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Conventional Prompt Strike
Conventional Prompt Strike
Conventional Prompt Strike
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Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS), formerly called Prompt Global Strike (PGS), is a United States military effort to develop a system that can deliver a precision-guided conventional weapon strike anywhere in the world within one hour, in a similar manner to a nuclear ICBM.[1][2] Such a weapon would allow the United States to respond far more swiftly to rapidly emerging threats than is possible with conventional forces. A CPS system could also be useful during a nuclear conflict, potentially replacing the use of nuclear weapons against up to 30% of targets.[3] The CPS program encompasses numerous established and emerging technologies, including conventional surface-launched missiles and air- and submarine-launched hypersonic missiles.

System

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The CPS system is intended to complement existing American rapid-response forces, such as Forward Deployed Forces, Air Expeditionary Groups (which can deploy within 48 hours) and carrier battle groups (which can respond within 96 hours).[4] Possible delivery systems for CPS warheads include:

In 2010, the United States Air Force prototyped a CPS system based on a modified Minuteman III ICBM.[5] In March 2011, Air Force Major General David Scott stated that the service had no plans to use a sea- or land-based ICBM system for Prompt Global Strike, as they would be expensive to develop and potentially "dangerous". Instead, efforts would focus on a hypersonic glider.[6] However, the following day, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Norton Schwartz said that an ICBM-based CPS system was still an option.[7]

Development history

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The Orbital Test Vehicles (OTV-1 and OTV-2) are on the left, and the X-34 is on the right. Mission: "demonstrate a reliable, reusable, unmanned space test platform for the United States Air Force." Possible applications: to serve as part of a reconnaissance program, a space bomber, or even a military satellite delivery system.

Background

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The George W. Bush administration considered developing a hypersonic conventional weapon for a CPS role in the 2000s, in the form of DARPA's Falcon Project.[8] A conventionally-armed modification of the Trident SLBM was also proposed as a CPS candidate in 2006.[9] The Bush administration ultimately rejected the idea of a CPS system because of fears that a submarine-launched ballistic missile would trigger the Russian nuclear-launch warning system, potentially provoking a nuclear war.[10] However, the Obama administration continued development of the system later in the decade. In April 2010, Marine Corps General James Cartwright explained the system's rationale, stating that "Today, unless you want to go nuclear, [the conventional military response time is] measured in days, maybe weeks".[5]

A potential enemy cannot be certain that a launched ICBM contains only a conventional warhead, not a nuclear one. It is thus currently unclear what design features or precautions could convince China and Russia, two countries with advanced launch-detection systems and nuclear ICBMs, to ignore their early-warning systems. Current ideas include a low-trajectory missile design, or allowing Russian and Chinese inspection of CPS missile sites.[4][5]

On 11 April 2010, United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates indicated that the United States already had a Prompt Global Strike capability.[11] This coincided with the New START disarmament treaty signed on 8 April 2010, which set new, lower limits on arsenals of ballistic missiles and their warheads. The treaty does not distinguish between conventional and nuclear versions of weapons, meaning any ballistic CPS missiles and warheads would count toward the new limit. However, the U.S. State Department stated in 2010 that this would not constrain plans for CPS deployment, since plans for the system at that time did not come near the New START limits.[12]

In 2024, Zumwalt-class destroyers were reported to be undergoing refits to carry hypersonic CPS.[13]

Advanced hypersonic weapon

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The Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) performs its first flight in 2011 on a STARS missile from the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Kauai in Hawaii

On 18 November 2011, the first advanced hypersonic weapon (AHW) glide vehicle was successfully tested by the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command as part of the Prompt Global Strike program.[citation needed] The missile was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii, and struck a target at the Reagan Test Site on Kwajalein Atoll, over 3,700 kilometres (2,300 mi) away, in under 30 minutes.[14] The prototype, which incorporated technologies developed by Sandia National Laboratories, was used to gather data to assist the development of future hypersonic warheads.[15] The AHW followed an endo-atmospheric (within earth atmosphere, at altitude below 100 kilometers) non-ballistic trajectory during the test flight. This is a crucial design feature, as following a depressed trajectory that is much lower and flatter than a normal ICBM prevents other nuclear-armed nations from mistakenly thinking the AHW is a nuclear-tipped missile.[16][clarification needed]

