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Sovereignty
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Sovereignty can generally be defined as supreme, independent control and lawmaking authority over a territory.[1][2][3] It finds expression in the power to rule and make law. Sovereignty entails hierarchy within a state as well as external autonomy for states.[4] In any state, sovereignty is assigned to the person, body or institution that has the ultimate authority over other people and to change existing laws.[5] In political theory, sovereignty is a substantive term designating supreme legitimate authority over some polity.[6] Under international law, sovereign states are all considered equal, and no state can interfere with the internal affairs of another sovereign state. While Article 2(7) of the UN Charter explicitly recognizes the sovereignty of states, and in general there is a principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states, the UN Security Council’s Chapter VII powers clearly contemplate the use of force against a state when necessary to restore peace. Further, the recent Responsibility to Protect (R2P) authorizes the United Nations to take action to “avert a humanitarian catastrophe” within a state when that state’s government cannot or will not act.
A state is generally considered to have sovereignty over a territory when it has consistently exercised state authority there without objection from other states.[7] De jure sovereignty refers to the legal right to do so; de facto sovereignty refers to the factual ability to do so. This can become an issue of special concern upon the failure of the usual expectation that de jure and de facto sovereignty exist at the place and time of concern, and reside within the same organization.
Etymology
[edit]The term arises from the unattested Vulgar Latin *superanus (itself a derived form of Latin super – "over") meaning "chief", "ruler".[8] Its spelling, which has varied since the word's first appearance in English in the 14th century, was influenced by the English word "reign".[9][10]
Concepts
[edit]The concept of sovereignty has had multiple conflicting components, varying definitions, and diverse and inconsistent applications throughout history.[11][12][13][14] The current notion of state sovereignty contains four aspects: territory, population, authority and recognition.[13] According to Stephen D. Krasner, the term could also be understood in four different ways:
- Domestic sovereignty – actual control over a state exercised by an authority organized within this state
- Interdependence sovereignty – actual control of movement across the state's borders
- International legal sovereignty – formal recognition by other sovereign states
- Westphalian sovereignty – there is no other authority in the state aside from the domestic sovereign (such other authorities might be e.g. a political organization or any other external agent).[11]
Often, these four aspects all appear together, but this is not necessarily the case – they are not affected by one another, and there are historical examples of states that were non-sovereign in one aspect while at the same time being sovereign in another of these aspects.[11] According to Immanuel Wallerstein, another fundamental feature of sovereignty is that it is a claim that must be recognized if it is to have any meaning:
Sovereignty is a hypothetical trade, in which two potentially (or really) conflicting sides, respecting de facto realities of power, exchange such recognitions as their least costly strategy.[15]
There are two additional components of sovereignty that should be discussed, empirical sovereignty and juridical sovereignty.[16] Empirical sovereignty deals with the legitimacy of who is in control of a state and the legitimacy of how they exercise their power.[16] Tilly references an example where nobles in parts of Europe were allowed to engage in private rights and Ustages, a constitution by Catalonia recognized that right which demonstrates empirical sovereignty.[17] As David Samuel points out, this is an important aspect of a state because there has to be a designated individual or group of individuals that are acting on behalf of the people of the state.[18] Juridical sovereignty emphasizes the importance of other states recognizing the rights of a state to exercise their control freely with little interference.[16] For example, Jackson, Rosberg and Jones explain how the sovereignty and survival of African states were more largely influenced by legal recognition rather than material aid.[19] Douglass North identifies that institutions want structure and these two forms of sovereignty can be a method for developing structure.[20]
For a while, the United Nations highly valued juridical sovereignty and attempted to reinforce its principle often.[16] More recently, the United Nations is shifting away and focusing on establishing empirical sovereignty.[16] Michael Barnett notes that this is largely due to the effects of the post Cold War era because the United Nations believed that to have peaceful relations states should establish peace within their territory.[16] As a matter of fact, theorists found that during the post Cold War era many people focused on how stronger internal structures promote inter-state peace.[21] For instance, Zaum argues that many weak and impoverished countries that were affected by the Cold War were given assistance to develop their lacking sovereignty through this sub-concept of "empirical statehood".[22]
History
[edit]Classical
[edit]The Roman jurist Ulpian observed that:[23]
- The people transferred all their imperium and power to the Emperor. Cum lege regia, quae de imperio eius lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat (Digest I.4.1)
- The laws do not bind the emperor. Princeps legibus solutus est (Digest I.3.31)
- A decision by the emperor has the force of law. Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem. (Digest I.4.1)
Ulpian was expressing the idea that the emperor exercised a rather absolute form of sovereignty that originated in the people, although he did not use the term expressly.
Medieval
[edit]Ulpian's statements were known in medieval Europe, but sovereignty was an important concept in medieval times. Medieval monarchs were not sovereign, at least not strongly so, because they were constrained by, and shared power with, their feudal aristocracy. Furthermore, both were strongly constrained by custom.[6] Sovereignty existed during the Medieval period as the de jure rights of nobility and royalty.[24]
Reformation
[edit]Sovereignty reemerged as a concept in the late 16th century, a time when civil wars had created a craving for a stronger central authority when monarchs had begun to gather power onto their own hands at the expense of the nobility, and the modern nation state was emerging. Jean Bodin, partly in reaction to the chaos of the French wars of religion, presented theories of sovereignty calling for a strong central authority in the form of absolute monarchy. In his 1576 treatise Les Six Livres de la République ("Six Books of the Republic") Bodin argued that it is inherent in the nature of the state that sovereignty must be:[6]
- Absolute: On this point, he said that the sovereign must be hedged in with obligations and conditions, must be able to legislate without his (or its) subjects' consent, must not be bound by the laws of his predecessors, and could not, because it is illogical, be bound by his own laws.
- Perpetual: Not temporarily delegated as to a strong leader in an emergency or a state employee such as a magistrate. He held that sovereignty must be perpetual because anyone with the power to enforce a time limit on the governing power must be above the governing power, which would be impossible if the governing power is absolute.
The treatise is frequently viewed as the first European text theorizing state sovereignty.[25]
Bodin rejected the notion of transference of sovereignty from people to the ruler (also known as the sovereign); natural law and divine law confer upon the sovereign the right to rule. And the sovereign is not above divine law or natural law. He is above (i.e. not bound by) only positive law, that is, laws made by humans. He emphasized that a sovereign is bound to observe certain basic rules derived from the divine law, the law of nature or reason, and the law that is common to all nations (jus gentium), as well as the fundamental laws of the state that determine who is the sovereign, who succeeds to sovereignty, and what limits the sovereign power. Thus, Bodin's sovereign was restricted by the constitutional law of the state and by the higher law that was considered as binding upon every human being.[6] The fact that the sovereign must obey divine and natural law imposes ethical constraints on him. Bodin also held that the lois royales, the fundamental laws of the French monarchy which regulated matters such as succession, are natural laws and are binding on the French sovereign.
