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Red Army
Red Army
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Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
Рабоче-крестьянская Красная армия
Red Army headgear insignia
Active28 January 1918 – 25 February 1946 (1918-01-28 – 1946-02-25)
Country
Allegiance
TypeArmy and Air force
RoleLand warfare
Size
  • 6,437,755 (Russian Civil War)
  • 34,476,700 (World War II)
Engagements
Commanders
Chief of the General StaffSee list

The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army,[a] often referred by its shortened name as the Red Army,[b] was the army and air force of the Russian Soviet Republic and, from 1922, the Soviet Union. The army was established in January 1918 by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars[1] to oppose the military forces of the new nation's adversaries during the Russian Civil War, especially the various groups collectively known as the White Army. In February 1946, the Red Army (which embodied the main component of the Soviet Armed Forces alongside the Soviet Navy) was renamed the "Soviet Army". Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union it was split between the post-Soviet states, with its bulk becoming the Russian Ground Forces, commonly considered to be the successor of the Soviet Army.

The Red Army provided the largest ground force in the Allied victory in the European theatre of World War II, and its invasion of Manchuria assisted the unconditional surrender of Japan. During its operations on the Eastern Front, it accounted for 75–80% of the casualties that the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS suffered during the war, and ultimately captured the German capital, Berlin.[2]

Up to 34 million soldiers served in the Red Army during World War II, 8 million of which were non-Slavic minorities. Officially, the Red Army lost 6,329,600 killed in action (KIA), 555,400 deaths by disease and 4,559,000 missing in action (MIA) (mostly captured). The majority of the losses, excluding POWs, were ethnic Russians (5,756,000), followed by ethnic Ukrainians (1,377,400).[3] Of the 4.5 million missing, 939,700 rejoined the ranks in liberated Soviet territory, and a further 1,836,000 returned from German captivity. The official grand total of losses amounted to 8,668,400.[clarification needed][3][4] This is the official total dead, but other estimates give the number of total dead up to almost 11 million.[5] Officials at the Russian Central Defense Ministry Archive (CDMA) maintain that their database lists the names of roughly 14 million dead and missing service personnel.[6]

Origins

[edit]

In September 1917, Vladimir Lenin wrote:

"There is only one way to prevent the restoration of the police, and that is to create a people's militia and to fuse it with the army (the standing army to be replaced by the arming of the entire people)."[7]

At the time, the Imperial Russian Army had started to collapse. Approximately 23% (about 19 million) of the male population of the Russian Empire were mobilized; however, most of them were not equipped with any weapons and had support roles such as maintaining the lines of communication and the base areas. The Tsarist general Nikolay Dukhonin estimated that there had been 2 million deserters, 1.8 million dead, 5 million wounded and 2 million prisoners. He estimated the remaining troops as numbering 10 million.[8]

While the Imperial Russian Army was being taken apart, "it became apparent that the rag-tag Red Guard units and elements of the imperial army who had gone over the side of the Bolsheviks were quite inadequate to the task of defending the new government against external foes." Therefore, the Council of People's Commissars decided to form the Red Army on 28 January 1918.[c] They envisioned a body "formed from the class-conscious and best elements of the working classes." All citizens of the Russian republic aged 18 or older were eligible. Its role being the defense "of the Soviet authority, the creation of a basis for the transformation of the standing army into a force deriving its strength from a nation in arms, and, furthermore, the creation of a basis for the support of the coming Socialist Revolution in Europe." Enlistment was conditional upon "guarantees being given by a military or civil committee functioning within the territory of the Soviet Power, or by party or trade union committees or, in extreme cases, by two persons belonging to one of the above organizations." In the event of an entire unit wanting to join the Red Army, a "collective guarantee and the affirmative vote of all its members would be necessary."[9][10] Because the Red Army was composed mainly of peasants, the families of those who served were guaranteed rations and assistance with farm work.[11] Some peasants who remained at home yearned to join the Army; men, along with some women, flooded the recruitment centres. If they were turned away, they would collect scrap metal and prepare care-packages. In some cases, the money they earned would go towards tanks for the Army.[12]

Red Guards unit of the Vulkan factory, Petrograd

The Council of People's Commissars appointed itself the supreme head of the Red Army, delegating command and administration of the army to the Commissariat for Military Affairs and the Special All-Russian College within this commissariat.[9] Nikolai Krylenko was the supreme commander-in-chief, with Aleksandr Myasnikyan as deputy.[13] Nikolai Podvoisky became the commissar for war, Pavel Dybenko, commissar for the fleet. Proshyan, Samoisky, Steinberg were also specified as people's commissars as well as Vladimir Bonch-Bruyevich from the Bureau of Commissars. At a joint meeting of Bolsheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, held on 22 February 1918, Krylenko remarked:

"We have no army. The demoralized soldiers are fleeing, panic-stricken, as soon as they see a German helmet appear on the horizon, abandoning their artillery, convoys and all war material to the triumphantly advancing enemy. The Red Guard units are brushed aside like flies. We have no power to stay the enemy; only an immediate signing of the peace treaty will save us from destruction."[9]

History

[edit]

Russian Civil War

[edit]
Hammer and plough cockade used by the Red Army from 1918 to 1922, when it was replaced by the hammer and sickle.[14]

The Russian Civil War (1917–1923) can be divided into three periods:

  1. October 1917 – November 1918, from the October Revolution to the World War I armistice. The Bolshevik government's nationalization of traditional Cossack lands in November 1917 provoked the insurrection of General Alexey Maximovich Kaledin's Volunteer Army in the River Don region. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918 aggravated Russian internal politics. The overall situation encouraged direct Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War, in which twelve foreign countries supported anti-Bolshevik militias. A series of engagements resulted, involving, amongst others, the Czechoslovak Legion, the Polish 5th Rifle Division, and the pro-Bolshevik Red Latvian Riflemen.
  2. January 1919 – November 1919, the advance and retreat of the White armies. Initially the White armies advanced successfully: from the south, under General Anton Denikin; from the east, under Admiral Aleksandr Vasilevich Kolchak; and from the northwest, under General Nikolai Nikolaevich Yudenich. The Whites beat back the Red Army on each front. Leon Trotsky reformed and counterattacked – the Red Army repelled Admiral Kolchak's army in June, and the armies of General Denikin and General Yudenich in October.[15] By mid-November the White armies were all almost completely exhausted. In January 1920 Budenny's 1st Cavalry Army entered Rostov-on-Don.
  3. 1919 to 1923, residual conflicts. Some peripheral theatres continued to see conflict for two more years, and remnants of the White forces remained in the Russian Far East into 1923.

At the start of the civil war, the Red Army consisted of 299 infantry regiments.[16] The civil war intensified after Lenin dissolved the Russian Constituent Assembly (5–6 January 1918) and the Soviet government signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (3 March 1918), removing Russia from the First World War. Freed from international obligations, the Red Army confronted an internecine war against a variety of opposing anti-Bolshevik forces, including the Revolutionary Insurgent Army of Ukraine led by Nestor Makhno, the anti-White and anti-Red Green armies, efforts to restore the defeated Provisional Government, monarchists, but mainly the White Movement of several different anti-socialist military confederations. "Red Army Day", 23 February 1918, has a two-fold historical significance: it was the first day of conscription (in Petrograd and Moscow), and the first day of combat against the occupying Imperial German Army.[17][d]

The Red Army controlled by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic also against independence movements, invading and annexing newly independent states of the former Russian Empire. This included three military campaigns against the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic, in January–February 1918, January–February 1919, and May–October 1920. Conquered nations were subsequently incorporated into the Soviet Union.[18]

In June 1918, Leon Trotsky abolished workers' control over the Red Army, replacing the election of officers with traditional army hierarchies and criminalizing dissent with the death penalty. Simultaneously, Trotsky carried out a mass recruitment of officers from the old Imperial Russian Army, who were employed as military advisors (voenspetsy).[19][20] The Bolsheviks occasionally enforced the loyalty of such recruits by holding their families as hostages.[21][page needed] As a result of this initiative, in 1918, 75% of the officers were former tsarists.[22] By mid-August 1920 the Red Army's former tsarist personnel included 48,000 officers, 10,300 administrators, and 214,000 non-commissioned officers.[23] When the civil war ended in 1922, ex-tsarists constituted 83% of the Red Army's divisional and corps commanders.[21][19]

Leon Trotsky and Demyan Bedny in 1918

In September 1918, the Bolshevik militias consolidated under the supreme command of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (Russian: Революционный Военный Совет, romanizedRevolyutsionny Voyenny Sovyet (Revvoyensoviet)). The first chairman was Trotsky, and the first commander-in-chief was Jukums Vācietis of the Latvian Riflemen; in July 1919 he was replaced by Sergey Kamenev. Soon afterwards Trotsky established the GRU (military intelligence) to provide political and military intelligence to Red Army commanders.[24] Trotsky founded the Red Army with an initial Red Guard organization and a core soldiery of Red Guard militiamen and the Cheka secret police.[25] Conscription began in June 1918,[26] and opposition to it was violently suppressed.[27][page needed] To control the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Red Army soldiery, the Cheka operated special punitive brigades which suppressed anti-communists, deserters, and "enemies of the state".[24][28]

Vladimir Lenin, Kliment Voroshilov, Leon Trotsky and soldiers, Petrograd, 1921

In 1919, 612 "hardcore" deserters of the total 837,000 draft dodgers and deserters were executed following Trotsky's draconian measures.[29] According to Figes, "a majority of deserters (most registered as "weak-willed") were handed back to the military authorities, and formed into units for transfer to one of the rear armies or directly to the front". Even those registered as "malicious" deserters were returned to the ranks when the demand for reinforcements became desperate". Forges also noted that the Red Army instituted amnesty weeks to prohibit punitive measures against desertion which encouraged the voluntary return of 98,000–132,000 deserters to the army.[30]

The Red Army used special regiments for ethnic minorities, such as the Dungan Cavalry Regiment commanded by the Dungan Magaza Masanchi.[31] It also co-operated with armed Bolshevik Party-oriented volunteer units, the Forces of Special Purpose from 1919 to 1925.[32]

The slogan "exhortation, organization, and reprisals" expressed the discipline and motivation which helped ensure the Red Army's tactical and strategic success. On campaign, the attached Cheka special punitive brigades conducted summary field court-martial and executions of deserters and slackers.[28][33] Under Commissar Yan Karlovich Berzin, the brigades took hostages from the villages of deserters to compel their surrender; one in ten of those returning was executed. The same tactic also suppressed peasant rebellions in areas controlled by the Red Army, the biggest of these being the Tambov Rebellion.[34] The Soviets enforced the loyalty of the various political, ethnic, and national groups in the Red Army through political commissars attached at the brigade and regimental levels. The commissars also had the task of spying on commanders for political incorrectness.[35] In August 1918, Trotsky authorized General Mikhail Tukhachevsky to place blocking units behind politically unreliable Red Army units, to shoot anyone who retreated without permission.[36] In 1942, during the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) Joseph Stalin reintroduced the blocking policy and penal battalions with Order 227.

In the spring of 1919, Anna Novikova was enrolled in the school of infantry commanders in Moscow. After completing military training, she became the first woman to command a combat unit of the Red Army. In 1920, she fought on an armored train.[37]

Polish–Soviet War and prelude

[edit]
Anti-Polish Soviet propaganda poster, 1920

The Soviet westward offensive of 1918–1919 occurred at the same time as the general Soviet move into the areas abandoned by the Ober Ost garrisons that were being withdrawn to Germany in the aftermath of World War I. This merged into the 1919–1921 Polish–Soviet War, in which the Red Army invaded Poland, reaching the central part of the country in 1920, but then suffered a resounding defeat in Warsaw, which put an end to the war. During the Polish Campaign the Red Army numbered some 6.5 million men, many of whom the Army had difficulty supporting, around 581,000 in the two operational fronts, western and southwestern. Around 2.5 million men and women were mobilized in the interior as part of reserve armies.[38]

Reorganization

[edit]

The XI Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (RCP (b)) adopted a resolution on the strengthening of the Red Army. It decided to establish strictly organized military, educational and economic conditions in the army. However, it was recognized that an army of 1,600,000 would be burdensome. By the end of 1922, after the Congress, the Party Central Committee decided to reduce the Red Army to 800,000. This reduction necessitated the reorganization of the Red Army's structure. The supreme military unit became corps of two or three divisions. Divisions consisted of three regiments. Brigades as independent units were abolished. The formation of departments' rifle corps began.

Doctrinal development in the 1920s and 1930s

[edit]
Soviet officers, 1938

After four years of warfare, the Red Army's defeat of Pyotr Wrangel in the south[39] in 1920[40] allowed the foundation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1922. Historian John Erickson sees 1 February 1924, when Mikhail Frunze became head of the Red Army staff, as marking the ascent of the general staff, which came to dominate Soviet military planning and operations. By 1 October 1924 the Red Army's strength had diminished to 530,000.[41] The list of Soviet divisions 1917–1945 details the formations of the Red Army in that time.

In the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, Soviet military theoreticians – led by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky – developed the deep operation doctrine,[42] a direct consequence of their experiences in the Polish–Soviet War and in the Russian Civil War. To achieve victory, deep operations envisage simultaneous corps- and army-size unit maneuvers of simultaneous parallel attacks throughout the depth of the enemy's ground forces, inducing catastrophic defensive failure. The deep-battle doctrine relies upon aviation and armor advances with the expectation that maneuver warfare offers quick, efficient, and decisive victory. Marshal Tukhachevsky said that aerial warfare must be "employed against targets beyond the range of infantry, artillery, and other arms. For maximum tactical effect aircraft should be employed en masse, concentrated in time and space, against targets of the highest tactical importance."[43]

"To the Red army, Stalin has dealt a fearful blow. As a result of the latest judicial frameup, it has fallen several cubits in stature. The interests of the Soviet defense have been sacrificed in the interests of the self-preservation of the ruling clique."

