Hubbry Logo
Eastern Theater CommandEastern Theater CommandMain
Open search
Eastern Theater Command
Community hub
Eastern Theater Command
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Eastern Theater Command
Eastern Theater Command
Eastern Theater Command
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Eastern Theater Command
东部战区
Founded1 February 2016; 10 years ago (2016-02-01)
Country People's Republic of China
TypeTheater command
Part of People's Liberation Army
HeadquartersNanjing, Jiangsu
WebsiteOfficial website (in English)
Commanders
CommanderGeneral Yang Zhibin
Political CommissarAdmiral Liu Qingsong
Chief of StaffLieutenant General Hong Jiangqiang
Insignia
Sleeve insignia

The Eastern Theater Command (Chinese: 东部战区; pinyin: Dōngbù zhànqū) is one of the five theater commands of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The command is headquartered in Nanjing.

Founded on 1 February 2016, the command replaced the Nanjing Military Region. Its jurisdiction includes the provinces of Anhui, Fujian, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang, as well as Shanghai and the East China Sea to include the Taiwan Strait. The Eastern Theater Command is primarily composed three subordinate single-service component commands: the Eastern Theater Ground Force of the PLAGF, the East Sea Fleet of the PLAN, and the Eastern Theater Command Air Force of the PLAAF which conduct combat operations within the command's area of responsibility. Also under the Eastern Theater Command is the Wuxi Joint Logistics Support Center (JSLC) of the CMC's Joint Logistics Support Force which provides logistic and material support to the command and Base 61 of the PLARF which is responsible for missile employment in the Eastern Theater.

Area of responsibility

[edit]

Eastern Theater Command's area of responsibility (AOR) includes East China, the East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.[1][2] The command's primary missions are maintaining security in the East China Sea and the conduct of major operations against Taiwan, including the Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Islands.[1][3][4] It is also likely responsible for matters relating to Japan, including the Ryukyu Archipelago, the Tsushima Strait and the disputed Senkaku Islands.[2][5]

History

[edit]

On 1 February 2016, the Eastern Theater Command held its inaugural meeting in the Bayi Building in Beijing. The meeting was held concurrently with all of the other newly created theater commands. General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the CMC Xi Jinping was in attendance, awarding military flags and issuing the official instructions. CMC Vice Chairman and CCP Politburo Member Fan Changlong read out the orders while CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang presided.[citation needed]

In response to the 2022 visit by United States Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, the Eastern Theater Command conducted joint ground, air, and naval military exercises including live-fire drills, missile launches over Taipei, and Taiwanese Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) incursions.[6][7][8] Another set of Chinese military exercises around Taiwan by the command began on 8 April 2023, after president Tsai visited U.S. Speaker Kevin McCarthy in California.[9][10] Upon taking office, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te stated that Taiwan and China are not subordinate to each other, prompting China to conduct military exercises codenamed Joint Sword-2024A.[11][12] In October 2024, China conducted further military exercises named Joint Sword-2024B.[13] In April 2025, China launched the Strait Thunder–2025A exercises. On 29 December, the Eastern Theater Command announced a major military exercise around Taiwan codenamed Justice Mission 2025, involving the command's land, sea, air, and rocket forces.[14]

Organizational structure

[edit]

The Eastern Theater Command, like other Chinese theater commands, consists of a joint headquarters, a joint logistics support center (JSLC) from the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force, a PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) service component, a PLA Air Force (PLAAF) service component, a PLA Navy (PLAN) service component, and a PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) service component. Within Eastern Theater Command these units these are the Nanjing headquarters, Wuxi Joint Logistics Support Facility, Eastern Theater Command Ground Forces, Eastern Theater Command Air Force, Eastern Fleet, and Base 61.[1][5]

Headquarters

[edit]

Located in Nanjing, capital of Jiangsu Province, the Eastern Theater Command headquarters includes both the General Staff Department, responsible for staff support to command leadership, and the Political Works Department, providing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) oversight and influence within the command.[15] The command's General Staff Department (Chinese: 参谋部; pinyin: Cānmóu Bù) consists of at least eight sections: combat bureau, intelligence bureau, information assurance agency, military demand bureau, joint training board, mobilization bureau, work department bureau, work direction bureau, and war service bureau.[citation needed] The command's Political Works Department (Chinese: 政治工作部; pinyin: Zhèngzhì Gōngzuò Bù) consists of at least six bureaus: general, organization, cadre, military and civilian, publicity, and group workers liaison bureau.[citation needed]

PLA Ground Force

[edit]
Map of Eastern Theater Command units
Main article: Eastern Theater Command Ground Force

The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) component of Eastern Theater Command is composed of three major units: The 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Army. Since 2017 reforms, the PLAGF group army represents a more evolved, flexible, and capable operational organization that provides Chinese military decision makers with the ability to task-organize forces to accomplish specific missions.[2] Each group army doctrinally commands twelve brigades: six combined-arms brigades (CA-BDEs) and six support brigades including aviation, artillery, air defense, CBRN, special operations forces (SOF), and others.[2] Its commander is Kong Jun (Chinese: 孔军) who formerly served as the first commander of the PLA Marine Corps.[16]

Directly Subordinate Units

[edit]

71st Group Army

[edit]

The 71st Group Army (Chinese: 第七十一集团军) traces its history back to the 12th Corps, a February 1949 consolidation of the 34th, 35th, and 36th Divisions.[20] In December 1950, the 12th Corps incorporated the 31st Division of the 11th Corps and entered the Korean War, fighting in the Shangganling Campaign against two United Nations divisions.[21] In May 1989, the Central Military Commission mobilized at least 14 of the PLA's 24 group armies to enforce martial law against student-led protests in Tiananmen Square from five of the seven military regions, a larger force than had been mobilized for China's border wars with Vietnam, India, or the Soviet Union.[22][23] The Nanjing Military Region, predecessor to the Eastern Theater Command, airlifted the 34th, 36th, and 110th Infantry Divisions, an artillery brigade, and an anti-aircraft battalion from the 12th Corps following Xu Qinxian's refusal to mobilize the 38th Army in Beijing.[24] In 2017 the 12th Corps was disbanded and replaced by the 71st Group Army as China replaced their seven military regions with five theater commands.[citation needed]

Headquartered in Xuzhou, Jiangsu, the composition of the 71st Group Army matches the Chinese doctrinal group army structure commanding six combined-arms brigades and seven support brigades.[2] The 71st Group Army is understood to consist of the below units.[citation needed] Note, the PLAGF uniquely identifies support brigades using the same unit number as the parent group army.

