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Force Design 2030
Force Design 2030
Force Design 2030
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Force Design 2030, also known as FD2030, is an ongoing force restructuring plan by the United States Marine Corps to reshape its combat power for future near-peer adversary conflicts that was introduced in March 2020 by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David H. Berger.[1] In October 2023 the program was renamed Force Design, removing the "2030."[2]

According to the Force Design documents, is designed to prepare the Marine Corps for a naval war against China. The plan's key goals are to modernize equipment, to work closer with the United States Navy and become more amphibious, to become more of a light strike force, and to manage personal talents better.[3][4]

Force Design will see the Marine Corps create a new formation called littoral regiments, consisting of infantry, rocket artillery, logistics, and an anti-air battery, which will be highly mobile and have a long range precision strike capability. The littoral regiments will be equipped with missiles and drones, and can form smaller teams that could be moved quickly from island to island using amphibious ships, to assist the Navy with attacking enemy vessels and keeping sea lanes open.[5][6][7] As part of these changes, the plan includes getting rid of all tanks[8] and replacing the majority of cannon artillery with rocket artillery.[9] Structural changes include increasing the number of UAV squadrons, missile artillery batteries, and C-130 transport squadrons, while removing almost all cannon artillery batteries, and all tank and bridging companies. The numbers of other units, including infantry battalions, tilt-rotor aircraft squadrons, and helicopter squadrons, are being slightly reduced.[5]

A group of about thirty retired generals, including every living former Commandant of the Marine Corps, has criticized the plan and tried to lobby against it.[10] Despite this, Force Design is supported by the Department of Defense and members of Congress and the Senate.[11] The main criticisms from the group of retired generals are that Force Design makes the Corps too focused on one theater, is based on new ideas that have not been thoroughly tested, and weakens its overall capability by the removal of tanks and the reduction of cannon artillery.[1][12][13][14] The advocates of Force Design have argued that recent events in the Russo-Ukrainian War and the Red Sea crisis prove the viability of the plan.[11][12]

Background

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Force Design was developed after the 2018 National Defense Strategy stated that the military must be prepared for the competition between the United States and China. In June 2017, then-Commandant Robert Neller told Congress that the Marine Corps was not ready to face a peer-adversary.[10] In July 2019 his successor as the commandant, General David Berger, published the Commandant's Planning Guidance to set out his vision for the Corps, which included making it capable of operating inside of the range of China's weapon systems (such as the first island chain and the South China Sea).[7] One of the key points of the restructuring is to create small units of Marines equipped with missile systems that would be placed on islands in the Western Pacific to assist the Navy with sinking Chinese warships.[13]

Summary

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Modernize equipment

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The Marine Corps understands that militaries that do not constantly seek technological advances are disadvantaged. It has sought out new ways to improve technology. For example, it will modify its use of OPFs "Organic Precision Fires", a missile system that ranges in size from a mount on a vehicle to a mortar round carried by a Marine. The Marine Corps is trying out having an OPF multi-canister launcher, basically a medium-range missile launcher, on JLTVs, a more modern version of a Humvee.[3] They are also trying out the same system on ULTVs, a buggy-like 4-wheel caged car.[3] They will be giving each squad, a unit of about 13 Marines, 1-2 OPFs that are manageable by Marines.[3]

The Marine Corps are also utilizing UAV technology. The belief is that drones are the future, and they are equipping each organizational ground unit with drones. The fire team, consisting of 4 Marines, receive a Black Hornet Nano drone.[3] The squad, consisting of 13 Marines, gets a "Skydilla" drone.[3] A platoon, consisting of 43 Marines, will receive a "FSkyRaider PQ-20B Puma".[3] A company, whose size may vary depending on what the job of the company is but will be around 150 Marines, will have a "Stalker Blk 30".[3]

The Marine Corps will also equip their Marines with new small arms. A squad of 13 Marines will be given a M3 MAAWS weapon, a grenade launcher designed for anti-personnel use.[3] Every infantry squad in the US military normally has a squad automatic weapon (SAW). Still, the Marine Corps is modernizing that too. They will give every squad a M27 IAR or the Next Generation Squad Weapon if one comes out soon.[3] Just about every Marine with a rifle will get a suppressor for their weapon so that they can better hear their commander and be better protected from hearing loss.[3] Every Marine will also get a sidearm pistol.[3]

Become more amphibious

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The Marine Corps has always worked with the Navy, but with the future threat being China, it needs to be closer to them. The Marine Corps has drifted away from the Navy in recent engagements like the fight against ISIS, but it now needs to work closer and focus more on amphibious warfare. It will need to work with the Navy and the Coast Guard in the event of a war with China.

