In economics, and in other social sciences, preference refers to an order by which an agent, while in search of an "optimal choice", ranks alternatives based on their respective utility. Preferences are evaluations that concern matters of value, in relation to practical reasoning. Individual preferences are determined by taste, need, ..., as opposed to price, availability or personal income. Classical economics assumes that people act in their best (rational) interest. In this context, rationality would dictate that, when given a choice, an individual will select an option that maximizes their self-interest. But preferences are not always transitive, both because real humans are far from always being rational and because in some situations preferences can form cycles, in which case there exists no well-defined optimal choice. An example of this is Efron dice.

The concept of preference plays a key role in many disciplines, including moral philosophy and decision theory. The logical properties that preferences possess also have major effects on rational choice theory, which in turn affects all modern economic topics.

Using the scientific method, social scientists aim to model how people make practical decisions in order to explain the causal underpinnings of human behaviour or to predict future behaviours. Although economists are not typically interested in the specific causes of a person's preferences, they are interested in the theory of choice because it gives a background to empirical demand analysis.

Stability of preference is a deep assumption behind most economic models. Gary Becker drew attention to this with his remark that "the combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach as it is." More complex conditions of adaptive preference were explored by Carl Christian von Weizsäcker in his paper "The Welfare Economics of Adaptive Preferences" (2005), while remarking that. Traditional neoclassical economics has worked with the assumption that the preferences of agents in the economy are fixed. This assumption has always been disputed outside neoclassical economics.

The representation of preferences by a Utiliy Function in an ordinal way is grounded in relational systems.

In 1926, Ragnar Frisch was the first to develop a mathematical model of preferences in the context of economic demand and utility functions. Up to then, economists had used an elaborate theory of demand that omitted primitive characteristics of people. This omission ceased when, at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, logical positivism predicated the need to relate theoretical concepts to observables. Whereas economists in the 18th and 19th centuries felt comfortable theorizing about utility, with the advent of logical positivism in the 20th century, they felt they needed a more empirical structure. Because binary choices are directly observable, they instantly appeal to economists. The search for observables in microeconomics is taken even further by the revealed preference theory, which holds consumers' preferences can be revealed by what they purchase under different circumstances, particularly under different income and price circumstances.

Despite utilitarianism and decision theory, many economists have differing definitions of what a rational agent is. In the 18th century, utilitarianism gave insight into the utility-maximizing versions of rationality; however, economists still have no consistent definition or understanding of what preferences and rational actors should be analyzed.

Since the pioneer efforts of Frisch in the 1920s, the representability of a preference structure with a real-valued function is one of the major issues pervading the theory of preferences. This has been achieved by mapping it to the mathematical index called utility. Von Neumann and Morgenstern's 1944 book "Games and Economic Behavior" treated preferences as a formal relation whose properties can be stated axiomatically. These types of axiomatic handling of preferences soon began to influence other economists: Marschak adopted it by 1950, Houthakker employed it in a 1950 paper, and Kenneth Arrow perfected it in his 1951 book "Social Choice and Individual Values".