  • Headquarters
  • 2nd Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 35th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 160th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 235th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 178th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 179th Light Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 71st Army Aviation Brigade
  • 71st Artillery Brigade
  • 71st Air Defense Brigade
  • 71st Special Operations Brigade
  • 71st Service Support Brigade

72nd Group Army

[edit]

The 72nd Group Army (Chinese: 第七十二集团军), headquartered in Huzhou, Zhejiang Province, originates from the 1930 activation of the 2nd Red Army in Hunan which took part in Mao's famous Long March. The 2nd Red Army was reorganized and redesignated as the 1st Corps in February 1947 taking an active role in the Chinese Civil War include in the battles for Shanzong, Fumei, and Longdong.[25] In April 1953, 1st Corps was deployed to the Korean War but returned to China after only a few months with the conflict's cessation.[26][27] In 2017, with the transformation of military regions to theater commands, the PLAGF 1st Corps was reorganized and redesignated as the 72nd Ground Army.[citation needed] The 72nd Group Army is understood to consist of the below units.[citation needed]

  • Headquarters
  • 10th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 5th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 124th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 85th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 90th Light Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 72nd Army Aviation Brigade
  • 72nd Artillery Brigade
  • 72nd Air Defense Brigade
  • 72nd Special Operations Brigade
  • 72nd Service Support Brigade

73rd Group Army

[edit]

The 73rd Group Army (Chinese: 第七十三集团军) is headquartered in Bantou, Jimei District, Xiamen, in Fujian Province – directly across the strait from Taiwan.[28] The 73rd Group Army's history begins in 1941 with the Shantung Column of the Shangtung Military Region. Undergoing a number of restructures and redesignations throughout the 1940s, eventually to become the 31st Corps.[29] Unlike the predecessors of the 71st and 72nd Group Armies (12th and 1st Corps) of the Eastern Theater Command, the 73rd Group Army's predecessor (the 31st Corps) was not selected to deploy in the early 1950s Korean War and remained in Fujian Province to defend the Chinese mainland against a potential US-Taiwan invasion.[30] Later in 1958, the 31st Corps took part in the artillery bombardment of the Republic of China's Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu Islands precipitating the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.[30] As the 12th Corps and 1st Corps were reorganized and redesignated as the 71st and 72nd Army Groups in China's 2015–2017 military reforms, the 31st Corps became the 73rd Army Group.[citation needed] As one of two group armies in the Eastern Theater Command with amphibious combined-arms brigades, the 73rd Group has been prominently featured by Chinese media conducting amphibious landing drills in Fujian Province demonstrating its capability to take part in the use of force against Taiwan.[31][32][33] The 73rd Group Army is understood to consists of the below units.[citation needed]

  • Headquarters
  • 86th Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 14th Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 91st Amphibious Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 145th Medium Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 3rd Light Combined-Arms Brigade
  • 73rd Army Aviation Brigade
  • 73rd Artillery Brigade
  • 73nd Air Defense Brigade
  • 73rd Special Operations Brigade
  • 73rd Service Support Brigade

PLA Air Force

[edit]
Main article: Eastern Theater Command Air Force

The Eastern Theater Command Air Force is the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) component of Eastern Theater Command and is led by commander Wu Junbao (Chinese: 吴俊宝) who took office in December 2021[34] and political commissar Lieutenant General Zhong Weiguo (Chinese: 钟卫国) who took office in June 2019.[35]

The PLAAF has largely disestablished divisions and converted their subordinate regiments to brigades. With only the 10th Bomber Division remaining as a division, the Eastern Theater Command Air Force is composed of the following units.

  • 8th Fighter Brigade
  • 9th Fighter Brigade
  • 25th Fighter Brigade
  • 40th Fighter Brigade
  • 41st Fighter Brigade
  • 78th Fighter Brigade
  • 83rd Fighter Brigade
  • 85th Fighter Brigade
  • 95th Fighter Brigade
  • 10th Bomber Division
    • 28th Bomber Regiment
    • 29th Bomber Regiment
    • 30th Bomber Regiment
  • 76th Air Regiment
  • 77th Air Regiment
  • 93rd Regiment
  • Unidentified drone attack brigade

PLA Navy

[edit]

The East Sea Fleet is a component of the Eastern Theater Command and one of the three Naval Fleets of the People's Liberation Army Navy. Its current commander is Vice Admiral Wang Zhongcai (Chinese: 王仲才) and Vice Admiral Mei Wen (Chinese: 梅文) is its political commissar.[36]

PLA Naval Air Force

  • 1st Air Division (Shanghai)
  • 17th Air Regiment (Changzhou)
  • 5th Independent Bomber Regiment (Changzhou)
  • 4th Naval Aviation Brigade (Taizhou)
  • 11th Air Regiment (Ningbo)
  • 18th Air Regiment (JH-7)

PLA Rocket Force

[edit]

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) component of Eastern Theater Command is Base 61 in Huangshan, Anhui. Base 61 has been regarded as the PLARF's "premier conventional base opposite Taiwan" where a number of senior PLARF leadership were likely to have been stationed.[37][38][39] Base 61 traces its origins back to August 1965 with the establishment of Unit 121 in Guangyang Township, Shitai County which was responsible for the construction of missile silos under the PLA's Second Artillery Corps (predecessor to the PLARF) and led by Liao Changmei (Chinese: 廖成美).[40][41] PLA Rocket Force 61st Base (Huangshan City, Anhui Province) The unit was converted into the Project 303 headquarters in June 1966 and remained until 25 May 1968 when the Central Military Commission renamed the headquarters to Base 52 of the Second Artillery Corps, the PLARF component of the Nanjing Military Region (predecessor to the Eastern Theater Command). PLA Rocket Force 61st Base (Huangshan City, Anhui Province) Base 52 comprised the 807th, 811th, 815th, 817th, 818th, 819th, 820th, and 827th Brigades armed with DF-21, DF-15C, DF-15A, DF-11A, CJ-10A, and DF-21C ballistic missiles. PLA Rocket Force 61st Base (Huangshan City, Anhui Province) In 2016 the newly established PLARF took command of Base 52 which would be redesignated as Base 61 and its subordinate brigades renamed 611 to 618.[42][43][44]

PLARF Units of the Eastern Theater Command
Brigade Chinese name Missile type City Province
Base 61 Headquarters Huangshan Anhui
611 六十一基地611旅 DF-21A Chizhou Anhui
612 六十一基地612旅 DF-21 or DF-21A Jingdezhen Jiangxi
613 六十一基地613旅 DF-15B Shangrao Anhui
614 六十一基地614旅 DF-11A or DF-17 Yong'an Fujian
615 六十一基地615旅 DF-11A Meizhou Guangdong
616 六十一基地616旅 DF-15 Ganzhou Jiangxi
617 六十一基地617旅 DF-16 Jinhua Zhejiang
618 六十一基地618旅 Unknown Unknown Unknown

List of leaders

[edit]

