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O Kuk-ryol (Korean: 오극렬; Hancha: 呉克烈, 7 January 1930[1] – 9 February 2023) was a North Korean military general. He was Chief of General Staff of the Korean People's Army from 1979 to 1988. He also served as vice-chairman of the National Defence Commission of North Korea, head of the Operations Department from April 2009 to June 2016.[2] Foreign observers referred to O as the second most powerful man in North Korea.[3]

Key Information

A childhood friend of Kim Jong Il, O was one of Kim's allies elected to the Politburo in 1980. He later led North Korean programs for cyberwarfare, counterfeiting, and nuclear weapons.

Military career

[edit]

The son of O Jung-song and nephew of O Jung-hup, who fought the Japanese with Kim Il Sung, O was among war orphans under the care of Kim Il Sung's wife Kim Jong-suk and was a close personal friend of Kim Jong Il from childhood.[4]

After attending Mangyongdae Revolutionary School, Kim Il Sung University, and air force academies in the Soviet Union, O served as an air force commander. In 1964, he began as a major general and superintendent of Kim Chaek Air Force Academy, the DPRK's top air force academy. In 1968, he became a lieutenant general and commander of the Korean People's Army Air and Anti-Air Force.

He commanded a group of North Korean pilots and instructors sent to aid the Egyptian Air Force in 1973. During the Yom Kippur War, North Korean pilots flew Egyptian fighters.[5]

O was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department of the Korean People's Army in 1977, and Chief in 1979.[6]

Political career

[edit]

In 1967, O was elected deputy to the Supreme People's Assembly. In 1970, he was named a member of the 5th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.[7]

He became part of the "1980 group," who rose to power as Kim Jong Il succeeded Kim Il Sung. At the Party's 6th Congress, O was elected member of the 6th Politburo and the 6th Central Military Commission. He was later awarded the Order of Kim Il Sung, promoted to general and put in charge of the Mirim Electronic Warfare Institute for developing cyber warfare.[6] A dispute with Minister of People's Armed Forces O Jin-u in 1988 led to his demotion and forced him to undertake a period of re-education;[6] this may have had to do with enabling his later counterfeiting activities.[7]

In 1989, O was pardoned and appointed head of the Party's Civil Defense Department, then head of the Operations Department, which was transferred under the National Defence Commission in 2009.[2][3] Together with So Sang Guk and Jon Pyong Ho, O led the early stages of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme.[8]

O Kuk-ryol migrated with the department, assuming the post of vice-chairman of the NDC in April 2009. He was reelected to the 6th Central Committee at the 3rd Conference of the Workers' Party of Korea in September 2010, but kept out of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea. Nevertheless, he was considered among "senior officials of party, state, army, security organs, and national institutions".[6]

In June 2009, O was identified by international authorities and the United States government as a key figure in North Korea's currency counterfeiting activities, specifically with United States one hundred-dollar bills, known as Superdollars.[9][10]

Under Kim Jong-un

[edit]

O Kuk-ryol took part at a meeting of top leaders held immediately after Kim Jong Il's death on 17 December 2011 to plan the funeral and succession.[11] He was a member of the Kim Jong-il funeral committee. As a Kim loyalist, speculations named him as a possible successor of Kim Jong Un, and the regime appeared to be purging O's protégés in January 2011 to prevent him from being a threat to Jong-un.[12] After the execution of Jang Sung-taek in December 2013, a powerful rival, O re-emerged as more of a public figure.[13]

O died from heart failure on 9 February 2023, at age 93.[14][15]

Family

[edit]

O was reported to have also involved members of his family, including his son O Se-won, in the counterfeiting business, which reportedly took place at the Pyongsong Trademark Printing Factory, a factory under the control of O's Operations Department.[9][10] His other son O Se-uk, who was also a military general, defected to the United States in 2004.[4] He also had five daughters, the eldest of which is a screenwriter for a film studio. O was also reportedly fluent in Russian, Chinese, and English.[7] In 2006, a South Korean intelligence report noted he was perceived as reliable and knew South Korea well.[16]

O family[17]
?
O Jung-songO Jung-hup
(1910–1939)
O Kuk-ryol
(1930–2023)
O Hye-young
(1956–)		O Hyon-ok
(1958–)		O Young-ae
(1960–)		O Se-uk
(1962–)		O Hye-sun
(1965–)		O Young-ranO Se-wonSo Ho-won
(in-law)

