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Premier Election Solutions, formerly Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI),[1] was a subsidiary of Diebold that made and sold voting machines.

Key Information

In 2009, it was sold to competitor ES&S. In 2010, Dominion Voting Systems purchased the primary assets of Premier, including all intellectual property, software, firmware and hardware for Premier's current and legacy optical scan, central scan, and touch screen voting systems, and all versions of the GEMS election management system from ES&S.

At the time ES&S spun off the company due to monopoly charges its systems were in use in 1,400 jurisdictions in 33 states and serving nearly 28 million people.[2]

History

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DESI was run by Bob Urosevich, starting in 1976. In 1979, Bob Urosevich founded, and served as the president (through 1992) of, American Information Systems, now known as Election Systems & Software, Inc. (ES&S), becoming a chief competitor to DESI. Todd Urosevich, Bob's brother, was vice president, aftermarket sales, of Election Systems & Software, Inc.

In 1995, Bob Urosevich started I-Mark Systems, whose product was a touch screen voting system utilizing a smart card and biometric encryption authorization technology. Global Election Systems, Inc. (GES) acquired I-Mark in 1997, and on 31 July 2000, Bob Urosevich was promoted from Vice President of Sales and Marketing and New Business Development, to president and chief operating officer. On January 22, 2002, Diebold announced the acquisition of GES, then a manufacturer and supplier of electronic voting terminals and solutions. The total purchase price, in stock and cash, was $24.7 million. Global Election Systems subsequently changed its name to Diebold Election Systems, Inc.[citation needed]

Name change

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In late 2006, Diebold decided to remove its name from the front of the voting machines in what its spokesperson called "a strategic decision on the part of the corporation".[3] In August 2007 Diebold Election Systems changed its name to "Premier Election Solutions" ("PES").[1]

Acquisition by Election Systems & Software

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Election Systems & Software (ES&S) acquired Premier Election Solutions on September 3, 2009. ES&S President and CEO Aldo Tesi said combining the two companies would result in better products and services for customers and voters.[4]

Acquisition by Dominion

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Following the acquisition, the Department of Justice and 14 individual states launched investigations into the transaction on antitrust grounds.[5] In March 2010, the Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust lawsuit against ES&S, requiring it to divest voting equipment systems assets it acquired from Premier Election Solutions in order to restore competition.[6] The company sold the assets to Dominion Voting Systems.

Dominion Voting Systems acquired Premier on May 19, 2010.[7] "We are extremely pleased to conclude this transaction, which will restore much-needed competition to the American voting systems market and will allow Dominion to expand its capabilities and operational footprint to every corner of the United States," said John Poulos, CEO of Dominion. The transaction was approved by the Department of Justice and nine state attorneys general.[8]

Controversies

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O'Dell's fundraising

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In August 2003, Walden O'Dell, chief executive of Diebold, announced that he had been a top fundraiser for President George W. Bush and had sent a get-out-the-funds letter to Ohio Republicans. In the letters he said he was "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president next year."[9] Although he clarified his statement as merely a poor choice of words, critics of Diebold and/or the Republican party interpreted this as at minimum an indication of a conflict of interest, at worst implying a risk to the fair counting of ballots. He responded to the critics by pointing out that the company's election machines division is run out of Texas by a registered Democrat. Nonetheless, O'Dell vowed to lower his political profile lest his personal actions harm the company. O'Dell resigned his post of chairman and chief executive of Diebold on December 12, 2005, following reports that the company was facing securities fraud litigation surrounding charges of insider trading.[10]

Security and concealment issues

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For more information on the 2004 elections see: 2004 United States election voting controversies: Voting machines

In January 2003, Diebold Election Systems' proprietary software, and election files, hardware and software specifications, program files, voting program patches, on its file transfer protocol site, were leaked, later 7 August 2003 leaked to Wired.[11] [12][13][14][15]

In 2004, Avi Rubin, a professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University and Technical Director of the Information Security Institute, analyzed the source code used in these voting machines and reported "this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."[16][17] Following the publication of this paper, the State of Maryland hired Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform another analysis of the Diebold voting machines. SAIC concluded "[t]he system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise."[18]

In January 2004, RABA Technologies, a security company in Columbia, Maryland, did a security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote, confirming many of the problems found by Rubin and finding some new vulnerabilities.[19][20]

In June 2005, the Tallahassee Democrat reported that when given access to Diebold optical scan vote-counting computers, Black Box Voting, a nonprofit election watchdog group founded by Bev Harris, hired Finnish computer expert Harri Hursti and conducted a project in which vote totals were altered, by replacing the memory card that stores voting results with one that had been tampered with. Although the machines are supposed to record changes to data stored in the system, they showed no record of tampering after the memory cards were swapped. In response, a spokesperson for the Florida Department of State said, "Information on a blog site is not viable or credible."[21]

In early 2006, a study for the state of California corroborated and expanded on the problem;[22] on page 2 the California report states that:

"Memory card attacks are a real threat: We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card of the AV-OS, and can tamper it (i.e. modify its contents), and can have the modified cards used in a voting machine during election, can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways. The fact that the results are incorrect cannot be detected except by a recount of the original paper ballots" and "Harri Hursti's attack does work: Mr. Hursti's attack on the AV-OS is definitely real. He was indeed able to change the election results by doing nothing more than modifying the contents of a memory card. He needed no passwords, no cryptographic keys, and no access to any other part of the voting system, including the GEMS election management server."