Trotsky on the Red Army purges of 1937.[44]

Red Army deep operations found their first formal expression in the 1929 Field Regulations and became codified in the 1936 Provisional Field Regulations (PU-36). The Great Purge of 1937–1939 and the 1941 Red Army Purge removed many leading officers from the Red Army, including Tukhachevsky himself and many of his followers, and the doctrine was abandoned. Thus, at the Battle of Lake Khasan in 1938 and in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol in 1939 (major border conflicts with the Imperial Japanese Army), the doctrine was not used. Only in the Second World War did deep operations come into play.

Chinese–Soviet conflicts

[edit]

The Red Army was involved in armed conflicts in the Republic of China during the Sino-Soviet conflict (1929), the Soviet invasion of Xinjiang (1934), when it was assisted by White Russian forces, and the Islamic rebellion in Xinjiang (1937) in Northwestern China. The Red Army achieved its objectives; it maintained effective control over the Manchurian Chinese Eastern Railway, and successfully installed a pro-Soviet regime in Xinjiang.[45]

Soviet–Japanese border conflicts

[edit]
Soviet tanks during the Battles of Khalkhin Gol, August 1939

The Soviet–Japanese border conflicts, also known as the "Soviet–Japanese Border War" or the first "Soviet–Japanese War", was a series of minor and major conflicts fought between the Soviet Union and the Empire of Japan from 1932 to 1939. Japan's expansion into Northeast China created a common border between Japanese controlled areas and the Soviet Far East and Mongolia. The Soviets and Japanese, including their respective client states of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo, disputed the boundaries and accused the other side of border violations. This resulted in a series of escalating border skirmishes and punitive expeditions, including the 1938 Battle of Lake Khasan, and culminated in the Red Army finally achieving a Soviet-Mongolian victory over Japan and Manchukuo at the Battles of Khalkhin Gol in September 1939. The Soviet Union and Japan agreed to a ceasefire. Later the two sides signed the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact on 13 April 1941, which resolved the dispute and returned the borders to status quo ante bellum.[46]

Winter War with Finland

[edit]
Red Army soldiers display a captured Finnish banner, March 1940

The Winter War (Finnish: talvisota, Swedish: finska vinterkriget, Russian: Зи́мняя война́)[e] was a war between the Soviet Union and Finland. It began with a Soviet offensive on 30 November 1939 – three months after the start of World War II and the Soviet invasion of Poland. The League of Nations deemed the attack illegal and expelled the Soviet Union on 14 December 1939.[51]

The Soviet forces led by Semyon Timoshenko had three times as many soldiers as the Finns, thirty times as many aircraft, and a hundred times as many tanks. The Red Army, however, had been hindered by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's Great Purge of 1937, reducing the army's morale and efficiency shortly before the outbreak of the fighting.[52] With over 30,000 of its army officers executed or imprisoned, most of whom were from the highest ranks, the Red Army in 1939 had many inexperienced senior officers.[53][54]: 56  Because of these factors, and high commitment and morale in the Finnish forces, Finland was able to resist the Soviet invasion for much longer than the Soviets expected. Finnish forces inflicted stunning losses on the Red Army for the first three months of the war while suffering very few losses themselves.[54]: 79–80 

Hostilities ceased in March 1940 with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. Finland ceded 9% of its pre-war territory and 30% of its economic assets to the Soviet Union.[55] Soviet losses on the front were heavy, and the country's international reputation suffered.[56] The Soviet forces did not accomplish their objective of the total conquest of Finland but did receive territory in Karelia, Petsamo, and Salla. The Finns retained their sovereignty and improved their international reputation, which bolstered their morale in the Continuation War (also known as the "Second Soviet-Finnish War") which was a conflict fought by Finland and Germany against the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944.

Second World War ("The Great Patriotic War")

[edit]
Soviet gun crew in action during the siege of Odessa, July 1941

In accordance with the Soviet-Nazi Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939, the Red Army invaded Poland on 17 September 1939, after the Nazi invasion on 1 September 1939. On 30 November, the Red Army also attacked Finland, in the Winter War of 1939–1940. By autumn 1940, after conquering its portion of Poland, Nazi Germany shared an extensive border with the USSR, with whom it remained neutrally bound by their non-aggression pact and trade agreements. Another consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, carried out by the Southern Front in June–July 1940 and Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. These conquests also added to the border the Soviet Union shared with Nazi-controlled areas. For Adolf Hitler, the circumstance was no dilemma, because[57] the Drang nach Osten ("Drive towards the East") policy secretly remained in force, culminating on 18 December 1940 with Directive No. 21, Operation Barbarossa, approved on 3 February 1941, and scheduled for mid-May 1941.

Salute to the Red Army at the Royal Albert Hall, London in February 1943

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, in Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army's ground forces had 303 divisions and 22 separate brigades (5.5 million soldiers) including 166 divisions and brigades (2.6 million) garrisoned in the western military districts.[58][59] The Axis forces deployed on the Eastern Front consisted of 181 divisions and 18 brigades (3 million soldiers). Three Fronts, the Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern conducted the defense of the western borders of the USSR. In the first weeks of the Great Patriotic War (as it is known in Russia), the Wehrmacht defeated many Red Army units. The Red Army lost millions of men as prisoners and lost much of its pre-war matériel. Stalin increased mobilization, and by 1 August 1941, despite 46 divisions lost in combat, the Red Army's strength was 401 divisions.[60]

The Soviet forces were apparently unprepared despite numerous warnings from a variety of sources.[61] They suffered much damage in the field because of mediocre officers, partial mobilization, and an incomplete reorganization.[62] The hasty pre-war forces expansion and the over-promotion of inexperienced officers (owing to the purging of experienced officers) favored the Wehrmacht in combat.[63][page needed] The Axis's numeric superiority rendered the combatants' divisional strength approximately equal.[f] A generation of Soviet commanders (notably Georgy Zhukov) learned from the defeats,[65] and Soviet victories in the Battle of Moscow, at Stalingrad, Kursk and later in Operation Bagration proved decisive.

Ivan Konev at the capture of Prague by the Red Army in May 1945

In 1941, the Soviet government raised the bloodied Red Army's esprit de corps with propaganda stressing the defense of Motherland and nation, employing historic exemplars of Russian courage and bravery against foreign aggressors. The anti-Nazi Great Patriotic War was conflated with the Patriotic War of 1812 against Napoleon, and historical Russian military heroes, such as Alexander Nevsky and Mikhail Kutuzov, appeared. Repression of the Russian Orthodox Church temporarily ceased, and priests revived the tradition of blessing arms before battle.

To encourage the initiative of Red Army commanders, the CPSU temporarily abolished political commissars, reintroduced formal military ranks and decorations, and introduced the Guards unit concept. Exceptionally heroic or high-performing units earned the Guards title (for example 1st Guards Special Rifle Corps, 6th Guards Tank Army),[66] an elite designation denoting superior training, materiel, and pay. Punishment also was used; slackers, malingerers, those avoiding combat with self-inflicted wounds[67] cowards, thieves, and deserters were disciplined with beatings, demotions, undesirable/dangerous duties, and summary execution by NKVD punitive detachments.

Marshals Zhukov and Rokossovsky with General Sokolovsky leave the Brandenburg Gate after being decorated by Field Marshal Montgomery

At the same time, the osobist (NKVD military counter-intelligence officers) became a key Red Army figure with the power to condemn to death and to spare the life of any soldier and (almost any) officer of the unit to which he was attached. In 1942, Stalin established the penal battalions composed of gulag inmates, Soviet PoWs, disgraced soldiers, and deserters, for hazardous front-line duty as tramplers clearing Nazi minefields, et cetera.[68][69] Given the dangers, the maximum sentence was three months. Likewise, the Soviet treatment of Red Army personnel captured by the Wehrmacht was especially harsh. Per a 1941 Stalin directive, Red Army officers and soldiers were to "fight to the last" rather than surrender; Stalin stated: "There are no Soviet prisoners of war, only traitors".[70] During and after World War II freed POWs went to special "filtration camps". Of these, by 1944, more than 90% were cleared, and about 8% were arrested or condemned to serve in penal battalions. In 1944, they were sent directly to reserve military formations to be cleared by the NKVD. Further, in 1945, about 100 filtration camps were set for repatriated POWs, and other displaced persons, which processed more than 4,000,000 people. By 1946, 80% civilians and 20% of POWs were freed, 5% of civilians, and 43% of POWs were re-drafted, 10% of civilians and 22% of POWs were sent to labor battalions, and 2% of civilians and 15% of the POWs (226,127 out of 1,539,475 total) were transferred to the Gulag.[70][71]

Red Army victory banner, raised above the German Reichstag in May 1945
Monument to the Red Army, Berlin

During the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army conscripted 29,574,900 men in addition to the 4,826,907 in service at the beginning of the war. Of this total of 34,401,807 it lost 6,329,600 killed in action (KIA), 555,400 deaths by disease and 4,559,000 missing in action (MIA) (most captured). Of the 4.5 million missing, 939,700 rejoined the ranks in the subsequently liberated Soviet territory, and a further 1,836,000 returned from German captivity. Thus the grand total of losses amounted to 8,668,400.[3][4] This is the official total dead, but other estimates give the number of total dead up to almost 11 million men, including 7.7 million killed or missing in action and 2.6 million prisoners of war (POW) dead (out of 5.2 million total POWs), plus 400,000 paramilitary and Soviet partisan losses.[5] Officials at the Russian Central Defense Ministry Archive (CDMA) maintain that their database lists the names of roughly 14 million dead and missing service personnel.[6] The majority of the losses, excluding POWs, were ethnic Russians (5,756,000), followed by ethnic Ukrainians (1,377,400).[3] As many as 8 million of the 34 million mobilized were non-Slavic minority soldiers, and around 45 divisions formed from national minorities served from 1941 to 1943.[72]

The German losses on the Eastern Front consisted of an estimated 3,604,800 KIA/MIA within the 1937 borders plus 900,000 ethnic Germans and Austrians outside the 1937 border (included in these numbers are men listed as missing in action or unaccounted for after the war)[73][page needed] and 3,576,300 men reported captured (total 8,081,100); the losses of the German satellites on the Eastern Front approximated 668,163 KIA/MIA and 799,982 captured (total 1,468,145). Of these 9,549,245, the Soviets released 3,572,600 from captivity after the war, thus the grand total of the Axis losses came to an estimated 5,976,645.[73][page needed] Regarding POWs, both sides captured large numbers and had many die in captivity – one recent[when?] British[74][page needed] figure says 3.6 of 6 million Soviet POWs died in German camps, while 300,000 of 3 million German POWs died in Soviet hands.[75]

Shortcomings

[edit]

In 1941, the rapid progress of the initial German air and land attacks into the Soviet Union made Red Army logistical support difficult because many depots (and most of the USSR's industrial manufacturing base) lay in the country's invaded western areas, obliging their re-establishment east of the Ural Mountains. Lend-Lease trucks and jeeps from the United States began appearing in large numbers in 1942. Until then, the Red Army was often required to improvise or go without weapons, vehicles, and other equipment. The 1941 decision to physically move their manufacturing capacity east of the Ural Mountains kept the main Soviet support system out of German reach.[76] In the later stages of the war, the Red Army fielded some excellent weaponry, especially artillery and tanks. The Red Army's heavy KV-1 and medium T-34 tanks outclassed most Wehrmacht armor,[77] but in 1941 most Soviet tank units used older and inferior models.[78]

Lend-Lease

[edit]

The Red Army was financially and materially assisted in its wartime effort by the United States. In total, the U.S. deliveries to the USSR through Lend-Lease amounted to $11 billion in materials ($180 billion in the 2020 money value):[79] over 400,000 jeeps and trucks; 12,000 armored vehicles (including 7,000 tanks, about 1,386[80] of which were M3 Lees and 4,102 M4 Shermans);[81] 14,015 aircraft (of which 4,719 were Bell P-39 Airacobras, 2,908 were Douglas A-20 Havocs and 2,400 were Bell P-63 Kingcobras)[82] and 1.75 million tons of food.[83]

Wartime rape

[edit]

Soviet soldiers committed mass rapes in occupied territories, especially in Germany.[84] The wartime rapes were followed by decades of silence.[85][86][87][88] According to historian Antony Beevor, whose books were banned in 2015 from some Russian schools and colleges, NKVD (Soviet secret police) files have revealed that the leadership knew what was happening, but did little to stop it.[89] It was often rear echelon units who committed the rapes.[5] According to professor Oleg Rzheshevsky, "4,148 Red Army officers and many privates were punished for committing atrocities".[4] The exact number of German women and girls raped by Soviet troops during the war and occupation is uncertain, but historians estimate their numbers are likely in the hundreds of thousands, and possibly as many as two million.[90]

Soviet–Japanese War (1945)

[edit]

While the Soviets considered the surrender of Germany to be the end of the "Great Patriotic War", at the earlier Yalta Conference the Soviet Union agreed to enter the Pacific Theater portion of World War II within three months of the end of the war in Europe. This promise was reaffirmed at the Potsdam Conference held in July 1945.[91]

The Red Army began the Soviet invasion of Manchuria on 9 August 1945 (three days after the first atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the same day the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, while also being exact three months after the surrender of Germany). It was the largest campaign of the Soviet–Japanese War, which resumed hostilities between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Empire of Japan after almost six years of peace following the 1932–1939 Soviet–Japanese border conflicts. The Red Army, with support from Mongolian forces, overwhelmed the Japanese Kwantung Army and local Chinese forces supporting them. The Soviets advanced on the continent into the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, Mengjiang (the northeast section of present-day Inner Mongolia which was part of another puppet state) and via an amphibious operation the northern portion of Korea.[92][93][94] Other Red Army operations included the Soviet invasion of South Sakhalin, which was the Japanese portion of Sakhalin Island (and Russia had lost to Japan in 1905 in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War), and the invasion of the Kuril Islands. Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender of Japan on 15 August. The commanding general of the Kwantung Army ordered a surrender the following day although some Japanese units continued to fight for several more days. A proposed Soviet invasion of Hokkaido, the second largest Japanese island, was originally planned to be part of the territory to be taken but it was cancelled.[95]

Administration

[edit]

Military administration after the October Revolution was taken over by the People's Commissariat of War and Marine affairs headed by a collective committee of Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko, Pavel Dybenko, and Nikolai Krylenko. At the same time, Nikolay Dukhonin was acting as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief after Alexander Kerensky fled from Russia. On 12 November 1917 the Soviet government appointed Krylenko as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and because of an "accident" during the forceful displacement of the commander-in-chief, Dukhonin was killed on 20 November 1917. Nikolai Podvoisky was appointed as the Narkom of War Affairs, leaving Dybenko in charge of the Narkom of Marine Affairs and Ovseyenko – the expeditionary forces to the Southern Russia on 28 November 1917. The Bolsheviks also sent out their own representatives to replace front commanders of the Russian Imperial Army.

