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Corruption
Corruption
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A map depicting the Corruption Perceptions Index in the world in 2023; a higher score indicates lower levels of corruption.
  100 – 90
  89 – 80
  79 – 70
  69 – 60
  59 – 50
  49 – 40
  39 – 30
  29 – 20
  19 – 10
  9 – 0
  No data

Corruption is a form of dishonesty or a criminal offense that is undertaken by a person or an organization that is entrusted in a position of authority to acquire illicit benefits or abuse power for one's gain. Corruption may involve activities like bribery, influence peddling, embezzlement, and fraud as well as practices that are legal in many countries, such as lobbying.[1] Political corruption occurs when an office-holder or other governmental employee acts in an official capacity for personal gain.

Historically, "corruption" had a broader meaning concerned with an activity's impact on morals and societal well-being: for example, the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates was condemned to death in part for "corrupting the young".[2]

Contemporary corruption is perceived as most common in kleptocracies, oligarchies, narco-states, authoritarian states, and mafia states,[citation needed] however, more recent research and policy statements acknowledge that it also exists in wealthy capitalist economies. In How Corrupt is Britain, David Whyte reveals that corruption exists "across a wide range of venerated institutions" in the UK,[3] ranked as one of the least corrupt countries by the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). In a 2022 speech on "Modern Corruption", USAID Administrator Samantha Power stated: "Corruption is no longer just about individual autocrats pilfering their nation's wealth to live large",[4] but also involves sophisticated transnational networks, including financial institutions hidden in secrecy. Responding to Whyte's book, George Monbiot criticized the CPI for its narrow definition of corruption that surveys mostly only Western executives about bribery.[5] Similarly, others point out that "global metrics systematically under-measure 'corruption of the rich' - which tends to be legalized, institutionalized, and ambiguously unethical - as opposed to 'corruption of the poor'".[6]

Corruption and crime are endemic sociological occurrences that appear regularly in virtually all countries on a global scale in varying degrees and proportions. Recent data suggests corruption is on the rise.[7] Each nation allocates domestic resources for the control and regulation of corruption and the deterrence of crime. Strategies undertaken to counter corruption are often summarized under the umbrella term anti-corruption.[8] Additionally, global initiatives like the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 16 also have a targeted goal which is supposed to reduce corruption in all of its forms substantially.[9] Recent initiatives like the Tax Justice Network go beyond bribery and theft and bring attention to tax abuses.[10]

Definitions and scales

[edit]
A billboard in Zambia exhorting the public to "Just say no to corruption"

Stephen D. Morris,[11] a professor of politics, wrote that political corruption is the illegitimate use of public power to benefit a private interest. Economist Ian Senior defined corruption as an action to secretly provide a good or a service to a third party to influence certain actions which benefit the corrupt, a third party, or both in which the corrupt agent has authority.[12] World Bank economist Daniel Kaufmann[13] extended the concept to include "legal corruption" in which power is abused within the confines of the law—as those with power often have the ability to make laws for their protection. The effect of corruption in infrastructure is to increase costs and construction time, lower the quality and decrease the benefit.[14]

Corruption is a complex phenomenon and can occur on different scales.[15] Corruption ranges from small favors between a small number of people (petty corruption),[16] to corruption that affects the government on a large scale (grand corruption), and corruption that is so prevalent that it is part of the everyday structure of society, including corruption as one of the symptoms of organized crime (systemic corruption). "Corruption of the rich" is particularly hard to measure and largely excluded from conventional metrics like the CPI.[17]

A number of indicators and tools have been developed which can measure different forms of corruption with increasing accuracy;[18][19] but when those are impractical, one study suggests looking at bodyfat as a rough guide after finding that obesity of cabinet ministers in post-Soviet states was highly correlated with more accurate measures of corruption.[20][21]

Petty theft, grand theft, speed money, access money

[edit]

Political economist Yuen Yuen Ang "unbundles corruption" into four types, encompassing both petty and grand corruption as well as legal and illegal versions: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, access money.[22] According to her definition, speed money "means petty bribes that businesses or citizens pay to bureaucrats to get around hurdles or speed things up." This is the kind of corruption associated with the "efficient grease hypothesis," which economists found burdensome to businesses in practice.[23] Ang defines access money as "high-stakes rewards extended by business actors to powerful officials, not just for speed, but to access exclusive, valuable privileges."[24] Most theories about bribery focus on speed money, but neglects access money. "From a businessperson's point of view, access money is less a tax than an investment... making it more sludge than grease."[25] The Unbundled Corruption Index measures the prevalence of these four types of corruption.

Whereas corruption with theft and speed money is endemic in poor countries, access money can be found in both poor and rich countries.[26]

Petty corruption

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Petty corruption occurs at a smaller scale and takes place at the implementation end of public services when public officials meet the public. For example, in many small places such as registration offices, police stations, state licensing boards,[27][28] and many other private and government sectors.

Grand corruption

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Grand corruption is defined as corruption occurring at the highest levels of government in a way that requires significant subversion of the political, legal and economic systems. Such corruption is commonly found in countries with authoritarian or dictatorial governments but also in those without adequate policing of corruption.[29]

The government system in many countries is divided into the legislative, executive and judicial branches in an attempt to provide independent services that are less subject to grand corruption due to their independence from one another.[30]

Systemic corruption

[edit]

Systemic corruption (or endemic corruption)[31] is corruption which is primarily due to the weaknesses of an organization or process. It can be contrasted with individual officials or agents who act corruptly within the system.

Factors which encourage systemic corruption include conflicting incentives, discretionary powers; monopolistic powers; lack of transparency; low pay; and a culture of impunity.[32] Specific acts of corruption include "bribery, extortion, and embezzlement" in a system where "corruption becomes the rule rather than the exception."[33] Scholars distinguish between centralized and decentralized systemic corruption, depending on which level of state or government corruption takes place; in countries such as the post-Soviet states both types occur.[34] Some scholars argue that there is a negative duty[clarification needed] of western governments to protect against systematic corruption of underdeveloped governments.[35][36]

Corruption has been a major issue in China, where society depends heavily on personal relationships. By the late 20th century that combined with the new lust for wealth, produced escalating corruption. Historian Keith Schoppa says that bribery was only one of the tools of Chinese corruption, which also included, "embezzlement, nepotism, smuggling, extortion, cronyism, kickbacks, deception, fraud, squandering of public money, illegal business transactions, stock manipulation and real estate fraud." Given the repeated anti-corruption campaigns it was a prudent precaution to move as much of the fraudulent money as possible overseas.[37]

In Latin American countries, corruption is permitted as a result of the cultural norms of the institution. In countries like the United States, there is a relatively strong sense of trust among strangers, one that is not found in Latin American countries. In Latin American countries, this trust does not exist, whereas the social norms imply that no stranger is responsible for the wellbeing or happiness of another stranger. Instead, the trust is found in acquaintances. Acquaintances are treated with trust and respect—a level of trust that is not found among acquaintances in countries like the United States. This is what permits for corruption in Latin American countries. If there is a strong enough trust within an administration that no one will betray the rest, corruptive policies will take place with ease.[38]

State-business collusion

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While not necessarily involving bribery, recent research documents the emergence of "a particular kind of large, non-state business group" that is akin to a mafia system in China.[39] In this situation, the boundary between public and private actors blurs.

Causes

[edit]

Per R. Klitgaard[40] corruption will occur if the corrupt gain is greater than the punitive damages multiplied by the likelihood of being caught and prosecuted.

Since a high degree of monopoly and discretion accompanied by a low degree of transparency does not automatically lead to corruption, a fourth variable of "morality" or "integrity" has been introduced by others. The moral dimension has an intrinsic component and refers to a "mentality problem", and an extrinsic component referring to circumstances like poverty, inadequate remuneration, inappropriate work conditions and inoperable or over-complicated procedures which demoralize people and let them search for "alternative" solutions.

According to a 2017 survey study, the following factors have been attributed as causes of corruption:[41]

  • Higher levels of market and political monopolization
  • Low levels of democracy, weak civil participation and low political transparency
  • Higher levels of bureaucracy and inefficient administrative structures
  • Low press freedom
  • Low economic freedom
  • Large ethnic divisions and high levels of in-group favoritism
  • Gender inequality
  • Poverty
  • Political instability
  • Weak property rights
  • Contagion from corrupt neighboring countries
  • Low levels of education
  • Lack of commitment to society
  • Unemployment
  • Lack of proper policies against corruption

It has been noted that in a comparison of the most corrupt with the least corrupt countries, the former group contains nations with huge socio-economic inequalities, and the latter contains nations with a high degree of social and economic justice.[42] While petty, grand, and systemic corruption, described above, are largely found in poor countries with weak institutions, a newer literature has turned to money politics in wealthy democracies and extreme global inequalities. Simon Weschle at Syracuse University examines the prevalence of campaign finance and its consequences for democracy.[43] Kristin Surak at the London School of Economics explores the controversial practice of millionaires buying "golden passports" with no intention of actually migrating. In her words, "a full-blown citizenship industry that thrives on global inequalities" has arisen."[44] Much of existing literature focuses on explicit corrupt actions like bribery and embezzlement, endemic in poor countries (see below). For "money in politics," the causes are very different and largely ignored in conventional literature. For example, the UK is a developed economy with a robust democracy, and yet London is a hub for money laundering.[45] In a critique of the failures and politics leading up to the US financial crisis, a Stanford financial economist noted, "In the real world, it turned out, important economic outcomes are often the consequences of political forces. During 2010, people within regulatory bodies told me privately that false and misleading claims were affecting key policy decisions... I saw confusion, willful blindness, political forces, various and sometimes subtle forms of corruption, and moral disengagement, first hand."[46]

Social norms have been posited as an explanation for why some environments are corrupt and others are not.[47]

Contemporary corruption in Africa has been linked by a book to the historical systematic use of material incentives by colonisers to compel local African rulers to collaborate. For all developing countries, the degree of European settlement in the colonial era correlates with levels of contemporary corruption.[48]: 17 

Within less democratic countries, the presence of resources such as diamonds, gold, oil, and forestry and other extractable resources tends to increase the prevalence of corruption, also called the resource curse. The presence of fuel extraction and export is unambiguously associated with corruption, whereas mineral exports only increased corruption in poorer countries. In wealthier countries, mineral exports such as gold and diamonds are actually associated with reduced corruption.[49]

While democratization in countries with below average democracy levels was found correlated with some increase in corruption, in countries with above average democracy indices further democratization tends to reduce corruption.[50] A study found the increase in corruption at low democracy levels associated with unfair elections and limited freedom of speech and freedom of association.[50]

By sector

[edit]

Corruption can occur in many sectors, whether they be public or private industry or even NGOs (especially in public sector). However, only in democratically controlled institutions is there an interest of the public (owner) to develop internal mechanisms to fight active or passive corruption, whereas in private industry as well as in NGOs there is no public control. Therefore, the owners' investors' or sponsors' profits are largely decisive.

Public sector

[edit]

Public corruption includes corruption of the political process and of government agencies such as tax collectors and the police, as well as corruption in processes of allocating public funds for contracts, grants, and hiring. Recent research by the World Bank suggests that who makes policy decisions (elected officials or bureaucrats) can be critical in determining the level of corruption because of the incentives different policy-makers face.[51]

Political

[edit]
A political cartoon from Harper's Weekly, 26 January 1878, depicting U.S. Secretary of the Interior Carl Schurz investigating the Indian Bureau at the U.S. Department of the Interior. The original caption for the cartoon is: "THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR INVESTIGATING THE INDIAN BUREAU. GIVE HIM HIS DUE, AND GIVE THEM THEIR DUES."

Political corruption is the abuse of public power, office, or resources by elected government officials for personal gain, by extortion, soliciting or offering bribes. It can also take the form of office holders maintaining themselves in office by purchasing votes by enacting laws which use taxpayers' money.[52] Evidence suggests that corruption can have political consequences- with citizens being asked for bribes becoming less likely to identify with their country or region.[53]

The political act of "graft" (American English), is a well known and now global form of political corruption, being the unscrupulous and illegal use of a politician's authority for personal gain, when funds intended for public projects are intentionally misdirected in order to maximize the benefits to illegally private interests of the corrupted individual(s) and their cronies. In some cases government institutions are "repurposed" or shifted away from their official mandate to serve other, often corrupt purposes.[54]

The Kaunas "Golden Toilet"

The Kaunas golden toilet case was a major Lithuanian scandal. In 2009, the municipality of Kaunas (led by mayor Andrius Kupčinskas) ordered that a shipping container was to be converted into an outdoor toilet at a cost of 500,000 litai (around 150,000 euros). It was to also require 5,000 litai (1,500 euros) in monthly maintenance costs.[55] At the same time when Kaunas's "Golden Toilet" was built, Kėdainiai tennis club acquired a very similar, but more advanced solution for 4,500 euros.[55] Because of the inflated cost of the outdoor toilet, it was nicknamed the "Golden Toilet". Despite the investment, the "Golden Toilet" remained closed for years due to the dysfunctionality and was a subject of a lengthy anti-corruption investigation into those who had created it and[55] the local municipality even considered demolishing the building at one point.[56] The group of public servants involved in the toilet's procurement received various prison sentences for recklessness, malfeasance, misuse of power and document falsifications in a 2012 court case, but were cleared of their corruption charges and received compensation, which pushed the total construction cost and subsequent related financial losses to 352,000 euros.

