Hubbry Logo
Raskamboni MovementRaskamboni MovementMain
Open search
Raskamboni Movement
Community hub
Raskamboni Movement
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Raskamboni Movement
Raskamboni Movement
Raskamboni Movement
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

The Raskamboni Movement (Somali: Xarakada Raaskambooni) is a jihadist Islamic movement led by Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, the current president of the Jubaland state in southern Somalia. After fighting with Al-Shabaab they managed to capture Kismayo with the help of Kenya.

Key Information

History

[edit]

Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia - Asmara wing (ARS-A) and JABISO militias, which were aligned with al-Shabaab in Hiiraan and Mogadishu refused to support the Ras Kamboni Brigades, meanwhile Muaskar Anole remained neutral. The fighting led to a split within the Ras Kamboni Brigades, with a faction led by Ahmed Madoobe fighting against al-Shabaab and a faction led by Hassan al-Turki siding with al-Shabaab.[4]

The Battle of Kismayo was won by al-Shabaab, which then expelled Madobe's Ras Kamboni Brigades from the city.[5] In the battles that followed, in November 2009, Madobe's forces were overpowered by al-Shabaab and its local allies. It was then forced to withdraw from the Lower Jubba region and most of southern Somalia.[4][5] In February 2010, al-Turki's branch declared a merger with al-Shabaab.[4]

On 20 December 2010, Hizbul Islam merged with al-Shabaab[6] and the Raskamboni movement then allied with Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a and the Transitional Federal Government.[7][8]

The Raskamboni engaged al-Shabab militiamen on March 13, 2011, in the village of Dif. The movement claimed to have destroyed a number of Al-Shabaab military vehicles in the fighting,[9] which left at least five dead.[10]

On April 3, 2011, the Raskamboni movement, in conjunction with Transitional Federal Government forces and the Kenyan Air Force, captured the border town Dhobley from Al-Shabab.[11][12]

In July 2012, it was reported that they staged a rescue operation to free four kidnapped aid workers from the Norwegian Refugee Council.[13]

In September 2012, a reconstituted Somali National Army assisted by AMISOM troops and Raskamboni militia reportedly re-captured Kismayo from Al-Shabaab insurgents during the Battle of Kismayo (2012).[14][15]

In February 2014, Al-Shabaab militants launched a string of attacks in Kismayo targeting Raskamboni members, including an IED that tore through a vehicle carrying the group's members and killed several civilians.[16] On 19 February, Raskamboni militants began an intensive search operation in the city after the group's security chief, Isse Kamboni, was shot dead by one of his bodyguards, a former Al-Shabaab member. According to eye-witnesses, Raskamboni subsequently started hunting down Al-Shabaab suspects. Many Raskomboni fighters were seen patrolling the streets, and more than 150 civilians were detained at the local police stations in connection with Isse's assassination. Seven civilian deaths were also reported during the clampdown with some accusing the militia of using the clampdown as an excuse to stifle dissent.[17] Hundreds of elders and businessmen had earlier fled the city.[18]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Raskamboni Movement

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Raskamboni Movement (Somali: Xarakada Raskamboni), also known as Raas Kaambooni, is an Islamist militia group based in southern Somalia's region, formed in 2010 as a splinter faction from the Ras Kamboni Brigade amid internal disagreements over alignment with al-Shabaab. Led by Mohamed Islam Madobe, a former member of the , the movement shifted to oppose al-Shabaab's dominance, aligning instead with Somali federal forces and troops to secure strategic border areas near and the port of . The group's defining role emerged during the 2011-2012 offensive against al-Shabaab, where it provided critical local fighters for Kenyan-led AMISOM operations, contributing to the capture of in October 2012 and weakening the jihadist group's control over lucrative trade routes. This success facilitated Madobe's election as president of in 2013, integrating the militia into semi-autonomous governance while maintaining its armed presence to counter ongoing al-Shabaab threats and clan rivalries. Primarily drawing from the Ogaden subclan of the , the movement's objectives include establishing regional autonomy, expelling extremists, and controlling economic hubs, though it has faced accusations of resource exploitation and tensions with Mogadishu's central authority. Despite its pro-government stance, recent clashes with units in 2024 highlight persistent frictions over territorial control in areas like Ras Kamboni town.

Origins and Early Development

Founding and Initial Ideology

The Raskamboni Movement emerged in early 2010 as a splinter from the Ras Kamboni Brigade, a militant Islamist group operating in Somalia's Lower Juba region. This split occurred amid escalating tensions within the Hizbul Islam coalition, which included the Brigade, following territorial losses to al-Shabaab and the January 2009 merger of the Brigade into Hizbul Islam. Brigade founder and leader Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki opted to dissolve the group and pledge allegiance to al-Shabaab in February 2010, prompting his deputy, Sheikh Ahmed Madobe—an Ogaden clan figure and former ICU affiliate—to break away and reestablish forces under the Raskamboni banner to preserve autonomy and continue resistance against both the Somali Transitional Federal Government and al-Shabaab. The Movement quickly positioned itself to contest control over Kismayo port, mobilizing roughly 500-1,000 fighters drawn from local Darod clans. Initially, the Movement's ideology aligned with the Salafi-jihadist framework of its parent organization, advocating strict implementation of Sharia law to govern Jubaland territories, including prohibitions on khat chewing, cigarette smoking, and civilian possession of firearms—measures enforced in areas like Ras Kamboni village as early as October 2008 under Brigade control. Rooted in the legacy of al-Itihaad al-Islamiya and the Islamic Courts Union, it emphasized jihad against perceived apostate regimes and foreign interveners, such as Ethiopian forces, while pursuing pan-Islamist goals of unifying Muslim rule in Somalia. Unlike al-Shabaab's emphasis on global jihad and allegiance to al-Qaeda, however, Raskamboni's early stance reflected pragmatic localism, prioritizing Ogaden clan interests, territorial defense, and expulsion of rival militants from southern Somalia over transnational ambitions.