After the signing of Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, a major reshuffling took place in the Soviet military administration. On 13 March 1918, the Soviet government accepted the official resignation of Krylenko and the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief was liquidated. On 14 March 1918, Leon Trotsky replaced Podvoisky as the Narkom of War Affairs. On 16 March 1918, Pavel Dybenko was relieved from the office of Narkom of Marine Affairs. On 8 May 1918, the All-Russian Chief Headquarters was created, headed by Nikolai Stogov and later Alexander Svechin.

On 2 September 1918, the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) was established as the main military administration under Leon Trotsky, the Narkom of War Affairs. On 6 September 1918 alongside the chief headquarters, the Field Headquarters of RMC was created, initially headed by Nikolai Rattel. On the same day the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was created, and initially assigned to Jukums Vācietis (and from July 1919 to Sergey Kamenev). The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces existed until April 1924, the end of Russian Civil War.

In November 1923, after the establishment of the Soviet Union, the Council of People's Commissars on War and Navy Affairs was transformed into the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs.

Organization

[edit]
Roza Shanina was a graduate of the Central Women's Sniper Training School credited with 59 confirmed kills.

At the beginning of its existence, the Red Army functioned as a voluntary formation, without ranks or insignia. Democratic elections selected the officers. However, a decree on 29 May 1918 imposed obligatory military service for men of ages 18 to 40.[96] To service the massive draft, the Bolsheviks formed regional military commissariats (voyennyy komissariat, abbr. voyenkomat), which as of 2023 still exist in Russia in this function and under this name. Military commissariats, however, should not be confused with the institution of military political commissars.

In the mid-1920s, the territorial principle of manning the Red Army was introduced. In each region, able-bodied men were called up for a limited period of active duty in territorial units, which constituted about half the army's strength, each year, for five years.[97] The first call-up period was for three months, with one month a year thereafter. A regular cadre provided a stable nucleus. By 1925, this system provided 46 of the 77 infantry divisions and one of the eleven cavalry divisions. The remainder consisted of regular officers and enlisted personnel serving two-year terms. The territorial system was finally abolished, with all remaining formations converted to the other cadre divisions, in 1937–1938.[98]

Mechanization

[edit]

The Soviet military received ample funding and was innovative in its technology. An American journalist wrote in 1941:[99]

Even in American terms the Soviet defence budget was large. In 1940 it was the equivalent of $11,000,000,000, and represented one-third of the national expenditure. Measure this against the fact that the infinitely richer United States will approximate the expenditure of that much yearly only in 1942 after two years of its greatest defence effort.

Most of the money spent on the Red Army and Air Force went for machines of war. Twenty-three years ago when the Bolshevik Revolution took place there were few machines in Russia. Marx said Communism must come in a highly industrialized society. The Bolsheviks identified their dreams of socialist happiness with machines which would multiply production and reduce hours of labour until everyone would have everything he needed and would work only as much as he wished. Somehow this has not come about, but the Russians still worship machines, and this helped make the Red Army the most highly mechanized in the world, except perhaps the German Army now.

Like Americans, the Russians admire size, bigness, large numbers. They took pride in building a vast army of tanks, some of them the largest in the world, armored cars, airplanes, motorized guns, and every variety of mechanical weapons.

Under Stalin's campaign for mechanization, the army formed its first mechanized unit in 1930. The 1st Mechanized Brigade consisted of a tank regiment, a motorized infantry regiment, as well as reconnaissance and artillery battalions.[100] From this humble beginning, the Soviets would go on to create the first operational-level armored formations in history, the 11th and 45th Mechanized Corps, in 1932. These were tank-heavy formations with combat support forces included so they could survive while operating in enemy rear areas without support from a parent front.

Impressed by the German campaign of 1940 against France, the Soviet People's Commissariat of Defence (Defence Ministry, Russian abbreviation NKO) ordered the creation of nine mechanized corps on 6 July 1940. Between February and March 1941, the NKO ordered another twenty to be created. All of these formations were larger than those theorized by Tukhachevsky. Even though the Red Army's 29 mechanized corps had an authorized strength of no less than 29,899 tanks by 1941, they proved to be a paper tiger.[101] There were actually only 17,000 tanks available at the time, meaning several of the new mechanized corps were badly under strength. The pressure placed on factories and military planners to show production numbers also led to a situation where the majority of armored vehicles were obsolescent models, critically lacking in spare parts and support equipment, and nearly three-quarters were overdue for major maintenance.[102] By 22 June 1941, there were only 1,475 of the modern T-34s and KV series tanks available to the Red Army, and these were too dispersed along the front to provide enough mass for even local success.[101] To illustrate this, the 3rd Mechanized Corps in Lithuania was formed up of a total of 460 tanks; 109 of these were newer KV-1s and T-34s. This corps would prove to be one of the lucky few with a substantial number of newer tanks. However, the 4th Army was composed of 518 tanks, all of which were the obsolete T-26, as opposed to the authorized strength of 1,031 newer medium tanks.[103] This problem was universal throughout the Red Army and would play a crucial role in the initial defeats of the Red Army in 1941 at the hands of the German armed forces.[104]

Wartime

[edit]
The Battle of Stalingrad is considered by many historians as a decisive turning point of World War II.

War experience prompted changes to the way frontline forces were organized. Following six months of combat against the Germans, the Stavka abolished the rifle corps which was intermediate between the army and division level because, while useful in theory, in the state of the Red Army in 1941, they proved ineffective in practice.[105] Following the decisive victory in the Battle of Moscow in January 1942, the high command began to reintroduce rifle corps into its more experienced formations. The total number of rifle corps started at 62 on 22 June 1941, dropped to six by 1 January 1942, but then increased to 34 by February 1943, and 161 by New Year's Day 1944. Actual strengths of front-line rifle divisions, authorized to contain 11,000 men in July 1941, were mostly no more than 50% of establishment strengths during 1941,[106] and divisions were often worn down, because of continuous operations, to hundreds of men or even less.

On the outbreak of war, the Red Army deployed mechanized corps and tank divisions whose development has been described above. The initial German attack destroyed many and, in the course of 1941, virtually all of them, (barring two in the Transbaikal Military District). The remnants were disbanded.[107] It was much easier to coordinate smaller forces, and separate tank brigades and battalions were substituted. It was late 1942 and early 1943 before larger tank formations of corps size were fielded to employ armor in mass again. By mid-1943, these corps were being grouped together into tank armies whose strength by the end of the war could be up to 700 tanks and 50,000 men.

Personnel

[edit]
People in Saint Petersburg at "Immortal regiment", carrying portraits of their ancestors who fought in World War II.
Benjamin Netanyahu and Red Army's Jewish veterans, Victory Day in Jerusalem, 9 May 2017

The Bolshevik authorities assigned to every unit of the Red Army a political commissar, or politruk, who had the authority to override unit commanders' decisions if they ran counter to the principles of the Communist Party. The Party leadership considered political control over the military absolutely necessary, as the army relied more and more on officers from the pre-revolutionary Imperial period and understandably feared a military coup. This system was abolished in 1925, as there were by that time enough trained Communist officers to render the counter-signing unnecessary.[108]

Ranks and titles

[edit]

The early Red Army abandoned the institution of a professional officer corps as a "heritage of tsarism" in the course of the Revolution. In particular, the Bolsheviks condemned the use of the word officer and used the word commander instead. The Red Army abandoned epaulettes and ranks, using purely functional titles such as "Division Commander", "Corps Commander" and similar titles.[15] Insignia for these functional titles existed, consisting of triangles, squares and rhombuses (so-called "diamonds").

In 1924 (2 October) "personal" or "service" categories were introduced, from K1 (section leader, assistant squad leader, senior rifleman, etc.) to K14 (field commander, army commander, military district commander, army commissar and equivalent). Service category insignia again consisted of triangles, squares and rhombuses, but also rectangles (1 – 3, for categories from K7 to K9).

On 22 September 1935 the Red Army abandoned service categories[clarification needed] and introduced personal ranks. These ranks, however, used a unique mix of functional titles and traditional ranks. For example, the ranks included "Lieutenant" and "Comdiv" (Комдив, Division Commander). Further complications ensued from the functional and categorical ranks for political officers (e.g., "brigade commissar", "army commissar 2nd rank"), for technical corps (e.g., "engineer 3rd rank", "division engineer"), and for administrative, medical and other non-combatant branches.

The Marshal of the Soviet Union (Маршал Советского Союза) rank was introduced on 22 September 1935. On 7 May 1940 further modifications to rationalise the system of ranks were made on the proposal by Marshal Voroshilov: the ranks of "General" and "Admiral" replaced the senior functional ranks of Combrig, Comdiv, Comcor, Comandarm in the Red Army and Flagman 1st rank etc. in the Red Navy; the other senior functional ranks ("division commissar", "division engineer", etc.) remained unaffected. The arm or service distinctions remained (e.g., general of the cavalry, marshal of armoured troops).[109][page needed] For the most part the new system restored that used by the Imperial Russian Army at the conclusion of its participation in World War I.

In early 1943 a unification of the system saw the abolition of all the remaining functional ranks. The word "officer" became officially endorsed, together with the use of epaulettes, which superseded the previous rank insignia. The ranks and insignia of 1943 did not change much until the last days of the USSR; the contemporary Russian Army uses largely the same system.

Military education

[edit]
Kursants (cadets) of the Red Army Artillery School in Chuhuyiv, Ukraine, 1933

During the Civil War the commander cadres were trained at the Nicholas General Staff Academy of the Russian Empire, which became the Frunze Military Academy in the 1920s. Senior and supreme commanders were trained at the Higher Military Academic Courses, renamed the Advanced Courses for Supreme Command in 1925. The 1931 establishment of an Operations Faculty at the Frunze Military Academy supplemented these courses. The General staff Academy was reinstated on 2 April 1936, and became the principal military school for the senior and supreme commanders of the Red Army.[110]

Purges

[edit]
Red Army Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who was executed during the Great Purge in June 1937. Here in 1920 wearing the budenovka.

According to the new data that emerged on the break of the 21st century,[111] The Vesna Case (also known as "Operation Vesna") of 1930–1931 was massive Soviet repressions targeting former officers and generals of the Russian Imperial Army who had served in the Red Army and Soviet Navy, a major purge of the Red Army preceding the Great Purge. According to over 3,000 group cases in Moscow, Leningrad and Ukraine, over 10,000 persons were convicted. In particular, in May 1931, in Leningrad alone over 1,000 persons were executed according to the so-called "Guards Case" (Russian: Гвардейское дело).[112][113]

The late 1930s saw purges of the Red Army leadership which occurred concurrently with Stalin's Great Purge of Soviet society. In 1936 and 1937, at the orders of Stalin, thousands of Red Army senior officers were dismissed from their commands. The purges had the objective of cleansing the Red Army of the "politically unreliable elements," mainly among higher-ranking officers. This inevitably provided a convenient pretext for the settling of personal vendettas or to eliminate competition by officers seeking the same command. Many army, corps, and divisional commanders were sacked: most were imprisoned or sent to labor camps; others were executed. Among the victims was the Red Army's primary military theorist, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who was perceived by Stalin as a potential political rival.[114] Officers who remained soon found all of their decisions being closely examined by political officers, even in mundane matters such as record-keeping and field training exercises.[115] An atmosphere of fear and unwillingness to take the initiative soon pervaded the Red Army; suicide rates among junior officers rose to record levels.[115] The purges significantly impaired the combat capabilities of the Red Army. Hoyt concludes "the Soviet defense system was damaged to the point of incompetence" and stresses "the fear in which high officers lived."[116] Clark says, "Stalin not only cut the heart out of the army, he also gave it brain damage."[117] Lewin identifies three serious results: the loss of experienced and well-trained senior officers; the distrust it caused among potential allies especially France; and the encouragement it gave Germany.[118][119]

Recently declassified data indicated that in 1937, at the height of the Purges, the Red Army had 114,300 officers, of whom 11,034 were dismissed. In 1938, the Red Army had 179,000 officers, 56% more than in 1937, of whom a further 6,742 were dismissed. In the highest echelons of the Red Army the Purges removed 3 of 5 marshals, 13 of 15 army generals, 8 of 9 admirals, 50 of 57 army corps generals, 154 out of 186 division generals, all 16 army commissars, and 25 of 28 army corps commissars.[120]

The result was that the Red Army officer corps in 1941 had many inexperienced senior officers. While 60% of regimental commanders had two years or more of command experience in June 1941, and almost 80% of rifle division commanders, only 20% of corps commanders, and 5% or fewer army and military district commanders, had the same level of experience.[121]

