Hubbry Logo
Council–manager governmentCouncil–manager governmentMain
Open search
Council–manager government
Community hub
Council–manager government
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Council–manager government
Council–manager government
Council–manager government
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia
Part of the Politics series
Common forms of local government
Executive and legislature separate
Executive and legislature fused
City commission
Direct democratic forms
icon Politics portal

The council–manager government is a form of local government commonly used for municipalities and counties in the United States[1] and Ireland,[2] in New Zealand regional councils, and in Canadian municipalities.[3][4] In the council-manager government, an elected city council hires a manager to serve as chief executive; this manager can be replaced by a simple majority at any time.

Overview

[edit]

The council-manager system is similar to the typical governance of a publicly traded corporation.[5] Under the form, an elected governing body, usually called a city council, board of aldermen, or similar title, is responsible for legislative functions such as establishing policy, passing local ordinances, voting appropriations, and developing an overall vision, similar to a corporate board of directors.[6] The city council is accountable to the citizens of the community they represent, who play a similar role to that of shareholders in a corporation. The council or commission appoints a city manager to oversee the administrative operations, implement its policies, and advise it. The manager position is similar to that of a corporate chief executive officer appointed by a board of directors. The position of "mayor" present in this type of legislative body is a largely ceremonial title, and may be selected by the council from among its members or elected as an at-large council member with no executive functions,[7] similar to a non-executive chairperson in a corporation.

The International City/County Management Association (ICMA), a professional organization for city managers, has listed at least three defining characteristics that distinguish a true council–manager government:

  • All governmental authority rests with the council or other elected body, except for certain executive or administrative duties that are assigned to the manager. However, the manager always is employed at the pleasure of the elected body.[8]
  • The manager is allocated their functions in codified form by the city charter or other law, not assigned them ad hoc by a mayor.[9]
  • The manager must be responsible to, hired by, and can be dismissed only by the entire council, not one individual, such as a mayor or chairperson.[9]

As of 2019, it is used in 52.7% of American cities with populations over 10,000.[10]

History in the United States

[edit]

The concept of the council–manager form of government was a product of a confluence of the prevailing modes of thought during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[11] Probably the foremost influence was the Progressive Movement; following along the thought lines of the movement, the municipal reformers of that time wanted to rid municipalities of the pervasive "political machine" form of government and the abuses of the spoils system. The thought was to have a politically impartial administrator or manager to carry out the administrative function.

Staunton, Virginia, is credited as the first American city to appoint a city manager, which it did in 1908.[12] This appointment attracted attention to the fledgling profession and caught the eye of Richard S. Childs, who would become known as the "father" of the council–manager form of government.[11][13] The first large city to adopt the council–manager form was Dayton, Ohio, in 1913. Ohio Progressives organizing for the city manager plan also prioritized proportional representation with adoption in Ashtabula, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Hamilton, and Toledo.[14]

The council–manager form of government developed, at least in part, as a response to some perceived limitations of the city commission government form. Since it relies on candidates being elected at-large, minority populations are often unable to elect candidates of their choice. In addition, it may concentrate too much power in individual commissioners, who also manage city departments. The council–manager form became the preferred alternative for progressive reform. After World War I, few cities adopted the commission form and many cities using the commission plan switched to the council–manager form.[15]

By 2001 there were 3,302 cities with a population over 2,500 and 371 counties using the council–manager system. Phoenix, Arizona, is the largest city in the United States to retain a council–manager government.[16]

Since the turn of the 21st century, there have been studies about hybrid forms of local governments that take elements of both council–manager and mayor–council forms. The cities that have modified their organizational structure from one of the pure forms have been called "adaptive" forms.[17]

History in the Republic of Ireland

[edit]
Main article: Council Manager (Republic of Ireland)

Following the turmoil of World War I (1914–1918), the 1916 rising, the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921), and the Irish Civil War (1921–1923), the Irish government found it necessary to remove the members of several local authorities and replace them temporarily by paid commissioners.

Both Dublin and Cork city councils were so removed. In both cities, there was a body of opinion that the services provided by the councils were delivered more efficiently and fairly under the commissioners than under the previous system, where the executive function had been, in effect, vested in the councils and their committees.

In 1926, a committee of commercial and industrial interests in Cork came together to consider a scheme of city government. Having regard to the city's experience of commissioners and recent experience in the United States a council–manager plan of city government was proposed.

After discussion between the minister for local government and local representatives, the minister, Richard Mulcahy, introduced as a government measure, the Cork City Management Bill 1929 and it became law despite opposition. The minister proposed and the Oireachtas enacted similar provision for Dublin City in 1930. Similar laws were passed for Limerick in 1934 and Waterford in 1939 under the Fianna Fáil government.

Under the County Management Act 1940, which was brought into operation in August 1942, a county manager is the manager of every borough or town in that county, but since the 1990s, has the power to delegate these functions to any other officer of that borough or town council.

The system was modified also in subsequent legislation, particularly the City and County Management (Amendment) Act 1955, which made some adjustments to give greater power to the council members, and the Local Government Act 1985, which provided for the council–manager system in Galway City once detached for local government purposes from County Galway.

The above acts have been replaced since that time, in substantially the same form, by the Local Government Act 2001.

History in Germany

[edit]

The council-manager form of local government was originally introduced into the West German states of Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia by post-WWII legislation. It was abolished in the mid-1990s when changes to local government law resulted in the adoption of the mayor-council system. The equivalent German term for the position of city manager was Oberstadtdirektor.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Council–manager government

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Council–manager government is a system of local , primarily used in municipalities, wherein an elected functions as the legislative body responsible for policy-setting and appoints a professional or manager as the chief executive to administer operations, manage staff, and implement directives. The manager, selected based on expertise rather than electoral , reports to the and can be dismissed by a simple majority vote, ensuring while insulating administration from partisan pressures. This structure emphasizes a separation between policymaking and execution, modeled on corporate hierarchies to prioritize efficiency and over . Emerging in the United States during the Progressive Era, the form originated as a response to widespread urban corruption, machine politics, and inefficient administration in mayor-council systems prevalent at the turn of the 20th century. The concept was first implemented in Staunton, Virginia, in 1908, with a formal charter adoption in Sumter, South Carolina, in 1912, marking the earliest codified example. Rapid adoption followed, driven by reform advocates seeking business-like management; by 1930, over 400 U.S. localities had embraced it, and Dayton, Ohio's 1914 implementation demonstrated its scalability in larger cities. Today, council–manager structures govern more than half of U.S. municipalities with populations exceeding 10,000, encompassing communities where approximately 130 million residents live, reflecting its dominance in mid-sized and larger jurisdictions. Empirical analyses indicate that council–manager governments often exhibit superior fiscal restraint, including lower per-capita debt and taxes, alongside reduced indicators of compared to mayor-council alternatives, attributable to professional oversight minimizing political favoritism. However, evidence on service delivery outcomes is mixed, with advantages in maintenance but less consistent gains in areas like public safety responsiveness. Defining characteristics include the manager's broad authority over budgeting and personnel—subject to council approval—and the absence of a singular elected executive, which proponents credit for apolitical stability but critics argue dilutes visible and voter , prompting occasional shifts back to strong-mayor models in dynamic urban environments.