Emergence in the Somali Insurgency

The Ras Kamboni Brigade, the precursor to the Raskamboni Movement, emerged in the aftermath of the Islamic Courts Union's (ICU) defeat by Ethiopian forces and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in December 2006, establishing local control in southern Somalia's region, including towns such as , Afmadoow, and Dhoobley. Under the leadership of Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, a former ICU commander, the group conducted early insurgent operations against TFG and Ethiopian targets, including imposing law in Ras Kamboni and by October 2008. This positioned it within the broader Somali insurgency as a clan-based Islamist drawing from subclans, initially aligning with al-Shabaab for joint attacks, such as the August 20, 2008, assault on port, before integrating into the coalition in January 2009 to challenge TFG and (AMISOM) forces. Tensions within Hizbul Islam escalated in late 2009 over al-Shabaab's growing dominance and proposals for merger, leading to a factional split in the Ras Kamboni Brigade by early 2010. Al-Turki's faction defected to al-Shabaab in February 2010, pledging allegiance to and dissolving the brigade's independent structure, while Sheikh Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe), al-Turki's deputy, rejected the merger due to ideological and strategic disagreements, including resistance to al-Shabaab's stricter Salafi-jihadist enforcement. This schism birthed the Raskamboni Movement on or around October 7, 2009, as a distinct entity focused on expelling al-Shabaab from southern Somalia while maintaining Sufi-influenced Islamist governance in territories. The Movement's emergence marked a pragmatic shift in the , allying temporarily with TFG elements and Kenyan interests against al-Shabaab's expansion, evidenced by early clashes such as the March 13, 2011, engagement near Dif village, where Raskamboni forces claimed destruction of al-Shabaab positions. This positioning exploited local clan dynamics and al-Shabaab's overreach, enabling Raskamboni to control border areas and disrupt jihadist supply lines, though it retained jihadist roots from its ICU heritage. By mid-2010, the split had fragmented further, with Madobe's group prioritizing territorial autonomy over unified Islamist opposition to the government.

Leadership and Structure

Key Leaders and Internal Dynamics

The Raskamboni Movement traces its origins to the Ras Kamboni Brigade, founded between 2006 and 2008 by Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, a veteran commander from the Al Ittihad al-Islamiya and who established the group in the Middle and Lower Juba regions near the Kenyan border. Al-Turki led the brigade until early 2010, directing operations against Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government forces and securing external support, including an estimated $40,000 to $50,000 monthly from in 2008. Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe, initially a deputy or senior commander under al-Turki, emerged as the primary leader of the faction that rejected alignment with Al-Shabaab, formalizing the Raskamboni Movement as an independent entity in 2010 following the brigade's merger into the alliance in January 2009 and subsequent fractures. Madobe has retained leadership since, leveraging the group's role in politics, including his election as interim president of the semi-autonomous state in May 2013. Internal dynamics have been shaped by factional splits driven by strategic divergences over alliances, particularly al-Turki's decision to merge his portion of the with Al-Shabaab in February 2010, prompting Madobe's group—comprising an estimated 500 to 1,000 fighters—to break away and position itself against the jihadist network. The movement's structure remains militia-like and clan-centric, predominantly recruiting from the sub-clan of the , which reinforces cohesion but also exposes it to local power struggles over resources like port revenues. These clan ties have facilitated pragmatic shifts, such as temporary pacts with the Somali government and Kenyan forces post-2010, contrasting al-Turki's hardline integration into Al-Shabaab, though underlying tensions persist amid broader Somali insurgent fragmentation.

Organizational Evolution

The Ras Kamboni Brigade was established between 2006 and 2008 in , southern , near the Kenyan border, by Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, a former leader in Al Ittihad Al Islamiya and the . Initially structured as a localized drawing primarily from the sub-clan, it focused on territorial control in areas such as , Afmadoow, and Dhoobley, enforcing strict Shariah-based governance including prohibitions on cigarettes, , and civilian firearms. In January 2009, the brigade merged with three other Islamist groups—the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Eritrea faction, Jabhatul Islamiya, and Muaskar Anole—to form , a coalition aimed at opposing the Transitional Federal Government. This merger expanded its operational scope but introduced internal tensions over strategy and leadership, as coordinated broader insurgent activities against government and forces. By October 2009, frictions within prompted a split, with the Ras Kamboni faction withdrawing. This culminated in February 2010, when al-Turki's faction formally joined Al Shabaab and pledged allegiance to , effectively disbanding the original brigade structure; concurrently, (known as Madobe), a deputy commander, formed the independent Raskamboni Movement, rejecting Al Shabaab's dominance and shifting toward opposition against it due to ideological and clan-based disputes. Under Madobe's leadership, the movement reorganized as a more autonomous , emphasizing local clan interests while maintaining Islamist roots. Following military successes against Al Shabaab alongside Kenyan and Somali government forces from 2011 onward, the movement evolved structurally by integrating into the nascent administration. Madobe's election as president on May 15, 2013, marked a transition from pure operations to a hybrid political-military entity, with Raskamboni forces providing security for the while retaining armed capabilities for territorial defense. This shift reflected pragmatic adaptations to federal dynamics, though core command structures remained clan-centric and loyal to Madobe.