Commanders

[edit]
English name Chinese name Took office Left office Notes
Liu Yuejun 刘粤军 February 2016 December 2019
He Weidong 何卫东 December 2019 January 2022
Lin Xiangyang 林向阳 January 2022 October 2025
Yang Zhibin 杨志斌 October 2025 Incumbent [45][46]

Political commissars

[edit]
English name Chinese name Took office Left office Notes
Zheng Weiping 郑卫平 February 2016 September 2017
He Ping 何平 September 2017 June 2023
Liu Qingsong 刘青松 June 2023 Incumbent [47]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Eastern Theater Command

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Eastern Theater Command (Chinese: 东部战区; pinyin: Dōngbù Zhànqū) is one of five joint theater commands of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), tasked with coordinating military operations in China's eastern strategic direction, including the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and Yellow Sea regions. Established on 1 February 2016 amid sweeping PLA structural reforms to enhance joint command and control, it absorbed assets from the former Nanjing Military Region and integrates ground, naval, air, and rocket forces for unified action against potential threats. Headquartered in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, the command prioritizes readiness for contingencies involving Taiwan unification operations, maritime security patrols, and deterrence against regional adversaries such as Japan and U.S. forces in the area. It has executed high-profile joint exercises, including the "Joint Sword-2024B" drills encircling Taiwan Island with multi-domain assaults, sea patrols, and precision strikes to test combat integration and signal resolve on sovereignty issues. These activities underscore the command's evolution into a modernized force emphasizing informationized warfare, cross-service interoperability, and rapid response capabilities amid escalating cross-strait tensions.

Historical Development

Pre-Reform Era Structure

The Nanjing Military Region, established in the mid-1950s as part of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) reorganization into seven geographic military regions following the Soviet model, served as the primary administrative and operational entity for eastern China prior to the 2016 reforms. Headquartered in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, it encompassed the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, and the Shanghai municipality, with a focus on defending the eastern seaboard against potential threats, including contingencies involving Taiwan. The region's command structure was dominated by the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF), reflecting the army-centric nature of the pre-reform PLA, where the absence of a dedicated army service headquarters meant ground forces exerted de facto control over regional operations, often marginalizing naval and air components. Subordinate PLAGF units included two primary group armies: the 12th Group Army, headquartered near in Province and specialized in amphibious and coastal defense operations critical for Taiwan-focused scenarios, and the 31st Group Army, based in , , oriented toward and rapid reaction capabilities. Each group army typically comprised 2-3 divisions, brigades, and support elements, totaling an estimated 150,000-200,000 ground personnel under the region, though exact figures varied due to periodic reorganizations and the PLA's opacity on force sizes. The structure emphasized land-based , with limited integration of joint maneuvers; for instance, amphibious exercises involving the 12th Group Army were conducted sporadically from the late 1990s, but without routine coordination across services. The PLA Navy's East Sea Fleet, headquartered in , , fell under Nanjing MR oversight, comprising surface combatants, submarines, and maritime aviation units responsible for patrolling the and supporting blockade or invasion operations. Similarly, PLA Air Force elements, organized into divisions under the Nanjing Military Region Air Force, included fighter, bomber, and transport squadrons based at airfields across the region, such as those in and , focused on air superiority and strike missions over the . Command authority was dual-hatted, with the MR commander—a ground forces general—exercising operational control, while service-specific chains reported parallelly to Beijing-based general departments, resulting in stovepiped operations that prioritized administrative control over warfighting efficiency. This setup, inherited from 1950s Soviet influences, persisted through multiple iterations, including the 1985 reduction of group armies, but failed to adapt fully to modern joint requirements evident in exercises like those in the during the 1995-1996 crisis.

2016 Theater Command Reforms and Establishment

In November 2015, the Central Military Commission (CMC) under Xi Jinping initiated a sweeping reform of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) structure, replacing the seven military regions—each dominated by ground forces—with five theater commands oriented toward joint operations and regional warfighting. These changes, formalized in decisions announced on November 24, 2015, aimed to streamline command authority under the CMC, diminish service branch silos, and enhance the PLA's ability to conduct integrated campaigns, while reinforcing Communist Party control over military loyalty and operations. The Eastern Theater Command was officially established on February 1, 2016, absorbing the responsibilities of the former Nanjing Military Region and inheriting its geographical jurisdiction spanning eastern , including key coastal provinces and the approaches. Headquartered in , Province, the new command was appointed with Liu Yuejun as its inaugural commander and General Zheng Weiping as , both experienced officers from the Nanjing Military Region era tasked with integrating , , , and rocket force elements under unified joint command. This devolved operational control to theater-level joint staffs, enabling faster decision-making for contingencies in the command's area, though ultimate authority remained centralized with the CMC to prevent regional power bases. Implementation involved reassigning over 200,000 personnel across services into theater-specific units, with the Eastern Theater Command prioritizing maritime-air integration for potential cross-strait operations, reflecting the reforms' emphasis on "winning informationized wars" through multi-domain coordination. Early exercises under the new structure, such as patrols in the , demonstrated initial efforts to operationalize these changes, though analysts noted persistent challenges in achieving true due to ingrained service rivalries and incomplete doctrinal shifts. By February 2, 2016, PLA spokespersons confirmed the theater commands' adjustment and establishment as accomplished, marking the culmination of the initial phase of reforms.

Post-Establishment Evolution and 2025 Developments

Following its establishment on February 1, 2016, as part of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) shift from seven military regions to five theater commands, the Eastern Theater Command underwent progressive refinements to enhance joint operational capabilities, particularly for scenarios involving Taiwan and the East China Sea. These included structural adjustments to prioritize interservice coordination under a unified joint command, moving away from service-specific silos toward integrated warfare emphasizing information dominance and rapid response. By 2017, the command had begun incorporating special operations forces (SOF) more effectively into theater-level planning, with observed changes in command-and-control protocols to support high-intensity conflicts. The command's evolution accelerated amid escalating tensions in the , with a surge in live-fire drills and exercises simulating blockades and amphibious assaults. From onward, integration of unmanned systems, such as the Sharp Claw I equipped with a 7.62 mm , bolstered ground force capabilities for contested island operations. In April 2024, broader PLA reforms announced by targeted improvements in informationized warfare, directly affecting the Eastern Theater by streamlining data fusion across air, sea, and cyber domains to enable precise strikes and denial operations. In 2025, the command conducted the "Strait Thunder-2025A" exercise in early April, evaluating joint operations both within and beyond the First Island Chain, including port blockades, precision strikes, and multi-domain coordination involving PLA Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force elements. These drills, part of a pattern revealed in contemporaneous exercises, outlined a potential three-phase operational approach for a Taiwan Strait contingency: initial long-range suppression, mid-phase isolation via sea-air control, and terminal assault phases. Later that year, a state documentary highlighted the command's "Joint Sword-B" maneuvers, framing them as anti-access/area-denial operations to deter external intervention. Amid these activities, ongoing PLA leadership purges, including high-level removals in the Eastern Theater, signaled Xi Jinping's persistent concerns over corruption and loyalty, prompting further internal restructuring to align with "world-class" military standards by 2027.

