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Deduction theorem
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In mathematical logic, a deduction theorem is a metatheorem that justifies doing conditional proofs from a hypothesis in systems that do not explicitly axiomatize that hypothesis, i.e. to prove an implication , it is sufficient to assume as a hypothesis and then proceed to derive . Deduction theorems exist for both propositional logic and first-order logic.[1][2] The deduction theorem is an important tool in Hilbert-style deduction systems because it permits one to write more comprehensible and usually much shorter proofs than would be possible without it. In certain other formal proof systems the same conveniency is provided by an explicit inference rule; for example natural deduction calls it implication introduction.

In more detail, the propositional logic deduction theorem states that if a formula is deducible from a set of assumptions then the implication is deducible from ; in symbols, implies . In the special case where is the empty set, the deduction theorem claim can be more compactly written as: implies . The deduction theorem for predicate logic is similar, but comes with some extra constraints (that would for example be satisfied if is a closed formula). In general a deduction theorem needs to take into account all logical details of the theory under consideration, so each logical system technically needs its own deduction theorem, although the differences are usually minor.

The deduction theorem holds for all first-order theories with the usual[3] deductive systems for first-order logic.[4] However, there are first-order systems in which new inference rules are added for which the deduction theorem fails.[5] Most notably, the deduction theorem fails to hold in Birkhoffvon Neumann quantum logic, because the linear subspaces of a Hilbert space form a non-distributive lattice.

Examples of deduction

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  1. "Prove" axiom 1: P→(QP) [6]
    • P 1. hypothesis
      • Q 2. hypothesis
      • P 3. reiteration of 1
    • QP 4. deduction from 2 to 3
    • P→(QP) 5. deduction from 1 to 4 QED
  2. "Prove" axiom 2: (P→(QR))→((PQ)→(PR))
    • P→(QR) 1. hypothesis
      • PQ 2. hypothesis
        • P 3. hypothesis
        • Q 4. modus ponens 3,2
        • QR 5. modus ponens 3,1
        • R 6. modus ponens 4,5
      • PR 7. deduction from 3 to 6
    • (PQ)→(PR) 8. deduction from 2 to 7
    • (P→(QR))→((PQ)→(PR)) 9. deduction from 1 to 8 QED
  3. Using axiom 1 to show ((P→(QP))→R)→R:
    • (P→(QP))→R 1. hypothesis
    • P→(QP) 2. axiom 1
    • R 3. modus ponens 2,1
    • ((P→(QP))→R)→R 4. deduction from 1 to 3 QED

Virtual rules of inference

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From the examples, one can see that we have added three virtual (or extra and temporary) rules of inference to our normal axiomatic logic. These are "hypothesis", "reiteration", and "deduction". The normal rules of inference (i.e. "modus ponens" and the various axioms) remain available.

1. Hypothesis is a step where one adds an additional premise to those already available. So, if the previous step S was deduced as:

then one adds another premise H and gets:

This is symbolized by moving from the n-th level of indentation to the n+1-th level and saying[9]

  • S previous step
    • H hypothesis

2. Reiteration is a step where one re-uses a previous step. In practice, this is only necessary when one wants to take a hypothesis that is not the most recent hypothesis and use it as the final step before a deduction step.

3. Deduction is a step where one removes the most recent hypothesis (still available) and prefixes it to the previous step. This is shown by unindenting one level as follows:[9]

  • H hypothesis
  • ......... (other steps)
  • C (conclusion drawn from H)
  • HC deduction

Conversion from proof using the deduction meta-theorem to axiomatic proof

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In axiomatic versions of propositional logic, one usually has among the axiom schemas (where P, Q, and R are replaced by any propositions):

  • Axiom 1 is: P→(QP)
  • Axiom 2 is: (P→(QR))→((PQ)→(PR))
  • Modus ponens is: from P and PQ infer Q

These axiom schemas are chosen to enable one to derive the deduction theorem from them easily. So it might seem that we are begging the question. However, they can be justified by checking that they are tautologies using truth tables and that modus ponens preserves truth.