References

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O Kuk-ryol

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![O Kuk-ryol](./ assets/Okukryolnknk.png)
O Kuk-ryol (c. 1930 – February 9, 2023) was a North Korean general and senior political figure who served as of the from 1979 to 1988 and later as Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission, maintaining influence across the leadership of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un. Born in Jilin Province, , to a family with ties to Korean revolutionaries, he received education at Revolutionary School, Kim Il-sung University, and Soviet institutions before rising rapidly in the , becoming a major general by 1964 and in 1967. Known as North Korea's first modernizer, O contributed to advancements in the defense industry and operational doctrines during his tenure, earning promotions to full general in 1985 and recognition as a twice Hero of the DPRK. His close personal ties to Kim Jong-il, stemming from shared upbringing, ensured his enduring advisory role despite periodic shifts in formal positions, including demotion and reinstatement in the early under Kim Jong-un. O died in from acute cardiac insufficiency at age 93, as announced by .

Early Life and Background

Birth and Family Origins

O Kuk-ryol was born in 1931 in , , during the period of Japanese colonial rule over Korea. His family originated from Korean revolutionaries active in , enduring persecution and hardships amid anti-Japanese guerrilla activities. He was the son of O Jung-song, a close aide and confidant to Kim Il-sung in the independence struggle against . The family maintained deep ties to the Kim lineage dating to , with O Kuk-ryol related to O Jung-hup, a revered North Korean hero credited with personally protecting Kim Il-sung during partisan operations; sources describe him as either O Jung-hup's son or nephew. This pedigree positioned the O family among the DPRK's foundational elite, fostering early connections that later influenced O Kuk-ryol's integration into the regime's power structure.

Revolutionary Pedigree and Initial Influences

O Kuk-ryol was born in 1931 in Province, , into a with deep roots in the anti-Japanese resistance struggle. His father, O Jung-song, served as a partisan fighter alongside Kim Il-sung in and was reportedly killed during the independence movement, while his uncle or relative, O Jung-hup, is credited in North Korean narratives with protecting Kim Il-sung from Japanese forces, forging early familial loyalty to the future leader. This pedigree positioned O as a "second-generation ," a status that North Korean later highlighted as ensuring his rapid ascent within the regime's hierarchy, though independent analysts note such claims often serve propagandistic purposes to legitimize elite continuity. As a child during the Japanese colonial era, O endured hardships typical of revolutionary families, including displacement and loss, which official obituaries describe as instilling unwavering commitment to the Kim leadership from an early age. After Korea's liberation in , his family returned to the North, where he was raised partly under the patronage of Kim Il-sung's household, alongside other war orphans, fostering personal ties to the ruling family that extended to a childhood friendship with Kim Jong-il. These connections, rooted in shared guerrilla origins rather than mere ideology, provided initial protection and opportunities in the post-war state-building phase. O's formal education began at the Revolutionary School in , an elite institution reserved for offspring of anti-Japanese fighters, emphasizing ideological indoctrination and loyalty to the . He progressed to Kim Il-sung University, where exposure to Marxist-Leninist principles and military theory shaped his worldview, before pursuing advanced training abroad, including at Soviet institutions in the early 1960s. This trajectory, blending familial prestige with state-sponsored schooling, marked the foundational influences that propelled him from revolutionary heir to military commander, underscoring how North Korea's elite reproduction relies on vetted pedigrees over merit alone.

Military Career

Entry into the Korean People's Army and Air Force Roles (1960s)

O Kuk-ryol joined the in May 1949, shortly after the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He participated in the as a member of the KPA , contributing to operations during the conflict from 1950 to 1953. In the postwar period, O advanced through military education, including graduation from the University, before assuming specialized roles in the KPA during the . His entry into prominent positions began in 1964, when he served as an instructor and administrator at the Kim Ch’aek , a key training institution for North Korean pilots and officers. By 1968, O had risen to the rank of and was appointed of the KPA , overseeing its expansion and operational readiness amid heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Prior to this command, he held positions such as vice-commander of the Command and rector of the University, roles that positioned him to influence doctrinal development and personnel training in the branch. These assignments marked his transition from junior service to senior leadership within the , leveraging his wartime experience and to revolutionary figures.

