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Maritime Zones under International Law

According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a nation's internal waters include waters on the side of the baseline of a nation's territorial waters that is facing toward the land, except in archipelagic states.[1] It includes waterways such as rivers and canals, and sometimes the water within small bays.

In internal waters, sovereignty of the state is equal to that which it exercises on the mainland. The coastal state is free to make laws relating to its internal waters, regulate any use, and use any resource. In the absence of agreements to the contrary, foreign vessels have no right of passage within internal waters, and this lack of right to innocent passage is the key difference between internal waters and territorial waters.[2] The "archipelagic waters" within the outermost islands of archipelagic states are treated as internal waters with the exception that innocent passage must be allowed, although the archipelagic state may designate certain sea lanes in these waters.

When a foreign vessel is authorized to enter inland waters, it is subject to the laws of the coastal state, with one exception: the crew of the ship is subject to the law of the flag state. This extends to labor conditions as well as to crimes committed on board the ship, even if docked at a port. Offences committed in the harbor and the crimes committed there by the crew of a foreign vessel always fall in the jurisdiction of the coastal state. The coastal state can intervene in ship affairs when the master of the vessel requires intervention of the local authorities, when there is danger to the peace and security of the coastal state, or to enforce customs rules.[1]

Disputes

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The claim by one state of a waterway as internal waters has led to disputes with other states. For example, Canada claims a section of the Northwest Passage as part of its internal waters, fully under Canadian jurisdiction,[3] a claim which has been disputed by the United States and most maritime nations, which consider them to be an international strait, which means that foreign vessels have a right of transit passage.[4][5][6] (See Canadian Internal Waters and Northwest Passage § International waters dispute.)

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which was formed in 1994, has the power to settle maritime disputes between party states, although in practice, these resolutions depend on the willingness of these states to adhere to the rulings.

See also

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References

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Sources

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Internal waters

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Internal waters are the bodies of water situated landward of the baseline from which the breadth of a coastal state's territorial sea is measured, encompassing areas such as bays, ports, harbors, rivers, lakes, and canals, over which the coastal state exercises sovereignty comparable to that over its dry land territory. This concept is codified in Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which states that such waters form part of the internal waters of the state, excluding provisions for archipelagic waters under Part IV. Unlike the territorial sea, where foreign vessels enjoy the right of innocent passage, internal waters permit the coastal state to regulate or prohibit navigation entirely at its discretion, reflecting the full extent of its jurisdictional authority including over airspace above and seabed below. The delineation of internal waters plays a critical role in defining maritime boundaries and , with baselines typically drawn along the low-water line or, in indented coasts, closing lines across bays that meet specific geometric criteria under UNCLOS Article 10, such as a semi-circle test for historic bays or those with penetration proportional to mouth width. Examples include major ports like those in river estuaries or enclosed gulfs, where states enforce , , and measures without international navigational servitudes, though may recognize limited in historically shared bays like the Gulf of Fonseca. This zone underscores the principle of territorial sovereignty in maritime affairs, enabling states to control economic activities, environmental protection, and military installations within these confined spaces.

Core Definition

Internal waters consist of those bodies of water located on the landward side of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, including enclosed bays, ports, harbors, rivers, and lakes that are not subject to international navigation rights. Under Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982 and entered into force on November 16, 1994, these waters form part of the internal waters of the coastal state, except in cases involving archipelagic waters governed by Part IV of the convention. This delineation positions internal waters as distinct from the territorial sea, where limited rights of innocent passage apply to foreign vessels. The coastal state exercises complete sovereignty over internal waters, equivalent to its authority over land territory, encompassing full jurisdiction over the water column, seabed, subsoil, and airspace above. Unlike the territorial sea, there is no right of innocent passage for foreign ships in internal waters, allowing the coastal state to regulate or prohibit entry at its discretion, subject only to exceptions such as the right of entry for vessels in distress. This sovereignty enables the enforcement of domestic laws on navigation, resource exploitation, environmental protection, and security without international interference. The of internal waters predates UNCLOS, rooted in , but the convention provides the modern codified framework, ratified by 169 parties as of 2023. of the baseline—typically the low-water line along the or straight baselines in certain geographic configurations—directly influences the extent of internal waters, with bays deeper than specified criteria qualifying as internal if enclosed by such lines.