Military Activities and Conflicts

Pre-Split Operations (2008-2010)

The Ras Kamboni Brigade emerged in Jubaland, southern Somalia, between 2006 and 2008 under the leadership of Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, a veteran of earlier Islamist groups including Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Following the Ethiopian intervention that dismantled the ICU in late 2006, the brigade established training camps near the border town of Ras Kamboni, leveraging its strategic location adjacent to Kenya for recruitment and logistics among local Ogaden clan militias. These early efforts focused on regrouping fighters displaced by the ICU's collapse and enforcing Sharia law in controlled pockets of the Middle and Lower Juba regions, including towns such as Jilib, Afmadoow, and Dhoobley. In August 2008, the brigade allied with Al-Shabaab for a coordinated offensive against , a key port city held by TFG-aligned forces and militias. On , joint forces launched attacks that captured the city after two days of fighting, though specific casualty figures remain undocumented; this success temporarily expanded Islamist control over southern trade routes before internal rivalries eroded the gains. By September 2008, the brigade shifted toward direct assaults on TFG installations, including an attack on the presidential compound in and clashes with Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers, aiming to disrupt government consolidation amid ongoing Ethiopian withdrawal. The brigade integrated into the newly formed coalition in early 2009, alongside other clan-based Islamist factions under overall leadership from , to counter Al-Shabaab's growing dominance. As part of , Ras Kamboni elements participated in southern skirmishes against Al-Shabaab, particularly vying for influence in , though these efforts yielded limited territorial advances amid escalating intra-Islamist violence. Operations during this phase emphasized against TFG and AMISOM outposts, sustaining pressure on pro-government forces while avoiding full-scale confrontations that could expose vulnerabilities to Al-Shabaab counteroffensives. Tensions within the coalition intensified by late 2009, foreshadowing fractures, but pre-split activities solidified the brigade's role as a localized jihadist actor rooted in dynamics rather than centralized command.

Post-Split Engagements Against Al-Shabaab (2010-2012)

Following its split from in May 2010, amid allegations of a secret deal between the Ras Kamboni faction and the Somali Transitional Federal Government alongside Kenyan backing, the movement under Sheikh Ahmed Madobe initiated hostilities against Al-Shabaab in southern . This rupture, building on earlier internal divisions in late 2009 and February 2010 where Madobe's group rejected Al-Shabaab alignment while a rival faction led by Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki defected to them, marked a pragmatic shift toward collaboration with government and regional forces to counter the more radical jihadists. Initial post-split clashes in 2010 involved skirmishes in , where Ras Kamboni forces targeted Al-Shabaab positions to secure local territorial control, though specific battle dates remain sparsely documented amid the fluid insurgency dynamics. By April 2011, approximately 600 Ras Kamboni fighters briefly seized the border town of Dhobley from Al-Shabaab, disrupting their supply lines and demonstrating growing operational capacity through Kenyan logistical support. The movement's engagements intensified following Kenya's invasion in October 2011, with Ras Kamboni units linking up with Kenyan Defence Forces near Afmadow in early November 2011 to conduct joint offensives against Al-Shabaab strongholds. These operations pressured Al-Shabaab into defensive postures, culminating in the group's partial withdrawal from on September 28, 2012, during Operation Sledge Hammer; Ras Kamboni forces, integrated with Kenyan troops, entered the port city in October 2012, capturing key infrastructure and temporarily severing Al-Shabaab's revenue from port taxes and exports. Despite these gains, Al-Shabaab retained guerrilla capabilities, adapting through alternative taxation on illicit trade.

Role in Jubaland Operations (2012-Present)


The Raskamboni Movement, under Sheikh Ahmed Madobe's leadership, allied with Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) during Operation Linda Nchi in 2012, launching offensives against Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia's Lower Juba region. This collaboration enabled the capture of Kismayo from Al-Shabaab control in September 2012, a key port city central to Jubaland's economy and logistics. Following the victory, Raskamboni forces secured strategic border towns like Ras Kamboni and Jilib, establishing de facto control over swathes of Jubaland territory adjacent to Kenya. Post-2012, the movement's militias integrated into the nascent administration, with Madobe's Ras Kamboni Brigade rebranded as the Jubaland Security Forces (JSF), trained and equipped by Kenyan forces to sustain anti-Al-Shabaab operations. These units played a core role in defending and surrounding areas from Al-Shabaab counterattacks, including repelling incursions and disrupting militant supply lines through joint patrols and targeted strikes. By 2013, Raskamboni-linked forces supported the formation of 's interim structures, aligning with federal constitutional processes while prioritizing local security against jihadist threats. From 2013 onward, the movement's operations focused on consolidating 's autonomy amid ongoing insurgencies, with JSF elements conducting clearance missions in rural districts to degrade Al-Shabaab's operational capacity. However, escalating frictions with Somalia's federal government intensified in late 2024, as deployed elite (SNA) units into Ras Kamboni village—long under control—forcing Raskamboni mobilization and skirmishes. The federal side accused Madobe of covert pacts with Al-Shabaab to facilitate troop movements, claims denied by authorities who asserted prior liberation of the area from militants over a decade earlier. These clashes, involving an estimated 600 SNA personnel, risked undermining coordinated counterterrorism efforts, prompting Kenyan intervention to repatriate federal troops and avert broader escalation.

