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Pak Jong-chon
Pak Jong-chon
Pak Jong-chon
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Pak Jong-chon (Korean: 박정천) is a North Korean Marshal who is a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK).

Key Information

Biography

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In 2014, he was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Chief of Fire Command at the General Staff. However, he was demoted to Major General in 2015 and the Deputy Chief of Staff was fired.[citation needed] In 2016 he was promoted to Lieutenant General and was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and Director General of the General Staff Department. He was promoted to Colonel General in 2017. He was promoted to General of the Army on April 14, 2019, and was appointed Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, having replaced Ri Yong-gil. The appointment is attributed to the successful launch of the new short-range ballistic missile as Artillery Director.[citation needed]

Pak also accompanied Kim Jong Un to the ceremony to the upgrading of the status of Samjiyon from a county (kun) status to a city which was described by the news as a socialist "paradise". He also has accompanied Kim Jong Un to Mt. Paektu and was seen riding near him on a horse.[1]

On May 23, 2020, Pak was promoted to vice marshal. He is often considered a "rising star" in the North Korean power hierarchy.[2]

On 5 October 2020, Pak was promoted to Marshal of the Korean People's Army.[3]

He was reportedly stripped of his Marshal title and demoted to alternate Politburo member in June 2021, following an unspecified "grave incident". In September, however, he was promoted to member of the Politburo Presidium and transferred from his military role to a position as secretary of the Central Committee.[4] On 25 April 2022 he was disclosed as a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea.

On 1 January 2023, he was removed as the vice chairman of the CMC. He was also dismissed as secretary of the Central Committee.[5]

On 31 August 2023 Kim Jong-Un visited the Training Command Post of the KPA General Staff Department where he was accompanied by Defense Minister Kang Sun-Nam and Marshal Pak Jong-chon reappearing in military duties, some sources speculated that Pak was given the title Director of the Political Leadership over Military Affairs of the Central Committee of the WPK.[6]

On 9 September 2023, he was seen wearing a Marshal of the KPA Uniform and insignia similar to Ri Pyong-chol's uniform.[citation needed]

On 10 September 2023, he left with Kim Jong-un and several officials from the Workers Party, and Armed Forces Organ. On 12 September 2023 Pak and several officials including Defense Minister Kang Sun-Nam and Ri Pyong-chol arrived at Russia for a summit with Vladimir Putin which may discuss arms deal that are not supported by the UN Security Council. Pak was seen wearing a tag with his name Pak Jong Chon and a long title on the upper text of his tag which translates to "Director of the Political Leadership over Military Affairs of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea Pak Jong Chon".[7]

On 31 December 2023, during a plenary meeting of the WPK Central Committee, Pak was reinstated as a vice chairman of the CMC.[8] He was also elected as a member of the WPK Politburo and a secretary of the Central Committee.[8]

References

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Pak Jong-chon

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Pak Jong-chon is a North Korean military officer holding the rank of , the highest in the (KPA), and serves as a secretary of the (WPK) responsible for military political leadership, as well as vice chairman of the WPK Central Military Commission. His career trajectory reflects rapid advancement under , beginning as commander of KPA artillery forces, where he specialized in large-caliber systems and reportedly instructed the supreme leader on artillery operations during Kim's early tenure. Promoted to in 2017 after prior demotions and restorations, he ascended to vice chief of the KPA General Staff in 2014 and full from 2019 to 2021, overseeing operational command and drills amid heightened tensions. In 2020, personally elevated him to vice marshal and later marshal, alongside Politburo membership, positioning him as the regime's second-most influential military figure. Pak's prominence was interrupted by his abrupt dismissal in late 2022, announced in early 2023, which analysts attributed to potential internal rivalries or policy shifts, though unconfirmed by ; he was swiftly reinstated by December 2023 to a deputy leadership role in the Central Military Commission, underscoring the of elite loyalty in North Korea's power structure. His oversight of artillery-centric exercises and advocacy against joint U.S.- drills highlight his role in bolstering the KPA's deterrence posture, with no publicly documented personal controversies beyond regime purges.

