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Ineligibility Clause
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Ineligibility Clause
The Ineligibility Clause (sometimes also called the Emoluments Clause, or the Incompatibility Clause, or the Sinecure Clause) is a provision in Article 1, Section 6, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution that makes each incumbent member of Congress ineligible to hold an office established by the federal government during their tenure in Congress; it also bars officials in the federal government's executive and judicial branches from simultaneously serving in either the U.S. House or Senate. The purpose of the clause is twofold: first, to protect the separation of powers philosophy (upon which the federal frame of government is built); and second, to prevent Congress from conspiring to create offices or increase federal officials' salaries with the expectation that members of Congress would later be appointed to these posts.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
The Framers of the Constitution understood this clause primarily as an anti-corruption device. Painfully familiar with the system of "royal influence", whereby the English kings had "purchased" the loyalty of Members of Parliament with appointment to lucrative offices, particularly as members of Parliament were not paid until 1911, the framers sought to limit the corrupting effect of patronage and plural office holding in the new republic. Drawing on examples provided by the bans on plural office holding contained in contemporaneous state constitutions, and in the Articles of Confederation, the Framers crafted a ban on dual office holding, which Alexander Hamilton described in The Federalist No. 76 as "an important guard against the danger of executive influence upon the legislative body."
Robert Yates proposed to the 1787 Constitutional Convention a ban on Members of Congress from "any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the U. States ... during the term of service, and under the national Government for the space of one year after its expiration." Luther Martin objected to the strictness of Yates' proposal, believing that it would operate to prevent members of Congress from being appointed to offices in either the federal government and the governments of their respective home states for the period which they were elected to serve. All the delegates in Philadelphia agreed that no Member of Congress should serve in an appointive position while he was sitting, but Nathaniel Gorham, James Wilson, and Alexander Hamilton wanted no bar at all once a person was no longer in Congress. Hamilton argued that since passion drives all men, the executive should be able to satisfy the desires of the better-qualified men by inducing them to serve in appointive offices. James Madison proposed a compromise solution: "that no office ought to be open to a member, which may be created or augmented while he is in the legislature". After much debate, Madison's proposal prevailed, but without the prohibition from holding state office (the state might need the Member's services) and without the one-year bar after leaving office (it was not long enough to be of any significant effect). The delegates also limited the bar to "civil" offices so that the military could have the services of all when the country was in danger.
While the Ineligibility Clause prohibits persons serving in a federal executive or judicial branch office from simultaneously serving in Congress, it does not (nor does any other constitutional provision) prohibit simultaneous service in executive branch and judicial branch offices. As well as John Jay, Chief Justices Oliver Ellsworth and John Marshall also served dual executive and judicial offices in the early decades of the nation's existence.
In 1945, Associate Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson was appointed to serve as U.S. Chief of Counsel for the prosecution of Nazi war criminals at the 1945–46 Nuremberg trials.
In 1964 Chief Justice Earl Warren was appointed as chairman of the commission formed to investigate the assassination of John F. Kennedy.
The Ineligibility Clause has resulted in some conflicts over potential appointments of Representatives and Senators to various Cabinet posts and other federal government offices. Among the earliest questions to be addressed under the clause was whether a person serving as a United States Attorney could continue to serve in that capacity after being elected to a seat in Congress. In 1816, Samuel Herrick was elected to the 15th United States Congress while still serving as U.S. Attorney for the District of Ohio. He was not allowed to take his seat until the House of Representatives had determined whether his service as a U.S. Attorney created a conflict under the clause. Finally, in December 1817, the United States House Committee on Elections determined that there was no conflict, because even though Herrick had been elected to Congress, he had not taken the Congressional oath of office while he was still serving as a U.S. Attorney.
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Ineligibility Clause
The Ineligibility Clause (sometimes also called the Emoluments Clause, or the Incompatibility Clause, or the Sinecure Clause) is a provision in Article 1, Section 6, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution that makes each incumbent member of Congress ineligible to hold an office established by the federal government during their tenure in Congress; it also bars officials in the federal government's executive and judicial branches from simultaneously serving in either the U.S. House or Senate. The purpose of the clause is twofold: first, to protect the separation of powers philosophy (upon which the federal frame of government is built); and second, to prevent Congress from conspiring to create offices or increase federal officials' salaries with the expectation that members of Congress would later be appointed to these posts.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
The Framers of the Constitution understood this clause primarily as an anti-corruption device. Painfully familiar with the system of "royal influence", whereby the English kings had "purchased" the loyalty of Members of Parliament with appointment to lucrative offices, particularly as members of Parliament were not paid until 1911, the framers sought to limit the corrupting effect of patronage and plural office holding in the new republic. Drawing on examples provided by the bans on plural office holding contained in contemporaneous state constitutions, and in the Articles of Confederation, the Framers crafted a ban on dual office holding, which Alexander Hamilton described in The Federalist No. 76 as "an important guard against the danger of executive influence upon the legislative body."
Robert Yates proposed to the 1787 Constitutional Convention a ban on Members of Congress from "any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the U. States ... during the term of service, and under the national Government for the space of one year after its expiration." Luther Martin objected to the strictness of Yates' proposal, believing that it would operate to prevent members of Congress from being appointed to offices in either the federal government and the governments of their respective home states for the period which they were elected to serve. All the delegates in Philadelphia agreed that no Member of Congress should serve in an appointive position while he was sitting, but Nathaniel Gorham, James Wilson, and Alexander Hamilton wanted no bar at all once a person was no longer in Congress. Hamilton argued that since passion drives all men, the executive should be able to satisfy the desires of the better-qualified men by inducing them to serve in appointive offices. James Madison proposed a compromise solution: "that no office ought to be open to a member, which may be created or augmented while he is in the legislature". After much debate, Madison's proposal prevailed, but without the prohibition from holding state office (the state might need the Member's services) and without the one-year bar after leaving office (it was not long enough to be of any significant effect). The delegates also limited the bar to "civil" offices so that the military could have the services of all when the country was in danger.
While the Ineligibility Clause prohibits persons serving in a federal executive or judicial branch office from simultaneously serving in Congress, it does not (nor does any other constitutional provision) prohibit simultaneous service in executive branch and judicial branch offices. As well as John Jay, Chief Justices Oliver Ellsworth and John Marshall also served dual executive and judicial offices in the early decades of the nation's existence.
In 1945, Associate Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson was appointed to serve as U.S. Chief of Counsel for the prosecution of Nazi war criminals at the 1945–46 Nuremberg trials.
In 1964 Chief Justice Earl Warren was appointed as chairman of the commission formed to investigate the assassination of John F. Kennedy.
The Ineligibility Clause has resulted in some conflicts over potential appointments of Representatives and Senators to various Cabinet posts and other federal government offices. Among the earliest questions to be addressed under the clause was whether a person serving as a United States Attorney could continue to serve in that capacity after being elected to a seat in Congress. In 1816, Samuel Herrick was elected to the 15th United States Congress while still serving as U.S. Attorney for the District of Ohio. He was not allowed to take his seat until the House of Representatives had determined whether his service as a U.S. Attorney created a conflict under the clause. Finally, in December 1817, the United States House Committee on Elections determined that there was no conflict, because even though Herrick had been elected to Congress, he had not taken the Congressional oath of office while he was still serving as a U.S. Attorney.