On 7 July 2020, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a global think tank, released a report claiming the Emirati city, Dubai, of being an enabler of global corruption, crime and illicit financial flows. It stated that the global corrupt and criminal actors either operated through or from Dubai. The city was also called a haven for trade-based money laundering, as it gives space to free trade zones, with minimal regulatory laws and customs enforcement.[57]

A report in September 2022 revealed that British Members of Parliament received a total of £828,211 over a period of eight years from countries of the Saudi-led coalition in the Yemeni Civil War. The money was granted in the form of all-expenses-paid trips to 96 MPs by Saudi Arabia (at least £319,406), Bahrain (£197,985), the United Arab Emirates (£187,251), Egypt (£66,695) and Kuwait (£56,872). MPs also received gifts, including a £500 food hamper, tickets for a Burns Supper, an expensive watch and a day out at the Royal Windsor Horse Show. The Saudi-led coalition was accused of attempting to buy influence in the UK. While the MPs registered the trips and gifts at Westminster as per the rules, critics called it "absolutely shameful" to accept donations from countries with poor human rights records.[58]

In 2022, four people were arrested for corruption in the European Parliament. This came to be known as the Qatar corruption scandal at the European Parliament. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said the allegations were "very serious" and called for the creation of a new ethics body to oversee the European Union.[59]

Judicial

[edit]

In the Renaissance fresco The Good and the Bad Judge (Monsaraz, Portugal), the Bad Judge, depicted as having two faces, is shown taking bribes: the nobleman to the right offers him gold coins from a purse, and the villein to the left gives him a pair of partridges.

Judicial corruption refers to the corruption-related misconduct of judges, through the receiving or giving of bribes, the improper sentencing of convicted criminals, judicial activism, bias in the hearing and judgement of arguments and other forms of misconduct. Judicial corruption can also be conducted by prosecutors and defense attorneys. An example of prosecutorial misconduct, occurs when a politician or a crime boss bribes a prosecutor to open investigations and file charges against an opposing politician or a rival crime boss, in order to hurt the competition.[60]

Governmental corruption of the judiciary is broadly known in many transitional and developing countries because the budget is almost completely controlled by the executive. The latter critically undermines the separation of powers, because it fosters financial dependence on the judiciary. The proper distribution of a nation's wealth, including its government's spending on the judiciary, is subject to constitutional economics.

The judiciary may be corrupted by acts of the government, such as through budget planning and various privileges, and by private acts.[61] Corruption in judiciary may also involve the government using its judicial arm to oppress opposition parties. Judicial corruption is difficult to completely eradicate, even in developed countries.[62]

Military

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Military corruption refers to the abuse of power by members in the armed forces, in order for career advancement or for personal gain by a soldier or soldiers. One form of military corruption in the United States Armed Forces is a military soldier being promoted in rank or being given better treatment than their colleagues by their officers due to their race, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, religious beliefs, social class or personal relationships with higher-ranking officers in spite of their merit.[63] In addition to that, the US military has also had many instances of officers sexually assaulting fellow officers and in many cases, there were allegations that many of the attacks were covered up and victims were coerced to remain silent by officers of the same rank or of higher rank.[64]

Another example of military corruption, is a military officer or officers using the power of their positions to commit activities that are illegal, such as skimming logistical supplies such as food, medicine, fuel, body armor or weapons to sell on the local black market.[65][66] There have also been instances of military officials, providing equipment and combat support to criminal syndicates, private military companies and terrorist groups, without approval from their superiors.[67] As a result, many countries have a military police force to ensure that the military officers follow the laws and conduct of their respective countries but sometimes the military police have levels of corruption themselves.[68]

Natural resources

[edit]

Corruption includes industrial corruption, consisting of large bribes, as well as petty corruption such as a poacher paying off a park ranger to ignore poaching. The international Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative seeks to create best practices for good governance of gas, oil, and minerals, particularly focusing on the state management of revenue from these resources. Any valued natural resource can be affected by corruption, including water for irrigation, land for livestock grazing, forests for hunting and logging, and fisheries.[49]

The presence or perception of corruption also undermines environmental initiatives. In Kenya, farmers blame poor agricultural productivity on corruption, and thus are less likely to undertake soil conservation measures to prevent soil erosion and loss of nutrients. In Benin, mistrust of government due to perceived corruption led small farmers to reject the adaptation of measures to combat climate change.[49]

Police

[edit]
A 1902 cartoon depicts a police officer whose eyes are covered with a cloth labelled "bribes".

Police corruption is a specific form of police misconduct designed to obtain financial benefits, personal gain, career advancement for a police officer or officers in exchange for not pursuing or selectively pursuing an investigation or arrest or aspects of the "thin blue line" itself where force members collude in lies to protect their precincts, unions and/or other law enforcement members from accountability. One common form of police corruption is soliciting or accepting bribes in exchange for not reporting organized drug or prostitution rings or other illegal activities. When civilians become witnesses to police brutality, officers are often known to respond by harassing and intimidating the witnesses as retribution for reporting the misconduct.[69] Whistleblowing is not common in law enforcement in part because officers who do so normally face reprisal by being fired, being forced to transfer to another department, being demoted, being shunned, losing friends, not being given back-up during emergencies, receiving professional or even physical threats as well as having threats be made against friends or relatives of theirs or having their own misconduct exposed.[70] In America another common form of police corruption is when white supremacist groups, such as Neo-Nazi Skinheads or Neo-Confederates (such as the Ku Klux Klan), recruit members of law enforcement into their ranks or encourage their members to join local police departments to repress minorities and covertly promote white supremacy.[71]

Another example is police officers flouting the police code of conduct in order to secure convictions of suspects—for example, through the use of surveillance abuse, false confessions, police perjury and/or falsified evidence. Police officers have also been known to sell forms of contraband that were taken during seizures (such as confiscated drugs, stolen property or weapons).[72] Corruption and misconduct can also be done by prison officers, such as the smuggling of contraband (such as drugs or electronics) into jails and prisons for inmates or the abuse of prisoners.[73][74] Another form of misconduct is probation officers taking bribes in exchange for allowing parolees to violate the terms of their probation or abusing their paroles.[75] More rarely, police officers may deliberately and systematically participate in organized crime themselves, either while on the job or during off hours. In most major cities, there are internal affairs sections to investigate suspected police corruption or misconduct. Similar entities include the British Independent Police Complaints Commission.

Private sector

[edit]

Private sector corruption occurs when any institution, entity or person that is not controlled by the public sector company, household and institution that is not controlled by the public sector engages in corrupt acts. Private sector corruption may overlap with public sector corruption, for example when a private entity operates in conjunction with corrupt government officials, or where the government involves itself in activity normally performed by private entities.

[edit]

Corruption facilitated by lawyers is a well known form of judicial misconduct. Such abuse is called Attorney misconduct. Attorney misconduct can be either conducted by individuals acting on their own accord or by entire law firms. A well known example of such corruption are mob lawyers. Mob lawyers are attorneys who seek to protect the leaders of criminal enterprises as well as their criminal organizations, with the use of unethical and/or illegal conduct such as making false or misleading statements, hiding evidence from prosecutors, failing to disclose all relevant facts about the case, or even giving clients advice on how to commit crimes in ways that would make prosecution more difficult for any investigating authorities.[76]

Corporate

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In criminology, corporate crime refers to crimes committed either by a corporation (i.e., a business entity having a separate legal personality from the natural persons that manage its activities), or by individuals acting on behalf of a corporation or other business entity (see vicarious liability and corporate liability). Some negative behaviours by corporations may not be criminal; laws vary between jurisdictions. For example, some jurisdictions allow insider trading.

Education

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Corruption in education is a worldwide phenomenon. Corruption in admissions to universities is traditionally considered one of the most corrupt areas of the education sector.[77] Recent attempts in some countries, such as Russia and Ukraine, to curb corruption in admissions through the abolition of university entrance examinations and introduction of standardized computer-graded tests have met backlash from part of society,[78] while others appreciate the changes. Vouchers for university entrants have never materialized.[79] The cost of corruption is that it impedes sustainable economic growth.[79]

Endemic corruption in educational institutions leads to the formation of sustainable corrupt hierarchies.[80][81][82] While higher education in Russia is distinct with widespread bribery, corruption in the US and the UK features a significant amount of fraud.[83][84] The US is distinct with grey areas and institutional corruption in the higher education sector.[85][86] Authoritarian regimes, including those in former Soviet republics, encourage educational corruption and control universities, especially during the election campaigns.[87] This is typical for Russia,[88] Ukraine,[89] and Central Asian regimes,[90] among others. The general public is well aware of the high level of corruption in colleges and universities, including thanks to the media.[91][92] Doctoral education is no exception, with dissertations and doctoral degrees available for sale, including for politicians.[93] Russian Parliament is notorious for "highly educated" MPs[94] High levels of corruption are a result of universities not being able to break away from their Stalinist past, over bureaucratization,[95] and a clear lack of university autonomy.[96] Both quantitative and qualitative methodologies are employed to study education corruption,[97] but the topic remains largely unattended by the scholars. In many societies and international organizations, education corruption remains a taboo. In some countries, such as certain eastern European countries, some Balkan countries and certain Asian countries, corruption occurs frequently in universities.[98] This can include bribes to bypass bureaucratic procedures and bribing faculty for a grade.[98][99] The willingness to engage in corruption such as accepting bribe money in exchange for grades decreases if individuals perceive such behavior as very objectionable, i.e. a violation of social norms and if they fear sanctions regarding the severity and probability of sanctions.[99]

Healthcare

[edit]

Corruption, the abuse of entrusted power for private gain as defined by Transparency International,[100] is systemic in the health sector. The characteristics of health systems with their concentrated supply of a service, high discretionary power of its members controlling the supply, and low accountability to others are the exact constellation of the variables described by Klitgaard on which corruption depends.[101]: 26 

Corruption in health care poses a significant danger to public welfare.[102] It is widespread, yet little has been published in medical journals about this topic. As of 2019, there is no evidence on what might reduce corruption in the health sector.[103] Corruption occurs within the private and public health sectors and may appear as theft, embezzlement, nepotism, bribery up until extortion, or undue influence.[104] It can occur anywhere within the sector, be it in service provision, purchasing, construction, and hiring. In 2019, Transparency International described the 6 most common ways of service corruption as follows: absenteeism, informal payments from patients, embezzlement, inflating services also the costs of services, favoritism, and manipulation of data (billing for goods and services that were never sent or done).[105]

Labor unions

[edit]

Labor unions leaders may be involved in corrupt action or be influenced or controlled by criminal enterprises.[106] For example, for many years the Teamsters were substantially controlled by the Mafia.[107]

Stock market corruption

[edit]

The Indian stock exchanges, Bombay Stock Exchange and National Stock Exchange of India, have been rocked by several high-profile corruption scandals.[108][109][110][111][112][113][114][115][116][117][118][119][120][121] At times, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has barred various individuals and entities from trading on the exchanges for stock manipulation, especially in illiquid small-cap and penny stocks.[122][123][124][125][126][127][128][129]

Arms trafficking

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"Arms for cash" can be done by either a state-sanctioned arms dealer, firm, or state itself to another party. It regards them as simply good business partners and not as political kindred or allies, thus making them no better than regular gun runners. Arms smugglers, who are already into arms trafficking, may work for them on the ground or with shipment. The money is often laundered and records are often destroyed.[130] It often breaks UN, national or international law.[130]

The Mitterrand–Pasqua affair, also known informally as Angolagate, was an international political scandal over the secret and illegal sale and shipment of arms from the nations of Central Europe to the government of Angola by the Government of France in the 1990s. It led to arrests and judiciary actions in the 2000s, involving an illegal arms sale to Angola despite a UN embargo, with business interests in France and elsewhere improperly obtaining a share of Angolan oil revenues. The scandal has subsequently been tied to several prominent figures in French politics.[131]

42 individuals, including Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, Jacques Attali, Charles Pasqua and Jean-Charles Marchiani, Pierre Falcone. Arcadi Gaydamak, Paul-Loup Sulitzer, Union for a Popular Movement deputy Georges Fenech, Philippe Courroye [fr] the son of François Mitterrand and a former French Minister of the Interior, were charged, accused, indicted or convicted with illegal arms trading, tax fraud, embezzlement, money laundering, and other crimes.[131][132][133]

Philosophy

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The 19th-century German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer acknowledged that academics, including philosophers, are subject to the same sources of corruption as the societies which they inhabit. He distinguished the corrupt "university" philosophers, whose "real concern is to earn with credit an honest livelihood for themselves and ... to enjoy a certain prestige in the eyes of the public"[134] from the genuine philosopher, whose sole motive is to discover and bear witness to the truth.