The significant growth of the Red Army during the high point of the purges may have worsened matters. In 1937, the Red Army numbered around 1.3 million, increasing to almost three times that number by June 1941. The rapid growth of the army necessitated in turn the rapid promotion of officers regardless of experience or training.[115] Junior officers were appointed to fill the ranks of the senior leadership, many of whom lacked broad experience.[115] This action in turn resulted in many openings at the lower level of the officer corps, which were filled by new graduates from the service academies. In 1937, the entire junior class of one academy was graduated a year early to fill vacancies in the Red Army.[115] Hamstrung by inexperience and fear of reprisals, many of these new officers failed to impress the large numbers of incoming draftees to the ranks; complaints of insubordination rose to the top of offenses punished in 1941,[115] and may have exacerbated instances of Red Army soldiers deserting their units during the initial phases of the German offensive of that year.[115]

By 1940, Stalin began to relent, restoring approximately one-third of previously dismissed officers to duty.[115] However, the effect of the purges would soon manifest itself in the Winter War of 1940, where Red Army forces generally performed poorly against the much smaller Finnish Army, and later during the German invasion of 1941, in which the Germans were able to rout the Soviet defenders partially due to inexperience amongst the Soviet officers.[122]

Weapons and equipment

[edit]

The Soviet Union expanded its indigenous arms industry as part of Stalin's industrialisation program in the 1920s and 1930s.[123]

See also

[edit]

Explanatory notes

[edit]

Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ ""Decree on the organization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army"". ru.wikisource.org (in Russian). Retrieved 19 December 2024.
  2. ^ Davies, Norman (5 November 2006), "How we didn't win the war ... but the Russians did", Sunday Times, London, archived from the original on 25 July 2021, retrieved 10 August 2021, Since 75%–80% of all German losses were inflicted on the Eastern Front it follows that the efforts of the western Allies accounted for only 20%–25%.
  3. ^ a b c d Кривошеев, ГФ [Krivosheev, GF], Россия и СССР в войнах XX века: потери вооруженных сил. Статистическое исследование [Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: losses of the Armed Forces. A Statistical Study] (in Russian){{citation}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link).
  4. ^ a b c "soviet casualties". encyclopedia.mil.ru. Archived from the original on 29 February 2020. Retrieved 21 February 2019.
  5. ^ a b c Erlikman, Vadim (2004), Poteri narodonaseleniia v XX veke: spravochnik (in Russian), Moscow, ISBN 5-93165-107-1{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link).
  6. ^ a b Il'Enkov, S. A. (2001). Pamyat O Millionach Pavshik Zaschitnikov Otechestva Nelzya Predavat Zabveniu Voennno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv No. 7(22) The Memory of those who Fell Defending the Fatherland Cannot be Condemned to Oblivion. Central Military Archives of the Russian Federation. pp. 73–80.
  7. ^ Lenin, Vladmir Ilich, "Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution", Collected Works, vol. 24, Marx 2 Mao, pp. 55–91, archived from the original on 26 March 2017, retrieved 29 May 2010.
  8. ^ Wollenberg, Erich, The Red Army, Marxists FR, archived from the original on 8 March 2012, retrieved 28 May 2010.
  9. ^ a b c "Appendix 1 – The Scheme for a Socialist Army", The Red Army (decree), The Council of People's Commissars, 15 January 1918, archived from the original on 21 July 2011, retrieved 28 May 2010.
  10. ^ Seventeen Moments, Soviet History, archived from the original on 27 December 2013.
  11. ^ Siegelbaum, Lewis. "1917: Red Guard into Army". Seventeen Moments in Soviet History. Archived from the original on 27 December 2013. Retrieved 21 January 2014. The Red Army's soldiers, overwhelmingly peasant in origin, received pay but more importantly, their families were guaranteed rations and assistance with farm work.
  12. ^ Shaw 1979, pp. 86–87.
  13. ^ Bonch-Bruyevich, Mikhail (1966), From Tsarist General to Red Army Commander, Vezey, Vladimir transl, Progress Publishers, p. 232.
  14. ^ Russian Center of Vexillology and Heraldry. "символы Красной Армии". www.vexillographia.ru. Vexillographia. Archived from the original on 18 June 2019. Retrieved 18 June 2019.
  15. ^ a b Erickson 1962, pp. 72–73.
  16. ^ Krasnov (in Russian), RU: FST Anitsa, archived from the original on 4 June 2008.
  17. ^ Lototskiy, SS (1971), The Soviet Army, Moscow: Progress Publishers, p. 25 cited in Scott & Scott 1979, p. 3.
  18. ^ Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923]
  19. ^ a b Overy 2004, p. 446: 'at the end of the civil war, one-third of Red Army officers were ex-Tsarist voenspetsy.'
  20. ^ Erickson 1962, pp. 31–34.
  21. ^ a b Williams 1987.
  22. ^ Williams 1987, p. 71.
  23. ^ Efimov, N (c. 1928), Grazhdanskaya Voina 1918–21 [The Civil War 1918–21] (in Russian), vol. Second, Moscow, p. 95, cited in Erickson 1962, p. 33
  24. ^ a b Suvorov, Viktor (1984), Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, New York: Macmillan.
  25. ^ Scott & Scott 1979, p. 8.
  26. ^ Read, Christopher (1996), From Tsar to Soviets, Oxford University Press, p. 137, By 1920, 77 per cent the enlisted ranks were peasants.
  27. ^ Williams 1987. 'Conscription-age (17–40) villagers hid from Red Army draft units; summary hostage executions brought the men out of hiding.'
  28. ^ a b Chamberlain 1957, p. 131.
  29. ^ Reese, Roger R. (2023). Russia's Army: A History from the Napoleonic Wars to the War in Ukraine. University of Oklahoma Press. p. 109. ISBN 978-0-8061-9356-4. Archived from the original on 22 April 2024. Retrieved 7 May 2024.
  30. ^ Figes, Orlando (1990). "The Red Army and Mass Mobilization during the Russian Civil War 1918–1920". Past & Present (129): 168–211. doi:10.1093/past/129.1.168. ISSN 0031-2746. JSTOR 650938. Archived from the original on 3 October 2023. Retrieved 7 May 2024.
  31. ^ Situating Central Asian review. Vol. 16. London; Oxford: The Central Asian Research Centre in association with the Soviet Affairs Study Group, St. Antony's College. 1968. p. 250. Retrieved 1 January 2011.
  32. ^ Khvostov, Mikhail (1995). The Russian Civil War (1): The Red Army. Men-at-arms series. Vol. 1. Osprey Publishing. pp. 15–16. ISBN 978-1855326088. Retrieved 27 October 2014. Only volunteers could join, they had to be aged between 14 and 55 and of fanatic loyalty – communists, idealistic workers and peasants, trade union members and members of the Young Comm[...]unist League (Komsomol). Chasti osobogo naznacheniya units fought in close co-operation with the Cheka and played an important part in the establishment of Soviet rule and the defeat of counter-revolution. They were always present at the most dangerous points on the battlefield, and were usually the last to withdraw. When retreat was the only option, many chonovtsi stayed behind in occupied areas to form clandestine networks and partisan detachments.[permanent dead link] Compare spetsnaz.
  33. ^ Daniels, Robert V (1993), A Documentary History of Communism in Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev, UPNE, p. 70, ISBN 978-0-87451-616-6, The Cheka Special Punitive Brigades also were charged with detecting sabotage and counter-revolution among Red Army soldiers and commanders.
  34. ^ Brovkin, Vladimire (Autumn 1990), "Workers' Unrest and the Bolsheviks' Response in 1919", Slavic Review, 49 (3): 350–373, doi:10.2307/2499983, JSTOR 2499983, S2CID 163240797.
  35. ^ Erickson 1962, pp. 38–39.
  36. ^ Volkogonov, Dmitri (1996), Shukman, Harold (ed.), Trotsky: The Eternal Revolutionary, London: HarperCollins, p. 180.
  37. ^ В. Новоселов. "Всю жизнь..." // газета "Правда" от 21 января 1986
  38. ^ Erickson 1962, p. 101.
  39. ^ Erickson 1962, pp. 102–107.
  40. ^ Compare: "Russian Civil War". Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. 2008. p. 1655. ISBN 978-1593394929. Retrieved 2 January 2018. The last White stronghold in the Crimea under Pyotr Wrangel, Denikin's successor, was defeated in November 1920 [...].
  41. ^ Erickson 1962, p. 167.
  42. ^ Habeck, Mary R (2003), Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939, Cornell University Press, ISBN 0-8014-4074-2.
  43. ^ Compare: Lauchbaum, R. Kent (2015). Synchronizing Airpower And Firepower in the Deep Battle. Pickle Partners Publishing. ISBN 978-1786256034. Retrieved 2 January 2018. Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevski stated that aerial warfare should be 'employed against targets beyond the range of infantry, artillery, and other arms. For maximum tactical effect aircraft should be employed in mass, concentrated in time and space, against targets of the highest tactical importance.'
  44. ^ "Leon Trotsky: How Stalin's Purge Beheaded the Red Army (1937)". www.marxists.org. Archived from the original on 5 April 2024. Retrieved 25 March 2024.
  45. ^ Lin, Hsiao-ting (2010), Modern China's Ethnic Frontiers: A Journey to the West, p. 58.
  46. ^ "Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact April 13, 1941: Declaration Regarding Mongolia". Yale Law School. Archived from the original on 19 August 2017. Retrieved 23 December 2014. In conformity with the spirit of the Pact on neutrality concluded on April 13, 1941, between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of Japan, in the interest of insuring peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, solemnly declare that the U.S.S.R. pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchoukuo and Japan pledges to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic.
  47. ^ Барышников, ВН; Саломаа, Э (2005). Вовлечение Финляндии во Вторую Мировую войну: Крестовый поход на Россию (in Russian). Военная Литература. Archived from the original on 6 November 2008. Retrieved 3 November 2009.
  48. ^ Ковалев, Эрик (2006). Зимняя война балтийских подводных лодок (1939–1940 гг.): Короли подплава в море червонных валетов (in Russian). Военная Литература. Archived from the original on 1 November 2022. Retrieved 3 November 2009.
  49. ^ М. Коломиец (2001). Танки в Зимней войне 1939–1940 [Фронтовая иллюстрация] (in Russian). Archived from the original on 20 July 2012. Retrieved 3 November 2009.
  50. ^ Александр Широкорад (2001). Зимняя война 1939–1940 гг. [Предыстория Зимней войны] (in Russian). Военная Литература. Archived from the original on 7 December 2019. Retrieved 3 November 2009.
  51. ^ "Expulsion of the U.S.S.R." League of Nations. 14 December 1939. Archived from the original on 24 June 2015. Retrieved 24 July 2009.
  52. ^ Bullock (1993). p. 489.
  53. ^ Glanz (1998). p. 58.
  54. ^ a b Ries (1988)
  55. ^ Edwards 2006, p. 18.
  56. ^ Edwards 2006, pp. 272–273.
  57. ^ Hitler, Adolf (1943), Mein Kampf, Boston, p. 654{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link), cited in Shirer, William L (1962), The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, London: The Reprint Society, p. 796.
  58. ^ "Was the Russian Military a Steamroller? From World War II to Today". War on the Rocks. 6 July 2016. Archived from the original on 10 April 2019. Retrieved 10 April 2019.
  59. ^ Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M. (1995). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. University Press of Kansas. pp. 301 Table C. Comparative Strengths of Combat Forces, Eastern Front, 1941–1945. ISBN 0700608990.
  60. ^ Glantz 1998, p. 15.
  61. ^ Jackson, Patrick (21 June 2011). "Barbarossa Hitler Stalin: War warnings Stalin ignored". BBC News. Retrieved 27 January 2017.
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  63. ^ Glantz 1998.
  64. ^ Glantz 1998, pp. 292–295.
  65. ^ Glantz 2005, pp. 61–62.
  66. ^ Glantz 2005, p. 181.
  67. ^ Merridale 2007, p. 157: 'Red Army soldiers who shot or injured themselves to avoid combat usually were summarily executed, to save the time and money of medical treatment and a court martial'.
  68. ^ Toppe, Alfred (1998), Night Combat, Diane, p. 28, ISBN 978-0-7881-7080-5, The Wehrmacht and the Soviet Army documented penal battalions tramplers clearing minefields; on 28 December 1942, Wehrmacht forces on the Kerch peninsula observed a Soviet penal battalion running through a minefield, detonating the mines and clearing a path for the Red Army.
  69. ^ Tolstoy 1981: 'Stalin's Directive 227, about the Nazi use of the death penalty and penal units as punishment, ordered Soviet penal battalions established.'
  70. ^ a b Tolstoy 1981.
  71. ^ The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939–1953
  72. ^ Glantz 2005, pp. 600–602.
  73. ^ a b Overmans 2000: 'It seems entirely plausible, while not provable, that one half of the missing were killed in action, the other half however in fact died in Soviet custody.'
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  83. ^ World War II The War Against Germany And Italy Archived 6 May 2017 at the Wayback Machine, US Army Center of Military History, p. 158.
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  85. ^ Helke Sander/Barbara Johr: Befreier und Befreite, Fischer, Frankfurt 2005
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The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA; : Рабоче-Крестьянская Красная армия), commonly known as the Red Army, was the primary land-based armed force of the state. Formed on 28 January 1918 by decree of the Council of People's Commissars, it safeguarded the Bolshevik government amid revolutionary upheaval and ensuing civil conflict. Initially composed of volunteer workers' militias and former personnel, it evolved under Leon Trotsky's organization into a conscript-based professional military that prioritized ideological loyalty alongside combat effectiveness. The Red Army decisively prevailed in the (1917–1922) against anti-Bolshevik White forces, foreign interventions, and peasant insurgencies, consolidating Soviet power across former Russian territories and enabling the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922. During the , it underwent rapid modernization but suffered catastrophic losses from Stalin's (1936–1938), which executed or imprisoned tens of thousands of officers, severely impairing readiness for the German invasion in 1941. In , despite initial defeats costing millions of lives, the Red Army regrouped to inflict the majority of German casualties on the Eastern Front, culminating in the capture of in May 1945 and contributing to the Allied victory over . Renamed the in February 1946 as part of postwar restructuring, the force retained its core structure until the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, enforcing communist dominance in through interventions such as those in (1956) and (1968). Its legacy includes monumental sacrifices—over 8 million military deaths in WWII alone—and defining characteristics such as , ruthless discipline, and integration of political commissars to ensure party control, though marred by internal repression, forced deportations, and widespread atrocities against civilians in occupied territories.