Definition and Core Features

Fundamental Principles

The council–manager government rests on of delineating policymaking authority from administrative implementation to optimize municipal efficiency and expertise. An elected exercises legislative powers, including enacting ordinances, setting fiscal priorities, and representing constituent interests, while delegating to a professionally qualified manager who handles operational execution without direct electoral . This separation mitigates risks of politicized administration, enabling the to focus on strategic and the manager on service delivery, thereby aligning local operations with objective standards rather than partisan influences. Central to this framework is the manager's accountability exclusively to the , which appoints and can dismiss the manager by majority vote, ensuring alignment with elected priorities while insulating daily decisions from short-term electoral pressures. The manager, in turn, recruits and supervises staff on merit-based criteria, prepares budgets for approval, and advises on feasibility, fostering a nonpartisan environment that prioritizes competence over . This structure promotes fiscal responsibility and responsiveness, as empirical assessments of adopting municipalities indicate improved administrative performance metrics, such as streamlined budgeting and reduced operational redundancies, attributable to oversight. The system's emphasis on professional management draws from progressive administrative theory, positing that specialized expertise in yields superior outcomes in complex service provision compared to elected executives prone to turnover. Managers typically possess advanced qualifications, such as degrees in , and adhere to ethical codes emphasizing impartiality, which s enforce through performance evaluations. By concentrating political power in the and diffusing administrative authority, the model counters concentration of executive influence, as seen in alternatives like strong-mayor systems, where single officials may prioritize personal agendas over collective policy.

Structural Components

The council–manager government features a bifurcated separating elected policymaking from appointed administration to promote professional management and . The elected , typically a of 5 to 11 members depending on size, holds legislative authority, including adopting ordinances, approving budgets, and defining community priorities such as infrastructure development or public safety. members are generally elected at-large or by for staggered terms of 2 to 4 years, ensuring continuity while reflecting voter preferences. Central to the structure is the , appointed by the council based on professional qualifications rather than political affiliation, serving as the responsible for executing policies, preparing annual budgets, and directing day-to-day operations. The manager oversees a of department heads in areas like , , and , with authority to hire, evaluate, and dismiss staff to align operations with council goals; this appointee serves at the council's pleasure and can be removed by majority vote without cause. This setup enforces a non-partisan administrative layer, insulating routine from electoral cycles. A or chairperson, often selected by the or directly elected in about 69% of implementations, functions as a voting member with primarily ceremonial duties, such as presiding over meetings, representing the community publicly, and facilitating council-manager communication, but without or independent executive powers. Interaction between components emphasizes oversight: the manager provides policy recommendations and operational reports, while the retains final , fostering transparency through public meetings and documented directives. This delineation minimizes administrative politicization, as evidenced by the form's adoption in over 3,700 U.S. municipalities serving more than 120 million residents as of 2019.

Comparison to Alternative Forms

The council–manager form contrasts primarily with the – form, where an elected holds executive authority, and the commission form, where elected commissioners jointly manage administration alongside legislative duties. In – systems, the typically appoints department heads, prepares budgets, and vetoes ordinances, concentrating executive power in an elected official, whereas the –manager separates policy-making (by the elected ) from nonpartisan administration (by the appointed manager). Commission governments, less common today, diffuse executive roles among commissioners, often leading to fragmented decision-making without professional oversight.
AspectCouncil–ManagerMayor–Council (Strong Mayor Variant)Commission
Executive LeadershipAppointed professional manager reports to councilElected mayor with direct executive powers, including veto and appointmentsElected commissioners share executive duties
AccountabilityIndirect via council oversight; manager serves at council's pleasureDirect to voters; mayor faces election cyclesDirect to voters but fragmented among commissioners
ProfessionalismEmphasizes trained administrators; reduces patronageProne to political appointees; may prioritize electoral incentives over expertiseLimited; commissioners often lack administrative specialization
Policy FocusCouncil sets policy; manager implements neutrallyMayor influences policy and implementation; potential for executive dominanceCommissioners handle both, risking inefficiency in large operations
This table draws from structural analyses showing council–manager's design promotes administrative continuity, as managers serve indefinite terms subject to removal, unlike fixed mayoral terms of 2–4 years. Empirical studies indicate council–manager governments often achieve higher efficiency in service delivery and fiscal management compared to mayor–council forms; for instance, a synthesis of research supports propositions that council–manager cities exhibit better debt management, lower per-capita spending growth, and superior . One analysis found city-manager-led municipalities outperform mayor–council counterparts in practices and overall metrics, attributing this to professional management insulating operations from electoral politics. Critics of council–manager argue it dilutes direct voter , as unelected managers wield significant influence without facing elections, potentially leading to bureaucratic in politically charged decisions—issues less prevalent in strong-mayor systems where executives provide visible leadership. –council forms may better suit larger, diverse cities requiring charismatic executive direction, as evidenced by their prevalence in major U.S. municipalities like New York and , where mayors negotiate high-stakes budgets and crises. However, council–manager reduces special-interest sway by diffusing power across the rather than funneling it through a single elected executive, fostering broader community input. Overall, adoption patterns reflect context: council–manager prevails in over 50% of U.S. cities with populations above 10,000, correlating with preferences for expertise-driven governance over personality-led administration.