AccuVote-TSx DRE voting machine with VVPAT attachment, at right

A new vulnerability, this time with the TSx DRE machines, was reported in May 2006. According to Professor Rubin, the machines are "much, much easier to attack than anything we've previously said... On a scale of one to 10, if the problems we found before were a six, this is a 10. It's a totally different ballgame."[23][24] According to Rubin, the system is intentionally designed so that anyone with access can update the machine software, without a pass code or other security protocol. Diebold officials said that although any problem can be avoided by keeping a close watch on the machines, they are developing a fix.[25]

Michael I. Shamos, a professor of computer science at Carnegie Mellon University who is a proponent of electronic voting and the examiner of electronic voting systems for Pennsylvania, stated "It's the most severe security flaw ever discovered in a voting system." Douglas W. Jones, a professor of computer science at the University of Iowa, stated "This is the barn door being wide open, while people were arguing over the lock on the front door." Diebold spokesman David Bear played down the seriousness of the situation, asserting that "For there to be a problem here, you're basically assuming a premise where you have some evil and nefarious election officials who would sneak in and introduce a piece of software. I don't believe these evil elections people exist."[26]

On October 30, 2006, researchers from the University of Connecticut demonstrated new vulnerabilities in Diebold AccuVote-OS optical scan voting terminal. The system can be compromised even if its removable memory card is sealed in place.[27]

On September 13, 2006, Director of the Center for Information and Technology Policy[28] at Princeton University, Professor Edward Felten, and graduate students Ariel Feldman and Alex Halderman discovered severe security flaws in a Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine.[29][30] Their findings claimed, "Malicious software running on a single voting machine can steal votes with little if any risk of detection. The malicious software can modify all of the records, audit logs, and counters kept by the voting machine, so that even careful forensic examination of these records will find nothing amiss."[31][32][33][34][35]

On November 2, 2006, HBO premiered Hacking Democracy, a documentary about the vulnerability of electronic voting machines (primarily Diebold) to hacking and inaccurate vote totals. The company argued that the film was factually inaccurate and urged HBO to air a disclaimer explaining that it had not verified any of the claims.[36][37][38] However, corroboration and validation for the exploits shown in Hacking Democracy was published in a report for the state of California (see above).

In January 2007, a photo of the key used to open Diebold voting machines was posted in the company's website. It was found possible to duplicate the key based on the photo. The key unlocks a compartment which contains a removable memory card, leaving the machine vulnerable to tampering.[39]

A report commissioned by Ohio's top elections official on December 15, 2007, found that all five voting systems used in Ohio (made by Elections Systems and Software; Premier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election Systems); and Hart InterCivic) have critical flaws that could undermine the integrity of the 2008 general election.[40]

On July 17, 2008, Stephen Spoonamore made the claim that he had "fresh evidence regarding election fraud on Diebold electronic voting machines during the 2002 Georgia gubernatorial and senatorial elections." Spoonamore is "the founder and until recently the CEO of Cybrinth LLC, an information technology policy and security firm that serves Fortune 100 companies." He claims that Diebold Election Systems Inc. COO Bob Urosevich personally installed a computer patch on voting machines in two counties in Georgia, and that the patch did not fix the problem it was supposed to fix.[41] Reports have indicated that then Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox did not know the patch was installed until after the election.[42]

States rejecting Diebold

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In 2004, after an initial investigation into the company's practices, Secretary of State of California Kevin Shelley issued a ban on one model of Diebold voting machines in that state. California Attorney General Bill Lockyer, joined the state of California into a false claims suit filed in November 2003 by Bev Harris and Alameda County citizen Jim March.[43][44]

The suit charged that Diebold had given false information about the security and reliability of Diebold Election Systems machines that were sold to the state. To settle the case, Diebold agreed to pay $2.6 million and to implement certain reforms.[45] On August 3, 2007, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen decertified Diebold and three other electronic voting systems after a "top-to-bottom review of the voting machines certified for use in California in March 2007."[46]

In April 2007, the Maryland General Assembly voted to replace paperless touchscreen voting machines with paper ballots counted by optical scanners, effective in time for the 2010 general (November) elections. The law, signed by the Governor in May 2007, was made contingent on the provision of funding by no later than April 2008. The Governor included such funding in his proposed budget in January 2008,[47] but the funding was defeated by the state House in July 2008.[48]

In March 2009, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen decertified Diebold's GEMS version 1.18.19 after the Humboldt County Election Transparency Project discovered that GEMS had silently dropped 197 ballots from its tabulation of a single precinct in Eureka, California.[49] The discovery was made after project members conducted an independent count using the ballot counting program Ballot Browser.

Leaked memos

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In September 2003, a large number of internal Diebold memos, dating back to 1999, were posted to the BlackBoxVoting.org web site, resulting in the site being shut down due to a Diebold cease and desist order. Later, other website organizations Why War? and the Swarthmore Coalition for the Digital Commons, a group of student activists at Swarthmore College posted the memos. U.S. Representative Dennis Kucinich, a Democrat from Ohio, placed portions of the files on his websites.[50]

Diebold attempted to stop the publication of these internal memos by sending cease-and-desist letters to each site hosting these documents, demanding that they be removed. Diebold claimed the memos as their copyrighted material, and asserted that anyone who published the memos online was in violation of the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act found in §512 of the United States Copyright Act.

When it turned out that some of the challenged groups would not back down, Diebold retracted their threat. Those who had been threatened by Diebold then sued for court costs and damages, in OPG v. Diebold. This suit eventually led to a victory for the plaintiffs against Diebold, when in October 2004 Judge Jeremy Fogel ruled that Diebold abused its copyrights in its efforts to suppress the embarrassing memos.

