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Turkish Identification Number
Turkish Identification Number
Turkish Identification Number
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Turkish Identification Number (Turkish: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Kimlik Numarası or abbreviated as T.C. Kimlik No.) is a unique personal identification number that is assigned to every citizen of Turkey.

Foreigners residing in Turkey at least six months for any purpose receive a Foreigner Identification Number, which is different from the Turkish Identification Number.[1]

Purpose

[edit]

The purpose of identification number's introduction is to resolve the problems that arise by same names of different citizens and to speed up the information transfer between the public institutions. With the identification number, services like taxation, security, voting, education, social security, health care, military recruitment, banking and many others can be carried out more quickly, rationally and reliably.[2]

History

[edit]

The Turkish Identification Number was introduced on October 28, 2000 in conjunction with the Act No. 3080, which amended the initial Population Registration Act No. 1587,[3] and applied to all citizens born after 1840, dead or alive around 120 million people at that time. It was issued by the 923 registration offices at district level across the country.[2]

From January 1, 2003 on, all public institutions integrated the personal identification number in their certificates and documents like identity card, passport, international family book, driving license, form and manifesto they issue to citizens. The Identity Card Serial Number formerly in use was not needed any more and so cancelled.[3]

MERNİS Project

[edit]

Turkish Identification Number was developed and put in service in context of a project called Central Registration Administration System (Turkish: Merkezi Nüfus İdaresi Sistemi, abbreviated as MERNİS),[2]

The idea for the project was born in 1972 after the Population Registration Law was enacted. Following infrastructural works done by the State Planning Organization and later by the Middle East Technical University, the World Bank financially supported the project in 1996 with credit.[4]

The cost of the project amounted to US$35 million. Personal data of 70 million Turkish citizens, 5 million Turks living abroad and 24 million dead were recorded in a databank with the help of the personal identification number using a special software that was developed for US$400,000. Moreover, 23 million records of married, divorced and naturalized people were added giving identification number.[5]

After accomplishment of the initial issue of the personal identification number, it is being given only to newborns and naturalized people.[2]

The MERNİS database is in online service since the end of November 2002, however not fully open to the public for secrecy of private data.[4] However leaked copies of the database have surfaced following a security breach by staff who sold copies on DVD in 2010,[6] and which became widely available on the internet via peer-to-peer file sharing services in early 2016.[7]

Identification number

[edit]

The identification number is a unique 11-digit number given by the MERNİS computer on the basis of the citizen's registration record that is kept by the registration office. The number does not reflect any personal information about the citizen. It is not possible to change the identification number once applied.[2]

Query of the identification number

[edit]

The identification number can be obtained by the registration offices or online at internet via the Ministry of Interior's portal.[8]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Turkish Identification Number

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Turkish Identification Number, known as T.C. Kimlik Numarası, is a unique 11-digit identifier automatically assigned to every Turkish citizen upon registration in the national population database managed by the Merkezi Nüfus İdaresi Sistemi (MERNİS), Turkey's centralized system. This number, introduced on 28 October 2000 to replace less efficient prior methods and address issues like duplicate names among citizens, serves as the foundational personal code for all official interactions with state institutions. Structurally, it consists of nine leading digits forming a sequential registration code—without a —followed by two trailing check digits computed via a specific applied to the initial nine to verify and detect transcription errors. Beyond basic identification on documents like the Republic of Turkey Identity Card (T.C. Kimlik Kartı), the number integrates across government databases for streamlined verification in areas such as taxation (where it doubles as the Tax Identification Number, or TIN, per legal mandate), social security, healthcare, banking, and electoral processes. Its design embeds no direct personal data like birth date or gender, prioritizing uniqueness and computational validation over encoded attributes to support secure, high-volume data handling in Turkey's population of over 85 million. Foreign residents receive a separate 10-digit foreign ID number, underscoring the T.C. Kimlik Numarası's exclusivity to citizens.