Formation and Early Conflicts

Bolshevik Seizure of Power and Initial Military Organization

The Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd on October 25, 1917 (Julian calendar; November 7 Gregorian), orchestrating the overthrow of the Provisional Government through the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, which mobilized Red Guard units—armed detachments of industrial workers, sailors, and sympathetic soldiers—to occupy strategic sites including the Winter Palace and telegraph stations. These Red Guards, numbering approximately 20,000-30,000 in Petrograd by late October, functioned as irregular militias without formal ranks or centralized command, relying on revolutionary enthusiasm rather than professional discipline to secure Bolshevik control amid the disintegrating Imperial Russian Army. Following the seizure, the Bolshevik leadership under initially opposed a , viewing it as a tool of bourgeois oppression, and instead expanded the into a network of local soviets' armed forces for defense against counter-revolutionary threats. However, escalating civil unrest, including uprisings by Cossack units and the dissolution of army committees, necessitated a more structured military apparatus; on January 15, 1918 (Old Style; January 28 New Style), the issued a establishing the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army as a voluntary force drawn from "the most class-conscious and organized elements of the working masses," explicitly barring "class enemies" and emphasizing ideological purity over prior military experience. Leon Trotsky, appointed People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs in March 1918, directed the initial reorganization, transitioning from decentralized Red Guard bands to a centralized by abolishing elected committees—which had undermined —and introducing compulsory , hierarchical ranks, and the integration of former Imperial officers (termed "military specialists") under political commissars to ensure loyalty. This hybrid structure, combining proletarian volunteers with conscripts mobilized from June 1918 onward, addressed the Red Army's early deficiencies in cohesion and expertise, though it remained plagued by desertions and uneven armament drawn from captured tsarist stocks. By mid-1918, the force had grown to over 300,000 personnel, laying the foundation for Bolshevik defense in the emerging Civil War.

Russian Civil War Campaigns and Strategies

The , formalized by decree on January 28, 1918, initially relied on volunteers from urban proletarian centers but shifted to compulsory in June 1918 to expand its forces amid escalating conflicts with armies. By spring 1919, its strength reached approximately one million troops, growing to three million in 1920 and five million by war's end through aggressive mobilization targeting peasant regions after the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919. This expansion incorporated former Imperial Russian officers as "military specialists" under political commissars to ensure loyalty, blending tsarist expertise with Bolshevik oversight. Under Leon Trotsky's direction as People's Commissar for War from March 1918, the Red Army adopted centralized command structures, emphasizing rapid rail transport via armored s for troop redeployment and logistical support across vast fronts. Tactics focused on , leveraging for quicker concentration of forces against divided White opponents, while political and ruthless discipline— including executions for or —curbed mutinies despite chronic shortages and high rates exceeding one million annually. Trotsky's personal oversight, often via armored , facilitated on-site adjustments, prioritizing defensive consolidation around and Petrograd before counteroffensives. On the Eastern Front, the Red Army repelled Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak's advance, recapturing on September 10, 1918, after initial losses, then driving eastward to reclaim Perm by December 1918 and Ekaterinburg by July 1919, effectively dismantling White momentum in by late 1919 through superior numbers and maneuvers. In the South, forces under commanders like defended Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad) from June 1918 to 1920 against Anton Denikin's , employing riverine defenses and local militias before launching counterattacks that halted Denikin's northward push at Orel in October 1919. The Northern Front saw successful repulsion of Nikolai Yudenich's October 1919 assault on Petrograd, with and worker militias reinforcing key positions to prevent . By 1920, strategies evolved to offensive operations, culminating in the Southern Front's victory at the Perekop Isthmus in November 1920, where concentrated and assaults breached Wrangel's fortifications, leading to the evacuation of remaining forces from . These campaigns relied on mass assaults supported by raids and limited , compensating for deficits through numerical superiority and ideological motivation, though at the cost of heavy estimated in the millions from combat, disease, and reprisals. Overall, the Red Army's success stemmed from unified political direction and adaptive tactics exploiting disunity, rather than doctrinal innovation, enabling Bolshevik consolidation by 1921.

Polish-Soviet War and Territorial Ambitions

In early 1920, following consolidation of power amid the Russian Civil War, Bolshevik leaders under Vladimir Lenin pursued aggressive expansion westward to propagate communist revolution across Europe, identifying independent Poland as the primary obstacle to linking with potential proletarian uprisings in Germany. Lenin articulated this strategic imperative, framing the conflict as an opportunity to shatter the Versailles order and ignite global upheaval, with directives emphasizing rapid advance to Warsaw as a gateway to Berlin. The Red Army's Western Front, numbering approximately 114,000 troops by mid-1920, embodied this ambition under commanders like Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who issued orders proclaiming, "Through the corpse of White Poland lies the road to worldwide conflagration." Polish forces, led by Józef Piłsudski, preemptively struck into Soviet Ukraine in April 1920, capturing on May 7 in alliance with Ukrainian nationalists, which provoked a massive Red Army counteroffensive involving over 800,000 mobilized personnel across fronts. The Southwestern Front under Alexander Yegorov recaptured by June, while Tukhachevsky's forces exploited Polish overextension, advancing 300 miles in two months to threaten by late July despite logistical strains from elongated supply lines and troop exhaustion. Soviet strategy prioritized ideological momentum over consolidation, dividing advances into divergent northern and southern thrusts that hindered coordination, as Stalin's reluctance to reinforce Tukhachevsky from the south exacerbated vulnerabilities. The decisive Battle of Warsaw unfolded from August 12 to 25, 1920, where Polish counterattacks, leveraging superior intelligence from intercepted Soviet communications and maneuvers, encircled and routed Tukhachevsky's overconfident forces, inflicting 15,000 killed, 65,000 captured, and 30,000 wounded on the Red Army against Polish losses of about 4,500 dead and 22,000 wounded. Soviet defeat stemmed from tactical errors, including underestimation of Polish resolve, poor inter-front communication, and diversion of the elite Konarmia under Budyonny to Lwów, preventing unified pressure on the capital. This reversal halted Bolshevik territorial ambitions, compelling retreat and exposing the fragility of revolutionary export reliant on military overreach rather than indigenous support, as Polish workers did not rally to Soviet calls despite propaganda promising liberation. The ensuing armistice led to the on March 18, 1921, which formalized Poland's retention of territories approximately 200 kilometers east of the , incorporating over 100,000 square kilometers of Belarusian and Ukrainian lands with populations exceeding 4 million, thereby establishing a buffer against Soviet expansion and frustrating Lenin's vision of continental . Red Army failures underscored doctrinal limitations in and , influencing later reforms, while the war's outcome preserved Polish sovereignty and temporarily contained Bolshevik , though Soviet sources later downplayed the ideological rout as mere frontier adjustment.

Interwar Development and Doctrinal Shifts

Internal Reorganization and Industrial Base Constraints

Following the , the Red Army demobilized from a peak strength of approximately 5 million personnel in to a peacetime force of around 562,000 by 1924, shifting toward a cadre-based with territorial components to conserve resources amid economic devastation. This reorganization emphasized professionalization through the expansion of officer training institutions, such as the , and the introduction of universal conscription in 1925, aiming to build a disciplined, ideologically aligned force capable of rapid mobilization. However, the system retained dual command structures, with political commissars overseeing military officers to ensure Bolshevik loyalty, which often undermined operational efficiency. Stalin's ascension and the of 1937-1938 profoundly disrupted these efforts, as purges targeted perceived disloyalty within the officer corps, resulting in the arrest of nearly two-thirds of the 1,863 general-grade officers and the execution or imprisonment of about 35,000 officers overall, including 3 of 5 marshals, 13 of 15 army commanders, and 50 of 57 corps commanders. This decimation, driven by Stalin's paranoia over potential coups rather than evidence of widespread treason, eliminated experienced leaders like and fostered an atmosphere of fear that prioritized political reliability over competence, leaving the army with inexperienced replacements and fragmented command chains. The Soviet industrial base imposed additional constraints, starting from a low baseline after years of war, famine, and underdevelopment, with pre-1928 military production limited to rudimentary small arms and few modern vehicles. The First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932) redirected resources toward , boosting tank output from 170 units annually in 1930 to over 3,000 by 1933, primarily copies of foreign designs like the British (T-26), but qualitative shortcomings persisted due to shortages of skilled labor, raw materials, and precision tooling, leading to high defect rates and mechanical unreliability. Aircraft production followed a similar trajectory, with annual output reaching several thousand by the mid-1930s via licensed models, yet the emphasis on quantity over innovation, coupled with technological isolation after the Rapallo-era German collaboration waned, left the Red Army under-equipped for mechanized warfare relative to potential adversaries. Collectivization and rapid industrialization diverted agricultural output and manpower, exacerbating inefficiencies through waste, , and reliance on forced labor, which further hampered sustainable military buildup.

Evolution of Deep Battle Doctrine Amid Ideological Constraints

The Soviet concept of deep battle, formalized as "deep operation" in military theory, emerged in the late 1920s from analyses of World War I's protracted fronts and the Russian Civil War's fluid maneuvers, emphasizing simultaneous strikes across the entire enemy depth using combined arms to achieve operational breakthroughs rather than linear attrition. Key contributions came from theorists like Vladimir Triandafillov, whose 1929 treatise The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies outlined multi-echelon offensives with aviation, armor, and infantry penetrating 100-200 kilometers into enemy territory to disrupt command and logistics. Mikhail Tukhachevsky, appointed deputy people's commissar for military and naval affairs in 1931, integrated these ideas into practical reforms, advocating for mechanized corps and air support to enable successive waves that would encircle and annihilate reserves, as detailed in his 1932 writings on the "permanent operation." This doctrine gained official endorsement in the Red Army's 1936 Provisional Field Service Regulations (PU-36), which prescribed deep penetration by shock groups supported by and to shatter enemy defenses at tactical, operational, and strategic levels, reflecting an evolution toward suited to the Soviet Union's vast and anticipated mass mobilizations. Ideological alignment with Marxist-Leninist principles reinforced its offensive orientation, viewing war as a dialectical clash where superior socialist would prevail through mass and technology, though debates persisted on balancing professional expertise with political , as seen in 1920s-1930s military journals prioritizing "" in command decisions. However, Stalinist ideology imposed constraints by subordinating doctrine to party control, mandating dual command structures with political commissars empowered to override officers on ideological grounds, which eroded initiative and fostered risk-aversion amid fears of deviation from "proletarian" methods. The of 1937-1938 exacerbated this, executing Tukhachevsky on June 12, 1937, after a fabricated , along with approximately 35,000 officers—nearly half the command cadre—including Triandafillov's successors and innovators like Georgy Isserson, whose works on deep operations were suppressed as "Trotskyite" or overly speculative. These losses, driven by Stalin's over military autonomy rather than doctrinal incompatibility, halted theoretical refinement, reverted training to static defense emphases, and prioritized numerical infantry masses over elite mechanized forces, as evidenced by the dissolution of experimental tank brigades by 1938. Post-purge, surviving loyalists like , Stalin's preferred defense commissar, diluted deep battle's emphasis on decentralized command, enforcing centralized planning that clashed with the doctrine's need for operational flexibility, while ideological campaigns against "mechanistic" worship of reinforced reliance on human waves, undermining the integration of tanks and theorized earlier. Empirical tests in limited maneuvers revealed coordination failures attributable to purged expertise, yet the doctrine's core persisted in regulations, providing a latent framework revived only after battlefield necessities overrode ideological rigidities.

Border Clashes with China and Japan

In July 1929, forces under warlord Zhang Xueliang seized Soviet interests in the in , triggering the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Red Army responded with a rapid mobilization, deploying over 150,000 troops from the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army and OGPU border units, which advanced into in August. By mid-November, Soviet forces had captured key cities including and forced Chinese withdrawal, restoring joint Soviet-Chinese control of the railway through the Khabarovsk Protocol on December 7, 1929. This operation marked one of the Red Army's first major post-Civil War deployments abroad, involving amphibious assaults and armored elements, though limited by logistical challenges in the region. Soviet casualties were reported as 143 , 4 missing, and 665 wounded. Tensions with escalated in 1938 amid disputes over border territories in the Soviet . The , from July 29 to August 11, 1938, saw Japanese and Manchukuo troops occupy the disputed Changkufeng Heights near the Soviet-Korean-Manchurian tripoint. Soviet 39th Rifle Corps, numbering around 20,000 men with artillery support, launched counteroffensives that dislodged the intruders after intense fighting in marshy terrain. The Red Army employed massed assaults and heavy bombardment, inflicting disproportionate losses despite command disruptions from Stalin's purges. Soviet forces suffered approximately 792 killed and 2,721 wounded; Japanese casualties totaled 526 killed and 913 wounded. A diplomatic settlement on August 11 compelled Japanese withdrawal, averting escalation but exposing vulnerabilities in Soviet border defenses. The Red Army's engagements peaked in the from May 11 to September 16, 1939, along the Soviet-Mongolian-Manchurian border. Japanese 23rd Division and supporting units, totaling about 75,000 troops, probed into Mongolian-claimed territory, prompting a Soviet-Mongolian response under General with roughly 57,000 personnel, 498 tanks, and 385 aircraft. Initial clashes favored due to Soviet disorganization, but Zhukov's August encirclement operation—utilizing tactics, deep penetration by armored forces, and air dominance—decimated the Japanese salient. Soviet casualties amounted to about 9,703 dead and 15,251 wounded; Japanese losses reached 17,000–18,000 dead and over 48,000 total casualties, with the 23rd Division effectively annihilated. This decisive victory halted Japanese expansion northward, influencing Tokyo's strategic pivot southward and paving the way for the April 1941 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.