Stephen Heller

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In January and February 2004, a whistleblower named Stephen Heller brought to light memos from Jones Day, Diebold's attorneys, informing Diebold that they were in breach of California law by continuing to use illegal and uncertified software in California voting machines. California Attorney General Bill Lockyer filed civil and criminal suits against the company, which were dropped when Diebold settled out of court for $2.6 million. In February 2006, Heller was charged with three felonies for this action.[51][52] On November 20, 2006, Heller made a plea agreement to pay $10,000 to Jones Day, write an apology, and receive three years probation.[53]

Diebold and Kenneth Blackwell's conflict of interest

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Ohio State Senator Jeff Jacobson, Republican, asked Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell, also a Republican, in July 2003 to disqualify Diebold's bid to supply voting machines for the state, after security problems were discovered in its software, but was refused.[54] Blackwell had ordered Diebold touch screen voting machines, reversing an earlier decision by the state to purchase only optical scan voting machines which, unlike the touch screen devices, would leave a "paper trail" for recount purposes. Blackwell was found, in April 2006, to own 83 shares of Diebold stock, down from 178 shares purchased in January 2005, which he attributed to an unidentified financial manager at Credit Suisse First Boston who had violated his instructions to avoid potential conflict of interest, without his knowledge.[55] When Cuyahoga county's primary was held on May 2, 2006, officials ordered the hand-counting of more than 18,000 paper ballots after Diebold's new optical scan machines produced inconsistent tabulations, leaving several local races in limbo for days and eventually resulting in a reversal of the outcome of one race for state representative. Blackwell ordered an investigation by the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections; Ohio Democrats demanded that Blackwell, who was also the Republican gubernatorial candidate in 2006, recuse himself from the investigation due to conflicts of interest, but Blackwell did not do so.[56]

The Republican head of the Franklin County, Ohio Board of Elections, Matt Damschroder, said a Diebold contractor came to him and bragged of a $50,000 check he had written to Blackwell's "political interests."[57]

See also

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Premier Election Solutions

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Premier Election Solutions was an American election technology company that developed and supplied electronic voting systems, including direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines and optical scanners, primarily through its AccuVote product line. Originally operating as Diebold Election Systems, a subsidiary of Diebold, Inc., the division was rebranded as Premier Election Solutions in 2007 amid efforts to refocus the business. In 2010, Diebold sold Premier to Election Systems & Software (ES&S), subject to U.S. Department of Justice requirements for divestiture of certain assets to preserve market competition in voting equipment. The company's systems, such as the touchscreen-based AccuVote TSX and the central-count AccuVote OS, received federal certification under Voluntary Voting System Guidelines but were widely criticized for security shortcomings, including exploitable software flaws and risks from physical access, as demonstrated in rigorous state-led examinations like California's Top-to-Bottom Review and Kansas's EVEREST study. These findings, rooted in empirical testing of and hardware, highlighted fundamental challenges in ensuring verifiable without auditable paper records, prompting many jurisdictions to phase out the machines and contributing to the diminished value of the business at the time of its sale.

Origins and Early Operations

Establishment under Diebold Inc.

Diebold Inc., an Ohio-based manufacturer of automated teller machines and security systems founded in 1859, entered the electronic voting market in 2002 by acquiring Global Election Systems Inc., a Canadian firm that had developed early direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines such as the AccuVote-TS. The acquisition, initially announced in June 2001 as a stock swap valued at approximately $31.5 million with additional $5 million in financing provided by Diebold, was completed in 2002, after which Global was renamed Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI) and operated as a wholly owned subsidiary headquartered in Allen, Texas. This establishment positioned Diebold to capitalize on the U.S. Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), which allocated federal funds for upgrading voting infrastructure following the 2000 presidential election disputes, enabling DESI to pursue contracts for touchscreen DRE systems lacking initial paper trails. DESI inherited Global's product portfolio, including the and AccuVote optical scan tabulators, which were marketed for their user-friendly interfaces and compliance with emerging federal standards. Under Diebold's ownership, the subsidiary expanded sales efforts, securing initial certifications and deployments in states like Georgia and by late 2002, where DESI systems were used to replace punch-card ballots. The integration leveraged Diebold's expertise in secure electronics and software, though DESI's systems drew early scrutiny for potential vulnerabilities in access and auditability, as noted in independent reviews commissioned by state officials. Key leadership included executives from Global, such as Bob Urosevich, who briefly served as DESI's CEO and had prior experience developing voting software at American Information Systems (later acquired by ). Diebold's strategic rationale emphasized diversification beyond , with DESI contributing modestly to overall revenue—reporting about $80 million in election systems sales by amid growing market demand driven by HAVA mandates. This foundational phase under Diebold laid the groundwork for DESI's expansion, though it also set the stage for subsequent debates over security and transparency.

Initial Product Development and Market Penetration

Diebold Inc. established its election systems division through the acquisition of Global Election Systems Inc. in January 2002 for $23.5 million, gaining access to federally certified direct-recording electronic (DRE) s. The core product inherited was the AccuVote-TS, a DRE system that recorded votes directly into internal memory without paper trails, designed for and efficiency in polling places. Diebold leveraged its expertise in secure financial hardware, such as ATMs, to integrate and certify these systems under federal standards, while initiating development of complementary technologies like the AccuVote-OS optical scanner for processing marked paper ballots at precinct or central locations. Market penetration accelerated following the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, which provided approximately $3.9 billion in federal funding to states for upgrading voting equipment in response to the 2000 election's punch-card and recount issues. Diebold secured an early major deployment in Georgia, where its touchscreen machines were used for the first time in a statewide election in November 2002, replacing lever machines and punch cards across the state. This contract, valued in the tens of millions, demonstrated the scalability of Diebold's DRE systems and opened doors to similar adoptions in states like , which selected the AccuVote-TS for polling place use by 2004. By mid-decade, Diebold Election Systems had achieved significant presence in over a dozen states, capitalizing on the demand for touch-screen and optical scan solutions amid competitive bidding processes influenced by HAVA deadlines. The company's strategy emphasized compliance with emerging federal certification requirements and partnerships with state election officials, though initial deployments faced scrutiny over security and reliability.

