended validation certificate, a CA requires verification of the requesting entity's identity and its operational status with its control over domain name and hosting server.

History

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Introduction by CA/Browser Forum

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In 2005 Melih Abdulhayoglu, CEO of the Comodo Group (currently known as Xcitium), convened the first meeting of the organization that became the CA/Browser Forum, hoping to improve standards for issuing SSL/TLS certificates.[3] On June 12, 2007, the CA/Browser Forum officially ratified the first version of the Extended Validation (EV) SSL Guidelines, which took effect immediately. The formal approval successfully brought to a close more than two years of effort and provided the infrastructure for trusted website identity on the Internet.[4] Then, in April 2008, the forum announced version 1.1 of the guidelines, building on the practical experience of its member CAs and relying-party application software suppliers gained in the months since the first version was approved for use[citation needed].

Creation of special UI indicators in browsers

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Most major browsers created special user interface indicators for pages loaded via HTTPS secured by an EV certificate soon after the creation of the standard. This includes Google Chrome 1.0, Internet Explorer 7.0, Firefox 3, Safari 3.2, Opera 9.5.[5] Furthermore, some mobile browsers, including Safari for iOS, Windows Phone, Firefox for Android, Chrome for Android, and iOS, added such UI indicators[citation needed]. Usually, browsers with EV support display the validated identity—usually a combination of organization name and jurisdiction—contained in the EV certificate's 'subject' field.

In most implementations, the enhanced display includes:

  • The name of the company or entity that owns the certificate;
  • A lock symbol, also in the address bar, that varies in color depending on the security status of the website.

By clicking on the lock symbol, the user can obtain more information about the certificate, including the name of the certificate authority that issued the EV certificate.[6]

Removal of special UI indicators

[edit]

In May 2018, Google announced plans to redesign user interfaces of Google Chrome to remove emphasis for EV certificates.[7] Chrome 77, released in 2019, removed the EV certificate indication from the omnibox, but EV certificate status can be viewed by clicking on lock icon and then checking for legal entity name listed as "issued to" under "certificate".[8] Firefox 70 removed the distinction in the omnibox or URL bar (EV and DV certificates are displayed similarly with just a lock icon), but the details about certificate EV status are accessible in the more detailed view that opens after clicking on the lock icon.[9]

Apple Safari on iOS 12 and MacOS Mojave (released in September 2018) removed the visual distinction of EV status.[1]

Issuing criteria

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Only CAs who pass an independent qualified audit review may offer EV,[10] and all CAs globally must follow the same detailed issuance requirements which aim to:

  • Establish the legal identity as well as the operational and physical presence of website owner;
  • Establish that the applicant is the domain name owner or has exclusive control over the domain name;
  • Confirm the identity and authority of the individuals acting for the website owner, and that documents pertaining to legal obligations are signed by an authorized officer;
  • Limit the duration of certificate validity to ensure the certificate information is up to date. CA/B Forum is also limiting the maximum re-use of domain validation data and organization data to maximum of 397 days (must not exceed 398 days) from March 2020 onward.

With the exception[11] of Extended Validation Certificates for .onion domains, it is otherwise not possible to get a wildcard Extended Validation Certificate – instead, all fully qualified domain names must be included in the certificate and inspected by the certificate authority.[12]

Extended Validation certificate identification

[edit]

EV certificates are standard X.509 digital certificates. The primary way to identify an EV certificate is by referencing the Certificate Policies (CP) extension field. Each EV certificate's CP object identifier (OID) field identifies an EV certificate. The CA/Browser Forum's EV OID is 2.23.140.1.1.[13] Other EV OIDs may be documented in the issuer's Certification Practice Statement. As with root certificate authorities in general, browsers may not recognize all issuers.

EV HTTPS certificates contain a subject with X.509 OIDs for jurisdictionOfIncorporationCountryName (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3),[14] jurisdictionOfIncorporationStateOrProvinceName (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2) (optional),[15]jurisdictionLocalityName (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.1) (optional),[16] businessCategory (OID: 2.5.4.15)[17] and serialNumber (OID: 2.5.4.5),[18] with the serialNumber pointing to the ID at the relevant secretary of state (US) or government business registrar (outside US)[citation needed].