Ascendancy in General Staff and Command Positions (1970s-1980s)

In October 1977, O Kuk-ryol was appointed Deputy Chief of the (KPA) General Staff, marking his transition from command to a senior operational role overseeing army-wide strategy and logistics. This position involved coordinating between service branches and implementing directives from the Supreme Command, amid North Korea's emphasis on self-reliant defense amid tensions. By September 1979, O was promoted to Chief of the KPA General Staff, succeeding in a role that centralized tactical planning, troop deployments, and wartime readiness under Kim Il-sung's leadership. In this capacity, he directed the General Staff Department's bureaus for operations, , and , contributing to the KPA's expansion to over 700,000 active personnel by the mid-1980s through and efforts. His tenure emphasized doctrines, including fortified border defenses and rapid mobilization exercises, as faced U.S.- joint maneuvers. O received promotion to in 1980, reflecting his influence in streamlining command structures during a period of internal purges and economic strains from the 1970s "military-first" policy precursors. By 1985, he attained the rank of full general, consolidating authority over KPA modernization initiatives, such as integrating Soviet-supplied MiG-21 fighters into broader air defense networks. These advancements were constrained by sanctions and resource shortages, yet O's oversight ensured doctrinal adherence to military principles, prioritizing elite units over mass infantry. Throughout the 1980s, as Chief until 1988, O navigated factional dynamics within the military elite, aligning with Kim Il-sung's succession preparations while managing espionage and infiltration operations along the DMZ, where KPA incursions averaged dozens annually. His role exemplified the KPA's hierarchical rigidity, where general staff chiefs reported directly to the leader, bypassing ministerial layers for swift decision-making in potential conflicts.

Modernization of Defense Capabilities (1990s-2000s)

In the early 1990s, O Kuk-ryol managed significant personnel changes among (KPA) general-grade officers, including purges and promotions, while serving as Director of the (WPK) Civil Defense Department from 1991 to 1993; these adjustments aimed to align military leadership with evolving defense priorities amid economic hardships and strategic shifts. Appointed Director of the WPK Operations Department in 1992—a role he held until 2009—O oversaw , operational planning, and activities targeted at , facilitating the integration of asymmetric capabilities into KPA doctrine. His earlier establishment of the Mirim Electronic Warfare Institute in the extended influence into the , supporting the development of cyber and electronic warfare units that enhanced KPA's non-conventional defense posture against technologically superior adversaries. By the , O's advocacy for modernization—rooted in expansion, weapons of mass destruction pursuits, and adoption of electronic warfare tactics—continued through high-level oversight, with elements of his programs remaining operational as late as 2017. In February 2009, O was elevated to Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission, where he contributed to consolidating foreign intelligence functions under the , bolstering strategic reconnaissance and amid Kim Jong-il's succession preparations. This position reinforced KPA's focus on intelligence-driven modernization, including ties to defense industry advancements, though specific technological outputs during his tenure remain opaque due to North Korea's secrecy.

Political and Strategic Roles

Service Under Kim Il-sung

O Kuk-ryol advanced into prominent political roles within the (WPK) and state apparatus during Kim Il-sung's leadership, leveraging his military background and revolutionary . Elected as a deputy to the 4th in 1967, he gained formal representation in the legislative body. In 1970, at the 5th WPK Congress, O was appointed to full membership on the , marking his entry into the party's core decision-making structure. By the 6th WPK Congress in October 1980, he ascended to the Political Bureau and the Central Military Committee, positions that integrated military strategy with party oversight. Throughout the 1970s and , O contributed to embedding Kim Jong-il's ideological framework, known as the successor system, within the , ensuring alignment with the ruling family's directives. He advocated for nuclear weapons development during this period, reflecting strategic priorities amid escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, O oversaw the establishment of the Mirim Electronic Warfare Institute in the , enhancing North Korea's capabilities in and countermeasures against electronic threats. These initiatives underscored his role in modernizing defense technologies under Kim Il-sung's guidance. Following his removal as Chief of the KPA General Staff in 1988, O underwent a six-month re-education program at the Higher Party School in 1988-1989, a common mechanism for reinforcing loyalty amid internal purges. He subsequently directed the WPK Department in 1989, focusing on civilian mobilization and preparedness. By 1992, O headed the WPK Operations Department, which managed and , consolidating his influence in strategic planning shortly before 's death. Throughout his service, O functioned as a trusted advisor to , drawing on his partisan heritage to bridge military command with political fidelity.

