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MV Spice Islander I
MV Spice Islander I
MV Spice Islander I
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Spice Islander I in Stone Town 2010
History
Name
  • Marianna (1967–1988)
  • Apostolos P (1988–2007)
  • Spice Islander I (2007–2011)
Owner
  • Thelogos P Naftiliaki (−1988)
  • Apostolos Shipping (1988–1999)
  • Saronikos Ferries (1999–2005)
  • Hellenic Seaways (2005–2007)
  • Makame Hasnuu (2007–2011)
Port of registry
  • Greece Piraeus, Greece (1967–2007)
  • Honduras San Lorenzo, Honduras (2007– )
  • Tanzania Zanzibar, Tanzania ( –2011)
Way number456
Launched1967
Completed1967
Out of service10 September 2011 (sank)
Identification
FateSank
General characteristics
Class & typeMarry
Tonnage
  • 836 GRT
  • 663 NRT
  • 225 DWT
Length60.00 metres (196.85 ft)
Beam11.40 metres (37.4 ft)
Installed power2 Poyaud 12VUD25 diesel engines
PropulsionScrew propeller
Capacity645 passengers
Crew45 crew

5°39′23″S 39°28′27″E / 5.65639°S 39.47417°E / -5.65639; 39.47417

Spice Islander I under tow by USS Stout in 2007

Spice Islander I was a 836 GRT Ro-Ro ferry which was built in Greece in 1967 as Marianna. She was renamed Apostolos P following a sale in 1988. She was sold to a Honduran company in 2007 and renamed Spice Islander I. On 10 September 2011, she sank, resulting in the deaths of 1,573 people, many of whom were never recovered.[2]

Description

[edit]

The ship was 60.00 metres (196.85 ft) long, with a beam of 11.40 metres (37.4 ft). She was assessed at 836 GRT, 663 NRT, 225 DWT. The ship was propelled by two Poyaud 12VUD25 diesel engines, of 1,560 horsepower (1,160 kW).[3]

History

[edit]

Built in 1967 as Marianna for an unknown owner, she was later sold to Theologos P. Naftiliaki of Piraeus, Greece. In 1988, Marianna was sold to Apostolos Shipping and renamed Apostolos P. She was later sold to Saronikos Ferries and placed in service on the Piraeus – Aegina – Agistri route.[3]

In 2005, Apostolos P was registered to Hellenic Seaways. In 2007, she was sold to Makame Hasnuu of Zanzibar, Tanzania, and renamed Spice Islander I.[3]

On 25 September 2007, Spice Islander I was off the coast of Somalia when she experienced engine problems due to contaminated fuel. After the alarm had been raised via Kenya, USS Stout from Combined Task Force 150 was sent to her aid.[4] The ship was on a voyage from Oman to Tanzania and was not carrying any passengers. USS James E. Williams also responded. Stout provided the ship with 7,800 US gallons (30,000 L; 6,500 imp gal) of fuel and supplied the ten crew with food and water. After her engines were restarted, she resumed her voyage to Tanzania.[5]

Loss

[edit]
Main article: Sinking of MV Spice Islander I

At 21:00 local time (19:00 UTC) on 9 September 2011, Spice Islander I set sail from Unguja for Pemba Island. She was reported to have been carrying an excess of 800 passengers.[6] Her capacity was 45 crew and 654 passengers.[3] At around 01:00, (local time) on 10 September (23:00, 9 September UTC) Spice Islander I sank between Zanzibar and Pemba. Of those on board, 620 were rescued.[6] Only 240 bodies were recovered,[7] and the death toll was placed at 2,976;[8] however, this estimate was revised downward in January 2012 to 1,573.[2]

References

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MV Spice Islander I

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from Grokipedia
The MV Spice Islander I was a 44-year-old inter-island passenger ferry operating in the coastal waters of , primarily serving routes between the mainland , (Zanzibar Island), and . On 10 September 2011, the vessel capsized and sank off the coast of , en route to , due to severe overloading and engine failure in rough seas, resulting in approximately 200 fatalities. Licensed to carry 600 passengers and crew along with cargo, the Spice Islander I departed with at least 800 people on board, including motor vehicles, food supplies, and other goods, far exceeding its capacity and stability limits. The sinking occurred early in the morning, about three hours after leaving port, when the ferry listed heavily and overturned, trapping many inside the hull. operations involving local boats and fishing vessels recovered around 620 survivors, but hopes for additional rescues faded within days as the death toll rose amid ongoing body recoveries from the wreckage. The disaster prompted immediate investigations by Tanzanian authorities, leading to charges against four individuals—including the ship's captain and owner representatives—for and endangering safety through overloading and inadequate maintenance. It underscored persistent safety challenges in Tanzania's sector, including lax enforcement of regulations, outdated vessels, and high demand for affordable transport in the , spurring temporary bans on sailings and calls for stricter oversight.