Historical Development

Origins in Progressive Era Reforms

The council–manager form of government emerged during the (approximately 1890–1920) as part of broader municipal reform efforts aimed at curbing corruption, inefficiency, and dominance in American cities, where and ward-based often prioritized spoils over . Reformers sought to insulate administration from partisan influences by separating policy-making from day-to-day operations, drawing on corporate management models to emphasize professional expertise and accountability. This approach contrasted with the prevailing mayor-council system, which concentrated executive power in elected officials vulnerable to machine , and the commission form adopted after events like the , which vested authority in a small elected board but lacked a dedicated professional administrator. A pivotal advocate was Richard S. Childs, a municipal reformer who championed the "short ballot" principle—limiting elected offices to reduce opportunities for factionalism—and promoted the council–manager structure as its practical embodiment, arguing it would enable small councils to hire trained managers akin to corporate executives. Childs's efforts, beginning around 1908 through organizations like the National Short Ballot Organization, laid the intellectual groundwork, influencing early experiments that tested the model's viability in smaller municipalities facing fiscal mismanagement and service failures. The earliest implementation occurred in , in 1908, where the city hired a professional administrator to oversee operations under an elected council, marking an initial shift toward expert-led governance amid Progressive demands for nonpartisan efficiency. , formalized the model in its 1912 charter, explicitly incorporating core principles such as a small elected council appointing a manager responsible for administration and removable at will. , adopted it in 1914 as the first major city (population over 100,000), prompted by a crisis that exposed administrative weaknesses; the success there, under initial manager Henry M. Waite, propelled national adoption by demonstrating measurable improvements in budgeting and infrastructure without expanding elected roles. These origins reflected causal priorities of the era: replacing amateurish, corruption-prone executives with accountable professionals to align with industrial-era demands for rational, evidence-based management.

Key Adoptions and Expansion in the United States

The council-manager form emerged in the United States during the Progressive Era as a response to municipal and inefficiency, with the first appointment of a occurring in , on February 24, 1908, when the city council hired an individual to oversee administrative operations under council direction. This innovation built on earlier ideas of professional administration but marked the initial practical implementation without a formal change. , followed in 1912 as the first city to formally adopt the council-manager plan via amendment, establishing a clear separation between elected policymaking and appointed execution. Dayton, Ohio, adopted the system in 1914 after a devastating flood exposed weaknesses in its mayor-council structure, becoming the first city of substantial size (population approximately 116,000) to implement it and gaining national prominence as a model for reform; Henry M. Waite served as its inaugural manager, emphasizing expert-led efficiency. This adoption spurred interest among reformers, leading to rapid early expansion: by 1920, at least 20 cities had transitioned, primarily smaller municipalities in the and Midwest seeking to professionalize operations amid pressures. Post-World War I adoptions slowed due to economic constraints and political resistance, but the form persisted in growing suburbs and newer Western cities, where homogeneous populations and less entrenched political machines facilitated acceptance. Expansion accelerated after , driven by , population booms, and advocacy from organizations like the /County Management Association (founded ), which promoted the model through training and best practices. By 1954, one-third of U.S. cities over 10,000 population operated under council-manager government, reflecting its appeal for scalable administration in diversifying metros. The and saw further growth, with a majority of cities over 10,000 adopting by 1958, often via voter referenda emphasizing fiscal control and nonpartisan expertise over patronage. This trend favored the Midwest and Far West, where younger, less tradition-bound municipalities predominated. Contemporary prevalence underscores sustained expansion: as of 2019, approximately 59% of U.S. cities utilized the council-manager form, rising to 63% for populations over 25,000 and 57% over 10,000, per International City/County Management Association surveys tracking municipal charters. Since 1970, most newly incorporated cities have selected this structure, contributing to a 45% increase in council-manager municipalities over recent decades, as documented in ICMA analyses of form-of-government shifts. This growth correlates with demands for professional management in expanding metro areas, though abandonments occur in some larger cities reverting to strong-mayor systems for perceived executive .

International Introductions and Adaptations

The council–manager form of government, originating in the United States during the Progressive Era, found early adoption outside the country in , where , , implemented it in 1913, marking the first formal instance beyond U.S. borders. This introduction aligned with reform efforts to professionalize municipal administration amid rapid , emphasizing an appointed manager's expertise over elected executives' potential partisanship. By the mid-20th century, the model had spread to various Canadian municipalities, particularly in provinces like and , where it facilitated efficient service delivery in growing cities without diluting council oversight. In other Commonwealth nations, adaptations emerged to suit local constitutional frameworks. and incorporated the system for both municipal and county levels, often retaining ceremonial mayors while vesting executive authority in professional managers appointed by elected councils. and the similarly adopted variants, with Australian local governments in states like employing council-appointed general managers to handle operations, reflecting a blend of British parliamentary traditions and American managerial efficiency. In the , the form influenced municipal structures where aldermen (elected executives) collaborate with appointed civil servants akin to managers, prioritizing technocratic administration over strongman leadership. These adaptations typically preserved elected policy-making while insulating day-to-day execution from electoral cycles, though implementation varied by national legal constraints on local . More recent explorations include , where examined the council–manager model in the 2020s as part of post-communist decentralization reforms. A study of Croatian local officials revealed moderate receptiveness, citing potential benefits in curbing and enhancing , though resistance stemmed from entrenched political networks. Such efforts highlight the model's appeal in transitioning democracies seeking to balance democratic accountability with administrative competence, often requiring legal amendments to empower appointed managers over elected intermediaries. Overall, international variants demonstrate the form's flexibility, with over 3,000 local governments worldwide employing it by the early , though empirical data on long-term outcomes remains sparser than in the U.S. context.

Operational Framework

Roles of the Elected Council

In the council–manager form of government, the elected functions as the primary legislative and representative body, concentrating on formulation, vision-setting, and oversight rather than daily operations. All governmental authority resides with the council, which enacts ordinances, adopts resolutions, and makes high-level decisions on issues such as , priorities, and service levels, while the manager implements these directives. This separation ensures elected officials focus on collective over administrative minutiae, with council members serving staggered terms—typically four years—to maintain continuity. The council's core responsibilities include appointing and evaluating the or manager, who serves at its discretion and can be removed for cause or misalignment. It approves the annual proposed by the manager, sets rates, and authorizes expenditures, ensuring fiscal alignment with goals; for instance, councils must authorize departmental structures and compensation levels per state statutes like Washington's RCW 35A.12.090. Oversight extends to monitoring managerial performance through periodic reviews, but councils delegate personnel decisions—hiring, firing, and supervision—to the manager to avoid . Elected s also embody representative functions, acting as conduits for constituent input via public hearings and meetings, while balancing local advocacy with stewardship for broader welfare. Governance frameworks from organizations like the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) outline six key council roles: strategic visionary for long-term ; trustee-steward for impartial ; constituent for resident concerns; builder for consensus; decision-maker for voting on proposals; and overseer for without administrative interference. These roles reinforce the council's non-executive position, prohibiting direct intervention in operations to preserve professional management integrity. In practice, councils engage citizens through public comment periods but retain final authority, limited by state-granted powers and provisions where applicable.