Corporate Changes and Acquisitions

Rebranding from Diebold Election Systems

Diebold, Inc., announced on August 16, 2007, that its subsidiary Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI) would rebrand as Premier Election Solutions to establish a standalone identity focused solely on and services, separate from Diebold's primary operations in automated teller machines and physical security systems. The change aimed to streamline management, foster specialized innovation in voting systems, and improve market positioning amid competitive pressures in the U.S. elections sector. The rebranding followed years of public scrutiny over DESI's direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines, including the AccuVote-TS models, which faced criticism for software vulnerabilities exposed through leaked in 2003 and subsequent independent analyses. Security researchers, such as those at , demonstrated in 2006 how the systems could be compromised with minimal physical access, raising concerns about tamper resistance and auditability that contributed to declining trust among officials. Diebold maintained that its machines met federal and state certification standards, but the negative associations with the parent brand prompted the separation to rebuild credibility without diluting Diebold's core reputation. Under the new name, Premier Election Solutions continued to market existing DESI products like optical scanners and tabulators while developing enhancements, such as voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT) for select DRE units, in response to (HAVA) requirements and state-level mandates for verifiable records. The entity retained its headquarters in , and operated as a wholly owned subsidiary until its divestiture in 2009.

Acquisition by Election Systems & Software

Diebold, Inc. sold its U.S. election systems subsidiary, Premier Election Solutions, Inc., to (ES&S) on September 3, 2009, for $5 million in cash. The transaction included Premier's portfolio of voting equipment, such as the AccuVote-TSx direct recording electronic machines and AccuVote optical scan tabulators, along with related intellectual property, software, and service contracts serving approximately 1,351 jurisdictions across 38 states. This divestiture allowed Diebold to exit the election industry amid ongoing controversies over security vulnerabilities in its systems and declining , which had prompted the company to rebrand from Diebold Election Systems to Premier in 2007. The acquisition positioned ES&S, already the dominant vendor with about 48% , to absorb Premier's roughly 10-15% share, raising immediate antitrust concerns about reduced competition in the oligopolistic U.S. market. U.S. Senator called for a Department of Justice (DOJ) probe in January 2010, arguing the consolidation of the two largest vendors could undermine election integrity by limiting options for election officials and potentially stifling innovation in secure voting technology. To address these issues, the DOJ approved the deal on , 2010, conditioned on ES&S divesting specific Premier assets, including and for certain DRE systems, to preserve competition; failure to comply would have blocked the acquisition. ES&S completed the purchase while integrating Premier's operations into its Omaha, Nebraska headquarters, though the divestiture requirements fragmented some of Premier's technology portfolio and delayed full consolidation.

Divestiture of Assets to Dominion Voting Systems

In September 2009, (ES&S) acquired , the rebranded election systems subsidiary of Diebold Inc., for $5 million, consolidating two of the largest vendors in the U.S. voting technology market. This transaction raised antitrust concerns, as it risked reducing competition in the production and sale of systems, prompting review by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and several state attorneys general. On March 8, 2010, the DOJ announced a settlement requiring ES&S to divest specific Premier assets to restore market competition, including all rights to Premier's hardware, software, and —covering past, present, and developmental versions such as the Assure 1.2 system and all iterations of the Global Election Management System (GEMS). The divestiture also encompassed tooling, fixed assets, inventory of parts and components, and an irrevocable perpetual license for the AutoMARK ballot marking device used by voters with disabilities. The buyer was required to be approved by the DOJ within 60 days of the settlement to ensure capability in maintaining and supporting the systems.
completed the acquisition of these assets on , 2010, obtaining , software, , and hardware designs for Premier's optical scan, central count tabulation, and touchscreen direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting systems, including models like the AccuVote-TSx. Additionally, secured perpetual licenses for the AutoMARK terminals and the VoteRemote absentee ballot processing solution, along with rights to spare parts, supplies, and a portion of existing inventory. The DOJ approved the sale to , noting it enabled the company to immediately contract with third-party customers for support and upgrades, thereby fulfilling the antitrust remedies. 's CEO stated the transaction would "restore much-needed competition to the American voting systems market." This divestiture allowed to expand its portfolio while ES&S retained certain Premier operations, such as service contracts in specific jurisdictions.

Technology and Systems

Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machines

Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) from Premier Election Solutions, originally developed under Diebold Election Systems, centered on the AccuVote-TS series. These devices allowed voters to select candidates and issues directly on a digital interface, with choices recorded electronically in the machine's internal rather than on ballots. The AccuVote-TS and its successor, the AccuVote-TSX, lacked a standard record, storing votes on for later tabulation. Introduced around 2000, the AccuVote-TS required voter authentication via insertion before displaying the . Voters navigated options using a , reviewed selections on a summary screen, and confirmed to cast votes, which were then saved to internal . Post-election, results transferred to removable PCMCIA cards for central counting. The system operated on Windows CE 4.1 with the BallotStation software managing the interface, powered by a 32-bit processor, 32 MB , and 64 MB RAM. The AccuVote-TSX upgrade, certified in various states by 2006, incorporated the optional AccuView Printer Module to generate a Voter-Verifiable Paper (VVPAT). This feature printed a tape record of selections for voter inspection through a window, enabling confirmation without retaining the paper as a , though it supported auditing if enabled. Physical protections included tamper-evident seals on access points. Initial deployment occurred in , in 2000, marking early adoption of DRE technology.