Ship Overview

Design and Construction

The MV Spice Islander I was constructed in in as a roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) passenger ferry named Marianna for an unidentified initial owner. This vessel was designed primarily for short coastal passenger services, featuring basic accommodations for travelers and capacity for vehicular and cargo transport typical of Ro-Ro ferries of the era. Measuring 60 meters in length with a beam of 11.4 meters, it had a gross tonnage of 836 GT and was built to accommodate up to 645 passengers in standard configuration. The ship's propulsion system consisted of two Poyaud 12VUD25 diesel engines driving twin screws, delivering a total of 1,560 horsepower and enabling a service speed of approximately 11.5 knots. Following its initial service in Greek waters, the Marianna was later sold to Theologos P. Naftiliaki of , . In 1988, it was sold to Apostolos Shipping Co. of , , and renamed Apostolos P. After renaming to Apostolos P in 1988 under Apostolos Shipping Co., it operated under from 1999 until its sale in 2007. It was acquired in 2007 by Makame Hasnuu of , , and renamed Spice Islander I. At this stage, no major structural modifications were reported, preserving its original Greek-built design for inter-island routes, though it was later adapted for -Pemba crossings with provisions for and limited .

Specifications and Capacity

The MV Spice Islander I was a and ro-ro with an official rated capacity of 645 in addition to 45 crew members. This steel-hulled vessel, measuring 60 meters in length and 11.4 meters in beam, had a gross registered of 836 and was powered by two Poyaud 12VUD25 diesel engines providing 1,560 horsepower. Designed primarily for domestic inter-island service, it was certified for operations in coastal waters around , limiting its seaworthiness to sheltered routes rather than extended open-ocean voyages. The ship had a deadweight tonnage of 225 tons, focused on essential provisions such as , foodstuffs, and goods to support communities. In calm conditions, it achieved a maximum speed of 11.5 knots via screw propeller . Safety equipment included basic lifeboats sufficient for roughly 300 individuals, along with life jackets and rudimentary suppression capabilities, though the absence of advanced stability or automated systems reflected its age and original standards from 1967.

Operational History

Service Routes and Ownership

The MV Spice Islander I operated routes connecting the mainland to the islands, as well as between () and Pemba islands within Tanzania's , providing an essential transportation link for passengers and cargo between these locations. This service supported the daily movement of local residents, traders transporting goods and provisions, and tourists visiting the region's popular destinations. Typical voyages consisted of regular crossings lasting approximately three to four hours, departing from ports on bound for Pemba. The vessel entered service in in 2007 following transfers from international operators in , where it had previously sailed under names such as Marianna, Apostolos P, and others managed by companies including Apostolos Shipping and . From 2007 onward, it was owned by Zanzibari businessman Makame Hasnuu, who renamed it Spice Islander I upon acquisition.

Pre-Sinking Incidents and Safety Concerns

Throughout the 2000s, the ferry system faced chronic overcrowding driven by surging passenger demand between the islands and the mainland, coupled with a limited number of aging vessels unable to meet needs. Operators often exceeded capacity limits to capitalize on affordable fares, exacerbating safety risks in the region's rough seas. MV Spice Islander I exhibited early signs of mechanical unreliability. In September 2007, while transiting without passengers from to off the coast of , the vessel suffered engine failure due to contaminated fuel, requiring assistance to resume its journey. This incident highlighted ongoing concerns about the ship's propulsion system, powered by two aging diesel engines. The vessel's operators were repeatedly accused of disregarding passenger limits on Spice Islander I and similar ferries, a practice common in the fleet to accommodate high volumes despite the vessel's rated capacity of 645 passengers. Such overloads drew regulatory , though remained inconsistent owing to understaffed authorities like the newly formed Zanzibar Maritime Authority in 2009. Prior to 2011, Spice Islander I experienced no major accidents, but passengers frequently reported instability and discomfort during voyages in rough weather, with locals in describing the ferry as a "disaster waiting to happen" due to its age and condition. These complaints underscored broader vulnerabilities in hull integrity and stability for the 1967-built vessel.

