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Liu Zhenli (general)
Liu Zhenli (general)
Liu Zhenli (general)
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Liu Zhenli (Chinese: 刘振立; born August 1964) is a general (Shangjiang) of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), currently serving as chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission. He was commander of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force from June 2021 to December 2022.[1]

Key Information

He is a member of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. He was a delegate to the 12th National People's Congress.

Biography

[edit]

Liu was born in Luancheng County, Hebei, in August 1964. He enlisted in the People's Liberation Army in September 1983 and joined the Chinese Communist Party in April 1984. He graduated from the PLA National Defence University.[citation needed]

In 1986, he participated in the Sino-Vietnamese conflicts (1979–1991). In the war, he and his men successfully defended the line against repeated the People's Army of Vietnam assaults for 36 times.[citation needed]

He was chief of staff of the 65th Group Army in December 2009, commander of the army in February 2012, and commander of the 38th Group Army in March 2014.[citation needed]

He was transferred to the People's Armed Police in July 2015 and appointed chief of staff.[citation needed]

In December 2015, he became the first chief of staff of the newly reshuffled People's Liberation Army Ground Force. In June 2021, he was made commander of the army.[citation needed]

In September 2022, he was commissioned as chief of staff of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission.[2][3][4]

He was promoted to the rank of major general (Shaojiang) in December 2010, lieutenant general (Zhongjiang) in July 2016, and general (Shangjiang) in July 2021.[5]

References

[edit]
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Liu Zhenli (general)

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Liu Zhenli (born August 1964) is a general in the (PLA) of , serving as of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), a position he has held since 2022. A career army officer born in Luancheng County, Province, Liu enlisted in the PLA in September 1983 and rose through reconnaissance and infantry commands, gaining combat experience in the 1980s border clashes with . Liu's military career features accelerated promotions, including command of the ground forces in the (2016–2017) and (2017–2019), followed by elevation to full general in 2019 and appointment as commander of the PLA in 2022 before his current joint staff role. As a member of the CMC, he oversees operational planning and has engaged in high-level military dialogues with counterparts from the , , , and to discuss regional security and bilateral ties. Notable for his relatively young age among top PLA leaders and frontline experience, Liu represents the operational focus of Xi Jinping's military reforms emphasizing joint command and modernization, though the PLA's broader context includes ongoing purges affecting senior ranks.

Early Life and Enlistment

Background and Initial Military Entry

Liu Zhenli was born in August 1964 in Luancheng County, Province, a rural region in northern that provided the backdrop for many individuals who later enlisted in the (PLA). This origin reflects the socioeconomic context of mid-20th-century rural , where agricultural communities often supplied recruits amid national efforts to bolster military ranks following the . In September 1983, at age 19, Liu enlisted in the PLA, initiating his professional military career during the era of reforms aimed at modernizing the armed forces through and reduced political . His entry point was as an enlisted soldier, a common pathway for rural youth into the PLA's ground forces, emphasizing discipline and basic training as foundational steps before progression. Limited public records detail his pre-enlistment education or family influences, underscoring enlistment itself as the verifiable onset of his service commitment. Liu joined the in April 1984, shortly after enlistment, aligning his early career with the party's emphasis on ideological loyalty within the military structure. This period coincided with PLA efforts to streamline recruitment and foster a merit-based officer cadre amid broader economic opening, setting the stage for Liu's subsequent advancements without reference to specific pre-military occupations or motivations.