Optical Scan and Tabulation Systems

Premier Election Solutions' optical scan systems utilized the AccuVote OS (AV-OS) series, including the AccuVote OS and its variant AccuVote OSX, as hand-fed precinct-count scanners designed to process voter-marked ballots at polling places. These devices scanned ballots using optical recognition technology to detect marks, such as filled ovals or boxes, on pre-printed forms, converting them into electronic tallies stored on internal memory or removable PCMCIA cards for later transfer. The systems supported ballots hand-marked with pens as well as those produced by assistive devices like the AutoMARK, which enabled voters with disabilities to mark ballots via audio and tactile interfaces before printing a version for scanning. In operation, precinct-based AV-OS units provided immediate tabulation, allowing election officials to generate preliminary results on-site while rejecting overvotes or undervotes according to programmable rules, with options for voter correction where ballots were returned uncast. For jurisdictions employing central-count configurations, the AccuVote OS Central handled batch processing of absentee, provisional, or remade damaged ballots at county facilities, feeding stacks of ballots into the scanner for high-volume tabulation without on-site voter interaction. Results from both modes were aggregated via the GEMS (Global Election Management System) software, which Diebold acquired through its purchase of Global Election Systems in 2002 and integrated for ballot programming, vote consolidation, and reporting across optical scan deployments. GEMS facilitated central tabulation by importing scanner data files, performing vote reconciliation, and storing images for potential manual audits, though its implementation required custom configurations per state standards, such as support for multiple languages and styles. These systems were certified under versions of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) up to 2002 standards in various states, emphasizing features like error logging and media encryption for data transfer, though precinct scanners relied on physical transport of cards to prevent premature result leaks. Adoption of AV-OS units peaked in the mid-2000s, accounting for a significant portion of U.S. optical scan infrastructure before subsequent vendor transitions.

Election Management Software Features

The Global Election Management System (GEMS), version 1.18.24 and later iterations such as 1.21.2, served as the core management software for Premier Election Solutions, enabling centralized administration on Windows-based servers. It facilitated preparation by allowing election officials to define and format databases, configure styles including multiple cards and language variants, and store data on races, candidates, issues, and precinct-specific configurations for up to 6,000 styles and 1,000 precincts. Programming functionalities included generating media for devices like the AccuVote-TSX direct-recording electronic (DRE) units and AccuVote-OS optical scanners, using tools such as VCProgrammer version 4.6.1 to load definitions onto memory cards with capacities up to 128 MB PCMCIA cards. Vote tabulation in GEMS supported both precinct-count and central-count modes, processing results uploaded from device memory cards via secure checksums and digital signatures to aggregate totals from DREs, optical scanners, and ballot marking devices like AutoMARK. It maintained counters for cast, total votes, write-ins, overvotes, and undervotes per race and , handling up to 1,549,703 ballot positions in certified configurations, with integration to Premier Central Scan (PCS) version 2.2.1 for high-speed central processing of absentee and scanned ballots. Reporting features generated election summaries, zero tapes for pre-election verification, geographic breakdowns by precinct, and exportable formats such as ASCII or state-specific results files, with JResult Client version 1.1.3 enabling real-time public displays or web postings of preliminary tallies. Audit and verification capabilities included non-deletable audit logs recording all GEMS activities, support for (VVPAT) data from AccuVote-TSX printers, and logic-and-accuracy (L&A) testing prior to elections to validate ballot programming against predefined tests. The ASSURE 1.2 system, certified by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission in 2009, extended these with ASSURE Security Manager version 1.2.1 for role-based access controls and multi-lingual audio ballot support for , accommodating features like straight-party voting, district rotation, and integration with devices. Operational limits encompassed a 2 GB database capacity using the , with error recovery mechanisms for data transmission over modems or networks requiring dual-official authentication for sensitive tasks.

Adoption in U.S. Elections

Jurisdictions and Scale of Deployment

As of May 2004, Diebold Election Systems—Premier's direct predecessor—had deployed its AccuVote-TS direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines in 194 counties nationwide, accounting for 6.23% of U.S. counties surveyed. These installations covered 9,928 precincts (5.39% of total precincts) and served approximately 9.8 million registered voters (6.23% of the national total), with systems in place for the November 2004 general across more than half of U.S. states. Following the to Premier Election Solutions, deployments expanded to include optical scan systems like the AccuVote OS and continued use of upgraded DRE models such as the TSX, with adoption in jurisdictions across states including , Georgia, , , and . By the late , prior to the acquisition by Election Systems & Software, Premier systems supported elections in multiple counties per state, though precise nationwide counts post-2004 are limited in public records due to varying state procurement and certification data. Legacy Premier-associated equipment persisted in some areas into the , used by jurisdictions representing an estimated 9% of the U.S. as of the election cycle. The scale reflected early Help America Vote Act-driven modernization, with Diebold/Premier capturing a notable share of DRE and optical scan markets amid competition from ES&S and Hart InterCivic, though deployments were concentrated in urban and suburban counties seeking touchscreen accessibility features. Specific examples include widespread use in Ohio's 2004 tabulation and Georgia's statewide DRE rollout of over 20,000 units in 2002, later scrutinized for .