The second AHW test flight occurred on 25 August 2014 from the Kodiak Launch Complex in Alaska. The mission was terminated shortly after liftoff due to an anomaly in the launch vehicle. Operators triggered a self-destruct sequence four seconds after launching, with eyewitnesses claiming the weapon had veered off trajectory just as it took off.[17] A Failure Review Board released the results of their investigation into the failed launch in early February 2015. The board determined that an external thermal protective cover, designed to regulate motor temperature, interfered with the launch vehicle's steering assembly; no issues were found with the hypersonic glide body, booster motors, or the Kodiak Launch Complex, and the board determined the test range flight safety officer correctly followed established protocol and procedures.[18]

HTV-2

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The HTV-2 Falcon, a project to develop an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle, staged a pair of test flights.[citation needed]

Submarine option

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Main articles: Submarine-launched ballistic missile and Submarine-launched cruise missile

In January 2012, the Pentagon stated that the CPS launch platform would be submarine-based.[19] However, practical efforts to develop the CPS system were delayed by fears of accidentally starting a nuclear conflict.[19] In February 2014, the U.S. Navy solicited proposals for two-year industry trade studies to test the feasibility of developing a hypersonic submarine-launched intermediate-range conventional CPS weapon. The Navy specified that the effort was a study to evaluate technology options, not to develop a system-level specific CPS solution. The Navy stated that it would be interested in awarding one or two 13-month technology evaluation contracts, each worth around US$5 million.[20]

The Conventional Prompt Strike successfully tested a rocket motor for ship and submarine-launched cells in June 2021.[21]: 1:35 to 6:50  The Army/Navy Common-Hypersonic Glide Body was successfully tested in 2020.[21] The U.S. Navy awarded Lockheed Martin a contract to integrate the Conventional Prompt Strike weapon system onto the Zumwalt-class destroyer in February 2023.[22]

Foreign responses

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People's Republic of China

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Further information: China and weapons of mass destruction

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) began developing a long-range hypersonic missile, the DF-ZF rocket-boosted hypersonic glide vehicle, in the 2010s.[23] Seven flight tests[24] — with one failure[25] — were conducted from January 2014[25] through 2016.[24] It likely entered service by October 2019.[26]

Russia

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In December 2010, Russian military experts indicated that the forthcoming S-500 missile defense system would include anti-hypersonic defenses.[27] In December 2012, commenting on the development of a replacement for its R-36M2 Voevoda ICBM, the commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Sergey Karakaev, stated that the missile would allow Russia "to realize such opportunities as the creation of high precision strategic weapons with non-nuclear warheads and a practical global range. Russia can create non-nuclear, high precision weapons based on intercontinental rockets in the event that the USA also works on designing such a weapon". On 11 December 2013, Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin warned that Russia would use nuclear weapons if it came under an attack, adding that this possibility serves as the main deterrent to potential aggressors. Rogozin also stated that the Russian Foundation for Advanced Research Projects in the Defense Industry (FPI) would develop a military response to the CPS system.[28]

In September 2014, Russia's president Vladimir Putin mentioned CPS among a number of the new threats Russia faced, along with the US Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system in Alaska, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System in Europe, and increased NATO activity in eastern Europe. Deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin again warned that Russia would upgrade its strategic nuclear forces and aerospace defences in response to the CPS system.[29]

Jane's Intelligence Review reported in 2015 that the Russian Yu-71 hypersonic boost-glide system had been undergoing test flights since 2011, though its predecessors date back to 2001.[citation needed]

In October 2015, while attending a non-proliferation conference in New York, the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department of Non-proliferation, Disarmament, and Arms Control Mikhail Ivanovich Ulyanov stated "[It] is the US policy that hinders further nuclear reductions [including through] gradual advancement towards implementing the “prompt global strike” concept"[30]

In March 2018, the Avangard hypersonic weapon system, a development of the Yu-71/Yu-74, entered series production.[31][32][33]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Conventional Prompt Strike