Introduction and Objectives

The Turkish Identification Number, designated as the T.C. Kimlik Numarası, constitutes an 11-digit unique identifier mandated for all Turkish citizens, generated and assigned through the Central Civil Registration System (MERNİS) based on an individual's registration record. This number is allocated at the point of birth registration for offspring of at least one Turkish citizen parent, irrespective of birthplace, or upon completion of naturalization procedures granting citizenship. As a permanent and non-transferable code, it encapsulates core personal data linkage from inception, enabling comprehensive tracking of civil status changes throughout life. The system's core objectives center on establishing a centralized, digitized framework for population management that supplants fragmented, paper-based records prone to inconsistencies. By assigning a singular, algorithmically verified identifier, MERNİS seeks to eradicate duplicate registrations, standardize inter-institutional data exchanges, and integrate disparate government databases covering taxation, healthcare provisioning, social security entitlements, and voter authentication. This architecture supports real-time verification and between public and private entities, minimizing reliance on redundant documentation. In pursuit of administrative efficacy, the identifier addresses vulnerabilities in prior name-centric systems, such as identity conflation from homonyms, thereby curtailing opportunities for fraudulent claims in service access and resource allocation. Its deployment has demonstrably expedited procedural workflows—facilitating identity confirmation, bolstering oversight in fiscal and welfare distributions, and curtailing informal economic activities—while fostering a unified informational ecosystem that enhances governance precision without compromising individual record integrity. The Turkish Identification Number, known as T.C. Kimlik Numarası, derives its foundational legal authority from Law No. 3080, enacted on October 28, 2000, which amended the pre-existing Population Law No. 1587 to establish a unique 11-digit identification system assigned to every Turkish citizen, regardless of birth date or status. This amendment mandated the replacement of prior numbering systems with the T.C. Kimlik Numarası in official records, ensuring universal applicability to approximately 120 million registrations covering citizens born after 1840. Subsequent codification in Law No. 5490 on Population Services, effective from June 29, 2006, reinforced this framework by requiring automatic assignment upon birth registration or citizenship acquisition, with the number remaining unique and unchangeable for life. Mandatory usage is explicitly stipulated in Article 47(1) of Law No. 5490, which demands inclusion of the T.C. Kimlik Numarası on all forms, declarations, identity cards, documents, and other records issued in an individual's name, rendering it indispensable for official transactions such as administrative filings, contracts, and public service applications. For Turkish citizens, this number doubles as the Tax Identification Number (TIN) under domestic tax regulations, with automatic linkage eliminating separate issuance and imposing a legal duty to furnish it for fiscal obligations, including income declarations and business registrations. Non-citizens, such as residents or entities, may receive equivalent numbers but lack this automatic integration. Enforcement relies on administrative and penal measures outlined in Law No. 5490, where failure to comply with registration duties or accurate documentation incurs graded fines starting from 51 TL for minor delays up to thousands for deliberate omissions or falsifications, escalating for repeat offenses. In tax contexts, omitting the TIN-equivalent can trigger substantial penalties under revenue laws, potentially blocking transactions or imposing surcharges. Misuse, including unauthorized disclosure or fabrication, attracts criminal liability under Articles 135-136 of the Turkish Penal Code for unlawful personal data handling, with imprisonment risks up to several years in severe cases, alongside civil sanctions from the Personal Data Protection Authority for excessive processing beyond necessity. These mechanisms ensure enforceability, prioritizing the number's role in preventing duplication and fraud while upholding data minimization principles in lawful contexts.

Historical Development

Pre-Digital Registration Systems

In the Ottoman Empire, civil registration practices originated with the introduction of nüfus defterleri (population registers) starting in 1831, which documented vital events including births, marriages, deaths, and migrations at the local administrative level. These manual ledgers, supplemented by identification documents such as the Tezkere-i Osmaniye issued from 1863, recorded personal identifiers like full name, age, birthplace, religion, and family ties, serving as the basis for administrative and military conscription purposes. Formal census legislation in 1875 and 1884 institutionalized this framework, mandating population registers at the district (kaza) level to track household compositions and enable rudimentary civil status verification. Upon the Republic of Turkey's establishment in 1923, the Ottoman registration infrastructure persisted, with nüfus defterleri evolving into family-based record books (soy kütüğü) maintained by local population directorates (nüfus müdürlükleri). These paper records centralized household data under the paternal head, relying on descriptive attributes—such as given name, father's name, mother's name, birth date, and village of origin—for individual identification, without a standardized unique code. Updates occurred through manual entries during life events, with extracts (nüfus kayıt örneği) issued for official transactions like military service. The system's decentralized, analog format faced mounting pressures from Turkey's demographic expansion, with population rising from 13.6 million in the 1927 census to 67.8 million by 2000, alongside urbanization that shifted residents from 24.2% urban in 1950 to 64.9% by 2000. Local registries struggled with inter-jurisdictional coordination for migrants, fostering duplicate entries amid prevalent identical naming conventions and exposing gaps in real-time tracking, as evidenced by the subsequent push to digitize records via the MERNIS initiative to consolidate fragmented data. This administrative burden, intensified by rural-to-urban flows overwhelming manual verification processes, underscored the limitations of name-based matching in preventing identity overlaps or fraudulent claims by the late 20th century.