The 2011 Sinking

Departure from Unguja

On the evening of September 10, 2011, the MV Spice Islander I departed from Stone Town port on island, heading toward in the . The vessel, licensed to carry up to 645 passengers and 45 crew members, had an official manifest listing over 500 passengers, though reports indicated at least 800 individuals boarded, with severe pushing the actual number to an estimated 1,000 or more, including many standing on the open deck. The was heavily laden with that exacerbated its from the outset, including motor vehicles, bags of provisions such as , and building materials like sacks, loaded unevenly across the decks. Even as it prepared to depart, the ship began to list noticeably due to the overload, prompting some passengers to attempt to disembark; however, crew members prevented this by removing access ladders, forcing most to remain aboard despite the evident risks. Initial weather conditions in the Zanzibar Channel were favorable, featuring clear skies and light winds that offered no immediate indication of trouble. The crew of approximately 45, under the command of Captain Said Abdallah Kinyanyite, proceeded with the voyage despite concerns over the excessive loading and passenger numbers.

Capsizing Sequence

The MV Spice Islander I departed from port on at approximately 21:00 EAT on 10 September 2011, bound for , despite visible listing at the dock caused by severe overloading with passengers and cargo. Crew members prevented passengers from disembarking by removing access ladders, allowing the voyage to proceed. Roughly four hours into the journey, around 01:00 EAT on 11 September, the vessel experienced engine failure, attributed to the excessive strain from overloading, which led to a loss of power and an initial list to starboard. In the ensuing panic, passengers rushed to the side for balance, further destabilizing the ship and accelerating the tilt. Water then rushed through open deck areas and unsecured hatches, flooding the lower compartments and ultimately killing the engines completely. The ferry fully capsized in the Zanzibar Channel, approximately 30 km off the northern coast of near Nungwi Beach, in deep waters of the characterized by strong currents. Rapid flooding trapped numerous passengers below decks amid shifted cargo, contributing to the vessel's swift sinking without recovery. No formal distress signal was transmitted from the ship due to a breakdown in onboard communications; the incident was initially reported through mobile phone calls from passengers to relatives ashore around the time of capsizing.

Casualties and Immediate Response

Death Toll Estimates

The official Tanzanian government investigative report, published on 19 January 2012, determined that the MV Spice Islander I carried 2,470 passengers and crew at the time of sinking, with 203 confirmed deaths, 1,370 individuals reported missing (bringing the presumed total death toll to 1,573), and initial reports citing approximately 620 survivors. Discrepancies in passenger counts arose due to incomplete manifests and overcrowding, leaving challenges in fully accounting for all aboard given the vessel's position in deep water approximately 30 kilometers off the coast. Independent assessments and later analyses suggested a potentially higher fatality count, ranging from 1,500 to over 2,000 deaths, as many bodies were believed to have sunk without trace in the currents. These estimates arose from discrepancies in initial passenger manifests and survivor accounts indicating severe beyond official records, with the total aboard possibly exceeding 3,000 including undocumented travelers. The victims were predominantly Zanzibari locals, comprising families—particularly women and children—returning from mainland after celebrating the end of . Few international were aboard, as the route primarily served inter-island commuters rather than leisure travelers. Contributing to the high toll were factors such as extreme that exceeded the vessel's capacity of 645 passengers and 45 crew by nearly fourfold, a scarcity of life jackets among the passengers, and the nighttime timing of the , which hindered immediate and response. Recovery efforts yielded about 240 bodies by mid-September 2011, many of which were identified through initiatives involving families and villagers who recognized personal effects and features. Dozens more washed ashore in the days following, wrapped in blankets and transported to hospitals for processing.