Relation to Baselines and Territorial Sea

Internal waters comprise all maritime areas situated on the landward side of the baseline, which delineates the inner boundary of the territorial sea. This baseline, typically the low-water line along the for normal circumstances, marks the seaward limit of internal waters and the starting point for measuring the territorial sea's breadth, extending up to 12 nautical miles . Under Article 8 of the Convention on the (UNCLOS, 1982), "waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State," except in archipelagic waters governed by Part IV. This provision echoes earlier codified in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, affirming that such waters are assimilated to the coastal state's land territory for jurisdictional purposes. In contrast, the territorial sea permits foreign vessels the right of , absent in internal waters unless granted by the coastal state. The use of straight baselines under UNCLOS Article 7 can significantly expand internal waters by connecting appropriate coastal points, thereby enclosing indentations, fjords, or fringing islands that would otherwise remain part of the territorial sea or high seas. Such baselines must not depart appreciably from the general direction of the coast nor cut off traditional fishing rights, ensuring the relation to the territorial sea reflects geographical realities rather than arbitrary enclosure. This demarcation underscores the baseline's role in balancing coastal state sovereignty with international navigation interests.

Historical Evolution

Pre-UNCLOS Customary Law

Under customary international law prior to the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, coastal states exercised sovereignty over internal waters equivalent to that over their land territory, encompassing areas such as ports, harbors, navigable rivers, lakes, and certain enclosed bays or gulfs. These waters lay landward of the baseline, generally the low-water mark along the coast, beyond which the narrower territorial sea—customarily limited to three nautical miles—permitted limited foreign navigation rights. Foreign vessels enjoyed no right of innocent passage in internal waters and required the coastal state's explicit consent for entry, reflecting the principle that such areas formed an integral extension of national domain subject to full regulatory control, including exclusion of unauthorized access. The regime originated from state practice and bilateral agreements rather than codified norms, with ports and harbors treated as internal due to their artificial or enclosed nature, allowing states to impose conditions on docking, loading, and security without international interference. Navigable rivers and their mouths were similarly internalized via straight closing lines across entrances, granting exclusive jurisdiction upstream, as evidenced by longstanding European and American practices from the 18th century onward. Bays posed greater variability: geographical bays were assessed by criteria like indentation depth, enclosure by headlands, and semi-circle tests derived from arbitral precedents, while historic bays required proof of continuous possession, effective control, and acquiescence by other states over extended periods, often decades, as in claims to Peter the Great Bay by Russia or Delaware Bay by the United States. Disputes highlighted the regime's reliance on factual possession over rigid formulas; for instance, the 1917 on the affirmed shared among , , and based on colonial-era joint usage to the 16th century, treating it as internal waters undivided by modern baselines. Absent such historic , unilateral claims risked if lacking geographical or vital state interests, underscoring customary law's emphasis on effective control and international tolerance rather than expansive self-assertion. This framework persisted until partial codification in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which introduced provisional bay criteria like a 24-nautical-mile closing line but left internal waters largely to ongoing custom.

Codification in UNCLOS and Subsequent Practice

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted on 10 December 1982 and entering into force on 16 November 1994, codified the longstanding customary international law principle that internal waters lie landward of the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. Article 8(1) explicitly provides that, except as stipulated in Part IV for archipelagic waters, "waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State." This provision affirms the coastal state's exercise of full territorial sovereignty over internal waters, akin to sovereignty over its land territory, encompassing exclusive control over navigation, resource exploitation, and security without any inherent right of innocent passage for foreign vessels. Article 2 further reinforces this by extending sovereignty "beyond its land territory and internal waters" to the territorial sea, distinguishing internal waters as subject to unqualified domestic jurisdiction. Article 8(2) introduces a targeted exception to preserve navigational interests: where straight baselines drawn under Article 7 enclose areas previously regarded as territorial sea or high seas, "a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters." This clause, rooted in equity, ensures that the shift to internal status does not abruptly extinguish established passage rights, applying the innocent passage regime outlined in Articles 17–26 (e.g., continuous and expeditious transit not prejudicial to the coastal state's peace, good order, or security). However, this exception does not extend to traditionally internal waters, such as those within bays closed by natural entrances or ports, where coastal states maintain absolute authority to regulate or deny entry. Post-UNCLOS state practice has broadly adhered to this framework, with over 160 parties depositing charts of straight baselines with the UN Secretary-General pursuant to Article 16(2), thereby designating extensive coastal indentations, fjords, and island-fringed areas as internal waters. For example, Canada has applied straight baselines along its Arctic archipelago since 1985, classifying waters including parts of the Northwest Passage as internal and subjecting foreign navigation to prior authorization rather than innocent passage. Similarly, Norway's baselines enclose numerous fjords as internal waters, exercising full regulatory control over transit and fisheries. These practices underscore the convention's role in standardizing baseline methods while allowing flexibility for geographical realities, though excessive claims—such as those departing significantly from the coast's general direction—have drawn protests, as in U.S. objections to certain configurations that unduly expand internal waters at the expense of high seas freedoms. Jurisprudential developments and diplomatic exchanges have further shaped , affirming UNCLOS provisions as reflective of even for non-parties like the . In the 2016 ( v. ), the indirectly referenced internal waters by scrutinizing baseline validity under Articles 7 and 8, ruling that low-tide elevations cannot generate baselines enclosing internal waters absent specific qualifications. Russia's post-1994 assertions of internal waters over segments of the have similarly prompted challenges, with states invoking Article 8(2) to argue for preserved passage in historically navigated areas. Overall, subsequent practice demonstrates robust compliance with codification principles, tempered by ongoing debates over baseline and the between sovereignty and , without of widespread deviation from Article 8's core tenets.