MERNİS Project and Modernization

The MERNİS (Merkezi Nüfus İdaresi Sistemi), or Central Civil Registration System, represented a pivotal digitization effort for Turkey's population management, with conceptual roots tracing to 1976 under the State Planning Organization, though substantive implementation accelerated from 1997 onward through digitization of paper-based records between 1997 and 1999. This initiative centralized fragmented local registries into a national electronic database under the Ministry of Interior, enabling automated processing of civil status changes without reliance on manual family ledgers. Core to MERNİS is its real-time linkage of vital events—encompassing births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and citizenship alterations—across all civil registration offices, ensuring instantaneous updates to a unified repository accessible nationwide. Identification numbers are generated sequentially upon initial registration, derived purely from entry order in the system rather than encoding demographic details like birth date or location, which preserves neutrality in numbering while facilitating checksum validation. By consolidating data silos previously siloed in provincial offices, MERNİS enhanced inter-agency coordination, streamlining identification and service delivery to yield faster public administration processes, such as immediate verification for administrative transactions. This centralization underpinned subsequent advancements like the Address Bpulation Registration System, which leveraged MERNİS records for register-based populations, supplanting error-prone traditional censuses with more reliable, annually updated figures that minimized undercounting in dynamic urban areas.

Implementation and Rollout in 2000

The Turkish Identification Number was officially rolled out on October 28, 2000, through Act No. 3080, which amended the Population Registration Act No. 1587 to establish a unique 11-digit identifier for all citizens, replacing reliance on names and sequential registry numbers prone to duplication. This legislative change enabled the centralized assignment of numbers via the MERNIS system, drawing from a pre-generated pool organized by district, registry volume, and family sequence to cover approximately 60 million citizens at the time. Implementation proceeded in phases, with initial assignments prioritized for newborns to integrate the number directly into birth registrations, while retroactive allocation occurred for adults based on existing civil records, requiring updates to identity documents upon renewal. The transition from legacy paper-based systems involved digitizing vast registry data nationwide, a process managed by the General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs to ensure sequential and verifiable numbering without gaps or overlaps. Logistical execution included coordinating provincial offices for data verification and issuance of updated identity cards bearing the number, starting immediately after the rollout date, which mitigated duplication issues in administrative processes. By 2006, integration advanced further under subsequent reforms, with the number becoming standard on all new documents, reflecting rapid systemic adoption amid ongoing MERNIS expansions.

Technical Structure and Validation

Digit Composition and Format

The Turkish Identification Number, known as T.C. Kimlik Numarası, is structured as an 11-digit numeric sequence without leading zeros, where the first digit ranges from 1 to 9. The initial nine digits constitute the core unique identifier assigned to each citizen, while the final two digits function as verification check digits derived algorithmically from the preceding ones to ensure data integrity. This format adheres to a non-informative design principle, meaning the digits do not encode personal attributes such as date of birth, gender, or geographic origin of registration, unlike certain international systems that embed such details for administrative efficiency. Instead, the number is generated by the Merkezi Nüfus İdaresi Sistemi (MERNİS) in sequential order based on the timing of an individual's entry into the national population registry, prioritizing uniqueness and randomness to mitigate risks of prediction or identity inference. This approach supports enhanced privacy by decoupling the identifier from exploitable biographical data, as the assignment relies solely on chronological registration records rather than demographic coding.

Checksum Algorithm and Verification

The Turkish Identification Number consists of 11 digits, with the 10th and 11th serving as check digits derived from the preceding digits via a mathematical algorithm to enable error detection and forgery prevention. To verify or generate the 10th digit, compute the sum AA of the digits in odd positions (1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 9th, where position 1 is the leftmost digit) and the sum BB of the digits in even positions among the first eight (2nd, 4th, 6th, and 8th). The 10th digit is then given by (7×A−B)mod  10(7 \times A - B) \mod 10. For validation, this computed value must match the provided 10th digit; discrepancies indicate errors such as transcription mistakes or invalid generation. The 11th check digit is calculated as the sum of the first 10 digits modulo 10. Verification requires recomputing this sum from the given first 10 digits and confirming it equals the 11th digit. The full validation process also enforces that the number comprises exactly 11 numeric digits and that the first digit is nonzero, as zero would imply an invalid or pre-2000 legacy format. These steps ensure deterministic local verification without requiring access to central registries. This algorithm leverages modular arithmetic with a weighted multiplier of 7 on odd-position sums to enhance detection of common errors, including single-digit substitutions and adjacent transpositions, which would rarely preserve both check digits due to the asymmetric weighting. Empirical implementations in software libraries confirm its robustness for standalone checks, yielding a low false-positive rate for random invalid inputs—approximately 1 in 100, as each check digit independently filters roughly 90% of erroneous cases. Public tools for verification include standalone online calculators that apply this algorithm to user-input numbers, providing instant feedback on mathematical validity. Developer libraries, such as Python's turkish-validator package or JavaScript functions, integrate the logic for programmatic use, often in applications requiring real-time checks without transmitting full numbers to servers. These complement but do not replace official database queries, which incorporate additional personal data for comprehensive authentication.