Combat Experience

Sino-Vietnamese Border Conflicts

Liu Zhenli participated in the Sino-Vietnamese border conflicts from 1986 to 1987 as a in the 12th Reconnaissance Battalion of the Military Region, which was deployed to conduct frontline operations against Vietnamese forces. These engagements occurred during the protracted "phony war" phase of hostilities, characterized by artillery duels, infantry probes, and localized assaults along the border, particularly in areas like Laoshan where rotational battles intensified Vietnamese incursions. At age 22, Liu's unit focused on missions, involving patrols that exposed personnel to and ambushes in rugged terrain, contributing to China's defensive posture against Vietnam's border offensives. His hands-on role in these operations, including scouting enemy positions under combat conditions, provided practical tactical experience rare among contemporary PLA senior officers, many of whom lack equivalent exposure to live hostilities post-1979. This frontline service honed skills in small-unit maneuvers and intelligence gathering amid artillery barrages that exceeded 800,000 shells fired by Chinese forces into Vietnamese-held areas in preceding years, underscoring the persistent intensity of the conflict. As one of the few PLA generals with verified combat veteran status from these clashes, Liu's experience informed a career emphasis on operational realism, differentiating him from peers reliant on simulations or peacetime drills.

Command and Operational Roles

Army Corps Leadership

Liu Zhenli advanced to senior ground force commands in the Military Region during the early , building on prior operational experience. In December 2009, he was appointed of the 65th Group , a unit focused on rapid response and border defense. He progressed to of the 65th Group in February 2012, marking him as the youngest group army in the at age 48, a promotion highlighting his merit-based trajectory from combat-tested roles. In March 2014, Liu assumed command of the 38th Group , an elite maneuver formation with origins in Korean War-era units and primary responsibility for Beijing's security amid the PLA's restructuring toward theater commands. This role emphasized conventional operations, including brigade-level for mechanized warfare, aligning with broader PLA reforms initiated in the to integrate ground forces into joint operations. He held the position until July 2015, during which the unit underwent enhancements in readiness for high-intensity maneuvers. These commands underscored his expertise in corps-level leadership, paving the way for subsequent joint and service-level responsibilities through demonstrated operational proficiency.

People's Armed Police Positions

Liu Zhenli served as Chief of Staff of the (PAP) from July to December 2015, a organization tasked with internal security duties including suppression, border protection, and emergency response. In this position, he directed operational planning amid heightened concerns over domestic stability, such as ethnic tensions in and urban incidents, where PAP units conducted anti-terrorism exercises and rapid deployment drills to maintain order without reliance on regular PLA forces. This role marked a shift from his prior frontline commands, emphasizing coordination of non-combat assets for preventive security rather than kinetic warfare. During his brief tenure, Liu Zhenli oversaw PAP involvement in disaster response, notably deploying to the port explosions on , 2015, where over 170 people died from chemical warehouse blasts, coordinating and containment efforts alongside local authorities. The PAP's mandate under his staff leadership focused on enhancing interoperability for and counter-terrorism, including joint training with provincial mobile units to address potential unrest from economic slowdowns and social grievances reported in official assessments of the era. These responsibilities highlighted PAP's distinct operational tempo—prioritizing and rapid over sustained combat—providing Liu with insights into domestic threat mitigation that later informed PLA-wide integration efforts. His PAP experience preceded the 2017 PLA Army reorganization and the 2018 PAP reforms, which subordinated the force directly to the Central Military Commission, fostering unified command structures for hybrid threats blending internal and external risks. Without documented direct command of suppression operations, Liu's oversight contributed to refining PAP doctrines for border patrols and anti-riot simulations, bridging siloed paramilitary functions toward broader joint operational readiness in China's evolving apparatus.

Senior Military Leadership

Joint Staff Department Responsibilities

Liu Zhenli was appointed Chief of the Central Military Commission's Joint Staff Department in March 2023, succeeding Li Zuocheng in a role that serves as the primary interface for operational command between the CMC and the PLA's theater commands. This position narrows the scope from the pre-2016 General Staff Department's broader administrative functions to emphasize combat planning, joint operational oversight, and support for campaign-level decision-making. Under Liu's leadership, the department focuses on formulating military strategies, organizing joint training exercises, and providing command support for integrated operations across PLA services. The Joint Staff Department, directed by Liu, oversees the standardization of PLA training regimens and the conduct of war-gaming simulations to enhance readiness for multi-domain conflicts, including potential scenarios involving maritime disputes or cross-strait contingencies. This includes directing joint coordination and planning to ensure among ground, naval, air, and rocket forces. Liu's prior command experience in the PLA Army, including leadership of the 38th Group Army, informs the department's emphasis on ground force integration within joint frameworks, though critiques from Western analyses highlight persistent army-centric biases in PLA jointness despite reforms. In alignment with Xi Jinping's 2015-2016 military reforms, Liu has advanced the operationalization of five theater commands by prioritizing joint command structures that devolve tactical authority to theater-level Joint Operations Command Centers while retaining strategic oversight at the CMC level. These efforts aim to rectify historical service siloes through mandatory joint exercises and data-sharing protocols, with the Joint Staff Department evaluating theater performance in simulated high-intensity operations. As of 2024, U.S. Department of Defense assessments note that while progress in joint training has accelerated under this structure, full integration remains constrained by command culture and technological gaps.