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![STARS_AHW_Kauai_launch.jpg][float-right] Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is a program to develop and field hypersonic boost-glide missiles capable of delivering conventional warheads for prompt, long-range strikes against high-value, time-sensitive targets. The system employs a two-stage to propel a common hypersonic glide body (C-HGB) that maneuvers at speeds exceeding Mach 5, enabling shorter flight times, extended ranges beyond 1,000 miles, and enhanced survivability against defenses compared to traditional ballistic or cruise missiles. Evolving from earlier Prompt Global Strike concepts, CPS shares its core booster and glide vehicle with the U.S. Army's (LRHW, or Dark Eagle), reflecting joint service efforts to accelerate hypersonic technology maturation amid competition from adversaries like and . Initial deployment focuses on sea-based platforms, including Virginia-class submarine torpedo rooms modified for vertical launch and Zumwalt-class destroyers' peripheral vertical launch systems, with plans for broader integration. Development milestones include successful end-to-end flight tests, such as a joint Army-Navy demonstration in December 2024 validating booster and glide body performance, and a pioneering sea-based cold-gas launch in May 2025 from a submerged surrogate, proving encapsulation and ejection mechanisms essential for stealthy operations. Despite these advances, the program faces technical challenges like managing and plasma interference during glide, alongside escalating costs that prompted a reduction in the 2026 budget request for hypersonics to $3.9 billion from prior years, though fielding of initial capabilities remains targeted for the late . CPS represents a strategic pivot toward non-nuclear hypersonic options to deter by compressing adversary response timelines and penetrating advanced air defenses, though its operational effectiveness hinges on resolving guidance precision under hypersonic conditions.

Program Overview

Objectives and Strategic Rationale

The Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program seeks to equip U.S. naval forces with a hypersonic boost-glide capable of delivering conventional warheads to any target on within one hour, enabling rapid response to time-sensitive, high-value threats such as mobile launchers or command centers. This capability addresses limitations in existing subsonic systems like the , which require flight times exceeding 24 hours for global reach, thereby closing the gap between tactical responsiveness and strategic range without resorting to nuclear options. Strategically, CPS responds to the proliferation of advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) networks and hypersonic weapons by peer competitors, including China's deployment of DF-21D and anti-ship ballistic missiles in the and Russia's use of Kinzhal hypersonic missiles in since 2022, which challenge U.S. and forward basing. By penetrating dense air defenses at speeds exceeding Mach 5, CPS provides combatant commanders with a non-nuclear tool to neutralize such threats preemptively, enhancing operational flexibility in contested environments like the or . From a deterrence perspective, the system's design supports proportional escalation by offering precise, attributable conventional strikes for non-existential provocations, thereby reserving nuclear weapons for scenarios threatening U.S. and reducing reliance on atomic forces in regional conflicts. This aligns with U.S. objectives outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review to diminish nuclear roles while bolstering conventional precision capabilities, mitigating risks of miscalculation where adversaries might interpret sub-threshold attacks as nuclear precursors.

System Description

The Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is a sea-based system employing a boost-glide to deliver conventional, non-nuclear payloads for rapid-response strikes against time-sensitive, high-value targets. Unlike nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, which rely on indiscriminate explosive yield, or slower conventional options like subsonic cruise missiles that afford extended warning times to adversaries, CPS prioritizes maneuverability and speed to penetrate advanced air defenses. The system launches a booster that accelerates a glide vehicle to hypersonic velocities—exceeding Mach 5—before separation, allowing the glide body to execute atmospheric maneuvers at relatively low altitudes, thereby reducing detectability and enhancing survivability against interception attempts. This design integrates a precision-guided conventional suited for surgical engagements, such as disrupting mobile launchers or hardened command infrastructure, where minimal is essential compared to nuclear alternatives. The hypersonic glide phase enables compressed flight timelines, potentially achieving intercontinental ranges in under an hour, distinguishing CPS from legacy systems limited by predictable trajectories or sub-hypersonic speeds that permit defensive countermeasures. CPS emphasizes multi-platform flexibility through modular components, primarily configured for vertical launch from U.S. Navy submarines and surface combatants, including Zumwalt-class destroyers and Virginia-class submarines. It leverages a common hypersonic glide body developed jointly with the U.S. Army's program, facilitating technology sharing that could extend adaptability to ground-based or other launch environments without requiring full-system redesigns. This shared architecture underscores CPS's role in addressing gaps in conventional prompt global strike capabilities, where speed and precision outweigh the escalatory risks of nuclear employment.