From these axiom schemas one can quickly deduce the theorem schema PP (reflexivity of implication), which is used below:

  1. (P→((QP)→P))→((P→(QP))→(PP)) from axiom schema 2 with P, (QP), P
  2. P→((QP)→P) from axiom schema 1 with P, (QP)
  3. (P→(QP))→(PP) from modus ponens applied to step 2 and step 1
  4. P→(QP) from axiom schema 1 with P, Q
  5. PP from modus ponens applied to step 4 and step 3

Suppose that we have that Γ and H together prove C, and we wish to show that Γ proves HC. For each step S in the deduction that is a premise in Γ (a reiteration step) or an axiom, we can apply modus ponens to the axiom 1, S→(HS), to get HS. If the step is H itself (a hypothesis step), we apply the theorem schema to get HH. If the step is the result of applying modus ponens to A and AS, we first make sure that these have been converted to HA and H→(AS) and then we take the axiom 2, (H→(AS))→((HA)→(HS)), and apply modus ponens to get (HA)→(HS) and then again to get HS. At the end of the proof we will have HC as required, except that now it only depends on Γ, not on H. So the deduction step will disappear, consolidated into the previous step which was the conclusion derived from H.

To minimize the complexity of the resulting proof, some preprocessing should be done before the conversion. Any steps (other than the conclusion) that do not actually depend on H should be moved up before the hypothesis step and unindented one level. And any other unnecessary steps (which are not used to get the conclusion or can be bypassed), such as reiterations that are not the conclusion, should be eliminated.

During the conversion, it may be useful to put all the applications of modus ponens to axiom 1 at the beginning of the deduction (right after the HH step).

When converting a modus ponens, if A is outside the scope of H, then it will be necessary to apply axiom 1, A→(HA), and modus ponens to get HA. Similarly, if AS is outside the scope of H, apply axiom 1, (AS)→(H→(AS)), and modus ponens to get H→(AS). It should not be necessary to do both of these, unless the modus ponens step is the conclusion, because if both are outside the scope, then the modus ponens should have been moved up before H and thus be outside the scope also.

Under the Curry–Howard correspondence, the above conversion process for the deduction meta-theorem is analogous to the conversion process from lambda calculus terms to terms of combinatory logic, where axiom 1 corresponds to the K combinator, and axiom 2 corresponds to the S combinator. Note that the I combinator corresponds to the theorem schema PP.

Helpful theorems

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If one intends to convert a complicated proof using the deduction theorem to a straight-line proof not using the deduction theorem, then it would probably be useful to prove these theorems once and for all at the beginning and then use them to help with the conversion:

helps convert the hypothesis steps.

helps convert modus ponens when the major premise is not dependent on the hypothesis, replaces axiom 2 while avoiding a use of axiom 1.

helps convert modus ponens when the minor premise is not dependent on the hypothesis, replaces axiom 2 while avoiding a use of axiom 1.

These two theorems jointly can be used in lieu of axiom 2, although the converted proof would be more complicated:

Peirce's law is not a consequence of the deduction theorem, but it can be used with the deduction theorem to prove things that one might not otherwise be able to prove.

It can also be used to get the second of the two theorems, which can be used in lieu of axiom 2.

Proof of the deduction theorem

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We prove the deduction theorem in a Hilbert-style deductive system of propositional calculus.[10]

Let be a set of formulas and and formulas, such that . We want to prove that .

Since , there is a proof of from . We prove the theorem by induction on the proof length n; thus the induction hypothesis is that for any , and such that there is a proof of from of length up to n, holds.

If n = 1 then is member of the set of formulas . Thus either , in which case is simply , which is derivable by substitution from pp, which is derivable from the axioms, and hence also , or is in , in which case ; it follows from axiom p → (qp) with substitution that and hence by modus ponens that .

Now let us assume the induction hypothesis for proofs of length up to n, and let be a formula provable from with a proof of length n+1. Then there are two possibilities:

  1. is member of the set of formulas ; in this case we proceed as for n=1.
  2. is arrived at by using modus ponens. Then there is a formula C such that proves and , and modus ponens is then used to prove . The proofs of and are with at most n steps, and by the induction hypothesis we have and . By the axiom (p → (qr)) → ((pq) → (pr)) with substitution it follows that , and by using modus ponens twice we have .

Thus in all cases the theorem holds also for n+1, and by induction the deduction theorem is proven.

The deduction theorem in predicate logic

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The deduction theorem is also valid in first-order logic in the following form:

  • If T is a theory and F, G are formulas with F closed, and , then .