Strategic Role and Area of Responsibility

Geographical Scope

The Eastern Theater Command covers the eastern provinces of , , , , and , along with the municipality, forming a densely populated and economically significant region along China's eastern seaboard. This land area, inherited from the former Nanjing Military Region with adjustments, supports ground force operations and logistics critical for theater-wide activities. Maritime responsibilities extend to the and the , encompassing waters adjacent to and disputed areas such as the Diaoyu Islands (known as Senkaku in ). The command's prioritizes naval and air operations in these zones, including patrols and potential amphibious contingencies across the , which separates from by approximately 130-180 kilometers at its narrowest points. The geographical scope aligns with China's strategic focus on Taiwan unification and regional deterrence, bordering the Northern Theater Command to the north and the Central Theater Command inland to the west, while extending seaward to influence Japanese and broader dynamics. This configuration, formalized in the 2016 reforms, enables integrated joint operations across terrestrial, littoral, and aerial domains within these boundaries.

Primary Missions and Focus on Taiwan


The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) bears primary responsibility for defending China's eastern maritime approaches, securing the , and conducting operations related to the , with an explicit focus on opposing independence and preparing for reunification efforts. Under the Central Military Commission, the ETC integrates PLA ground, naval, air, and rocket forces to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity in its area, including contingencies involving the and broader East Asian maritime domains. This mission emphasizes joint combat readiness, real-combat training, and deterrence against perceived separatist activities in . Central to the ETC's role is the orchestration of potential campaigns against , encompassing naval blockades of key ports, amphibious assaults, precision strikes on command-and-control nodes, and establishment of multi-domain superiority to neutralize defenses and external intervention. The command conducts frequent, large-scale exercises simulating these scenarios, such as Joint Sword-2024A in May 2024, which involved sea-air patrols encircling , joint firepower strikes using systems like the PCH-191 multiple-launch rocket system, and integration of aircraft carriers for offensive operations. Similarly, the Strait Thunder-2025A exercise in April 2025 demonstrated capabilities in seizing maritime control, targeting critical infrastructure, and multi-service coordination around the island and associated territories like , , and Matsu. These activities align with PLA goals for enhanced mobility, rapid deployment, and firepower projection by 2027 to compel negotiations or enforce reunification. The ETC's Taiwan focus extends to leveraging auxiliary forces, including the maritime militia and civilian ferries for logistical support in amphibious operations, alongside coordination with the PLA Rocket Force for initial saturation strikes using intermediate-range ballistic missiles like the DF-26. U.S. Department of Defense analyses assess the command's structure and training as optimized for a high-intensity Taiwan contingency, prioritizing erosion of regional norms through persistent air and naval incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone and midline of the strait. This operational posture underscores the ETC's role in escalating pressure tactics short of full conflict while maintaining readiness for escalation.

Organizational Structure

Headquarters and Joint Command

The headquarters of the Eastern Theater Command is located in , Province, serving as the primary nerve center for coordinating joint operations across the theater's area of responsibility. This site was selected due to its strategic centrality and historical precedence as the headquarters of the former Nanjing Military Region, which the Eastern Theater Command absorbed during the reforms. The facility houses key departments including operations, intelligence, logistics, and political work organs, enabling centralized planning and execution of campaigns focused on maritime and amphibious contingencies. The joint command structure emphasizes integration of PLA services under a unified theater , with the commander—typically drawn from the —overseeing deputies from , , and other components who are dual-hatted as service representatives. This setup includes standing deputy commanders, deputy s, a , and specialized bureaus for joint fires, information support, and campaign planning, designed to facilitate multi-domain operations without service-specific silos. Political oversight is embedded through a parallel structure, ensuring alignment with Central Military Commission directives. Established on February 1, 2016, as part of Xi Jinping's military reforms to enhance , the headquarters replaced fragmented military region commands with a streamlined theater model prioritizing wartime responsiveness over peacetime administration. The within the headquarters manages real-time , integrating data from surveillance assets, service components, and Rocket Force units to support scenarios such as blockades or invasions in the . While official Chinese sources portray this as a model of , external analyses highlight persistent challenges in achieving true joint interoperability due to inter-service rivalries and centralized control from .

PLA Ground Force Components

The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) components of the Eastern Theater Command are structured around three group armies—the 71st, 72nd, and 73rd—subordinated to the theater command for joint operations across eastern , with a focus on deterring and preparing for contingencies involving . These units, reformed in as part of the PLA's shift to theater-based commands, emphasize modular brigade-level formations for rapid mobilization, amphibious projection, and integration with naval and air assets. The 71st Group Army, headquartered in Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province, serves as a maneuver force with heavy mechanized brigades suited for continental operations and reinforcement of eastern defenses. It includes brigades equipped for and special operations elements for theater-wide support. The 72nd Group Army, based in , Province, incorporates amphibious brigades designed for littoral maneuvers and cross-strait assaults, bolstering the command's ability to seize and hold beachheads. Its structure prioritizes joint amphibious training with PLA Navy elements, as demonstrated in exercises simulating scenarios. The 73rd Group Army, stationed in , Province directly opposite , features specialized amphibious units and aviation brigades for helicopter-borne assaults, positioning it as the vanguard for potential invasion operations across the 100-180 km . This army maintains heightened readiness, with reforms enhancing its organic fire support and logistics for sustained operations. Across these group armies, the standard organization includes approximately six brigades (mixing heavy, medium, and light types), plus dedicated , air defense, engineer, , and service support brigades, enabling scalable responses from border defense to expeditionary campaigns. brigades in each provide unconventional capabilities, such as and , integrated into theater joint exercises conducted annually since 2016.