Duties and Selection of the City Manager

The city manager is appointed by a majority vote of the elected council for an indefinite term, serving at the pleasure of the governing body without elective status. Selection emphasizes professional qualifications over political affiliation, with minimum requirements typically including a master's degree in public administration or related field plus at least two years of local government management experience, or a bachelor's degree plus five years of such experience. The process involves developing a job description tailored to community needs, advertising the position through professional networks like the International City/County Management Association (ICMA), reviewing applications, conducting interviews with top candidates, and negotiating a formal employment agreement that includes performance goals and annual evaluations. Councils may engage executive recruitment firms for broader searches, particularly in larger municipalities, to ensure candidates possess demonstrated skills in personnel administration, budget management, and policy implementation. Many successful candidates hold a Master of Public Administration (MPA) degree, reflecting the profession's emphasis on advanced training, though backgrounds in political science or business administration are also common. As the , the directs all administrative operations under the council's policy guidance, exercising independent professional judgment while remaining continuously accountable to the elected body. Core duties include appointing and removing department heads and other city personnel to maintain efficient service delivery; preparing and submitting the annual budget for council approval, along with regular financial reports; and supervising day-to-day municipal functions such as utilities, , and . The manager advises the council on administrative feasibility, fiscal implications of proposed policies, and long-term community goals, often coordinating interdepartmental efforts to implement ordinances and promote operational innovations. Removal occurs by majority council vote, potentially following a public hearing, underscoring the system's design for managerial responsiveness without tenure protections that could entrench inefficiency. This structure prioritizes expertise-driven execution, as evidenced by ICMA surveys showing managers' focus on balancing public funds and achieving measurable service outcomes.

Policy Implementation and Administrative Processes

In the council-manager , the elected establishes through legislative actions such as ordinances, resolutions, and approvals, which the professionally appointed is responsible for executing. The manager translates these directives into operational plans, directing department heads and staff to carry out services like public safety, , and programs without direct council interference in daily administration. This division ensures that policy reflects electoral mandates while implementation leverages managerial expertise, with the manager held accountable to the full council for outcomes. Administrative processes under the manager include preparing and submitting an annual for review and adoption, typically aligned with goals and fiscal constraints. The manager executes the approved by allocating funds across departments, procuring , and monitoring expenditures to maintain financial compliance. Personnel management falls to the manager, who recruits, appoints, and evaluates department directors and employees based on merit, often under rules, fostering a non-partisan insulated from political turnover. Operational oversight involves coordinating interdepartmental efforts, such as integrating technology for service efficiency or responding to emergencies, with regular performance metrics reported back to the . To ensure fidelity in implementation, managers employ tools like , systems, and public reporting, allowing the council to evaluate results without micromanaging. For instance, key performance indicators track metrics such as response times for services or per capita for , enabling data-driven adjustments to policies. Audits and council work sessions provide mechanisms for oversight, where the manager presents progress reports and recommends refinements, maintaining a feedback loop that prioritizes over political expediency. This structure has been credited with reducing administrative duplication, as evidenced by ICMA analyses showing council-manager municipalities often achieving lower per-capita s in service delivery compared to politicized systems.

Empirical Evidence of Performance

Efficiency and Innovation Metrics

Empirical assessments of in council-manager governments highlight advantages in and fiscal management, though evidence on pure operational cost minimization remains limited. Studies indicate that city managers allocate more time to administrative duties—averaging 50.8% of their efforts compared to 44.2% for mayors in mayor-council systems—enabling focused implementation of policies without political distractions. Council-manager municipalities are also 15% more likely to out services, facilitating cost reductions through competitive bidding and specialization. Fiscal analyses, such as those examining production costs for public services, reveal lower expenditures per unit of output in council-manager forms, attributed to oversight reducing . Regarding innovation, council-manager systems demonstrate higher adoption rates of administrative and reforms. A 2015 study of U.S. municipalities found that council-manager governments, including those with ceremonial mayors, exhibited elevated in practices, even after controlling for size and growth. This includes greater implementation of tools and service delivery , with evidence from reviews of 76 studies supporting broader experimentation due to apolitical executive . Such metrics underscore causal links between professional and proactive adaptation, though outcomes vary by local context and do not universally outperform in all service domains.

Fiscal Responsibility and Service Outcomes

Council-manager governments demonstrate enhanced fiscal responsibility through professional administrative oversight, which correlates with lower long-term levels and higher fund balances relative to mayor-council systems. Empirical analysis of U.S. municipalities indicates that council-manager structures maintain superior budgetary , as evidenced by reduced expenditures on basic services while sustaining . These outcomes stem from the adoption of sophisticated revenue , multiyear budgeting, and expenditure controls, practices more prevalent in manager-led forms than in politically dominated mayor-council setups. Bond ratings further underscore this fiscal prudence, with council-manager municipalities exhibiting statistically higher assessments. A study of cities using 2005 data found the manager form positively associated with elevated bond ratings (ordered coefficient: 0.742, p<0.01), attributing this to diminished political interference in financial decisions and enhanced managerial expertise. Lower debt burdens in these systems reduce fiscal liabilities, enabling more predictable borrowing costs and compared to mayor-council counterparts, where mayoral influence on administrators can exacerbate financial strain. Regarding service outcomes, council-manager frameworks yield greater efficiency in delivery, facilitated by advanced information systems and that optimize resource use. Cities under this model achieve efficiency gains in core functions such as and response, with lower spending correlating to sustained or improved service levels rather than cuts. Additionally, these governments experience 57% fewer convictions among officials, fostering that indirectly bolsters service quality by minimizing misallocation of funds. While causal links require controlling for factors like size and economic conditions, the consistent empirical patterns across studies affirm that apolitical promotes cost-effective outcomes without compromising .