Here, the symbol means "is a syntactical consequence of." We indicate below how the proof of this deduction theorem differs from that of the deduction theorem in propositional calculus.

In the most common versions of the notion of formal proof, there are, in addition to the axiom schemes of propositional calculus (or the understanding that all tautologies of propositional calculus are to be taken as axiom schemes in their own right), quantifier axioms, and in addition to modus ponens, one additional rule of inference, known as the rule of generalization: "From K, infer ∀vK."

In order to convert a proof of G from T∪{F} to one of FG from T, one deals with steps of the proof of G that are axioms or result from application of modus ponens in the same way as for proofs in propositional logic. Steps that result from application of the rule of generalization are dealt with via the following quantifier axiom (valid whenever the variable v is not free in formula H):

  • (∀v(HK))→(H→∀vK).

Since in our case F is assumed to be closed, we can take H to be F. This axiom allows one to deduce F→∀vK from FK and generalization, which is just what is needed whenever the rule of generalization is applied to some K in the proof of G.

In first-order logic, the restriction of that F be a closed formula can be relaxed given that the free variables in F has not been varied in the deduction of G from . In the case that a free variable v in F has been varied in the deduction, we write (the superscript in the turnstile indicating that v has been varied) and the corresponding form of the deduction theorem is .[11]

Example of conversion

[edit]

To illustrate how one can convert a natural deduction to the axiomatic form of proof, we apply it to the tautology Q→((QR)→R). In practice, it is usually enough to know that we could do this. We normally use the natural-deductive form in place of the much longer axiomatic proof.

First, we write a proof using a natural-deduction like method:

  • Q 1. hypothesis
    • QR 2. hypothesis
    • R 3. modus ponens 1,2
  • (QR)→R 4. deduction from 2 to 3
  • Q→((QR)→R) 5. deduction from 1 to 4 QED

Second, we convert the inner deduction to an axiomatic proof:

  • (QR)→(QR) 1. theorem schema (AA)
  • ((QR)→(QR))→(((QR)→Q)→((QR)→R)) 2. axiom 2
  • ((QR)→Q)→((QR)→R) 3. modus ponens 1,2
  • Q→((QR)→Q) 4. axiom 1
    • Q 5. hypothesis
    • (QR)→Q 6. modus ponens 5,4
    • (QR)→R 7. modus ponens 6,3
  • Q→((QR)→R) 8. deduction from 5 to 7 QED

Third, we convert the outer deduction to an axiomatic proof:

  • (QR)→(QR) 1. theorem schema (AA)
  • ((QR)→(QR))→(((QR)→Q)→((QR)→R)) 2. axiom 2
  • ((QR)→Q)→((QR)→R) 3. modus ponens 1,2
  • Q→((QR)→Q) 4. axiom 1
  • [((QR)→Q)→((QR)→R)]→[Q→(((QR)→Q)→((QR)→R))] 5. axiom 1
  • Q→(((QR)→Q)→((QR)→R)) 6. modus ponens 3,5
  • [Q→(((QR)→Q)→((QR)→R))]→([Q→((QR)→Q)]→[Q→((QR)→R)]) 7. axiom 2
  • [Q→((QR)→Q)]→[Q→((QR)→R)] 8. modus ponens 6,7
  • Q→((QR)→R) 9. modus ponens 4,8 QED

These three steps can be stated succinctly using the Curry–Howard correspondence:

  • first, in lambda calculus, the function f = λa. λb. b a has type q → (qr) → r
  • second, by lambda elimination on b, f = λa. s i (k a)
  • third, by lambda elimination on a, f = s (k (s i)) k