To be a philosopher, that is to say, a lover of wisdom (for wisdom is nothing but truth), it is not enough for a man to love truth, in so far as it is compatible with his own interest, with the will of his superiors, with the dogmas of the church, or with the prejudices and tastes of his contemporaries; so long as he rests content with this position, he is only a φίλαυτος [lover of self], not a φιλόσοφος [lover of wisdom]. For this title of honor is well and wisely conceived precisely by its stating that one should love the truth earnestly and with one's whole heart, and thus unconditionally and unreservedly, above all else, and, if need be, in defiance of all else. Now the reason for this is the one previously stated that the intellect has become free, and in this state, it does not even know or understand any other interest than that of truth.[135]

Religious organizations

[edit]

The history of religion includes numerous examples of religious leaders calling attention to the corruption which existed in the religious practices and institutions of their time. The Jewish prophets Isaiah and Amos berate the rabbinical establishment of Ancient Judea for failing to live up to the ideals of the Torah.[136] In the New Testament, Jesus accuses the rabbinical establishment of his time of hypocritically following only the ceremonial parts of the Torah and neglecting the more important elements of justice, mercy and faithfulness.[137] Corruption was one of the important issues which led to the Investiture Controversy. In 1517, Martin Luther accused the Catholic Church of widespread corruption, including the selling of indulgences.[138]

In 2015, Princeton University professor Kevin M. Kruse advances the thesis that business leaders in the 1930s and 1940s collaborated with clergymen, including James W. Fifield Jr., in order to develop and promote a new hermeneutical approach to Scripture which would de-emphasize the social Gospel and emphasize themes, such as individual salvation, which were more congenial to free enterprise.[139]

Business leaders, of course, had long been working to "merchandise" themselves through the appropriation of religion. In organizations such as Spiritual Mobilization, the prayer breakfast groups, and the Freedoms Foundation, they had linked capitalism and Christianity and, at the same time, they likened the welfare state to godless paganism.[140]

Methods

[edit]

In systemic corruption and grand corruption, multiple methods of corruption are used concurrently with similar aims.[141]

Bribery

[edit]
An election leaflet with money stapled to it

Bribery involves the improper use of gifts and favours in exchange for personal gain. This is also known as kickbacks or, in the Middle East, as baksheesh. It is a common form of corruption. The types of favors given are diverse and may include money, gifts, real estate, promotions, sexual favors, employee benefits, company shares, privileges, entertainment, employment and political benefits. The personal gain that is given can be anything from actively giving preferential treatment to having an indiscretion or crime overlooked.[142]

Bribery can sometimes form a part of the systemic use of corruption for other ends, for example to perpetrate further corruption. Bribery can make officials more susceptible to blackmail or to extortion.

Embezzlement, theft and fraud

[edit]

Embezzlement and theft involve someone with access to funds or assets illegally taking control of them. Fraud involves using deception to convince the owner of funds or assets to give them up to an unauthorized party.

Examples include the misdirection of company funds into "shadow companies" (and then into the pockets of corrupt employees), the skimming of foreign aid money, scams, electoral fraud and other corrupt activity.

Graft

[edit]

The political act of graft is when funds intended for public projects are intentionally misdirected to maximize the benefits to private interests of the corrupt individuals.

Extortion and blackmail

[edit]

While bribery is the use of positive inducements for corrupt aims, extortion and blackmail centre around the use of threats. This can be the threat of physical violence or false imprisonment as well as exposure of an individual's secrets or prior crimes.

This includes such behavior as an influential person threatening to go to the media if they do not receive speedy medical treatment (at the expense of other patients), threatening a public official with exposure of their secrets if they do not vote in a particular manner, or demanding money in exchange for continued secrecy. Another example can be a police officer being threatened with the loss of their job by their superiors, if they continued with investigating a high-ranking official.

Access money

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According to Ang, access money "encompasses high-stakes rewards extended by business actors to powerful officials, not just for speed, but to access exclusive, valuable privileges." Whereas bribery and extortion is always illegal and unethical, access money can encompass both illegal and legal actions, and it can involve only corrupt individuals or entire institutions where no person is individually liable for corruption. "Illegal forms of access money entail large bribes and kickbacks, but they can also include ambiguously or completely legal exchanges that omit cash bribes, for example, cultivating political connections, campaign finance, “revolving door” practices."[143]

Influence peddling

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Influence peddling is the illegal practice of using one's influence in government or connections with persons in authority to obtain favors or preferential treatment, usually in return for payment.

Networking

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Networking (both Business and Personal) can be an effective way for job-seekers to gain a competitive edge over others in the job-market. The idea is to cultivate personal relationships with prospective employers, selection panelists, and others, in the hope that these personal affections will influence future hiring decisions. This form of networking has been described as an attempt to corrupt formal hiring processes, where all candidates are given an equal opportunity to demonstrate their merits to selectors. The networker is accused of seeking non-meritocratic advantage over other candidates; advantage that is based on personal fondness rather than on any objective appraisal of which candidate is most qualified for the position.[144][145]

Euro bank notes hidden in sleeve

Abuse of discretion

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Abuse of discretion refers to the misuse of one's powers and decision-making facilities. Examples include a judge improperly dismissing a criminal case or a customs official using their discretion to allow a banned substance through a port.

Favoritism, nepotism and clientelism

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Favouritism, nepotism and clientelism involve the favouring of not the perpetrator of corruption but someone related to them, such as a friend, family member or member of an association. Examples would include hiring or promoting a family member or staff member to a role they are not qualified for, who belongs to the same political party as you, regardless of merit.[146]

State capture

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The term state capture was first used by the World Bank in 2000 to describe certain Central Asian countries making the transition from Soviet communism, where small corrupt groups used their influence over government officials to appropriate government decision-making in order to strengthen their own economic positions.[147] The original definition of state capture refers to the way formal procedures (such as laws and social norms) and government bureaucracy are manipulated by government officials, state-backed companies, private companies or private individuals, so as to influence state policies and laws in their favour.[148] State capture seeks to influence the formation of laws, in order to protect and promote influential actors and their interests. In this way it differs from most other forms of corruption which instead seek selective enforcement of already existing laws.[148]

State capture is not necessarily illegal, depending on determination by the captured state itself,[149] and may be attempted through lobbying and advocacy. The influence may be through a range of state institutions, including the legislature, executive, ministries, and the judiciary, or through a corrupt electoral process. It is similar to regulatory capture but differs in the scale and variety of influenced areas and, unlike regulatory capture, the private influence is never overt.[150]

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Though corruption is often viewed as illegal, a concept of "legal corruption" has been described by Daniel Kaufmann and Pedro Vicente.[13][151] It might be termed as processes which are corrupt, but are protected by a "legal" (that is, specifically permitted, or at least not proscribed by law) framework.[152]

Examples

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In 1994, the German Parliamentary Financial Commission in Bonn presented a comparative study on "legal corruption" in industrialized OECD countries[153] They reported that in most industrial countries foreign corruption was legal, and that their foreign corrupt practices ranged from simple, through governmental subsidization (tax deduction), up to extreme cases as in Germany, where foreign corruption was fostered, whereas domestic was legally prosecuted. The German Parliamentary Financial Commission rejected a Parliamentary Proposal by the opposition, which had been aiming to limit German foreign corruption on the basis of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA from 1977), thus fostering national export corporations.[154] In 1997 a corresponding OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was signed by its members.[155][156] It took until 1999, after the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention came into force, that Germany withdrew the legalization of foreign corruption.[157]

Foreign corrupt practices of industrialized OECD countries 1994 study

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A study on foreign corrupt practices of industrialized OECD countries 1994 (Parliamentary Financial Commission study, Bonn)[153] indicates widespread acceptance of bribes in business practices.

Belgium: bribe payments are generally tax deductible as business expenses if the name and address of the beneficiary is disclosed. Under the following conditions kickbacks in connection with exports abroad are permitted for deduction even without proof of the receiver:

  • Payments must be necessary in order to be able to survive against foreign competition
  • They must be common in the industry
  • A corresponding application must be made to the Treasury each year
  • Payments must be appropriate
  • The payer has to pay a lump-sum to the tax office to be fixed by the Finance Minister (at least 20% of the amount paid).

In the absence of the required conditions, for corporate taxable companies paying bribes without proof of the receiver, a special tax of 200% is charged. This special tax may, however, be abated along with the bribe amount as an operating expense.

Denmark: bribe payments are deductible when a clear operational context exists and its adequacy is maintained.

France: basically all operating expenses can be deducted. However, staff costs must correspond to an actual work done and must not be excessive compared to the operational significance. This also applies to payments to foreign parties. Here, the receiver shall specify the name and address, unless the total amount in payments per beneficiary does not exceed 500 FF. If the receiver is not disclosed the payments are considered "rémunérations occult" and are associated with the following disadvantages:

  • The business expense deduction (of the bribe money) is eliminated.
  • For corporations and other legal entities, a tax penalty of 100% of the "rémunérations occult" and 75% for voluntary post declaration is to be paid.
  • There may be a general fine of up 200 FF fixed per case.

Japan: in Japan, bribes are deductible as business expenses that are justified by the operation (of the company) if the name and address of the recipient is specified. This also applies to payments to foreigners. If the indication of the name is refused, the expenses claimed are not recognized as operating expenses.

Canada: there is no general rule on the deductibility or non-deductibility of kickbacks and bribes. Hence the rule is that necessary expenses for obtaining the income (contract) are deductible. Payments to members of the public service and domestic administration of justice, to officers and employees and those charged with the collection of fees, entrance fees etc. for the purpose to entice the recipient to the violation of his official duties, can not be abated as business expenses as well as illegal payments according to the Criminal Code.

Luxembourg: bribes, justified by the operation (of a company) are deductible as business expenses. However, the tax authorities may require that the payer is to designate the receiver by name. If not, the expenses are not recognized as operating expenses.

Netherlands: all expenses that are directly or closely related to the business are deductible. This also applies to expenditure outside the actual business operations if they are considered beneficial to the operation for good reasons by the management. What counts is the good merchant custom. Neither the law nor the administration is authorized to determine which expenses are not operationally justified and therefore not deductible. For the business expense deduction it is not a requirement that the recipient is specified. It is sufficient to elucidate to the satisfaction of the tax authorities that the payments are in the interest of the operation.

Austria: bribes justified by the operation (of a company) are deductible as business expenses. However, the tax authority may require that the payer names the recipient of the deducted payments exactly. If the indication of the name is denied e.g. because of business comity, the expenses claimed are not recognized as operating expenses. This principle also applies to payments to foreigners.

Switzerland: bribe payments are tax deductible if it is clearly operation initiated and the consignee is indicated.

US: (rough résumé: "generally operational expenses are deductible if they are not illegal according to the FCPA")

UK: kickbacks and bribes are deductible if they have been paid for operating purposes. The tax authority may request the name and address of the recipient.

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Referring to the recommendation of the above-mentioned Parliamentary Financial Commission's study,[153] the then Kohl administration (1991–1994) decided to maintain the legality of corruption against officials exclusively in foreign transactions[158] and confirmed the full deductibility of bribe money, co-financing thus a specific nationalistic corruption practice (§4 Abs. 5 Nr. 10 EStG, valid until 19 March 1999) in contradiction to the 1994 OECD recommendation.[159] The respective law was not changed before the OECD Convention also in Germany came into force (1999).[160] According to the Parliamentary Financial Commission's study, however, in 1994 most countries' corruption practices were not nationalistic and much more limited by the respective laws compared to Germany.[161]

Development of the shadow economy in (West-) Germany 1975–2015. Original shadow economy data from Friedrich Schneider, University Linz.

Particularly, the non-disclosure of the bribe money recipients' name in tax declarations had been a powerful instrument for Legal Corruption during the 1990s for German corporations, enabling them to block foreign legal jurisdictions which intended to fight corruption in their countries. Hence, they uncontrolled established a strong network of clientelism around Europe (e.g. SIEMENS)[162] along with the formation of the European Single Market in the upcoming European Union and the Eurozone. Moreover, in order to further strengthen active corruption the prosecution of tax evasion during that decade had been severely limited. German tax authorities were instructed to refuse any disclosure of bribe recipients' names from tax declarations to the German criminal prosecution.[163] As a result, German corporations have been systematically increasing their informal economy from 1980 until today up to 350 bn € per annum (see diagram on the right), thus continuously feeding their black money reserves.[164]

Siemens corruption case

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In 2007, Siemens was convicted in the District Court of Darmstadt of criminal corruption against the Italian corporation Enel Power SpA. Siemens had paid almost €3.5 million in bribes to be selected for a €200 million project from the Italian corporation, partially owned by the government. The deal was handled through black money accounts in Switzerland and Liechtenstein that were established specifically for such purposes.[165] Because the crime was committed in 1999, after the OECD convention had come into force, this foreign corrupt practice could be prosecuted. It was the first time a German court of law convicted foreign corrupt practices like a national practice, although the corresponding law did not yet protect foreign competitors in business.[166]

During the judicial proceedings it was disclosed that numerous such black accounts had been established in the past decades.[162]

Measurement

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Several organizations measure corruption as part of their development indexes. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries "by their perceived levels of public sector corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys." The index has been published annually by the non-governmental organization Transparency International since 1995.[167] On the supply side, Transparency International used to publish the Bribe Payers Index, but stopped in 2011.