Online Certificate Status Protocol

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Main article: Online Certificate Status Protocol

The criteria for issuing Extended Validation certificates do not require issuing certificate authorities to immediately support Online Certificate Status Protocol for revocation checking. However, the requirement for a timely response to revocation checks by the browser has prompted most certificate authorities that had not previously done so to implement OCSP support. Section 26-A of the issuing criteria requires CAs to support OCSP checking for all certificates issued after Dec. 31, 2010.

Criticism

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Colliding entity names

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The legal entity names are not unique, therefore an attacker who wants to impersonate an entity might incorporate a different business with the same name (but, e.g., in a different state or country) and obtain a valid certificate for it, but then use the certificate to impersonate the original site. In one demonstration, a researcher incorporated a business called "Stripe, Inc." in Kentucky and showed that browsers display it similarly to how they display certificate of payment processor "Stripe, Inc." incorporated in Delaware. Researcher claimed the demonstration setup took about an hour of his time, US$100 in legal costs and US$77 for the certificate. Also, he noted that "with enough mouse clicks, [user] may be able to [view] the city and state [where entity is incorporated], but neither of these are helpful to a typical user, and they will likely just blindly trust the [EV certificate] indicator".[19]

Availability to small businesses

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Since EV certificates are being promoted and reported[20] as a mark of a trustworthy website, some small business owners have voiced concerns[21] that EV certificates give undue advantage to large businesses. The published drafts of the EV Guidelines[22] excluded unincorporated business entities, and early media reports[21] focused on that issue. Version 1.0 of the EV Guidelines was revised to embrace unincorporated associations as long as they were registered with a recognized agency, greatly expanding the number of organizations that qualified for an Extended Validation Certificate.

Effectiveness against phishing attacks with IE7 security UI

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In 2006, researchers at Stanford University and Microsoft Research conducted a usability study[23] of the EV display in Internet Explorer 7. Their paper concluded that "participants who received no training in browser security features did not notice the extended validation indicator and did not outperform the control group", whereas "participants who were asked to read the Internet Explorer help file were more likely to classify both real and fake sites as legitimate".

Domain-validated certificates were created by CAs in the first place

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While proponents of EV certificates claim they help against phishing attacks,[24] security expert Peter Gutmann states the new class of certificates restore a CA's profits which were eroded due to the race to the bottom that occurred among issuers in the industry. According to Peter Gutmann, EV certificates are not effective against phishing because EV certificates are "not fixing any problem that the phishers are exploiting". He suggests that the big commercial CAs have introduced EV certificates to return the old high prices.[25]

See also

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Extended Validation Certificate

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
An Extended Validation Certificate (EV Certificate) is an issued after a stringent verification that confirms the legal identity of the organization or entity controlling a or online service, enabling secure encrypted communications while providing heightened assurance against and . EV Certificates were introduced in 2007 through guidelines developed by the (CA/B Forum), a of certificate authorities and browser vendors, to address growing concerns over online identity verification in the face of increasing cyber threats. The primary purposes of EV Certificates are to identify the legal entity—such as its name, address, jurisdiction, and registration details—that controls the web or service site, and to facilitate encrypted data transmission via protocols like TLS. Secondary benefits include combating , distribution, and online by establishing verifiable legitimacy, which aids and user trust. EV Certificates must include specific fields like the organization's name and of incorporation, and they conform to broader Baseline Requirements for TLS server certificates while incorporating additional EV-specific vetting. By 2019, major browsers had phased out distinct visual indicators such as a green address bar or company name display, though the rigorous validation process remains intact to support advanced security needs. As of November 2025, EV Certificates have a maximum validity of 398 days, with planned reductions to 200 days by March 2026, 100 days by March 2027, and 47 days by March 2029, aligning with CA/B Forum efforts to shorten certificate lifetimes industry-wide to improve security through more frequent re-verification. Despite these evolutions, EV Certificates continue to represent the gold standard for entity authentication in TLS ecosystems, particularly for sectors requiring demonstrable trust.

Overview

Definition and Purpose

An Extended Validation (EV) Certificate is an X.509-compliant TLS certificate that authenticates both a website by its domain name and the legal entity controlling that website, providing reasonable assurance of the entity's identity through rigorous verification beyond mere domain control. The primary purposes of EV Certificates are to confirm the legal existence, operational status, and of the , thereby enhancing user trust in encrypted connections and helping to mitigate risks such as and . By verifying these details against official records, EV Certificates enable secure transactions while establishing the legitimacy of the entity behind the site. Key attributes unique to EV Certificates include the inclusion of verified fields in the certificate's subject, such as the full legal name, physical (with or province, and ), jurisdiction of incorporation (using ISO codes and applicable locality details), and a unique registration number assigned by the incorporating agency. These elements are populated based on official documentation, distinguishing EV Certificates from others by embedding detailed identity information directly into the certificate . Unlike standard TLS certificates that primarily secure data transmission through , EV Certificates emphasize identity assurance, offering a higher level of verification for the legal entity while still supporting the same cryptographic protections. For instance, in contrast to Domain Validated certificates, EV Certificates require proof of the organization's operational existence and location.