Positions During Kim Jong-il's Leadership

During Kim Jong-il's leadership, which began following Kim Il-sung's death on July 8, 1994, O Kuk-ryol held pivotal roles in the (WPK) and military oversight, leveraging his prior experience as (KPA) Chief of General Staff from 1979 to 1988. In 1989, shortly before the leadership transition, he was appointed director of the WPK Department, a position focused on internal security and mobilization planning, which he retained into the early Kim Jong-il era amid the onset of the Arduous March famine and economic isolation. By 1992, O was transferred to direct the WPK Operations Department (also known as the Reconnaissance Bureau in some contexts), where he managed collection, covert operations planning, and training for , including oversight of foreign and capabilities during a period of heightened tensions with and the . O's influence expanded in the late 2000s as Kim Jong-il consolidated power through the National Defense Commission (NDC), the supreme state body for military policy. On February 2009, he was appointed Vice Chairman of the NDC, second only to Kim Jong-il as chairman, positioning him to advise on strategic defense matters, including missile tests and nuclear development amid following the 2006 and 2009 atomic detonations. In this role, O Kuk-ryol reportedly acted as a close confidant to Kim Jong-il, bridging with high-level and helping stabilize factional dynamics within the KPA elite during Kim's health decline after his 2008 stroke. His tenure emphasized "military-first" () policies, prioritizing KPA resources for regime survival, though North Korean opacity limits verification of specific operational impacts.

Involvement Under Kim Jong-un

O Kuk-ryol retained his position as Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) following Kim Jong-un's assumption of supreme leadership after Kim Jong-il's death on December 17, 2011, providing continuity in the regime's military oversight structure during the power transition. The NDC, as the DPRK's paramount body for defense and policy until its replacement by the State Affairs Commission in 2016, allowed O to influence strategic decisions under the new leader, drawing on his prior advisory roles in military operations and succession support mechanisms. His appointment to the NDC in February 2009 had been explicitly aimed at bolstering the hereditary succession to Kim Jong-un, a role he fulfilled by aligning the military hierarchy with the young leader's authority amid potential factional challenges. As an elder statesman and confidant from the Kim Jong-il era, O Kuk-ryol reportedly served as an advisor to Kim Jong-un on military strategies, particularly operations concerning , leveraging his expertise in command and general staff operations to guide early policy directions. This advisory capacity extended to the regime's emphasis on (military-first) politics, where O's oversight of the Second Economic Committee—responsible for munitions production—intersected with Kim Jong-un's push for advanced weaponry development, though his direct influence waned as younger loyalists like rose in the NDC alongside him. In 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned O for his NDC vice chairmanship and committee directorship, citing contributions to weapons proliferation, reflecting Western assessments of his enduring role in sustaining the DPRK's defense-industrial base under Kim Jong-un. O's involvement exemplified the regime's reliance on pre-existing revolutionary elites for legitimacy during Kim Jong-un's consolidation, yet his prominence diminished post-2016 as the State Affairs Commission streamlined power under the supreme leader, with no public indications of his elevation to new bodies despite his survival as a non-purged figure from the old guard. This phase underscored tensions between continuity and renewal in North Korean leadership dynamics, where O's loyalty ensured short-term stability but highlighted the regime's pattern of sidelining veterans in favor of kin-centric networks.

Contributions to Nuclear and Missile Programs

Coordination of Military Aspects

O Kuk-ryol functioned as the chief coordinator for North Korea's nuclear weapons program, ensuring alignment between scientific research and implementation. In this capacity, he collaborated with key figures such as scientist So Sang-guk and munitions expert Jon Pyong-ho to advance the program's early stages, focusing on operationalizing nuclear capabilities within the (KPA). His oversight extended to development, where coordination bridged technical innovation with strategic deployment requirements. As Chief of the KPA General Staff from 1979 to 1988, O directed a broad modernization initiative that incorporated nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles into defense doctrine, emphasizing self-reliant production and command integration. He advocated persistently for nuclear armament during the , leveraging his position to prioritize for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) amid economic constraints. This era saw the establishment of institutions like the Mirim Electronic Warfare Institute under his influence, which trained personnel in electronic systems critical to and nuclear command-control architectures. In subsequent roles, including director of the (WPK) Operations Department around 1992 and Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission from 2009, O maintained authority over departments supervising nuclear and advancements, such as elements of the WPK Machine Industry Department. These positions enabled him to coordinate reconnaissance, , and industrial outputs tied to WMD proliferation, as evidenced by U.S. sanctions designating him in 2010 and 2013 for impeding North Korea's and nuclear efforts. His longevity in these roles—spanning three Kim leaderships—ensured continuity in military-nuclear fusion, though direct attribution of specific tests or deployments remains opaque due to regime secrecy.