Applications and Integration

Domestic Uses in Administration and Services

The Turkish Identification Number, or TC Kimlik Numarası, serves as a mandatory identifier for Turkish citizens in key administrative domains, functioning as the Tax Identification Number (TIN) under domestic law for taxation purposes, thereby enabling automated tax processing and compliance verification. It is required for opening and maintaining bank accounts, where citizens must provide the number to update records and link financial transactions to their identity. In healthcare, the number is essential for patient admission and accessing services under the Social Security Institution (SGK), including record linkage and insurance eligibility confirmation at facilities. For property transactions, it acts as the TIN to facilitate title deeds, sales registries, and related fiscal obligations through land registry offices. Integration into digital platforms exemplifies its role in bureaucratic efficiency, particularly via the e-Devlet portal, where the number authenticates users for secure access to 8,309 public services as of 2024, encompassing document issuance, payments, and status inquiries that minimize physical visits and paperwork. This system has streamlined administrative processes by centralizing identity verification, with government data indicating substantial growth in service adoption and transaction volumes since its expansion. In social welfare administration, the number underpins targeted distribution through the Integrated Social Assistance System (ISAS), which matches applicants' unique IDs to eligibility databases for precise aid allocation, reducing duplication and enhancing delivery accuracy across programs. Such traceability supports fiscal accountability in public spending, aligning with broader efforts to verify beneficiary claims against centralized records.

Query and Access Mechanisms

The Turkish Identification Number, or T.C. Kimlik Numarası, can be verified by individuals through dedicated online portals operated by the Nüfus ve Vatandaşlık İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü (NVİ). The primary service is available at tckimlik.nvi.gov.tr, where users enter personal details such as name, surname, and birth year to confirm the corresponding 11-digit number, ensuring accuracy without full disclosure of sensitive data. Additional e-services via the e-Devlet platform (turkiye.gov.tr) allow citizens to query their own identity document status, including kimlik kartı details linked to the number, accessible after authentication with electronic signature or mobile methods. In-person verification occurs at district nüfus müdürlükleri (registry offices), where biometric features of the kimlik kartı—such as fingerprint or chip data—are used for secure confirmation during administrative procedures. For public institutions and authorized organizations, the Kimlik Paylaşım Sistemi (KPS), launched in 2009, facilitates centralized, electronic querying of identification numbers and associated data like names, birth dates, and addresses. This system enables one-way, secure access to MERNİS records without requiring physical documents from citizens, thereby streamlining inter-agency processes such as benefit distribution or service eligibility checks. Queries under KPS include retrieving person information by Numarası or vice versa, with integration via web services for approved entities. Access to both individual and institutional mechanisms is tightly controlled to mitigate misuse, with public queries limited to self-verification or basic confirmation to avoid unauthorized data mining. KPS restricts usage to legally authorized bodies under bilateral agreements and data protection laws, incorporating audit logs for all transactions to enable oversight and accountability. These measures prioritize data integrity while supporting efficient governance, as unauthorized public access to full records remains prohibited.