The Global Corruption Index (GCI), designed by the Global Risk Profile to be in line with anti-corruption and anti-bribery legislation, covers 196 countries and territories. It measures the state of corruption and white-collar crimes around the world, specifically money laundering and terrorism financing.[168]

Absence of corruption is one of the eight factors[169] the World Justice Project[170] Rule of Law Index[171] measures to evaluate adherence to the rule of law in 140 countries and jurisdictions around the globe. The annual index measures three forms of government corruption across the executive branch, the judiciary, the military and police, and the legislature: bribery, improper influence by public or private interests, and misappropriation of public funds or other resources.[172]

The Unbundled Corruption Index (UCI) measures perceived levels of corruption in four categories: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, access money. It uses "stylized vignettes" instead of broadly worded survey questions.[173]

Relationship to economic growth

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Different types of corruption harm in different ways, though not all are immediately growth-impeding. Following an "Unbundled Corruption" framework, Ang describes using the analogy of drugs: "Petty theft and grand theft are like toxic drugs; they directly and unambiguously hurt the economy by draining public and private wealth while delivering no benefits in return. Speed money is akin to painkillers; it may relieve a headache but doesn't improve one's strength. Access money, on the other hand, is like steroids. It spurs muscle growth and allows one to perform superhuman feats, but it comes with serious side effects, including the possibility of a complete meltdown."[174]

Corruption can negatively impact the economy both directly, through for example tax evasion and money laundering, as well as indirectly by distorting fair competition and fair markets, and by increasing the cost of doing business.[175] It is strongly negatively associated with the share of private investment and, hence, lowers the economic growth rate.[176]

Corruption reduces the returns of productive activities. If the production returns fall faster than the returns to corruption and rent-seeking activities, resources will flow from productive activities to corruption activities over time. This will result in a lower stock of producible inputs like human capital in corrupted countries.[176]

Corruption creates the opportunity for increased inequality, reduces the return of productive activities, and, hence, makes rent-seeking and corruption activities more attractive. This opportunity for increased inequality not only generates psychological frustration for the underprivileged but also reduces productivity growth, investment, and job opportunities.[176]

Some experts have suggested that corruption stimulated economic growth in East and Southeast Asian countries. An often-cited example is South Korea, where President Park Chung Hee favored a small number of companies, and later used this financial influence to pressure these chaebols to follow the government's development strategy.[177][178] This 'profit-sharing' corruption model incentivizes government officials to support economic development, as they would personally benefit financially from it.[175][179]

One neglected example of high growth with corruption is the American Gilded Age, which Yuen Yuen Ang has compared to China's Gilded Age. In both, she noted, "corruption evolved over time from thuggery and theft to more sophisticated exchanges of power and profit," and resultingly, both saw unequal and risky growth.[180] Biased narratives about Western development and global corruption metrics have obscured this historical pattern.[181]

Prevention

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Competition law

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Breaking up monopolies and increasing competition tends to reduce corruption caused by companies.[182] On the other hand, biased competition law enforcement can create corruption.[183] Transparency with public access to reliable information could reduce the problem. Djankov and other researchers[184] have independently addressed the role information plays in fighting corruption with evidence from both developing and developed countries. Disclosing financial information of government officials to the public is associated with improving institutional accountability and eliminating misbehavior such as vote buying. The effect is specifically remarkable when the disclosures concern politicians' income sources, liabilities and asset level instead of just income level. Any extrinsic aspects that might reduce morality should be eliminated. Additionally, a country should establish a culture of ethical conduct in society with the government setting the good example in order to enhance the intrinsic morality.

Enhancing civil society participation

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Protests in Brazil in 2015–2016 were sparked by revelations that a number of politicians had accepted bribes linked to contracts at the state-owned energy company Petrobras.

Creating bottom-up mechanisms, promoting citizens participation and encouraging the values of integrity, accountability, and transparency are crucial components of fighting corruption. As of 2012, the implementation of the "Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres (ALACs)” in Europe had led to a significant increase in the number of citizen complaints against acts of corruption received and documented[185] and also to the development of strategies for good governance by involving citizens willing to fight against corruption.[186]

Anti-corruption programmes

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United Nations Convention against Corruption

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA, USA 1977) was an early paradigmatic law for many western countries i.e. industrial countries of the OECD. There, for the first time the old principal-agent approach was moved back where mainly the victim (a society, private or public) and a passive corrupt member (an individual) were considered, whereas the active corrupt part was not in the focus of legal prosecution. Unprecedented, the law of an industrial country directly condemned active corruption, particularly in international business transactions, which was at that time in contradiction to anti-bribery activities of the World Bank and its spin-off organization Transparency International.

As early as 1989 the OECD had established an ad hoc Working Group in order to explore "the concepts fundamental to the offense of corruption, and the exercise of national jurisdiction over offenses committed wholly or partially abroad."[187] Based on the FCPA concept, the Working Group presented in 1994 the then "OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation" as precursor for the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions[188] which was signed in 1997 by all member countries and came finally into force in 1999. However, because of ongoing concealed corruption in international transactions several instruments of Country Monitoring[189] have been developed since then by the OECD in order to foster and evaluate related national activities in combating foreign corrupt practices. One survey shows that after the implementation of heightened review of multinational firms under the convention in 2010 firms from countries that had signed the convention were less likely to use bribery.[190]

In 2013, a document[191] produced by the economic and private sector professional evidence and applied knowledge services help-desk discusses some of the existing practices on anti-corruption. They found:

  • The theories behind the fight against corruption are moving from a principal agent approach to a collective action problem. Principal–agent theories seem not to be suitable to target systemic corruption.
  • The role of multilateral institutions has been crucial in the fight against corruption. UNCAC provides a common guideline for countries around the world. Both Transparency International and the World Bank provide assistance to national governments in term of diagnostic and design of anti-corruption policies.
  • The use of anti-corruption agencies have proliferated in recent years after the signing of UNCAC. They found no convincing evidence on the extent of their contribution, or the best way to structure them.
  • Traditionally anti-corruption policies have been based on success experiences and common sense. In recent years there has been an effort to provide a more systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. They found that this literature is still in its infancy.
  • Anti-corruption policies that may be in general recommended to developing countries may not be suitable for post-conflict countries. Anti-corruption policies in fragile states have to be carefully tailored.
  • Anti-corruption policies can improve the business environment. There is evidence that lower corruption may facilitate doing business and improve firm's productivity. Rwanda in the last decade has made tremendous progress in improving governance and the business environment providing a model to follow for post-conflict countries.[191]
  • Armenia aims to achieve zero corruption through raising awareness on the societal hazards. After the lavish spending accusations on the Armenian anti-corruption council, through action strategies with implementation and observing instruments progress is noticeable.[192]

In recent years, anti-corruption efforts have also been criticised for overemphasising the benefits of the eradication of corruption for economic growth and development,[193][194][195][196] following a diversity of literature which has suggested that anti-corruption efforts, the right kind of institutions and "good governance" are key to economic development.[197][198] This criticism is based on the observed fact that a variety of countries, such as Korea and China but also the US in the 19th and early 20th century, saw high economic growth and broader socio-economic development coinciding with significant corruption.[199][200]

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In some countries people travel to corruption hot spots or a specialist tour company takes them on corruption city tours, as is the case in Prague.[201][202][203][204] Corruption tours have also occurred in Chicago[205] and Mexico City.[206][207]

Films about corruption include Runaway Jury, The Firm, Syriana, The Constant Gardener, and All the President's Men.

Historical responses in philosophical and religious thought

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Philosophers and religious thinkers have responded to the inescapable reality of corruption in different ways. Plato, in The Republic, acknowledges the corrupt nature of political institutions, and recommends that philosophers "shelter behind a wall" to avoid senselessly martyring themselves.

Disciples of philosophy ... have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen and been satisfied of the madness of the multitude, and known that there is no one who ever acts honestly in the administration of States, nor any helper who will save any one who maintains the cause of the just. Such a savior would be like a man who has fallen among wild beasts—unable to join in the wickedness of his fellows, neither would he be able alone to resist all their fierce natures, and therefore he would be of no use to the State or to his friends, and would have to throw away his life before he had done any good to himself or others. And he reflects upon all this, and holds his peace, and does his own business. He is like one who retires under the shelter of a wall in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along; and when he sees the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content if only he can live his own life and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good will, with bright hopes.

— Plato, Republic, 496d

The New Testament, in keeping with the tradition of Ancient Greek thought, also frankly acknowledges the corruption of the world (ὁ κόσμος)[208] and claims to offer a way of keeping the spirit "unspotted from the world."[209] Paul of Tarsus acknowledges his readers must inevitably "deal with the world,"[210] and recommends they adopt an attitude of "as if not" in all their dealings. When they buy a thing, for example, they should relate to it "as if it were not theirs to keep."[211] New Testament readers are advised to refuse to "conform to the present age"[212] and not to be ashamed to be peculiar or singular.[213] They are advised not be friends of the corrupt world, because "friendship with the world is enmity with God."[214] They are advised not to love the corrupt world or the things of the world.[215] The rulers of this world, Paul explains, "are coming to nothing"[216] While readers must obey corrupt rulers in order to live in the world,[217] the spirit is subject to no law but to love God and love our neighbors as ourselves.[218] New Testament readers are advised to adopt a disposition in which they are "in the world, but not of the world."[219] This disposition, Paul claims, shows us a way to escape "slavery to corruption" and experience the freedom and glory of being innocent "children of God".[220]

Corruption by country

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See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Corruption constitutes the abuse of entrusted power, particularly in public office, for private benefit, encompassing dishonest actions that deviate from formal rules governing the exercise of such . This misconduct undermines institutional integrity and public trust, often involving the redirection of resources from collective welfare to individual or factional gain.
Corruption appears in distinct forms, including grand corruption, which entails large-scale exploitation by high-level officials benefiting elites at the expense of broader society; petty corruption, characterized by routine small-scale bribes in daily administrative dealings; and , such as influence peddling or that distorts democratic processes. Empirical analyses consistently demonstrate its detrimental economic effects, including reduced growth rates through inefficient investment allocation, heightened public expenditure, and diminished , with studies estimating that curtailing corruption could boost GDP per capita significantly in affected nations. Efforts to quantify corruption predominantly rely on indices like the (CPI), which aggregates expert and business perceptions of malfeasance across countries, revealing stark disparities—such as high-corruption environments in parts of and low-corruption ones in —though its reliance on subjective views invites scrutiny over potential biases in source data. Causally, corruption thrives where institutional checks are weak, monopoly power prevails, and mechanisms falter, perpetuating cycles of inefficiency and inequality absent robust enforcement.

Definitions and Conceptual Framework

Etymology and Evolving Definitions

The term "corruption" derives from the Latin corruptio, denoting the act of decay or depravity, entering English usage by the mid-14th century. Its root lies in corrumpere, a compound of com- ("together" or "thoroughly") and rumpere ("to break"), implying a breaking or spoiling of wholeness, whether physical, , or institutional. This etymological sense of rupture or destruction underscores corruption as a deviation from an original, uncorrupted state, extending beyond mere to encompass broader perversion or contamination. Historically, corruption was conceived in philosophical and political thought as a systemic decay akin to a disease afflicting the , rather than isolated acts of individual wrongdoing. Ancient thinkers like viewed it as a corruption of the polity's , where deviations from the ideal form—such as rule by the many over the few—eroded communal and . Enlightenment philosophers, including , extended this to warn of institutional rot where unchecked power led to moral and structural breakdown, emphasizing corruption's role in undermining republican governance. In medieval and early modern contexts, the term often carried a moral-theological , linking personal to societal disorder, as seen in critiques of clerical or monarchical abuses that "broke" divine or . By the 19th and 20th centuries, definitions narrowed in political discourse toward specific abuses of public authority, influenced by reform movements addressing patronage and graft in expanding bureaucracies. , for instance, post-Civil War reformers like framed corruption as the infiltration of economic interests into politics, shifting from abstract moral decay to tangible practices like vote-buying and spoils systems. Modern institutional definitions, such as those from the World Bank and since the 1990s, standardize corruption as "the abuse of public office for private gain," prioritizing measurable acts like over philosophical breadth. This evolution reflects a pragmatic focus on empirical detection and policy, though critics argue it underemphasizes private-sector parallels or in enforcement, potentially overlooking deeper causal incentives like power concentration. Illegal corruption involves acts that violate criminal statutes, such as where a public official accepts cash or gifts in exchange for specific favors, or of public funds for personal use. These are prosecutable under laws like the of 1977, which criminalizes such exchanges internationally, with over 100 enforcement actions by the Department of from 2000 to 2020 resulting in fines exceeding $2 billion. Legal corruption, however, encompasses practices permitted by law but enabling undue private influence over public decisions, such as unlimited campaign contributions or revolving-door employment where officials join industries they regulated, as seen in the U.S. where 375 former members of became lobbyists between 1998 and 2004. This distinction highlights how legality often hinges on jurisdiction-specific thresholds, like proving , allowing influence peddling to persist under the guise of protected speech, as affirmed in U.S. rulings like (2010). Moral corruption centers on individual ethical breaches, where personal vice—such as greed or favoritism—deviates from one's duty, independent of legality, as philosophers argue it represents a fundamental decay in character rather than mere rule-breaking. For instance, an official prioritizing family hires over merit, even if not statutorily barred, embodies moral corruption by subordinating public good to private loyalty. Institutional corruption, conversely, arises when systemic practices or incentives within organizations undermine their core purpose without necessarily implicating individual illegality, such as pharmaceutical firms funding research that biases clinical trials toward profitable drugs, eroding medical integrity as documented in analyses of U.S. healthcare where industry payments to physicians totaled $3.5 billion in 2016. This form often manifests causally: accepted norms like conflicts of interest accumulate to corrode trust and efficacy, as in congressional ethics where legal earmarks funneled $20 billion in pork-barrel spending annually pre-2011 ban, distorting legislative priorities. The moral-institutional divide underscores that while individual agency drives isolated acts, entrenched structures amplify corruption's persistence, demanding reforms beyond criminalization to realign incentives with institutional mandates.