Strategic Decision-Making and Factional Dynamics

O Kuk-ryol emerged as a key advocate for North Korea's nuclear weapons program during the , pushing for the prioritization of nuclear capabilities as a strategic deterrent against perceived threats from the and , at a time when conventional forces faced technological inferiority. This advocacy aligned with broader defense modernization efforts under Kim Il-sung, emphasizing assets over large-scale conventional buildup, informed by assessments of global power dynamics and the regime's resource constraints. In his capacity as Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission from April 2009, O Kuk-ryol participated in high-level strategic deliberations on and nuclear development, particularly during the transition to Kim Jong-un's leadership following Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011. His appointment was strategically intended to bolster institutional continuity and to the hereditary succession, ensuring that nuclear and programs—central to the "military-first" () policy—remained insulated from internal disruptions. O's influence extended to coordinating resources for these programs through oversight of defense industry entities, reflecting a pragmatic approach to sustaining advancements despite and technical hurdles. Factional dynamics within North Korea's circles positioned O Kuk-ryol as a stabilizing of the influential O family, one of the regime's entrenched political lineages, which helped him navigate purges and power shifts without marginalization. Analysts have viewed him as a potential to rivals such as prior to the latter's execution in December 2013, leveraging his military pedigree and alignment with Kim family priorities to maintain leverage in nuclear policy councils. This familial and institutional embeddedness facilitated resilient decision-making processes, where O's longevity—spanning three Kim leaders—prioritized regime survival through nuclear deterrence over factional infighting, though his exact influence waned in later years amid Kim Jong-un's consolidation of younger loyalists.

Family and Personal Life

Ties to Revolutionary Elite

O Kuk-ryol's familial connections to North Korea's revolutionary elite trace back to the anti-Japanese guerrilla struggle of the 1930s, positioning him within the DPRK's founding cadre of loyalists tied to Kim Il-sung. He belonged to the influential O clan, which included O Jung-hup, a key communist fighter who operated alongside Kim Il-sung in and is officially credited in North Korean narratives with personally shielding the future leader from Japanese forces during combat. The honors O Jung-hup through a dedicated marching song emphasizing this protective role, underscoring the clan's entrenched status in regime mythology. Sources differ on O Kuk-ryol's precise relation to O Jung-hup, with some identifying him as the direct son and others as a nephew or more distant kin through shared lineage with figures like O Jung-song and O Chong-song, both partisan veterans orphaned or elevated post-war alongside emerging elites. These ties extended directly to the Kim dynasty, as O Kuk-ryol's family intersected with Kim Il-sung's inner circle during the partisan era, fostering intergenerational loyalty that propelled his ascent. Orphaned during the , O was reportedly raised under the care of Kim Jong-il's mother, Hyon Hui-gyong, which cemented personal bonds with the successor generation; accounts describe him growing up alongside Kim Jong-il, sharing formative experiences that reinforced his alignment with the "Paektu bloodline" narrative central to DPRK legitimacy. This proximity to revolutionary orphans and heirs distinguished O as a second-generation elite, distinct from purges targeting non-partisan lineages, and enabled his integration into military-intelligence networks insulated from factional upheavals. The O clan's revolutionary pedigree, validated through state propaganda and intermarriages, afforded O Kuk-ryol symbolic capital in a prioritizing guerrilla heritage over technocratic merit. Unlike imported Soviet-trained officers, his background aligned with the "Mount Paektu" ethos, granting influence in defense commissions and nuclear oversight roles that outsiders lacked. This embedding persisted across transitions, as evidenced by his survival of purges in the and , reflecting causal ties between familial vetting and regime stability rather than mere coincidence.

