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Third Transjordan attack

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Third Transjordan attack

The Third Transjordan attack by Chaytor's Force, part of the British Empire's Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF), took place between 21 and 25 September 1918, against the Ottoman Empire's Fourth Army and other Yildirim Army Group units. These operations took place during the Battle of Nablus, part of the Battle of Megiddo which began on 19 September in the final months of the Sinai and Palestine campaign of World War I. Fought on the right flank and subsidiary to the Battle of Nablus, the Third Transjordan attack began northwards, with the assault on Kh Fasail. The following day a section of Chaytor's Force, attacked and captured the Ottoman Empire's 53rd Division (Seventh Army) on the main eastwards line of retreat out of the Judean Hills across the Jordan River. Retreating columns of the Yildirim Army Group were attacked during the battle for the Jisr ed Damieh bridge, and several fords to the south were also captured, closing this line of retreat. Leaving detachments to hold the captured bridge and fords, Chaytor's Force began their eastwards advance by attacking and capturing the Fourth Army garrison at Shunet Nimrin on their way to capture Es Salt for a third time. With the Fourth Army's VIII Corps in retreat, Chaytor's Force continued their advance to attack and capture Amman on 25 September during the Second Battle of Amman. Several days later, to the south of Amman, the Fourth Army's II Corps which had garrisoned the southern Hejaz Railway, surrendered to Chaytor's Force at Ziza, effectively ending military operations in the area.

The British Empire victories during the Third Transjordan attack resulted in the occupation of many miles of Ottoman territory and the capture of the equivalent of one Ottoman corps. Meanwhile, the remnants of the Fourth Army were forced to retreat in disarray north to Damascus, along with the remnants of the Seventh and Eighth Armies after the EEF victories during the Battle of Sharon and Battle of Nablus. Fighting extended from the Mediterranean Sea during these seven days of battle, resulting in the capture of many thousands of prisoners, and extensive territory. After several days pursuing remnant columns, Desert Mounted Corps captured Damascus on 1 October. The surviving remnants of Yildirim Army Group which escaped Damascus were pursued north during the Pursuit to Haritan when Homs was occupied and Aleppo was captured by Prince Feisal's Sherifial Army Force. Soon after, on 30 October, the Armistice of Mudros was signed between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire, ending the Sinai and Palestine campaign.

Following the victory at the Battle of Jerusalem at the end of 1917, and the Capture of Jericho in February 1918, the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) crossed the Jordan River, establishing bridgeheads in March prior to the First Transjordan attack on Amman. These bridgeheads remained after the Second Transjordan attacks on Shunet Nimrin and Es Salt when a second withdrawal back to the Jordan Valley took place from 3 to 5 May. This marked the end of major operations in the area until September 1918. General Edmund Allenby, the commander of the EEF, decided to occupy the Jordan Valley during the summer of 1918 for a number of reasons. A retreat out of the valley would further enhance the morale of the German and Ottoman forces, and their standing among the peoples living in the region, following their two Transjordan victories. So important did Allenby consider the support of the Hedjaz Arabs to the defence of his right flank, that they were substantially subsidised:

I think we shall manage the subsidy required as well as the extra £50,000 you require for Northern Operations ... I am urging for another £500,000 additional to the £400,000 en route from Australia and I am sure you will do what you can, through the WO to represent the importance of not risking a delay again in the payment of our Arab subsidy.

— General Reginald Wingate to Allenby on 5 July 1918

The road from the Hedjaz railway station at Amman to Shunet Nimrin remained a serious threat to the occupation of the Jordan Valley, as a large German and Ottoman force could quickly be moved along this line of communication from Amman to Shunet Nimrin, from where they could mount a major attack into the Jordan Valley. As Allenby explains,

I am not strong enough to make holding attacks on both flanks, and the Turks can transfer their reserves from flank to flank as required. The Turks have more of these, the VII Army have 2400, and the VIII Army 5800 in Reserve. I must maintain my hold on the bridges of the Jordan, and my control of the Dead Sea. This will cause the Turks to keep a considerable force watching me, and ease pressure on Feisal and his forces. It is absolutely essential to me that he should continue to be active. He is a sensible, well–informed man; and he is fully alive to the limitations imposed on me. I keep in close touch with him, through Lawrence. I have now in the valley two Mounted Divisions and an Indian Infantry Brigade. I cannot lessen this number yet.

— Allenby letter to Wilson 5 June 1918

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