See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Deduction Theorem is a core principle in mathematical logic that links the provability of a formula from an extended set of assumptions to the provability of a conditional statement from the original assumptions alone. Formally, it asserts that if a set of formulas Γ together with an additional formula A entails a formula B (denoted Γ, A ⊢ B), then Γ alone entails the implication A ⊃ B (or A → B, depending on notation). This theorem holds in many deductive systems, including classical and intuitionistic propositional and predicate logics, and is typically proven by induction on the length of derivations. The theorem's significance lies in its role as a bridge between hypothetical reasoning and unconditional proofs, enabling the systematic construction of implications in proof systems like natural deduction and Hilbert-style axiomatic frameworks. It facilitates the formalization of conditional arguments, supports automated theorem proving in computer science, and underpins meta-logical properties such as soundness and completeness in various logics, including substructural and modal variants. Historically, the idea was anticipated semantically by Bernard Bolzano in the early 19th century, but its syntactic formulation emerged with Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift (1879), where it was used without proof. Jacques Herbrand provided a rigorous proof in 1930, independently of Alfred Tarski, who later generalized it as a defining condition for abstract deductive systems. Gerhard Gentzen further integrated it into natural deduction systems in the 1930s, emphasizing its connection to introduction and elimination rules for implication.

Overview

Definition and Statement

The Deduction Theorem is a fundamental meta-theorem in mathematical logic that establishes a correspondence between conditional proofs and the introduction of implications in formal deductive systems. Formally, in a deductive system equipped with the implication connective (→) and the modus ponens rule, it states that for any set of premises Γ, and formulas A and B, if Γ ∪ {A} ⊢ B (meaning B is derivable from Γ together with the assumption A), then Γ ⊢ A → B (meaning the implication A → B is derivable from Γ alone). This equivalence holds in both directions under appropriate conditions, providing a bidirectional link between hypothetical derivability and unconditional provability of conditionals. As a meta-theorem, the Deduction Theorem operates at a level above the object of the logical , justifying the practice of hypothetical reasoning by demonstrating that temporary assumptions can be systematically discharged through the formation of implications. It was first rigorously formulated by Jacques Herbrand in 1930 for classical propositional logic and independently by for sentential systems, highlighting its role in validating structural rules of inference without altering the underlying axioms. This meta-level property enables the transformation of proofs involving assumptions into pure theorems, streamlining the construction of formal derivations. The theorem's scope is primarily within formal systems that include implication as a primitive connective and as an inference rule, such as Hilbert-style axiomatic systems for classical propositional logic. It extends naturally to first-order predicate logic and certain non-classical logics like intuitionistic systems, provided the underlying supports the necessary structural features. Intuitively, the Deduction Theorem bridges localized deductions made under specific assumptions to globally valid theorems, encapsulating the logical intuition that "if assuming A leads to B, then A implies B" in a precise, system-independent manner.

Historical Development

The idea was anticipated semantically by in the early in his Wissenschaftslehre, though without a syntactic proof. The roots of the deduction theorem trace back to the early 20th-century axiomatic program initiated by , which emphasized rigorous formalization of through finite proofs from axioms, implicitly relying on principles akin to the theorem for handling hypothetical reasoning. Earlier, implicit uses appeared in Gottlob Frege's (1879), where formal deductions assumed the equivalence between assuming a premise and deriving a conditional conclusion without explicit proof. Similarly, Bertrand and Alfred North Whitehead's (1910–1913) employed such reasoning in their development of and propositional logic, treating implication introduction as a natural step in axiomatic derivations. The deduction theorem was first rigorously proved by Jacques Herbrand in his 1930 thesis and independently formulated by in his 1930 work on deductive systems, where he axiomatized it as a property ensuring that if a formula follows from a set of assumptions including a , then the conditional formed by that implies the formula follows from the remaining assumptions. Tarski refined this in his 1936 Polish monograph, later translated as Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences (1941 English edition), establishing it as a cornerstone for analyzing relations. Popularization occurred through influential textbooks, notably and Paul Bernays' Grundlagen der Mathematik (Volume I, 1934; Volume II, 1939), which integrated the theorem into Hilbert-style axiomatic proofs for , and Elliott Mendelson's Introduction to (first edition, 1964), which presented it as a standard tool for both propositional and predicate logics in pedagogical contexts. In proof theory, the deduction theorem facilitated the separation of meta-level reasoning about proofs from object-level logical derivations, influencing structural developments like Gentzen's systems (1934–1935) and enabling consistency proofs in formal systems. Since the 1950s, it has become integral to , underpinning resolution-based methods (e.g., J.A. Robinson, 1965) for efficient proof search in , and to , where it supports the Curry-Howard isomorphism linking proofs to lambda terms in constructive logics (e.g., as in Per Martin-Löf's , 1970s onward).