Winter War Failures and Lessons

The Red Army's invasion of , launched on November 30, 1939, encountered severe operational setbacks despite overwhelming numerical superiority, with Soviet forces totaling around 600,000 troops against 's 250,000–340,000 defenders. Initial advances stalled due to inadequate preparation for conditions, where temperatures reached -40°C, causing widespread and reducing combat effectiveness; many soldiers lacked proper winter clothing and , hindering mobility in deep snow. Tactical shortcomings compounded environmental challenges, as Soviet doctrine emphasized massed infantry assaults without sufficient reconnaissance or adaptation to terrain, rendering divisions vulnerable to Finnish motti encirclements and ambushes. In the Battle of Suomussalmi (December 1939–January 1940), Finnish forces under Hjalmar Siilasvuo trapped and annihilated the Soviet 163rd and 44th Divisions, inflicting approximately 23,000–27,000 casualties while suffering fewer than 1,000, exposing deficiencies in Soviet command initiative and supply lines severed by guerrilla tactics. The recent Great Purge (1937–1938) had eliminated experienced officers, leading to hesitant leadership and poor coordination, with frontline units often committing to frontal attacks on fortified positions like the Mannerheim Line without adequate artillery or air support. Logistical failures further hampered operations, including insufficient maps, reliance on roads ill-suited for mechanized units, and overextended supply chains disrupted by Finnish sabotage, resulting in total Soviet casualties estimated at 320,000–400,000 (including killed, wounded, missing, and captured) by the war's end on March 13, 1940. In response, Soviet command under , appointed in January 1940, implemented adaptations such as concentrated artillery barrages, improved inter-arm coordination, and reinforced assaults, enabling the breach of the on February 11, 1940, after intensified bombardment. Postwar evaluations revealed systemic issues beyond doctrine, including inadequate training and political interference, prompting reforms like enhanced winter warfare drills, better equipping for cold weather, and partial restoration of officer autonomy to foster initiative. These lessons underscored the Red Army's vulnerabilities in maneuver and logistics, influencing pre-1941 reorganizations that mitigated some weaknesses ahead of the German invasion, though full implementation was limited by ongoing purges and resource constraints.

World War II Engagements

Pre-Invasion Purges and Strategic Vulnerabilities

In June 1937, initiated a sweeping of the Red Army officer corps, driven by paranoia over potential military coups following the fabricated "Tukhachevsky Affair," in which Marshal and other senior commanders were accused of treasonous plotting with foreign powers. This campaign, which continued until November 1938, resulted in the removal of approximately 35,000 officers—about 40% of the total corps—including the execution or imprisonment of three of five marshals, 13 of 15 army commanders, 57 of 67 corps commanders, and 110 of 195 division commanders. The purges targeted not only alleged conspirators but also broader categories of officers deemed unreliable, often on flimsy evidence from interrogations, decimating institutional knowledge accumulated from the and interwar conflicts. The abrupt loss of experienced leadership created acute command vacuums, filled by rapid promotions of junior officers lacking operational expertise or initiative; by mid-1941, over 75% of regimental commanders had less than two years in their roles. This inexperience manifested in rigid adherence to outdated directives, hesitation in adapting to fluid battlefield conditions, and a pervasive fear of reprisal that stifled decentralized decision-making essential for countering tactics. Stalin's ongoing distrust, amplified by the purges, further exacerbated vulnerabilities: intelligence reports of German troop buildups along the border in spring 1941 were dismissed as provocations, preventing timely mobilization or redeployment. Strategically, the Red Army's forward basing—concentrating some 2.9 million troops, 22,000 tanks, and 14,000 aircraft near the western frontiers—exposed forces to immediate without adequate depth or fortified lines, as the Stalin Line was partially dismantled in favor of an incomplete new frontier. Doctrinal emphasis on massed offensives, inherited from pre-purge theorists like Tukhachevsky but poorly implemented amid leadership gaps, left defenses ill-prepared for defensive depth or combined-arms coordination, with aviation and armor often committed piecemeal due to command paralysis. These weaknesses, rooted in the purges' erosion of competence and morale, contributed directly to the Red Army's collapse in the opening phases of on June 22, 1941, where German forces and destroyed over 4 million Soviet personnel by December.

Barbarossa and Catastrophic Early Losses

, the German-led Axis invasion of the , began on June 22, 1941, involving over 3 million German and allied troops organized into three army groups targeting Leningrad, , and Kiev respectively. Despite extensive prior intelligence from sources including the Soviet spy and British decrypts indicating a massive buildup, Stalin rejected these as British provocations or German feints to secure resources for the Western Front, maintaining the non-aggression pact's facade and prohibiting defensive preparations. This denial persisted even as German forces massed along the border, with Stalin reportedly executing officers who reported suspicious activity to avoid escalating tensions. The Great Purge of 1937–1938 had profoundly undermined Red Army readiness, eliminating around 35,000 officers through execution, imprisonment, or dismissal, which left surviving commanders inexperienced, overly reliant on political commissars for decision-making, and hesitant to deviate from rigid orders. Forward-deployed Soviet forces, numbering about 2.9 million in the western districts, lacked fortified defenses and were caught in unprepared positions, enabling German panzer groups to achieve rapid penetrations and envelopments from the outset. Stalin's initial response to the invasion was paralysis; he retreated to his near , issuing no orders for several days and briefly contemplating before resuming control under pressure from members. German Army Group Center's advance exemplified the ensuing catastrophe, reaching by June 28 and encircling the Western Front's remnants in the Bialystok-Minsk pocket, where Soviet forces suffered heavy destruction due to poor coordination and orders to counterattack without . The secured within days, destroying approximately 2,000 Soviet aircraft—largely on the ground—crippling and close support capabilities. Subsequent battles amplified losses: the in July–August trapped multiple armies, contributing to over 300,000 irrecoverable casualties, while Stalin's insistence on holding Kiev led to the September encirclement of the Southwestern Front, resulting in the capture of around 665,000 troops and the loss of vast . By late 1941, these early disasters had inflicted approximately 4.5 million Red Army casualties (killed, wounded, missing, or captured), with over 3 million personnel and 20,000 artillery pieces lost in the first five months alone, representing a near-total collapse of the frontier forces and exposing the USSR's industrial heartland. Inexperienced troops, hampered by obsolete equipment like BT-series tanks vulnerable to German anti-tank guns and a emphasizing massed assaults over maneuver, failed to inflict proportional attrition, allowing Axis forces to advance over 600 miles in places despite logistical strains. This phase underscored causal factors including purges' erosion of initiative, Stalin's misjudgment of Hitler's intentions rooted in ideological overconfidence in the pact's durability, and the Red Army's untested mobilization against a battle-hardened .

Stalingrad to Berlin: Counteroffensives and Attrition Warfare

The Red Army's , launched on November 19, 1942, marked the initiation of major counteroffensives against German forces at Stalingrad, encircling the Axis 6th Army and elements of the through pincer attacks by the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts. This operation exploited weaknesses in the extended German flanks held by Romanian and Italian units, leading to the isolation of approximately 250,000 German troops by November 23. Field Marshal surrendered on February 2, 1943, with 91,000 German soldiers captured, of whom fewer than 6,000 survived to return home due to harsh conditions and disease. Soviet casualties during the broader Stalingrad campaign exceeded 1 million, reflecting the attritional nature of the fighting, where numerical superiority and willingness to absorb losses enabled the breakthrough despite initial tactical setbacks. Following Stalingrad, the Red Army conducted a series of winter offensives in 1943, pushing German forces back across the Donets River and recapturing Kharkov by March, though these advances strained Soviet logistics and incurred heavy estimated at over 300,000 in some operations. The in July 1943 represented a defensive stand followed by counterattacks, where Soviet forces under Generals Zhukov and Rokossovsky repelled , the last major German offensive on the Eastern Front. German losses included around 200,000 and nearly 700 tanks, while Soviet reached approximately 800,000, underscoring the persistence of high loss ratios favoring German efficiency in defensive phases but overwhelmed by Soviet reserves. In 1944, , commencing June 22, exemplified the Red Army's maturing deep battle doctrine, annihilating German Army Group Center in and advancing over 300 miles to the River. This offensive destroyed 28 of 34 German divisions, inflicting about 450,000 German casualties, with Soviet losses around 750,000, achieved through coordinated frontal assaults, armored penetrations, and encirclements that leveraged superior manpower and artillery. Subsequent operations, including the Vistula-Oder Offensive in , propelled Soviet forces to the outskirts of , covering 300 miles in two weeks amid attritional and forced marches. The final Berlin Offensive, from April 16 to May 2, 1945, involved over 2.5 million Soviet troops assaulting fortified urban positions, resulting in the capture of the Reichstag and Hitler's suicide on April 30. Soviet casualties totaled approximately 274,000, including 78,000 killed, compared to German military losses of 92,000-100,000 dead and 480,000 captured, with civilian deaths estimated at 125,000. Throughout these campaigns, the Red Army's emphasized attrition, sustaining casualty ratios that improved from 5:1 Soviet-to-German in 1942-43 to nearer parity by 1945, enabled by mobilizing over 34 million personnel against Germany's 17 million, though at the cost of immense human sacrifice.

Dependence on Lend-Lease and Allied Contributions

The program extended to the shortly after the German invasion on June 22, 1941, with the first aid protocol signed on October 1, 1941, enabling shipments via Arctic convoys, the , and Pacific routes despite significant losses to U-boats and weather. By war's end, the had delivered approximately $11 billion in —equivalent to about 4 percent of total U.S. wartime production but timed to fill acute Soviet shortages in logistics and advanced components—while British Commonwealth aid added complementary supplies like aircraft and tanks. These transfers proved vital amid the Red Army's industrial disruptions from evacuations and territorial losses, sustaining operations when domestic output strained under resource constraints. Key deliveries addressed mobility deficits, with over 400,000 trucks—primarily U.S. US6 models—forming up to one-third of the Red Army's truck fleet by 1944 and enabling rapid supply lines for counteroffensives like those at Stalingrad and . Aircraft totaled around 14,000 units, including Bell P-39 Airacobras suited to Soviet tactics, supplementing domestic production and comprising roughly 10-15 percent of operational fighters and bombers during peak years. Tanks numbered about 13,000, mainly M4 Shermans and British models, which integrated into armored units despite preferences for T-34s, providing reliability in maintenance-challenged conditions.
CategoryQuantity ProvidedImpact on Red Army Operations
Trucks400,000+Enabled mechanized for deep advances post-1943, compensating for weak Soviet .
Aircraft~14,000Bolstered air support, filling gaps in high-performance models and .
Tanks~13,000Augmented armored divisions, offering superior and radios for coordination.
Food4.5 million tonsFreed agricultural resources for munitions, preventing amid strains.
Petroleum Products2.7 million tonsSupplied high-octane fuel critical for , where Soviet refining lagged.
Allied raw materials were equally indispensable: the and Britain furnished 55 percent of Soviet aluminum for production and substantial portions of and explosives precursors, without which output of tanks and planes would have halved in 1942-1943. later recounted that these assets, particularly post-Stalingrad trucks and tractors, averted "colossal" setbacks by facilitating mechanized maneuvers otherwise impossible with horse-drawn reliance. At the November 1943 , Stalin conceded the program's decisiveness, declaring, "Without the machines we received through , we would have lost the war," though postwar Soviet narratives minimized its role to emphasize self-reliance amid ideological imperatives. Empirical assessments confirm that while formed a minority of frontline weapons, its logistical backbone—evident in the Red Army's 1944-1945 operational tempo—prevented attrition stalemates and causal breakdowns in supply chains.

Commission of War Crimes and Mass Rapes

During the Red Army's offensives into Axis-held territories from 1944 to 1945, particularly in Poland, , the , and , soldiers perpetrated extensive war crimes, including summary executions of civilians suspected of collaboration, arbitrary killings of prisoners, widespread , and destruction of property beyond . These acts were fueled by a combination of for German atrocities on Soviet soil, lax , and initial Soviet portraying the advance as a crusade against fascism, which commanders like Marshal and General tolerated or encouraged in practice despite formal restraints. Eyewitness accounts from local populations and German military records document instances such as the massacre of several thousand civilians in East Prussia's Nemmersdorf area in October 1944, where Red Army units under the 3rd Belorussian Front executed non-combatants and mutilated bodies, though Soviet authorities later attributed such events to isolated excesses. The most notorious aspect involved mass rapes, affecting an estimated 1.4 to 2 million German women and girls across occupied eastern , with particularly intense violence in during the battle. In the capital alone, Soviet medical units and hospitals recorded over 100,000 cases, corroborated by clinic logs showing two million women seeking treatment for injuries, pregnancies, or venereal diseases in the following months; many victims endured repeated gang rapes, often at gunpoint, spanning ages from prepubescent girls to elderly women. Similar patterns occurred earlier in regions like and from January 1945, where advancing units of the under Marshal systematically targeted civilian women, leading to spikes in suicides—such as the 9,000 recorded in in alone—as a response to the assaults. Rapes extended beyond Germany into allied or neutral Axis territories, including and . In during the January–February 1945 siege, Red Army troops from the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts raped tens of thousands of women, with Hungarian Red Cross estimates citing 5,000 deaths from related violence or suicides; Polish accounts from the in January 1945 report comparable abuses against ethnic German and Polish civilians, often intertwined with deportations and reprisal killings. In the , reoccupation in 1944–1945 saw Red Army involvement in pogroms against suspected collaborators, including rapes and executions numbering in the thousands, though forces bore primary responsibility for systematic deportations. Soviet leadership issued directives to curb excesses, such as Stalin's January 19, 1945, order No. 006 prohibiting plunder and violence against civilians in , which mandated executions for violators and was reiterated in by Zhukov, resulting in some 4,000 courts-martial by May 1945. However, enforcement was inconsistent, undermined by frontline commanders' reluctance and Stalin's private tolerance of "" sentiments, as reflected in his reported quip to Yugoslav communists that Soviet soldiers earned such liberties after their sacrifices. Soviet narratives denied or minimized these crimes, attributing reports to Nazi , while Western archival access post-1991 confirmed the scale through declassified medical and diplomatic records.