Technical Characteristics

Missile Components and Design

The missile employs a boost-glide consisting of a two-stage stacked with the Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB). The booster stages use solid rocket motors to provide initial high-thrust acceleration, propelling the C-HGB to hypersonic velocities before separation, with design elements adapted from established systems for reliable vertical launch from naval vessels. The C-HGB serves as the unpowered reentry vehicle and glide phase component, featuring a compact, wedge-shaped optimized for atmospheric maneuver and sustained . It incorporates a thermal protection shield and heat-resistant materials to mitigate aero-thermal stresses from and compression heating, enabling glide durations without active while preserving the payload's integrity. This configuration draws from prior boost-glide prototypes, emphasizing survivability against thermal loads exceeding thousands of degrees . The within the C-HGB comprises a conventional , designed for high-velocity impact to achieve destructive effects through rather than large explosive charges, distinguishing it from nuclear-armed variants in intercontinental systems. This integration prioritizes structural compatibility with the glide body's forebody, ensuring release and terminal stability without nuclear components.

Performance and Guidance Systems

The Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missile achieves hypersonic velocities exceeding Mach 5 during its glide phase, enabling it to follow depressed trajectories that reduce flight times and compress enemy warning periods relative to traditional ballistic missiles with higher apogees. This speed profile, combined with atmospheric maneuvering, complicates interception by conventional missile defenses designed for predictable ballistic paths. Operational range for CPS, leveraging the Common-Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB), exceeds 2,775 kilometers, allowing strikes against time-sensitive targets from forward naval positions with global potential when launched from assets positioned accordingly. The system's maneuverability during glide further enhances survivability against area defenses by enabling course adjustments to evade threats. Guidance employs inertial navigation augmented by GPS for mid-course corrections, with the C-HGB demonstrating precision capable of sub-meter accuracy in developmental tests, as evidenced by Army evaluations of the shared glide body achieving impacts within 15 centimeters of intended points. This resilience to electronic warfare stems from the hypersonic regime's limited exposure to jamming windows and the glide vehicle's autonomous terminal-phase capabilities.

Development and Testing

Historical Background and Early Concepts

The conceptual origins of Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) trace to post-Cold War strategic reassessments in the United States, where reductions in nuclear forces under the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review highlighted the limitations of relying solely on nuclear weapons for time-sensitive global strikes against emerging threats. With the U.S. nuclear arsenal shrinking to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads as directed by President in 2001, defense planners recognized that nuclear options carried unacceptable escalatory risks for non-nuclear targets, such as mobile missile launchers or terrorist facilities, necessitating non-nuclear alternatives capable of rapid, precision delivery. This shift was driven by the causal reality that subsonic cruise , like the , required hours to reach distant targets, rendering them ineffective against fleeting threats in high-end conflicts with peer adversaries. Early concepts coalesced around the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) initiative, initially explored under the and influenced by the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review's emphasis on transformative global strike capabilities. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's ( in the early 2000s further advanced hypersonic technologies for conventional rapid global reach, aiming to deliver munitions from the continental U.S. to anywhere worldwide within hours. These efforts addressed the strategic gap exposed by proliferating threats from states like and , whose programs demonstrated the need for strikes that could neutralize time-urgent targets without the ambiguities of nuclear signaling. Congressional authorization in 2008 formalized the Conventional Prompt Global Strike program through the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (H.R. 5658), directing the Department of Defense to develop and report on non-nuclear prompt strike systems while prioritizing technologies to distinguish conventional launches from nuclear ones, thereby mitigating misinterpretation risks. This pivot to conventional payloads was rooted in first-principles analysis of deterrence dynamics, where nuclear ambiguity could provoke unintended escalation, particularly against adversaries perceiving any launch—regardless of payload—as an existential threat. The program's early focus thus emphasized boost-glide and ballistic systems to achieve minutes-scale response times, overcoming the inherent speed constraints of legacy conventional arsenals.