Propositional Logic

Proof in Propositional Logic

The deduction theorem for classical propositional logic asserts that if a set of formulas Γ\Gamma together with an additional formula AA derives a formula BB (denoted Γ{A}B\Gamma \cup \{A\} \vdash B), then Γ\Gamma alone derives the implication ABA \to B (denoted ΓAB\Gamma \vdash A \to B). This holds in a standard Hilbert-style axiomatic system for propositional logic, which uses implication \to and negation ¬\neg as connectives, along with the following axiom schemata for all formulas AA, BB, and CC:
  1. A(BA)A \to (B \to A)
  2. (A(BC))((AB)(AC))(A \to (B \to C)) \to ((A \to B) \to (A \to C))
  3. (¬B¬A)(AB)(\neg B \to \neg A) \to (A \to B)
The sole rule of inference is : from ϕ\phi and ϕψ\phi \to \psi, infer ψ\psi. The proof proceeds by on the length nn of a formal proof of BB from Γ{A}\Gamma \cup \{A\} in this system. The converse direction—that if ΓAB\Gamma \vdash A \to B, then Γ{A}B\Gamma \cup \{A\} \vdash B—follows immediately by MP, treating AA as an additional assumption and applying it to the premise ABA \to B. The nontrivial direction (Γ{A}B\Gamma \cup \{A\} \vdash B implies ΓAB\Gamma \vdash A \to B) relies on transforming the original proof into one where each line ϕk\phi_k (for k=1k = 1 to nn) is replaced by the prefixed implication AϕkA \to \phi_k, ensuring the transformed sequence is a valid proof from Γ\Gamma alone. This transformation preserves the structure because the axioms are schemata closed under such prefixing (provable using axioms 1 and 2), and MP is preserved via axiom 2. The presence of (via axiom 3) does not affect the proof, as the inductive steps apply uniformly to any formulas, including those involving ¬\neg. Base case (n=1n = 1): The proof consists of a single line BB.
  • If BB is an instance of one of the s, say ϕ\phi, then ΓAϕ\Gamma \vdash A \to \phi follows from axioms 1 and 2: specifically, axiom 1 yields ϕ(Aϕ)\phi \to (A \to \phi) by appropriate substitution, and further applications of axiom 2 and MP derive the required implication directly.
  • If BΓB \in \Gamma, then since ΓB\Gamma \vdash B, the same derivation as above yields ΓB(AB)\Gamma \vdash B \to (A \to B) via axiom 1, and MP (if BB is used as a ) gives ΓAB\Gamma \vdash A \to B.
  • If B=AB = A (the added assumption), then ΓAA\Gamma \vdash A \to A is provable: axiom 1 with B=AB = A gives A(AA)A \to (A \to A), and axiom 2 instantiated appropriately (with suitable MP steps) eliminates the outer implication to obtain AAA \to A.
Inductive hypothesis: Assume the claim holds for all proofs of length at most nn, so for any such proof of a formula DD from Γ{A}\Gamma \cup \{A\}, we have ΓAD\Gamma \vdash A \to D. Inductive step (n+1n+1): Consider a proof of length n+1n+1 ending with Bn+1=BB_{n+1} = B, derived by MP from two earlier lines BjB_j (for jnj \leq n) and Bm=BjBB_m = B_j \to B (for mnm \leq n).
  • If Bn+1B_{n+1} is an axiom or in Γ\Gamma, reduce to the base case.
  • Otherwise, by the inductive hypothesis applied to the subproofs of BjB_j and BmB_m, we have ΓABj\Gamma \vdash A \to B_j and ΓA(BjB)\Gamma \vdash A \to (B_j \to B). Now, 2 yields Γ[A(BjB)][(ABj)(AB)]\Gamma \vdash [A \to (B_j \to B)] \to [(A \to B_j) \to (A \to B)]. Applying MP with ΓA(BjB)\Gamma \vdash A \to (B_j \to B) gives Γ(ABj)(AB)\Gamma \vdash (A \to B_j) \to (A \to B). Finally, applying MP with ΓABj\Gamma \vdash A \to B_j derives ΓAB\Gamma \vdash A \to B.
This completes the induction, establishing the deduction theorem. The result relies on the soundness and completeness of the for classical propositional tautologies, ensuring that all valid implications are captured.