Extensions for Foreigners and International Context

The Yabancı Kimlik Numarası (YKN), or Foreigner Identification Number, is a unique 11-digit code assigned to non-citizens upon granting residence permits, international protection, or temporary protection status in Turkey. This format mirrors the citizen identification number in length and incorporates a checksum mechanism for validation, typically starting with "99" to distinguish it from national numbers, and is embedded in official identity documents issued by the Presidency of Migration Management. The YKN enables foreigners to engage in taxation, banking, property transactions, and utility registrations, serving as a prerequisite for residency-linked administrative functions without granting citizenship privileges. For refugees and asylum seekers, the YKN is included on international protection beneficiary documents, valid for up to three years and renewable, or on temporary protection cards for groups like Syrians, which lack expiration dates but limit rights to long-term residency or naturalization. Following the 2015-2016 migration waves, issuance surged to accommodate mass inflows; as of the end of 2024, over 2.9 million Syrians held temporary protection status with associated YKNs, facilitating coordinated registration, work authorization (with 63,789 permits issued by mid-2021 amid broader integration efforts), and access to education and healthcare. This expansion supported tracking and service provision for approximately 3.7 million Syrians at peak registration levels by 2022. In the 2020s, adaptations extended to emerging migrant categories, including the digital nomad visa launched on September 17, 2024, targeting remote workers aged 21-55 from non-Turkish employers with annual incomes exceeding $36,000 and relevant qualifications. Successful applicants receive short-term residence permits entitling them to a YKN, renewable up to one year initially, to streamline remote work facilitation while integrating into the national identification framework for compliance and monitoring. Internationally, the YKN system underpins migrant data sharing in bilateral arrangements, such as those tied to the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement, which emphasized registration and return mechanisms to curb irregular flows, with Turkey's centralized numbering aiding verification in cross-border contexts.

Security, Privacy, and Criticisms

Data Protection and Security Features

The MERNİS system incorporates secure access mechanisms through the Turkish Identity Information Sharing System (KPS), which facilitates one-way electronic access to civil status records and personal data for authorized public institutions, thereby restricting bidirectional data flows to prevent unauthorized alterations or extractions. This segmented approach ensures that while data integrity is maintained centrally, dissemination is controlled and auditable, supporting verification without exposing the full database to external risks. Since 2017, the T.C. Kimlik Kartı electronic identity cards link the Turkish Identification Number to biometric identifiers, including fingerprints stored on embedded chips, enabling multi-factor authentication for services and reducing reliance on static numerical data alone for identity confirmation. These cards support visual, electronic, and biometric verification methods, with the biometric elements designed to withstand tampering through secure chip architecture. Data associated with the identification number falls under the Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698 (KVKK), effective from 2016, which mandates security safeguards such as access controls, pseudonymization where feasible, and accountability for controllers processing identification-linked information. Amendments in 2024 refined conditions for sensitive data processing, drawing parallels to GDPR requirements for explicit legal bases and enhanced cross-border transfer rules, thereby strengthening protections against misuse in centralized repositories like MERNİS. The centralized yet access-restricted framework of MERNİS and integrated systems promotes data consistency across administrations, allowing real-time validation that counters duplication-based fraud more effectively than fragmented records, as utilized in e-commerce and service verifications requiring TCKN authentication.

Notable Breaches and Incidents

In April 2016, a massive data breach exposed personal information of approximately 49.6 million Turkish citizens, including TC Kimlik numbers, full names, addresses, birthdates, and parents' names, which was posted online via BitTorrent by unidentified hackers. The leaked dataset, totaling around 6.6 GB, represented over half of Turkey's population at the time and was claimed to originate from government-held records, prompting immediate risks of identity theft and fraud. Turkish prosecutors launched an investigation, though officials initially disputed the breach's authenticity before confirming elements of the data's validity. Subsequent incidents highlighted ongoing vulnerabilities in systems linked to TC Kimlik data. In August 2025, authorities uncovered a digital forgery operation that infiltrated e-government databases, enabling the creation of at least 57 falsified university diplomas, 108 driver's licenses, and other official records using cloned credentials, potentially compromising verification processes tied to identification numbers. Reports in September 2025 revealed exposure of over 102 million records containing TC Kimlik numbers, names, parental details, birth information, and localities, attributed to unsecured datasets possibly from public sector sources. These events underscored unauthorized access by criminal networks, including potential data mining by state agencies like police and intelligence, though official disclosures remained limited. In response to the 2016 breach, Turkey enacted the Personal Data Protection Law (KVKK, Law No. 6698) on April 7, 2016, establishing the Personal Data Protection Authority and imposing stricter penalties for data mishandling, which fortified legal frameworks for TC Kimlik-related systems. Post-incident audits and reforms included enhanced encryption protocols and cybersecurity audits across government databases, reducing immediate re-exposure risks as verified in subsequent KVKK compliance reports. For the 2025 forgery case, individuals faced trial, with investigations leading to system-wide access controls and to prevent similar credential cloning.

