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Tallinn offensive
The Tallinn offensive (Russian: Таллинская наступательная операция) was a strategic offensive by the Red Army's 2nd Shock Army and 8th Army and the Baltic Fleet against the German Army Detachment Narwa and Estonian units in mainland Estonia on the Eastern Front of World War II on 17–26 September 1944. Its German counterpart was the abandonment of the Estonian territory in a retreat codenamed Operation Aster (German: Unternehmen Aster).
The Soviet offensive commenced with the 2nd Shock Army breaching the defence of the II Army Corps along the Emajõgi River in the vicinity of Tartu. The defenders managed to slow the Soviet advance sufficiently enough for Army Detachment Narwa to be evacuated from mainland Estonia in an orderly fashion. On 18 September, the constitutional Government of Estonia captured the government buildings in Tallinn from the Germans and the city was abandoned by the German forces by 22 September. The Leningrad Front seized the capital and took the rest of mainland Estonia by 26 September 1944.
Attacks by the Leningrad Front had pushed Army Group North west of Lake Peipus, resulting in a series of operations around Narva. In the south, Soviet forces had advanced towards the Baltic coast at the end of Operation Bagration the Belorussian strategic offensive (June–August 1944) against Army Group Centre. The Soviet Tallinn offensive was designed as a part of the Baltic offensive to eliminate the positions of Army Group North along the Baltic.
Stavka began an intricate supply and transport operation, to move the 2nd Shock Army from the Narva front to the Emajõgi river on September 5, 1944. The 25th River Boat Brigade and engineer troops were ordered by Stavka to ferry the units over Lake Peipus. Five crossings were built from the Russian settlement of Pnevo across the 2 km (1.2 mi)-wide sound of Lämmijärv to the Estonian village of Mehikoorma. Forty-six vessels worked 24 hours a day to carry 135,000 troops, 13,200 horses, 9,100 lorries, 2,183 artillery and 8,300 tons of ammunition across the lake. Luftwaffe units observed the move without intervening. The 2nd Shock Army acquired command over the Emajõgi front from the 3rd Baltic Front on 11 September 1944.
The three Soviet Baltic Fronts launched their Riga offensive operation on 14 September, along the German 18th Army front segment from the town of Madona in Latvia to the mouth of the Väike Emajõgi river. In the Estonian section, from the Valga railway junction to Lake Võrtsjärv, the Soviet 3rd Baltic Front attacked the German XXVIII Army Corps.[page range too broad] The German and Estonian Omakaitse units held their positions and prevented the Army Detachment Narwa from being encircled in Estonia.
The Soviet forces attempted to capture Estonia and its capital Tallinn. Stavka hoped a quick breakthrough at the Emajõgi front would open a path for the armoured units to the north, thus cutting the Army Detachment Narwa off from the rest of Army Group North. The Red Army command presumed that the main direction of retreat for the German forces would be Tallinn, and concentrated their forces there in an attempt to block the roads.
Army Group North had already considered abandoning Estonia in February 1944, during the Soviet Kingisepp-Gdov offensive. A large number of units would have been freed up with changes to the front, but the Narva front continued to be defended on Hitler's orders. The German Command considered it important to maintain control over the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland to ease the situation in Finland and keep the Soviet Baltic Fleet trapped in the eastern bay of the gulf. Retaining the oil shale reserves and oil shale industry in Ida-Viru was important for economic reasons.
The exit of Finland from the war on 3 September provided the political impetus for abandoning Estonia. The next day, Generaloberst Heinz Guderian suggested that it would not be possible to hold Ostland and ordered plans for the evacuation operation, codenamed Königsberg, to be drawn up. Hitler, however, declared that Ostland must not be given up at any cost, since doing so would provide support to those Finns that did not favour the new course of the government, and would influence Sweden to maintain its current foreign policy. After lunch, Guderian ordered that the Königsberg plan nevertheless be secretly initiated. On the next day, Oberst Natzmer visited the headquarters of Army Detachment Narwa to discuss details of the evacuation. On 11 September, the evacuation of Estonia was discussed in the Army Headquarters at length. On 15 September, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, Generaloberst Ferdinand Schörner, requested that Guderian convince Hitler to order the evacuation of German troops from the continental part of Estonia, codenamed Operation Aster. Schörner emphasised that although the front was still holding, delaying the order would mean the units in Estonia would be trapped. Hitler agreed on 16 September.