Despite his commitment to absolutism, Bodin held some moderate opinions on how government should in practice be carried out. He held that although the sovereign is not obliged to, it is advisable for him, as a practical expedient, to convene a senate from whom he can obtain advice, to delegate some power to magistrates for the practical administration of the law, and to use the Estates as a means of communicating with the people.[citation needed] Bodin believed that "the most divine, most excellent, and the state form most proper to royalty is governed partly aristocratically and partly democratically".[26]
Age of Enlightenment
[edit]During the Age of Enlightenment, the idea of sovereignty gained both legal and moral force as the main Western description of the meaning and power of a State. In particular, the "Social contract" as a mechanism for establishing sovereignty was suggested and, by 1800, widely accepted, especially in the new United States and France, though also in Great Britain to a lesser extent.
Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan (1651) put forward a conception of sovereignty similar to Bodin's, which had just achieved legal status in the "Peace of Westphalia", but for different reasons. He created the first modern version of the social contract (or contractarian) theory, arguing that to overcome the "nasty, brutish and short" quality of life without the cooperation of other human beings, people must join in a "commonwealth" and submit to a "Soveraigne [sic] Power" that can compel them to act in the common good. Hobbes was thus the first to write that relations between the people and the sovereign were based on negotiation rather than natural submission.[27]: 10 His expediency argument attracted many of the early proponents of sovereignty. Hobbes strengthened the definition of sovereignty beyond either Westphalian or Bodin's, by saying that it must be:[citation needed][28]
- Absolute: because conditions could only be imposed on a sovereign if there were some outside arbitrator to determine when he had violated them, in which case the sovereign would not be the final authority.
- Indivisible: The sovereign is the only final authority in his territory; he does not share final authority with any other entity. Hobbes held this to be true because otherwise there would be no way of resolving a disagreement between the multiple authorities.
Hobbes' hypothesis—that the ruler's sovereignty is contracted to him by the people in return for his maintaining their physical safety—led him to conclude that if and when the ruler fails, the people recover their ability to protect themselves by forming a new contract.
Hobbes's theories decisively shape the concept of sovereignty through the medium of social contract theories. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1712–1778) definition of popular sovereignty (with early antecedents in Francisco Suárez's theory of the origin of power), provides that the people are the legitimate sovereign. Rousseau considered sovereignty to be inalienable; he condemned the distinction between the origin and the exercise of sovereignty, a distinction upon which constitutional monarchy or representative democracy is founded. John Locke, and Montesquieu are also key figures in the unfolding of the concept of sovereignty; their views differ with Rousseau and with Hobbes on this issue of alienability.
The second book of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du droit politique (1762) deals with sovereignty and its rights. Sovereignty, or the general will, is inalienable, for the will cannot be transmitted; it is indivisible since it is essentially general; it is infallible and always right, determined and limited in its power by the common interest; it acts through laws. Law is the decision of the general will regarding some object of common interest, but though the general will is always right and desires only good, its judgment is not always enlightened, and consequently does not always see wherein the common good lies; hence the necessity of the legislator. But the legislator has, of himself, no authority; he is only a guide who drafts and proposes laws, but the people alone (that is, the sovereign or general will) has authority to make and impose them.[29][30]
Rousseau, in the Social Contract[31] argued, "the growth of the State giving the trustees of public authority more and means to abuse their power, the more the Government has to have force to contain the people, the more force the Sovereign should have in turn to contain the Government," with the understanding that the Sovereign is "a collective being of wonder" (Book II, Chapter I) resulting from "the general will" of the people, and that "what any man, whoever he may be, orders on his own, is not a law" (Book II, Chapter VI) – and predicated on the assumption that the people have an unbiased means by which to ascertain the general will. Thus the legal maxim, "there is no law without a sovereign."[32]
According to Hendrik Spruyt, the sovereign state emerged as a response to changes in international trade (forming coalitions that wanted sovereign states)[4] so that the sovereign state's emergence was not inevitable; "it arose because of a particular conjuncture of social and political interests in Europe."[33]
Once states are recognized as sovereign, they are rarely recolonized, merged, or dissolved.[34]
Post World War II world order
[edit]Today, no state is sovereign in the sense they were prior to the Second World War.[35] Transnational governance agreements and institutions, the globalized economy,[36] and pooled sovereignty unions such as the European union have eroded the sovereignty of traditional states. The centuries long movement which developed a global system of sovereign states came to an end when the excesses of World War II made it clear to nations that some curtailment of the rights of sovereign states was necessary if future cruelties and injustices were to be prevented.[37][38] In the years immediately prior to the war, political theorist Carl Schmitt argued that sovereignty had supremacy over constitutional and international constraints arguing that states as sovereigns could not be judged and punished.[39] After the Holocaust, the vast majority of states rejected the prior Westphalian permissiveness towards such supremacist power based sovereignty formulations and signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. It was the first step towards circumscription of the powers of sovereign nations, soon followed by the Genocide Convention which legally required nations to punish genocide. Based on these and similar human rights agreements, beginning in 1990 there was a practical expression of this circumscription when the Westphalian principle of non-intervention was no longer observed for cases where the United Nations or another international organization endorsed a political or military action. Previously, actions in Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Cambodia or Liberia would have been regarded as illegitimate interference in internal affairs. In 2005, the revision of the concept of sovereignty was made explicit with the Responsibility to Protect agreement endorsed by all member states of the United Nations. If a state fails this responsibility either by perpetrating massive injustice or being incapable of protecting its citizens, then outsiders may assume that responsibility despite prior norms forbidding such interference in a nation's sovereignty.[40]
European integration is the second form of post-world war change in the norms of sovereignty, representing a significant shift since member nations are no longer absolutely sovereign. Some theorists, such as Jacques Maritain and Bertrand de Jouvenel have attacked the legitimacy of the earlier concepts of sovereignty, with Maritain advocating that the concept be discarded entirely since it:[37]
- stands in the way of international law and a world state,
- internally results in centralism, not pluralism
- obstructs the democratic notion of accountability
Efforts to curtail absolute sovereignty have met with substantial resistance by sovereigntist movements in multiple countries who seek to "take back control" from such transnational governance groups and agreements, restoring the world to pre World War II norms of sovereignty.[41]
Definition and types
[edit]There exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon.