Ideology and Objectives

Jihadist Foundations and Pragmatic Shifts

The Ras Kamboni Movement, also known as the Ras Kamboni Brigade, emerged in the mid-2000s as a local militant Islamist faction rooted in the jihadist resistance against the Ethiopian invasion of in 2006. Drawing from the ideological currents of the (ICU), which blended Sufi traditions with stricter Wahhabi-influenced interpretations, the group initially positioned itself as defenders of Islamic governance in the region, particularly around . Under early leadership including figures like Turki Bihi, a foreign fighter linked to al-Qaeda, the movement adopted jihadist rhetoric emphasizing armed struggle against "infidel" occupiers and apostate regimes, aligning with transnational Salafi-jihadist networks for training and resources. By 2009-2010, following the Ethiopian withdrawal, Ras Kamboni briefly integrated into , a coalition of Islamist factions, but internal fractures led a faction under Bihi to pledge allegiance to al-Shabaab, framing their operations as part of a global against Western-backed forces. This period marked the peak of the group's jihadist foundations, with public statements invoking (declaring Muslims apostates) and calls for implementation, mirroring al-Shabaab's ideology while prioritizing local territorial defense along clan lines, primarily among the sub-clan. Pragmatic shifts began in late 2010 after Bihi's death in a clash with Kenyan forces near the border on January 1, 2011, allowing Sheikh Ahmed Madobe—previously a moderate ICU official and governor from 2006—to consolidate control. Madobe steered the group away from strict global jihadism toward clan-based autonomy and anti-al-Shabaab operations, breaking formally with al-Shabaab over disputes regarding 's control and resource allocation rather than ideological purity. This realignment facilitated alliances with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2010 and later with Kenyan troops during in October 2011, where Ras Kamboni fighters provided local intelligence and manpower to capture al-Shabaab strongholds, prioritizing regional power in over transnational ambitions. These shifts reflected causal pressures from clan rivalries and survival imperatives, as al-Shabaab's domineering tactics alienated local supporters; Madobe's faction retained Islamist for legitimacy but subordinated it to pragmatic , such as negotiating port revenues and federal recognition, evidenced by Madobe's role in Jubaland's 2013 . Analysts note this evolution diluted pure jihadist zeal, transforming Ras Kamboni into a hybrid militia-state actor, though remnants of jihadist persist in and anti-government when federal interests clash.

Goals of Territorial Control and Autonomy

The Raskamboni Movement, under Sheikh Ahmed Madobe's leadership, sought to establish firm territorial control over the and regions of southern , viewing these areas as core to its operational base and clan-aligned interests. Formed after splitting from Al-Shabaab in 2010, the group prioritized expelling jihadist rivals from strategic locations such as and the border town of Ras Kamboni to secure economic lifelines like the Kismayo port, which facilitated exports including charcoal despite international bans. This control was not merely defensive but aimed at creating a administrative zone insulated from central authority, leveraging alliances with Kenyan forces during in 2011-2012 to oust Al-Shabaab and consolidate holdings. Central to these efforts was the pursuit of within Somalia's federal framework, rejecting full integration of its Ras Kamboni Brigade militias into national structures that would dilute local command. The movement advocated for —a proposed interim administration encompassing , , and —as a semi-autonomous entity capable of managing security, border affairs, and resource revenues independently, a position Madobe reinforced upon his election as president in May 2013. This stance framed federal interventions, such as troop deployments to Ras Kamboni in late 2024, as threats to regional rather than unifying measures, leading to clashes that preserved movement-aligned forces' dominance over approximately 200 kilometers of Kenyan border territory. Autonomy goals extended to economic self-sufficiency, with territorial holdings enabling revenue from port duties and trade routes to fund operations and local services, bypassing Mogadishu's fiscal oversight. By , unilateral control over Kismayo's exports demonstrated this intent, generating millions in unmonitored income that bolstered the group's resilience against both insurgents and federal pressures. However, these objectives have been critiqued as clan-centric, prioritizing sub-clan dominance in and over broader inclusivity, which has fueled rivalries and stalled national reconciliation efforts. Despite pragmatic shifts from strict , the movement's territorial strategy remains rooted in maintaining defensible enclaves to counter Al-Shabaab incursions while resisting centralization that could erode its influence.

Alliances and Rivalries

Relations with Al-Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam

The Ras Kamboni Brigade, the precursor organization to the Raskamboni Movement, initially allied with Al-Shabaab following its formation between 2006 and 2008 under Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, conducting a joint operation to capture on August 20, 2008. In January 2009, the brigade merged with the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Eritrea wing, Jabhatul Islamiya, and Muaskar Anole to form , an Islamist coalition positioned as a rival to Al-Shabaab in opposition to the Transitional Federal Government. Al-Turki assumed the role of deputy chairman in during this period. Tensions within escalated by late 2009, with al-Turki's faction aligning ideologically and operationally with Al-Shabaab amid disputes over strategy and leadership. On February 1, 2010, al-Turki's Ras Kamboni Brigade formally defected from , merging with Al-Shabaab and pledging allegiance to as part of a broader unification effort to establish an Islamic emirate in the ; this move, announced by Al-Shabaab spokesman Shaykh Fu'ad Muhammad Khalaf in , involved 500–1,000 fighters and significantly weakened under its chairman . Concurrently, Mohamed Islam (Madobe), a key commander in the brigade, led a splinter faction that rejected the merger, forming the independent Raskamboni Movement in 2010 and shifting to opposition against Al-Shabaab. Post-split, the Raskamboni Movement under Madobe engaged in direct military confrontations with Al-Shabaab, aligning with Kenyan and Somali government forces; this included operations in 2011–2012 that contributed to the capture of Kismayo from Al-Shabaab control in October 2012. The earlier Hizbul Islam affiliation dissolved without further formal ties after the 2010 defection, as the coalition fragmented under pressure from Al-Shabaab's expansions and internal rivalries. These shifts reflected pragmatic divergences, with Madobe's group prioritizing local territorial control in Jubaland over Al-Shabaab's transnational jihadist agenda.