PLA Air Force Units

The Eastern Theater Command Air Force (ETCAF), established in 2016 as part of the PLA's theater command reforms, serves as the primary PLAAF component for operations in the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and adjacent airspace, emphasizing air denial, strike, and support for joint amphibious and blockade missions. Headquartered in , Province, the ETCAF aligns PLAAF assets with the theater's focus on deterring and, if necessary, coercing Taiwan reunification, integrating fighter, bomber, transport, and special mission units under a streamlined base-brigade model that replaced legacy divisions for enhanced deployability and combat readiness. Subordinate structure includes two air defense bases—Shanghai Base and Fuzhou Base—responsible for coordinating networks, (SAM) batteries, and composite brigades tailored for high-intensity peer conflict. Fighter brigades, typically comprising 24-36 per brigade with integrated maintenance and support elements, are equipped with fourth- and fifth-generation platforms such as the J-10C multirole fighter, J-16 , and J-20 stealth , enabling rapid surge for air superiority over the theater. SAM defenses feature advanced Russian-origin systems like the S-300 PMU2 and S-400, deployed to counter penetrating strikes on coastal and inland assets. Bomber and special aviation divisions under direct ETCAF control provide long-range precision strike capabilities, primarily using upgraded H-6K/J variants armed with cruise missiles for maritime targets, while transport units facilitate airborne logistics and troop mobility. Recent enhancements include the 2023 reorganization incorporating former PLA Navy aviation assets, such as the 4th and 6th Aviation Brigades previously under the , into PLAAF brigades to bolster shore-based strike and over the . By mid-2024, J-20 allocations to Eastern Theater brigades, including transitions like the 41st Aviation Brigade, numbered in the range of 160-200 airframes across the PLAAF but prioritized for ETC due to contingencies, reflecting accelerated modernization amid corruption probes disrupting some procurement timelines.

PLA Navy Elements

The Eastern Theater Navy, as the PLA Navy component of the Eastern Theater Command, is headquartered in , Zhejiang Province, and focuses on operations in the , including the and contingencies involving . It comprises two naval bases, two submarine flotillas, two destroyer flotillas, surface ship flotillas, aviation brigades, and associated support elements, enabling maritime power projection, amphibious operations, and (A2/AD) capabilities tailored to regional threats. These units fall under operational control of the theater command while retaining administrative ties to PLA Navy headquarters in . Key naval assets assigned to the Eastern Theater include one , one , four destroyers, 22 frigates, 51 landing ships, and four attack , supporting joint exercises such as those east of in 2023. Surface combatants, including Luyang III-class destroyers and Jiangkai II/III-class frigates, are equipped with anti-ship missiles and land-attack cruise missiles for precision strikes against surface and land targets. Submarine forces feature Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and Yuan/Song-class diesel-electric submarines (SSs), capable of launching missiles for and anti-submarine roles.
CategoryQuantityKey Types and Capabilities
Aircraft Carriers1Shandong (CV-17); supports carrier-based air operations beyond the .
Amphibious Assault Ships1Yushen-class; enables helicopter assaults and troop transport for amphibious landings.
Destroyers4Luyang II/III; multi-mission with anti-air, anti-surface, and ASW armaments.
Frigates22Jiangkai II/III; focused on escort, patrol, and missile strikes.
Attack Submarines4Shang SSN, Yuan/Song SS; stealthy platforms for undersea interdiction.
These elements integrate with theater-wide joint operations, emphasizing long-range mobilization and live-fire training to deter or execute blockades and invasions in the area. The fleet's modernization, including commissioning of advanced platforms by 2023, enhances its role in challenging foreign naval presence through gray-zone activities and escalated patrols since August 2022.

PLA Rocket Force Contributions

The (PLARF) provides the Eastern Theater Command with critical long-range precision strike capabilities, enabling suppression of enemy air defenses, targeting of high-value assets, and anti-ship operations in potential contingency scenarios. These contributions emphasize conventional ballistic and cruise missiles optimized for the theater's area of responsibility, including the and , where PLARF units integrate into joint operations to degrade adversary command-and-control, airfields, ports, and naval forces. Over 1,000 missiles from PLARF brigades are oriented toward , supporting amphibious assault preparations by neutralizing defenses and deterring third-party intervention, such as U.S. carrier strike groups. PLARF Base 61, headquartered in , Province, serves as the primary operational hub for the Eastern Theater Command, overseeing at least eight missile brigades (611th to 618th) equipped predominantly with short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. These units, numbering around 11 brigades in total under theater alignment, focus on rapid deployment and salvo fires to overwhelm defenses. For instance, the 612th Brigade fields variants for conventional strikes up to 1,750 km, while the 617th employs /16 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with ranges of 600–800 km for precision attacks on fixed targets. Emerging capabilities include hypersonic glide vehicle-equipped brigades, such as the 96714th in Yong'an, Fujian, enhancing penetration of missile defenses.
BrigadeLocationPrimary MissilesRange (km)Role
611thDF-21A2,100+Nuclear-capable MRBM for regional targets
612thEastern China1,750+Conventional MRBM for precision strikes
613thEastern ChinaDF-15B750+Conventional SRBM for Taiwan suppression
617thEastern ChinaDF-15/16600–800+Conventional SRBM with maneuverable warheads
96714thYong'an, 1,000–1,800Hypersonic MRBM for defense evasion
PLARF's theater contributions extend to joint exercises demonstrating integrated fires, such as the Joint Sword series in 2023 and 2024, where systems like the PCH-191 long-range rocket and /16 variants simulated strikes on 's infrastructure during sea-air patrols. These operations, coordinated via theater joint operations command centers, leverage PLARF's space-based reconnaissance and C4ISR for real-time targeting, with at least four ballistic missiles overflying in August 2022 to signal escalation potential. Modernization efforts have expanded inventories, including intermediate-range missiles for anti-ship roles against Western Pacific assets, though 2023 corruption purges in PLARF leadership temporarily disrupted training and readiness.