One way the Corps is going to do this is to institute a new type of regiment called a Littoral Regiment.[15] This regiment will be a naval formation that will be able to conduct fast strike missions.[15] A unit will consist of a combat team, an anti-air battalion, and a logistics battalion.[15] It will debut in Hawaii, and each regiment will have 1,800-2,000 Marines and Sailors.[15]

Another way the Corps will become more amphibious is by using a new type of watercraft called Light Amphibious Warships or LAWs. These crafts will mend the gap between the large, full-scale Navy ships and the small landing crafts that were famous in WWII.[16]

Become a strike force

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The Marine Corps has been defined, at least in the past, as being the Navy's version of the Army. However, now it is being described as America's strike force. To better fit this role, the Marine Corps is making changes that make them more mobile and shift them away from the heavy infantry of the past and towards a high-speed raid force. To do this, the Marine Corps will divert resources away from heavy components like the infantry and towards flexible things like reconnaissance.

The Corps is reducing overall manpower by 12,000 Marines.[4] It plans to increase the Marine Infantry Course from 8 to 14 weeks so that these Marines can be more effective in raids.[17] It has divested of three military police battalions[4] and one regimental headquarters, bringing the total number to 7.[4] They will get rid of 3 active and 2 reserve infantry battalions, bringing the total numbers to 21 and 6, respectively.[4] They will also reduce the number of Marines in those battalions by about 200.[4] They will be shifting from cannon to rocket artillery by disbanding 16 cannon batteries, for a total of 5, and adding 14 rocket batteries, for a total of 21.[4] However, the biggest change is the dissolution of all 7 tank companies,[4] with the expectation that the army will be the primary armour source. They will use this money to add 3 light armored reconnaissance companies for a total of 12.[4] Assault amphibian companies will be reduced by 2, for a total of 4.[4] The Marines will also be utilizing "stand in forces" to deploy to a combat zone before combat commences.[18]

USMC airpower will also be changing. The Corps will reduce the number of fighters to 10 active attack fighters per squadron.[4] The Corps will also eliminate 3 active tiltrotors squadrons, with 14 remaining,[4] in addition to reducing heavy lift helicopter squadrons by 3, for a total of 5.[4] They will get rid of 2 light attack helicopter squadrons for a remainder of 5.[4] They will be adding 1 aerial refueler squadrons for a total of 4.[4] They will also add 3 active unmanned aerial companies for a total of 6.[4]

The Marines plan to rely on the Navy for more aircraft.

Another significant change is that the Marines are trying to modernize how they organize their logistical components. They will combine the dental and medical battalions into one Health Service Support Battalion.[3] They will also combine the Supply and Maintenance battalions into one Material Readiness Battalion.[3] They will combine the Transport Battalion and the Landing Support Battalion. This battalion was previously not a part of logistics. Still, into the Distribution Support Battalion as well.[3] They will increase the amount of Combat Logistics Battalions from 15 to 18.[3] The whole point of doing this is so they are packaged in a way that is easier to manage on the fly, making the Marines able to move from place to place quicker. This will enable the fast and mobile warfare the Marines are preparing for.

Personnel talents

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The Marine Corps is trying to revamp how they measure the worth of a Marine and how they use that worth. They are making some changes to how they do this. However, the most significant difference is that they will allow people in specific fields, like engineering, to skip basic training and a few ranks. This works because a man might have a degree or specific skill the Marine Corps is after. The Marine Corps gives him "lateral entry," where he skips basic and comes in as maybe a sergeant instead of a private. However, he is locked into that field and cannot move out for any reason. So, a technician with a lateral entry will not be commanding infantry Marines.[3]

The Corps has already formed the Talent Management Strategy Group (TMX) to look after any talent management changes.[3] They have said they will emphasize tests other than the ASVAB.[19] They will be a virtual talent marketplace, virtual reenlistments, and virtual review boards to circumvent the paper processes.[19]

Criticism

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Politico wrote in April 2022 that as many as thirty retired Marine Corps generals oppose Force Design. Several of these generals met with Marine Commandant David H. Berger on March 3, 2022, but they were not satisfied with the result of the discussion, according to retired lieutenant general Paul Van Riper. Among the critics of the plan were every living former Commandant and other notable generals, including Jim Mattis, Anthony Zinni, John Kelly,[10] Charles Wilhelm, Terrence Dake,[20] Walter Boomer,[13] and Paul Van Riper.[21] The group of retired senior Marines that opposed Force Design 2030 called itself "Chowder II," a reference to the "Chowder Society" in the late 1940s, which opposed any efforts to limit or eliminate in the Marine Corps in the years after World War II.[12]