Central Military Commission Involvement

Liu Zhenli was appointed as a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in October 2022, serving in this capacity as of 2025 alongside Chairman , Vice Chairman , and other members including . As of the CMC Joint Staff Department, his role emphasizes professional military input on operational matters, distinct from the political oversight provided by civilian or party-focused members. This positions him as one of two primary career officers on the CMC, offering expertise derived from his ground force command experience to inform high-level decisions on force structure and deployment. In collaboration with Vice Chairman , another combat veteran from the Sino-Vietnamese border conflicts, Liu contributes to CMC deliberations on (PLA) force modernization, including oversight of equipment processes streamlined under the 2015 reforms. Their shared operational backgrounds enable focused input on integrating advanced systems into joint operations, amid broader CMC efforts to enforce measures in and chains. These activities align with the CMC's mandate to align military capabilities with national strategic goals, prioritizing verifiable advancements in joint command structures over unconfirmed doctrinal shifts. During 2024 and 2025, Liu's CMC involvement included assessments of PLA combat readiness, particularly in joint training exercises designed to counterbalance U.S. military presence in the . As Joint Staff Department head, he oversees the execution of these exercises, emphasizing across PLA services to enhance real-world operational efficacy, with documented increases in multi-domain simulations reported in official channels. This work supports CMC directives for sustained readiness amid geopolitical tensions, focusing on empirical metrics from field maneuvers rather than hypothetical scenarios.

Political Positions

Communist Party and National Congress Roles

Liu Zhenli joined the Communist Party of China (CPC) in April 1984, shortly after enlisting in the in September 1983. This early party affiliation aligned with standard requirements for career advancement in the PLA, where political reliability is a prerequisite for senior command roles. In October 2017, Liu was elected to the 19th of the CPC at the party's national congress, a body comprising 205 full members responsible for electing the and overseeing key policy directions. His selection reflected the party's emphasis on integrating experienced military officers into its central leadership, particularly those with operational backgrounds, to ensure alignment between armed forces and CPC directives on . He retained membership into the 20th term following the 2022 congress, underscoring sustained elevation within the party structure. Liu served as a delegate to the (NPC) from 2013 to 2018, representing military interests in China's unicameral legislature. In this capacity, he contributed to sessions reviewing defense-related legislation, including budget approvals and policies on military modernization, though NPC delegates from the PLA typically operate within parameters set by the Central Military Commission to maintain party control over armed forces oversight. Such representational roles for generals like Liu facilitate the fusion of military expertise with legislative processes, without independent policymaking authority.

Recent Developments and Engagements

Military Diplomacy and 2024-2025 Activities

In October 2024, General Liu Zhenli engaged in a video conference with U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General CQ Brown Jr., marking a key instance of resumed high-level U.S.-China military dialogue amid ongoing tensions over Taiwan and South China Sea operations; the discussions focused on operational safety and risk reduction protocols, filling a gap left by absences in China's defense minister position. This interaction underscored Liu's role in maintaining channels for de-escalation, as China's military leadership has prioritized continuity in bilateral communications despite domestic purges. Early in 2025, Liu led a delegation to , visiting and from January 6 to 9, where he met with senior defense officials to advance military cooperation, including discussions on joint training and regional security coordination. These engagements reflected the PLA's strategy of bolstering ties with nations to counterbalance U.S. alliances in the . On May 22, 2025, Liu hosted 's Chief of Defence Forces General Songwit Noonpackdee in Beijing, resulting in agreements to enhance , deepen joint military exercises, and expand practical cooperation in areas such as and personnel exchanges. The talks emphasized mutual trust-building and , signaling China's intent to integrate more closely into its regional defense framework. In August 2025, Liu held talks with Australia's Chief of the Defence Force Admiral David Johnston in on August 13, exchanging views on international and regional issues, including maritime stability and defense exchanges, to foster practical military cooperation. These discussions highlighted efforts to stabilize bilateral relations amid differing strategic outlooks, with both sides committing to risk mitigation in shared operational domains.