Capabilities and Modernization

Equipment and Technological Advancements

The Eastern Theater Command (ETC) has prioritized the integration of advanced weaponry and systems to enhance joint operational capabilities, particularly for scenarios involving , as part of the PLA's broader modernization drive toward , informatization, and intelligentization by 2027. This includes fielding precision-guided munitions, hypersonic weapons, and networked C4ISR platforms to enable multi-domain dominance, with emphasis on anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) architectures. Key advancements feature indigenous developments like the WS-15 for fifth-generation fighters and electromagnetic catapults on emerging carriers, reducing reliance on foreign technology. Ground forces under the ETC, comprising the 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Armies with 18 brigades and 6 amphibious brigades, are equipped with modern armored vehicles, , and support systems for island-seizing operations. Notable assets include approximately 1,100 main battle tanks, 2,300 pieces (including self-propelled guns and multiple rocket launchers), ZTQ-15 light tanks for rapid maneuver, ZTL-11 wheeled assault guns, and PCH-191 300mm long-range demonstrated in 2023 exercises. units employ unmanned aerial systems (UAS), night-vision gear, and CSK-series vehicles, while marine brigades utilize wheeled howitzers and Type-05 amphibious vehicles for littoral assaults. These systems support enhanced mobility and firepower in joint island-landing campaigns. Aerial assets in the ETC, managed by 13 fighter and ground-attack brigades plus bomber and special mission units, emphasize stealth, electronic warfare, and long-range strike. The command fields around 350 fighters (including J-11 variants and J-20 deployed in Taiwan-adjacent exercises), H-6 bombers modified for YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missiles (270 nautical mile range), and KJ-500 airborne early warning platforms for integrated air defense. Advancements include J-15 carrier-based fighters with electronic warfare variants and developmental KJ-600 fixed-wing early warning aircraft, alongside improved for extended operations. These enable air superiority and suppression of enemy air defenses in contested environments. Naval elements of the ETC, including the Eastern Theater Navy's destroyer and submarine flotillas, feature large-displacement combatants for . The fleet includes the Type 055 Renhai-class cruisers (up to 112 vertical launch system cells each, with 8 commissioned by 2022), over 30 Luyang III destroyers, 22 frigates, and the carrier, which conducted multiple deployments in 2023. Amphibious capabilities are bolstered by 3-4 Yushen-class ships and Z-20F anti-submarine helicopters, with the Type 076 LHA under development incorporating electromagnetic catapults for unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Hypersonic missiles have been tested from Type 055 platforms, enhancing . Missile forces, drawn from 11 PLARF brigades, provide the ETC's standoff strike backbone, with systems like hypersonic glide vehicle-armed medium-range ballistic missiles (fielded since 2020), anti-ship variants, and CJ-10 ground-launched cruise missiles (>1,500 km range). The inventory supports precision targeting of fixed infrastructure, with over 900 short- and medium-range ballistic missiles allocated for regional contingencies. Underground facilities protect launchers, while integration with space-based ISR improves accuracy against mobile targets like ships. These assets underpin the command's ability to conduct joint firepower strikes and deter intervention.
Missile TypeRange (km)Key FeaturesETC Role
(HGV)~1,000-2,500 for evading defensesPrecision strikes on high-value targets
~1,000-3,000 variantMaritime denial
CJ-10>1,500Ground-launched Land-attack operations

Joint Operations and Training Exercises

The Eastern Theater Command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) emphasizes joint operations through multi-service training exercises that integrate ground, naval, air, and rocket forces to simulate conflict scenarios in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding areas. These drills focus on enhancing interoperability, real-time command and control, and capabilities such as blockading key ports, establishing sea and air superiority, precision strikes, and amphibious assaults. Such exercises have demonstrated improvements in joint fire support, with air force units providing advisory roles to ground forces for integrated air defense training. Prominent examples include the "Joint Sword" series, which tests blockade and seizure operations. The Joint Sword-2024A exercise, conducted May 23–24, 2024, involved coordinated actions by army, navy, air force, and rocket force units to practice port quarantines, regional dominance, maritime assaults, and ground strikes around . Similarly, Joint Sword-2024B on October 14, 2024, emphasized quarantining Taiwan's key ports and achieving comprehensive superiority through joint operations. These drills incorporate live-fire elements and resource-sharing across branches, such as joint air training in the observed in early 2025. In 2025, the command executed further joint exercises, including Strait Thunder-2025A on April 1–2, which featured sea-air patrols, precision strikes on key targets, and control seizure maneuvers as part of a routine large-scale training regimen. Additional drills on April 1–2, 2025, wrapped up tasks in joint superiority establishment and assaults on maritime and ground objectives, signaling a shift toward more frequent operations—nearly monthly by mid-decade—to refine . Analyses from U.S. military assessments indicate these activities reveal phased for potential Taiwan contingencies, including initial blockades followed by escalated strikes.

Leadership and Internal Dynamics

Commanders

The Eastern Theater Command was established on February 1, 2016, as part of the People's Liberation Army's reorganization into joint theater commands, with General Yuejun appointed as its inaugural commander. , previously commander of the Military Region, oversaw the initial integration of ground, naval, air, and rocket forces under a unified joint structure focused on the and regions. In December 2019, General succeeded Liu as commander, bringing experience from leading the 31st Group Army and emphasizing joint operations training amid heightened tensions over . , promoted to full general in 2019, served until January 2022, during which period the command conducted large-scale exercises simulating blockades and amphibious operations. His tenure aligned with Xi Jinping's push for military modernization, though subsequent investigations revealed systemic corruption issues within the PLA. General Lin Xiangyang assumed command in January 2022, having previously served as deputy commander and commander of the . Lin, a general from Province with roots in the 31st Group Army, directed intensified "gray-zone" activities, including frequent air and naval incursions into Taiwan's , peaking at over 1,700 sorties in 2022 alone. On October 17, 2025, Lin was expelled from the and removed from office on corruption charges as part of a broader targeting nine senior PLA officials, including those linked to equipment procurement scandals. No successor has been publicly announced as of October 27, 2025, leaving the command under interim leadership amid ongoing investigations into loyalty and graft within Xi's military inner circle.

Political Commissars

In the People's Liberation Army (PLA), political commissars at the theater command level direct political work, including ideological training, party organization, and enforcement of loyalty to the (CCP), operating in a dual-leadership system alongside the commander to prioritize political reliability over purely operational concerns. For the , established in 2016 with primary responsibility for operations toward , the political commissar plays a heightened role in fostering resolve for potential conflict scenarios, such as unification campaigns, through propaganda emphasizing "resolute struggle" against perceived separatist forces. This function underscores the CCP's absolute control over the military, as articulated in official directives from the Central Military Commission (CMC). General Zheng Weiping served as the inaugural of the Eastern Theater Command upon its formation on February 1, 2016, overseeing initial integration of legacy regional commands into the joint theater structure. He was replaced in 2017 by Lieutenant General He Ping, who assumed the role amid efforts to strengthen political oversight in the command's sensitive operational domain facing the . He Ping, promoted to full general on December 13, 2019, continued to emphasize political education tailored to the theater's strategic priorities, including exercises simulating blockades and amphibious operations. The position's influence extends to vetting personnel for ideological purity and coordinating with the CMC's Political Work Department, which has intensified anti-corruption and loyalty campaigns under since 2012, resulting in over 100 senior PLA expulsions by 2025, though no public actions have targeted the Eastern Theater's political commissar directly as of October 2025. This opacity reflects the PLA's limited transparency on internal , with official announcements often delayed or absent for political roles compared to operational commands. Recent theater-level purges, such as the 2025 expulsion of former Eastern Theater commander Lin Xiangyang for , highlight systemic efforts to align the command with CCP directives, indirectly reinforcing the commissar's authority in maintaining discipline.