Partnerships with Somali Government and Kenyan Forces

The Raskamboni Movement forged tactical alliances with Kenyan forces amid Kenya's , initiated on October 16, 2011, to counter Al-Shabaab incursions along the shared border. Ras Kamboni militias, under Madobe's leadership, collaborated directly with the Kenyan (KDF) in offensives that recaptured border locales including Dobley on November 24, 2011, and Ras Kamboni town itself by early 2012, leveraging Kenyan logistical and aerial support to dislodge Islamist holdouts. These partnerships stemmed from mutual security imperatives, as Al-Shabaab's cross-border attacks threatened Kenyan territory, prompting to back Madobe's group as a local proxy capable of sustaining ground operations in clan-dominated areas. Kenya's involvement extended to joint efforts under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), where Ras Kamboni elements integrated loosely with KDF contingents for the October 2012 Battle of , contributing fighters to the coalition that ousted Al-Shabaab from the port city after three months of combat. This cooperation facilitated Ras Kamboni's control over southern territories, with Kenya providing training to Madobe's forces—later rebranded as the Jubaland Security Forces (JSF)—and viewing them as a buffer against jihadist resurgence. By 2020, these ties had evolved into sustained backing for Madobe's administration, including diplomatic support during 's state formation processes, though recent frictions, such as the December 2024 Battle of Ras Kamboni, highlighted limits when Kenyan mediation aided the repatriation of 600 troops defeated by JSF units. Partnerships with Somali federal entities were more circumscribed and opportunistic, primarily through the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) prior to 2012. On April 3, 2011, Ras Kamboni joined TFG troops and Kenyan air assets to seize the border town of Badhadhe, marking early coordination against Al-Shabaab strongholds. In 2012, the movement participated in broader anti-Al-Shabaab campaigns alongside Somali government-aligned forces within the AMISOM framework, aiding territorial gains in without formal subordination. These alignments reflected pragmatic convergence on rather than ideological unity, as Ras Kamboni prioritized clan-based autonomy in and , often resisting full integration into federal structures amid disputes over revenue and command. Post-2012, cooperation waned due to federal efforts to dilute Madobe's influence, exemplified by 2024 clashes where JSF repelled advances near the Kenyan border.

Tensions with Federal Somali Authorities

The Raskamboni Movement, operating as a key component of Jubaland's forces under president Ahmed Madobe, has experienced escalating frictions with Somalia's federal government in primarily over issues of regional , electoral legitimacy, and military integration. These tensions stem from 's push for centralized control amid the planned withdrawal of forces by 2025, contrasting with Jubaland's insistence on rooted in local clan structures and anti-Al-Shabaab operations. Clashes intensified in November-December 2024 in Ras Kamboni town, a strategic border area historically tied to the movement, when (SNA) units advanced to assert federal authority, prompting Jubaland forces—including Raskamboni elements—to repel them. On December 11, 2024, federal drone strikes targeted positions, leading to heavy fighting that resulted in Jubaland capturing the town and airport, with dozens of SNA troops surrendering or withdrawing. Kenya subsequently repatriated around 600 Somali federal soldiers from its border bases to de-escalate, highlighting regional concerns over spillover. Political disputes peaked following Madobe's controversial re-election on November 3, 2024, for a third term, which the federal government deemed unconstitutional and a violation of electoral laws, accusing him of consolidating power through clan loyalty rather than national reconciliation. Failed talks in October 2025, including a visit by President to , collapsed over disagreements on constitutional amendments favoring federal oversight of regional elections and security. Mogadishu responded by threatening parallel administrative structures in and accusing Madobe of inciting violence in region as early as July 2025. These confrontations have undermined joint anti-Al-Shabaab efforts, as diverted resources and fractured alliances allow the group to exploit divisions, with analysts noting that federal centralization drives risk alienating effective local militias like Raskamboni, which have held key southern fronts. Jubaland's cabinet has framed federal actions as "illegal interference," while portrays Madobe's resistance as warlordism obstructing national unity.

Political Role in Jubaland

Influence on State Formation

The Raskamboni Movement exerted considerable influence on the formation of as a semi-autonomous federal in by leveraging its territorial control and militia strength to drive key political processes. Following the ouster of Al-Shabaab from in September 2012 by a coalition including Raskamboni fighters, Kenyan Defense Forces, and troops, the movement's leader, Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, was selected as interim president of the nascent Jubaland administration in late 2012, positioning it to dominate early governance structures. This military foothold allowed Raskamboni to shape the 2013 constitutional conference in , where delegates, heavily swayed by the group's presence, elected Madobe as president on May 15, 2013, formalizing 's provisional institutions despite opposition from the Somali Federal Government (SFG). The movement's role facilitated the transition of its fighters into the Security Forces, providing the backbone for state security and enabling administrative consolidation around as the headquarters by mid-2013, which helped establish autonomy in the , , and regions. However, this influence also embedded clan-based dynamics, particularly favoring the sub-clan, into state-building efforts, as Raskamboni's leverage often overrode SFG preferences for alternative leadership during negotiations. By 2013, these developments had solidified 's framework under Madobe's presidency, with the movement's brigades retaining operational control over border areas like Ras Kamboni, which bolstered the region's capacity to negotiate federal relations independently. Ongoing tensions with the SFG, including disputes over electoral processes, underscore how Raskamboni's foundational role has perpetuated a hybrid state model blending with formal institutions, contributing to Jubaland's resilience against centralization efforts as of 2025. This pattern of influence, rooted in post-2012 territorial gains, has prioritized local stabilization over national unity, enabling to adopt a provisional recognizing its status while maintaining Raskamboni-derived apparatuses.