Certification Processes and Regulatory Approval

Premier Election Solutions' voting systems, including direct recording electronic (DRE) machines like the AccuVote-TS and AccuVote-TSx, as well as optical scan systems such as the AccuVote-OS and Assure series, were subject to a multi-layered certification process involving federal guidelines and state-specific approvals. Federally, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), established under the Help America Vote Act of 2002, oversees certification through accredited Voting System Test Laboratories (VSTLs) that evaluate systems against the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG). These guidelines, developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the EAC's Technical Guidelines Development Committee, assess functionality, accessibility, security, and accuracy. , as a registered manufacturer with the EAC until its inactivation, submitted systems for this testing, though not all models achieved full federal certification due to evolving VVSG requirements, such as mandates for voter-verifiable paper audit trails (VVPAT) in later versions. Specific federal testing milestones for systems included the Assure 1.2 optical scan and marking system, which underwent EAC-reviewed , culminating in a draft test dated February 22, 2008, confirming compliance in areas like hardware durability and software under VVSG 1.0. However, earlier DRE models like the AccuVote-TS, deployed widely before comprehensive EAC processes matured, relied more on pre-HAVA state certifications and faced scrutiny for lacking inherent , prompting conditional approvals or upgrades in some jurisdictions. State regulatory bodies conducted independent examinations, often mirroring or exceeding federal standards; for example, performed detailed system examinations for (formerly Diebold) equipment, evaluating tabulation accuracy and audit capabilities. State-level approvals varied, with certifications granted after source code reviews, logic and accuracy testing, and public demonstrations. In California, the Premier GEMS election management software version 1.18.24 received conditional reapproval on December 31, 2009, following a comprehensive top-to-bottom review that addressed security gaps identified in prior audits. Florida's Department of State certified Premier Election Solutions Release 1.20.2, Version 1 (revised), affirming its suitability for ballot tabulation and reporting under state law. These approvals enabled deployment in dozens of jurisdictions but were later impacted by divestitures and emerging security concerns, leading to decertifications in states like California by 2010. Regulatory processes emphasized empirical testing over theoretical assurances, yet critics noted that approvals sometimes overlooked independent analyses revealing exploitable flaws, such as remote access vulnerabilities in Diebold systems documented in academic reviews predating full VVSG 2.0 adoption.

Security and Integrity Issues

Identified Vulnerabilities and Technical Analyses

In September 2006, researchers Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and W. Felten from published a of the Diebold AccuVote-TS direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machine, which formed the basis for Premier Election Solutions' systems. The study revealed that attackers with brief physical access—approximately one minute—could install vote-stealing via the machine's PCMCIA slot, exploiting weak and unencrypted . This malware altered vote tallies undetectably, modified logs and self-tests to conceal changes, and demonstrated potential for a self-propagating "" spreading silently between machines during routine transfers using memory cards. The analysis highlighted fundamental flaws in the AccuVote-TS's , including reliance on outdated and insecure Windows CE components, absence of cryptographic protections for vote data, and inadequate tamper-evident seals on hardware ports. Researchers prototyped functional exploits in a setting, showing how an attacker could flip votes from one candidate to another while maintaining the appearance of a legitimate outcome. required substantial hardware redesigns, such as secure boot mechanisms, and procedural changes like air-gapped operations, underscoring the machine's unsuitability for high-stakes elections without verifiable paper trails. The 2007-2008 EVEREST study, commissioned by the and conducted by teams from , the , and other experts, performed an in-depth of Premier Election Solutions' systems, including the AccuVote-TSx DRE, GEMS election management software, and voter-activated systems. It uncovered systemic vulnerabilities, such as insufficient election data integrity controls allowing manipulation of vote totals and of voters, alongside weak defenses against insider threats that permitted undetected tampering by poll workers or technicians. Specific issues included exploitable flaws enabling unlimited ballot casting without detection and manipulable voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPATs) that could be chemically altered to destroy records. Technical examinations in doubled previously known vulnerabilities, identifying 27 new flaws through source code audits, hardware probing, and penetration testing over nine weeks. For instance, the ExpressPoll touchscreen and Voter Card Encoder software suffered from integrity failures, allowing unauthorized code execution, while audit logs exposed voter choices, compromising . Undocumented features and poor engineering practices, like hardcoded passwords and unpatched legacy code, exacerbated risks of remote or supply-chain attacks. The study emphasized unreliable auditing due to easily falsified logs, recommending cryptographic enhancements and mandatory risk-limiting audits for any continued deployment.

Leaked Internal Documents and Whistleblower Claims

In August 2003, internal Diebold Election Systems documents, including over 15,000 emails and memos, were anonymously leaked and posted online by activists, revealing company discussions about known weaknesses in the AccuVote-TS direct-recording machines, such as inadequate for smart cards and vulnerabilities to unauthorized software modifications. The memos indicated Diebold engineers had identified risks like potential backdoor access via memory cards but prioritized rapid deployment over full remediation, with internal correspondence from 2001–2002 documenting failed tests and workarounds that bypassed certification standards. Diebold responded by issuing cease-and-desist letters and filing lawsuits against universities and individuals for to remove the files, but courts ruled the postings constituted for public criticism of security. In 2004, , a temporary clerical worker at the office of (Diebold's counsel), leaked additional internal documents obtained from the firm's files, which exposed Diebold's shipment of voting machines to Kern County, , pre-loaded with uncertified software versions not approved by state regulators for security and functionality testing. Heller's disclosures, shared with integrity advocates, prompted a whistleblower lawsuit under the False Claims Act, alleging Diebold defrauded state agencies by selling non-compliant systems while certifying them as meeting Help America Vote Act requirements. The suit claimed the uncertified software introduced untested risks, including potential vote miscounts documented in internal testing logs showing discrepancies of up to 2% in simulated s. Diebold settled the False Claims Act case in November 2007 for $2.6 million without admitting wrongdoing, with funds distributed to affected counties like and , which had purchased over 5,000 machines. Heller faced charges of unauthorized computer access, commercial burglary, and receiving stolen property, pleading guilty in 2006 to a and receiving three years' , a development critics attributed to retaliation against exposing irregularities rather than for personal gain. These revelations contributed to broader scrutiny of Premier Election Solutions (Diebold's rebranded election division post-2007), highlighting patterns of deploying systems with documented but unaddressed flaws, though independent analyses later confirmed some vulnerabilities were inherent to the DRE architecture rather than solely software certification lapses.