Force Design has been criticized by the retired generals for making the Marine Corps too focused on the Pacific at the expense of its global expeditionary capability, and for dispersing small groups of Marines on remote islands in the Pacific that would be vulnerable to Chinese attack and without a viable way of resupplying or moving them.[13]

The advocates of Force Design have responded to these criticisms, arguing that recent events in the Russo-Ukrainian War and the Red Sea crisis demonstrate how mainly land-based forces with missiles, drones, and littoral craft can deny sea access to conventional ships, and, in the case of Ukraine, keep sea lines of communication open.[12][11]

References

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Force Design 2030

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Force Design 2030 is a comprehensive restructuring initiative launched by the in March 2020 under Commandant Gen. David H. Berger to reorient the service as a distributed, naval expeditionary force optimized for operations in contested maritime domains, particularly to deter and defeat peer adversaries like in the . The plan emphasizes integration with the through concepts such as Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), where small, mobile Marine units establish temporary bases on islands or coastlines to conduct using long-range precision fires and sensors. Central to the redesign are force structure changes that divest legacy heavy systems—including all tank battalions, towed artillery (reduced from 21 to 5 batteries), and certain aviation assets like medium squadrons—to redirect resources toward unmanned systems, such as the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction (NMESIS), advanced mobility platforms, and resilient command-and-control networks. These shifts support scalable Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) organized into three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) with distinct roles: I MEF for global crisis response, II MEF for operations, and III MEF incorporating three Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) for forward positioning in areas like the . Implementation has involved reducing overall Marine end strength by approximately 12,000 personnel by 2030, divesting over $16 billion in equipment, and conducting a continuous Campaign of Learning through wargames, exercises, and operations to validate capabilities against simulated peer threats. Recent updates, including the October 2025 annual report, highlight progress in equipping forces with drones, cyber tools, and electronic warfare while affirming the MAGTF's enduring flexibility for multi-domain operations. The initiative has sparked significant debate, with proponents citing wargame outcomes and trends like those observed in —favoring precision strikes and distributed forces over massed armor—as empirical justification for prioritizing sea control and joint fleet support over traditional large-scale amphibious assaults. Critics, including retired Marine generals such as and , contend that the divestments erode combined-arms proficiency and crisis-response versatility, potentially rendering the Corps overly specialized for hypothetical high-end conflicts at the expense of proven capabilities for insurgencies, regional contingencies, or forced-entry operations, while relying on uncertain logistics and untested EABO tactics in real combat. Congress has responded with mandates for independent assessments, reflecting ongoing scrutiny over amphibious ship procurement shortfalls and the balance between innovation and core Marine functions.

Origins and Historical Context

Initial Conceptualization (2019–2020)

General David H. Berger assumed the position of the 38th of the on July 11, 2019, during a ceremony at Marine Barracks Washington. Five days later, on July 16, 2019, he released the 38th 's Planning Guidance (CPG), a strategic document outlining priorities for adapting the Marine Corps to contemporary security challenges. The CPG emphasized the shift from prolonged operations in the to preparing for peer-level competition with adversaries like and , as articulated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, necessitating a reevaluation of force structure, capabilities, and integration with naval forces in the theater. The CPG initiated a comprehensive review process, directing the Marine Corps to conduct force design activities through modeling, , wargaming, and experimentation to develop concepts for naval in contested maritime environments. It highlighted the need to divest legacy platforms ill-suited for high-threat littoral operations, such as main battle tanks and excess heavy equipment, while prioritizing mobile, low-signature capabilities for sensing, striking, and in distributed operations. By October 3, 2019, Berger reported that the for the 2030 force design was nearly finalized, with ongoing validation through rigorous testing to ensure alignment with operational realities in the Western Pacific. This preparatory phase culminated in the public release of the initial Force Design 2030 document on March 23, 2020, which formalized early proposals for organizational changes, including the elimination of all Marine tank battalions and a reduction in towed units, to create a leaner force focused on expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) and littoral anti-ship warfare. The conceptualization drew on analyses conducted by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, incorporating lessons from joint exercises and threat assessments to prioritize affordability, sustainability, and interoperability with the amid fiscal constraints and evolving anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges posed by potential adversaries. These efforts marked the beginning of a multi-year transformation, grounded in empirical evaluation rather than untested assumptions.