Absoluteness
[edit]An important factor of sovereignty is its degree of absoluteness.[43][44] A sovereign power has absolute sovereignty when it is not restricted by a constitution, by the laws of its predecessors, or by custom, and no areas of law or policy are reserved as being outside its control. International law; policies and actions of neighboring states; cooperation and respect of the populace; means of enforcement; and resources to enact policy are factors that might limit sovereignty. For example, parents are not guaranteed the right to decide some matters in the upbringing of their children independent of societal regulation, and municipalities do not have unlimited jurisdiction in local matters, thus neither parents nor municipalities have absolute sovereignty. Theorists have diverged over the desirability of increased absoluteness.
Exclusivity
[edit]A key element of sovereignty in a legalistic sense is that of exclusivity of jurisdiction also described as the ultimate arbiter in all disputes on the territory. Specifically, the degree to which decisions made by a sovereign entity might be contradicted by another authority. Along these lines, the German sociologist Max Weber proposed that sovereignty is a community's monopoly on the legitimate use of force; and thus any group claiming the right to violence must either be brought under the yoke of the sovereign, proven illegitimate or otherwise contested and defeated for sovereignty to be genuine.[45] International law, competing branches of government, and authorities reserved for subordinate entities (such as federated states or republics) represent legal infringements on exclusivity. Social institutions such as religious bodies, corporations, and competing political parties might represent de facto infringements on exclusivity.
De jure and de facto
[edit]De jure, or legal, sovereignty concerns the expressed and institutionally recognised right to exercise control over a territory. De facto sovereignty means sovereignty exists in practice, irrespective of anything legally accepted as such, usually in writing. Cooperation and respect of the populace; control of resources in, or moved into, an area; means of enforcement and security; and ability to carry out various functions of state all represent measures of de facto sovereignty. When control is practiced predominantly by the military or police force it is considered coercive sovereignty.
Sovereignty and independence
[edit]This section needs additional citations for verification. (July 2015) |
State sovereignty is sometimes viewed synonymously with independence, however, sovereignty can be transferred as a legal right whereas independence cannot.[46] A state can achieve de facto independence long after acquiring sovereignty, such as in the case of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.[46] Additionally, independence can also be suspended when an entire region becomes subject to an occupation. For example, when Iraq was overrun by foreign forces in the Iraq War of 2003, Iraq had not been annexed by any country, so sovereignty over it had not been claimed by any foreign state (despite the facts on the ground). Alternatively, independence can be lost completely when sovereignty itself becomes the subject of dispute. The pre-World War II administrations of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia maintained an exile existence (and considerable international recognition) whilst their territories were annexed by the Soviet Union and governed locally by their pro-Soviet functionaries. When in 1991 Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia re-enacted independence, it was done so on the basis of continuity directly from the pre-Soviet republics.[46][47]
Another complicated sovereignty scenario can arise when regime itself is the subject of dispute. In the case of Poland, the People's Republic of Poland which governed Poland from 1945 to 1989 is now seen to have been an illegal entity by the modern Polish administration. The post-1989 Polish state claims direct continuity from the Second Polish Republic which ended in 1939. For other reasons, however, Poland maintains its communist-era outline as opposed to its pre-World War II shape which included areas now in Belarus, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovakia and Ukraine but did not include some of its western regions that were then in Germany.
Additionally sovereignty can be achieved without independence, such as how the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic made the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic a sovereign entity within but not independent from the USSR.
At the opposite end of the scale, there is no dispute regarding the self-governance of certain self-proclaimed states such as the Republic of Kosovo or Somaliland (see List of states with limited recognition, but most of them are puppet states) since their governments neither answer to a bigger state nor is their governance subjected to supervision. The sovereignty (i.e. legal right to govern) however, is disputed in both cases as the first entity is claimed by Serbia and the second by Somalia.
Internal
[edit]Internal sovereignty is the relationship between sovereign power and the political community. A central concern is legitimacy: by what right does a government exercise authority? Claims of legitimacy might refer to the divine right of kings, or to a social contract (i.e. popular sovereignty).[48] Max Weber offered a first categorization of political authority and legitimacy with the categories of traditional, charismatic and legal-rational.
With "sovereignty" meaning holding supreme, independent authority over a region or state, "internal sovereignty" refers to the internal affairs of the state and the location of supreme power within it.[49] A state that has internal sovereignty is one with a government that has been elected by the people and has the popular legitimacy. Internal sovereignty examines the internal affairs of a state and how it operates. It is important to have strong internal sovereignty to keeping order and peace. When you have weak internal sovereignty, organisations such as rebel groups will undermine the authority and disrupt the peace. The presence of a strong authority allows you to keep the agreement and enforce sanctions for the violation of laws. The ability for leadership to prevent these violations is a key variable in determining internal sovereignty.[50] The lack of internal sovereignty can cause war in one of two ways: first, undermining the value of agreement by allowing costly violations; and second, requiring such large subsidies for implementation that they render war cheaper than peace.[51] Leadership needs to be able to promise members, especially those like armies, police forces, or paramilitaries will abide by agreements. The presence of strong internal sovereignty allows a state to deter opposition groups in exchange for bargaining. While the operations and affairs within a state are relative to the level of sovereignty within that state, there is still an argument over who should hold the authority in a sovereign state.
This argument between who should hold the authority within a sovereign state is called the traditional doctrine of public sovereignty. This discussion is between an internal sovereign or an authority of public sovereignty. An internal sovereign is a political body that possesses ultimate, final and independent authority; one whose decisions are binding upon all citizens, groups and institutions in society. Early thinkers believed sovereignty should be vested in the hands of a single person, a monarch. They believed the overriding merit of vesting sovereignty in a single individual was that sovereignty would therefore be indivisible; it would be expressed in a single voice that could claim final authority. An example of an internal sovereign is Louis XIV of France during the seventeenth century; Louis XIV claimed that he was the state. Jean-Jacques Rousseau rejected monarchical rule in favor of the other type of authority within a sovereign state, public sovereignty. Public Sovereignty is the belief that ultimate authority is vested in the people themselves, expressed in the idea of the general will. This means that the power is elected and supported by its members, the authority has a central goal of the good of the people in mind. The idea of public sovereignty has often been the basis for modern democratic theory.[52]
Modern internal sovereignty
[edit]Within the modern governmental system, internal sovereignty is usually found in states that have public sovereignty and is rarely found within a state controlled by an internal sovereign. A form of government that is a little different from both is the UK parliament system. John Austin argued that sovereignty in the UK was vested neither in the Crown nor in the people but in the "Queen-in-Parliament".[6] This is the origin of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and is usually seen as the fundamental principle of the British constitution. With these principles of parliamentary sovereignty, majority control can gain access to unlimited constitutional authority, creating what has been called "elective dictatorship" or "modern autocracy". Public sovereignty in modern governments is a lot more common with examples like the US, Canada, Australia and India where the government is divided into different levels.[53]
External
[edit]External sovereignty concerns the relationship between sovereign power and other states. For example, the United Kingdom uses the following criterion when deciding under what conditions other states recognise a political entity as having sovereignty over some territory;
"Sovereignty." A government which exercises de facto administrative control over a country and is not subordinate to any other government in that country or a foreign sovereign state.