Types of TLS Certificates

Transport Layer Security (TLS) certificates, commonly referred to as SSL/TLS certificates, are categorized primarily by their validation levels, which determine the extent of identity verification performed by the issuing Certificate Authority (CA). The three main types are Domain Validated (DV), Organization Validated (OV), and Extended Validation (EV) certificates, each offering progressively deeper assurance of the certificate holder's identity to mitigate risks such as phishing and impersonation. Domain Validated (DV) certificates provide the lowest level of validation, confirming only that the applicant controls the associated with the certificate. This is typically achieved through automated methods such as sending an to a domain-registered , uploading a specific file to the , or adding a DNS record. DV certificates are issued rapidly, often within minutes, and are inexpensive, making them suitable for basic websites, blogs, or internal testing environments where is needed but entity identity is not critical. While they enable the padlock icon in browsers, they do not convey about the organization behind the site, offering minimal protection against social engineering attacks. Organization Validated (OV) certificates build on DV by additionally verifying the legal existence and operational details of the organization, such as its name, , and registration status, using public databases and direct contact methods. The validation process takes 1-3 days and includes manual checks by the CA, resulting in certificates that include the organization's name in the certificate details, visible upon clicking the . OV certificates are appropriate for small businesses, sites, and content platforms seeking moderate trust assurance without the overhead of extensive vetting. They enhance user confidence over DV by associating the site with a verified , though they still lack the rigorous scrutiny of higher levels. Extended Validation (EV) certificates represent the highest validation standard, requiring comprehensive legal and operational verification of the entity, including review of incorporation documents, physical address confirmation, and operational existence through third-party sources or direct contact. This process, governed by guidelines from the , can take 1-5 days or longer and involves multiple rigorous verification requirements as outlined in the Extended Validation Guidelines to ensure the applicant's right to use the domain and its legitimate business status. EV certificates are designed for high-trust scenarios, such as financial institutions, , and platforms handling sensitive transactions, where they aim to reduce risks by providing the strongest identity assurance. Although all TLS certificate types enable secure encryption via , EV's depth of validation uniquely supports user trust through verified entity information, positioning it as a key tool in the broader ecosystem of TLS security. The key differences among these types lie in validation depth: DV focuses solely on domain control with automated checks, OV adds basic organizational verification via public records, and EV demands rigorous, multi-faceted legal confirmation. Use cases scale accordingly, from simple (DV) to business legitimacy (OV) and anti-phishing protection in high-stakes environments (EV). Security implications emphasize that while all types secure data in transit, higher validation levels like EV better address identity-based threats by fostering greater user confidence.
Certificate TypeValidation FocusIssuance TimeTypical Use CasesTrust Indicators
DVDomain controlMinutesBlogs, test sitesStandard padlock icon
OVDomain + organization details1-3 daysE-commerce, businessesStandard padlock icon (organization details on click)
EVDomain + rigorous entity verification1-5+ daysBanking, financeStandard padlock icon (detailed entity verification on click)

History

Development by CA/Browser Forum

The CA/Browser Forum, established in 2005 as a collaborative body comprising certificate authorities (CAs) and browser vendors, played a pivotal role in standardizing Extended Validation (EV) certificates to enhance web security amid growing concerns over phishing and online fraud. By 2007, the forum had formalized guidelines specifically targeting the need for robust identity verification, responding to browser vendors' calls for mechanisms that provide stronger assurance of website legitimacy beyond basic domain validation (DV) certificates, which CAs issue rapidly with minimal checks. In June 2007, the forum adopted Version 1.0 of the EV Guidelines through Ballot 1, marking the initial milestone in defining EV certificates as an enhanced subset of organization validation (OV) certificates with additional procedural requirements for verifying the legal entity's identity, operational existence, and . These guidelines outlined minimum standards for CAs to conduct thorough , including legal and operational checks, to distinguish EV from quicker DV issuances and thereby mitigate fraud risks. The development was motivated by the escalating prevalence of attacks, where malicious sites impersonated legitimate entities, prompting the forum to create a framework that assists in fraud investigations and bolsters user trust in secure connections. Subsequent ballots and revisions have ensured ongoing compliance and adaptation, with the EV Guidelines integrated into broader baseline requirements while maintaining their focus on high-assurance identity proofing.