Recent Purges and Implications

In October 2025, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) expelled nine senior People's Liberation Army (PLA) generals from its ranks as part of an intensified anti-corruption campaign, with several having direct ties to the Eastern Theater Command. Among them was General Lin Xiangyang, who had served as commander of the Eastern Theater Command until his reassignment in late 2022, overseeing operations focused on the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea. Investigations by the Central Military Commission's Discipline Inspection Commission cited violations including "serious breaches of political discipline, organizational discipline, integrity discipline, mass discipline, work discipline, and life discipline," alongside allegations of bribery and personnel mismanagement. Seven of the expelled officers had previously held positions within the Eastern Theater Command, including roles in its ground forces and deputy commands, highlighting a concentration of scrutiny on this theater's leadership cadre. These actions build on prior investigations within the command, such as the 2023 probes into procurement and elements integrated into Eastern Theater operations, which exposed systemic graft in arms deals and promotions. Lin Xiangyang's downfall, linked to his tenure in the 31st Group Army—a key Eastern Theater contributor—underscores patterns of , where rapid promotions under prior administrations allegedly involved selling ranks and favors. Official announcements from the Ministry of National Defense framed the expulsions as essential for purifying the 's political loyalty, with PLA media emphasizing that combating is prerequisite for wartime effectiveness. Independent analyses, however, attribute the scale to CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping's efforts to eliminate entrenched networks from pre-2012 leadership eras, potentially rooted in equipment scandals that compromised missile and naval assets critical to the theater's anti-access/area-denial strategy. The implications for the Eastern Theater Command are profound, particularly given its mandate for potential contingencies involving . The purge has dismantled significant portions of the command's senior chain, including former deputies like Wang Xiubin, disrupting continuity in joint operations planning and training regimens simulated for amphibious assaults and air superiority over the . This risks eroding operational readiness, as repeated high-level turnover—coupled with earlier Rocket Force purges affecting theater-integrated units—may foster hesitation among subordinates wary of scrutiny, thereby undermining the command's ability to execute gray-zone coercion or escalation dominance. While Xi's campaign aims to enforce absolute loyalty and rectify corruption that could sabotage modernization (e.g., falsified procurement inflating costs for J-20 fighters and Type 055 destroyers), it signals persistent institutional frailties: empirical evidence from past purges shows graft has historically inflated PLA capabilities on paper while hollowing out actual combat proficiency through diverted funds and politicized appointments. Externally, observers note that such instability could deter aggressive posturing toward in the near term, affording breathing room to U.S. and allied deterrence efforts, though it may accelerate Xi's push for ideologically aligned replacements to tighten centralized control.

Controversies and International Perspectives

Military Exercises and Gray-Zone Tactics

The Eastern Theater Command of the (PLA) organizes joint military exercises focused on the and surrounding areas, integrating army, navy, air force, and rocket force elements to simulate , amphibious , and precision strike scenarios. These drills emphasize multi-domain coordination and long-range fire capabilities, often announced via official PLA channels as routine training to enhance . For instance, on April 1, 2025, the command initiated the "Strait Thunder-2025A" exercise in the central and southern waters of the , involving integrated joint operations and concluding after two days with vows to sustain high-alert patrols. As part of this operation, ground force units executed long-range live-fire drills in the on April 2, 2025, targeting simulated maritime threats with systems. Earlier exercises under the command's purview, such as the Joint Sword series, have scaled up in intensity following political events in . In May 2024, following the inauguration of 's President , the PLA deployed 111 aircraft and 46 naval vessels around , with 82 aircraft crossing the median line of the strait, testing encirclement and seizure of key maritime zones. The April 2024 Joint Sword drill, spanning three days, similarly involved Eastern Theater Command assets in live-fire and simulations east and south of . These operations frequently incorporate naval flotillas conducting formation maneuvers and live-fire training, as seen in an August 2025 destroyer flotilla exercise in the emphasizing anti-surface and air defense tactics. Complementing large-scale exercises, the Eastern Theater Command employs gray-zone tactics, defined as coercive actions below the threshold of armed conflict, to normalize PLA presence and erode Taiwan's response capacity. Primary among these are routine incursions into Taiwan's (ADIZ) by PLAAF aircraft from the command's Eastern Theater Air Force, with violations surging to unprecedented levels in 2024, including frequent median line crossings documented by U.S. assessments. By August 2025, single-day incursions exceeded 80 aircraft, demonstrating sustained operational tempo and integration with naval patrols to simulate without direct engagement. Such tactics, often unannounced and persistent, aim to desensitize defenses and assert control over contested airspace, as analyzed in PLA doctrinal shifts toward "symbolic encirclement" blending daily operations with exercise spikes. The U.S. Department of Defense reports these activities as part of broader Eastern Theater Command force laydown, involving centerline violations to probe reactions and build proficiency in sub-threshold coercion.

Criticisms of Aggression and Responses from Taiwan, US, and Allies

The (PLA) Eastern Theater Command has faced international criticism for conducting large-scale military exercises around , interpreted as rehearsals for or scenarios that heighten cross-strait tensions. In April 2025, the command executed two days of joint drills involving , air, ground, and rocket forces, encircling and practicing multi-domain strikes, which U.S. officials described as a direct threat to regional stability and an escalation of Beijing's coercive tactics. 's Presidential Office condemned these activities as "provocative" and disruptive to shipping and air traffic, arguing they undermine peace in the rather than serving defensive purposes. Analysts from defense think tanks have noted that such operations, including simulated joint fire strikes, reveal operational planning for potential campaigns, prioritizing intimidation over de-escalation. Taiwan has responded to these perceived aggressions by enhancing its defensive posture and conducting counter-exercises. The 2025 Han Kuang drills, held in July, emphasized "all-out defense" scenarios, incorporating tactics, drone procurement, and civil-military integration to counter PLA encirclement threats, with investments exceeding prior years in domestic production. Taiwanese authorities have tracked PLA activities daily, issuing warnings about incursions into air defense identification zones—over 1,700 aircraft detections in 2024 alone—and maintaining vigilance without confirming further escalatory drills. The has consistently opposed Eastern Theater Command exercises, viewing them as destabilizing unilateral actions that risk miscalculation. In April 2025, the U.S. State Department reaffirmed its commitment to stability, explicitly warning against any changes to the status quo by force and highlighting the drills' role in eroding deterrence. American responses include bolstering alliances and urging restraint, with assessments framing the exercises as tests of U.S. resolve amid Beijing's gray-zone coercion. Allied nations, including and , have echoed concerns over the command's activities as broader threats to security. has classified PLA drills near as risks to its own territorial integrity, prompting enhanced U.S.-Japan military coordination and contingency planning. , through frameworks, has engaged in discussions on potential roles in scenarios, emphasizing coordinated deterrence against missile and air threats while prioritizing regional basing and intelligence sharing. These responses underscore a push for , though operational limits in allied support remain debated amid China's sustained strategy projected through 2025.