Immediate Family and Succession Connections

O Kuk-ryol's included his son O Se-won, who held a position in the foreign department of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces and managed operations linked to the regime's economic networks, including import-export firms interfacing with . O Se-won and other children of O Kuk-ryol were involved in commercial activities that supported North Korea's patronage systems, reflecting the intergenerational embedding of lineage in economic and military spheres. These familial ties facilitated O Kuk-ryol's alignment with North Korea's hereditary succession, as his 2009 appointment to the National Defense Commission explicitly aimed to bolster Kim Jong-un's ascension amid the transition from Kim Jong-il. O Se-won personally advised the emerging leader Kim Jong-un, extending the family's role in stabilizing the Kim dynasty's third generational shift through direct counsel and network integration. This positioning underscored how O Kuk-ryol's revolutionary pedigree—rooted in partisan ties from —translated into operative loyalty, with his offspring reinforcing elite cohesion during power consolidation.

Death and Posthumous Recognition

Circumstances of Death

O Kuk-ryol died of on the morning of February 9, 2023, in at the age of 93. The official announcement came four days later on February 13, 2023, through a joint obituary issued by the Central Committee and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea State Affairs Commission, which stated that he "passed away" without specifying further medical details beyond the cause. At the time of his death, O held the retired position of advisor to the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces and had been out of active high-level roles since 2012, though he retained influence as a senior revolutionary cadre. No independent verification of the cause exists outside North Korean , and foreign analysts have not reported evidence contradicting the official account of natural due to advanced age and cardiac issues.

Impact on North Korean Military Hierarchy

O Kuk-ryol's death on February 9, 2023, from in at age 93, marked the passing of a key survivor from North Korea's revolutionary military cadre, but elicited no observable immediate restructuring within the (KPA) command. As former Chief of the KPA General Staff (1979–1988) and Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission (2009–2016), O had embodied continuity from the Kim Il-sung era, contributing to military modernization, intelligence reforms, and the 2011–2012 transition to Kim Jong-un's leadership by offering veteran endorsement to the young supreme leader. By 2023, however, O held no formal authority, having been sidelined after the National Defense Commission's replacement by the State Affairs Commission in , amid Kim Jong-un's broader of elder figures and elevation of post-2011 loyalists such as No Kwang-chol and to top KPA posts. announced his death with standard honors, including a funeral committee chaired by Kim Jong-un and attendance by senior military officials, signaling respect for his historical role without implying power vacuums. Analysts assess that his demise reinforces the regime's generational turnover, diminishing residual influence from pre-Kim Jong-un networks and solidifying Kim's dominance over a increasingly composed of officers in their 50s and 60s, selected for personal rather than pedigree. No s or promotions were publicly linked to the event, consistent with the opacity of KPA transitions, which prioritize loyalty over seniority.

References

  1. https://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/leadership-biographies/gen-o-kuk-ryol/
  2. https://www.nknews.org/2023/02/o-kuk-ryol-north-korean-general-under-3-generations-of-kim-leaders-dies-at-90/
  3. https://nkleadershipwatch.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/o-kuk-ryul1.pdf
  4. https://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/2023/02/14/gen-o-kuk-ryol-1930-2023/
  5. https://world.kbs.co.kr/english/event/nkorea_nuclear/people/who_detail_41.htm
  6. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2012/01/02/politics/A-pair-of-former-spy-bosses-lurk-in-the-shadows/2946530.html
  7. https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/O_Kuk-ryol
  8. https://sinonk.com/2012/02/01/o-kuk-ryol-the-old-guard-never-dies/
  9. http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2012/201204/news11/20120411-40ee.html
  10. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0921/5-key-people-to-watch-in-North-Korea/General-O-Kuk-ryol
  11. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jl0372
  12. https://www.38north.org/2018/07/mmadden070318/
  13. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/behind-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-programme-a-geriatric-trio-idUSKBN0UL0Y9/
  14. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/25/kims-rocket-stars--the-trio-behind-north-koreas-missile-program.html
  15. https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/COP-2013-U-005684-Final.pdf
  16. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA598497.pdf
  17. https://www.hrnk.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/eng/Gause_NKHOC_FINAL_WEB.pdf
  18. https://sinonk.com/2012/03/22/kim-family-business-north-korean-elite-social-networks-and-dprk-foreign-trade/
  19. https://www.gis-reseau-asie.org/en/article/new-leadership-and-new-challenges-north-korea-0
  20. https://www.ask-oracle.com/birth-chart/o-kuk-ryol/
  21. https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1676185637-209623642/o-kuk-ryol-passes-away/
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