Predecessor Programs and Tests

The Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) program, led by the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, conducted early boost-glide tests that laid groundwork for subsequent systems like Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS). On November 17, 2011, the first AHW test launched from the in Kauai, , using a three-stage booster to deploy the glide vehicle on its intended trajectory over the , successfully collecting data on hypersonic technologies and long-range atmospheric flight performance. A follow-on test on August 25, 2014, encountered a flight anomaly shortly after launch from the same facility, leading to early termination and highlighting persistent challenges in vehicle stability and control during hypersonic reentry. Parallel efforts under DARPA's program tested the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2 (HTV-2), an unmanned glide vehicle designed to validate hypersonic aerodynamics and guidance at speeds exceeding Mach 20. The initial HTV-2 flight in 2010 experienced a booster malfunction that prevented full glide phase execution, though it provided partial data on high-speed dynamics. The second test on August 11, 2011, achieved booster separation and hypersonic glide for approximately nine minutes, demonstrating controlled flight at extreme velocities before loss of contact due to and control issues, which informed glide body designs for CPS by confirming key principles of maneuverability and thermal management. In the , the U.S. initiated feasibility studies for submarine-launched hypersonic variants under the broader Conventional Prompt Global Strike framework, focusing on adapting boost-glide technologies to vertical launch system constraints such as missile tube dimensions and underwater ejection dynamics. These assessments, beginning around 2014, identified integration challenges for platforms like Virginia-class submarines, including the need for compact common hypersonic glide bodies to enable prompt conventional strikes from submerged assets. Outcomes from AHW and HTV-2 tests directly reduced risks in these studies by validating core hypersonic components, paving the way for CPS-specific adaptations despite setbacks in full-duration flights.

Recent Developments and Milestones

In 2023 and 2024, the Conventional Prompt Strike program conducted a series of flight tests that demonstrated end-to-end boost-glide vehicle performance, including validation and on . These efforts resolved anomalies identified in earlier evaluations, such as guidance precision and issues, contributing to improved maturity despite delays from test failures. The fiscal year 2025 budget request included Conventional Prompt Strike within the Department of Defense's $6.9 billion allocation for development, emphasizing accelerated prototyping to address capability gaps. This funding supported ongoing risk reduction measures, aligning with Government Accountability Office recommendations to prioritize ground-based simulations and modular testing to mitigate flight anomalies before full-scale demonstrations. On May 2, 2025, the U.S. Navy executed the first sea-based test of the Conventional Prompt Strike missile using a cold-gas launch system from a submerged platform off Florida's coast, confirming ejection reliability and initial boost-phase separation for ship- and submarine-compatible operations. In September 2025, integration advanced on the destroyer, incorporating the into the ship's vertical launch system and enabling initial at-sea verification of launch sequencing.

Deployment and Integration

The U.S. Navy's (CPS) program prioritizes integration into Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyers as the initial platform, leveraging their existing peripheral vertical launch systems (PVLS) modified to accommodate CPS all-up-rounds. Two Zumwalt-class ships are undergoing modernization specifically for CPS fielding, with live-fire testing aboard (DDG-1000) scheduled to commence in fiscal year 2027 or 2028. This approach exploits the destroyers' advanced power generation and , enabling up to 12 CPS missiles per ship without requiring extensive hull alterations. For submerged operations, CPS integration targets -class Block V attack submarines, which incorporate the Virginia Payload Module (VPM)—a 28-tube extension providing capacity for larger-diameter hypersonic weapons launched via vertical launch systems while submerged. The VPM's design supports CPS's boost-glide vehicle requirements, with initial operational capability on these submarines projected for the early 2030s, aligning with Block V procurement starting in the late 2020s. This timeline reflects ongoing adaptations to ensure compatibility with the submarines' stealth profiles and mission systems, including fire control upgrades for hypersonic targeting. These naval integrations enhance feasibility by utilizing proven platforms, reducing development risks associated with new hull forms, and enabling prompt strike from dispersed, mobile assets resistant to preemptive targeting.

Army Collaboration and Shared Technologies

The Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program collaborates with the U.S. Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), designated Dark Eagle, through shared development of the Common-Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB), a maneuverable glide vehicle designed for hypersonic speeds exceeding Mach 5. Both systems also utilize a common two-stage rocket booster, originally developed by the Navy, which enables ground and sea launches while reducing production redundancies and overall program costs via joint manufacturing and supply chains. This commonality allows the Department of Defense to allocate resources more efficiently toward countering peer adversaries' anti-access/area-denial capabilities, rather than duplicating efforts across services. Joint flight tests in 2024 validated the of these shared components, including two end-to-end all-up-round demonstrations of the C-HGB that confirmed hypersonic performance over extended ranges. A December 12, 2024, test from a ground-based launcher successfully integrated the Army's with the common booster and glide body, providing data that refines naval adaptations while accelerating fielding timelines for both services. These efforts demonstrate how Army-led ground prototyping informs CPS sea-based variants, fostering cost savings estimated through shared testing infrastructure and avoiding service-specific silos.