Comparative Studies with Mayor-Council Systems

Empirical research consistently indicates that council-manager governments outperform mayor-council systems in fiscal responsibility and administrative efficiency. A comprehensive review by James H. Svara synthesizes studies supporting ten propositions, including superior fiscal management, lower debt levels, and reduced in council-manager forms, attributing these to professional management insulated from electoral . For instance, council-manager cities exhibit stronger budgetary , with lower long-term liabilities and more conservative revenue forecasting compared to mayor-council counterparts, as evidenced by analyses of over 1,000 U.S. municipalities from 1997 to 2012. On , municipalities with council-manager structures are 57 percent less likely to experience federal convictions than those under mayor-council systems, based on a of 1,805 U.S. cities from 1997 to 2011; this disparity arises from diffused executive power and professional oversight reducing opportunities for . Mayor-council systems, with concentrated executive in an elected , correlate with higher instances of and , as the role incentivizes short-term political gains over long-term integrity. Service delivery and innovation metrics further favor council-manager governments. Studies show they allocate resources more efficiently to core services like public safety and , with lower per-capita spending variances and higher adoption rates of tools—up to 20 percent more frequent use of fiscal analyses—due to managerial expertise rather than political bargaining. In contrast, mayor-council systems often prioritize visible projects for electoral appeal, leading to fragmented administration and slower , though some notes no significant gap in smaller jurisdictions where mayoral enhances to local priorities.
MetricCouncil-Manager AdvantageEvidence Source
Corruption Convictions57% lower likelihoodPublic Administration Review (2019)
Budgetary SolvencyStronger reserves, lower Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (2019)
Fiscal Analysis Use20% higher frequencySvara Review (2015)
Service EfficiencyMore consistent outcomesNBER (2009)
Critics of council-manager systems argue they diminish democratic , as unelected managers may prioritize technocratic over voter , a concern less prevalent in mayor-council forms where direct executive elections foster visible . However, empirical data on citizen satisfaction shows comparable or higher approval in council-manager cities for , suggesting professional administration enhances rather than undermines through stable governance.

Criticisms and Challenges

Concerns Over Democratic Legitimacy

Critics of the council-manager government argue that its structure creates a by vesting substantial executive authority in an unelected , who oversees daily operations, budget execution, and policy implementation without direct voter mandate. This arrangement, originating from reforms in the early 20th century aimed at professionalizing administration to curb , prioritizes expertise over electoral , potentially distancing from public will. While the elected council appoints and can remove the manager—typically serving terms averaging 5-7 years in U.S. municipalities—the indirect nature of this oversight is seen as insufficient to ensure responsiveness to constituent demands, as voters influence the manager only through council elections held every 2-4 years. Expanded roles of city managers into advisory and leadership functions exacerbate legitimacy concerns, as these activities blur the separation between elected policymaking and appointed administration, undermining the council's primacy. Studies indicate that managers in over 80% of council-manager cities engage in substantive influence, raising questions about whether such involvement derives legitimate authority from bureaucratic expertise or electoral representation. Opponents, including local advocates, contend this dynamic fosters perceptions of , where professional administrators prioritize efficiency metrics over diverse community values, as evidenced in debates over adopting the form in cities like Albuquerque in 2025, where it was criticized for weakening direct executive accountability. Empirical challenges to the system often cite this as a key factor, with some municipalities reverting to strong-mayor models to restore voter control over . Theoretical analyses highlight that while legal foundations grant managers authority through council delegation, true democratic legitimacy requires alignment with voter sovereignty, which indirect mechanisms may fail to guarantee amid complex urban . For instance, in cases of managerial overreach, such as influencing priorities without council consensus, accountability relies on council intervention, but divided councils—common in nonpartisan elections—can prolong misalignments with public preferences. These structural vulnerabilities contribute to ongoing debates, with critics asserting that the form's emphasis on apolitical administration inadvertently erodes trust in local institutions by obscuring lines of responsibility.

Risks of Managerial Overreach and Instability

In the council-manager form of government, managerial overreach occurs when the appointed extends influence beyond administrative execution into formulation, exploiting expertise and informational advantages to shape decisions. This dynamic can erode the elected 's primacy in setting directions, as managers may selectively present data or recommendations that align with their preferences, fostering a of unelected dominance over local . For example, in instances where managers publicly advocate for controversial positions, they risk assuming roles akin to elected executives, potentially shielding from political while advancing agendas not fully vetted through democratic processes. Empirical studies highlight how such overreach stems from structural ambiguities in the model, where the manager's professional autonomy—intended to insulate administration from —can inadvertently enable subtle policy steering. Research analyzing council-manager relations identifies policy disagreements as a primary trigger for tensions, with managers sometimes prioritizing operational efficiencies or long-term visions over short-term electoral mandates, leading to accusations of bureaucratic capture. In cities like Santa Monica, critics have noted that unelected staff, including managers, often dominate decision-making under this system, prompting calls for stronger elected oversight to counteract such imbalances. Instability manifests prominently through elevated turnover rates among city managers, averaging around 3 to 5 years in many U.S. municipalities, driven by conflicts with councils over styles or perceived encroachments on roles. Quantitative analyses of municipal data reveal that council-manager discord, particularly on substantive issues like priorities or service delivery, significantly elevates dismissal risks, with one study finding that external conflicts double the likelihood of turnover compared to internal council strife alone. This churn disrupts administrative continuity, hampers long-term , and signals underlying fragility, as frequent leadership vacuums deter high-caliber candidates and amplify short-term political pressures. Further compounding instability, economic or political shifts exacerbate manager-council misalignments, as evidenced by models linking turnover to volatile local conditions such as electoral changes or fiscal downturns. In cases like , where a city manager resigned amid widespread complaints and internal turmoil in 2023, such events underscore how unresolved overreach disputes can cascade into operational breakdowns and public distrust. While some research posits that occasional turnover enables adaptation, persistent patterns—observed in over 20% of council-manager cities annually—indicate systemic vulnerabilities that undermine the model's purported stability advantages over alternatives like mayor-council systems.

Empirical Cases of Failures and Abandonments

In the of 2010, the council-manager system facilitated extensive corruption, with Robert Rizzo receiving an annual salary of $787,000 and assistant manager Angela Spaccia $376,000, alongside members paid up to $100 per meeting despite minimal duties in a low-income city of about 40,000 residents; Rizzo was later sentenced to 12 years in for misappropriation of public funds, , and falsification of records, while the episode exposed complicity in approving unchecked and deals exceeding $10 million in total liabilities. This case exemplified risks of managerial overreach, as the professional manager and passive enabled estimated at over $5 million, prompting state legislative reforms like Government Code Section 3511.2 limiting executive contracts but without altering the underlying form. Abandonments of the council-manager form remain infrequent, with national data indicating only about 3.5% of adopting cities reverted within a 12-year period as of the mid-20th century, and in , just three successful voter reversals out of 34 elections over 90 years. Among larger cities, Cleveland, Ohio, adopted the form in 1924 but abandoned it after a brief trial period by the early , citing inadequate political leadership and fragmentation that hindered decisive action amid economic challenges. Similarly, , , implemented council-manager government in 1942 but voters rejected it in 1947, favoring a return to mayor-council amid postwar growth demands for a more visible executive to handle rapid and needs. More recently, , effectively deviated from council-manager principles without a formal voter , as city managers over the past decade usurped roles—such as agenda control and staff time allocations traditionally reserved for the —while city staff and salaries expanded disproportionately compared to peer municipalities, fostering opacity through confidential favoring the manager over the body. Critics attributed this erosion to weakened democratic oversight, including a misogynistic environment that discouraged scrutiny, underscoring how internal dynamics can undermine the system's purported professional insulation from . In smaller cases like Electra (adopted 1975, abandoned 1989) and Ranger (1919–1921), reversals similarly stemmed from local dissatisfaction with managerial detachment during fiscal or service delivery shortfalls. These instances highlight causal vulnerabilities, such as diluted enabling either or , prompting shifts toward forms with stronger elected executives despite the council-manager model's general resilience.