Examples in Propositional Logic

To illustrate the deduction theorem in propositional logic, consider a basic application where an assumption is discharged to form an implication. Suppose we have a derivation from the singleton set {P} that establishes Q → P using and standard axioms for implication. By the deduction theorem, this yields a theorem without the assumption: ⊢ P → (Q → P). This example demonstrates the "currying" effect, transforming a conditional consequence into a nested implication, which is a tautology in classical propositional logic. A more involved conditional proof highlights how the theorem facilitates deriving implications from temporary assumptions. Assume A as a and derive B using the axioms of propositional logic, such as the standard axioms for implication or equivalent systems supporting . Once B is obtained under the assumption A, the deduction theorem discharges A to conclude ⊢ A → B, allowing the proof to proceed unconditionally thereafter. This process is essential for building complex theorems by layering implications without retaining extraneous assumptions. For nested assumptions, the theorem enables derivations. Given the context Γ = {A → B}, assume ¬B and derive ¬A using on the given implication and rules for . Applying the deduction theorem discharges ¬B, yielding Γ ⊢ ¬B → ¬A. A second application, leveraging the elimination or equivalent, further transforms this to Γ ⊢ B → A, illustrating . This stepwise discharge shows how the theorem handles layered hypotheses in proofs involving multiple connectives. Common pitfalls in applying the deduction theorem arise when the proof system lacks full support for implication introduction or , as these are prerequisites for valid discharge. For instance, the theorem does not directly apply to conjunctions without additional steps to encode them via implications, potentially leading to invalid generalizations. Users must verify that the system is Hilbert-style or natural deduction-based with these rules to avoid errors in assumption elimination. Visualizing the impact, consider a proof tree before and after applying the theorem. Prior to discharge, the tree branches from an assumption node (e.g., A) leading to derived nodes for B via intermediate steps like modus ponens applications. Post-theorem, the assumption node closes, collapsing the branch into a single implication node A → B at the root, shortening the unconditional proof and emphasizing modularity in logical derivations. This transformation is depicted in formats, where subproofs under assumptions resolve into implication rules.

Proof Systems and Techniques

Virtual Rules of Inference

The deduction theorem facilitates the use of virtual rules of inference, which permit the temporary assumption of a AA to derive another BB, followed by the discharge of AA to conclude ABA \to B, in contrast to primitive rules that operate solely on established premises without such hypothetical introductions. These virtual rules, also termed hypothetical or discharge rules, enable modular proof construction by encapsulating subderivations under assumptions, thereby streamlining the representation of conditional reasoning. In natural deduction systems, virtual rules manifest as the implication introduction rule (\to-introduction), where if BB is derived from the assumption AA (possibly alongside other premises Γ\Gamma), then ABA \to B may be inferred, discharging AA. Similarly, in sequent calculus, the right implication rule (\toR) achieves this by deriving ΓΔ,AB\Gamma \vdash \Delta, A \to B from Γ,AΔ,B\Gamma, A \vdash \Delta, B, effectively discharging the added assumption AA on the antecedent side. This implementation aligns directly with the deduction theorem, embedding its logic into the core inference apparatus of these systems. The primary advantages of virtual rules lie in their ability to simplify proof through modular, assumption-based reasoning, which mirrors intuitive human argumentation and reduces dependence on a large set of axioms by focusing on connective-specific introduction and elimination rules. For instance, proofs become more structured and readable, as subproofs can be nested hierarchically without proliferating global axioms, enhancing both pedagogical clarity and computational efficiency in . Formally, the deduction theorem establishes the equivalence between derivations using virtual rules and those in purely axiomatic systems: a derivation of BB from Γ{A}\Gamma \cup \{A\} using virtual rules corresponds to an axiomatic derivation of ABA \to B from Γ\Gamma, ensuring that the former can always be transformed into the latter without loss of validity. This equivalence, proven via induction on proof structure, validates the use of virtual rules as a conservative extension. However, virtual rules operate at a meta-level in axiomatic frameworks like Hilbert-style systems, where they are not primitive but justified by the deduction theorem; thus, any proof employing them must be expandable into a sequence of primitive inferences and axioms if a fully axiomatic form is required.