Influences from Prior Reforms

Force Design 2030 represents a continuation of the U.S. Marine Corps' longstanding practice of periodic force structure reviews and adaptations to align with evolving strategic priorities, budget constraints, and technological advancements, with foundational elements traceable to reforms spanning four decades across multiple commandants. Early influences include adjustments under Gen. P.X. Kelley in the 1980s, which emphasized technology offsets for personnel reductions and refined infantry squad organization from 13 to 11 Marines before reverting, setting precedents for balancing manpower with innovation. Similarly, Gen. Alfred Gray's Total Force 2000 initiative in the late 1980s and early 1990s reduced active infantry battalions from 27 to 24 while enhancing reserve integration and modern battlefield capabilities, reflecting early efforts to divest excess capacity for agility. In the 1990s, Gen. Charles Krulak advanced lighter, technology-enabled structures through initiatives like Sea Dragon, which cut heavy equipment such as 50% of tanks to prioritize readiness and expeditionary responsiveness amid post-Cold War fiscal pressures. The 2010 Force Structure Review Group further informed divestment rationales by identifying redundancies, such as in Marine Wing Support Groups, recommending their elimination to reallocate resources toward higher-priority capabilities. Under Gen. James Amos, the 2014 McKenzie Report sustained 21 infantry battalions despite austerity, while Gen. Robert Neller's tenure laid groundwork by addressing emerging peer threats through force modernization planning. More proximate doctrinal influences stem from the Force 2025 and Beyond review, including 2016 experiments that reorganized infantry battalions for enhanced lethality, directly informing Force Design 2030's unit restructuring. These build on pre-2020 operational concepts like Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE), developed to enable low-signature, distributed engagements in contested littorals, complemented by the Navy's Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) for integrated naval campaigning. Collectively, these prior reforms underscored the obsolescence of 1950s-era structures optimized for large-scale amphibious assaults and sustained land campaigns, paving the way for Force Design 2030's emphasis on precision fires, unmanned systems, and stand-in forces amid great power competition.

Strategic Rationale

Evolving Threat Landscape

The 2018 National Defense Strategy marked a pivotal shift in U.S. military priorities, redirecting focus from countering violent extremists in the Middle East to deterring and defeating peer competitors, particularly China and Russia, amid their emergence as revisionist powers challenging the international order. This reorientation emphasized great power competition in the Indo-Pacific theater, where China's assertive territorial claims and military buildup posed the most acute threat to U.S. interests and alliances. The strategy highlighted erosion of U.S. military advantages due to adversaries' investments in advanced technologies, necessitating a reevaluation of force structures optimized for past conflicts. China's (PLA) has rapidly modernized, fielding the world's largest navy with over 370 battle force ships as of 2024, surpassing the U.S. Navy in hull count while prioritizing capabilities for regional dominance. Key to this is an integrated (A2/AD) architecture, featuring long-range precision-guided munitions such as the DF-21D and anti-ship ballistic missiles—dubbed "carrier killers" for their 1,500–4,000 kilometer ranges—and the hypersonic missile with speeds exceeding Mach 6. These systems, supported by advanced submarines, integrated air defenses, and sensor networks, enable layered denial of maritime approaches, particularly around and the , where bases extend China's weapon engagement zones. Proliferation of such precision strike regimes has increased the vulnerability of large, centralized U.S. naval and amphibious formations to saturation attacks. Russia's resurgence, evidenced by its 2014 annexation of and ongoing aggression in , underscores hybrid and conventional threats from another nuclear-armed peer, though its capabilities lag China's in scale for Pacific contingencies. Collectively, these adversaries exploit gray-zone tactics—short of open —to coerce allies and erode U.S. deterrence, amplifying the need for forces capable of persistent forward presence inside contested zones without triggering escalation. The maturation of reconnaissance-strike complexes, where low-signature platforms compete in hider-finder dynamics, further demands agile, distributed units over legacy heavy assets vulnerable to modern fires.

Shift to Distributed Maritime Operations

Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) represents the U.S. Navy's operational concept for conducting warfare through dispersed naval forces that integrate sensors, shooters, and decision-makers across domains to complicate adversary targeting and achieve or control in contested environments. This approach counters (A2/AD) capabilities, such as those posed by precision-guided missiles and advanced sensing systems from peer competitors like , by emphasizing small, agile detachments over massed formations. DMO relies on networked operations where distributed units contribute to a joint "kill web" rather than centralized command structures vulnerable to disruption. Force Design 2030 marks the U.S. Marine Corps' alignment with DMO by restructuring to serve as stand-in forces within the littorals, enabling Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) where small Marine units seize and hold key maritime terrain to support naval maneuver. Announced in March 2020 by then-Commandant Gen. David Berger, the initiative shifts the Corps from legacy amphibious assault focused on large-scale landings to distributed, mobile operations using precision fires like the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). This involves divesting heavy assets—such as all 452 main battle tanks by 2021 and most towed artillery—to prioritize lighter, expeditionary units equipped with anti-ship missiles, unmanned systems, and reconnaissance/counter-reconnaissance capabilities, allowing squads to achieve combined arms effects through miniaturized technology. The shift enhances deterrence by forcing adversaries to expend resources across a wider , buying time for assembly while conduct "blunt" operations to degrade enemy sea control. Operating from austere bases inside A2/AD umbrellas, these forces deny along key lines of communication, integrating with fleets to extend operational reach without exposing large concentrations to saturation attacks. Annual updates, including the October 2024 report, refine this integration, emphasizing sea denial through dispersed rocketry and unmanned aerial systems to shape the theater amid evolving threats like hypersonic weapons. Critics, including some congressional reports, contend that this specialization may limit versatility for non-peer conflicts, but proponents argue it restores against high-end threats by leveraging technological enablers for scalable dispersion.