External sovereignty is connected with questions of international law – such as when, if ever, is intervention by one country into another's territory permissible?
Following the Thirty Years' War, a European religious conflict that embroiled much of the continent, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established the notion of territorial sovereignty as a norm of noninterference in the affairs of other states, so-called Westphalian sovereignty, even though the treaty itself reaffirmed the multiple levels of the sovereignty of the Holy Roman Empire. This resulted as a natural extension of the older principle of cuius regio, eius religio (Whose realm, his religion), leaving the Roman Catholic Church with little ability to interfere with the internal affairs of many European states. It is a myth, however, that the Treaties of Westphalia created a new European order of equal sovereign states.[54][55]
In international law, sovereignty means that a government possesses full control over affairs within a territorial or geographical area or limit. Determining whether a specific entity is sovereign is not an exact science, but often a matter of diplomatic dispute. There is usually an expectation that both de jure and de facto sovereignty rest in the same organisation at the place and time of concern. Foreign governments use varied criteria and political considerations when deciding whether or not to recognise the sovereignty of a state over a territory.[citation needed] Membership in the United Nations requires that "[t]he admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be affected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."[56]
Sovereignty may be recognized even when the sovereign body possesses no territory or its territory is under partial or total occupation by another power. The Holy See was in this position between the annexation in 1870 of the Papal States by Italy and the signing of the Lateran Treaties in 1929, a 59-year period during which it was recognised as sovereign by many (mostly Roman Catholic) states despite possessing no territory – a situation resolved when the Lateran Treaties granted the Holy See sovereignty over the Vatican City. Another case, sui generis is the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, the third sovereign entity inside Italian territory (after San Marino and the Vatican City State) and the second inside the Italian capital (since in 1869 the Palazzo di Malta and the Villa Malta receive extraterritorial rights, in this way becoming the only "sovereign" territorial possessions of the modern Order), which is the last existing heir to one of several once militarily significant, crusader states of sovereign military orders. In 1607 its Grand masters were also made Reichsfürst (princes of the Holy Roman Empire) by the Holy Roman Emperor, granting them seats in the Reichstag, at the time the closest permanent equivalent to an UN-type general assembly; confirmed 1620. These sovereign rights were never deposed, only the territories were lost. Over 100 modern states maintain full diplomatic relations with the order,[57] and the UN awarded it observer status.[58]
The governments-in-exile of many European states (for instance, Norway, Netherlands or Czechoslovakia) during the Second World War were regarded as sovereign despite their territories being under foreign occupation; their governance resumed as soon as the occupation had ended. The government of Kuwait was in a similar situation vis-à-vis the Iraqi occupation of its country during 1990–1991.[59] The government of Republic of China (ROC) was generally recognized as sovereign over China from 1911 to 1971 despite the 1949 victory of the Communists in the Chinese civil war and the retreat of the ROC to Taiwan. The ROC represented China at the United Nations until 1971, when the People's Republic of China obtained the UN seat.[60]: 228 The ROC political status as a state became increasingly disputed; it became commonly known as Taiwan.
The International Committee of the Red Cross is commonly mistaken to be sovereign. It has been granted various degrees of special privileges and legal immunities in many countries, including Belgium, France, Switzerland,[61] Australia, Russia, South Korea, South Africa and the US, and soon in Ireland. The Committee is a private organisation governed by Swiss law.[62]
Shared and pooled
[edit]Just as the office of head of state can be vested jointly in several persons within a state, the sovereign jurisdiction over a single political territory can be shared jointly by two or more consenting powers, notably in the form of a condominium.[63]
Likewise the member states of international organizations may voluntarily bind themselves by treaty to a supranational organization, such as a continental union. In the case of the European Union member-states, this is called "pooled sovereignty".[64][65]
Another example of shared and pooled sovereignty is the Acts of Union 1707 which created the unitary state now known as the United Kingdom.[66][67][68] It was a full economic union, meaning the Scottish and English systems of currency, taxation and laws regulating trade were aligned.[69] Nonetheless, Scotland and England never fully surrendered or pooled all of their governance sovereignty; they retained many of their previous national institutional features and characteristics, particularly relating to their legal, religious and educational systems.[70] In 2012, the Scottish Government, created in 1998 through devolution in the United Kingdom, negotiated terms with the Government of the United Kingdom for the 2014 Scottish independence referendum which resulted in the people of Scotland deciding to continue the pooling of its sovereignty with the rest of the United Kingdom.
Nation-states
[edit]A community of people who claim the right of self-determination based on a common ethnicity, history and culture might seek to establish sovereignty over a region, thus creating a nation-state. Such nations are sometimes recognised as autonomous areas rather than as fully sovereign, independent states.
Federations
[edit]In a federal system of government, sovereignty also refers to powers which a constituent state or republic possesses independently of the national government. In a confederation, constituent entities retain the right to withdraw from the national body and the union is often more temporary than a federation.[71]
Different interpretations of state sovereignty in the United States of America, as it related to the expansion of slavery and fugitive slave laws, led to the outbreak of the American Civil War. Depending on the particular issue, sometimes both northern and southern states justified their political positions by appealing to state sovereignty. Fearing that slavery would be threatened by results of the 1860 presidential election, eleven slave states declared their independence from the federal Union and formed a new confederation.[72] The United States government rejected the secessions as rebellion, declaring that secession from the Union by an individual state was unconstitutional, as the states were part of an indissoluble federation in Perpetual Union.[73]
Sovereignty versus military occupation
[edit]In situations related to war, or which have arisen as the result of war, most modern scholars still commonly fail to distinguish between holding sovereignty and exercising military occupation.
In regard to military occupation, international law prescribes the limits of the occupant's power. Occupation does not displace the sovereignty of the occupied state, though for the time being the occupant may exercise supreme governing authority. Nor does occupation effect any annexation or incorporation of the occupied territory into the territory or political structure of the occupant, and the occupant's constitution and laws do not extend of their own force to the occupied territory.[74]
To a large extent, the original academic foundation for the concept of "military occupation" arose from On the Law of War and Peace (1625) by Hugo Grotius and The Law of Nations (1758) by Emmerich de Vattel. Binding international rules regarding the conduct of military occupation were more carefully codified in the 1907 Hague Convention (and accompanying Hague Regulations).