Forms and Methods

Petty vs. Grand and Systemic Corruption

Petty corruption involves the abuse of power by low- or mid-level public officials in routine interactions with citizens or businesses, typically demanding small bribes or favors to perform or expedite services that should be provided as a matter of course. Such acts include soliciting payments to overlook minor infractions or staff requiring unofficial fees for access to care, as documented in Sierra Leone's facilities where patients pay small sums for basic treatment. In East African countries like , , and , petty corruption manifests in dealings such as licensing or permit issuance, where officials extract modest payments from individuals navigating bureaucratic processes. These practices erode daily trust in institutions and impose cumulative costs on the poor, who lack alternatives to comply. Grand corruption, by contrast, entails the misuse of high-level authority by senior officials or political s to manipulate national policies, allocate resources, or award contracts for personal enrichment, often involving sums in the millions or billions. This form distorts the core functions of , as seen in under President , where and rigged contracts funneled public funds to allies between 1990 and 2000. In , grand corruption has included the diversion of oil revenues, with cases like the 2012 fuel subsidy scam siphoning approximately $6 billion from state coffers through fraudulent claims. Unlike petty acts, grand corruption benefits a narrow while imposing widespread economic harm, such as reduced public investment and heightened inequality. Systemic corruption describes a condition where corrupt behaviors permeate an entire institutional framework, becoming normalized and self-reinforcing across levels rather than isolated incidents. It differs from grand corruption by emphasizing pervasiveness over scale, though the two often overlap; for instance, unchecked grand acts at the top can foster petty corruption below by signaling . In such environments, corruption integrates into economic and political systems, as in states where or judicial processes routinely favor insiders, undermining and deterring foreign investment. Addressing systemic corruption requires structural reforms beyond punishing individuals, as individual accountability alone fails against entrenched norms. While petty and grand forms highlight actor levels, systemic views underscore institutional failures enabling both.

Common Techniques: Bribery, Embezzlement, Extortion

constitutes a core technique of corruption, involving the offering, promising, or giving of an undue advantage to a public official to influence the performance of official duties, as defined under Article 15 of the (UNCAC). This active form contrasts with passive , where the official solicits or accepts the advantage. In practice, often manifests in processes, where firms pay officials to secure contracts or favorable terms, distorting competitive markets and diverting public resources. A prominent example occurred in the corruption case, where the company admitted to using third-party agents to bribe officials across multiple countries from 2011 to 2015, facilitating aircraft sales and resulting in over $3.9 billion in global penalties paid in January 2020. Similarly, in Brazil's (Lava Jato), executives from and contractors engaged in bribery schemes between 2004 and 2014, inflating contract prices by up to 3% to fund kickbacks totaling billions of dollars to politicians and officials. Embezzlement involves the or diversion of property entrusted to a official or private actor for personal gain, targeted under UNCAC Articles 17 and 22. This technique exploits positions of responsibility, such as in funds management, where officials falsify records or divert assets without external inducement, differing from bribery's transactional nature. In the (1MDB) scandal, former Malaysian Prime Minister and associates embezzled approximately $4.5 billion from the state investment fund between 2009 and 2014 through fraudulent transactions and shell companies, with $700 million laundered into his personal accounts. Another case involved , where executives and Mark Swartz embezzled over $150 million in unauthorized bonuses and loans from 1997 to 2002, using company funds for personal luxuries including a $2 million birthday party. Extortion in corruption contexts entails the use of threats or by officials to obtain undue advantages, akin to passive but emphasizing duress, such as threats to withhold services or impose harm unless payments are made. Unlike 's voluntary offer for preferential treatment, extortion compels compliance through intimidation, often targeting businesses or individuals reliant on official actions. Historical examples include groups extorting protection money from businesses in during the , where the threatened violence unless "pizzo" payments were made, extracting millions annually from Palermo merchants alone. In modern public sector cases, foreign officials have demanded bribes under threat of regulatory penalties, as seen in U.S. prosecutions where extortion-like demands by officials in countries like led to corporate payments totaling hundreds of millions from 2010 to 2020. These techniques—, , and —frequently intersect, enabling corrupt actors to exploit power asymmetries while evading detection through layered schemes.

Influence Peddling, Nepotism, and State Capture

Influence peddling involves individuals leveraging their official positions, connections, or authority to secure undue advantages, such as contracts, permits, or policy favors, for third parties in exchange for personal benefits like payments or reciprocal favors. This practice differs from direct by emphasizing the intermediary role of influence rather than outright exchange, though it often overlaps with in effect. For instance, lobbyists or former officials may promise access to decision-makers to extract fees, undermining merit-based processes and public trust. Nepotism manifests as the preferential appointment or promotion of relatives or close associates to public positions, irrespective of qualifications, thereby constituting a through and resource misallocation. It erodes institutional fairness by prioritizing personal ties over competence, often leading to reduced efficiency and heightened vulnerability to further abuses like . In political contexts, this can extend to awarding contracts or sinecures to members, as observed in various administrations where such favoritism has been documented to stifle and . State capture represents a more systemic variant, wherein private entities—typically corporations, oligarchs, or elite networks—exert control over state institutions to mold laws, regulations, and enforcement in their favor, effectively privatizing formulation. Unlike episodic influence peddling or , state capture operates through sustained mechanisms like campaign financing, revolving-door employment between regulators and regulated firms, or direct infiltration of bureaucracies, resulting in entrenched and policy distortions. Empirical analyses from transition economies highlight how such capture concentrates benefits among captors while imposing diffuse costs on society, such as weakened antitrust enforcement or subsidized monopolies. These phenomena interconnect: influence peddling can facilitate nepotistic appointments by trading access for loyalty, while both may prelude or sustain state capture by normalizing elite entrenchment. Nepotism, as a form of favoritism, overlaps with cronyism in state capture scenarios, where kin networks evolve into broader patronage systems that capture regulatory capture. Consequences include diminished accountability, as captured states prioritize insider gains over public welfare, often measurable in stalled reforms or inflated public spending— for example, studies of captured sectors show procurement costs rising 10-20% due to rigged bidding influenced by such dynamics. Countermeasures, such as merit-based hiring mandates and transparency in lobbying disclosures, aim to disrupt these cycles, though enforcement varies by institutional strength.

Root Causes from First Principles

Human Incentives: Greed, Power Concentration, and

Human self-interest, a foundational aspect of behavior observable across economic and psychological studies, manifests in corruption when individuals in authority prioritize personal gain over public duty. Public choice theory, developed by economists such as and , models political actors as rational utility maximizers who engage in —expending resources to capture government favors for private benefit—leading to inefficiencies and corrupt practices like and favoritism. This framework explains why expanded government roles amplify opportunities for self-interested exploitation, as bureaucrats and politicians respond to incentives rather than abstract . Empirical analyses, including those examining states, confirm that behaviors driven by such incentives correlate with reduced economic wealth and heightened corruption levels. Greed, as a dispositional trait rooted in evolutionary pressures for resource acquisition, incentivizes corrupt acts by motivating individuals to pursue disproportionate personal rewards, often blurring ethical boundaries in resource-scarce or opportunity-rich environments. Studies on dispositional reveal that greedy individuals achieve higher economic outcomes through aggressive self-advancement but at the cost of ethical lapses, aligning with historical patterns where officials siphon public funds for luxury, as seen in cases like the by Zaire's , estimated at up to $15 billion from 1965 to 1997. In organizational contexts, fuels bottom-up corruption, where lower-level actors rationalize small-scale graft as survival, escalating to systemic issues without moral restraints from community norms. This incentive persists because human favors immediate gains, with research indicating that unchecked erodes collective moral orders that historically curbed excessive self-enrichment. Power concentration exacerbates corruption by attracting self-interested actors and diminishing internal checks, creating environments where unchecked enables abuse. Constitutional designs vesting excessive executive or parliamentary power in few hands empirically correlate with elevated corruption, as evidenced in Latin American and Caribbean nations where higher executive dominance predicts poorer outcomes, independent of economic factors. For instance, regimes with fused powers—lacking separation between legislative and executive branches—exhibit 10-20% higher perceived corruption scores in regional comparisons, as concentrated reduces accountability and invites . Neurologically, power alters , with studies showing power-holders exhibit reduced and heightened risk-taking for personal gain, including increased entitlement that fosters infidelity and hedonistic pursuits such as maintaining mistresses as status symbols, often funded by corrupt proceeds to satisfy narcissistic stimulation-seeking. This reinforces a cycle where initial concentrations draw corruptible individuals, further entrenching malfeasance. Moral hazard arises in governance when officials, shielded from full consequences of corrupt actions, pursue private benefits at public expense, akin to principal-agent dilemmas where monitors (politicians) shirk oversight. In high office, this hazard manifests as hidden corruption or rebellion risks, modeled dynamically where sovereigns must balance deterrence with incentives, yet constrained penalties allow graft to persist even under rational efforts. Empirical models from World Bank analyses demonstrate that when detection costs exceed rewards or penalties are capped, corruption endures, as agents exploit information asymmetries—evident in public procurement where pre-election bidding irregularities rise by 1.3-6.1% due to reduced pressures. This incentive structure is amplified in stable bureaucracies, where long tenures insulate actors from electoral or legal repercussions, fostering systemic moral hazards that undermine institutional .

Institutional Failures: Lack of Accountability and Overregulation

Lack of in public institutions fosters corruption by diminishing the perceived costs of illicit behavior for officials, who act as agents diverging from the principals' (citizens') interests due to . Without mechanisms like independent audits, whistleblower protections, and swift judicial enforcement, discretionary powers enable , , and without repercussions. Empirical analyses show that countries with weaker structures, such as limited transparency in , exhibit higher corruption levels; for example, a study across developing nations found that accountability deficits exacerbate principal-agent problems, leading to systemic abuse in . Overregulation compounds this by proliferating rules that create bureaucratic bottlenecks, granting regulators extensive leeway in approvals, inspections, and compliance enforcement—opportunities for or favoritism. Firm-level from enterprise surveys in developing countries reveal that higher regulatory burdens directly correlate with elevated petty corruption, as entities to circumvent or ambiguities in labyrinthine processes. Cross-national studies further confirm that excessive invites , where officials exploit complexity to extract payments, independent of overall governance quality. These failures interact synergistically: unaccountable regulators in overregulated environments wield unchecked monopoly power, turning into private gain. Evidence from regulatory impact assessments indicates that simplifying rules reduces such interactions and corruption incidence, as seen in reforms yielding measurable declines in payments. Institutional redesign emphasizing clear, minimal rules alongside verifiable —such as performance-based monitoring—addresses root incentives, though implementation lags in high-corruption contexts due to entrenched interests.

Systemic Factors: Role of Government Size and Monopoly Power

Larger size, measured by expenditure as a of GDP or the extent of regulatory intervention, empirically correlates with elevated levels of corruption across countries. A analysis of 94 studies found a positive association between government size and corruption, with evidence of toward null or negative findings but an overall robust link after corrections. This relationship arises because expanded operations create more discretionary authority over resource allocation, amplifying opportunities for and abuse by officials acting in . For instance, firm-level surveys in developing countries demonstrate that higher regulatory burdens—proxies for —significantly increase payments to public officials, as regulations generate rents that officials can extract. Government monopoly power exacerbates this dynamic by insulating state actors from competitive pressures that discipline private entities. Unlike markets, where monopolies face potential entry or , governments hold coercive authority over taxation, licensing, and enforcement without rivals, fostering and unchecked extraction. theory posits that bureaucrats and politicians, motivated by personal gain, expand government scope to capture larger budgets and influence, leading to systemic inefficiencies and corruption as oversight lags behind complexity. Empirical patterns support this: economies with greater openness and less on services exhibit lower corruption, as reduces the benefits of and favoritism. Causal realism underscores that does not inherently breed corruption through size alone but via the concentration of unaccountable power it entails. Overregulation and state dominance in sectors like or multiply interaction points between citizens and officials, where asymmetric information favors the latter. Studies disaggregating reveal that transfers and subsidies—hallmarks of larger welfare states—correlate more strongly with corruption than core functions like defense, as they invite political manipulation. While some high-spending democracies maintain low corruption through cultural factors or , cross-national data consistently show that reducing government monopoly via or diminishes corrupt practices, affirming the incentive structures at play.