Delimitation and Formation

Normal Baselines and Enclosed Waters

Normal baselines are defined under Article 5 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the low-water line along the coast, as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state. These baselines apply to coasts that are not deeply indented, fringed with islands, or otherwise requiring straight baselines under Article 7. The ambulatory nature of normal baselines means they shift with changes in the low-water line due to erosion, accretion, or sea-level variations, though fixed baselines may be used in specific cases like ports under Article 11 if harbor works exist from before specified dates. Waters landward of normal baselines qualify as internal waters, where the coastal state holds complete sovereignty akin to its land territory, excluding rights of innocent passage that apply seaward in the territorial sea (UNCLOS Article 8). This includes naturally enclosed or semi-enclosed areas such as harbors, small bays, estuaries, and river mouths that do not satisfy the geometric or semi-circle tests for bay closing lines under Article 10. For mouths of rivers flowing directly into the sea, a straight baseline is drawn across the opening between low-water points on the banks, enclosing the upstream waters as internal (UNCLOS Article 9). Similarly, waters within roadsteads or small indentations hugging the coast fall landward of the sinuous low-water line, subjecting them to exclusive coastal state control without international navigation guarantees. Enclosed waters under normal baselines contrast with those formed by straight baselines, as they rely on the coastline's configuration rather than deliberate closing lines across larger indentations. Examples include the tidal waters of rivers like the in the United States, where the baseline crosses the low-water line at the riverbanks, rendering upstream reaches internal waters subject to full U.S. jurisdiction for navigation, resources, and . In , normal baselines along mainland coasts enclose port areas such as Harbour's inner reaches, where sovereignty extends to regulate all activities without foreign vessel passage . These formations prioritize fidelity to the coast's low-water mark, avoiding the enclosure of open-sea-like waters that straight baselines might encompass, thus preserving distinctions in jurisdictional scope.

Straight Baselines and Their Implications

Straight baselines, as codified in Article 7 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (), permit coastal states to draw lines connecting appropriate points along a deeply indented coastline or one fringed with islands in immediate proximity, provided the baselines do not depart appreciably from the general direction of the coast and account for the interests of states in . This method, upheld by the in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case regarding Norway's longstanding practice, transforms irregularly shaped coastal areas into a simplified boundary from which maritime zones are measured. Waters enclosed landward of these baselines are classified as internal waters under Article 8(2) of , granting the coastal state territorial sovereignty equivalent to that over its land domain. The primary implication of straight baselines is the extension of full sovereign control over previously open or semi-open waters, eliminating rights of that apply in territorial seas. Foreign vessels require explicit permission to enter these internal waters, enabling coastal states to enforce strict security measures, regulate resource extraction such as fisheries and hydrocarbons without international oversight, and impose , fiscal, and sanitary controls. However, Article 8(2) includes a : if straight baselines enclose areas previously deemed territorial sea or high seas, pre-existing rights are preserved unless the coastal state formally objects, though this provision has rarely mitigated broader navigational restrictions in practice. In application, straight baselines often enclose substantial maritime areas, amplifying sovereign resource claims but sparking disputes when drawn excessively, as they can encroach on traditional international navigation routes and high seas freedoms. The , for instance, has protested baselines by states including in the and , arguing they violate UNCLOS criteria by spanning long distances without qualifying indentations or island fringes, thereby unlawfully converting into internal ones and limiting access to used for global trade. Such practices, documented in over 20 cases of non-compliance by UNCLOS parties like and , underscore tensions between coastal assertions and the convention's intent to balance with navigational equity, often leading to diplomatic protests rather than resolved delimitations.

Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction

Full Sovereignty Exercised

In internal waters, the coastal state exercises complete and exclusive over the waters, the above them, and their bed and subsoil, on par with its authority over land territory. This enables the state to regulate all activities without the limitations imposed on other maritime zones, such as the territorial sea. Foreign vessels and aircraft lack any right of or overflight in internal waters, requiring explicit permission from the coastal state for entry or transit. The coastal state may enforce national laws on , customs, security, , and public order, including boarding, arresting, or expelling non-compliant entities. Resource exploitation in internal waters falls under full control, permitting unrestricted extraction of minerals, hydrocarbons, and living resources from the , , and subsoil. This extends to development, such as ports or artificial islands, subject only to domestic regulations. Exceptions arise only through voluntary international agreements, like bilateral treaties granting limited access to specific internal waters, such as rivers or ports used historically for trade.

Resource Exploitation and Security Controls

Coastal states exercise complete sovereignty over natural resources in internal waters, permitting unrestricted exploration and exploitation of living resources in the water column—such as fish and shellfish—through domestic fisheries management regimes that include licensing, quotas, and enforcement to prevent overexploitation. Non-living resources in the seabed and subsoil, including aggregates like sand and gravel, are similarly subject to exclusive national control, often extracted via dredging for coastal construction or infrastructure projects under regulated concessions. This authority contrasts with adjacent zones like the exclusive economic zone, where rights are limited to sovereign purposes without full territorial jurisdiction. Aquaculture operations thrive in the sheltered conditions of internal waters, such as bays and estuaries, where states authorize farms for species like oysters and mussels to leverage calm environments for higher yields and reduced storm risks, contributing to local economies while adhering to national environmental standards. Full sovereignty ensures that resource activities face no international oversight beyond general obligations like environmental protection under UNCLOS Part XII, allowing states to prioritize economic development aligned with domestic priorities. Security controls in internal waters derive from the absence of any right of innocent or transit passage for foreign vessels, enabling coastal states to mandate prior permission for all entries and impose stringent access restrictions. This facilitates comprehensive measures, including mandatory inspections, vessel tracking systems, and exclusion zones around ports, naval bases, and critical infrastructure to counter threats like smuggling, unauthorized surveillance, or terrorism. Coastal states deploy dedicated patrols and surveillance technologies, exercising jurisdiction akin to that over land territory to maintain operational secrecy and rapid interdiction capabilities.

Notable Examples

Standard National Internal Waters

Standard national internal waters consist of aquatic areas landward of the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured, as defined under Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the (UNCLOS), without dependence on historic title assertions. These waters arise from the application of normal baselines along the low-water mark or closing lines across river mouths and qualifying bays, granting the coastal state complete sovereignty equivalent to that over its land territory. Foreign vessels lack any right of in such waters, subjecting their entry to the coastal state's discretion. Typical formations include ports, harbors, and estuaries enclosed by these baselines. For instance, the internal waters of U.S. ports such as Boston Harbor encompass areas behind the baseline, where the United States maintains exclusive control over navigation, resources, and security. Similarly, river mouths, like those of the Thames in the United Kingdom, are closed by straight lines under UNCLOS Article 9, rendering upstream waters internal. Bays meeting UNCLOS criteria—entrance points not exceeding 24 nautical miles and significantly indented—also qualify, as seen in smaller coastal indentations along Norway's fjord-dotted coastline, treated as internal absent straight baseline complications. Inland lakes and fully enclosed lagoons exemplify unambiguous cases. The Great Lakes, including Lake Erie shared by the United States and Canada, function as internal waters under bilateral agreements aligned with baseline principles, covering approximately 245,000 square kilometers with the coastal states holding sovereign rights over fisheries and pollution control. Lake Constance, bordering Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, operates similarly as internal waters divided by treaty, emphasizing resource management without international passage rights. These examples underscore the primacy of geometric and baseline rules in defining standard internal waters, distinct from contested historic claims.