Global Prevalence and Variations

The council-manager form is the predominant structure of municipal government in the United States, particularly in cities with populations exceeding 10,000 residents. According to data from the / Association (ICMA), approximately 54% of the over 4,300 U.S. municipalities with populations of 10,000 or more operate under this system, rising to 59% among the 347 largest municipalities exceeding 100,000 residents. This form governs communities home to over 92 million people, reflecting its scalability for professional administration in diverse urban settings. In contrast, smaller towns and rural areas more frequently retain traditional mayor-council or commission structures, where elections and part-time officials suffice for simpler operations. Historically, adoption surged during the Progressive Era following its inception in , in 1901, as reformers sought to insulate administration from machine politics and . The form's expansion accelerated after , especially in postwar suburban growth areas, establishing it as the principal model for cities over 5,000 residents by the mid-20th century, with steady diffusion documented in ICMA records showing increases from fewer than 500 implementations in the to over 3,500 by 2007 among municipalities above 2,500 residents. This trajectory aligned with demands for expertise-driven governance amid urbanization, outpacing mayor-council persistence in entrenched political centers like older industrial cities. Contemporary trends indicate stability with episodic shifts, as economic pressures and growth dynamics influence form changes. While the council-manager model remains the most common per ICMA's Municipal Form of Government Survey—covering over 4,100 respondents—some expanding cities have transitioned to mayor-council systems to consolidate executive authority for navigating complex challenges like booms or fiscal crises. Event-history analyses reveal that abandonments correlate with prosperous conditions enabling voter preferences for visible leadership, whereas adoptions occur amid downturns favoring managerial efficiency; net adoptions have slowed since the 1980s, but outright reversals remain rare, affecting fewer than 1% of implementations annually. This equilibrium underscores the form's resilience in mid-sized municipalities, though hybrids incorporating elected mayoral vetoes have emerged in select jurisdictions to balance professional management with political accountability.

Implementations in Europe and Beyond

In Ireland, the –manager form has been utilized in select urban districts and borough corporations since the early , with managers appointed by elected s to oversee administrative operations, as seen in historical adoptions predating widespread U.S. implementation. This structure emphasizes professional management while maintaining council policy oversight, though reforms in the shifted some responsibilities toward directly elected mayors in larger cities. The United Kingdom employs analogous systems in many local councils, where elected members appoint a chief executive or managing director to handle day-to-day administration, separating political leadership from operational duties; this model, rooted in 1970s local government reorganization, is prevalent in non-metropolitan districts and unitary authorities. Similar arrangements exist in the Netherlands, particularly in smaller municipalities, where councils hire a secretary-general or burgemeester-supported manager for executive functions, promoting efficiency in service delivery. Beyond Europe, adopted the form early, with Westmount, , implementing it in 1913 as one of the first international examples, and it remains common in provinces like and , where councils appoint chief administrative officers (CAOs) for over 1,600 municipalities. In , state-level local governments in and Victoria frequently use council-general manager structures, with approximately 500 councils employing appointed CEOs since the 1990s reforms emphasizing professional governance. New Zealand's territorial authorities, numbering around 78 as of 2020, operate under a comparable model, with elected councils delegating executive powers to chief executives appointed under the Local Government Act 2002. Interest in formal adoption has emerged in , such as , where surveys of local officials in 2023–2024 indicated receptiveness to council–manager reforms for depoliticizing administration, though no widespread implementations have occurred as of 2025. In contrast, continental European nations like and predominantly retain strong-mayor systems augmented by appointed administrative directors, diverging from pure council–manager principles due to traditions of fused political-executive authority.

Hybrid Models and Recent Reforms

Hybrid models of council-manager government integrate elements of the traditional council-manager structure with features from mayor-council systems, typically by enhancing the of an elected while retaining a for administrative duties. These variations aim to address criticisms of democratic legitimacy by providing a visible elected executive, without fully shifting executive authority away from the appointed manager. According to classifications by scholars James H. and Kimberly A. Nelson, true hybrid forms include the "empowered mayor-council-manager," where the appoints the manager subject to council approval, possesses power over council decisions, conducts initial reviews, or appoints department heads, thereby blending ceremonial and limited leadership with managerial expertise. Examples of such hybrids exist primarily in the United States, where approximately 20 municipalities in operate under a mixed form combining council-manager administration with a stronger al presence, often featuring an elected who influences appointments or policy initiation. In , , the charter establishes a hybrid by allowing the to serve at the council's pleasure while incorporating mayoral input in a manner that deviates from pure council-manager . Internationally, hybrid adaptations are less common but appear in contexts where council-manager principles are layered onto existing parliamentary-local structures, such as in select European municipalities experimenting with professional managers under council oversight augmented by executive to improve . These models have proliferated in response to empirical observations that pure council-manager systems can suffer from diffused leadership, with studies indicating hybrids foster marginally higher innovation rates in smaller cities due to clarified roles, though differences remain statistically minor across variations. Recent reforms in the council-manager system reflect ongoing adaptations to enhance efficiency, responsiveness, and professional management amid fiscal pressures and public demands for transparency. In the United States, voters in , , approved charter amendments in 2024 that strengthened the city manager's position by eliminating salary caps and term limits, enabling retention of experienced administrators to handle complex urban challenges like and budgeting. Similarly, in 2025, , transitioned to a council-manager form effective November 3, following voter approval, emphasizing policy-setting by elected councils paired with expert implementation to combat perceived inefficiencies in prior structures. , saw its city council override a mayoral in August 2025 to place a reverting to council-manager government on the ballot, aiming to eliminate the strong mayor office and restore professional management after documented administrative instability. The / Management Association (ICMA) reported successful adoptions in Mattoon and , in 2025, alongside advocacy efforts in other cities to promote the form for its track record in reducing and improving service delivery. Internationally, reforms indicate growing interest in council-manager principles as a tool for modernizing local governance. A 2024 exploratory study in found local officials receptive to adopting the model to enhance administrative professionalism and reduce political interference, with pilot implementations emphasizing manager-led execution under council policy direction, though full-scale rollout remains limited by entrenched traditions. These reforms, driven by of better fiscal outcomes in manager-led systems—such as lower debt ratios and higher service efficiency in adopting U.S. cities—underscore a trend toward hybridization and reinforcement of managerial roles to balance expertise with electoral , without evidence of widespread abandonment in the .