Evaluation and Context

Achievements in Operational Readiness

Liu Zhenli's direct involvement in Sino-Vietnamese border clashes during the late 1970s and early 1980s endowed him with frontline combat experience uncommon among contemporary PLA senior leaders, who largely lack exposure to live-fire engagements beyond exercises. Serving initially in a reconnaissance company of the 112th Division after enlisting in September 1983, his early career emphasized and intelligence gathering in contested environments, skills that contrasted with the PLA's historical emphasis on over tactical proficiency. In his subsequent roles, including as and commander of the PLA Army from 2021 to 2022, Liu advanced training methodologies that integrated reconnaissance-derived insights into joint operations, prioritizing brigade-level coordination within theater commands to simulate multi-domain warfare scenarios. This built on post-2015 military reforms, where his oversight facilitated exercises emphasizing fusion and maneuverability, addressing gaps in between army units and other services. Such reforms were evident in heightened operational tempo, with PLA units demonstrating improved synchronization in command post simulations and live-fire drills by 2022. As chief of the Joint Staff Department since October 2022, Liu has directed PLA-wide and readiness assessments, streamlining joint command structures to enhance responsiveness amid evolving threats. His tenure has coincided with sustained execution of theater-level exercises, incorporating combat-honed principles to bolster force projection capabilities without major disruptions from internal shifts between 2023 and 2025. Analysts have noted this continuity as a stabilizing factor, positioning Liu as a potential candidate for elevated roles like Central Military Commission vice chairman due to his proven track record in translating historical lessons into modern readiness metrics.

Broader PLA Challenges and Purges

Liu Zhenli has not been implicated in the extensive purges that swept through the (PLA) in 2024 and 2025, which targeted high-ranking officials involved in procurement and equipment scandals, unlike figures such as former Defense Minister , expelled in mid-2024 for graft tied to the Rocket Force, and Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman , removed in October 2025 as the most senior uniformed officer purged in the campaign. This distinction aligns with Liu's emphasis on joint operations and staff coordination rather than domains prone to , such as systems acquisition, where investigations revealed widespread falsification of quality controls and substandard components. Systemic within the PLA has raised doubts about equipment reliability and operational readiness, with U.S. Department of Defense assessments indicating that graft in the Rocket Force—once viewed as China's "crown jewel"—may have resulted in defective missiles and eroded senior leaders' confidence in core capabilities. These issues, documented through investigations removing at least 15 senior officers and defense executives in 2023-2024, have disrupted progress toward Xi Jinping's 2027 modernization targets by diverting resources and fostering a culture of falsified reporting over genuine proficiency. Analyses from think tanks like RAND highlight how such causally undermines , as inflated costs and poor-quality gear compound personnel shortcomings and untested integration in joint exercises. Xi's centralization of , while intended to enforce and curb factional graft, has drawn from Western observers for potentially stifling lower-level initiative and adaptability, as rigid hierarchies prioritize political reliability over tactical innovation. Empirical evidence from reports suggests these purges, though disruptive in the short term, represent a pragmatic response to entrenched that left-leaning narratives in some academic circles understate, given the PLA's historical in upholding regime stability at the expense of warfighting reforms. By targeting networks, the campaign addresses causal drivers of readiness gaps, such as unreliable munitions stocks, though full restoration of trust requires verifiable improvements beyond opaque internal audits.

References

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