Eastern Command (Pakistan)
Eastern Command (Pakistan)
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Eastern Command (Pakistan)

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Eastern Command (Pakistan)

The Eastern Command of the Pakistan Army (initially designated as III Corps) was a corps-sized military field maneuver formation overseen and commanded by its Commander, typically at the holding rank of the Lieutenant-General.

From the partition of India by Great Britain in 1947 and until 1970, Pakistan was a divided country with consists of two wings geographically separated by 1,000 miles (1,600 km). With chain of command and armed forces' combat machinery stationed in the Western wing, the military mission of the Pakistan armed forces in Eastern wing was to defend and hold in reserves until Pakistani military in west staled or ceasefire with larger Indian Army (in case of war). The Central Command based in Army GHQ in Rawalpindi at that time created the formation with one army commander who was to be assisted by the naval and air commanders.[citation needed] War planners had drawn up a plan to defend Dacca by concentrating all their forces along the Dhaka Bowl (the area surrounded by the rivers Jamuna, Padma and Meghna).

To curb the insurgent attacks, and political activism led by All-Pakistan Awami League in east, the Central Command authorized to launched clearance operations (Searchlight and Barisal), which led to the creation of Mukti Bahini and their fighting for independence throughout eastern wing, Lieutenant-General A. A. K. Niazi revised the existing plan in accordance with Central Command directive (which emphasized the need to prevent the Mukti Bahini from occupying any area of the province and to fight for every inch of territory). The Central Command expected the Indians to occupy a large area of the province, transfer the Mukti Bahini and Bengali refugees there and recognize the Bangladesh government in exile – turning the insurgency into an international diplomatic issue. Lt-Gen. Niazi designated ten cities (Jessore, Jhenaidah, Bogra, Rangpur, Jamalpur, Mymensingh, Sylhet, Comilla and Chittagong) on major communication hubs as "fortress towns" and deployed larger formations of ground troops near the Indian border. The final plan called for the armed forces to delay Indian attacks at the border and then gradually fall back to the fortress towns. From the fortresses, part of the surviving force was to take up positions near Dhaka and hold out until India was forced for a ceasefire in the west; Pakistani forces in the fortress towns would delay the bulk of the Indian forces and prevent them from concentrating on Dhaka.

The Pakistan Army inherited six infantry divisions and an armored brigade after independence in 1947 from the British Indian Army, deploying most of their armed assets in West Pakistan. East Pakistan had one infantry brigade in 1948, which was made up of two infantry battalions, the 1st East Bengal Regiment and the 1/14th (1st battalion of 14th Punjab Regiment) or 3/8th Punjab Regiment (3rd battalion of the 8th Punjab Regiment). Between them, the two battalions boasted five rifle companies (a battalion normally had five companies). This weak brigade – under the command of Brigadier Ayub Khan (served as an acting Major General – appointment: GOC, 14th Infantry Division) – and a number of East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) wings were tasked with defending East Pakistan during the Kashmir War of 1947. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and Pakistan Navy had little presence in East Pakistan at that time. The reasons for placing more than 90 percent of the armed might in West Pakistan were:

The Pakistan Armed Forces grew significantly in size between the wars of 1949 and 1965. The number of infantry divisions jumped from 6 to 13; it also boasted two armored divisions and several independent infantry and armored brigades by 1965. All these formations had the required artillery, commando, engineer and transport units attached to them. The growth in military infrastructure was slower in East Pakistan; the single division (14th Infantry division) HQed at Dhaka now contained two infantry brigades, with the 53rd Brigade stationed at Comilla and the 107th Brigade deployed in Jessore by 1963. In 1964, the 23rd Brigade was created in Dhaka. This under-strength division comprised three infantry brigades, with no armour and supported by 10 EPR wings, 12 F-86 Saber planes, and three gunboats rode out the 1965 war in the east. The Air Forces had bombed each other's bases with the PAF emerging on top, while the Border Security Force (BSF) and EPR had skirmished along the border; although India had one infantry division and one armoured brigade posted near East Pakistan, the armies never clashed in the east.[citation needed]

When Yahya Khan became Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army in 1966, he initiated a series of reforms to revamp the combat capability of the Pakistan army. In East Pakistan a corps headquarters was to be established (initially designated as the III corps which later known as the Eastern Command), but except the 14th Infantry Division, Dacca no new division was raised (although the 57th Infantry Brigade was formed in Dhaka, while the 23rd Infantry Brigade was sent to Rangpur). In 1970, the 29th Cavalry was deployed in Rangpur from Rawalpindi, but East Pakistan was not given any corps artillery or armoured units.

The Pakistan Eastern Command headquarters was inaugurated in Dacca Cantonment, Dacca on 23 August 1969 and Lt. Gen. Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was appointed as the commander; on 1 September 1969, the Chief Martial Law Administrator of the country, General Yahya Khan, sent Vice-Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan as Martial Law Administrator of East Pakistan. Syed Mohammad Ahsan, when Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Navy, had established the naval forces in East Pakistan; the naval presence was tripled in East Pakistan with more officers from West Pakistan deployed in the region. Earlier, The Chief of the General Staff at GHQ, Rawalpindi, Major General Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, decided to run a series of exercises in East Pakistan to formulate an integrated battle plan for the province in 1967. Dubbed "Operation X-Sunderbans-1", it was run by (then) Colonel Rao Farman Ali under the command of Major General Muzaffaruddin (GOC 14th Division); the conclusions of this exercise formed the basis for the Pakistani operational plan in 1971.

Pakistani planners assumed that the army in East Pakistan would not defend every inch of the province. Pakistani staff planners identified the following features as significant for setting up a defence plan:

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