Contemporary Debates

Evolving Council-Manager Dynamics

In the early , city managers in council-manager governments operated primarily as neutral administrators focused on efficient implementation of council policies, a role rooted in the progressive reform movement's emphasis on separating politics from administration. Over decades, however, managers' responsibilities expanded to include substantive policy advisory functions, driven by the growing complexity of urban issues such as , demands, and . This shift was evident by the late 1980s, when empirical analyses documented managers' increasing political activism in agenda-setting and option-framing, without formal authority to decide policy. By the , research confirmed enduring involvement alongside emerging roles, where managers engage in public visioning and stakeholder coordination to address fragmented local challenges. Variation in stems from noninstitutional factors, including managers' professional expertise, alignment of preferences with elected officials, and mayors' political experience, which can prompt to managers on technical matters. Such involvement often trades off against pure administrative control, creating tensions as managers balance compliance with proactive input, particularly in council-manager cities where elected bodies retain ultimate sovereignty. Recent trends reflect heightened collaboration amid external pressures like fiscal constraints and public distrust, with managers increasingly shaping through data-driven recommendations while councils assert oversight to maintain democratic . Professional associations such as the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) advocate for this evolved model, citing empirical evidence of superior ethical performance—council-manager systems are 57% less prone to instances compared to mayor-council forms—though challenges persist from political turnover and calls for stronger elected leadership in larger municipalities. In response, some communities have explored hybrids, but core dynamics emphasize professional management buffering councils from daily operations, fostering stability despite evolving expectations for managerial influence.

Responses to Equity, Representation, and Trust Issues

Proponents of the council-manager system address trust concerns by highlighting the form's association with reduced risks, which fosters greater public confidence in integrity. A 2019 study published in Public Administration Review analyzed municipal across government structures and found that council-manager governments are 57% less likely to experience compared to mayor-council forms, attributing this to professional practices that prioritize ethical standards over political . This ethical framework, enforced through bodies like the / Association (ICMA), includes adherence to codes that emphasize transparency and , countering perceptions of instability or overreach. To mitigate representation challenges, city managers facilitate policy processes that accommodate diverse council viewpoints, enabling elected officials to better reflect community interests without managerial interference in electoral dynamics. Managers operationalize representation by anticipating claims from varied constituencies and integrating them into administrative advice, as outlined in professional literature on local government roles. This neutral facilitation helps councils navigate social heterogeneity, where direct elected mayors might prioritize personal agendas over collective representation. In practice, ICMA guidelines encourage managers to support councils in building inclusive decision-making, though empirical surveys indicate no inherent structural advantage in trust perceptions tied to form alone, underscoring the importance of competent service delivery. Equity issues are tackled through procedural fairness in and service delivery, with managers conceptualizing as a core integrated into daily operations. Interviews with 23 local leaders reveal that council-manager administrators prioritize equitable processes, such as data-informed budgeting, despite occasional resistance from elected bodies favoring political priorities. In response, ICMA updated its Code of in 2023 following extensive member consultations—including surveys of over 2,100 professionals and focus groups—to explicitly commit managers to equity, racial , and inclusive service for all segments, addressing critiques of systemic disparities. Complementing this, a 2022 ICMA-commissioned study of 353 local governments found 42% operate formal (DEI) programs, emphasizing diverse recruitment (43% usage) and equitable employee treatment (52% focus), which enhance internal equity and, by extension, external policy in council-manager settings. These measures aim to operationalize equity via merit-based, impartial administration rather than redistributive mandates, though implementation varies by local context and alignment.