Conversion to Axiomatic Proofs

The conversion to axiomatic proofs leverages the deduction theorem to transform a derivation of a BB from a set of axioms Γ\Gamma together with an additional assumption AA into a derivation of ABA \to B solely from Γ\Gamma, without relying on the assumption AA. This process is constructive and proceeds by induction on the length of the original proof, ensuring that each step in the assumed proof is mirrored by a corresponding step in the implication-prefixed proof using only axioms and (MP). The algorithm begins with the base cases of the induction. If the last step of the proof is the assumption AA itself, then AAA \to A follows directly from the of reflexivity (often denoted as the identity ). If the last step is an XX from Γ\Gamma, then X(AX)X \to (A \to X) is an instance of the of prefixing (such as p(qp)p \to (q \to p)), and applying MP yields AXA \to X from Γ\Gamma. For the inductive step, suppose the last step applies MP to derive CC from BCB \to C and BB, both previously derived under Γ{A}\Gamma \cup \{A\}. By the induction hypothesis, ΓA(BC)\Gamma \vdash A \to (B \to C) and ΓAB\Gamma \vdash A \to B; then, using the of suffixing (such as (p(qr))(pq)(pr)(p \to (q \to r)) \to (p \to q) \to (p \to r)) and two applications of MP, it follows that ΓAC\Gamma \vdash A \to C. This recursive wrapping effectively prefixes the assumption AA to every line of the proof, building the implication outward. For proofs involving multiple nested assumptions, such as deriving CC from Γ{A,B}\Gamma \cup \{A, B\}, the process iterates recursively: first convert the subproof under {A,B}\{A, B\} to ΓBC\Gamma \vdash B \to C, then apply the theorem again to obtain ΓA(BC)\Gamma \vdash A \to (B \to C). This currying-like propagation replaces conjunctions of assumptions with nested implications, as the implication connective serves to discharge assumptions in sequence. In a skeletal example, suppose a proof under assumption AA consists of lines L1,,Ln=BL_1, \dots, L_n = B; the converted proof constructs lines AL1,,ABA \to L_1, \dots, A \to B by applying the above inductive rules to each LiL_i. The resulting axiomatic proof preserves because the deduction theorem establishes an equivalence between derivability with assumptions and conditional derivability without them, maintaining logical validity throughout the transformation. However, this conversion incurs a cost in proof length: each application of the theorem roughly doubles the number of steps due to the additional MP inferences and axiom instantiations, leading to in the worst case when discharging deeply nested assumptions.

Supporting Theorems

The weakening theorem, a fundamental property of monotonic consequence relations in axiomatic proof systems, states that if a AA is derivable from a set of Γ\Gamma, then AA remains derivable upon adding any additional formulas Δ\Delta to the . Formally, ΓA\Gamma \vdash A implies ΓΔA\Gamma \cup \Delta \vdash A for any Δ\Delta. This theorem ensures that proof systems are robust to the inclusion of irrelevant assumptions, facilitating modular reasoning and the extension of existing derivations without invalidating conclusions. It is a direct consequence of the structural rules in systems like those developed by Hilbert and Ackermann, where entailment is preserved under premise expansion. Closely related is the contraction theorem, which addresses redundancy by allowing the elimination of duplicate . It asserts that if Γ{A,A}B\Gamma \cup \{A, A\} \vdash B, then Γ{A}B\Gamma \cup \{A\} \vdash B. This property handles repeated uses of the same assumption in derivations, streamlining proofs in axiomatic frameworks and aligning with the contraction rule in sequent calculi, where multiple occurrences of a can be consolidated into one without loss of derivability. In classical propositional logic, contraction complements weakening to maintain the of entailment over premise sets. Monotonicity serves as an immediate of the weakening theorem, reinforcing that the derivability relation in standard logical systems is upward closed with respect to : adding formulas to Γ\Gamma cannot undermine an established derivation ΓA\Gamma \vdash A. This monotonic behavior is intrinsic to the deduction theorem's application, as it guarantees that conditional proofs from extended contexts yield equivalent implications, supporting the theorem's role in transforming hypothetical derivations into unconditional ones. The deduction theorem further relates to cut-elimination in sequent calculi, where it aids in demonstrating that any proof involving a cut rule—a binary inference combining two subproofs—can be transformed into an equivalent cut-free proof. By leveraging the theorem to manage premise dependencies during cut reduction, this process preserves derivability while enforcing the subformula property, a key insight in Gentzen's framework for analyzing proof complexity and consistency. Collectively, these supporting theorems ensure the deduction theorem's robust applicability across varying premise configurations in axiomatic systems, enabling reliable manipulations of assumptions and inferences without compromising logical validity. They underpin transformations between proof formats, such as from natural deduction to axiomatic styles, by providing the structural guarantees needed for premise adjustments.