In 1946, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal stated with regard to the Hague Convention on Land Warfare of 1907: "The rules of land warfare expressed in the Convention undoubtedly represented an advance over existing International Law at the time of their adoption ... but by 1939 these rules ... were recognized by all civilized nations and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war."
Acquisition
[edit]A number of modes for acquisition of sovereignty are presently or have historically been recognized in international law as lawful methods by which a state may acquire sovereignty over external territory. The classification of these modes originally derived from Roman property law and from the 15th and 16th century with the development of international law. The modes are:[75]
- Cession is the transfer of territory from one state to another usually by means of treaty;
- Occupation is the acquisition of territory that belongs to no state (or terra nullius);
- Prescription is the effective control of territory of another acquiescing state;
- Operations of nature is the acquisition of territory through natural processes like river accretion or volcanism;
- Creation is the process by which new land is (re)claimed from the sea such as in the Netherlands.
- Adjudication and
- Conquest
| Outer space (including Earth orbits; the Moon and other celestial bodies, and their orbits) | |||||||
| national airspace | territorial waters airspace | contiguous zone airspace[citation needed] | international airspace | ||||
| land territory surface | internal waters surface | territorial waters surface | contiguous zone surface | Exclusive Economic Zone surface | international waters surface | ||
| internal waters | territorial waters | Exclusive economic zone | international waters | ||||
| land territory underground | Continental shelf surface | extended continental shelf surface | international seabed surface | ||||
| Continental shelf underground | extended continental shelf underground | international seabed underground | |||||
Justifications
[edit]There exist vastly differing views on the moral basis of sovereignty. A fundamental polarity is between theories which assert that sovereignty is vested directly in the sovereigns by divine or natural right, and theories which assert it originates from the people. In the latter case there is a further division into those which assert that the people effectively transfer their sovereignty to the sovereign (Hobbes), and those which assert that the people retain their sovereignty (Rousseau).[76]
During the brief period of absolute monarchies in Europe, the divine right of kings was an important competing justification for the exercise of sovereignty. The Mandate of Heaven had similar implications in China for the justification of the Emperor's rule, though it was largely replaced with discussions of Western-style sovereignty by the late 19th century.[77]
A republic is a form of government in which the people, or some significant portion of them, retain sovereignty over the government and where offices of state are not granted through heritage.[78][79] A common modern definition of a republic is a government having a head of state who is not a monarch.[80][81]
Democracy is based on the concept of popular sovereignty. In a direct democracy the public plays an active role in shaping and deciding policy. Representative democracy permits a transfer of the exercise of sovereignty from the people to a legislative body or an executive (or to some combination of the legislature, executive and Judiciary). Many representative democracies provide limited direct democracy through referendum, initiative, and recall.
Parliamentary sovereignty refers to a representative democracy where the parliament is ultimately sovereign, rather than the executive power or the judiciary.
Views
[edit]- Classical liberals such as John Stuart Mill consider every individual as sovereign.
- Realists view sovereignty as being untouchable and as guaranteed to legitimate nation-states.[citation needed]
- Rationalists see sovereignty similarly to realists. However, rationalism states that the sovereignty of a nation-state may be violated in extreme circumstances, such as human rights abuses.[citation needed]
- Internationalists believe that sovereignty is outdated and an unnecessary obstacle to achieving peace, in line with their belief in a global community. In the light of the abuse of power by sovereign states such as Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Soviet Union, they argue that human beings are not necessarily protected by the state whose citizens they are and that the respect for state sovereignty on which the UN Charter is founded is an obstacle to humanitarian intervention.[82]
- Anarchists and some libertarians deny the sovereignty of states and governments. Anarchists often argue for a specific individual kind of sovereignty, such as the Anarch as a sovereign individual. Salvador Dalí, for instance, talked of "anarcho-monarchist" (as usual for him, tongue in cheek); Antonin Artaud of Heliogabalus: Or, The Crowned Anarchist; Max Stirner of The Ego and Its Own; Georges Bataille and Jacques Derrida talked of a kind of "antisovereignty". Therefore, anarchists join a classical conception of the individual as sovereign of himself, which forms the basis of political consciousness. The unified consciousness is sovereignty over one's own body, as Nietzsche demonstrated (see also Pierre Klossowski's book on Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle). See also sovereignty of the individual and self-ownership.
- Imperialists hold a view of sovereignty where power rightfully exists with those states that hold the greatest ability to impose the will of said state, by force or threat of force, over the populace of other states with weaker military or political will. They effectively deny the sovereignty of the individual in deference to either the good of the whole or to divine right.[citation needed]
According to Matteo Laruffa "sovereignty resides in every public action and policy as the exercise of executive powers by institutions open to the participation of citizens to the decision-making processes"[83]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]
This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Herbermann, Charles, ed. (1913). "Plenary Council". Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company.
- ^ Philpott, Daniel (1995). "Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History". Journal of International Affairs. 48 (2): 353–368. ISSN 0022-197X. JSTOR 24357595.
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Law, Jonathan, ed. (21 June 2018). "Sovereignty". A Dictionary of Law. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-880252-5. Retrieved 20 May 2024.
sovereignty [...] Supreme authority in a state.
- ^
Bartelson, Jens (9 May 2014). Sovereignty as Symbolic Form. Critical Issues in Global Politics. New York: Routledge. p. 16. ISBN 9781317685838. Retrieved 20 May 2024.
Claims to supreme authority have long been encoded in Sovereignty as symbolic form.
- ^ a b Spruyt, Hendrik (1994). The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change. Vol. 176. Princeton University Press. pp. 3–7. doi:10.2307/j.ctvzxx91t. ISBN 978-0-691-03356-3. JSTOR j.ctvzxx91t. S2CID 221904936.
- ^ "Sovereignty". A Dictionary of Law. Oxford University Press. 21 June 2018. ISBN 978-0-19-880252-5. Retrieved 20 May 2024.
In any state sovereignty is vested in the institution, person, or body having the ultimate authority to impose law on everyone else in the state and the power to alter any pre-existing law.
- ^ a b c d e "sovereignty (politics)". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 5 August 2010.
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- ^ Bodin, Six livres, 6:254 (VI:vi).
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- ^ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (2017) [1762]. The Social Contract (PDF). Jonathan Bennett – via earlymoderntexts.com.
- ^ Social Contract, Book II, Chapter III.