References

  1. https://icma.org/page/icma-history
  2. https://icma.org/page/council-manager-form-government-resources
  3. https://www.sugarlandtx.gov/Faq.aspx?QID=188
  4. https://icma.org/articles/article/icma-2018-municipal-form-government-survey
  5. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24757440
  6. https://evanstonroundtable.com/2022/07/14/city-government-101-pros-and-cons-of-council-manager-government/
  7. https://fiveable.me/key-terms/fundamentals-american-government/council-manager-system
  8. https://www.colleyville.com/government/departments-a-l/city-manager/council-manager-form-of-government
  9. https://www.cibolotx.gov/government/city_managers_office/council___manager_form_of_government/index.php
  10. https://content.civicplus.com/api/assets/97018dbe-489b-4fe2-b2fd-9ba5aec8c635?cache=1800
  11. https://icma.org/sites/default/files/302618_Council-Manager%2520or%2520Strong%2520Mayor%2520-%2520The%2520Choice%2520is%2520Clear.pdf
  12. https://icma.org/sites/default/files/Council-Manager%20Form%20Brochure%20(FINAL)%2010-2019.pdf
  13. https://ballotpedia.org/Council-manager_government
  14. https://mrsc.org/explore-topics/officials/roles/roles-and-responsibilities
  15. https://www.nlc.org/resource/cities-101-forms-of-local-government/
  16. https://flintcitycharter.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Forms-of-Government-comparison-chart.pdf
  17. https://mrsc.org/explore-topics/government-organization/cities/city-forms-of-government
  18. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280915640_What_Have_We_Learned_about_the_Performance_of_Council-Manager_Government_A_Review_and_Synthesis_of_the_Research
  19. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0278425403000206
  20. https://lims.minneapolismn.gov/Download/FileV2/23033/ModelsofCityGovernment.pdf
  21. https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtid=2&psid=3137
  22. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/biography/richard-spencer-childs
  23. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/councilmanager-government-the-political-thought-of-its-founder-richard-s-childs-by-john-porter-east-chapel-hill-university-of-north-carolina-press-1965-pp-vii-183-450/037366F40045FECD6D0D9ED5B4D37DAD
  24. https://www.madison-heights.org/Faq.aspx?QID=128
  25. https://patimes.org/is-the-council-manager-form-of-government-the-right-form-of-government/
  26. https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2612&context=roadschool
  27. https://www.burlingtonnc.gov/2400/History-of-the-CouncilManager-Form-of-Go
  28. https://video.dos.ny.gov/lg/handbook/html/city_government.html
  29. https://www.clevelandheights.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1848
  30. https://www.ilcma.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/form-of-government-statistics.pdf
  31. https://icma.org/sites/default/files/%257BB14D75E4-C2A4-4C1B-84FD-E9E8B7A20A9C%257D.pdf
  32. https://springfieldohio.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Council_Manager_Government2.pdf
  33. https://www.ilcma.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Council-Manager-Form-of-Government_ICMA-Brochure.pdf
  34. https://www.ogallala-ne.gov/your_government/overview/index.php
  35. https://www.rrnm.gov/1616/Council-Manager-Form-of-Government
  36. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0160323X241232166
  37. https://eastprovidenceri.qscend.com/filestorage/9177/9461/9463/9596/ICMA_Council-Manager_Form_of_Government.pdf
  38. https://icma.org/articles/pm-magazine/getting-great-defining-roles-governing-body-and-local-government-manager
  39. https://www.nationalcivicleague.org/model-city-charter-9th-edition-article-iii-city-manager/
  40. https://icma.org/hiring-a-manager
  41. https://icma.org/what-it-takes-be-professional-local-government-manager
  42. https://icma.org/sites/default/files/Council-Manager%2520Form%2520Brochure%2520%2528FINAL%2529%252010-2019.pdf
  43. https://sog.unc.edu/courses/course-materials/form-administration
  44. https://icma.org/page/careers-local-government-management
  45. https://icma.org/benefits-professional-local-government-management
  46. https://www.ca-ilg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/a_key_ingredient_for_success__an_effective_city_council_city_manager_relationship.pdf?1498671576
  47. https://www.sog.unc.edu/publications/articles/form-government-still-matters-fostering-innovation-us-municipal-governments-american-review-public
  48. https://jdacm.com/index.php/jdacm/article/download/49/41
  49. https://mccmeetingspublic.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/landerwy-meet-7e46ad5184114e28ba86d8c6e82dd4cd/ITEM-Attachment-001-a9010b572f3249dc87f494f4cc08b877.pdf
  50. https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=gov_fac
  51. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09540962.2021.1923168
  52. https://digitalcommons.wcupa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1113&context=all_doctoral
  53. https://academic.oup.com/jpart/article/30/1/161/5544095
  54. https://icma.org/blog-posts/study-confirms-council-manager-governments-are-more-ethical
  55. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332324933_Ethics_by_Design_The_Impact_of_Form_of_Government_on_Municipal_Corruption
  56. https://indigo.uic.edu/ndownloader/files/19261835
  57. https://ideas.repec.org/p/iuk/wpaper/2007-02.html
  58. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w14857/w14857.pdf
  59. https://www.salina.com/story/opinion/columns/2023/11/05/unelected-leaders-make-many-kansas-municipalities-daily-decisions/71411457007/
  60. https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/context/localgovernmentreconsidered/article/1201/viewcontent/Tom_Hogen_Esch___Predator_State___Corruption_in_a_Concil_Manager_System___Case_of_Bell_CA.pdf
  61. https://www.abqjournal.com/2599698/council-manager-system-strong-mayor-council-system.html
  62. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24758024
  63. https://academic.oup.com/jpart/article/20/2/461/1151200/City-Managers-Policy-Leadership-in-Council-Manager
  64. https://www.sccounties.org/sites/default/files/uploads/meetings/annual-conference/2021/lemmie_democracy_beyond_the_ballot_box.pdf
  65. https://www.goodlocalgovernment.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/John-Nalbandian-Facilitating-Community-Enabling-Democracy-New-Roles-for-Local-Government-Managers.pdf
  66. https://smmirror.com/2025/10/sm-a-r-t-column-santa-monicas-governance-problem-elected-council-strong-mayor-or-part-two-of-two/
  67. https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/R_DeHoog_City_1991.pdf
  68. https://www.jstor.org/stable/977109
  69. https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/163796/padm12663_am.pdf
  70. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227496502_Turnover_among_City_Managers_The_Role_of_Political_and_Economic_Change
  71. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1078087419869544
  72. https://icma.org/sites/default/files/3407_.pdf
  73. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/04/16/303768753/ex-city-manager-caught-in-calif-salary-scandal-gets-12-years
  74. https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/former-chief-administrative-officer-city-bell-sentenced-federal-prison-cheating-irs
  75. https://www.jstor.org/stable/975605
  76. https://www.tcma.org/155/Council-Manager-Form-of-Government-PDF
  77. https://dentonrc.com/opinion/denton-has-abandoned-its-council-manager-form-of-government/article_c8b20a2a-87f5-5b16-a06e-3a57b9d7ac4b.html
  78. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42003002
  79. https://www.cityofithaca.org/FAQ.aspx?QID=277
  80. https://www.madison-heights.org/Faq.aspx?QID=127
  81. https://icma.org/blog-posts/municipal-form-government-numbers
  82. https://www.governing.com/archive/government-mayor-council-manager-form-changes.html
  83. https://icma.org/2018-municipal-fog-survey
  84. https://cplg.sog.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/16800/2019/03/0275074010382134.pdf
  85. https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/edcoll/9781789908244/9781789908244.00021.pdf
  86. https://www.memun.org/Training/Citizen-Education/Forms-of-Government
  87. https://www.clevelandheights.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1592/Forms-of-Government-Overview
  88. https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2048&context=allfaculty-peerpub
  89. https://www.governing.com/management-and-administration/the-form-of-governance-that-keeps-cities-moving-forward
  90. https://www.cityofhomewood.com/new-govt-passed
  91. https://www.kktv.com/2025/08/26/pueblo-city-council-overrides-mayors-veto-city-manager-form-government/
  92. https://priceschool.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Sahn.pdf
  93. https://icma.org/articles/pm-magazine/making-big-strides-advocating-council-manager-government
  94. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/027507408901900401
  95. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/puar.12296
  96. https://www.calicma.org/news/the-evolving-role-of-city-managers-policy-administration-and-community-leadership
  97. https://www.ncmanagers.org/news/472217/Study-shows-council-manager-form-of-government-to-be-more-ethical.htm
  98. https://governing.com/archive/government-mayor-council-manager-form-changes.html
  99. https://ncmanagers.org/news/472217/Study-shows-council-manager-form-of-government-to-be-more-ethical.htm
  100. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/puar.13050
  101. https://icma.org
  102. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3109948
  103. http://appstate.edu/~keyem/Eskridge_and_Key.pdf
  104. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0160323X241281515
  105. https://icma.org/page/icma-code-ethics-review-focusing-diversity-equity-and-inclusion
  106. https://wacities.org/advocacy/news/advocacy-news/2022/08/10/icma-releases-results-of-study-on-local-government-dei-efforts
  107. https://slge.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/managing-lg-workforce-dei-part1_survey-data.pdf
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.