Control-flow integrity (CFI) is a general term for computer security techniques that prevent a wide variety of malware attacks from redirecting the flow of execution (the control flow) of a program.

A computer program commonly changes its control flow to make decisions and use different parts of the code. Such transfers may be direct, in that the target address is written in the code itself, or indirect, in that the target address itself is a variable in memory or a CPU register. In a typical function call, the program performs a direct call, but returns to the caller function using the stack – an indirect backward-edge transfer. When a function pointer is called, such as from a virtual table, we say there is an indirect forward-edge transfer.

Attackers seek to inject code into a program to make use of its privileges or to extract data from its memory space. Before executable code was commonly made read-only, an attacker could arbitrarily change the code as it is run, targeting direct transfers or even do with no transfers at all. After W^X became widespread, an attacker wants to instead redirect execution to a separate, unprotected area containing the code to be run, making use of indirect transfers: one could overwrite the virtual table for a forward-edge attack or change the call stack for a backward-edge attack (return-oriented programming). CFI is designed to protect indirect transfers from going to unintended locations.

Associated techniques include code-pointer separation (CPS), code-pointer integrity (CPI), stack canaries, shadow stacks (SS), and vtable pointer verification. These protections can be classified into either coarse-grained or fine-grained based on the number of targets restricted. A coarse-grained forward-edge CFI implementation, could, for example, restrict the set of indirect call targets to any function that may be indirectly called in the program, while a fine-grained one would restrict each indirect call site to functions that have the same type as the function to be called. Similarly, for a backward edge scheme protecting returns, a coarse-grained implementation would only allow the procedure to return to a function of the same type (of which there could be many, especially for common prototypes), while a fine-grained one would enforce precise return matching (so it can return only to the function that called it).

Related implementations are available in Clang (LLVM front-end),, GNU Compiler Collection, Microsoft's Control Flow Guard and Return Flow Guard, Google's Indirect Function-Call Checks and Reuse Attack Protector (RAP).

The LLVM compiler's C/C++ front-end Clang provides a number of "CFI" schemes that works on the forward edge by checking for errors in virtual tables and type casts. Not all of the schemes are supported on all platforms and most of them, the exception being two "kcfi" schemes intended for low-level kernel software, depends on link-time optimization (LTO) to know what functions are supposed to be called in normal cases.

Also provided is a separate "shadow call stack" (SCS) instrumentation pass that defends on the backward edge by checking for call stack modifications, available only for the aarch64 and RISC-V ISAs. And due to use of a shared processor register SCS is only enforceable on certain ABIs or if in other ways it is ensured that any other software using the register set (thread/processor) does not interfere with this use.

Google has shipped Android with the Linux kernel compiled by Clang with link-time optimization (LTO) and CFI enabled since 2018. Even though SCS is available for the Linux kernel as an option, and support is also available for Android's system components it is recommended only to enable it for components for which it can be ensured that no third party code is loaded.