- ^ Stallybrass, William Teulon Swan (1918). "A society of states: Or, Sovereignty, independence, and equality in a league of nations". G. Routledge & sons, Limited. p. 80.
there is no law without a sovereign Seydel.
- ^ Spruyt, Hendrik (1994). The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change. Vol. 176. Princeton University Press. pp. 18–19. doi:10.2307/j.ctvzxx91t. ISBN 978-0-691-03356-3. JSTOR j.ctvzxx91t. S2CID 221904936.
- ^ Strang, David (1996), Weber, Cynthia; Biersteker, Thomas J. (eds.), "Contested sovereignty: the social construction of colonial imperialism", State Sovereignty as Social Construct, Cambridge University Press, p. 25, ISBN 978-0-521-56599-8
- ^ Grimm 2015, p. 57.
- ^ Ozcelik, Burcu; Xidias, Jason (2017). An Analysis of Seyla Benhabib's The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (e-book ed.). London: Routledge- Taylor & Francis Group. p. 11,21. ISBN 9781912284870.
- ^ a b Philpott 2016.
- ^ Kallis 2018, p. 6.
- ^ Minakov, Mikhail (2022). "Sovereignty as a Contested Concept: The Cases of Trumpism and Putinism". Inventing Majorities: Ideological Creativity in Post-Soviet Societies. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag. p. 286. ISBN 9783838216416.
- ^ Grimm 2015, pp. 50–56.
- ^ Kallis, Aristotle (2018). "Populism, Sovereigntism, and the Unlikely Re-Emergence of the Territorial Nation-State" (PDF). Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences. 11 (3): 10,14. doi:10.1007/s40647-018-0233-z. S2CID 158092242.
- ^ Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 66 (Sir Arnold D. McNair ed., 4th ed. 1928)
- ^ Núñez, Jorge Emilio (2014). "About the Absolute State Sovereignty". International Journal for Law. 27 (4): 645–664. doi:10.1007/s11196-013-9333-x. S2CID 150817547.
- ^ Núñez, Jorge Emilio (2015). "of Absolute State Sovereignty: The Middle Ages". International Journal for the Law. 28 (2): 235–250. doi:10.1007/s11196-014-9379-4. S2CID 153788601.
- ^ Newton, Kenneth. Foundations of comparative politics: democracies of the modern world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- ^ a b c Talmon, Stefan (1998). Recognition of Governments in International Law. Oxford Monographs in International Law Series. Oxford University Press. p. 50. ISBN 9780198265733.
- ^ Mälksoo, Lauri (2003). Illegal Annexation and State Continuity: The Case of the Incorporation of the Baltic States by the USSR. M. Nijhoff Publishers. p. 193. ISBN 978-9041121776.
- ^ "Investigating the Role of Legitimacy in the Political Order of Conflict-torn Spaces" (PDF). eprints.lse.ac.uk. Archived (PDF) from the original on 20 January 2025. Retrieved 9 March 2025.
- ^ Heywood, Andrew. "Political Theory". pg. 92. Palgrave Macmillan. Archived from the original on 24 December 2011. Retrieved 25 June 2011.
- ^ Wolford, Scott; Rider, Toby. "War, Peace, and Internal Sovereignty" (PDF). pg.1. Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 April 2020. Retrieved 19 June 2011.
- ^ Wolford, Scott; Rider, Toby. "War, Peace, and Internal Sovereignty" (PDF). pg.3. Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 April 2020. Retrieved 19 June 2011.
- ^ Heywood, Andrew. "Political Theory". pg. 93. Palgrave Macmillan. Archived from the original on 24 December 2011. Retrieved 21 June 2011.
- ^ Heywood, Andrew. "Political Theory". pgs. 94–95. Palgrave Macmillan. Archived from the original on 20 January 2012.
- ^ Andreas Osiander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth", International Organization Vol. 55 No. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 251–287.
- ^ Burbank, Jane; Cooper, Frederick (2010). Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference. Princeton University Press. pp. 182, 219. ISBN 978-0-691-12708-8.
- ^ "UN Chart, Article 2". Archived from the original on 8 December 2013. Retrieved 4 October 2011.
- ^ "Bilateral diplomatic relations of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta". Archived from the original on 3 December 2015.
- ^ United Nations General Assembly Session 48 Resolution 265. Observer status for the Sovereign Military Order of Malta in the General Assembly A/RES/48/265 {{{date}}}. Retrieved 10 September 2007.
- ^ Nolan, Cathal J. (2002). The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations. Vol. 4. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 1559. ISBN 9780313323836.
- ^ Chen, Dean P. (2024). "Xi Jinping and the Derailment of the KMT-CCP "1992 Consensus"". In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.). China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment. Leiden University Press. ISBN 9789087284411.
- ^ By formal agreement between the Swiss government and the ICRC, Switzerland grants full sanctity of all ICRC property in Switzerland including its headquarters and archive, grants members and staff legal immunity, exempts the ICRC from all taxes and fees, guarantees the protected and duty-free transfer of goods, services, and money, provides the ICRC with secure communication privileges at the same level as foreign embassies, and simplifies Committee travel in and out of Switzerland.
On the other hand Switzerland does not recognize ICRC issued passports Archived 10 May 2011 at the Wayback Machine. - ^ "About the International Committee of the Red Cross". 29 October 2010.
- ^ Joel H. Samuels, Condominium Arrangements in International Practice: Reviving an Abandoned Concept of Boundary Dispute Resolution, 29 Mich. J. Int'l L. 727 (2008). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol29/iss4/3
- ^ Peterson, John (1997). "The European Union: Pooled Sovereignty, Divided Accountability". Political Studies. 45 (3): 559–578. doi:10.1111/1467-9248.00096. S2CID 144362061.
- ^ McNaughton, Neil (2003). Understanding British and European political issues : a guide for A2 politics studies. Manchester University Press. p. 207. ISBN 978-0719062452.
- ^ Mannin, Michael L. (2010). British government and politics balancing Europeanization and independence. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 134. ISBN 9780742567771.
- ^ Rawlings, Richard; Leyland, Peter; Young, Alison L (2013). Sovereignty and the law : domestic, European, and international perspectives. Oxford University Press. p. 28. ISBN 978-0199684069.
- ^ Jesse, Neal G.; Williams, Kristen P. (2005). Identity and institutions: conflict reduction in divided societies. State Univ. of New York Press. p. 120. ISBN 978-0791464519.
- ^ R. Mitchison, A History of Scotland (London: Routledge, 3rd edn., 2002), ISBN 0415278805, p. 314.