Measurement and Empirical Evidence

Corruption Perceptions Index and Other Metrics

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), compiled annually by the non-governmental organization Transparency International since 1995, ranks 180 countries and territories based on perceived public sector corruption as assessed by experts and business executives. Scores range from 0, indicating highly corrupt conditions, to 100, denoting very clean governance, derived by aggregating data from at least three independent sources among 13 global surveys and assessments conducted in the previous 24 months. The 2024 edition, released on February 11, 2025, showed over two-thirds of countries scoring below 50, signaling entrenched corruption challenges in most nations, with Denmark maintaining its position as the least corrupt at the top of the rankings. In the 2023 CPI, top performers included Denmark (90), Finland (87), New Zealand (85), Norway (84), and Singapore (83), while the lowest scores were recorded by Somalia (11), South Sudan (13), Syria (13), Venezuela (13), and Yemen (14), highlighting stark disparities often correlating with institutional stability and economic freedom. The index's methodology involves rescaling source data to a 0-100 uniform scale, averaging scores, and calculating standard errors to indicate uncertainty, though it emphasizes perceptions rather than direct measures of corrupt acts. Other prominent metrics include the World Bank's (WGI), which feature a Control of Corruption component estimating the extent to which power is exercised for private gain, encompassing both petty and grand corruption forms. This indicator, updated biennially and covering over 200 countries since 1996, uses an unweighted average of available data sources normalized to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, yielding estimates from approximately -2.5 (weak control) to 2.5 (strong control), alongside percentile ranks. For 2023, the global average stood at -0.04, with scoring 2.38 and -1.75, reflecting patterns similar to the CPI but incorporating broader data.
MetricPublisherScaleKey FeaturesGlobal Insight (Recent)
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)Transparency International0-100 (0 highly corrupt)Aggregates 13 perception surveys; annual since 19952024: Majority below 50; Denmark leads
Control of Corruption (WGI)World Bank~ -2.5 to 2.5 (higher better)Multi-source perceptions; biennial updates2023: Avg. -0.04; Denmark 2.38, Syria -1.75
Perception-based indices like the CPI and WGI provide comparative benchmarks but draw for conflating visibility of corruption—often higher in countries with —with actual prevalence, potentially biasing scores against nations facing adversarial coverage or those with less transparent reporting systems. Methodological concerns include aggregation assumptions lacking robust empirical validation and the risk of perverse policy incentives, where rankings prioritize optics over substantive reforms. Despite these limitations, the indices correlate with objective outcomes like and foreign investment, underscoring their value as signals of quality when interpreted cautiously.

Methodological Challenges and Verifiable Data Sources

Measuring corruption poses significant methodological challenges due to its clandestine and illegal nature, which incentivizes participants to conceal transactions and discourages reporting. Direct is rare, leading to reliance on indirect proxies that often conflate perceptions with incidence, while underreporting is exacerbated by fear of , legal risks, or in surveys. Cross-country comparisons are further complicated by varying definitions of corruption, cultural tolerances for certain practices, and differences in enforcement capacity, which can make high prosecution rates indicate either elevated corruption or effective efforts rather than true prevalence. Perception-based indices, such as the (CPI) compiled by , aggregate expert and business executive opinions but face criticism for methodological flaws including source inconsistencies, unequal weighting of inputs, and limited comparability due to rescaling processes that amplify small differences. These indices may reflect media coverage or elite biases more than objective reality, potentially penalizing countries with freer press or higher transparency through greater exposure of scandals, while overlooking private sector or transnational corruption. Lack of consensus on what constitutes corruption—encompassing both illegal acts and potentially legal but unethical influence peddling—further undermines their reliability for or evaluation. Verifiable data sources emphasize objective indicators over perceptions, such as administrative records of prosecutions and convictions, which provide concrete evidence of detected cases, as utilized in U.S. federal corruption analyses drawing from Department of Justice filings. Audit-based measures, including forensic reviews of public spending irregularities by supreme audit institutions, offer empirical traces of embezzlement or misallocation, with datasets like those from the World Bank's public expenditure tracking revealing discrepancies in resource flows. Experience-based surveys, such as the Subnational Corruption Database aggregating over 800 household and firm polls from 1995–2022 across multiple countries, capture self-reported bribe payments or service denials, providing micro-level incidence data less prone to aggregate bias. Microeconomic datasets from revealed bribery, like firm-level reports in 49 countries, quantify transaction frequencies, though coverage remains uneven and dependent on voluntary disclosure or enforcement vigor. These sources, while imperfect due to detection gaps, enable causal inference when triangulated with economic proxies like unexplained public procurement variances. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published annually by Transparency International, showed global stagnation in perceived public-sector corruption levels from 2020 to 2024, with the worldwide average score remaining around 43 out of 100—a threshold indicating high corruption risk. This lack of progress persisted despite international commitments, as over two-thirds of 180 ranked countries scored below 50 in 2024, reflecting entrenched systemic issues rather than isolated events. The from 2020 to 2022 amplified corruption vulnerabilities through emergency spending on , vaccines, and aid, with weak oversight enabling and on a scale estimated in billions of dollars globally. For instance, reports documented inflated contracts for and falsified testing kits, prolonging crises in affected regions by diverting resources. Post-peak pandemic, recovery funds faced similar risks, as evidenced by ongoing investigations into misuse of trillions in stimulus across and developing economies. By 2023-2024, geopolitical conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine war, introduced new corruption vectors in and sanctions evasion, with documented diversions reducing aid efficacy by up to 30% in some channels. Digital tools offered mixed results: while reduced petty in select Asian and African nations, cyber-enabled schemes like laundering surged, complicating enforcement. Only 28 countries achieved meaningful CPI improvements over this period, often tied to judicial reforms, underscoring that broad gains require sustained institutional accountability amid rising global economic pressures.

Sectoral Manifestations

Public Sector: Politics, Military, and Resources

Corruption in the often involves the exchange of for policy favors, electoral advantages, or appointments, enabling where private interests dominate public decision-making. In many democracies, irregularities facilitate undue influence; for instance, opaque political donations have been linked to policy biases favoring donors in countries scoring low on corruption indices. persists through family or crony appointments to high offices, as seen in fragile states where leaders allocate positions based on rather than merit, exacerbating failures. Empirical data from global assessments indicate that higher correlates with reduced and inefficient , with in averaging 10-25% markups in affected nations. Military corruption predominantly arises in and budgeting, where vast expenditures create opportunities for kickbacks and overpricing. Recent investigations revealed systemic at NATO's Support and Agency (NSPA), leading to arrests of three Belgian nationals in October 2025 for alleged in contracts worth millions, highlighting vulnerabilities in multinational defense logistics. In , internal audits from 2025 exposed irregularities in secret weapons , including repeated sole-source awards to favored firms amid wartime pressures, potentially diverting funds from frontline needs. China's [People's Liberation Army Rocket Force](/page/People's_Liberation_Army_Rocket Force) purged nearly 200 suppliers and evaluators in September 2025 following corruption probes into rigged bids and falsified qualifications, underscoring how opacity in hierarchies enables . Studies show corrupt militaries exhibit higher spending as a share of GDP, with losses undermining readiness; for example, U.S. investigations in 2025 uncovered millions in violations through inflated pricing. In resource management, the "resource curse" manifests as elites siphoning revenues from oil, minerals, and forests, fostering corruption that distorts economies. Empirical analyses across sub-Saharan Africa demonstrate that abundant natural resources amplify corruption, reducing bureaucratic quality and rule of law while hindering growth; for instance, oil-rich nations often see rents captured by ruling networks, leading to 1-2% annual GDP losses from misallocation. In high-corruption settings, mineral and forest exploitation correlates with negative growth impacts, as bribes and patronage divert funds from public goods. Global trends link resource dependence to elevated corruption perceptions, with exporting countries experiencing institutional erosion unless offset by strong accountability; data from 1984-2014 panels confirm resources fail to boost growth in weakly governed states, instead fueling volatility.

Private Sector: Corporate, Financial, and Labor

Private sector corruption encompasses acts such as , , fraud, and misleading financial reporting, where individuals or entities abuse entrusted positions within corporations, financial institutions, or labor operations for personal gain, often distorting markets and eroding . Unlike public sector equivalents, these manifestations frequently involve internal or interactions with regulators, leading to inflated costs, unfair advantages, and resource misallocation; for instance, bid-rigging in private processes undermines . from firm-level studies in indicates that exposure of corrupt practices, such as illegal interactions, reduces affected firms' employment growth by up to 5.5% in the short term and 10% over five years, highlighting causal links to . In the corporate domain, corruption often materializes through accounting manipulations and , as seen in the 2021 Wirecard scandal where executives fabricated €1.9 billion in cash balances, leading to the firm's and criminal convictions for . More recently, in October 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice charged , cofounder of investment firm , with a $500 million wire fraud scheme involving false representations to secure loans and investments, demonstrating how corporate leaders exploit investor trust for illicit gains. Such cases contribute to broader market distortions, with global estimates suggesting fraud costs economies 5% of GDP annually through lost productivity and distorted investment decisions. Financial sector corruption prominently features and investment s, exemplified by the October 2025 indictment of Chen Zhi, chairman of Cambodia's Prince Group, for operating forced labor compounds that generated illicit profits via "pig butchering" scams, resulting in over $12 billion in forfeitures—the largest in U.S. history. Similarly, schemes like the 2025 Estonian nationals' $577 million involved deceptive platforms to siphon funds, underscoring vulnerabilities in unregulated digital finance. These acts facilitate illicit financial flows, with noting that private financial intermediaries enable and , amplifying global inequality by shielding corrupt proceeds. Labor-related corruption in the includes in hiring, for job placements, and facilitation of exploitative practices through corrupt supply chains, as documented in services where skews . A key example is corruption enabling labor trafficking, which the estimates generates $32 billion in annual illicit profits for perpetrators by corrupting oversight in global supply chains, often via bribes to inspectors or falsified records. In developing economies, such practices distort labor markets by favoring connected insiders, reducing overall growth; firm surveys reveal that corruption raises operational costs for honest competitors, hindering small and medium enterprises' access to workers and finance. These dynamics perpetuate inefficiency, with corrupt hiring practices linked to lower firm productivity due to unqualified personnel selected via kickbacks.

Judiciary, Police, and Professional Sectors (Healthcare, )

Corruption in systems primarily involves for favorable rulings, political interference in judicial appointments and case outcomes, and the sale of positions within the . Such practices undermine the by allowing money or influence to determine case prioritization, dismissals, or verdicts, as documented in global assessments where judicial corruption correlates with weakened protections and public distrust. In developing countries, factors like low salaries, excessive caseloads, and weak oversight exacerbate these issues, leading to economic consequences such as distorted investment decisions due to unpredictable legal enforcement. For instance, surveys by the across 102 countries in 2015 revealed high perceptions of in judicial proceedings, with reforms proposed to mitigate such risks through measurable indicators. Police corruption manifests through extortion, bribery to ignore violations or provide protection, and fabrication of evidence, often enabled by broad discretionary powers and inadequate accountability mechanisms. Worldwide data from victim surveys indicate that police interactions frequently involve bribe requests, with prevalence rates varying by country but consistently ranking law enforcement among the most corrupt public interfaces; for example, UNODC reports highlight how vague statutes on business verification foster such demands. In regions like the , up to 19% of respondents in countries such as the and reported paying bribes to police or similar officials within the past year, illustrating petty corruption's scale in daily enforcement. In healthcare, corruption encompasses procurement —where bribes to officials inflate costs for drugs and equipment by 10-25%—as well as informal patient payments for access to services, falsified invoicing, and favoritism in supplier selection. These practices divert resources from essential care, with a 2020 identifying in service delivery as prevalent in low- and middle-income countries, often adding substantial markups to transaction costs. During the , reports documented increased , for ventilators or tests, and favoritism in distribution, creating conditions where patients faced demands for unofficial payments amid heightened desperation. Educational sector corruption includes for admissions, , and of institutional funds, compromising merit-based access and resource allocation. Common forms involve payments to administrators for enrollment slots or to instructors for passing grades, alongside in of textbooks and . In higher education, international schemes are estimated to generate $1.5-2.5 billion annually, including credential mills and recruitment scams. A notable case is the 2019 U.S. ", where wealthy parents paid $25 million between 2011 and 2018 to bribe coaches and falsify qualifications for elite university admissions, exposing vulnerabilities in oversight despite operating in a high-transparency environment. Globally, such practices erode educational quality, with surveys confirming widespread demands for sexual favors or cash in exchange for academic favors in multiple regions.