Core Components and Reforms

Organizational Restructuring

Force Design 2030 initiated a comprehensive overhaul of Marine Corps unit structures to prioritize distributed, expeditionary operations in contested maritime environments, emphasizing smaller, more mobile formations over traditional heavy, mechanized units. This restructuring divested legacy capabilities deemed unsuitable for peer-level conflicts, such as all three tank battalions equipped with M1A1 Abrams tanks, which were fully decommissioned by fiscal year 2021 to free resources for anti-ship and unmanned systems. Similarly, tube artillery assets were reduced from 21 batteries to five, with a shift toward and systems like the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), reflecting a doctrinal pivot from sustained land campaigns to littoral denial and disruption. By 2022, these divestments totaled approximately $16 billion in equipment value, redirected toward investments in long-range precision fires and sensor networks. Central to the reorganization is the establishment of Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs), designed as self-sustaining, multi-domain units for the "contact" and "blunt" layers of naval campaigns, capable of operating from expeditionary advanced bases to contest adversary sea control. The first two MLRs—3d MLR and 12th MLR—were activated under in fiscal year 2022, with 3d MLR achieving initial operating capability in December 2023. Each MLR typically comprises a , a Littoral Combat Regiment with multiple for maneuver and fires, a dedicated Littoral Anti-Ship equipped with mobile launchers, and a Littoral for sustainment in austere environments. Plans call for at least three MLRs total, with potential expansion to support theater requirements under U.S. Command. Infantry and support structures were streamlined to enhance agility, including a reduction in active regiments from eight to seven, eliminating three organic battalions to reallocate personnel toward littoral-focused roles. Aviation units saw increases in squadrons and C-130 transport squadrons to bolster and intra-theater lift, while sizes were scaled down for rapid deployment via amphibious or expeditionary ships. These changes integrate more closely with naval forces, positioning Marine units as enablers for fleet operations rather than independent ground forces, though implementation has required iterative adjustments documented in annual updates through 2025.

Equipment Modernization and Divestments

Force Design 2030 involves the divestment of legacy equipment deemed incompatible with distributed maritime operations in contested environments, such as the theater. This includes the complete elimination of all Marine tank battalions, resulting in the divestment of over 450 s, with more than 400 transferred to the U.S. Army and the remainder scheduled for similar transfer. Towed capabilities were sharply reduced, with batteries cut from 21 to 5, eliminating most legacy towed systems to prioritize mobility over sustained ground fires. Bridging equipment was fully divested, alongside other legacy systems totaling over $16 billion in value, including more than 5,500 pieces worth $494 million divested in fiscal year 2020 alone. These actions, largely completed by 2023, aim to reduce logistical burdens and enhance force agility against peer adversaries equipped with advanced anti-access/area-denial capabilities. Proceeds from divestments have been redirected toward modernization priorities emphasizing long-range precision fires, unmanned systems, and integrated air defense. and batteries increased from 7 to 20, incorporating systems like the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) for anti-ship strikes. Unmanned aerial system (UAS) squadrons expanded from 3 to 6, with investments in a family of drones including loitering munitions and the Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel (LRUSV) prototype, tested rapidly post-2019 guidance updates. Ground-based air defense enhancements include the Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC), successfully tested in December 2021 and September 2022 quad-launches against aerial threats, alongside integrated systems like the Marine Air Defense Integrated System. The fiscal year 2024 budget request allocated $16.9 billion specifically for equipment modernization under Force Design 2030, supporting these shifts while maintaining procurement of 420 F-35 and adding aerial refueling squadrons from 3 to 4. By October 2025, the Marine Corps reported progress in fielding these capabilities, with 96 associated programs advancing despite flat , focusing on drones and precision-guided munitions to counter evolving threats like advanced adversary drones and long-range fires.