References

  1. https://orcasia.org/theater-commands-of-china
  2. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/TheaterCommands/index.html
  3. https://project2049.net/2018/08/13/the-peoples-liberation-army-theater-command-leadership-the-eastern-theater-command/
  4. http://newyork.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/xw/201602/t20160202_4715284.htm
  5. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/969668/what-do-chinas-military-reforms-mean-for-taiwan/
  6. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2023/Active-Defense/
  7. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16345116.html
  8. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2022-08/26/content_4919731.htm
  9. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1747574/coming-to-a-new-theater-near-you-command-control-and-forces/
  10. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16310861.html
  11. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/793267/chinas-goldwater-nichols-assessing-pla-organizational-reforms/
  12. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2016/09/pla-reforms-and-their-ramifications.html
  13. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/nanjing-mr.htm
  14. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/AD1030342.pdf
  15. https://www.usmcu.edu/Outreach/Marine-Corps-University-Press/China-Military-Studies-Review/CMSR-2025-Adapting-to-Future-Wars/
  16. https://www.orfonline.org/research/mapping-the-recent-trends-in-china-s-military-modernisation-2025
  17. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/4157257/a-new-step-in-chinas-military-reform/
  18. https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/04/the-plas-strait-thunder-exercise/
  19. https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/recent-pla-exercises-revealed-chinas-operational-plan-for-a-taiwan-strait-conflict/
  20. https://jamestown.org/program/new-documentary-promotes-pla-development/
  21. https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-24-2025/
  22. https://bharatshakti.in/targeting-taiwan-xi-rejigs-eastern-theatre-and-nuclear-command-leadership/
  23. https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot-chinas-eastern-theater-command/
  24. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3144921/chinas-military-structure-what-are-theatre-commands-and-service
  25. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/the-transformation-of-the-chinese-peoples-liberation-army-into-a-world-class-military
  26. https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2025/05/08/1888a601/tradoc-g2-how-china-fights-in-lsco-apr-25-public.pdf
  27. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF
  28. https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/china-concludes-its-largest-military-drills-near-taiwan/
  29. https://mickryan.substack.com/p/chinas-lighting-operation-around
  30. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plaaf-tc-east.htm
  31. https://mapcarta.com/W363607514
  32. https://www.marefa.org/%25D9%2582%25D9%258A%25D8%25A7%25D8%25AF%25D8%25A9_%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D9%2585%25D8%25B3%25D8%25B1%25D8%25AD_%25D8%25A7%25D9%2584%25D8%25B4%25D8%25B1%25D9%2582%25D9%258A
  33. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/tc-east.htm
  34. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/ga.htm
  35. https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF
  36. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=cmsi-maritime-reports
  37. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Toolkit%20presentations/1%20CASI%20Commanders%20Toolkit-%20PLAAF.pdf
  38. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plaaf-org-2016.htm
  39. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/China-Reader-Special-Edition-September-2021/Mihal-PLA-Rocket-Force/
  40. https://jamestown.org/program/integrating-the-pla-rocket-force-into-conventional-theater-operations/
  41. https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/web_peoples_liberation_army_rocket_force_order_of_battle_07102023.pdf
  42. https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/chinese-military-exercises-highlight-improvements-in-joint-operations/
  43. https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/10/chinas-military-exercises-around-taiwan-trends-and-patterns/
  44. https://jamestown.org/program/joint-sword-2024b-quarantining-key-ports-and-seizing-comprehensive-superiority/
  45. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3297633/taiwan-strait-chinese-military-branches-share-resources-joint-air-training
  46. https://jamestown.org/program/strait-thunder-2025a-drill-implies-future-increase-in-pla-pressure-on-taiwan/
  47. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202504/1331408.shtml
  48. https://jamestown.org/program/cronyism-and-failed-promotions-xis-pla-purge/
  49. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-23/china-military-purge-targets-group-who-undermined-xi-s-authority
  50. https://jamestown.org/program/assessment-of-pla-leaders-at-the-end-of-2024/
  51. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16416111.html
  52. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cwy7528ekzro
  53. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/18/china-expels-top-military-commanders-in-latest-anticorruption-purge
  54. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/17/world/asia/china-military-general-he-corruption.html
  55. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/index_5.html
  56. http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/topnews/2019-12/13/content_75508633.htm
  57. http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2025xb/H_251454/L_251456/16416109.html
  58. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-expels-two-top-generals-communist-party-anti-corruption-purge-2025-10-17/
  59. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/chinese-communist-party-implements-purge-surge/
  60. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3330257/win-wars-pla-must-fight-corruption-chinas-military-mouthpiece-declares
  61. https://behorizon.org/power-purges-and-the-pla-xi-jinpings-campaign-to-command-the-gun/
  62. https://www.intelligenceonline.com/government-intelligence/2025/09/04/pla-purges-hamper-beijing-s-strategy-on-taiwan%2C110517671-art
  63. https://pamirllc.com/blog/friday-nights-are-for-bad-news
  64. https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/glimpses-of-a-power-struggle-within-the-chinese-military-high-command/
  65. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16378460.html
  66. http://english.news.cn/20250402/23996b346b9440aa8ff9f47e512db7a7/c.html
  67. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202504/02/WS67eca2cca3104d9fd381d369.html
  68. https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/10/breaking-the-barrier-four-years-of-prc-military-activity-around-taiwan/
  69. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/Videos/16403010.html
  70. https://jamestown.org/program/military-implications-of-pla-aircraft-incursions-in-taiwans-airspace-2024/
  71. https://www.taiwanplus.com/news/taiwan-news/military/250811008/analysis-surge-in-chinas-adiz-incursions-show-pla-air-forces-capacity
  72. https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/04/operationalizing-symbolic-encirclement-a-comparison-of-pla-exercises-following-recent-high-profile-visits/
  73. https://news.usni.org/2025/04/02/chinese-military-wraps-intimidation-drills-off-taiwan
  74. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/us-slams-chinas-military-drills-near-taiwan-as-threat-to-regional-stability/
  75. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2025/04/02/2003834467
  76. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/04/03/signaling-displeasure-with-washington-china-conducts-military-exercises-around-taiwan/
  77. https://globaltaiwan.org/2025/08/2025-han-kuang-exercise/
  78. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-tracking-china-activity-cannot-say-if-there-will-be-more-drills-post-2025-10-03/
  79. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/4176900/less-politics-more-military-the-outlook-for-chinas-2025-military-incursions-int/
  80. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/us-opposes-china-s-military-exercises-around-taiwan-warns-against-destabilizing-behavior-/3525754
  81. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/china-is-carrying-out-dress-rehearsals-to-take-taiwan-heres-how-the-us-should-respond/
  82. https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/aug/06/china-halts-cooperation-with-us-on-climate-and-military-issues-after-sending-missiles-over-taiwan-live-news
  83. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/pentagon-presses-japan-australia-role-possible-taiwan-conflict
  84. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/11/more-than-the-sum-of-its-parts-developing-a-coordinated-us-australian-response-to-potential-chinese-aggression?lang=en
  85. https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-and-national-security-analysis/china-likely-to-continue-to-prioritise-intimidation-against-taiwan-in-the-next-six-to-12-months
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.