Vendor Conflicts and Fundraising Practices

In August 2003, Walden W. O'Dell, then-chairman and CEO of Diebold Inc. (parent company of Diebold Election Systems, later rebranded as ), penned a letter to 100 wealthy Republican donors in , stating he was "committed to helping deliver its electoral votes to the president next year." This pledge came amid Diebold's push to supply touch-screen voting machines to counties, where the company secured contracts worth tens of millions of dollars, including a $30 million deal for deployment. O'Dell, a certified Bush "Pioneer" fundraiser who raised over $100,000 for George W. Bush's 2000 campaign and committed to similar efforts in , exemplified executive-level political engagement that critics argued compromised vendor neutrality in election technology procurement. The episode highlighted broader concerns over election vendors' fundraising ties, as Diebold executives and the company itself engaged in lobbying and contributions favoring Republican causes. A analysis by the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project and others documented voting system manufacturers' political activities, noting Diebold's donations and advocacy aligned with GOP priorities, potentially influencing state certification and contract awards in battleground states like , where Bush won by 118,601 votes amid reports of machine malfunctions. O'Dell later described the letter as a "huge mistake" in May , attributing it to personal enthusiasm rather than corporate intent, and resigned from Diebold in 2005 amid mounting scrutiny over partisanship and security flaws. Such practices raised questions about inherent conflicts in an industry where vendors rely on contracts for revenue—Diebold Election Systems generated over $100 million annually from U.S. by the mid-2000s—while executives fundraised for candidates who oversaw administration. No linked these activities to altered outcomes, but the overlap fueled demands for stricter vendor independence rules, including bans on political contributions by firms bidding on voting systems, as proposed in subsequent legislative efforts. Post-rebranding to Premier Election Solutions in 2007, the subsidiary continued operations under similar scrutiny until its 2009 sale to a group for $5 million, reflecting Diebold's exit from a politically charged market.

Responses, Rejections, and Reforms

Company and Official Defenses

Premier Election Solutions, formerly Diebold Election Systems, asserted that its voting systems met or exceeded federal and state certification standards, including those set by the in 2002, which incorporated independent laboratory testing for security and reliability. The company highlighted implemented enhancements such as removable hard-coded keys and passwords, encrypted result uploads, and digitally signed files to prevent unauthorized modifications. In response to academic analyses identifying potential vulnerabilities, Diebold representatives argued that such exploits were theoretical and required improbable levels of physical access or procedural lapses, dismissing them after real-world poll observations confirmed no practical risks. The firm reported zero security incidents across over 55,000 AccuVote-TSX units deployed in the March 2004 primaries and claimed 100% accuracy in California's parallel vote monitoring tests. Election officials in adopting states defended the systems' integrity by emphasizing procedural safeguards, including tamper-evident seals, chain-of-custody protocols, and post-election audits, which they stated mitigated identified technical risks in controlled environments. For instance, administrators in Georgia and cited consistently low undervote rates—0.88% and below, respectively—and successful large-scale implementations without of compromise as validation of operational . Officials further noted that state certifications, renewed after vendor-submitted patches for known flaws like audit log weaknesses in , ensured ongoing compliance despite external critiques.

State-Level Decertifications and Replacements

In August 2007, Debra Bowen decertified Premier Election Solutions' (formerly Diebold) AccuVote-TSx direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines and associated GEMS election management software version 1.18.24 following a "top-to-bottom " that identified critical vulnerabilities, including weak , insufficient access controls, and potential for unauthorized software modifications. The , initiated in response to academic analyses and whistleblower reports, concluded that the systems lacked adequate safeguards against tampering, prompting the withdrawal of approval for all previously certified configurations effective August 3, 2007. This action affected over 14,000 machines deployed across multiple counties, building on a 2004 provisional ban by then-Secretary Kevin Shelley due to uncertified software updates and lapses. Subsequent investigations in 2009 revealed additional flaws, such as a "delete" function in the log software that could erase evidence of alterations without detection, further justifying the decertification. Counties responded by transitioning to hand-marked paper ballots scanned optically, often using systems from alternative vendors like (ES&S) or Hart InterCivic, with limited conditional recertification of DREs for purposes only in 2010. By 2018, California's confirmed full decertification of all legacy Premier systems, emphasizing verifiable paper records as a core reform. In December 2007, decertified Premier's DRE machines used in major counties, including and Jefferson, after independent tests demonstrated failures in functionality, such as inaccurate ballot tabulation and software glitches during logic and accuracy checks. The decision impacted thousands of units, citing non-compliance with state standards for reliability and security, and led to their replacement with paper and optical scan systems for the elections. This shift aligned with broader post-2000 (HAVA) reforms but was accelerated by empirical testing revealing operational deficiencies rather than theoretical risks alone. These decertifications contributed to a national reevaluation of DRE systems, with affected states prioritizing auditable trails; however, no other states enacted comparable statewide bans on Premier equipment, though localized replacements occurred in jurisdictions like certain counties facing recurring tabulation errors. Premier's eventual in 2010 and asset sale to ES&S effectively ended new deployments, leaving legacy machines phased out amid ongoing scrutiny.