Final Offensive Against Japan

In fulfillment of commitments made at the in February 1945, where Soviet leader pledged to enter the war against within two to three months of Nazi Germany's defeat, the prepared for an offensive in the following Germany's on May 8, 1945. The in July 1945 reaffirmed these obligations, with the Allies expecting participation to hasten 's capitulation and avoid a costly invasion of the Japanese home islands. By mid-1945, the Red Army had redeployed over 1.5 million troops, including battle-hardened units from Europe, along with approximately 5,363 tanks, 26,137 artillery pieces, and 3,721 aircraft to the , organized into three fronts: the Transbaikal Front under Marshal , the 1st Far Eastern Front under Marshal Vasily Konev, and the 2nd Far Eastern Front under General Maxim Purkayev. The Soviet declaration of war on was issued on August 8, 1945, at 2300 hours , abrogating the 1941 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and stating that the USSR would consider itself at war effective August 9. The invasion, codenamed Operation August Storm, commenced shortly thereafter on August 9, with Soviet forces crossing into Japanese-held from multiple directions, exploiting the element of strategic surprise despite Japanese intelligence anticipating an attack but underestimating its scale and timing. The Japanese , once a formidable force of nearly 700,000 men in 1939, had been severely weakened by 1945 through the transfer of elite divisions to the Pacific theater and home defense, leaving it with about 713,000 troops, many poorly trained conscripts, obsolete equipment, and limited armor—fewer than 1,000 tanks and 1,800 artillery pieces—commanded by General Otozo Yamada. Soviet forces achieved rapid penetrations: the Transbaikal Front advanced over 500 miles in eight days, capturing Mukden (Shenyang) on August 16; the 1st Far Eastern Front seized Harbin and pushed into Korea; while the 2nd Far Eastern Front, supported by amphibious operations, overran southern Sakhalin Island and the Kuril Islands by early September. The offensive concluded with the Kwantung Army's formal surrender on August 19, 1945, though isolated pockets like the Hutou Fortress resisted until August 26. Casualties reflected the asymmetry: Soviet losses totaled approximately 12,031 killed and 24,425 wounded, while Japanese forces suffered around 83,737 killed or wounded and 594,000 captured, including 148 generals, marking one of the largest surrenders in military history. The Manchurian campaign decisively contributed to Japan's decision to accept the and announce surrender on August 15, 1945, as the collapse of the eliminated any hope of a negotiated peace leveraging Soviet mediation and exposed the empire's continental defenses. Soviet advances also facilitated the occupation of northern Korea (divided at the 38th parallel with U.S. forces), , and the aforementioned islands, altering postwar territorial arrangements in despite initial Allied expectations of limited Soviet involvement.

Organizational Framework

Central Administration and Political Control

The central administration of the Red Army was established through the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs (Narkomvoenmor), formed in March 1918 under as the first People's Commissar, who directed the consolidation of disparate Red Guard units into a disciplined force amid the . The , chaired by Trotsky, handled immediate operational command, while the provided overarching authority, emphasizing centralized planning and resource allocation from . Trotsky retained leadership until January 1925, after which successors like and continued professionalization efforts, including the 1921 formation of a unified General Staff to coordinate strategy across military districts. By 1934, the commissariat evolved into the of Defense under Voroshilov, incorporating naval forces and formalizing the (Supreme High Command) for wartime direction, though pre-1935 structures relied heavily on field . Political control was embedded via a parallel hierarchy of commissars, instituted from April 1918 to safeguard Bolshevik dominance, especially over "military specialists"—former tsarist officers integrated for expertise but distrusted for potential disloyalty. Commissars, appointed as and Soviet representatives, shared full responsibility with unit commanders for political , order execution, and ideological conformity, operating under dual-command protocols that required mutual countersignature for orders. The Main Political Administration of the Red Army (GlavPUR), evolving from early organs, supervised this network, conducting pervasive , morale assessments, and to preempt dissent, with thousands of political workers embedded across regiments and divisions by the late . This apparatus intensified during the Great Terror (1937–1938), purging over 30,000 officers on grounds, which prioritized over command cohesion and contributed to administrative paralysis. Reforms in 1942 temporarily subordinated commissars to commanders for operational decisions, reflecting wartime exigencies, but restored dual authority in 1943 to reinforce Party oversight amid battlefield setbacks.

Force Structure and Mechanization Challenges

The Red Army's force structure prior to and during the early phases of was characterized by a emphasizing massed infantry, with rifle divisions as the foundational tactical unit, typically structured as triangular formations consisting of three rifle regiments, supporting artillery regiments, and ancillary units such as and engineer battalions. These divisions were grouped into rifle corps of three divisions each, which in turn formed armies under front commands, reflecting a doctrinal focus on deep operations through overwhelming numerical superiority rather than flexible maneuver. Armored elements were consolidated into mechanized corps by mid-1941, each comprising two to three tank divisions and a motorized rifle division, designed to execute rapid breakthroughs but often exceeding 1,000 tanks per corps, which strained command and logistical coordination. Rapid expansion from approximately 1.5 million personnel in 1939 to over 5 million by created acute challenges in maintaining and readiness, as many rifle divisions operated at 50-70% of authorized strength—averaging 6,000-8,000 men instead of the intended 12,000—due to insufficient trained cadres and equipment allocation amid demands. The 1937-1938 purges exacerbated these issues by decimating experienced officers, leading to improvised and diluted operational effectiveness, while the simplified force structure adopted in abandoned pre-war elaborate echelons in favor of larger but less responsive formations. Historians such as David Glantz note that this structure, while enabling vast scale, suffered from doctrinal rigidity and inadequate integration of , contributing to vulnerabilities exposed during initial German offensives. Mechanization efforts in produced a substantial inventory—over 23,000 operational by June 1941—but were undermined by imbalances in support infrastructure, with mechanized proving unwieldy due to oversized tank divisions (authorized at around 400 s each) lacking sufficient , recovery vehicles, and fuel depots for sustained operations. Technical deficiencies, including obsolete models like the BT series and early production flaws, compounded maintenance challenges, as purges targeted engineering specialists and industrial prioritization favored quantity over quality or logistical enablers. The Red Army's overall motorization rate remained critically low, with truck holdings insufficient for a force of its scale—estimated at under 300,000 vehicles against needs for millions of tons of supplies—resulting in 80-90% reliance on horse-drawn for , , and divisional , particularly in units where vast distances and poor road networks amplified vulnerabilities. This dependence, involving up to 3.5 million horses across the army, limited operational tempo to 5-6 kilometers per day in non-mechanized sectors and hindered refueling for units, as evidenced by stalled advances in pre-war exercises and early war retreats. Soviet planners' emphasis on output over production, coupled with resource constraints from the Five-Year Plans, created systemic bottlenecks that persisted until mid-war reforms, underscoring causal links between centralized economic directives and battlefield immobility.

Equipment Procurement and Technological Gaps

The Red Army's equipment procurement operated through a centralized system of state-controlled factories managed by specialized People's Commissariats for the defense industry, which issued contracts to produce weapons and for military needs. Following the German invasion on June 22, 1941, the assumed direct oversight of production priorities, coordinating the evacuation of over 1,500 factories eastward to evade occupation and maintain output despite initial disruptions from lost industrial capacity in . This system emphasized of standardized designs under pre-war five-year plans, but chronic issues with and persisted, often prioritizing quantity over reliability. Technological gaps were evident in the composition of forces on the eve of . The Red Army fielded 23,106 tanks, including 12,782 in western districts, but only a fraction—such as the newly produced 1,503 and KV-1 models—represented modern designs; the bulk comprised obsolete light tanks like the and BT series, plagued by spare parts shortages and mechanical unreliability. Aircraft inventories totaled 20,978, with 13,211 combat-ready, yet merely 20% qualified as modern fighters like the MiG-3 or Yak-1, while most were outdated I-15 biplanes or I-16 monoplanes vulnerable to superior German models.
Equipment CategoryTotal Inventory (June 1941)Key Deficiencies
Tanks23,106Majority obsolete (, BT); spare parts shortages; limited radios for coordination
Aircraft20,978Only 20% modern; engine underperformance; fuel quality issues
Motor Vehicles~500,000 (short 314,200 of requirement)Insufficient trucks for ; <200,000 produced domestically throughout war
These shortcomings extended to ancillary technologies, including sparse radio communications—most tanks lacked sets, relying on flags or messengers—and inadequate anti-tank weaponry, exacerbating vulnerabilities against German tactics. Design and manufacturing flaws, such as unreliable engines and frequent accidents, stemmed from rushed development and purges that depleted engineering expertise, hindering innovation in areas like powerplants and precision optics. Early war losses compounded these gaps, with vast equipment destruction during retreats necessitating improvised measures and exposing systemic lags in Soviet industrial adaptability compared to adversaries.

Personnel and Human Elements

Conscription Policies and Demographic Strain

The Universal Compulsory Law of , established the framework for Red Army by requiring all male Soviet citizens aged 19 to 50 to register for service, with active-duty terms of two years for the army and (including ) and three years for the . Exemptions were limited to those deemed physically unfit or essential for critical civilian roles, though enforcement prioritized ideological reliability and class background in early implementations. Reserves underwent periodic training from age 18, enabling rapid expansion upon . The German invasion on June 22, 1941, triggered an immediate escalation, with the Soviet government invoking emergency decrees to conscript from all eligible cohorts, including lowering the active call-up age to 18 in some cases and mobilizing older reservists up to age 50. By February 1942, Joseph Stalin's Order No. 227 further intensified recruitment, mandating the conscription of additional millions and prohibiting retreats or unauthorized absences under penalty of execution or penal battalions. This resulted in the mobilization of over 30 million personnel by war's end, representing roughly one-fifth of the pre-war Soviet population of approximately 170 million, with men comprising the vast majority despite limited female enlistment in combat roles. Conscription mechanisms relied on local military commissariats, which coordinated with internal security organs to enforce quotas amid widespread evasion attempts, often met with harsh reprisals including family deportations. The scale of conscription inflicted profound demographic strain, as military fatalities alone reached 8.6 to 11.5 million, compounded by millions more wounded, captured, or missing, yielding total human losses of 26 to 27 million or about 14% of the population. This attrition disproportionately affected prime-age males, with certain birth cohorts—such as those born in 1923—suffering up to 80% non-survival rates due to combat exposure. The resulting sex-ratio imbalances, with females outnumbering males by ratios exceeding 2:1 in some rural regions by 1946, depressed marriage and fertility rates, elevated out-of-wedlock births and abortions, and contributed to long-term population deficits estimated at several million. Economically, mass depleted the labor pool, particularly in where men formed the backbone, leading to reduced harvests, increased reliance on forced labor from deportees and prisoners, and heightened vulnerability to in occupied or rear areas. By late 1944, manpower shortages forced the Red Army to integrate undertrained recruits and ethnic minorities from peripheral republics, while reserves dwindled to the point of near exhaustion, compelling tactical shifts toward conserving personnel in final offensives. , the strain manifested in delayed demographic recovery, with elevated male mortality persisting into the and skewing Soviet society's age and gender structure for decades.

Rank Structure, Training, and Commissar Influence

The Red Army initially operated without formal ranks from its formation in 1918, relying on functional titles such as "platoon commander" or "regiment commander" to denote responsibilities, reflecting Bolshevik egalitarian ideals that rejected tsarist hierarchies. This system proved inadequate for discipline and organization during the Russian Civil War, leading to the introduction of personal ranks on September 22, 1935, via orders 2590 and 2591, which established a hierarchy from junior lieutenant to marshal of the Soviet Union, including specialized ranks for political commissars parallel to military ones. During World War II, ranks evolved further; in 1940, general officer ranks were formalized, and by 1943, epaulettes were reintroduced with adjusted insignia, such as collar and sleeve markings for enlisted and NCOs from 1941-1943, to enhance professionalism amid heavy losses. Military training in the Red Army emphasized ideological alongside basic skills, but practical was often curtailed by rapid mobilization and resource shortages, particularly after the 1941 German invasion. Regulations mandated six months of for riflemen in training regiments, covering marksmanship, tactics, and physical conditioning, yet many conscripts received far less—sometimes weeks or none—due to frontline urgency, resulting in high initial casualties from poor tactical proficiency. Pre-war doctrine prioritized offensive operations, with exercises focusing on mass assaults and deep battle concepts, but the decimated experienced instructors, and wartime realities forced ad hoc adaptations, including reliance on penal units for high-risk tasks; by 1943, training quality improved modestly through captured German methods and veteran mentoring, though systemic flaws persisted. Political commissars, instituted in 1918 as representatives of Soviet power, wielded significant influence over Red Army operations to ensure ideological loyalty and prevent activity, often holding veto power over commanders' decisions in a dual-command structure that prioritized party control over military expertise. This system, rooted in Civil War necessities, fostered paranoia and hesitation, as commissars focused on , political education, and monitoring for disloyalty rather than tactical input, contributing to command inefficiencies evident in 1941 disasters. Reforms in shifted toward one-man command, subordinating commissars as deputies; by October 9, 1942, Stalin's decree abolished the commissar institution entirely, merging their roles into military deputies with ranks, to streamline decision-making and boost initiative amid mounting defeats, though political oversight continued via reduced and party mechanisms. These changes reflected causal recognition that ideological interference hampered operational effectiveness, yet residual political influence perpetuated morale issues and executions for perceived failures.

