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Antonio Pelle
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Antonio Pelle (Italian pronunciation: [anˈtɔːnjo ˈpɛlle]; March 1, 1932 – November 4, 2009), also known as Ntoni Gambazza ("Tony Bad Leg"), was a historically significant and charismatic 'Ndrangheta boss from San Luca in Calabria. He was the patriarch of the San Luca locale and the 'Ndrangheta capo crimine, the titular head of the organisation, although with little effective power.[1] He reached the rank of vangelo, at the time the highest rank in the organisation.[2]

Key Information

Criminal career

[edit]

Ntoni Pelle was born as the fourth child in a very poor family in San Luca. As an illiterate shepherd he rambled the desolate Aspromonte mountains around San Luca, Platì and Careri. In 1957 he was charged with burglary, but released for insufficient proof. A year later he was shot in the leg and in 1959 he was again acquitted, this time for illegal possession of a firearm. In 1961, he was arrested for murder, attempted murder and criminal conspiracy. Released because of expiration of detention terms in 1970, the Court of Appeal sentenced him to 11 years, 11 months and 11 days a year later. Pelle became a fugitive until he was arrested in November 1977.[3]

Pelle disappeared from the radar screen until 1989 when several indictments were issued against him. The indictments charged Pelle for kidnapping, money laundering and mafia conspiracy together with 49 others such as the high ranking 'Ndrangheta bosses Sebastiano Romeo from San Luca, Giuseppe Morabito from Africo, Pasquale Barbaro and others. Several clans formed a single entity, known as the Anonima sequestri dell’Aspromonte, that had been responsible for a string of kidnappings in the 1980s. In the course of the investigations, police authorities calculated that Pelle had acquired some 1.5 billion lire (some €750,000).[3]

Moving into drug trafficking

[edit]

Pelle was charged again in 1992 and 1993 for drug trafficking. The investigations revealed how Pelle and Giuseppe Morabito provided 340 million lire (some €170,000) to Antonio Papalia to pay for drug consignments. The money from kidnappings was invested in drug trafficking by the 'Ndrangheta, which became the most important source for illegal revenue and replaced the kidnap business which attracted too much media and police attention. The 'Ndrangheta at the time made the decisive and conscious decision to reform from an archaic organisation to a modern one involved in the drug business.[3]

According to several 'Ndrangheta turncoats (pentiti), Pelle was a member of Camera di Controllo, a provincial commission of the 'Ndrangheta, formed at the end of the Second 'Ndrangheta war in September 1991 to avoid further internal conflicts.[3][4]

San Luca feud

[edit]
Main article: San Luca feud

The Pelle-Vottari-Romeo, is one of the protagonists in the San Luca feud against the Strangio-Nirta clan. The vendetta between the two clans from San Luca reached the headlines of the world press when on August 15, 2007, six men belonging to the Pelle-Vottari-Romeo clan were shot dead in their cars in front of a pizzeria near the train station of Duisburg in western Germany.[5] Notwithstanding his non-involvement in the facts, Antonio Pelle was indirectly involved through his son-in-law, Francesco Vottari, one the protagonists among the disputing clans, who is married to his daughter Maria Pelle.[2][6]

Antonio Pelle tried in every way to end the feud and make peace. However, he was only able to secure that the section of the clan he headed (the "Vanchelli") was not involved in the feud that affected another element of the clan. In order to underline his non-involvement in the feud, he asked family members to send a letter to the Gazzetta del Sud newspaper. The message was clear: the feud was a clash between minor elements of the clan and Gambazza was trying to reach a peace without victors, as he had done in the past, in 1991, when the conflict started.[2][7]

Fugitive

[edit]

During his criminal career he was acquitted in nine out of ten trials. In the early years his lawyer was Giovanni Leone before he became President of the Italian Republic in 1971.[8] He had been a fugitive and included on the list of most wanted fugitives in Italy since 2000.[9] He faced a 26-year sentence for cocaine trafficking and mafia association. While in hiding, he allegedly found refuge somewhere in the desolate Aspromonte mountains.[7]

In his ten years on the run Pelle never made use of telephones, cell phones, credit cards, ATMs, computers; nothing that could in any way "trace" his presence to specific locations.[2] His son Salvatore Pelle wanted since 1991, was arrested on March 10, 2007.[8] During an operation in San Luca on March 4, 2008, the police discovered an underground bunker in one of the seized buildings which investigators believed was used as a hideout by Pelle.[10]