Implemented Mitigations and Upgrades

In response to security analyses identifying risks such as propagation via memory cards and inadequate , Premier Election Solutions released updates for its AccuVote-TSX and AccuVote-OS optical scan machines. These included upgrading the AV-OS from version 1.96.6 to 1.96.10 and the AV-TSX from BLR 7.1.2.1 to 1.3.9, aimed at mitigating tampering and infection vectors observed in prior reviews. The company also deployed the Key Card Tool for AV-TSX units, enabling election officials to generate custom keys and passwords that replaced vulnerable default credentials, thereby strengthening device and during loading and results transfer. Tamper-evident seals—consisting of serialized wire, plastic, and label variants—were applied to critical access points like slots, seams, front panels, and doors on both AccuVote models, with procedures requiring pre-election verification and logging to detect physical intrusions. For central election management, patched its Global Election Management System (GEMS) software in version 1.21.5, certified by iBeta Quality Assurance under Election Assistance Commission standards on August 12, 2009. The update addressed deficiencies in audit logging by mandating records of all events—including vote deletions—with accurate timestamps, user identification, and login attempts; it further encrypted the database via Windows Workspace protections and blocked operations if logs were disabled, countering undetected alterations in jurisdictions across nearly three dozen states. To enable post-election audits, Premier incorporated voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) modules into select AccuVote-TSX configurations, printing a verifiable record of selections for voter before finalization, as deployed in states requiring hybrid DRE-paper systems. The Assure 1.2 platform upgrade, targeting optical scanners, touchscreens, and servers, resolved 38 documented vulnerabilities—reducing them to 13—though statewide rollout demanded approximately 1,000 man-hours and awaited full EAC beyond initial testing in 2008. Additional procedural mitigations included secure shipping via tamper-resistant cases and overwriting voter access cards post-use to prevent reuse exploits.

Legacy and Current Relevance

Influence on Modern Voting Technology

Premier Election Solutions, through its Diebold predecessor, significantly shaped the adoption of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems in the United States following the Help America Vote Act of 2002, which allocated over $3 billion for replacing outdated punch-card and lever machines with electronic alternatives. The company's AccuVote-TS DRE machines became widely deployed in at least 28 states by the mid-2000s, enabling touch-based vote selection and electronic storage without initial paper records. This proliferation accelerated the shift from manual to computerized voting but exposed systemic vulnerabilities, including remote access capabilities via modem connections and inadequate , as identified in independent analyses. Security evaluations, such as California's 2007 Top-to-Bottom Review and the EVEREST study in , revealed exploitable flaws in Premier systems, including the ability to alter votes undetectably due to the lack of voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT). These findings prompted regulatory reforms, influencing the and 2015 updates to the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) by emphasizing auditable paper records and risk-limiting audits. By 2018, the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported that most jurisdictions had transitioned away from paperless DREs toward optical scan systems with marking devices (BMDs), directly responding to the risks demonstrated by Premier's equipment. The 2009 sale of Premier's assets to (ES&S) transferred legacy technologies, including optical scanners like the AccuVote-OS, which ES&S integrated into its offerings for central count tabulation of paper ballots. While pure DREs have largely been phased out— with fewer than 10% of U.S. voters using them by —Premier's influence persists in hybrid BMDs that produce verifiable paper ballots, a design evolution driven by the need to mitigate the unverifiable electronic-only risks exemplified by early Diebold systems. Ongoing scrutiny of legacy equipment, including decade-old vulnerabilities in models like the AccuVote-TS, underscores the enduring lessons from Premier's era in prioritizing cybersecurity and transparency in modern voting infrastructure.

Ongoing Use of Legacy Equipment and Scrutiny

Legacy equipment from Premier Election Solutions, such as the AccuVote TSX direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machine, continues to see limited deployment in U.S. jurisdictions during the 2024 general elections, despite the company's assets being acquired by Election Systems & Software (ES&S) and Dominion Voting Systems in 2010 as part of a U.S. Department of Justice-mandated divestiture to address antitrust concerns. The AccuVote TSX, originally certified under early standards in states like Kansas and Kentucky dating to 1997, operates on Windows CE 4.1 and records votes directly to internal flash memory using touch screens and smart cards for voter authentication. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission maintains certification for the Premier Assure 1.2 system under the outdated Voluntary Voting System Guidelines of 2002, though Premier itself was designated inactive in 2019, raising questions about ongoing maintenance and support for deployed units. While some AccuVote TSX configurations include optional printers to produce verifiable paper records, base models lack such features, contributing to persistent criticism of DRE systems for insufficient auditability. Technical analyses have highlighted enduring vulnerabilities in these machines, including the potential for to spread silently via memory cards during ballot preparation and tabulation processes, enabling undetectable vote alterations. A 2007 study demonstrated practical attacks where an attacker with brief physical access could install a virus that modifies votes in real-time without triggering alarms or leaving traces detectable by standard procedures. The EVEREST evaluation that same year uncovered systemic weaknesses in hardware and software, such as easily bypassed tamper-evident seals allowing unauthorized firmware replacement, prompting decertification in that state and recommendations for broader reforms. Ongoing scrutiny emphasizes the risks of unpatched legacy operating systems and hardware susceptible to modern threats, including insider manipulation or supply-chain compromises, especially in jurisdictions retaining these machines due to cost barriers to replacement. experts, including those involved in federal reviews, argue that reliance on such undermines public and exposes elections to exploitation, advocating for nationwide transitions to paper-based systems with robust auditing capabilities. Despite mitigations like air-gapping and procedural controls, the absence of routine audits and end-of-life support for Premier systems amplifies concerns over causal pathways to integrity failures in high-stakes contests.

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