Strategic and Operational Role

Deterrence and warfighting Advantages

The (CPS) system strengthens U.S. deterrence by providing a credible, non-nuclear capability to rapidly engage high-value, time-sensitive targets worldwide, thereby expanding conventional response options and diminishing reliance on nuclear escalation for addressing regional aggressions. This prompt global strike potential, achievable within approximately one hour via boost-glide hypersonic delivery, alters adversary by imposing immediate risks on mobile or fleeting assets that traditional subsonic or slower platforms cannot match. Such attributes fill gaps in existing conventional forces, enhancing the overall versatility and reliability of the U.S. strategic posture against peer-level threats. In warfighting contexts, CPS offers superior survivability through its hypersonic glide vehicle's maneuverability at speeds exceeding Mach 5, which complicates interception by advanced integrated air defense systems compared to predictable ballistic trajectories. from joint U.S. and flight tests, including a successful end-to-end demonstration on December 12, 2024, validates this responsiveness and evasion capability against defended environments. The system's design enables precision strikes on distant, hardened targets, providing commanders with flexible, proportional conventional tools that support controlled escalation ladders without crossing nuclear thresholds. These advantages collectively enable non-nuclear reprisals to limited provocations, fostering strategic stability by demonstrating U.S. resolve through empirically verifiable conventional potency rather than ambiguous nuclear signaling. Defense Science Board assessments underscore how such alert-ready, low-cost hypersonic options bolster deterrence credibility without introducing undue instability, as they prioritize causal denial of adversary objectives over alone.

Capabilities in Peer Competitor Scenarios

The Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) system enhances U.S. operational capabilities in peer competitor conflicts by enabling hypersonic strikes against mobile, time-sensitive targets within adversaries' anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) networks. In scenarios involving , CPS facilitates rapid neutralization of assets like DF-21 missile batteries, which form a core element of Beijing's A2/AD strategy in the Western Pacific by threatening U.S. naval forces at extended ranges. The system's boost-glide vehicle, achieving speeds exceeding Mach 5, allows for maneuverable trajectories that complicate interception by Chinese defenses, permitting strikes from or surface platforms outside the initial A2/AD envelope. This capability supports early degradation of mobile launchers, which can relocate within hours, thereby preserving U.S. access to contested areas without immediate territorial basing concessions. In potential engagements with , CPS provides a means to target relocatable air defense systems such as S-400 batteries, which safeguard and troop concentrations in theaters like the Baltic or regions. The hypersonic vehicle's low-altitude glide phase and velocity overwhelm legacy interceptors, as evidenced by analyses of Russian systems' limitations against maneuvering high-speed threats. Unclassified insights from simulations of peer conflicts underscore the value of such prompt strikes in disrupting integrated air defenses during the opening phases, where delays could enable adversary escalation. Sea-launched CPS maintains strategic ambiguity and survivability, launching from dispersed naval assets to avoid preemptive targeting of fixed sites. Deployed from forward-positioned and destroyers, CPS extends U.S. global reach, allowing responses to aggression—such as island seizures or border incursions—without ceding initiative or relying on vulnerable airfields. This maritime basing preserves force primacy by enabling strikes over intercontinental distances in under an hour, contrasting with slower conventional alternatives. Open-source assessments confirm CPS timelines offer an edge over adversaries' theater-range hypersonics, which lack equivalent conventional global promptness, as China's and Russia's Kinzhal prioritize regional arcs rather than worldwide responsiveness. In wargamed peer scenarios, this temporal advantage facilitates sequential targeting of command nodes and mobile threats, compounding disruptions before full adversary mobilization.