Introduction of Special UI Indicators

The introduction of special UI indicators for Extended Validation (EV) certificates marked a significant step in enhancing user trust in web browsing by providing visual cues that distinguished highly vetted sites from others. Microsoft Internet Explorer 7 (IE7), released in October 2006, pioneered this approach by implementing a address bar that appeared when users visited sites secured with an EV certificate, prominently displaying the verified organization's name to signal rigorous identity validation. This feature was designed to address user confusion over site legitimacy, particularly in scenarios involving sensitive transactions, by leveraging a distinct color and layout change in the browser's interface. Following IE7's lead, other major browsers adopted similar indicators to standardize EV recognition. Mozilla Firefox 3, released in June 2008, introduced a green bar segment to the right of the for EV-secured sites, which highlighted the organization's identity and aimed to improve user awareness of enhanced . Google Chrome followed suit in its early versions starting around 2009, incorporating colored bars or icons to denote EV status, thereby aligning with the growing ecosystem of secure web practices. The played a key role in facilitating this browser integration through collaborative guidelines that mandated support for EV certificates and specified how verified organization names should be displayed in UI elements. These guidelines ensured consistency across implementations, promoting the EV standard's adoption by requiring browsers to recognize and visually emphasize certificates meeting strict validation criteria. The primary goal of these UI indicators was to elevate user awareness of site legitimacy, with early studies indicating improvements in perceived trust during high-risk interactions, such as or . For instance, user experiments showed that green-bar displays reduced hesitation and increased confidence in entering personal information on verified domains compared to standard certificates. Technically, browsers triggered these UI elements by querying specific fields in the EV certificate, such as the subjectAltName for domain verification and organizationName for entity identity, along with policy extensions confirming EV compliance. This inspection allowed real-time rendering of enhanced indicators without altering core TLS protocols, bridging the gap between EV standards and practical .

Removal of Special UI Indicators

The removal of special (UI) indicators for Extended Validation (EV) certificates marked a significant shift in browser policies, driven by evidence that these visual cues provided limited benefits. Apple was the first major browser vendor to eliminate distinct EV visuals, removing the company name display from Safari's UI in and , released in September 2018. This change unified the appearance across platforms, aligning with a broader trend toward simplifying signals. Google followed suit with Chrome version 77, released on September 10, 2019, which relocated the EV indicator from the omnibox to the page info panel accessible via the lock icon. Mozilla implemented a similar in version 70, released on October 22, 2019, where the EV status was moved to the identity panel rather than being prominently displayed in the URL bar. , transitioning to its Chromium-based version in early 2020, aligned with Chrome's policy by version 79, though full legacy Edge support ended in 2021, completing the removal across all major browsers by that year. The primary rationale for these changes stemmed from research demonstrating negligible impact on user security behaviors. A 2019 study by Google researchers analyzed user interactions and found that removing the EV indicator did not significantly affect metrics such as susceptibility to phishing or site trust assessments, as users often overlooked or misunderstood the cues. Additional factors included the exploitation of UI similarities by phishers and the increasing ubiquity of HTTPS, which shifted focus from visual distinctions to universal encryption enforcement. Browsers cited these findings to prioritize less distracting interfaces that encouraged broader adoption of secure connections over highlighting specific certificate types. The has continued to update its EV Guidelines post-2019, maintaining focus on rigorous identity verification. Despite the loss of visual prominence, EV certificates continued to be issued and maintained their technical validity, though their market-perceived value diminished without the distinctive indicators that once justified higher costs. This evolution reflected a consensus that EV's core benefits lay in enhanced validation processes rather than frontend displays.