Early Military Career

Initial Assignments and Promotions

Pak Jong-chon assumed leadership of the (KPA) Artillery Command in 2012, a position that aligned with his concurrent promotion to the rank of , marking his entry into senior command roles focused on conventional capabilities. This assignment placed him in charge of coordinating North Korea's vast assets, which include thousands of conventional pieces positioned to threaten targets in , underscoring the regime's strategic reliance on as a primary deterrent in its asymmetric military posture. His progression reflected the hierarchical rigidity of the KPA, where promotions are tied to demonstrated loyalty and operational effectiveness under the Supreme Commander's oversight. By early 2013, Pak advanced to the rank of , enabling expanded responsibilities in firepower integration across KPA units. These steps positioned him amid North Korea's post-2011 military reorganization under , prioritizing modernization and drill proficiency to maintain credible threats against perceived adversaries.

Rise in the Korean People's Army

Artillery Leadership and Key Appointments

Pak Jong-chon established his military career through specialized roles in operations within the (KPA). In 2012, he was assigned as head of the KPA Command, a critical entity responsible for overseeing North Korea's extensive conventional firepower assets, and was concurrently promoted to the rank of one-star general. This appointment aligned with the mid-2010s reorganization of structures under , emphasizing enhanced command over long-range and multiple rocket systems as core elements of asymmetric deterrence strategy. In July 2014, Pak received dual key appointments as Deputy Chief of Staff of the KPA General Staff Department and Chief of the Firepower Command, the latter succeeding the former Artillery Guidance Bureau and consolidating control over operational firepower execution. These roles elevated his influence during the leadership transition following Kim Jong Il's death, focusing on practical artillery integration into broader KPA tactics amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Reports from North Korean sources and defectors indicate Pak's direct involvement in instructing Kim Jong Un on artillery tactics and maneuvers during the leader's early consolidation of power, underscoring his role in operational mentorship rather than purely administrative duties. Pak's artillery expertise contributed to a rapid promotion trajectory reflecting Kim Jong Un's trust in his capabilities for firepower-centric warfare. He advanced to by 2017, then to on April 14, 2019, positioning him for higher strategic oversight. In May 2020, by direct order from , Pak was elevated to the rank of Vice Marshal—the first such promotion under the young leader—affirming his proven reliability in artillery command and execution.

Tenure as Chief of the General Staff

Operational Roles and Military Developments

Pak Jong-chon assumed the role of of the (KPA) in April 2020, becoming the second-highest-ranking military officer after Supreme Commander , with responsibilities for operational planning, troop readiness, and execution of defense exercises. His promotion to Vice Marshal on May 23, 2020, by direct order of further solidified his authority over KPA forces, emphasizing and firepower integration into broader strategic operations. In this capacity, Pak directed efforts to refine precision strike doctrines, leveraging his prior experience as head of the KPA's command to prioritize mobile and rapid-response systems amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Throughout 2021, Pak oversaw multiple high-profile drills demonstrating advancements in and capabilities. On September 16, 2021, he guided the inaugural test-firing of a railway-borne , verifying the system's operational viability for concealed deployment and swift launches, which described as enhancing survivability against preemptive strikes. This exercise highlighted tactical innovations in mobile launch platforms, allowing missiles to evade detection by relocating along rail networks. Later, on November 6, 2021, Pak inspected and directed an artillery firing competition involving KPA frontline units, focusing on improving accuracy, mobility, and real-time firepower coordination to bolster . These operational roles contributed to North Korea's reported progress in self-defensive weaponry, with drills underscoring integration of tactical missiles into systems for asymmetric deterrence. State outlets claimed such developments strengthened precision-guided arsenals, though independent verification of performance metrics remained limited due to the closed nature of DPRK testing. Pak's guidance in these activities aligned with directives to modernize KPA forces for rapid, evasive strikes, reflecting a doctrinal shift toward technology-enhanced conventional threats over the period leading to his 2023 dismissal.