Impacts on Society and Economy

Direct Economic Costs: Growth Inhibition and Resource Misallocation

Corruption inhibits economic growth by distorting incentives and reducing the efficiency of capital and labor allocation, as resources are diverted toward bribe payments and favoritism rather than productive investments. Empirical studies consistently find a negative relationship between corruption levels and GDP per capita growth; for instance, a one-standard-deviation increase in perceived corruption (reversed CPI) leads to a cumulative long-run reduction in real per capita GDP of approximately 17%. This effect arises because corrupt practices undermine the rule of law, deterring foreign direct investment and domestic entrepreneurship, with cross-country regressions showing that higher corruption correlates with lower investment rates and slower productivity gains. Resource misallocation is exacerbated by corruption through mechanisms such as -induced distortions that favor politically connected firms over more efficient ones, leading to lower (TFP). In settings with high corruption, resources like and are allocated based on connections rather than marginal , resulting in persistent inefficiencies; for example, firm-level data from developing economies reveal that creates size-dependent distortions, where smaller, potentially innovative enterprises are crowded out, reducing aggregate output by up to several percentage points of GDP. Illicit payments and weak enforcement further amplify this, as seen in analyses of informal economies where corruption sustains , preventing reallocation toward high-return sectors. Globally, these misallocations contribute to an estimated annual economic loss equivalent to 5% of world GDP, or about $2.6 trillion, through foregone growth and inefficient spending. While some theoretical arguments, such as those positing corruption as a "grease" for bureaucratic wheels, suggest potential short-term growth benefits in highly regulated environments, rigorous rejects this in favor of a net negative "sand the wheels" effect, particularly in long-run panels controlling for institutions and levels. A one-unit increase in corruption indices has been associated with GDP per capita reductions of 0.15% to 1.5%, underscoring the causal drag on growth via misallocation and reduced accumulation. If corruption were reduced to levels observed in top-performing countries, global GDP could increase by over $1 trillion annually through better resource utilization and investment flows.

Broader Social Effects: Erosion of Trust and Inequality Amplification

Corruption undermines in institutions by fostering perceptions of unfairness and systemic favoritism, as evidenced by cross-national surveys linking higher corruption levels to diminished trust in . A study analyzing data from the across multiple countries found that experiences of and perceptions of official corruption significantly reduce interpersonal and institutional trust, with respondents in high-corruption environments reporting 15-20% lower in officials compared to low-corruption counterparts. This erosion manifests in reduced civic participation, such as lower and voluntary association membership, as citizens view engagement as futile amid of resources. Empirical analyses from European municipalities further confirm causality, where exposure to corruption scandals decreased trust in local by up to 10 percentage points in affected areas, persisting even after controls for economic factors. The linkage between corruption and social trust forms a feedback loop, where low trust exacerbates corrupt practices by weakening norms of reciprocity and . Research utilizing from over 100 countries demonstrates that a one-standard-deviation increase in corruption perceptions correlates with a 0.12-point decline in generalized trust metrics from sources like the , independent of income levels or democratic status. In contexts like , repeated scandals have halved public approval of democratic institutions over two decades, correlating with heightened cynicism toward policy implementation. This dynamic not only hampers against graft but also justifies further by officials, as diminished oversight reduces detection risks. Corruption amplifies by enabling rent extraction that disproportionately benefits elites with access to influence networks, skewing resource distribution away from broad-based public goods. Cross-country regressions from data indicate that higher corruption indices raise the by 2-4 points on average, as public expenditures shift toward infrastructure and defense—sectors ripe for kickbacks—while cuts in and exacerbate traps for the lower quintiles. Instrumental variable analyses confirm unidirectional , with corruption driving inequality rises in nations, where a 10% increase in perceived graft correlates with a 1.5% widening of disparities over five-year periods. This amplification occurs through mechanisms like in and , where the wealthy secure exemptions or subsidies unavailable to others, perpetuating intergenerational divides. Panel studies across 166 countries reveal that corruption's inequality effects are strongest in resource-dependent economies, where alliances with officials divert up to 20% of revenues into private gains, leaving minimal trickle-down. Consequently, high-corruption settings exhibit stalled , with the top capturing 50% more of national income growth than in low-corruption peers, as measured by World Bank inequality databases. Such patterns reinforce a stratified , where the poor face barriers to merit-based advancement, further entrenching and .

Prevention and Reform Strategies

Institutional Reforms: Audits, Decentralization, and Competition

Independent audits of expenditures and programs have demonstrated effectiveness in detecting and deterring corruption by increasing the probability of exposure and prosecution. In , randomized audits conducted by the Comptroller General from 2001 to 2005 revealed systematic discrepancies in transfers, leading to a 10-15 reduction in re-election rates for mayors in municipalities with irregularities, as voters punished exposed corruption. Similarly, in , intensified audits following the 1998 correlated with decreased missing expenditures in audited projects, particularly where local elections enabled voter . China's provincial audit bureaus, active since the 1980s, have uncovered billions in illicit funds, contributing to a measurable decline in detected corruption cases post-audit implementation, though enforcement varies by local political incentives. These outcomes underscore that audits reduce corruption primarily through deterrence rather than mere detection, with efficacy amplified by and public disclosure. Decentralization, particularly fiscal and administrative forms, can lower aggregate corruption levels by enhancing local and enabling inter-jurisdictional , though results depend on institutional safeguards like elections and transparency. Cross-country analyses indicate that greater fiscal —measured by subnational expenditure shares—is associated with 0.5 to 1 point improvements in scores, as local governments face closer citizen scrutiny and "yardstick" comparisons with peers. In the United States, federal grant programs with decentralized oversight showed reduced corruption in compared to centralized allocations, with states exhibiting higher local correlating with fewer convictions for public malfeasance. However, political without strong local elections may exacerbate corruption, as seen in some developing contexts where subnational capture occurs; empirical studies emphasize that market-preserving , with constitutional limits on central interference, yields the strongest effects. This aligns with causal mechanisms where citizens can "vote with their feet," pressuring inefficient or corrupt locales to reform or lose resources. Competition, both in public and private markets, mitigates corruption by eroding rents that incentivize and favoritism, though it requires rules against . In public tenders, open competitive bidding has reduced corruption risks by 20-30% in World Bank-financed projects, as evidenced by lower shares of single-bid contracts post-reform, which proxy for rigged processes. Italian data on investigated procurement officials reveal that discretionary, non-competitive auctions exhibit 2-3 times higher corruption incidence than rule-based competitive ones, with negotiation-based awards enabling kickbacks. In private sectors, historical U.S. from 1850-2000 shows that rising market competition inversely correlates with corporate , as firms in concentrated industries pay higher bribes to secure advantages, while competitive pressures force efficiency over illicit shortcuts. Countervailing studies suggest competition can sometimes amplify cost-side corruption if regulators are captured, but overall, empirical patterns favor competition's disciplinary role when paired with antitrust enforcement.

Transparency Tools: Whistleblower Protections and Open Data

Whistleblower protections refer to legal frameworks designed to shield individuals who disclose evidence of corruption, fraud, or other illegal activities within organizations from retaliation such as dismissal, , or . In the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 established federal protections for corporate whistleblowers following scandals like , prohibiting retaliation and providing remedies through the Department of Labor. The Dodd-Frank Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 extended these to financial sectors, introducing monetary rewards of 10-30% of sanctions exceeding $1 million for tips leading to successful enforcement. Internationally, the European Union's Whistleblower Protection Directive (2019/1937), transposed by member states by December 2021, mandates protections against reprisals and requires reporting channels for public and private sector disclosures. The adopted a model whistleblower in 2010, updated in 2016, influencing hemispheric standards by emphasizing anonymity and non-retaliation. Empirical evidence indicates that robust whistleblower protections increase reporting rates of , thereby aiding detection of corruption, though their deterrent effects depend on quality and cultural factors. A cross-country study found that enacting specific whistleblower laws correlates with statistically significant reductions in perceived corruption levels, as measured by indices like the , particularly in nations with prior high corruption. Experimental research confirms protections foster in controlled settings, raising detection probabilities by up to 20-30% compared to unprotected scenarios, but retaliation risks persist where laws lack teeth, as seen in under-enforced systems. In , legislative protections have been linked to modest declines in graft reports, yet weak judicial follow-through limits broader impact. High-profile cases, such as the 2016 leak by an anonymous whistleblower, exposed global networks, prompting reforms, though the informant faced risks absent strong safeguards. Open data initiatives involve governments and organizations publishing structured, machine-readable datasets on public expenditures, contracts, and decisions to enable external scrutiny and reduce opportunities for hidden corruption. The (OGP), launched in 2011 with over 70 founding members, promotes such releases, with commitments in areas like transparency yielding detectable improvements in bidding competitiveness. Estonia's model, featuring on public finances since the early 2000s, has been associated with corruption reductions, as digital access facilitates real-time audits and citizen monitoring, contributing to its top rankings in global transparency metrics. The World Bank's highlights how releasing data curbs bribery by allowing cross-verification of bids, with case studies showing 5-15% cost savings in reformed systems. However, empirical studies reveal open 's anti-corruption effects are conditional on enabling environments like free media and capacity, rather than automatic. A of 56 transparency interventions found modest overall reductions in corruption ( around 0.1-0.2 standard deviations), but open performs better in high- settings with robust , where it amplifies detection without relying solely on formal institutions. In contrast, low-quality or incomplete datasets, as analyzed through frameworks, can fail to expose graft if pipelines introduce errors or omissions, underscoring that technical openness alone does not guarantee causal deterrence. Integrating whistleblower protections with open enhances efficacy, as protected disclosures can validate or generate datasets for public analysis, forming a feedback loop that pressures corrupt actors through heightened visibility and .

Cultural Shifts: Ethical Education and Incentive Alignment

Ethical programs seek to cultivate long-term societal norms against corruption by embedding principles in formal curricula and ongoing professional training, targeting both youth and public officials to internalize values from an early age. In , the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), established in 1974, has run comprehensive youth education initiatives for over four decades, reaching millions through school modules, media campaigns, and community outreach that emphasize and the societal costs of graft, contributing to a cultural shift that has sustained the territory's low corruption levels since the . Empirical evaluations of similar programs, such as a 2025 study on Indonesian secondary interventions, demonstrate statistically significant improvements in students' (pre-post gains of 25-30%) and self-reported commitment to ethical conduct, though long-term behavioral changes depend on reinforcement beyond classroom settings. A 2023 U4 Resource Centre analysis of global training highlights moderate evidence of reduced unethical intentions among trainees, but stresses that isolated modules yield limited systemic impact without integration into organizational cultures and enforcement mechanisms. Complementing education, incentive alignment restructures rewards and penalties to make honest behavior the rational default, addressing root causes where personal gain from corruption outweighs detection risks. Singapore's framework, overseen by the (CPIB) since 1952, exemplifies this by imposing severe penalties—including fines up to SGD 100,000 and imprisonment for up to seven years under the Prevention of Corruption Act—while enabling asset confiscation, rendering corruption a high-risk, low-yield activity that has kept the nation's corruption conviction rate stable at around 100-150 cases annually despite economic growth. Strategies include merit-based promotions decoupled from discretionary rents and whistleblower rewards, which a 2015 World Bank review identifies as effective in aligning behavioral incentives with integrity by increasing the expected costs of deviance through probabilistic enforcement and social norms. In practice, such alignments have empirically lowered petty corruption in aligned systems; for instance, performance-linked pay in public reduces bribe solicitation by 15-20% in controlled studies, as agents prioritize verifiable outputs over illicit side payments. Successful cultural shifts require synergistic application, as education alone falters without credible incentives, while punitive alignments without ethical foundations risk resentment or evasion. Hong Kong's ICAC combines mandatory training for civil servants with integrity pacts and reporting hotlines, correlating with a decline in detected cases from over 1,000 in 1976 to under 200 by the 2020s, though critics note reliance on perception metrics like the , which may undervalue enforcement rigor. Cross-national evidence from a 2022 integrity-led interventions review indicates that bundled approaches— curricula plus incentive reforms—yield 10-25% greater reductions in reported irregularities than siloed efforts, underscoring causal links between aligned personal incentives and sustained norm adherence. Failures, such as in contexts with weak rule enforcement, reveal that misaligned incentives undermine education; a study links poor training design to persistent unethical acts when rewards favor shortcuts over compliance.