Issuance Process

Validation Requirements

Extended Validation (EV) Certificates require rigorous verification processes to confirm the legitimacy of the subscribing organization, as outlined in the CA/Browser Forum's Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates (version 2.0.1). These requirements emphasize checks against official government records or qualified independent information sources (QIIS) to ensure the entity's legal standing and operational viability, setting EV apart from less stringent Organization Validation (OV) or Domain Validation (DV) certificates by mandating proof of a verifiable identity. The verification of legal existence is a foundational requirement, where Certificate Authorities (CAs) must confirm the organization's registration through its Incorporating Agency, Registration Agency, or a Qualified Information Source (). For private organizations, this includes validating the full , of the registered office or principal place of , registration number, and details of the registered or authorized representative. Operational status must also be affirmed, demonstrating the entity's right to conduct , typically via evidence of an active status in government records, a account, or business records spanning at least three years. Physical verification requires cross-checking against , QIIS, Qualified Third-party Information Sources (QTIS), or through a site visit or Verified Professional Letter to ensure the location is operational and not merely a postal . Additionally, any "doing as" (DBA) names must be confirmed as registered with a relevant using similar authoritative sources. EV Certificates must incorporate specific identity proof fields in the certificate's Subject Distinguished Name to reflect the verified details, including the organizationName (the full as registered), jurisdictionOfIncorporation (specifying the country, state or province, and locality using codes), and businessCategory (such as "Private Organization" for for-profit entities). These fields ensure the certificate transparently identifies the validated entity without ambiguity. EV Certificates may be issued to private organizations, entities, entities, and non-commercial international organizations that meet the specified validation criteria; individuals are not eligible. To maintain compliance, CAs are obligated to undergo annual audits by a Qualified adhering to standards like the WebTrust Program for CAs or ETSI TS 102 042, covering their EV processes and practices. Subscriber agreements further enforce accuracy by requiring a legally binding signed by an authorized Contract Signer, whose authority is verified through a corporate resolution, Verified Professional Letter, or equivalent documentation.

Procedural Steps for Issuance

The issuance of an Extended Validation (EV) Certificate begins with the initial application, where the applicant—typically a private organization, government entity, business entity, or non-commercial entity—submits a request to the (CA) through an authorized Certificate Requester. This submission includes legal documents such as articles of incorporation or equivalent proof of legal existence, along with contact information and a signed Subscriber Agreement outlining the terms of issuance. The CA may require pre-authorization from a Contract Signer to confirm the applicant's authority to request the certificate. Following the application, the CA conducts verification phases to confirm the applicant's identity and eligibility, adhering to specific validation requirements such as those outlined in the CA/Browser Forum guidelines. This involves confirming the entity's legal existence and physical operational presence through public records from Qualified Government Information Sources (QGIS) or Qualified Independent Information Sources (QIIS), such as government registries. The CA verifies contact details via a reliable method, including phone or email confirmation against phone company records or a Verified Professional Letter from an attorney. If necessary, a site visit by a Third-Party Validator may be performed to document physical existence with photos and evidence of business activity, particularly when public records are insufficient. Attorney letters, in the form of Verified Legal Opinions from licensed practitioners, can also substantiate details like assumed names or operational status. These phases typically span 1-5 business days, depending on the complexity and responsiveness of the applicant. Once verification is complete, the CA generates the EV Certificate, incorporating the required policy identifier (2.23.140.1.1) in the certificatePolicies extension to indicate compliance with EV requirements, with entity identification provided through the specified Subject Distinguished Name attributes. The certificate is then delivered to the applicant for installation on their server. Post-issuance, the CA maintains ongoing responsibilities, including the ability to reuse verification for up to 398 days (approximately 13 months) for renewals or re-issuances, provided it remains valid and current. For multi-year certificates under subscription plans, re-verification aligns with this reuse period rather than strict annual checks, though full re-validation is required if expires or significant entity changes occur, such as mergers or name alterations. may be initiated by the subscriber or CA if inaccuracies are discovered, with the CA processing it promptly and updating online status checks via OCSP or similar mechanisms. The manual vetting involved in EV issuance contributes to higher costs compared to lower-validation certificates, with annual fees typically ranging from $100 to $500 as of 2025, varying by CA, certificate duration, and domain coverage.