Historic Title Claims

Historic title claims to internal waters assert that certain maritime areas qualify as internal waters under due to long-continued, peaceful, and effective exercise of sovereignty by the coastal state, coupled with the or absence of effective protest from other states, notwithstanding failure to meet standard geometric criteria for bays or enclosed waters. This doctrine, preserved in the United Nations Convention on the (UNCLOS) Article 10(6), exempts so-called "historic bays" from the Convention's definitional requirements for bays, allowing treatment as internal waters where historical consolidation of title exists. The (ICJ) in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case (1951) defined such waters as those "treated as internal waters but which would not have that character were it not for the existence of an historic title," emphasizing elements like continuous possession, vital state interests, and lack of vital opposition. Establishing historic title demands proof of open, notorious, and uninterrupted sovereignty over an extended period—often decades or centuries—without significant international challenge, distinguishing it from mere national assertion. Unlike baselines drawn under UNCLOS Article 7, which may enclose prior territorial seas with residual innocent passage rights per Article 8(2), consolidated historic internal waters confer unqualified sovereignty, excluding foreign vessel transit absent coastal state consent. However, the threshold for recognition remains high; unilateral proclamations seldom suffice without corroborative international practice or treaty acknowledgment, as acquiescence implies tacit acceptance by affected states. Academic analyses note that systemic biases in maritime scholarship, often favoring open-sea regimes over expansive claims, may undervalue evidence of pre-UNCLOS effective control in peripheral regions. Notable examples include the United States' domestic recognition of Mississippi Sound—separating mainland Mississippi, Alabama, and the barrier islands—as historic internal waters for regulatory purposes, upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court based on over a century of unchallenged customs enforcement and navigation controls dating to the 19th century. Similarly, Long Island Sound has been treated as historic internal waters in U.S. law for tariff and commerce regulation, reflecting longstanding state practice without foreign protest, though its international status as fully internal remains untested in adjudication. Libya's 1973 proclamation of the Gulf of Sidra (24,000 square miles) as a historic bay, invoking Ottoman-era usage and post-independence exercises, failed to garner acquiescence; U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations in 1981 and 1986, culminating in military clashes, demonstrated lack of international consolidation, rendering the claim ineffective under customary law. Canada's assertion of Hudson Bay (approximately 1.23 million square kilometers) as internal waters rests on British colonial title from 1610, continuous ice-bound control, and navigational restrictions since 1904, with limited protests enabling partial acquiescence; however, persistent U.S. objections frame it as a semi-enclosed sea eligible for transit regimes. Russia's claims to waters in Peter the Great Bay and portions of the Sea of Okhotsk invoke Tsarist-era possession and Soviet-era baselines, accepted by neighbors like Japan in bilateral fisheries agreements but contested broadly for excluding innocent passage. These cases illustrate that while historic title can solidify internal waters status where evidence aligns with ICJ criteria, contested claims often revert to UNCLOS defaults absent diplomatic or judicial validation.