Extensions and Variants

Adaptation to Predicate Logic

The deduction theorem extends to first-order predicate logic, but requires adjustments to account for quantifiers and the handling of free variables. In this setting, assuming a Hilbert-style proof system, if a set of formulas Γ union {A} derives B—where A and B may contain free variables—and the proof employs the generalization rule only on variables not free in A, then Γ derives A → B. This formulation ensures that the implication is valid without unintended variable bindings. A variant incorporates universal generalization: if x is not free in Γ, then Γ derives ∀x (A → B), provided the proof satisfies the free variable condition. This adaptation applies specifically to Hilbert-style systems equipped with standard quantifier axioms, such as the universal instantiation axiom ∀x φ(x) → φ(t) (where t is free for x in φ) and the distribution axiom ∀x (φ → ψ) → (φ → ∀x ψ) when x is not free in φ. The proof rules include and (∀-introduction), with the latter restricted to avoid applying it over variables that appear free in assumptions like A. These axioms and rules enable the theorem's validity while preserving in the presence of quantifiers. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the derivation from Γ ∪ {A} to B, extending the propositional case. For the base step, if B is an or from Γ, the implication A → B follows directly via propositional tautologies or the deduction lemma for independent formulas. In the inductive step, for , assume prior implications hold and apply the rule accordingly; for to ∀x C (with x not free in A), the induction hypothesis yields Γ ⊢ A → C, followed by to Γ ⊢ ∀x (A → C) and use of the distribution to obtain Γ ⊢ A → ∀x C. This structure mirrors the propositional induction but incorporates quantifier handling. Key challenges in this extension arise from free variable restrictions, which prevent variable capture during —for instance, deriving ∀x P(x) from P(x) succeeds, but claiming P(x) → ∀x P(x) fails without the condition, as x would be improperly bound. The eigenvariable condition enforces that generalized variables act as "fresh" placeholders, akin to eigenvalues in , ensuring no dependency on assumption-bound variables. These precautions maintain the theorem's reliability amid quantifier shifts.

Example Application in Predicate Logic

A key application of the deduction theorem in predicate logic arises in proving the valid ∀x (P(x) → Q(x)) ⊢ ∀x P(x) → ∀x Q(x), which distributes the universal quantifier over implication under the given . To demonstrate, first extend the premises with the assumption ∀x P(x) and derive ∀x Q(x) using rules, careful with variable handling to satisfy the theorem's conditions in predicate logic (no over free variables from the discharged assumption). Select a fresh variable y not occurring in the premises or assumption to avoid capture.
  • Instantiate ∀x P(x) to P(y).
  • Instantiate the premise ∀x (P(x) → Q(x)) to P(y) → Q(y).
  • Apply to P(y) and P(y) → Q(y), yielding Q(y).
  • Generalize over y (valid since y is fresh), obtaining ∀x Q(x).
By the deduction theorem, discharge the assumption ∀x P(x) to obtain ∀x (P(x) → Q(x)) ⊢ ∀x P(x) → ∀x Q(x). This process highlights the theorem's role in converting hypothetical derivations involving quantifiers into implications, with applied only after ensuring no dependency on the discharged formula's free variables. A simpler case illustrates the theorem's utility with instantiation. Given ∀x (A(x) → B(x)) and A(c) (where c is a ), instantiate the universal premise to A(c) → B(c), then apply to derive B(c). The deduction theorem discharges A(c), yielding ∀x (A(x) → B(x)) ⊢ A(c) → B(c). Since c can be any term without free variables conflicting with the , this establishes the instantiation principle modularly. Such applications enable modular proofs by treating quantified hypotheses as conditional consequences, streamlining complex derivations in predicate logic. A common pitfall is neglecting fresh variable selection during , potentially invalidating the discharge due to unintended variable capture in quantified contexts.
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