Integration with Naval Forces

Force Design 2030 emphasizes the Marine Corps' role within the broader naval team, aligning its capabilities with the Navy's Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept to enable distributed, resilient operations across contested maritime domains. Under this framework, Marine units operate as integrated components of naval expeditionary forces, contributing to and control by establishing temporary positions in the littorals to sense, shape, and deliver effects against adversary naval assets. This integration prioritizes forward-deployed, sea-based forces to maintain persistent presence, with leveraging smaller, more survivable platforms to support naval maneuvers without relying on large-scale amphibious assaults. Central to this naval synergy is the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) doctrine, which positions Marine elements to occupy key maritime —such as small islands or atolls—for anti-surface and anti-air warfare, thereby extending the Navy's operational reach and complicating adversary targeting. These operations facilitate a networked "web of " shared across Marine ground sensors, naval ships, aircraft, and satellites, enhancing awareness and enabling dynamic retasking of fires in support of DMO. forces, refined through Force Design 2030, are explicitly nested within DMO and the Joint Warfighting Concept, allowing Marines to persist inside an adversary's weapons engagement zone while providing persistent , targeting data, and layered defenses for naval forces. Organizational adaptations, including the creation of Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs), further operationalize this integration by structuring smaller, agile units optimized for maritime campaigns, with embedded naval liaison elements to ensure seamless within Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). These regiments divest from heavy, shore-based assets to focus on mobile, logistics-light formations that can embark on lighter amphibious ships, addressing the need for distributed and reducing vulnerability to long-range precision strikes. However, effective implementation requires enhanced "" intelligence fusion between Navy maritime and Marine littoral domains, as current gaps in shared sensor data and analysis could undermine the stand-in forces' ability to contribute to naval cycles. Logistical and platform dependencies highlight ongoing challenges in naval integration, with Force Design 2030 advocating for approximately 35 new, cost-effective amphibious vessels capable of operating in shallow or narrow waters to transport and sustain these distributed units, rather than relying on fewer, larger legacy ships vulnerable to saturation attacks. exercises and doctrinal updates, such as the 2023 annual review, continue to refine these ties, emphasizing scalable MAGTFs under unified naval commanders to adapt to varying threat levels from to high-intensity conflict.

Implementation and Progress

Key Milestones and Annual Updates

The Force Design 2030 initiative was formally announced with the publication of its foundational document on March 23, 2020, by Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. David H. Berger, which proposed sweeping changes including divestment of heavy ground combat systems like tanks and towed to prioritize distributed, littoral-focused capabilities for competition. This initial pamphlet set the stage for experimentation and iterative refinement, emphasizing integration with naval forces and adaptation to contested maritime environments. In April 2021, the first annual update was released following a year of field experimentation, detailing progress on prototyping Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) and initial divestments, such as the retirement of all M1A1 Abrams tanks from active inventory to reallocate resources toward long-range precision fires and unmanned systems. The update highlighted early validations through exercises simulating stand-in forces in the , underscoring the shift from large-scale mechanized operations to agile, expeditionary units capable of operating inside adversary weapon engagement zones. The May 2022 annual update reported completion of directed tasks from prior guidance, including the publication of "A Concept for Stand-in Forces" and further organizational realignments, such as establishing the as the first prototype MLR under in . It also addressed logistics and sustainment challenges, directing investments in expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) infrastructure to support persistent forward presence. June 2023's annual update outlined continued modernization priorities, including expansions in unmanned aerial systems procurement and integration of architectures, while noting the inactivation of three battalions and two artillery regiments as part of force structure reductions totaling over 12,000 billets reoriented toward littoral regiments. This iteration emphasized empirical feedback from service-level training exercises, validating concepts like missile-armed mobile units for . Early 2024 marked a conceptual evolution when the Marine Corps officially dropped the "2030" designation, rebranding the effort as ongoing "Force Design" to signify perpetual adaptation rather than a fixed endpoint amid accelerating technological and threat dynamics. On October 23, 2025, Commandant Gen. Eric M. Smith released the latest Force Design Update, accelerating modernization in areas like artificial intelligence-enabled targeting and hypersonic defenses, while directing divestment of legacy platforms such as certain amphibious assault vehicles to fund next-generation connectors and loitering munitions. This update reaffirmed commitments to naval expeditionary warfare, incorporating lessons from recent operational deployments and wargames to enhance resilience against peer adversaries.