International Disputes and Challenges

South China Sea Claims

China maintains sovereignty claims over the Paracel Islands (Xisha Qundao) and Spratly Islands (Nansha Qundao) in the South China Sea, asserting internal waters within straight baselines drawn around these archipelagic groups. In 1996, China promulgated baselines enclosing the Paracel Islands, treating the 130 features—comprising 15 islands, 28 reefs, and numerous shoals—as a cohesive unit, thereby designating the waters landward of these lines, spanning roughly 8,000 square nautical miles, as internal waters subject to full sovereign control, including restrictions on foreign navigation without permission. This approach invokes Article 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for straight baselines, justified by China as applicable to "deeply indented coastlines" or chains of fringing islands, though critics argue it misapplies the provision to offshore insular formations lacking sufficient coastal linkage. For the Spratly Islands, China has not formally declared baselines as of 2024 but has signaled intent to do so, potentially enclosing internal waters amid its 100+ occupied outposts, including artificial enlargements on seven reefs since 2013. These claims extend historic title assertions dating to 1947 maps, positing the islands and "adjacent seas" as inherent Chinese territory predating UNCLOS, thereby exempting enclosed areas from innocent passage rights. China's 2021 maritime white paper reaffirms internal waters formation via baselines around "Nanhai Zhudao" (islands of the South China Sea), integrating them into a unified maritime jurisdiction that overlaps approximately 80% of the sea's area when combined with territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) pretensions. However, this framework conflicts with UNCLOS Article 121, which limits archipelagic baselines to recognized archipelagic states like the Philippines, not continental powers like China. Vietnam contests China's Paracel baselines, claiming the entire group (Hoang Sa) as its own historic territory since the 17th century, with administrative control over select Spratly features and rejection of enclosures as unlawful enclosures of high seas. The Philippines similarly disputes Spratly encroachments, citing its 2009 EEZ baselines and occupation of nine features, arguing China's actions violate UNCLOS by generating internal waters from low-tide elevations ineligible for territorial seas. The 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) award in Philippines v. China invalidated broad historic rights within the nine-dash line, clarifying that features like Mischief Reef are low-tide elevations incapable of baselines or territorial seas, thus preserving high seas corridors and undermining group-enclosure rationales; the tribunal noted no evidence supports internal waters claims beyond immediate insular vicinities. China dismissed the ruling as "null and void," citing non-participation and incompatibility with its "indisputable sovereignty," while continuing enforcement through coast guard patrols and island-building, escalating incidents like the 2024 Second Thomas Shoal standoff. International analyses, including U.S. State Department studies, deem China's baselines excessive, as they aggregate disparate features into artificial archipelagos, contravening UNCLOS prohibitions on arbitrary enclosures that impinge on neighboring EEZs and freedom of navigation. Brunei and Malaysia maintain limited overlapping claims but prioritize EEZ delimitations over island sovereignty, while Taiwan echoes China's insular assertions via a U-shaped line. These disputes have prompted multilateral responses, such as ASEAN's 2016 statement upholding UNCLOS and U.S. freedom-of-navigation operations challenging internal waters pretensions since 2015, highlighting tensions between unilateral baseline assertions and multilateral maritime norms.

Arctic and Baltic Sea Developments

In the Arctic, Canada maintains that the Northwest Passage constitutes historic internal waters enclosed by straight baselines established in 1985 around the Arctic Archipelago, asserting full sovereignty based on longstanding exploration, governance, and Indigenous use by Inuit communities. This claim enables Canada to regulate navigation, environmental standards, and security without granting automatic transit rights. The United States rejects this characterization, viewing the Passage as an international strait under Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which mandates transit passage for foreign vessels connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, irrespective of historical use or ice conditions. Between 2020 and 2024, the Passage saw 117 complete transits, including 41 in 2023 and 38 in 2024, primarily by yachts, commercial vessels, and passenger ships, heightening tensions as melting sea ice facilitates increased commercial and potential military activity. Russia similarly claims segments of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as internal waters subject to full sovereignty, particularly straits along its Arctic coast, contrasting with U.S. assertions of transit passage rights. A federal law signed on December 5, 2022, amended prior legislation to impose strict requirements on foreign warships in these waters, mandating 90 days' advance permission, a limit of one vessel at a time, surfaced passage for submarines displaying flags, and the potential suspension of navigation for security reasons. These measures underscore Russia's prioritization of control over emerging shipping lanes amid geopolitical competition, though the U.S. has signaled possible freedom of navigation operations to challenge the claims, escalating disputes over baseline-drawn internal waters. In the Baltic Sea, Russia enacted Decree 914 on June 18, 2025, establishing new straight baselines spanning approximately 150 kilometers in the eastern Gulf of Finland from the Finnish-Russian border to the Estonian-Russian border near the Bay of Narva, thereby designating nearly the entire eastern gulf—including approaches to Saint Petersburg ports—as internal waters. This update replaces outdated 1985 Soviet-era baselines, citing improved mapping technology and post-dissolution geographical adjustments, and aligns with UNCLOS provisions for enclosing deeply indented coastlines or fringing islands as internal waters where foreign vessels require permission for entry. The changes also affect areas around the Kaliningrad enclave, extending the measurement of the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea without altering internationally agreed sovereign boundaries from prior treaties with Finland (1965) and Estonia (2014, unratified). Unlike Arctic disputes, these adjustments have prompted no formal objections from neighbors, potentially clarifying navigation zones amid NATO-Russia tensions and hybrid threats, though they reinforce Russia's authority to intercept unauthorized foreign ships in the newly defined internal areas. The U.S. has historically not recognized certain Russian straight baseline claims globally, viewing some as excessive deviations from coastal direction under UNCLOS Article 7.