Arrest and death

[edit]

Antonio Pelle was arrested on June 12, 2009, in a hospital in Polistena (Calabria), recovering from a hernia surgery. "It's all over, it's all over," he said to the police, who found him when they followed his wife Giuseppa Giampaolo visiting the hospital.[9] He died from a heart attack in a hospital in Locri on November 4, 2009, a day after he had been released for his bad health condition.[2][11][12]

According to investigators, his nephew Sebastiano Pelle returned to San Luca to take over when his uncle died.[13] However, it is generally acknowledged that his second-born son Giuseppe Pelle is the successor at the head of the clan.[14] One of the four sons of Antonio Pelle, Giuseppe married a daughter of the ‘Ndrangheta boss Francesco Barbaro from Platì, securing a tight alliance between these two powerful 'ndrine.[2]

References

[edit]
[edit]
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Antonio Pelle

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from Grokipedia
Antonio Pelle (born c. 1962), known as "La Mamma," is an Italian organized crime figure and leader of the Pelle-Vottari-Romeo clan within the 'Ndrangheta, Calabria's dominant syndicate originating from . He was convicted in absentia of association, , and drug trafficking, resulting in a 20-year prison sentence. In August 2011, Pelle escaped from a hospital in while under guard for medical treatment, evading capture for over five years until Italian police arrested him on October 5, 2016, discovering him concealed in a narrow secret compartment between a bathroom and bedroom wall in his family home. As a key operator in the 'Ndrangheta's international drug trade and territorial conflicts, including the violent with rival families, Pelle's activities underscore the syndicate's entrenched control over Calabrian localities and global criminal networks.

Early Life and Background

Birth, Family, and Upbringing in San Luca

Antonio Pelle was born on 1 March 1932 in , a remote village in the , nestled in the Aspromonte mountains of , . He originated from a of shepherds, emblematic of the entrenched rural poverty and agrarian economy that characterized the region, where formal education was often inaccessible and economic prospects limited to pastoral pursuits. As the fourth son in his family, Pelle emerged as the patriarch of the Pelle 'ndrina, a kinship-based clan integral to the 'Ndrangheta's hierarchical structure in . Married to Giuseppa Giampaolo, he fathered at least three sons, including Salvatore (known as "Sarvu") and , who would assume significant roles within the family's operations. The clan's influence was bolstered through strategic matrimonial alliances, such as Giuseppe Pelle's marriage to a daughter of Francesco Barbaro, alias "Cicciu u Castanu," a prominent figure in a allied 'Ndrangheta family, thereby reinforcing blood ties essential to power consolidation and territorial control. Pelle's upbringing occurred in an environment dominated by 'Ndrangheta clans, where served as a central hub—often termed "mamma San Luca"—fostering deep-rooted loyalties to familial and criminal networks over distant state authorities. Pervasive inter-clan tensions and the unwritten code of —enforcing silence and retaliation against betrayal—instilled a worldview prioritizing vengeance, secrecy, and self-reliance amid the isolation and hardships of the Aspromonte, where violence was normalized as a mechanism for and social ordering.

Entry into Organized Crime

Initial Criminal Charges and Convictions

Antonio Pelle's earliest documented criminal charges occurred in 1957, when he was accused of —a common survival tactic in the impoverished, clan-controlled economy of , where formal opportunities were limited and local resources like livestock were fiercely monopolized. He was released due to insufficient evidence. In 1959, Pelle faced charges for illegal possession of a , reflecting the armament typical in 'Ndrangheta initiation and enforcement amid territorial disputes; he was acquitted. Pelle's progression to violent crystallized in 1961 with indictments for murder, , and , stemming from his role in the killing of rival Sebastiano Pizzata during a shooting in San Luca's woodlands—a rooted in enforcing clan control over local economic monopolies rather than abstract motives. Arrested shortly after surrendering and confessing (though his account diverged from investigative findings), he was released in 1970 as terms expired. In 1971, the of Appeal convicted Pelle of Pizzata's , sentencing him to 11 years, 11 months, and 11 days , formalizing his status within the Pelle clan's violent . Court records from these proceedings reveal a pattern of escalating aggression linked causally to intra-clan rivalries over resource dominance, substantiated by ballistic and witness evidence tying Pelle to the targeted enforcement actions.