2025 Force Design Update

On October 23, 2025, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Eric M. Smith released the 2025 Force Design Update, a 24-page document assessing progress in the ongoing overhaul initiated by Force Design 2030 and outlining refinements to adapt to evolving peer threats. The update emphasizes equipping with precision fires, unmanned systems, advanced mobility platforms, resilient networks, and data-driven decision tools to operate effectively in environments contested by drones, long-range precision-guided munitions, cyber operations, and electronic warfare. Force structure refinements prioritize "stand-in forces" configured as scalable Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs)—including Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), Brigades (MEBs), and Forces (MEFs)—for naval expeditionary operations, particularly and control within the to deter adversary advances. Marine Littoral Regiments, introduced in 2022 for distributed island-chain operations, have advanced with the 3rd Regiment in reaching initial operating capability in December 2023, while the 12th Regiment is slated for full capability by 2026. enhancements include 12 expeditionary fabrication laboratories for in-theater resupply, transition of Autonomous Low-Profile Vessels to a formal program for contested , and expanded prepositioned stocks in the , , and to mitigate supply vulnerabilities. Modernization milestones feature fielding of the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), with six launchers delivered to the and plans for 18 per medium-range missile battery by 2033; all planned High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) have been deployed across 10 active and reserve batteries; 257 Amphibious Combat Vehicle variants (personnel carriers and ) will be fielded by year's end, achieving 41% of the total objective; and 5,000 of 12,500 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles have been distributed. Defensive capabilities like the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) for countering drones and missiles have been tested alongside NMESIS in , with forthcoming HIMARS evaluations near . Unmanned and integrations include establishment of a Marine Corps Attack Drone Team at Quantico, experimentation with XQ-58 drones in tandem with F-35 aircraft, AI/ infusions into systems, and development of collaborative combat aircraft. Command and control advancements involve refreshing the Marine Air Command and Control System and contributing to Project Dynamis, which accelerates kill webs—interconnected networks fusing sensors, intelligence, and effectors to surpass traditional kill chains by enabling distributed, resilient targeting against dynamic threats. The update candidly positions Force Design at its midpoint, committing to accelerated refinement through a continuous Campaign of Learning that incorporates insights from wargames, exercises, and operations to ensure adaptability without overhauling completed divestments or structures. General Smith underscored this human-centric approach, stating, "We do not man the equipment, we equip the Marine."

Reception and Controversies

Arguments in Favor

Proponents of Force Design 2030 maintain that it realigns the Marine Corps with the demands of competition, particularly in the , where adversaries possess advanced capabilities that render traditional large-scale amphibious assaults untenable. The initiative shifts focus from counterinsurgency-era heavy forces to distributed, littoral operations emphasizing stand-in forces that can persist in contested spaces, providing scalable options for deterrence and response without escalating to full-scale war. This adaptation is grounded in assessments of peer threats, including hypersonic missiles and integrated air defenses, which necessitate lighter, more mobile units integrated with naval assets to complicate enemy targeting and enable multi-domain fires. A core argument centers on resource reallocation: by divesting $16 billion in legacy systems—such as 120mm mortar systems, bridging equipment, and excess tactical vehicles—the redirects funds toward high-priority investments in precision-guided munitions, unmanned aerial and surface vehicles, and long-range anti-ship missiles like the . This trade-off enhances operational effectiveness by prioritizing standoff lethality over protected mobility, allowing smaller Marine Littoral Regiments to generate disproportionate effects through networked sensors and fires, while reducing logistical vulnerabilities in expeditionary settings. Advocates note that such modernization accelerates acquisition cycles, with prototypes like loitering munitions and expeditionary advanced bases already fielded, fostering a leaner force structure that sustains end strength reductions of about 12,000 personnel by emphasizing quality over quantity. Force Design 2030 also strengthens joint naval integration, aligning Marine units with Distributed Maritime Operations to create a more cohesive sea control architecture. By designing purpose-built formations like Marine Littoral Regiments for rapid deployment from ships or austere sites, the Corps contributes to persistent forward posture, complicating adversary calculus in scenarios like a contingency. This builds on four decades of doctrinal evolution, from concepts to expeditionary advanced base operations, ensuring the changes represent iterative refinement rather than abandonment of core amphibious expertise. Recent 2025 updates further validate this by incorporating resilient communications and AI-enabled targeting, equipping to thrive amid accelerating technological competition.