Great Terror's Decimation of Leadership

The Great Terror of 1937–1938, orchestrated by through the , extended to the Red Army's command structure, resulting in the removal of experienced officers on accusations of disloyalty, , or espionage. In June 1937, personally authorized an extensive of military personnel, which continued until November 1938 and systematically dismantled the officer corps perceived as a potential threat to his absolute control. This campaign discharged approximately 35,000 army leaders from their ranks, with tens of thousands more arrested and several thousand executed by firing squad or in camps. The purge disproportionately affected higher echelons, where competence and prior Civil War experience intersected with political vulnerability. Of the 1,863 officers holding general-grade ranks in 1936, nearly two-thirds were arrested within two years, with almost half of those executed. Prominent victims included Marshal , deputy of defense and architect of deep battle , executed on June 12, 1937, after a secret trial alleging conspiracy with —a charge fabricated by interrogators using coerced confessions. Other high-profile losses encompassed army commanders, corps leaders, and division heads, leaving voids filled by rapid promotions of juniors lacking operational expertise or by overseers prioritizing ideological conformity over tactical acumen. This decimation eroded the Red Army's institutional knowledge and initiative, as surviving officers adopted risk-averse behaviors to avoid purge accusations, stifling doctrinal innovation and training efficacy. Quantitative analyses indicate the purges targeted not only elites but mid-level cadres, amplifying command disruptions across units and contributing to operational failures in subsequent conflicts like the 1939 clashes and the . While some historians, drawing on declassified Soviet archives, argue the overall officer loss represented 3.7–7.7% of total strength and that pre-purge loyalty issues justified selective removals, the scale nonetheless impaired readiness against imminent threats, as evidenced by the army's disorganized response to the 1941 German invasion. The policy reflected Stalin's causal prioritization of personal power over military professionalism, yielding a leadership vacuum that persisted until wartime necessities forced partial rehabilitation of purged doctrines.

Morale, Desertions, and Penal Units

Morale in the Red Army during the early phases of the German invasion in was severely undermined by the shock of rapid defeats, leadership decimation from the , inadequate training, and logistical failures, leading to widespread panic and unauthorized retreats. By mid-1942, these issues culminated in extensive desertions, with reports documenting over 600,000 arrests for desertion and related offenses in the first year of the war alone, though many cases involved temporary absences amid chaos rather than outright cowardice. The scale reflected not only fear of the but also distrust in command structures compromised by Stalin's purges, which had eliminated experienced officers and fostered a culture of suspicion enforced by political commissars. In response to collapsing front lines during the German summer offensive of 1942, issued on July 28, 1942, famously declaring "Not a step back!" to halt s and enforce discipline through draconian measures, including the formation of blocking detachments composed of troops and reliable Red Army units positioned behind wavering formations to shoot retreaters on sight. These detachments, numbering up to 200 men each and expanded to nearly 200 across fronts by late 1942, executed thousands—contributing to approximately 158,000 total Red Army executions for , , or panic-mongering over the course of the —while returning many others to the front under threat. Though controversial, the order's coercive mechanisms, including family punishments under earlier directives like , stiffened resistance by prioritizing survival through compliance over voluntary zeal, with blocking units proving effective in key sectors like Stalingrad by preventing routs without widespread mutiny. Penal units, or shtrafbats (penal battalions), were formalized under as repositories for deserters, convicts, and minor offenders, comprising 1-3 battalions per front command and staffed by those sentenced by military tribunals for crimes such as or self-inflicted wounds. From 1942 to 1945, roughly 422,700 personnel were funneled into these units, which were deployed in high-casualty assault roles—such as clearing minefields or leading charges—without adequate equipment or officer protections, resulting in extraordinarily high attrition; for instance, penal formations suffered 170,298 losses (killed, wounded, or sick) in alone among permanent staff. Service in shtrafbats offered a path to redemption through combat merit, allowing survivors to return to regular units after fulfilling "blood debt" quotas, but the system's reliance on expendable convict labor underscored the regime's prioritization of manpower quantity over individual welfare, with mortality rates often exceeding 50% per engagement due to their sacrificial positioning. The tide turned decisively after the Red Army's victory at Stalingrad in February 1943, which not only halted the German advance but also engendered a surge in morale through tangible proof of Soviet resilience and German vulnerability, fostering greater unit cohesion and offensive initiative in subsequent operations like the Battle of Kursk. This shift was reinforced by propaganda emphasizing patriotic defense of the Motherland—shifting from class-war rhetoric—and material incentives like improved rations, though underlying coercion persisted; desertion rates plummeted as successes bred confidence, with soldiers increasingly motivated by revenge for occupied territories and the existential stakes of total war, enabling the Red Army to sustain massive offensives despite ongoing purges and hardships. By 1944-45, morale had stabilized sufficiently for voluntary enlistments and low-desertion advances into Eastern Europe, reflecting a pragmatic blend of ideological indoctrination, battlefield vindication, and unrelenting state terror.

Assessments and Legacy

Key Military Achievements and Overstated Narratives

The Red Army achieved its most significant military successes during the Eastern Front campaign of , inflicting the majority of German casualties and ultimately capturing . From 1941 to 1945, Soviet forces halted the Wehrmacht's advance at the in December 1941, preventing the fall of the Soviet capital despite initial setbacks. The turning point came at the from August 23, 1942, to February 2, 1943, where encirclement operations destroyed Germany's Sixth Army, resulting in approximately 500,000 Axis casualties, including 91,000 prisoners, and shifting momentum to the Soviets. Further victories included the from July 5 to August 23, 1943, the largest armored engagement in history, where defensive preparations and counteroffensives inflicted around 50,000 German casualties against Soviet losses of nearly 200,000, securing strategic initiative for subsequent advances. In 1944, Operation Bagration from June 22 to August 19 devastated German Army Group Center, liberating Belarus and inflicting over 400,000 German casualties—exceeding losses at Stalingrad—while advancing hundreds of kilometers toward Poland, with Soviet forces suffering about 180,000 killed or missing and over 500,000 wounded. These operations contributed to the Red Army's role in destroying roughly 70 percent of German field forces on the Eastern Front, capturing 3 million Axis prisoners, and enabling the final push to Berlin in April–May 1945, where hoisting the Victory Banner over the Reichstag symbolized Nazi Germany's capitulation on May 8. Soviet historiography and propaganda, however, frequently overstated these achievements by portraying the Red Army as tactically and doctrinally superior from the outset, downplaying reliance on numerical superiority, territorial depth, and . Early defeats, such as the loss of vast territories in 1941–1942, stemmed from doctrinal rigidities and the Great Purges' of officer corps, with victories often achieved through massed infantry assaults absorbing disproportionate losses—official figures record 8.6 million Red Army military deaths against 4–5 million German ones on the Eastern Front. Narratives minimized Allied contributions, including supplies that provided over 400,000 trucks and jeeps for mobility, 14,000 aircraft, one-third of Soviet explosives, and substantial food aiding civilian and military sustenance, which Soviet leaders like Khrushchev later acknowledged as critical to sustaining the war effort. Postwar Soviet accounts, biased toward ideological glorification and state control over information, exaggerated independent prowess while ignoring how Western fronts, , and resource diversion weakened , enabling Soviet breakthroughs. Independent analyses emphasize that while operational adaptations like deep battle doctrine emerged by 1943, initial successes relied more on overwhelming manpower—drawing from a base larger than 's—and industrial relocation east of the Urals, rather than innate military excellence. This pattern of overstatement persists in some modern Russian narratives, contrasting with of inefficiencies, such as penal battalions and high rates underscoring morale issues.

Doctrinal Flaws, Inefficiencies, and Ideological Handicaps

The Red Army's , shaped in the , placed disproportionate emphasis on offensive operations rooted in Marxist-Leninist , which viewed war as an instrument of class struggle favoring aggressive proletarian advances over defensive postures. This bias neglected comprehensive defensive training and fortifications, as Soviet theorists like prioritized "deep battle" concepts that assumed rapid breakthroughs without adequate contingency for prolonged enemy offensives. Consequently, in June 1941 during , forward-deployed Soviet forces, unprepared for mobile defense, suffered massive encirclements, losing over 4 million personnel in the first six months due to doctrinal rigidity and overextended supply lines. Ideological handicaps compounded these doctrinal shortcomings through the system, reinstated on May 10, 1937, amid the to enforce party loyalty. Commissars held co-equal authority with commanders, requiring dual approval for orders, which often paralyzed decision-making and discouraged tactical initiative out of fear of political reprisal. This structure prioritized ideological reliability—ensuring troops' adherence to communist principles—over professional expertise, leading to hesitancy in fluid combat situations and contributing to operational inefficiencies, such as delayed retreats or uncoordinated maneuvers observed in the 1939-1940 against , where Soviet forces incurred approximately 126,000 deaths against a far smaller adversary due to inflexible assault tactics ill-suited to forested terrain. Systemic inefficiencies further stemmed from centralized command hierarchies that suppressed decentralized problem-solving, as ideological oversight fostered a risk-averse corps more concerned with avoiding accusations of disloyalty than innovating under pressure. The abolition of mandatory veto power in October 1942, restoring unified command, acknowledged these defects but came after initial war losses exceeding 5 million, highlighting how political interference had eroded the army's adaptability and exacerbated logistical and coordination failures in early campaigns.

Enormous Casualties and Economic Toll

The Red Army suffered approximately 8.7 million military fatalities during World War II, encompassing deaths from combat, wounds, disease, and captivity. These losses stemmed primarily from the Eastern Front campaigns against Nazi Germany, where brutal attrition warfare, inadequate medical support, and high-risk offensive doctrines amplified mortality rates. In parallel, around 15 million soldiers were wounded or fell ill, with many incurring lifelong disabilities that strained postwar healthcare and labor resources. Over 5.7 million Red Army personnel were captured as prisoners of by Axis forces, of whom approximately 3.3 million perished in captivity from systematic starvation, exposure, forced labor, and executions—representing one of the highest POW mortality rates in modern . These figures, drawn from declassified Soviet archives analyzed by military G. F. Krivosheev, account for roughly a quarter of the 34 million personnel mobilized into the Red Army between 1941 and 1945, underscoring the demographic devastation that left entire generations depleted. Total non-fatal casualties pushed aggregate losses to nearly 30 million, equivalent to sustained frontline strengths eroded multiple times over. The economic consequences compounded this human tragedy, obliterating and across occupied territories comprising about 40% of Soviet farmland and industry. More than 1,710 cities and towns, 70,000 villages, and 32,000 factories were destroyed or razed, alongside 6 million residential buildings and 98,000 collective farms, rendering millions homeless and halting agricultural output. This devastation equated to roughly one-third of the USSR's prewar national wealth, with contracting sharply—industrial output fell by over 50% in 1942 alone due to occupation, evacuations, and resource diversion to war production. The loss of skilled labor from casualties and deportations, coupled with and , imposed long-term burdens, delaying civilian recovery until the late 1940s despite forced relocations of 1,500 factories eastward and Allied aid. Reparations extracted from and mitigated some costs but could not fully offset the systemic strain on an already centralized .

Postwar Dissolution and Historiographical Debates

On 25 February 1946, the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was renamed the by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, marking the formal end of its identity as a revolutionary force and its transition to a national military institution under Stalin's direction. This administrative change coincided with broader postwar reorganization, including the integration into the unified alongside the and , emphasizing centralized control and preparation for emerging geopolitical tensions. Demobilization commenced on 23 June 1945, with mass releases beginning 5 July 1945 and continuing through 1948, reducing personnel from over 11 million to approximately 2.8 million by the latter year to alleviate economic strain while retaining a substantial force for occupation duties in and potential conflict with the West. Stalin's postwar reforms preserved the army's mass-mobilization structure, prioritizing quantity over qualitative modernization amid resource shortages and the onset of the , with limited investment in until the late 1940s. The maintained ideological oversight through political commissars and units, while officer corps stability improved post-purge but remained subordinate to party control, reflecting Stalin's distrust of military autonomy. Demobilized veterans faced reintegration challenges, including urban overcrowding and rural labor shortages, often compelled into reconstruction efforts, which underscored the regime's utilitarian view of over welfare. Historiographical debates center on the Red Army's effectiveness, with Soviet-era narratives, propagated by state-controlled archives, attributing victory solely to ideological resolve and Stalin's genius while minimizing external aid like , which supplied 400,000 trucks enabling operational mobility. Western and post- Russian scholars, drawing on declassified data, highlight doctrinal rigidities, purge-induced leadership voids (eliminating 35,000 officers in 1937-1938), and punitive tactics—such as Order No. 227's "Not a Step Back" policy—as causal factors in irretrievable losses estimated at 8.7 million , far exceeding Allied figures due to human-wave assaults and inadequate training. These analyses, often skeptical of Moscow's underreported totals, argue that while the Eastern Front inflicted 75-80% of German casualties, success stemmed from industrial relocation, numerical superiority (fielding 6.5 million by 1945), and attrition rather than tactical innovation, challenging glorified accounts that ignore Allied second-front diversions. Russian since 1991 has oscillated between patriotic revivalism and critical reevaluations, but institutional biases persist in downplaying Stalinist inefficiencies to sustain national myth-making.

References

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