Rise within the Pelle 'Ndrangheta Clan

Antonio Pelle ascended to de facto leadership of the Pelle 'ndrina, a core clan within the 'Ndrangheta's San Luca locale, inheriting the nickname "La Mamma" from his father, which denoted his role in providing protective yet authoritarian oversight over clan affiliates. This moniker reflected a leadership style blending paternalistic nurturing with ruthless enforcement of loyalty, enabling him to consolidate authority amid the clan's familial hierarchy where succession typically follows bloodlines to minimize betrayal risks. By the early 2000s, Pelle had emerged as the acting head of the Pelle-Vottari subgroup, leveraging personal charisma to forge allegiance among relatives and affiliates in San Luca, a town synonymous with 'Ndrangheta strongholds. The 'Ndrangheta's organizational preference for consanguineous ties—drawing over 90% of members from networks—facilitated Pelle's rise, as clans like the Pelle prioritized internal trust over external recruitment to sustain cohesion and operational secrecy. Through participation in traditional rituals and inter-clan pacts sealed via marriages and oaths, Pelle expanded the Pelle-Vottari subgroup's influence, embedding familial obligations that bound members to hierarchical roles from to capobastone. This structure, rooted in Calabria's kinship systems, allowed him to command loyalty without relying on coercive violence alone, distinguishing the 'Ndrangheta from more fractious groups like the . Such clan dynamics, while enabling internal stability, permitted extensive infiltration of legitimate businesses and public administration in Calabria, where extortion and corruption extract an estimated 0.5-5% of affected firms' output, contributing to regional economic stagnation marked by GDP per capita roughly 40% below Italy's national average. Empirical analyses attribute this underdevelopment to mafia-induced barriers to investment and entrepreneurship, countering unsubstantiated claims of mafias as informal welfare providers by highlighting verifiable distortions in resource allocation and governance. Pelle's oversight exemplified how familial command structures perpetuated these parasitic controls, prioritizing clan dominance over broader socioeconomic vitality.

Major Criminal Activities

Kidnappings and Traditional Mafia Operations

During the 1970s and 1980s, the 'Ndrangheta clans operating in , including those from like the Pelle 'ndrina, extensively utilized kidnappings for as a core revenue mechanism, holding victims in isolated bunkers within the Aspromonte mountain range to evade detection. These operations, estimated to number over 200 across the organization during this era, generated substantial funds that fortified clan structures and financed subsequent expansions, often involving the sequestration of affluent individuals or those linked to debtors and rivals for enforcement purposes. As the longstanding boss of the Pelle from the mid-20th century onward, Antonio Pelle oversaw participation in these traditional tactics, which extended beyond abductions to systematic of local businesses, agricultural producers such as shepherds, and usurious lending practices that preyed on community vulnerabilities. Firearms trafficking supplemented these rackets, supplying arms for internal enforcement and inter-clan disputes. Such "" demands, while ostensibly stabilizing short-term clan hierarchies through coerced , empirically exacerbated regional by inflating operational costs for legitimate enterprises—effectively taxing and deterring —as documented in analyses of Calabria's persistent tied to infiltration. Long-term outcomes included pervasive community terror, with victim accounts detailing prolonged and disappearances that eroded social trust, countering notions of honorable codes by revealing the raw underlying operations; state interventions, including deployments to Aspromonte, ultimately diminished kidnapping viability by the 1990s, prompting shifts away from these high-risk, low-yield methods.