Technical Implementation

Certificate Identification Methods

Since the removal of prominent UI indicators like green address bars in major browsers around 2019, Extended Validation (EV) certificates have been identified through user-accessible details rather than automatic visual prominence. By 2021, all leading browsers—, Mozilla Firefox, , and —display EV information in connection details menus or tooltips, including the verified organization name and certificate validity status, to aid user trust assessment without altering the standard padlock icon. Technically, browsers identify EV certificates by parsing the certificate structure, particularly the Certificate Policies extension, which must include the EV policy (OID) 2.23.140.1.1 assigned by the . They also examine the subject Distinguished Name (DN) for mandatory EV indicators, such as the serialNumber (registration number from official records, OID 2.5.4.5) and organizationName (legal entity name, OID 2.5.4.10), along with and fields that confirm the applicant's and incorporation. The organizationalUnitName (OID 2.5.4.11) is prohibited in EV certificates since September 2022 to prevent misleading hierarchies. Users access these details by clicking the icon in the : in Chrome and Edge (Chromium-based), this opens Page Info revealing the EV organization; in , it leads to the certificate viewer under "Connection secure > More Information > View Certificate," flagging EV status; and in , selecting "Connection Security Details" from the or clicking the exposes the full certificate, highlighting the verified . Unlike historical green bars, this method relies on deliberate user interaction, with full EV parsing supported across all major desktop browsers for compatibility.

Integration with OCSP

The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), defined in RFC 6960, enables real-time validation of Extended Validation (EV) certificates by allowing client applications, such as web browsers, to query a certificate authority's (CA) OCSP responder for the current revocation status prior to establishing a secure connection to a website. In the context of EV certificates, which provide heightened identity assurance through rigorous legal and operational verification, OCSP plays a critical role in ensuring that the certificate's status reflects any post-issuance changes, such as entity dissolution or key compromise, thereby maintaining ongoing trust in the validated identity. For EV certificates, if a CA operates an OCSP responder, it must support the HTTP GET method for responses, with updates to OCSP information provided at least every four days and a maximum response validity period of ten days, as per the Baseline Requirements (section 4.9.10). Additionally, CAs should support as outlined in RFC 6066, where the server attaches a pre-obtained, time-stamped OCSP response to the TLS , reducing client latency and risks associated with direct OCSP queries. This stapling mechanism is particularly beneficial for EV contexts, as it minimizes delays in high-assurance scenarios without compromising the real-time nature of status checks. The OCSP validation process for an EV certificate begins when a browser extracts the certificate's and constructs a request containing the issuer name hash, issuer key hash, and , which is sent to the OCSP responder specified in the certificate's Authority Information Access extension. The responder returns a signed response indicating one of three statuses—good (not revoked), (with reason and time), or unknown (status unavailable)—along with the production time and a validity interval, allowing the browser to confirm the certificate's ongoing validity before proceeding. If the OCSP URL is absent, the certificate must include a CRL Distribution Point extension as a fallback, though this is less preferred for EV due to the overhead of downloading large lists. By facilitating immediate revocation checks, OCSP ensures that EV certificates' enhanced identity assurances remain enforceable throughout their lifecycle, addressing risks like business dissolution or unauthorized use that could invalidate the initial validation. In contrast, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are less commonly relied upon for EV certificates owing to their larger size and periodic update nature, which can introduce delays unsuitable for high-security, real-time validations; thus, while OCSP provides real-time checks when implemented, the Baseline Requirements now allow it as optional for all TLS certificates, with CRLs serving as the mandatory revocation mechanism.

Criticism and Challenges

Entity Name Collision Risks

One significant criticism of Extended Validation (EV) certificates lies in the risk of entity name collisions, where unrelated organizations with similar or identical legal names can obtain valid EV certificates, potentially misleading users into assuming affiliation despite the rigorous identity verification process. This issue arises because EV guidelines require certificate authorities (CAs) to verify the applicant's legal name against official registration records but do not mandate absolute uniqueness across jurisdictions, allowing multiple entities to legally operate under nearly identical names in different regions. For instance, a shell company incorporated in one state or country can share a name like "" or a close variant with a well-known registered elsewhere, leading to visual similarity in browser displays without violating issuance rules. In the , researchers demonstrated this through practical exploits, such as in 2017 when expert Ian Carroll incorporated "" as a legal entity in —distinct from the Delaware-based Stripe—and successfully obtained an EV certificate from Comodo CA. This certificate displayed the verified name in browsers like , creating a site (stripe.ian.sh) that mimicked the legitimate company's identity, highlighting how could use shell companies to impersonate brands for deceptive purposes. Similar cases involved attackers forming entities with names echoing major banks or services, enabling sites that appeared fully authenticated under EV standards. To mitigate these risks, the CA/Browser Forum's EV guidelines (Section 3.2.2.12.1) require CAs to perform due diligence, including cross-correlation of verification data to ensure the organization name does not mislead relying parties into associating it with an unrelated entity, though this falls short of comprehensive trademark screening. Some CAs voluntarily implement additional checks against known trademarks and global databases, but gaps persist due to varying jurisdictional laws that permit name overlaps without infringement, limiting uniform enforcement worldwide. These name collision risks undermine EV certificates' core value in combating phishing, as a verified legal identity does not inherently confirm affiliation with a trusted brand, allowing sophisticated deceivers to exploit the green-bar or name-display indicators for greater credibility in fraudulent schemes.