Dismissal and Reinstatement

Events of 2022–2023 and Internal Dynamics

In late December 2022, during the 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th of the , Pak Jong-chon was dismissed from his role as of the and as a secretary of the , with the decision announced by official reports on January 1, 2023. No explicit reasons for the dismissal were provided in , leading many international analysts to interpret it as a purge indicative of internal power struggles, loyalty tests under , or shifts in military policy priorities amid heightened tensions with the and . By December 2023, Pak was reinstated as vice chairman of the Workers' Party's Central Military Commission during a five-day plenary meeting of the , a position overseeing key aspects of armed forces command and strategy, as confirmed by and his subsequent public appearances alongside at military inspections. This rapid return highlighted the fluid nature of elite positioning in North Korean politics, where dismissals do not always equate to permanent downfall but may serve as mechanisms for realignment or demonstration of regime control. Analyst interpretations diverged on the underlying dynamics: mainstream Western outlets emphasized purge narratives tied to potential disloyalty or failure in artillery-focused doctrines during 2022 missile tests, while sources with North Korean defector networks, such as , argued for a tactical repositioning rather than execution of downfall, citing Pak's preserved rank and influence as evidence against sensationalized accounts of irreversible ousting. The opacity of Pyongyang's decision-making processes underscores challenges in verifying motives, with state media's silence on causes privileging observable personnel shifts over speculative causal attributions.

Recent Military Activities

Oversight of Drills and Weapon Tests Post-2023

In August 2025, Pak Jong-chon, alongside , oversaw (KPA) firing drills conducted as a warning to the and ahead of their joint exercises, with state media emphasizing enhanced combat readiness against perceived external threats. These exercises involved and troop maneuvers, reported by the (KCNA) as demonstrating the KPA's ability to respond decisively to alliance activities. On October 22, 2025, Pak supervised the test-firing of a new hypersonic missile system, which KCNA described as successfully verifying structural and technical indices for a tactical weapon with hypersonic glide capabilities. He stated that the development proved the "steadily upgrading self-defensive technical capabilities" of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), amid heightened tensions coinciding with the (APEC) summit in . The tests involved multiple projectiles launched from a transporter-erector-launcher, signaling advancements in precision strike options for multi-domain operations.

Political and Party Roles

Positions in the Workers' Party of Korea

Pak Jong-chon holds the position of Secretary of the of the (WPK), a role entailing supervision of party operations with a focus on military and security domains. This appointment, solidified through internal promotions in the early , positions him to enforce WPK policies across state institutions, including ideological guidance for defense structures. As Vice Chairman of the WPK Central Military Commission (CMC), Pak assists Chairman Kim Jong Un in directing Korean People's Army (KPA) strategy to conform with party mandates, ensuring military actions advance WPK objectives without independent operational autonomy. The CMC functions as the paramount organ for integrating armed forces under party supremacy, a mechanism that fuses political oversight with command hierarchies to prevent deviations from core directives. His tenure in this vice chairmanship, reinstated in December 2023 following prior adjustments, persisted into 2025, as evidenced by official engagements. Pak also directs the WPK Department of Political Leadership of the Military, which embeds party cadres within KPA units to maintain ideological discipline and loyalty, thereby subordinating tactical decisions to WPK priorities. In this capacity, he has contributed to statements justifying military enhancements as sovereign responses to external pressures, such as a 2025 declaration asserting that DPRK actions would compel adversaries to view their exercises as futile, thereby upholding a posture of self-reliant defense. These roles collectively exemplify the institutionalized party dominance over military apparatus in North Korean .