Shift to International Drug Trafficking

During the 1980s and 1990s, the 'Ndrangheta, including the Pelle clan under figures like Antonio Pelle, pivoted from traditional extortion and kidnappings to international cocaine trafficking as European demand surged amid intensified U.S. anti-drug efforts that redirected supply routes. This shift capitalized on the organization's familial, low-profile structure, which minimized betrayals and contrasted with the more hierarchical, publicity-prone operations of Sicily's Cosa Nostra, enabling discreet global expansion. Pelle, as a rising leader in the San Luca-based Pelle 'ndrina, became implicated in this transition through convictions for drug trafficking association, reflecting the clan's integration into broader syndicate networks. Calabria's ports, particularly , emerged as critical hubs for imports, with the 'Ndrangheta coordinating shipments from South American cartels via containerized concealment in legitimate cargo. Alliances with Colombian and Venezuelan producers facilitated multi-ton consignments, as evidenced by repeated seizures at , where Calabrian clans controlled unloading and initial distribution with minimal violence due to their insular, blood-tied loyalty. Pelle's oversight extended to these logistics within the Pelle clan's operations, leveraging the port's proximity to for rapid inland movement while maintaining operational secrecy. Pelle directed distribution chains radiating from Calabria to northern European markets, including and the , where 'Ndrangheta affiliates handled wholesale supply amid verifiable intercepts linking Calabrian groups to over six tons of in coordinated probes. These networks funded clan consolidation, with drug revenues—estimated to generate billions annually for the syndicate—reinvested in Calabrian and , masking illicit gains through front companies. However, this influx distorted local economies by inflating property values unsustainably and enabling that crowded out legitimate investment, while causally exacerbating addiction epidemics across consumer markets without offsetting benefits like broad employment.

Involvement in the San Luca Feud

Origins of the Conflict

The San Luca feud erupted on February 10, 1991, during carnival celebrations in the Calabrian town of , when young members of the Nirta-Strangio clan hurled eggs and insults at rivals from the Pelle-Vottari-Romeo alliance, sparking a brawl that left two men dead and two injured. This seemingly trivial provocation tapped into deeper animosities over local power structures in , a 'Ndrangheta epicenter where clans enforce dominance through intimidation and extortion. Retaliatory murders followed intermittently, escalating the vendetta into a protracted series of ambushes and assassinations that claimed at least 15 lives by mid-2007, per assessments from Italian prosecutors and police. The conflict's endurance reflected the erosion of 'Ndrangheta's customary internal arbitration processes, which typically imposed truces to avert open warfare and preserve operational secrecy. Clan accounts portrayed the killings as obligatory responses to affronts against familial honor, yet antimafia inquiries by Italy's Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia exposed intertwined economic drivers, notably rival claims to drug importation networks routing and through Calabria's ports toward . These territorial stakes amplified personal vendettas, yielding a net toll of instability that hindered even illicit enterprises and drew heightened state scrutiny to the region.

Pelle Clan's Engagements and Strategies

Due to his advanced age during the escalation of the in the mid-2000s, Antonio Pelle maintained limited direct involvement in violent operations, instead exercising strategic oversight through family proxies, particularly within the allied Vottari branch of the clan. Intercepted communications and testimonies from cooperating witnesses indicate that Pelle directed retaliatory actions, including efforts to enforce truces amid escalating violence, while relying on kin networks to execute hits and maintain operational deniability. The Pelle clan's tactics emphasized targeted ambushes and shootings, exemplified by the December 25, 2006, ambush at the home of Giovanni Nirta, where Maria Strangio, his wife, was killed in retaliation for prior attacks on Pelle affiliates. This operation, attributed to Pelle-Vottari elements under familial directives, involved close-range gunfire and highlighted the use of familial loyalty to insulate higher echelons from direct exposure. Additional verifiable engagements from 2005 to 2007 included multiple tit-for-tat killings and attempted murders, contributing to at least five deaths in the area before the feud's spillover. Efforts to eliminate potential informants and secure through were integral, though specific instances tied to Pelle's oversight remain documented primarily via post-feud judicial proceedings. The clan's strategies exploited ties for and execution, fostering resilience against infiltration but perpetuating cycles of vengeance. These engagements inflicted civilian casualties, such as the Maria Strangio, and caused profound economic disruption in , where pervasive fear silenced public life and , eroding institutional in favor of parochial tribal codes. from the period underscores how such unchecked kinship-based vendettas prioritize clan honor over societal stability, contravening narratives that romanticize them as mere cultural disputes by revealing their toll on innocents and .