Barriers for Small Businesses

Extended Validation (EV) certificates present significant economic barriers for small businesses and startups, primarily due to their higher issuance fees and prolonged validation timelines. EV certificates typically range from $100 to $500 annually, far exceeding the costs of domain validation (DV) certificates, which are often free through services like or available for under $10. This pricing reflects the intensive vetting process, including third-party audits and compliance with standards, which increases the certificate authorities' operational expenses passed on to applicants. Furthermore, EV issuance requires several days for verification—often 1 to 7 days—contrasted with DV's near-instantaneous approval, creating delays that can hinder rapid online deployments critical for resource-limited entities. Procedural and documentation hurdles exacerbate these challenges, often excluding smaller or informally structured firms from EV eligibility. Applicants must provide extensive proofs of legal incorporation, such as registration documents from government agencies, along with verification of physical addresses, operational history (typically requiring at least three years of or additional attestations if shorter), and domain ownership through methods like phone calls or site visits. Small businesses frequently lack ready access to licensed professionals (e.g., accountants or attorneys) for required letters of verification or face-to-face validations, and sole proprietorships without formal entity status are generally ineligible. These requirements demand time, legal expertise, and administrative effort disproportionate to the needs of startups or micro-enterprises, fostering inequities in access to high-assurance . Market data illustrates the resultant low adoption among smaller entities: as of 2025, EV certificates comprise only 2-5% of the global SSL market, overwhelmingly utilized by large corporations like banks and giants that can absorb the costs and comply with rigorous standards. This disparity highlights how EV's emphasis on organizational legitimacy sidelines small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs), limiting their ability to signal trust in competitive online spaces. In response, the industry has increasingly promoted organization validation (OV) certificates as a more accessible alternative for mid-tier needs, offering moderate vetting without EV's full procedural burden, while DV remains the default for informal or budget-constrained operations.

Limitations in Phishing Prevention

Despite initial promises that Extended Validation (EV) certificates would mitigate phishing by offering prominent visual cues of verified site identity, empirical evidence has revealed significant shortcomings in their practical efficacy. Introduced in 2007 alongside 7's green address bar, EV was positioned as a tool to combat rising phishing scams by distinguishing legitimate entities from fraudsters through enhanced validation and UI indicators. However, a contemporaneous user study by Jackson et al. demonstrated that EV certificates failed to assist participants in detecting phishing attacks, with the green bar and related cues providing no measurable improvement in site classification accuracy compared to standard certificates. Subsequent research in the underscored even lower reliance on these indicators due to behavioral factors. Eye-tracking analyses, such as Sobey et al.'s 2008 experiment, showed that users noticed EV cues in unmodified browsers only 0% of the time, with attention to browser chrome elements averaging just 3.5-8.75% of session duration among participants. This pattern of neglect persisted, as users prioritized content over peripheral signals, rendering EV's visual assurances largely invisible and ineffective against deceptive tactics that exploit haste or distraction. Browser changes from 2019 to 2021 exacerbated these issues by deprecating prominent EV UI elements, shifting verification details to less accessible menu-based views that demand deliberate user action. Google's 2019 field experiment, involving over 1,800 participants, found no significant changes in secure behaviors—such as withholding passwords on unverified sites—after removing the EV indicator, confirming its negligible influence on real-world decisions. Phishers, undeterred, predominantly adopted Domain Validation (DV) certificates for attacks, with a 2018 analysis of Google Safe Browsing data revealing that 99.82% of encrypted phishing sites used DV rather than EV, often via typosquatting on similar but unrelated domains to bypass entity checks. At a conceptual level, EV's focus on entity validation overlooks 's core vulnerability: domain-brand mismatch. While EV rigorously confirms the certificate holder's legal identity, it permits attacks on non-affiliated domains where a legitimate entity's certificate creates undue trust, as phishers need only control the targeted . Security researcher Peter Gutmann has critiqued this as addressing an irrelevant problem, arguing that EV neither prevents users from visiting fraudulent domains nor resolves the domain confusion central to most phishing schemes.