International Status and Sanctions

U.S. and Allied Designations

In December 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's (OFAC) designated Pak Jong-chon under 13722 for acting as a key facilitator in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) illicit financial activities and military support to , specifically citing his role as Vice Chair of the (WPK) Central Military Commission. This sanction freezes any U.S.-jurisdiction assets and prohibits transactions with Pak, reflecting concerns over his involvement in high-profile events tied to DPRK military advancements, including oversight of and programs that enhance nuclear-capable delivery systems. Empirical data on DPRK's hypersonic tests, such as those conducted in October 2025 under Pak's reported guidance, underscore the escalatory nature of these capabilities, which prioritize offensive range and maneuverability over defensive postures. Allied frameworks have aligned with U.S. actions, with the adding Pak to its sanctions list via Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/3152 on December 16, 2024, for his accompaniment of during a September 2023 visit to alongside military and arms officials, amid DPRK's provision of munitions to support 's invasion. These designations emphasize causal links between Pak's command positions and DPRK's proliferation of ballistic missiles and , which have included over 100 tests since 2022, demonstrating iterative improvements in solid-fuel and (MIRV) technologies rather than mere deterrence signals. Such measures counter narratives minimizing DPRK threats by focusing on verifiable escalations, including troop deployments to and advancements in systems capable of striking U.S. allies like and . No direct designation specifically names Pak, though his activities fall under broader DPRK sanctions regimes targeting weapons programs established since 2006.

References

  1. http://www.vok.rep.kp/index.php/revo_de/getDetail/ien250404009/en
  2. https://www.38north.org/2025/07/north-korea-reiterates-partys-precedence-over-the-military-conducts-sweeping-changes-in-kpa-leadership/
  3. https://www.dailynk.com/english/new-details-revealed-north-korea-recent-naming-pak-jong-chon-key-positions-power/
  4. https://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/leadership-biographies/col-gen-pak-jong-chon/
  5. https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/Q16905280/
  6. https://www.nknews.org/2020/05/rising-stars-north-korea-promotes-two-high-profile-military-officials/
  7. https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/02/asia/north-korea-military-official-fired-intl-hnk
  8. https://www.koreaherald.com/article/3290945
  9. https://www.sentinelassam.com/more-news/international/pak-jong-chon-second-most-powerful-military-official-in-north-korea-fired-by-kim-jong-un-631120
  10. https://www.nknews.org/2014/07/pak-jong-chon-appointed-vice-chief-of-general-staff/
  11. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2021/202109/news16/20210916-01ee.html
  12. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/PYH20210916010400315
  13. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211107000600325
  14. https://www.nknews.org/2021/11/north-korea-launches-artillery-drill-to-increase-combat-capabilities/
  15. https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1631739672-562011738/secretary-pak-jong-chon-guides-launching-drill-of-railway-mobile-missile-regiment-for-inspection/
  16. https://www.38north.org/2021/09/its-the-launcher-not-the-missile-initial-evaluation-of-north-koreas-rail-mobile-missile-launches/
  17. https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/north-koreas-kim-sacks-no-2-military-official-2023-01-02/
  18. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230101002300325
  19. https://www.dailynk.com/english/a-different-take-pak-jong-chon-supposed-sacking/
  20. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/northkorea/20231231/sacked-nk-military-official-returns-to-no-2-post-of-military
  21. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20250812000751315
  22. https://news.usni.org/2025/10/23/north-korea-tests-hypersonic-missile-system
  23. https://defence-blog.com/u-s-military-vows-readiness-after-north-korea-hypersonic-missile-test/
  24. https://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-pictures-hypersonic-missile-warning-trump-10925481
  25. https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1667320625-674221250/press-statement-of-secretary-of-wpk-central-committee-pak-jong-chon/
  26. https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1757994616-13662038/Press-Statement-Issued-by-Vice-Chairman-of-WPK-Central-Military-Commission/
  27. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2751
  28. https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241216
  29. https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=52117
  30. https://www.skadden.com/-/media/files/publications/2025/03/latest-eu-sanctions-extend-asset-freezes/council_implementing_regulation_eu_2024_3152_of_16_december_2024.pdf
  31. https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2024/12/16/north-korea-sanctions-missile-russia-ukraine/
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