International Reactions

China

China has portrayed the United States' Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program, previously known as Prompt Global Strike (PGS), as a destabilizing and pre-emptive capability that undermines strategic stability and contributes to an . Chinese analyses label PGS/CPS alongside U.S. defenses as the "spear and shield" of offensive warfare, arguing it enables rapid conventional strikes against Chinese assets, including nuclear forces, thereby pressuring Beijing's deterrent posture. Official rhetoric, including in and defense commentaries, frames these U.S. efforts as part of a broader encirclement strategy in the , exacerbating tensions over regional disputes like . In parallel, the (PLA) has accelerated its (HGV) programs, notably the equipped with an HGV warhead, which entered service around 2019 following tests dating back to 2014. The , capable of speeds exceeding Mach 5 and maneuvers to evade defenses, is designed for precision strikes against regional targets, including U.S. bases and naval assets in potential contingencies, enabling anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) operations. Similarly, the DF-27, a longer-range system tested in recent years with ranges up to 5,000-8,000 km, incorporates hypersonic elements for both conventional and nuclear payloads, further enhancing PLA capabilities to threaten distant U.S. facilities like those on . These developments, including deployments of multiple brigades, align temporally with U.S. PGS milestones but reflect China's independent pursuit of prompt strike technologies to counter perceived intervention threats. PLA defense white papers, such as the 2019 edition, assert that avoids nuclear arms races and maintains , while criticizing U.S. advancements as provocative. Yet, empirical evidence from 's hypersonic tests—including a 2021 orbital maneuver vehicle demonstration and routine firings near —demonstrates offensive maturation that mirrors CPS objectives, such as rapid, non-nuclear precision strikes within minutes. This progression, with over 1,000 missiles oriented toward including hypersonic variants, underscores that U.S. CPS addresses an existing asymmetry rather than initiating escalation, as PLA systems prioritize coercive leverage in cross-strait scenarios over purely defensive needs.

Russia

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the development of advanced hypersonic systems, including the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, during his March 1, 2018, address to the Federal Assembly, claiming these weapons rendered U.S. missile defenses obsolete and achieved speeds up to Mach 27 while carrying nuclear payloads of up to two megatons. This revelation intensified U.S. concerns over strategic imbalances and accelerated efforts in programs like Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS), which aim for rapid, precision conventional strikes to counter such peer capabilities without nuclear escalation. Russia has deployed analogous systems, such as the air-launched Kinzhal missile, first used operationally against Ukrainian targets in March 2022, reaching speeds of Mach 10 and serving as a tactical hypersonic analog for prompt strikes. Similarly, the Zircon hypersonic cruise missile, capable of Mach 9 speeds and nuclear arming, has been integrated into naval platforms, mirroring CPS's dual-use potential for anti-ship or land-attack roles despite official emphasis on conventional applications. These developments reflect parallel advancements in hypersonic technology between Russia and the U.S., driven by mutual perceptions of vulnerability in existing defenses. Russian strategic analysts and officials have criticized U.S. CPS as eroding distinctions between conventional and nuclear strikes, arguing it could preemptively target Russian nuclear assets and provoke escalatory responses, with some statements indicating any detected incoming ballistic trajectory might be treated as nuclear. However, Russia's own deployment of dual-capable hypersonics like Avangard and employs similar blurring tactics, suggesting critiques stem partly from deterrence posturing rather than doctrinal opposition. CPS, in this context, bolsters NATO's conventional rapid-response options against Russian aggression patterns observed in , prioritizing non-nuclear precision to avoid broader escalation while addressing gaps in allied deterrence.

Other Nations

Under the security partnership, and the have pursued collaborative hypersonic technology development with the , including agreements to share testing facilities and accelerate capabilities under Pillar II. In November 2024, the three nations formalized arrangements for joint hypersonic flight testing campaigns, aiming for six tests by 2028, which complement U.S. Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) efforts by enhancing allied in high-speed strike systems. India has advanced its independent hypersonic programs, notably the BrahMos-II hypersonic developed in partnership with , targeting speeds of Mach 6 or higher, as part of a global response to emerging hypersonic threats rather than direct adoption of CPS technology. This effort reflects indirect competitive pressures from international advancements, including U.S. initiatives, driving indigenous and joint developments to bolster regional deterrence. European Union nations have expressed views framing U.S. hypersonic programs like CPS as a counterbalance to Russian and Chinese capabilities, amid acknowledged gaps in Europe's own hypersonic defenses and strike systems. Officials in countries such as and have highlighted the stabilizing role of allied conventional hypersonic options in scenarios, prioritizing integration over independent replication due to developmental lags. Proliferation risks from CPS-related technologies remain a concern for secondary actors, with assessments indicating that states like and are likely to acquire hypersonic weapons independently, potentially through reverse-engineering or foreign assistance. However, CPS's emphasis on conventional payloads mitigates direct contributions to nuclear escalation, distinguishing it from adversaries' nuclear-capable hypersonic programs and focusing cooperative effects among allies.