Other Regional Conflicts

In the Gulf of Fonseca, bordering El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, maritime spaces have been contested since the 19th century, with the International Court of Justice ruling in its September 11, 1992, judgment that the Gulf constitutes a historic bay whose waters are internal waters subject to a condominium regime shared equally by the three littoral states. This determination excluded third-party rights such as innocent passage, attributing full sovereignty over the enclosed waters to the co-riparians while apportioning islands like the Conejos islets to Honduras and Meanguera to El Salvador based on uti possidetis juris principles from colonial boundaries. The ruling stemmed from El Salvador's claim for exclusive maritime zones and Nicaragua's intervention asserting condominium, resolving core boundary ambiguities but leaving peripheral tensions unresolved, including Nicaragua's 2013 communications to the UN on overlapping claims. Recent flare-ups, such as El Salvador and Nicaragua's mutual accusations of sovereign waters violations in 2022, underscore persistent enforcement challenges despite the ICJ's framework. The Bay of Piran dispute between Croatia and Slovenia arose from the 1991 dissolution of Yugoslavia, where the bay—previously internal waters under Yugoslav sovereignty—became divided, prompting Slovenia to demand unimpeded access to international waters. In its June 29, 2017, final award, the Permanent Court of Arbitration delimited the maritime boundary along the midline of the bay, affirming its status as internal waters post-dissolution and obligating Croatia to provisionally apply a junction area ensuring Slovenia's access to the high seas without prejudicing final adjudication. The tribunal rejected Slovenia's broader claims for a guaranteed route but emphasized equitable principles under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, noting the bay's enclosure by baselines rendered it non-territorial sea. Croatia disputed the award's validity, citing arbitrator bias and procedural irregularities, and refused implementation, leading to EU-mediated stalemates and Slovenia's 2017 blockage of Croatia's Eurozone accession talks. Other instances include Iran's expansive assertions in the Persian Gulf, where its 1993 maritime zones act claims internal waters status for areas between islands lacking international legal basis, exceeding even straight baseline allowances and fueling tensions with neighbors over navigation freedoms. These claims, rooted in security rationales, contrast with UNCLOS-compliant 12-nautical-mile territorial seas adopted by Gulf states, complicating transit through chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz without constituting full-scale internal waters enclosures.

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  26. https://www.nbr.org/publication/the-role-of-history-and-law-in-the-south-china-sea-and-arctic-ocean/
  27. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/LIS150-SCS.pdf
  28. https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/pantheon_files/files/publication/SCS%2520Report%2520-%2520web.pdf
  29. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-china-bending-rules-south-china-sea
  30. https://amti.csis.org/reading-between-lines-next-spratly-dispute/
  31. https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/how-china-bending-rules-south-china-sea
  32. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea
  33. https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf
  34. https://www.uscc.gov/research/south-china-sea-arbitration-ruling-what-happened-and-whats-next
  35. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/wjbz/jh/202405/t20240527_11312137.html
  36. https://www.csis.org/analysis/manila-and-beijing-clarify-select-south-china-sea-claims
  37. https://amti.csis.org/maritime-claims-map/
  38. https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/explainer-northwest-passages-shipping-potential-legal-status-and-whats-stake
  39. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/new-russian-law-northern-sea-route-navigation-gathering-arctic-storm-or-tempest-teapot
  40. https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2025/what-does-russias-new-maritime-law-mean-baltic-security-qa-pierre-thevenin
  41. https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1153942/Russia-redraws-territorial-waters-baseline-in-Baltic-Sea
  42. https://stjececmsdusgva001.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/public/documents/RussianFederation2023.pdf
  43. https://www.icj-cij.org/case/75
  44. https://sovereignlimits.com/blog/judgment-bay
  45. https://stjececmsdusgva001.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/public/documents/El_Salvador_2023_zDpyJsY.pdf
  46. https://en.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/el-golfo-de-fonseca-como-exponente-del-exito-o-fracaso-de-la-integracion-centroamericana
  47. https://us-asia-law-institute.squarespace.com/s/CroatiavSloveniaOdomJ.pdf
  48. https://jmic.online/issues/v8n2/2/
  49. https://www.acerislaw.com/final-award-pca-arbitration-slovenia-croatia/
  50. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/court-says-slovenia-should-have-corridor-to-international-waters-in-dispute-with-idUSKBN19K2K5/
  51. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/LIS-114.pdf
  52. https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1912
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