Connection to the Duisburg Massacre

On August 15, 2007, six Italian men associated with the Pelle-Vottari-Romeo clans of the 'Ndrangheta were executed by gunfire outside the Da Bruno pizzeria in , , in an attack carried out by members of the rival Strangio-Nirta clan. The victims, aged 16 to 39 and including relatives of Pelle clan affiliates, were shot multiple times in the head while seated in their vehicles, marking the first documented instance of a Calabrian vendetta extending to execution-style killings abroad. This massacre served as direct retaliation for the Pelle clan's December 25, 2006, killing of Maria Strangio, a key Strangio-Nirta figure, amid escalating hostilities in that had already claimed over a dozen lives since the feud's ignition in the early . Italian and German authorities, supported by forensic tracing of weapons and to Calabrian origins, attributed the underlying provocation to the Pelle clan's aggressive strategies in the San Luca conflict, positioning Antonio Pelle, as the clan's leader, as a central figure in the chain of events that exported the violence. While the Strangio-Nirta perpetrators faced convictions—including life sentences for key organizers in —the Pelle clan's denial of orchestrating the German reprisal did not negate empirical , as investigations revealed the victims' ties to Pelle networks operating in Germany's Italian diaspora communities for and drug logistics. The incident underscored the 'Ndrangheta's deep infiltration into northern European economies, particularly through construction and waste management fronts in the region, prompting coordinated Europol-led probes that dismantled related cells and seized assets worth over €150 million from feuding clans by 2008. These efforts exposed how geographic relocation failed to shield members from vendettas, fueling broader EU anti-mafia operations that targeted the Pelle clan's transnational operations, though the group's resilience persisted amid ongoing arrests into the 2020s.

Fugitive Years and Capture

Periods of Evasion and Law Enforcement Pursuit

Antonio Pelle became a fugitive in 2000 following convictions related to 'Ndrangheta activities, leading to his inclusion on Italy's list of the 30 most wanted criminals. His evasion relied on the 'Ndrangheta's cellular organization, where operations were segmented by family units to minimize betrayal risks and information flow to authorities. This structure, rooted in blood ties and , thwarted comprehensive infiltration despite growing state resources dedicated to . Law enforcement pursuit escalated in the 1990s through the Carabinieri's ROS unit, which deployed wiretaps, physical surveillance, and interrogations of pentiti to dismantle clan hierarchies amid rising feuds. However, Pelle's longstanding authority as a capo crimine enabled sustained logistical support from loyalists, including supplies delivered to remote hideouts in Calabria's Aspromonte massif, a favored refuge for 'Ndrangheta latitanti due to its inhospitable terrain and constructed bunkers. campaigns by affiliates further complicated tracking, as clans disseminated false leads to protect high-value targets. Major operations, such as those probing networks, exposed peripheral members and finances but struggled against Pelle's insulated command, sustained by personal respect rather than overt coercion. The 'Ndrangheta's low reliance on external allies reduced defection incentives, contrasting with more hierarchical groups like Cosa Nostra, and allowed Pelle to direct activities remotely for nearly a decade. His evasion highlighted limitations in anti-mafia strategies, where compartmentalization preserved core leadership amid peripheral disruptions, until advancing age and health constraints eroded operational security.

Final Arrest in 2009

Antonio Pelle, a fugitive since 2000 and listed among Italy's 30 most dangerous latitanti, was captured on June 12, 2009, in the surgery ward of Polistena hospital in , where he had infiltrated under a false name while recovering from for a strangulated . The operation was executed by from the (ROS) and the territorial group, who raided the facility after tracking Pelle's wife and acting on intelligence tips that pinpointed his location. This human intelligence-driven approach culminated a manhunt exceeding nine years, during which Pelle, known as "Ntoni Gambazza," had evaded capture despite his prominent role in the Pelle 'ndrina of . At the time of arrest, Pelle was 77 years old and posed as an ordinary patient, offering no resistance as he was still debilitated from the recent procedure, which facilitated the swift apprehension without confrontation. He faced immediate charges of association with a mafia-type organization under Article 416-bis of the Italian Penal Code, distinct from his existing sentences for prior convictions related to organized crime activities. The hospital infiltration tactic, leveraging medical facilities for concealment under alias, represented a calculated evasion strategy, but surveillance of familial movements exposed its limitations against persistent investigative pressure. Unlike earlier pursuits reliant on technological intercepts or broader raids, this capture emphasized the pivotal role of informant-derived tips and physical tailing, yielding concrete results amid the 'Ndrangheta's entrenched resilience in Calabria's Aspromonte region. Empirical accounts from the arrest detailed minimal clan intervention or escape attempts, reflecting operational strains on the Pelle network following intensified anti-mafia efforts post the .