Rescue Operations

Following the of the MV Spice Islander I in the early hours of , 2011, efforts were triggered when some survivors managed to reach the shores of island and notify local authorities. Operations began that evening, with local fishing boats and privately owned fast ferries leading the initial response in the challenging nighttime conditions off the coast of . police, soldiers, and workers coordinated the search from harbor, supported by aerial assistance from helicopters, including one piloted by a South African captain who helped spot survivors in the water. The search and rescue phase lasted approximately 48 hours, extending into September 12 as divers attempted to access the wreck lying 400 meters underwater. Key challenges included the darkness, strong currents in the Zanzibar Channel, high waves, and a widespread debris field that complicated locating individuals adrift. By the end of September 11, over 600 survivors had been pulled from the sea and transported back to Stone Town, where a temporary rescue center was established at the harbor and Maisara grounds for triage and identification. Many of these survivors suffered severe injuries, including dehydration, physical wounds, and internal trauma, and received treatment at Mnazi Mmoja Hospital in Stone Town. Survivor accounts highlighted the desperation of those awaiting , with many clinging to floating such as mattresses, refrigerators, and wooden planks for up to seven hours amid the rough seas. Some individuals swam several kilometers toward before being spotted, while others were guided to vessels by helicopter lights sweeping the area. The Zanzibar maritime authorities oversaw the overall coordination, emphasizing the role of community and vessels in saving lives despite the limited availability of life-saving equipment on the overcrowded .

Aftermath and Legacy

Official Investigation

The Tanzanian government established a commission of inquiry into the sinking of MV Spice Islander I shortly after the incident on September 10, 2011, under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport. The investigation examined the vessel's operations, loading practices, and regulatory oversight. The final report was published on January 19, 2012, providing a detailed analysis of the disaster's causes and contributing factors. Key findings identified severe overloading as the primary cause, with the ferry carrying 2,470 passengers—over four times its certified capacity of 600—leading to instability and . Secondary causes included engine failure attributed to inadequate maintenance and operational , which prevented the vessel from maneuvering effectively in rough seas. The also noted the lack of of protocols at the port of departure, exacerbating the risks. These conclusions were supported by survivor testimonies, wreckage analysis, and records of the ship's condition. Responsibility was attributed to multiple parties, including the captain, crew, vessel owner Yusuf Suleiman Jussa, and port authorities for failing to conduct proper loading checks and allowing the departure despite evident . In response, nine individuals were initially charged with and endangering lives through , while broader culpability was placed on lax regulatory oversight. The investigation briefly referenced the ship's history of safety lapses, underscoring systemic issues in vessel upkeep. The report issued recommendations for enhanced maritime safety, including stricter vessel licensing requirements, mandatory real-time enforcement of passenger and cargo capacities, and routine inspections to verify maintenance compliance. Legally, while initial charges led to trials, the Zanzibar High Court acquitted 12 accused individuals in April 2021 on technical grounds, including defective charge sheets and incomplete investigations, resulting in no major imprisonments or fines. The MV Spice Islander I was officially declared a total loss and not salvaged.

Safety Reforms and Subsequent Events

Following the 2011 sinking of MV Spice Islander I, implemented maritime safety reforms, including a 2012 directive requiring all imported sea vessels to be no more than 15 years old upon entry and mandating compulsory seaworthiness inspections before operations. These measures aimed to address chronic issues like vessel age and maintenance, building on existing frameworks such as the Merchant Shipping Act No. 21 of 2003 and the Zanzibar Maritime Transport Act of 2006, which enforce compliance with (IMO) standards for passenger ferries, including limits on passengers and cargo. Recommendations from post-disaster analyses emphasized enhanced inspections by the Maritime Authority to verify safety equipment, such as ensuring life jackets are accessible, properly marked, and sufficient in number per SOLAS conventions, though implementation challenges persisted with inadequate passenger briefings on their use. Overloading fines were introduced under these acts, with penalties for non-compliance escalating to deter operators from exceeding capacity limits. Annual seaworthiness audits became standard for ferries to monitor structural integrity and emergency preparedness. Major operator Azam Marine responded by modernizing its fleet, replacing older vessels with high-speed, fuel-efficient catamarans designed for enhanced safety and capacity, such as the Incat Crowther-built Kilimanjaro series introduced in the years following the disaster. These upgrades included advanced hull designs and quality-assured systems to reduce risks like , reflecting a broader industry shift toward reliable transport between and . The sinking of MV Skagit on July 18, 2012, near Chumbe Island off , underscored the limitations of early reforms, as the overcrowded ferry—carrying at least 290 passengers despite a 250-person capacity—capsized, resulting in at least 63 confirmed deaths and estimates exceeding 140. This incident, occurring less than a year after the Spice Islander I tragedy, highlighted persistent enforcement gaps in overloading prevention. The disaster spurred international assistance for Tanzanian maritime safety, with the IMO offering for investigations and capacity-building to align local operations with global standards. Annual memorials on commemorate the victims, fostering public awareness of ongoing risks. Despite these changes, audits into the reveal persistent safety gaps, including the lack of passenger-counting systems at key stations, enabling overloading during peak times and violating national regulations. The Controller and Auditor General's 2023/2024 noted that 56% of state ferries were non-operational due to delayed inspections and repairs, exacerbating vulnerabilities in the sector.