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Tallinn offensive
The Tallinn offensive (Russian: Таллинская наступательная операция) was a strategic offensive by the Red Army's 2nd Shock Army and 8th Army and the Baltic Fleet against the German Army Detachment Narwa and Estonian units in mainland Estonia on the Eastern Front of World War II on 17–26 September 1944. Its German counterpart was the abandonment of the Estonian territory in a retreat codenamed Operation Aster (German: Unternehmen Aster).
The Soviet offensive commenced with the 2nd Shock Army breaching the defence of the II Army Corps along the Emajõgi River in the vicinity of Tartu. The defenders managed to slow the Soviet advance sufficiently enough for Army Detachment Narwa to be evacuated from mainland Estonia in an orderly fashion. On 18 September, the constitutional Government of Estonia captured the government buildings in Tallinn from the Germans and the city was abandoned by the German forces by 22 September. The Leningrad Front seized the capital and took the rest of mainland Estonia by 26 September 1944.
Attacks by the Leningrad Front had pushed Army Group North west of Lake Peipus, resulting in a series of operations around Narva. In the south, Soviet forces had advanced towards the Baltic coast at the end of Operation Bagration the Belorussian strategic offensive (June–August 1944) against Army Group Centre. The Soviet Tallinn offensive was designed as a part of the Baltic offensive to eliminate the positions of Army Group North along the Baltic.
Stavka began an intricate supply and transport operation, to move the 2nd Shock Army from the Narva front to the Emajõgi river on September 5, 1944. The 25th River Boat Brigade and engineer troops were ordered by Stavka to ferry the units over Lake Peipus. Five crossings were built from the Russian settlement of Pnevo across the 2 km (1.2 mi)-wide sound of Lämmijärv to the Estonian village of Mehikoorma. Forty-six vessels worked 24 hours a day to carry 135,000 troops, 13,200 horses, 9,100 lorries, 2,183 artillery and 8,300 tons of ammunition across the lake. Luftwaffe units observed the move without intervening. The 2nd Shock Army acquired command over the Emajõgi front from the 3rd Baltic Front on 11 September 1944.
The three Soviet Baltic Fronts launched their Riga offensive operation on 14 September, along the German 18th Army front segment from the town of Madona in Latvia to the mouth of the Väike Emajõgi river. In the Estonian section, from the Valga railway junction to Lake Võrtsjärv, the Soviet 3rd Baltic Front attacked the German XXVIII Army Corps.[page range too broad] The German and Estonian Omakaitse units held their positions and prevented the Army Detachment Narwa from being encircled in Estonia.
The Soviet forces attempted to capture Estonia and its capital Tallinn. Stavka hoped a quick breakthrough at the Emajõgi front would open a path for the armoured units to the north, thus cutting the Army Detachment Narwa off from the rest of Army Group North. The Red Army command presumed that the main direction of retreat for the German forces would be Tallinn, and concentrated their forces there in an attempt to block the roads.
Army Group North had already considered abandoning Estonia in February 1944, during the Soviet Kingisepp-Gdov offensive. A large number of units would have been freed up with changes to the front, but the Narva front continued to be defended on Hitler's orders. The German Command considered it important to maintain control over the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland to ease the situation in Finland and keep the Soviet Baltic Fleet trapped in the eastern bay of the gulf. Retaining the oil shale reserves and oil shale industry in Ida-Viru was important for economic reasons.
The exit of Finland from the war on 3 September provided the political impetus for abandoning Estonia. The next day, Generaloberst Heinz Guderian suggested that it would not be possible to hold Ostland and ordered plans for the evacuation operation, codenamed Königsberg, to be drawn up. Hitler, however, declared that Ostland must not be given up at any cost, since doing so would provide support to those Finns that did not favour the new course of the government, and would influence Sweden to maintain its current foreign policy. After lunch, Guderian ordered that the Königsberg plan nevertheless be secretly initiated. On the next day, Oberst Natzmer visited the headquarters of Army Detachment Narwa to discuss details of the evacuation. On 11 September, the evacuation of Estonia was discussed in the Army Headquarters at length. On 15 September, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, Generaloberst Ferdinand Schörner, requested that Guderian convince Hitler to order the evacuation of German troops from the continental part of Estonia, codenamed Operation Aster. Schörner emphasised that although the front was still holding, delaying the order would mean the units in Estonia would be trapped. Hitler agreed on 16 September.