Criticisms and Challenges

Technical and Developmental Hurdles

Early development of hypersonic technologies underpinning Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) encountered significant test anomalies. In August 2014, a test of the Advanced (AHW), a precursor to CPS components, failed due to a flight anomaly shortly after launch from , resulting in the vehicle's destruction and loss of data. Similarly, Joint Flight Campaign-1 (JFC-1) in 2022 experienced an in-flight anomaly that prevented full data collection across the intended profile, attributed to control and telemetry issues, though the root cause was later identified and corrected by the . These incidents highlighted challenges in booster , glide body control, and data recovery under hypersonic conditions, including potential thermal management strains from . Cost management has posed ongoing hurdles, with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noting in 2024 that hypersonic programs like CPS face difficulties in accurate cost estimation due to immature technologies and limited prior experience, contributing to risks of overruns amid over $10 billion in projected investments across shared Army-Navy efforts. The GAO highlighted that while CPS benefits from joint development of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body with the Army's , reducing some duplication, persistent technical risks in areas like and integration have delayed milestones and inflated lifecycle expenses. DOT&E assessments have further critiqued narrow testing scopes, urging broader operational evaluations to mitigate suitability gaps. Despite these challenges, progress has been achieved through iterative resolutions and recent demonstrations. Corrective actions post-JFC-1 enabled subsequent flight tests, culminating in a successful end-to-end CPS missile flight from on April 25, 2025, validating sea-based launch viability and prototype performance. This test, announced May 2, 2025, confirmed key capabilities in range, accuracy, and survivability, advancing CPS toward operational deployment on Zumwalt-class destroyers and Virginia-class submarines while addressing prior control and thermal hurdles via refined designs.

Strategic Debates and Risks

Proponents of Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) argue that it strengthens strategic stability by providing non-nuclear options for rapid, precise strikes against time-sensitive targets, thereby reducing reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence and allowing graduated responses in crises. According to Department of Defense assessments, such capabilities address gaps in conventional firepower against distant threats, enhancing U.S. credibility in deterring aggression without escalating to nuclear thresholds, particularly in scenarios involving rogue states or regional powers. This view counters arguments from arms control advocates—who often emphasize de-escalatory restraint—that prioritize limiting U.S. innovations amid adversaries' expansions, such as China's construction of approximately 320 new silos since 2021, which proceeds independently of U.S. restraint. Critics, including some analysts from organizations focused on nonproliferation, contend that CPGS could undermine stability by prompting miscalculation, as adversaries like or might interpret a hypersonic launch—sharing ballistic trajectories with nuclear missiles—as a nuclear first strike, compressing decision timelines and risking preemptive responses. However, proponents rebut this by noting technological discriminability: CPGS systems employ boost-glide vehicles or alternative profiles distinguishable from nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles via signatures, flight paths, and monitoring, mitigating false alarms in practice. U.S. tests, including multiple firings since the early 2010s, have not triggered observed destabilizing reactions from adversaries, with no documented escalatory incidents despite public announcements and data sharing in some cases. The proliferation of prompt-strike technologies appears driven more by U.S. developmental delays than by reactive arms racing, as and advanced their hypersonic systems independently—Russia deploying the Avangard glide vehicle in 2019 and Kinzhal air-launched missile earlier, while fielded the in 2019—predating full U.S. operationalization of CPGS equivalents. This timeline underscores that adversary programs stem from intrinsic strategic ambitions, including countering U.S. conventional superiority, rather than mirroring American initiatives, which faced setbacks like test failures and funding shifts from the 2000s onward. Empirical data from these developments show no causal link to heightened global instability, as mutual advancements have coincided with sustained deterrence equilibria absent major conflicts.

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