Comparative Perspectives Across Regimes

Democracies vs. Authoritarian Systems: Empirical Outcomes

Empirical assessments, including the (CPI) compiled by , reveal that consolidated democracies exhibit substantially lower perceived corruption levels than authoritarian systems. In the 2023 CPI, which ranks 180 countries on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), the highest scorers— (90), (87), (85), (84), and (82)—are established democracies characterized by strong , independent judiciaries, and competitive elections. Authoritarian regimes dominate the lower ranks, with countries like (11), (13), and (13) reflecting entrenched graft amid centralized power and suppressed dissent. Full democracies averaged a CPI score of 73, compared to 29 for authoritarian regimes, underscoring a broad pattern where democratic accountability correlates with effective corruption controls. This disparity extends beyond perceptions to objective indicators, such as the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators on control of corruption, which similarly favor democracies with free press and electoral turnover. Academic analyses, including cross-national regressions, identify a curvilinear relationship: corruption rises during partial democratization— as in hybrid or competitive authoritarian regimes lacking full institutional checks—before declining in mature democracies. For instance, transitional states often experience heightened elite capture, whereas high-quality democracies leverage electoral sanctions and media scrutiny to deter rent-seeking, reducing corruption by an estimated 0.5 to 1 standard deviation in long-term panels. Hybrid regimes, prevalent in regions like Eastern Europe and Latin America post-1990s, register the highest corruption due to manipulated elections that preserve ruler impunity without genuine opposition. Authoritarian systems, by contrast, sustain lower corruption in select cases through top-down enforcement, as exemplified by Singapore's consistent high ranking (83 in 2023) under one-party dominance and aggressive anti-graft agencies like the , established in 1952. Yet such successes are rare and contingent on leader commitment; personalist autocracies, where rulers prioritize loyalty networks over merit, amplify corruption via unchecked , as evidenced in resource-rich states like under Chávez and Maduro since 1999, where oil rents fueled exceeding 20% of GDP in misallocated contracts. Stable dictatorships without personalism, such as China's post-2012 anti-corruption campaigns under —which prosecuted over 1.5 million officials by 2020—can suppress visible graft but often mask systemic issues like party elite privileges, with underground economy estimates reaching 12% of GDP. Unstable democracies, however, outperform stable autocracies in corruption control, as volatility prompts institutional reforms to secure power. Causal mechanisms in democracies include dispersed power structures that raise detection risks: independent media exposed 78% of major U.S. scandals from 1976–2010, per one study, while term limits and opposition scrutiny impose recurring absent in autocracies. Authoritarian resilience to corruption varies by subtype—electoral autocracies fare worse than closed ones due to facade costs without benefits—but overall, regime duration data from 1946–2010 show democracies converging toward lower equilibrium corruption levels after 20–30 years, driven by norm reinforcement and judicial precedents. Exceptions like highlight that authoritarian low-corruption requires exceptional leadership and cultural factors, but empirical aggregates affirm democracies' superior outcomes through institutionalized pluralism over personalized rule.

Market vs. Centralized Economies: Incentives and Corruption Levels

Market economies, characterized by rights, decentralized decision-making, and competitive pressures, create incentives that limit systemic corruption by making costly and inefficient. Firms and individuals must innovate and compete on merit, reducing reliance on bureaucratic favoritism, as officials lack monopoly control over . Property rights enforcement further deters expropriation or , as and market signals expose malfeasance quickly. Centralized economies, where state planners dictate production, , and distribution, concentrate vast discretionary power in officials' hands, fostering corruption through opportunities for bribe demands on scarce resources or permits. Without price mechanisms or , shortages incentivize black markets and favoritism, as officials exploit their gatekeeping roles without accountability from rivals or consumers. This structure aligns incentives toward personal gain over public welfare, as evidenced in historical planned systems where corruption permeated from elite to local cadres. Empirical data reveals a strong positive between —measured by indices like the Heritage Foundation's —and lower corruption perceptions, as captured by Transparency International's (CPI), where higher scores indicate less corruption. A panel study of 92 developing countries from 1995 to 2021 found that greater significantly reduces corruption levels, with components like secure property rights and open markets exerting causal downward pressure. Countries in the "free" category (scores above 80) consistently average CPI scores exceeding 75, while "repressed" economies (below 50) average below 30, based on cross-country rankings. Illustrative cases underscore these dynamics: South Korea's market-oriented reforms post-1960s yielded a CPI of 63 in 2023, contrasting North Korea's score of 17 amid centralized control and endemic graft. Similarly, Venezuela's shift toward central planning after 1999 correlated with CPI decline from 21 in 1998 to 13 in 2023, driven by state oil monopolies enabling , while market-liberal maintained a CPI of 67. Transition economies like , adopting market institutions post-Soviet collapse, improved from high corruption to a 2023 CPI of 76, versus persistent issues in more centralized former Soviet states. These patterns hold after controlling for income levels, affirming that institutional incentives, not mere wealth, drive outcomes.

Historical and Philosophical Dimensions

Pre-Modern Views: Religious and Classical Thought

In ancient Greek philosophy, corruption was viewed as a deviation from justice and the common good, often arising when rulers prioritized personal gain over civic virtue. Plato, in The Republic (circa 375 BCE), described how unchecked power leads to the corruption of regimes, progressing from aristocracy to timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and ultimately tyranny, where the tyrant, driven by insatiable desires, enslaves the state for self-enrichment. He argued that philosophical guardians must be insulated from wealth and family ties to prevent such moral decay, as exposure to power without wisdom corrupts even the best souls. Aristotle, in Politics (circa 350 BCE), similarly identified corruption as the perversion of constitutions, where kingship devolves into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and polity into democracy through rulers' pursuit of private interests via greed (pleonexia), which undermines distributive justice and habitual virtue. He emphasized that stable regimes require education in virtue to counteract this, noting that corruption manifests habitually when leaders habitually favor kin or allies over merit. Roman thinkers extended these ideas, framing corruption as a threat to republican institutions through and self-interest. (106–43 BCE), in works like , condemned magistrates who accepted bribes or favored private gain, arguing that true statesmanship demands placing the above personal advantage, as corrupt leaders not only harm the state but propagate vice among citizens. He prosecuted cases of judicial corruption, such as in of Oppianicus, highlighting how systemic eroded Rome's legal integrity during the late Republic. viewed such practices as antithetical to and , which demand impartial rule for the common welfare. Religious traditions pre-modernly equated corruption with moral and spiritual infidelity, often condemning leaders who exploited power for gain as betrayers of divine order. In the , prophets like (circa 8th century BCE) denounced Israelite rulers, priests, and prophets for perverting through bribes and false , declaring in Micah 3:11 that "her heads judge for reward, and her priests teach for hire, and her prophets divine for money," leading to under divine judgment. (circa 6th century BCE) similarly excoriated corrupt kings and officials for deceit and exploitation, portraying their actions as covenant violation inviting exile. Early Christian thought inherited this, viewing corruption as against God's . In Islam, the Quran (revealed 610–632 CE) prohibits corruption (fasad) explicitly, as in Surah 2:188, which forbids consuming others' unjustly through deceit, and Surah 5:90, linking it to moral vices like and that undermine communal trust. Hindu texts, such as the (compiled circa 400 BCE–400 CE), catalog 99 forms of corruption through the avaricious acts of figures like the Kauravas, attributing societal decay to rulers' greed and advising (righteous duty) as the antidote. Confucianism (circa 5th century BCE), while not strictly religious, stressed incorruptible officials via ren (benevolence) and ritual propriety; Confucius rejected wealth gained unjustly, stating that success without righteousness is mere disgrace, and advocated merit-based bureaucracy to curb favoritism. These views collectively positioned corruption as a causal agent of , resolvable through aligned with higher principles rather than institutional checks alone.

Modern Analyses: Critiques of Power and Critiques of Utopian Ideals

Public choice theory, pioneered by economists James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in works such as The Calculus of Consent (1962), applies economic reasoning to political behavior, arguing that politicians, bureaucrats, and voters act primarily in self-interest rather than the public good, fostering rent-seeking behaviors like bribery and regulatory capture that manifest as corruption. This framework critiques the idealistic assumption of benevolent governance, positing instead that concentrated decision-making authority incentivizes officials to extract private gains, as evidenced by models where bureaucrats demand bribes to supply public goods inefficiently. Empirical cross-country analyses support this, showing that systems with fewer veto points—where power is less diffused—exhibit higher corruption levels, as measured by indices correlating executive dominance with bribe prevalence in procurement. Building on these insights, modern analyses emphasize how power itself distorts judgment and , amplifying preexisting traits toward self-serving actions; psychological studies indicate that elevated reduces and increases risk-taking for personal benefit, as seen in scandals involving corporate and political leaders where unchecked discretion led to exceeding billions, such as the 2015 FIFA case involving $150 million in bribes. Rather than power universally corrupting the pure-hearted, it magnetizes and exacerbates corruptible individuals, per experimental findings where assigned power roles prompted deceptive resource allocation. This causal mechanism underscores first-principles critiques: without competitive checks akin to markets, power holders face minimal accountability, leading to systemic graft, as documented in models where opaque processes enable non-market exchanges like favoritism in licensing. Critiques of utopian ideals, particularly those envisioning centralized equality through state control, highlight their neglect of human incentives and knowledge limits, inevitably spawning corruption via unaccountable elites; F.A. Hayek's analysis in (1944) argued that planning disperses essential price signals, empowering planners to arbitrarily allocate resources and invite abuse, a dynamic empirically borne out in Soviet-era purges and black markets where officials skimmed 20-30% of state procurements by the 1980s. Utopian blueprints, by assuming moral transformation or perfect altruism, concentrate coercive power without diffusion, fostering rent extraction as rulers prioritize loyalty over efficiency, contrasting with decentralized systems where competition curbs such excesses—evident in post-1991 Eastern Europe's corruption drop after market liberalization reduced state monopolies. These failures stem from causal overreach: idealizing ignores self-interest, enabling high-level graft like Venezuela's scandal, where $2 billion in oil funds vanished amid nationalized control by 2017, illustrating how utopian centralization transmutes egalitarian intent into elite predation.

Debates and Empirical Controversies

Myths: Corruption as Capitalism's Fault or Inevitable in All Systems

The assertion that corruption is an intrinsic fault of contradicts empirical observations linking lower corruption to market-oriented institutions. In the 2023 (CPI), top performers such as (score 90), (87), (85), (84), and (83) feature robust market economies with decentralized decision-making, competitive pressures, and strong , which limit public officials' discretion over private transactions. Conversely, bottom-ranked countries like (13), a case of extensive state control and under socialist policies, exhibit rampant corruption tied to centralized without competitive oversight. These patterns align with research showing that —encompassing property rights, trade openness, and regulatory efficiency—negatively correlates with corruption, as freer markets reduce opportunities by dispersing economic power away from state monopolies. Critiques blaming often originate from ideological sources emphasizing profit motives as corruptive, yet reveals higher corruption in planned economies where state dominance amplifies bureaucratic discretion and opacity. Historical from the demonstrates how centralized planning created vast networks of favoritism and black markets, with party officials wielding unchecked authority over production quotas and distribution. Empirical studies confirm that market competition undermines incentives by eroding the value of exclusive access to resources, as firms bypass corrupt gatekeepers through alternative channels. In developing nations, transitions toward market reforms, such as Chile's post-1973 , correlated with declining corruption indices, contrasting with persistent graft in retained command structures elsewhere in . The claim of corruption's inevitability in all systems dismisses causal variability driven by institutional incentives rather than alone. Corruption thrives under concentrated power lacking , a condition mitigated—not caused—by competitive markets that shrink the public sector's role in economic rents. Singapore's low CPI score, achieved via meritocratic pay competitive with rates and severe anti-graft enforcement, illustrates effective containment in a non-democratic context, while democratic grapples with entrenched despite capitalist elements. Cross-regime data underscores that no system immunizes against abuse, but those prioritizing , transparency, and penalty alignment demonstrably achieve lower levels, refuting both capitalism's culpability and systemic inescapability.

Key Disputes: Cultural Relativism vs. Universal Causality

in the context of corruption posits that perceptions and tolerances of corrupt practices are shaped by societal norms, where behaviors such as , gift-giving, or networks may be viewed as legitimate expressions of or reciprocity rather than abuses of power. Proponents argue that imposing universal definitions risks , as evidenced by anthropological studies highlighting how pre-colonial African or Asian systems integrated through personal ties without the formal of Western bureaucracies. This view has gained traction in some academic circles, potentially influenced by postmodern toward absolute moral standards, leading to claims that anti-corruption efforts in developing nations often reflect rather than objective reform. In contrast, advocates of universal causality maintain that corruption—defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain—arises from invariant human incentives and structural opportunities, such as unchecked in public office or weak enforcement mechanisms, independent of cultural context. Empirical cross-national analyses, including regressions on the (CPI), demonstrate that institutional variables like , , and press freedom explain a larger share of variance in corruption levels than cultural factors alone, with coefficients for institutional quality often exceeding those for Hofstede's cultural dimensions (e.g., power distance or ). For instance, economically similar ethnic groups exhibit stark differences: Singapore's multi-ethnic population scores 83 on the 2023 CPI due to stringent systems, while , sharing Austronesian cultural roots, scores 34 amid patronage politics. Similarly, post-communist shows convergence toward lower corruption in EU-integrated states with adopted institutional reforms, overriding Soviet-era cultural legacies. The debate intensifies over causal persistence: some experimental studies using corruption games find cultural norms influencing bribe acceptance rates, suggesting intergenerational transmission of attitudes that resist institutional fixes. However, field evidence from rapid reforms challenges this, as Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution dismantled corrupt networks through depoliticized policing and e-governance, dropping its CPI score from 18 in 2003 to 56 by 2023 without altering core cultural values. Universal causality gains support from outcome universality: high corruption correlates with reduced GDP growth (e.g., a 1-point CPI increase links to 0.13% higher annual growth across 100+ countries from 1995–2015) and elevated infant mortality, effects consistent across Confucian, Latin American, and Sub-Saharan contexts, implying causal mechanisms transcend relativism. Critiques of relativism highlight its potential to perpetuate equilibria where citizens rationalize participation in corrupt systems, as modeled in game-theoretic traps, while institutional causality aligns with first-principles opportunism under asymmetric information. Academic emphasis on culture may reflect biases toward avoiding normative judgments, yet data prioritize causal interventions like incentive realignment over cultural reprogramming.

References

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