Control Over Key Economic Assets

The Raskamboni Movement, under the leadership of Madobe, gained control over the port city of in October 2012 following joint operations with Kenyan forces that dislodged Al-Shabaab militants from the area. serves as Jubaland's primary economic lifeline, handling imports of essential goods like food and fuel while exporting commodities such as , bananas, and , generating revenues estimated in the hundreds of millions of Kenyan shillings monthly for regional authorities aligned with the movement. This control has enabled the group to derive significant financial resources directly from port fees, customs duties, and trade facilitation, funding militia operations and administrative functions in . Charcoal production and , which constituted approximately 90% of Kismayo's pre-ban as stated by Madobe himself in 2016, represented a cornerstone asset under Raskamboni-influenced , despite international prohibitions aimed at curbing and funding to insurgents. The movement's forces have maintained oversight of these activities through alliances with local traders and security arrangements, even as resolutions intermittently disrupted exports. Post-2012, fighters loyal to Madobe reinforced dominance over port infrastructure amid clashes with rival factions, ensuring sustained revenue streams that bolstered the group's autonomy from federal oversight. Beyond the port, the Raskamboni Movement exerts influence over agricultural lands and trade routes in districts like Ras Kamboni and Badhadhe, where control of riverine access points facilitates cross-border commerce with and supports informal taxation on goods transiting militia-held territories. These assets have been pivotal in sustaining the group's operational capacity, though disputes with the Somali federal government over persist, highlighting tensions between regional economic self-reliance and national fiscal integration.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Clan-Based Warlordism

The Raskamboni Movement, under the leadership of Madobe, an ethnic , has been predominantly composed of fighters from the sub-clan of the , reflecting the demographic makeup of the region where it originated. This clan homogeneity has fueled allegations that the group operates less as an ideologically driven Islamist force and more as a vehicle for interests, prioritizing sub-clan loyalty over broader Somali unity or anti-extremist goals. Critics, including representatives of rival clans such as the , contend that Madobe's command structure entrenches patronage networks that favor recruitment, resource allocation, and territorial control, resembling traditional warlordism masked by jihadist rhetoric. These claims gained prominence during the 2012-2013 power struggles in Jubaland, where Madobe's Ras Kamboni forces captured Kismayo from Al-Shabaab on October 2, 2012, but were accused of subsequently sidelining non-Ogaden elements in administration and security roles. Rival faction leader Barre Hirale, from the Marehan clan, challenged Madobe's authority, portraying the movement's dominance as an imposition of Ogaden hegemony that marginalized other local groups and revived inter-clan factionalism dormant since the early 2000s Islamist upsurge. The federal Somali government echoed these concerns after Madobe's election as Jubaland president on May 15, 2013, rejecting the process as illegitimate and clan-biased, arguing it perpetuated militia fiefdoms incompatible with national reconciliation. Observers have noted that such dynamics contributed to a "volatile realignment toward clan-based Islamist warlordism," where groups like Ras Kamboni leveraged anti-Al-Shabaab alliances to consolidate sub-clan power bases. Further allegations surfaced in analyses of the movement's governance, with reports highlighting how control over economic assets like the port—secured post-2012—allegedly funneled revenues into Ogaden-dominated networks, exacerbating grievances from minority clans and fueling recruitment for extremist rivals like Al-Shabaab. In , inter-clan skirmishes, such as those in 2013 involving Ras Kamboni and militias, were attributed to competition over land and checkpoints, underscoring accusations of warlord-style and exclusionary rule. Madobe's allies have countered that clan composition mirrors local realities and that the movement's successes against Al-Shabaab demonstrate broader legitimacy, yet detractors maintain that systemic favoritism undermines Jubaland's viability as a multi- entity, perpetuating Somalia's cycle of fragmented authority.

Human Rights and Governance Issues

The Raskamboni Movement's forces have been implicated in harm during anti-Al-Shabaab operations, notably through indiscriminate shelling. In October 2011, amid clashes near the Kenyan border in Dhobley, Raskamboni-aligned s fired mortars into populated areas, contributing to at least 10 deaths alongside casualties from Al-Shabaab counterfire. Such incidents reflect broader patterns of unaccountable tactics in 's , where pro-government groups prioritize territorial gains over precision to minimize . As the core of 's clan-dominated security apparatus under leader Ahmed Madobe, Raskamboni operates with minimal oversight, exacerbating governance deficits like impunity for abuses. Reports highlight how Somali state-aligned militias, including those in Jubaland, engage in looting, arbitrary detentions, and failure to investigate internal violations, fostering a where is subordinated to clan loyalty and operational expediency. has critiqued the group's violent methods as infringing human rights norms, though detailed attributions remain sparse compared to insurgent groups. In controlled border enclaves like Ras Kamboni, governance relies on informal rule rather than robust institutions, leading to justice systems prone to favoritism and exclusion of minority clans. This hybrid structure perpetuates weak , with federal reports noting persistent security force abuses in regional states, including extrajudicial actions and restricted humanitarian access, amid limited . Tensions with over electoral manipulations and force deployments underscore these frailties, prioritizing militia entrenchment over transparent administration.