References

  1. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14864400
  2. https://www.reuters.com/article/tanzania-ferry-idUKL5E7KB06B20110911/
  3. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/four-charged-over-zanzibar-ferry-disaster-idUSJOE78G03H/
  4. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/9/11/hope-fades-for-zanzibar-disaster-survivors
  5. https://safety4sea.com/zanzibar-ferry-disaster-hopes-of-finding-more-survivors-fade/
  6. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/slim-hope-for-more-survivors-from-zanzibar-ferry-idUSTRE7890PJ/
  7. https://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?164131
  8. http://www.ferrysafety.org/documents/Ferry_Safety-in_Dar_Es_Salaam.pdf
  9. http://www.zanzinews.com/2011/09/mv-spice-islander-asili-yake.html
  10. https://www.wikiwand.com/en/articles/MV_Spice_Islander_I
  11. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367655578_Safety_of_domestic_ferries_A_scoping_study_of_seven_high-risk_countries
  12. https://www.theelephant.info/analysis/2018/10/04/that-sinking-feeling-who-is-to-blame-for-the-mv-nyerere-ferry-disaster/
  13. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/sep/13/zanzibar-ferry-disasters-mv-spice-islander
  14. https://allafrica.com/stories/201201230263.html
  15. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna44465501
  16. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/9/10/scores-drowned-in-zanzibar-ferry-sinking
  17. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-09-12/divers-to-recover-zanzibar-ferry-bodies/2882248
  18. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AkFVoTOkOn0
  19. https://globalnews.ca/news/153093/ship-carrying-at-least-600-sinks-off-tanzanian-coast-nearly-200-bodies-recovered/
  20. https://allafrica.com/stories/202009160508.html
  21. https://stm-stmvalidation.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/uploads/20160420153038/ML2-D4.4.1-Report-on-Maritime-Accidents.pdf
  22. https://www.euronews.com/2018/09/21/lake-victoria-ferry-disaster-in-tanzania-what-we-know
  23. https://safety4sea.com/tanzania-ferry-death-toll-may-rise-sharply/
  24. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/opinion/columnists/protected-presidents-drowning-citizens--1407946
  25. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14869596
  26. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tanzania-ferry-survivors/survivors-say-zanzibar-ferry-was-overcrowded-idUKTRE78929J20110910/
  27. https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/court-frees-12-charged-in-connection-with-ferry-disaster-2511756
  28. https://kibogoji.com/2018/09/21/analyzing-mv-spice-islanders-investigation-report-in-light-of-the-mv-nyerere-ferry-sinking-in-mwanza-region-of-tanzania/
  29. https://allafrica.com/stories/201207260186.html
  30. https://ijecm.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/4741.pdf
  31. https://www.rivieramm.com/news-content-hub/news-content-hub/tanzanian-operator-azam-marine-welcomes-new-ferry-with-design-enhancements-86183
  32. https://www.marinelog.com/news/azam-marine-adds-another-incat-crowther-to-its-fleet/
  33. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-18899397
  34. https://www.reuters.com/article/business/at-least-68-dead-in-zanzibar-ferry-disaster-idUSLNE86J01N/
  35. https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/09/386202
  36. https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/unlicensed-vessels-poor-ferry-services-in-tanzania-draw-cag-scrutiny-5005884
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