Controversies Over Surveillance and Centralization

Critics of the Turkish Identification Number system, particularly privacy advocates and opposition figures, have raised alarms over its centralization within the MERNIS database, arguing that it facilitates ernment overreach. Following the empt, authorities expanded access to ID-linked data for tracking suspected Gülen movement affiliates, with police and intelligence agencies gaining extensive querying rights over citizens' personal records, including location and communication metadata tied to TC Kimlik numbers. This has been described as enabling preventive, indiscriminate monitoring, producing vast data troves for future use against dissidents, amid a broader post-coup purge that detained over 50,000 individuals using ID-verified records. Such concerns are amplified by Turkey's geopolitical risks, where centralized systems could normalize eroded civil liberties, though mainstream reporting often frames these as routine security measures without scrutinizing authoritarian drift. Data breaches underscore the privacy vulnerabilities of this centralized approach, with a 2016 leak exposing TC Kimlik numbers and other details of approximately 50 million Turks—nearly half the population—to identity theft and fraud risks. Subsequent incidents, including a pandemic-era breach affecting over 100 million records and hacks on e-Devlet portals tied to ID verification, have eroded public trust, enabling black-market sales of personal data for as little as 100 Turkish lira. Privacy groups advocate decentralization, such as distributed ledgers over monolithic databases, to mitigate single-point failures and limit state access, citing first-hand evidence from electronic ID implementations where biometric integration heightens tracking without proportional safeguards. Proponents, including government officials, counter that centralization yields empirical security gains in a high-threat environment marked by terrorism and coups, with TC Kimlik integration preventing fraud in services like tax collection and enabling rapid threat detection. Recent upgrades incorporating blockchain and AI for ID verification are projected to reduce breaches by enhancing tamper-proofing and real-time anomaly detection, as demonstrated in early applications for tax evasion prevention. The mandatory, unique nature of TC Kimlik curbs anonymous criminality—such as money laundering or insurgent financing—by enforcing traceability, with centralized validation algorithms empirically lowering administrative errors and duplicate identities compared to fragmented systems elsewhere. National security imperatives in Turkey's volatile region justify these trade-offs, as decentralized alternatives risk exploitation by non-state actors, per analyses of global ID frameworks where unification correlates with fraud reductions of up to 30% in high-risk jurisdictions. While acknowledging breach risks, defenders emphasize that robust encryption and judicial oversight in recent laws balance privacy against existential threats, outperforming laxer, distributed models in causal efficacy for governance stability.

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  57. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/04/database-allegedly-containing-id-numbers-of-50m-turks-posted-online
  58. https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-35978216
  59. https://www.wired.com/2016/04/hack-brief-turkey-breach-spills-info-half-citizens/
  60. https://thehackernews.com/2016/04/personal-data-leaked.html
  61. https://www.securityweek.com/50-million-pii-records-turkish-citizens-posted-online/
  62. https://turkishminute.com/2025/08/04/199-face-trial-over-forged-degrees-licenses-in-mass-breach-of-turkeys-e-government-system/
  63. https://www.turkishminute.com/2025/08/06/turkeys-digital-forgery-scandal-tip-of-the-iceberg-fraudsters-could-simulate-functions-of-any-ministry/
  64. https://www.linkedin.com/posts/vdyachenko_another-turkish-dataset-exposed-on-sept-activity-7373325119936561153-9x4P
  65. https://turkishminute.com/2025/08/06/turkeys-digital-forgery-scandal-tip-of-the-iceberg-fraudsters-could-simulate-functions-of-any-ministry/
  66. https://nordicmonitor.com/2025/08/secret-report-reveals-turkish-police-and-intelligence-hold-extensive-access-to-citizens-private-data/
  67. https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Turkey/Turkey-all-citizens-under-surveillance-219694
  68. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/08/03/government-response-turkeys-coup-affront-democracy
  69. https://advox.globalvoices.org/2025/03/27/in-turkey-a-controversial-law-on-cybersecurity-is-widely-seen-as-yet-another-censorship-tool/
  70. https://advox.globalvoices.org/2024/08/21/one-hundred-turkish-lira-for-your-data-how-turkish-citizens-lost-all-expectations-of-data-security-and-privacy/
  71. https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/citizenship?articlesBySimilarityPage=23
  72. https://coingeek.com/turkey-upgrades-digital-id-ai-projected-to-stifle-breaches/
  73. https://regulaforensics.com/blog/idv-compliance-in-turkey/
  74. https://www.fraud.com/post/centralized-fraud-operations
  75. https://www.linklaters.com/en-us/insights/data-protected/data-protected---turkey
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