Major Criticisms

Critics of Force Design 2030, including over two dozen retired Marine Corps generals and analysts from organizations such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), contend that the initiative erodes the Corps' effectiveness as a force by divesting legacy capabilities without mature, validated replacements. These detractors, among them seven of the eight living former Marine Corps commandants as of 2025, argue that the reforms prioritize speculative distributed maritime operations over proven , potentially leaving the ill-equipped for high-intensity maneuver or sustained land campaigns. Key divestments include the elimination of all tank battalions (12 units, approximately 180 M1A1 Abrams tanks), a 76% reduction in towed 155mm batteries from 21 to 5, and cuts to rotary-wing assets and battalions, totaling over $16 billion in systems removed between 2020 and 2023. Retired Lt. Gen. and Gen. have highlighted that these losses undermine Congressional mandates for integrated armor, , and operations, creating vulnerability in contested environments where anti-ship missiles and unmanned systems cannot fully substitute for support and mobility. reports echo these concerns, noting risks to the Corps' ability to conduct forcible entry or urban combat, as the new Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) rely on untested concepts like Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). Logistical sustainability for stand-in forces across dispersed island chains remains a focal point of skepticism, with critics arguing that distributed operations lack robust resupply mechanisms amid peer-level anti-access/area-denial threats, potentially isolating small units without naval or force integration. The reforms' narrow tailoring to Indo-Pacific scenarios against China is seen as neglecting global commitments in , the , or , where larger-scale ground operations predominate; for instance, the ' reduced amphibious lift requirements (31 L-class ships plus 35 LSMs) conflict with assessments and could strain forcible entry missions. Empirical validations from the ongoing Ukraine conflict have intensified debates, as massed artillery, armor, and —capabilities FD2030 diminishes—have proven decisive in attritional warfare, contradicting the emphasis on precision fires and small, dispersed teams. Retired leaders like Zinni assert that these lessons underscore causal risks: divesting "boots " for high-tech standoff capabilities assumes technological dominance that may not materialize against adversaries with integrated air defenses and electronic warfare. While supporters dismiss such critiques as resistance to overdue adaptation, detractors maintain that rushed implementation without comprehensive wargaming or live-force experimentation invites operational failure, as evidenced by persistent on budgetary and readiness impacts through 2025.

Empirical Validations and Debates

The U.S. Marine Corps has conducted extensive , modeling, simulations, and field exercises as part of a "Campaign of Learning" to test Force Design 2030 concepts, with official reports claiming these efforts validate the shift toward distributed, littoral operations in contested environments. For instance, the June 2023 Force Design 2030 Annual Update asserts that results from these activities, combined with observations from conflicts in and the Western Pacific, confirm the need for smaller, more mobile units equipped with long-range precision fires and anti-access/area-denial capabilities to counter peer adversaries like . Experiments such as infantry battalion redesign trials, initiated prior to the March 2020 Force Design publication, demonstrated improved agility in distributed operations, leading to recommendations for reduced force structure in traditional heavy units. However, empirical validations remain contested due to methodological concerns in wargaming. Critics, including former Marine officers, have alleged that some were structured to favor Force Design outcomes by underemphasizing , attrition, and peer-level threats, with whistleblower accounts in 2024 highlighting rigged scenarios that ignored realistic sustainment challenges in the . Proponents counter that form part of an iterative "virtuous cycle" of refinement, not definitive proof, and point to tangible progress in exercises like those integrating stand-in forces with naval assets. Independent analyses, such as from the for Strategic and International Studies, note that while simulations support enhanced sensor-shooter integration, they have not fully tested the Corps' reduced capacity for forced-entry operations against non-peer threats. Debates over Force Design 2030's empirical foundation often center on its narrow focus on high-end Sino-Pacific scenarios, potentially at the expense of versatility. Groups like the "Chowder II" retirees argue that divestments in tanks and have eroded the ' ability to seize or respond to global crises, citing unproven assumptions about naval logistics in prolonged conflicts. In contrast, defenders, including active leaders, maintain that real-world adaptations in —such as drone swarms and precision strikes—empirically affirm the design's emphasis on scalable, low-signature forces over legacy heavy maneuver. Testing in non-Indo-Pacific theaters, like U.S. Southern Command exercises in 2025, has shown mixed results for forces in hybrid threats, suggesting adaptability but highlighting gaps in scaling for multi-domain operations.
AspectClaimed ValidationKey Debate Points
Wargames & SimulationsIterative testing refines littoral regiments and unmanned systems integration.Alleged bias toward success; insufficient logistics modeling.
Field ExercisesProgress in distributed ops with naval forces, e.g., Project Overmatch derivatives.Limited empirical data on sustained combat; overreliance on simulations vs. live-fire scalability.
Real-World AnalogiesUkraine lessons on precision fires validate anti-ship/anti-air focus.Analogies overstated; ignores differences in scale and peer vs. near-peer dynamics.

References

  1. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47614
  2. https://www.marines.mil/Force-Design/
  3. https://www.csis.org/analysis/marine-corps-force-design-2030-examining-capabilities-and-critiques
  4. https://news.usni.org/2025/10/23/u-s-marine-corps-force-design-update
  5. https://www.marines.mil/News/Press-Releases/Press-Release-Display/Article/1901503/gen-david-h-berger-becomes-38th-commandant-of-the-marine-corps/
  6. https://www.dvidshub.net/news/331693/commandants-planning-guidance
  7. https://news.usni.org/2019/10/03/berger-marine-2030-force-design-is-nearly-complete-concepts-now-being-modeled-tested
  8. https://warontherocks.com/2025/07/marine-force-design-is-four-decades-in-the-making/
  9. https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf
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  11. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF
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