Islamist Residual Threats

The Raskamboni Movement traces its roots to the Ras Kamboni Brigade, an Islamist militia formed between 2006 and 2008 that sought to enforce law in southern , including bans on cigarettes, firearms, and chewing in controlled territories such as Ras Kamboni and . This ideological foundation, emphasizing strict Islamic governance, persisted even after the group's partial realignment against Al-Shabaab, prompting ongoing scrutiny from Somali federal authorities and international observers regarding potential radical holdovers. A pivotal fracture occurred in February 2010, when the brigade's founder, Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, led a faction to defect and merge with Al-Shabaab, explicitly pledging allegiance to and bolstering the rival group's operational capacity in . This split, which fragmented the broader coalition, highlighted the presence of irreconcilable jihadist elements within Ras Kamboni ranks, as al-Turki's hardliners prioritized transnational Islamist goals over localized alliances. In response, Ahmed Madobe, a senior commander, established the Raskamboni Movement as a opposing Al-Shabaab, but the defection underscored vulnerabilities to radical infiltration and ideological divergence. These events have fueled criticisms that residual Islamist sympathies within the Movement could reemerge as threats, particularly amid tensions with the Somali federal government, where Madobe's background in —a coalition of four Islamist militias—raises doubts about full . Although the Movement has cooperated with forces and Kenyan troops since 2011, enforcing Sharia-like measures in territories continues to evoke concerns of latent militancy, as evidenced by internal rifts that previously enabled al-Shabaab absorptions. No major defections to Al-Shabaab have been reported from the Movement since 2010, yet the historical precedent illustrates how clan-based loyalties intertwined with can sustain low-level threats, including risks in Ogaden-dominated areas.

Impact and Legacy

Contributions to Anti-Al-Shabaab Efforts

The Raskamboni Movement, under Sheikh Ahmed Madobe's leadership, broke from prior alignments with Al-Shabaab following internal splits in Hizbul Islam during late 2009 and early 2010, positioning itself as an adversary to the jihadist group in southern Somalia's Jubaland region. This opposition facilitated early clashes, including renewed fighting in Dhobley in early October 2011, where Raskamboni forces, alongside Transitional Federal Government-affiliated militias, targeted Al-Shabaab positions. By leveraging local Ogaden clan networks, Raskamboni provided essential ground-level intelligence and manpower, contrasting Al-Shabaab's reliance on foreign fighters and stricter ideological enforcement, which alienated some Somali clans. A pivotal contribution came through collaboration with Kenyan Defence Forces during , launched on October 16, 2011, aimed at dismantling Al-Shabaab strongholds along the Kenya-Somalia border. Raskamboni militias supported Kenyan advances, capturing key towns such as Dobley in late October 2011 and Tabda, disrupting Al-Shabaab supply lines and forcing retreats in . In November 2011, Raskamboni forces repelled Al-Shabaab counterattacks near Kulbio, claiming destruction of several enemy vehicles and inflicting casualties, though exact figures remain unverified. This partnership extended to the Battle of in 2012, where combined efforts led to Al-Shabaab's withdrawal from the port city on October 2, 2012, depriving the group of an estimated $250 million annual revenue from port taxes and exports. Post-capture, Raskamboni maintained security in , conducting operations to clear residual Al-Shabaab elements and prevent territorial reclamation, contributing to the group's shift toward asymmetric rather than conventional control. Their clan-based sustained fighter numbers—estimated at 500-1,000—enabling sustained patrols and ambushes, which complemented African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) efforts by holding liberated areas against infiltration. Despite these gains, Al-Shabaab retained influence through and hit-and-run attacks, underscoring Raskamboni's role as a localized rather than a decisive eradicator.

Challenges to Somali National Unity

The Raskamboni Movement, through its integration into 's Darwish forces under Ahmed Madobe's leadership, has contributed to federal-regional frictions by prioritizing local control over border areas like Ras Kamboni, a strategic town near where clashes erupted on November 26, 2024, between troops and (SNA) units deployed by . These confrontations, triggered by federal troop movements amid the African Union Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) withdrawal, highlighted resistance to central authority, with forces repelling SNA advances and seizing positions. Such incidents underscore how the movement's structure fosters autonomy, challenging the Somali Federal Government's efforts to unify security operations under a national command. Further straining unity, Jubaland's administration—bolstered by Raskamboni-aligned elements—suspended cooperation with the federal government on November 28, 2024, citing Mogadishu's interference in regional elections and troop deployments as violations of the provisional constitution. Madobe's contested re-election in late 2024, which the federal executive dismissed as illegitimate, prompted plans for parallel governance in disputed areas like , exacerbating clan-based divisions where Raskamboni's affiliations clash with federal preferences for broader inclusivity. This dynamic has politicized military deployments, eroding trust and creating security vacuums exploited by Al-Shabaab, as federal-regional infighting diverts resources from . The movement's historical evolution from anti-Al-Shabaab operations to consolidation amplifies these challenges, as its control over key assets like the Raskamboni border post resists federal integration of local militias into the SNA, perpetuating fragmented command structures that hinder nationwide cohesion. External actors, including Kenya's efforts in 2025, reflect how these tensions invite foreign involvement, further complicating Somalia's by reinforcing perceptions of as a semi-independent entity rather than a federal subunit. Overall, Raskamboni's role entrenches centrifugal forces, prioritizing and regional interests over centralized authority, as evidenced by ongoing skirmishes that killed at least ten in July 2025 near the border.