Historical Context with Domain Validation

Certificate Authorities (CAs) introduced automated Domain Validation (DV) certificates in the early 2000s to promote rapid adoption by enabling quick issuance based solely on domain control verification, without requiring checks on the applicant's identity. This approach, pioneered by in 2002, streamlined certificate procurement but inadvertently enabled attacks, as malicious actors could obtain valid certificates for deceptive domains mimicking legitimate sites, with the first documented SSL-enabled phishing incidents occurring around 2005. To counter these vulnerabilities in DV processes, the established the first Extended Validation (EV) guidelines on June 7, 2007, mandating comprehensive identity verification to confirm the legal entity controlling the website, thereby offering a premium assurance level especially suited for trust-sensitive applications like . These guidelines aimed to restore user confidence by distinguishing high-assurance sites through enhanced procedural rigor, directly addressing DV's lack of entity authentication. Ironically, despite EV's design to mitigate DV's risks, DV certificates continue to dominate with approximately 94% as of 2025, reflecting EV's limited uptake and prompting debates on whether the added validation justifies its complexity in an where basic suffices for most users. The evolution of validation standards includes initiatives to phase out insecure DV methods, such as the 2025 of WHOIS-based domain control validation effective June 15, which requires more robust verification techniques and indirectly supports EV's role by elevating baseline expectations across certificate types.

Current Status

In 2025, all major web browsers support the parsing and display of Extended Validation (EV) certificates, including , Mozilla Firefox, , and Apple Safari. These browsers render EV-specific information, such as the verified organization name, within their certificate details menus or side panels when users inspect the site's security status. However, following updates in , no major browser provides distinctive visual indicators—like green address bars or highlighted organization names—for EV certificates in the primary interface, aligning their appearance more closely with Organization Validation (OV) and Domain Validation (DV) certificates. EV certificate adoption has declined significantly by 2025, comprising only 2-5% of all global TLS certificates, compared to higher market shares in the mid-2010s before browser UI changes diminished their perceived benefits. Usage remains concentrated in high-stakes sectors like and healthcare, where the enhanced vetting process supports and user trust for handling sensitive data. Globally, around 21,000 active websites employ EV certificates, reflecting their niche role amid the dominance of cheaper DV options. The CA/Browser Forum's current guidelines limit EV certificate validity to a maximum of 398 days, but Ballot SC081v3, passed in April 2025, introduces a phased reduction: to 200 days by March 15, 2026, 100 days by March 15, 2027, and ultimately 47 days by March 15, 2029. This shift is expected to increase renewal frequency for EV certificates, potentially straining administrative processes for organizations reliant on them. Despite reduced browser prominence, certificate authorities such as and Sectigo actively promote EV certificates for their superior validation rigor, highlighting benefits for PCI-DSS compliance in payment processing and environments.

Future Developments and Relevance

The has approved a phased reduction in maximum validity periods for public TLS subscriber certificates, including Extended Validation (EV) certificates, to bolster by minimizing the window for key compromise exploitation. Effective March 15, 2026, the maximum validity will decrease to 200 days; this will further reduce to 100 days on March 15, 2027, and to 47 days by March 15, 2029. These changes apply uniformly to EV certificates as they fall under subscriber certificate guidelines, necessitating more frequent revalidation and issuance while integrating with existing EV identity assurance processes. Emerging proposals aim to adapt TLS certificates, including EV, for (PQC) environments, including hybrid certificate formats that combine classical and quantum-resistant algorithms to maintain high-assurance identity proofing during the transition to PQC standards. Additionally, discussions explore extending EV principles to non-web contexts, such as and server certificates, and potential synergies with authentication protocols like to enhance entity verification in credential-based systems. Despite the deprecation of prominent EV indicators in browser user interfaces, EV certificates retain value in regulated sectors like and healthcare, where stringent identity validation supports compliance with standards such as Qualified Website Authentication Certificates (QWAC). However, critics highlight that automation protocols like ACME, which streamline issuance for Domain Validation (DV) and Organization Validation (OV) certificates, underscore EV's challenges in scaling due to its manual verification requirements, potentially favoring lighter validation classes for broader adoption. Looking ahead, EV certificates are poised to endure as a specialized high-assurance mechanism, particularly for scenarios demanding rigorous legal entity confirmation, amid projections of steady but limited growth in the overall SSL certificate market.

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