Death and Legacy

Circumstances of Death

Antonio Pelle died of a heart attack on November 4, 2009, at the age of 77, while receiving treatment at the hospital in . He had been admitted the previous night, November 3, reflecting his advanced age and preexisting health vulnerabilities, including a precarious condition noted in contemporaneous reports. This event took place roughly five months after his June 2009 arrest, during which time incarceration and medical transfers underscored the physical toll of his years as a and organized crime leader. Contemporary news coverage and official accounts uniformly attributed the death to cardiac failure, with no evidence or allegations of external involvement emerging from or investigations at the time. Speculation regarding foul play, occasionally voiced in informal discussions, lacks substantiation and contradicts the verifiable etiology, which aligns with age-related deterioration compounded by from evasion and clan conflicts. Within the Pelle clan, Pelle's death was mourned as the departure of a foundational figure whose strategic acumen had sustained the family's influence amid the . Italian law enforcement and judicial authorities, conversely, framed it as a de facto resolution to his criminal , given his capture shortly before and the prevention of further operational direction from behind bars. Authorities subsequently prohibited public funerals to curb potential clan displays of power, prioritizing public order over ritual observances.

Impact on the 'Ndrangheta and Clan Succession

Antonio Pelle's death on November 4, , from natural causes in a hospital shortly after his release from , prompted a familial succession within the , with shifting to his sons and allied figures in the Pelle-Vottari network, which had been instrumental in sustaining the group's operations amid the . This transition preserved short-term continuity in drug trafficking and territorial control, yet the loss of Pelle's unifying influence exacerbated existing divisions, manifesting in renewed internal skirmishes and alliances that failed to fully stabilize the clan against rivals like the Nirta-Strangio. Ongoing violence, including high-profile incidents post-2009, underscored this fragmentation, as clan members prioritized retaliatory actions over consolidated strategy, leading to operational vulnerabilities. Law enforcement capitalized on the resultant instability through intensified operations, such as those following the 2007 massacre inquiries, culminating in maxi-trials that convicted dozens from families, including Pelle affiliates, on charges of association and trafficking. These proceedings, yielding sentences totaling hundreds of years, coincided with asset seizures exceeding millions in value, which eroded the clan's financial base and logistical networks. While 'Ndrangheta-wide defection rates remained low—estimated below 5% due to blood ties—isolated collaborations with authorities in post-2009 cases provided prosecutors with insider testimony, further weakening Pelle-linked structures compared to pre-death cohesion. Pelle's tenure exemplified the 'Ndrangheta's evolution toward global cocaine routes, yet his era's escalated feuds imposed verifiable economic tolls on , where activities like and diverted resources, reducing effective demand and accumulation by stifling and . Quantitative assessments link such mafia-induced distortions to annual GDP losses in the region approximating 5-10% of local output through distorted markets and violence deterrence of legitimate enterprise. This legacy critiques narratives of inherent mafia durability, as state-driven erosions—via seizures and trials—have demonstrably fragmented clans like Pelle's, prioritizing empirical setbacks over romanticized resilience.

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  48. https://www.lavocedifiore.org/SPIP/article.php3?id_article=4903
  49. https://www.quotidianodelsud.it/archivio/2009/11/04/locri-e-morto-il-boss-antonio-pelle-detto-gambazza
  50. https://www.lagazzettadelmezzogiorno.it/news/italia/143216/ndrangheta-morto-boss-pelle.html
  51. https://www.tempostretto.it/news/reggio-dintorni-ndrangheta-morto-antonio-pelle-boss-reggino-stroncato-infarto.html
  52. https://www.liberainformazione.org/2009/11/04/ndrangheta-muore-il-boss-di-san-luca-antonio-pelle-era/
  53. https://www1.ilmortodelmese.com/2009/11/antonio-pelle-1932-2009.html
  54. https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2009/11/18/news/muore_boss_della_ndrangheta_il_questore_vieta_funerali_pubblici-1820456/
  55. https://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/real-life/gruesome-death-of-ndrangheta-dons-son-ignites-fears-of-bloody-mafia-war/news-story/07869e1426b205456e8ef48d0d4571bc
  56. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/06/italian-maxi-trial-results-in-conviction-of-70-ndrangheta-suspects
  57. https://www.wionews.com/world/this-60-billion-italian-mafia-organisation-is-big-enough-to-list-on-nasdaq-all-about-ndrangheta-cartel-1756506349816
  58. https://www.siecon.org/sites/default/files/oldfiles/uploads/2012/08/Capuano-Purificato.pdf
  59. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268121002158
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