References

  1. https://militiasdb.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-public/pgag/609/
  2. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/a-new-solution-that-brings-new-problems-for-somalias-jubaland
  3. https://mappingmilitants.org/files/group-profiles/ras_kamboni_brigade.pdf
  4. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/12/analysis-somali-forces-turn-their-weapons-on-each-other.php
  5. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/shabaab_absorbs_southern_islamist_group_splits_hizbul_islam.php
  6. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/shabaab_absorbs_sout.php
  7. https://www.voanews.com/a/somalias-powerful-hizbul-islam-insurgent-group-splits-93691434/117602.html
  8. https://mappingmilitants.org/node/493
  9. https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/the-smiling-warlord-who-controls-ras-kamboni--815524
  10. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-jubaland-idUSBRE94E0K320130515
  11. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%257B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%257D/Somalia%2520S%25202010%252091.pdf
  12. https://www.cve-kenya.org/media/library/Anderson_and_McKnight_2014_Kenya_at_War_-_Al_Shabaab_and_its_Enemies_in_Eastern_Africa.pdf
  13. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2013/04/16/somalia-federalism-and-jubaland
  14. https://nation.africa/kenya/weekly-review/why-was-somalia-s-jubaland-formed-and-who-is-its-leader-madobe--5183878
  15. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/challenges-to-americas-counterterrorism-strategy-in-somalia
  16. https://www.saferworld-global.org/downloads/pubdocs/forging-jubaland.pdf
  17. https://www.peaceau.org/en/article/report-of-the-chairperson-of-the-commission-on-the-situation-in-somalia-4
  18. https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2024/Dec/199351/kenya_to_repatriate_600_somali_soldiers_after_ras_kamboni_clash.aspx
  19. https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2024/Nov/199099/raskamboni_braces_for_confrontation_as_jubaland_mobilizes_forces_against_federal_troops_amid_atmis_void.aspx
  20. https://www.garoweonline.com/en/news/somalia/jubaland-conflict-who-is-responsible-for-what-happened-in-raskamboni
  21. https://www.aberfoylesecurity.com/?p=2655
  22. https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/b74-somalia-s-divided-islamists.pdf
  23. https://www.voanews.com/a/islamist-allyn-somalias-al-shabab-02dec09--78323982/416097.html
  24. https://www.theelephant.info/analysis/2018/01/18/proxy-wars-the-intrigues-leading-to-kenyas-invasion-of-somalia/
  25. https://www.africa-confidential.com/profile/id/3799/ahmed-mohamed-islaan
  26. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/rethinking-counterinsurgency-in-somalia/
  27. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n13/361/85/pdf/n1336185.pdf?OpenElement
  28. https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/may-2013
  29. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/somalia/b208-electoral-showdown-somalia-averting-another-round-turmoil
  30. https://thesomalidigest.com/jubaland-in-crisis-dissecting-the-fgss-moves-and-their-implications/
  31. https://www.ijisrt.com/assets/upload/files/IJISRT21JAN144.pdf
  32. https://www.theelephant.info/analysis/2020/09/21/kenya-should-get-out-of-somalia-and-negotiate-with-al-shabaab/
  33. https://newafricanmagazine.com/news-analysis/al-shabaab-renews-focus-on-north-eastern-kenya/
  34. https://militiasdb.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-public/pgag/609/evidence/
  35. https://gga.org/federal-feud-escalating-tensions-between-somalias-federal-government-and-jubaland/
  36. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/fighting-erupts-between-somalias-jubbaland-region-federal-government-officials-2024-12-11/
  37. https://kenyanwallstreet.com/jubaland-and-mogadishu-standoff-escalates-after-ahmed-madoobe-reelected-president/location_jubaland
  38. https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/somalias-government-eyes-parallel-administration-in-jubaland-after-talks-collapse/
  39. https://shabellemedia.com/somalia-federal-government-accuses-jubaland-leader-of-fueling-fresh-conflict-in-gedo/
  40. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2612473/amp
  41. https://allafrica.com/stories/202510100608.html
  42. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/somalia/jubaland-jeopardy-uneasy-path-state-building-somalia
  43. https://www.voanews.com/a/talks-to-create-jubaland-in-somalia-make-little-progress/1648884.html
  44. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/former-islamist-warlord-elected-president-of-somali-region-idUSBRE94E1AS/
  45. https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2021/09/20-01079-gltn-land-and-conflict-in-jubaland_final.pdf
  46. https://gloceps.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Deescalating%2520the%2520Jubaland%2520Crisis%2520to%2520Secure%2520Somalia%2520and%2520Stabilize%2520the%2520Horn%2520of%2520Africa%2520web.pdf
  47. https://www.news24.com/somali-warlord-tightens-control-of-port-20130610
  48. https://theworld.org/stories/2016/07/31/saving-somalia-matter-charcoal-and-un-bureaucracy
  49. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/6/27/more-deaths-in-battles-over-somali-port-city
  50. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/somalia-strikes-deal-with-former-islamist-over-port-city-idUSBRE97R0U6/
  51. https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somali-clan-disputes-giving-boost-al-shabab
  52. https://pambazuka.org/somalia-raskamboni-militia-challenges-us-un-credibility
  53. https://lansinginstitute.org/2024/11/29/tension-rises-between-somalia-and-jubbaland/
  54. https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/05/somalia-al-shabaab-attack-indefensible
  55. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2012/country-chapters/somalia
  56. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-problem-with-militias-in-somalia-almost-everyone-wants-them-despite-their-dangers/
  57. https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/somalia
  58. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2024-12/somalia-38.php
  59. https://jamestown.org/brief/briefs-161/
  60. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/timeline-operation-linda-nchi
  61. https://jamestown.org/program/can-somalias-al-shabaab-survive-the-loss-of-kismayo/
  62. https://www.somaliguardian.com/news/somalia-news/fighting-erupts-between-somalias-army-and-jubaland-forces-in-raskamboni/
  63. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-jubbaland-government-suspends-ties-with-federal-administration-2024-11-28/
  64. https://hornreview.org/2025/09/02/kenya-steps-in-mediation-amid-the-jubaland-mogadishu-rift/
  65. https://www.facebook.com/AddisstandardEng/posts/somalia-fighting-between-somali-federal-troops-and-jubaland-forces-kills-at-leas/1160302389468329/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.