- ^ McCann, Philip (2016). The UK Regional–National Economic Problem: Geography, globalisation and governance. Routledge. p. 372. ISBN 9781317237174.
- ^ "Confederation". Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 17 June 2020.
- ^ McPherson, James, Battle Cry of Freedom, (1988) pp. 40, 195, 214, 241
- ^ "Lincoln on Secession". National Park Service. 10 April 2015. Archived from the original on 16 September 2020. Retrieved 31 October 2020.
The secessionists claimed that according to the Constitution every state had the right to leave the Union. Lincoln claimed that they did not have that right.
- ^ United States Court of Berlin (14 March 1979), U.S. v. Tiede, United Settlement (Canada)., retrieved 26 October 2021
- ^ Malanczuk, Peter (1997). Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law. International politics/Public international law. Routledge. pp. 147–152. ISBN 9780415111201.
- ^ Tuck, Richard (2016). The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of Modern Democracy. Cambridge University Press. p. 100. ISBN 9781316425503
- ^ Mitchell, Ryan Martínez (2022). Recentering the World: China and the Transformation of International Law. Cambridge University Press. pp. 32, 52, 63. ISBN 9781108690157
- ^ "Republic". Encyclopædia Britannica.
- ^ Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748), Bk. II, ch. 1.
- ^ "republic". WordNet 3.0. Retrieved 20 March 2009.
- ^ "Republic". Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 14 August 2010.
- ^ Beatrice Heuser: "Sovereignty, self-determination and security: new world orders in the 20th century", in Sohail Hashmi (ed.): State Sovereignty: Change and Persistence in International Relations (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 1997).
- ^ Matteo Laruffa, "The European Integration and National Interests: from an intergovernmental model to a Constitutional Agreement" (Hungarian Academy of Social Sciences, Budapest, 3 July 2014)
Further reading
[edit]- Benton, Lauren (2010). A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-88105-0.
- Grimm, Dieter (2015). Howard, Dick (ed.). Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept. Columbia Studies in Political Thought / Political History. Translated by Cooper, Belinda (e-book ed.). Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231539302.
- Paris, R. (2020). "The Right to Dominate: How Old Ideas About Sovereignty Pose New Challenges for World Order." International Organization.
- Philpott, Dan (2016). "Sovereignty". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
- Prokhovnik, Raia (2007). Sovereignties: contemporary theory and practice. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire New York, N.Y: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9781403913234.
- Prokhovnik, Raia (2008). Sovereignty: history and theory. Exeter, UK Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic. ISBN 9781845401412.
- Thomson, Janice E. (1996). Mercenaries, pirates, and sovereigns: state-building and extraterritorial violence in early modern Europe. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-02571-1.
External links
[edit]
The dictionary definition of sovereignty at Wiktionary
Quotations related to Sovereignty at Wikiquote
Sovereignty
View on GrokipediaEtymology and Conceptual Foundations
Etymology
The term "sovereignty" derives from the Old French soveraineté, denoting supreme authority or royal dominion, which entered English in the mid-14th century. This Old French form stems from soverain (or souerrain), meaning "highest" or "supreme," itself borrowed from Vulgar Latin superānus, an adjective formed from Latin super ("above" or "over") and the suffix -ānus indicating relation or quality. The Latin root super underscores the concept's foundational sense of elevation or supremacy, originally applied to rulers or powers positioned above others in hierarchy. Early English usages, as in 1325 records, equated it with "realte" or kingship, reflecting its initial connotation of undivided royal power rather than abstract political theory. By the late 14th century, "sovereignty" expanded to describe not only persons wielding supreme authority but also the abstract quality of such power, independent of specific holders. This semantic shift paralleled the term's adoption in legal and philosophical discourse, though its etymological core retained the vertical imagery of dominance inherent in super. Unlike related terms like "lordship" from Old English hlāford (bread-keeper), sovereignty emphasized unqualified supremacy, free from feudal subordination. In Romance languages, cognates such as Italian sovranità (from 16th-century texts) preserved this lineage, influencing modern definitions in international law.Core Philosophical Concepts
The philosophical foundations of sovereignty crystallized in the early modern period, distinguishing it from medieval notions of divided authority among kings, nobles, and church. Jean Bodin, in his 1576 work Six Livres de la République, defined sovereignty as the "absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth," emphasizing its supremacy over all subjects and laws within the realm, unbound by any superior human authority except divine or natural law.[10] Bodin's conception introduced key attributes such as absoluteness—unlimited in scope domestically—and perpetuity, enduring beyond the tenure of any ruler, which laid the groundwork for viewing the state as an enduring entity.[3] Thomas Hobbes advanced this in his 1651 Leviathan, portraying sovereignty as an artificial construct arising from a social contract where individuals in the anarchic state of nature surrender rights to a sovereign—be it a monarch or assembly—to enforce peace and security.[5] Hobbes insisted on the sovereign's absolute authority as the sole source of law and indivisible power, arguing that division leads to civil war, as seen in England's conflicts of the 1640s; subjects authorize the sovereign's actions fully, retaining only self-preservation rights.[6] This absolutist view prioritized causal mechanisms of human self-interest and fear of death to justify undivided rule, rejecting mixed constitutions as unstable.[11] In contrast, John Locke, in his 1689 Two Treatises of Government, relocated sovereignty to the people, viewing it as a trust delegated to government for protecting natural rights to life, liberty, and property; rulers forfeit authority upon violation, enabling resistance.[12] Locke's limited sovereignty emphasized consent and conditional power, diverging from Bodin and Hobbes by subordinating government to popular will while maintaining territorial supremacy externally.[13] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in his 1762 The Social Contract, conceptualized popular sovereignty as the expression of the general will, inalienable and indivisible, where citizens legislate as a collective body rather than delegating to representatives.[14] This democratic inflection held sovereignty as emanating directly from the community, unbound by particular interests, influencing later republican thought but critiqued for potential tyranny of the majority.[15] These theories underscore sovereignty's core attributes: supremacy (unrivaled decision-making), absoluteness (unconstrained domestically), indivisibility (cannot be partitioned without dissolution), and inalienability (not transferable).[1] Empirical historical outcomes, such as the stabilization of absolutist monarchies in 17th-century Europe post-religious wars, lent credence to absolutist models, though Lockean ideas informed constitutional limits in England after 1688.[16]Definitions and Typologies
Formal Definitions in Political Theory
![Frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan]float-right In political theory, sovereignty denotes the supreme authority within a polity, characterized by absoluteness, perpetuity, and indivisibility.[1] Jean Bodin formalized this concept in his 1576 treatise Les Six Livres de la République, defining sovereignty as "the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonwealth," which recognizes no superior and is not bound by positive laws of predecessors.[17] This definition emphasized the sovereign's capacity to legislate without consent from equals or inferiors, marking a shift from medieval divided authorities to centralized power.[17] Thomas Hobbes further developed the idea in Leviathan (1651), portraying sovereignty as an artificial person created through a covenant among individuals escaping the state of nature, granting the sovereign absolute, undivided authority to enforce peace and security.[1] Hobbes argued that the sovereign's power is inalienable and perpetual, with subjects retaining no rights against it except self-preservation, ensuring monopoly over coercive force within the territory.[1] Unlike Bodin's focus on the sovereign's legislative prerogative, Hobbes grounded sovereignty in contractual authorization, where division or limitation invites civil war.[1] Subsequent theorists refined these absolutenist foundations; for instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau in The Social Contract (1762) introduced popular sovereignty, positing the general will of the people as the ultimate sovereign, though retaining indivisibility to prevent factionalism.[1] These definitions collectively underscore sovereignty's role as the apex of political order, immune to internal challenge and external interference, though empirical applications often reveal constraints from constitutional limits or international norms.[1]Absoluteness, Exclusivity, and Scope
In political theory, the absoluteness of sovereignty denotes the supreme, indivisible authority of the sovereign over all matters within its domain, unbound by any superior power or conditionality. Jean Bodin, in his 1576 treatise Six Books of the Commonwealth, defined sovereignty as "the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonwealth," emphasizing its independence from legislative consent or external constraints, though Bodin qualified that it remains subject to divine and natural law.[18][4] Thomas Hobbes extended this in Leviathan (1651), arguing that absolute sovereignty emerges from the social contract to escape the anarchic "state of nature," where the sovereign—whether monarch, assembly, or other form—holds unchecked power to enforce peace, as division of authority invites civil war.[19][20] This absolutist view posits that sovereignty's efficacy derives from its totality; any limitation undermines the sovereign's capacity to command obedience uniformly.[1] Exclusivity complements absoluteness by asserting that sovereignty tolerates no parallel or competing authorities within its jurisdiction, ensuring the sovereign's monopoly on legitimate coercion. Hobbes described the sovereign as the sole source of law, with subjects surrendering rights to it exclusively to prevent factionalism.[6] In international relations, this manifests as the recognition of states' exclusive territorial control, where no external entity may lawfully intervene in domestic governance without consent, as codified in principles like non-intervention under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter (1945).[21][22] Bodin reinforced exclusivity by insisting sovereignty is perpetual and inalienable, rejecting divided or shared power among estates or assemblies, which he saw as devolving into tyranny or anarchy.[23] Critics, including pluralist theorists, contend that modern federal systems or supranational bodies like the European Union erode exclusivity, yet classical formulations maintain it as essential for order.[24] The scope of sovereignty delineates the breadth of its application, traditionally encompassing internal affairs—supreme dominion over persons, resources, and law-making within borders—and external relations—autonomy from foreign dictation. Internal scope involves unqualified authority over citizens, as Hobbes's Leviathan grants the sovereign rights to taxation, warfare, and adjudication without recourse.[25] External scope, rooted in Westphalian principles post-1648, affirms independence in diplomacy and recognition by peers, though constrained by mutual reciprocity among equals.[26][2] In practice, scope varies: absolutists like Bodin envisioned comprehensive reach limited only by self-preservation, while contemporary analyses note erosions via human rights treaties or economic interdependence, such as WTO obligations binding 164 members as of 2023.[1] Nonetheless, sovereignty's theoretical scope remains total within its sphere, with deviations viewed as pragmatic delegations rather than inherent dilutions.[27]De Jure versus De Facto Sovereignty
De jure sovereignty refers to the formal, legally enshrined authority of a state to govern its territory and population, typically validated through constitutions, international treaties, or recognition by other states, granting rights such as diplomatic immunity and participation in global institutions.[28] De facto sovereignty, by contrast, describes the tangible exercise of supreme power in practice, including effective control over territory, enforcement of laws, collection of taxes, and maintenance of order, even absent full legal endorsement.[29] This distinction originates in Roman legal traditions—"de jure" meaning "by law" and "de facto" "in fact"—and gained prominence in international relations theory to reconcile nominal rights with empirical capabilities, as physical force underpins de facto rule while legal claims sustain de jure status.[30] The divergence manifests when legal recognition outpaces or lags effective control, often in secessionist conflicts or regime changes. Entities like the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, established in 1983, exemplify de facto sovereignty through autonomous governance and military defense since its separation from the Republic of Cyprus, yet it receives de jure recognition solely from Turkey, limiting its international engagement.[31] Similarly, Taiwan has operated with de facto sovereignty since 1949, managing a population of over 23 million, a GDP exceeding $800 billion in 2023, and compulsory military service, but faces de jure constraints from the one-China policy, with formal recognition from only 12 states as of 2024.[31] Historical precedents include Rhodesia from 1965 to 1979, which controlled territory and resources under minority rule without de jure acceptance beyond South Africa and Portugal, leading to economic isolation via UN sanctions.[29] Instances of de jure without de facto sovereignty arise in failed states or occupations, where titular governments retain legal status but forfeit practical authority. The Afghan Islamic Republic, recognized internationally until August 2021, held de jure sovereignty post-2001 Bonn Agreement but eroded de facto control amid Taliban resurgence, culminating in the group's seizure of Kabul on August 15, 2021, after which it assumed de facto rule without broad de jure acknowledgment.[32] During World War II, the Polish government-in-exile maintained de jure legitimacy under the 1935 constitution, recognized by Allies including the UK from 1939 to 1945, yet lacked de facto power as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union occupied Poland from September 1939.[31] In Somalia, the Federal Government claims de jure sovereignty since its 2012 provisional constitution, backed by UN recognition, but de facto authority remains fragmented, with al-Shabaab controlling roughly 20% of territory and clan militias dominating rural areas as of 2023.[33] This duality impacts global stability, as de facto entities may foster parallel economies or alliances—such as Transnistria's reliance on Russian gas transit since 1990—while de jure gaps invite interventions or sanctions to enforce legal norms.[32] Over time, sustained de facto control can pressure de jure evolution, as in Bangladesh's 1971 independence from Pakistan, initially de facto under Mukti Bahini forces before UN recognition in 1974; conversely, unbridged divides perpetuate "sovereignty gaps," undermining service delivery and exposing populations to conflict.[29][33] International law, via frameworks like the 1933 Montevideo Convention, prioritizes de facto criteria for statehood—permanent population, defined territory, government, capacity for relations—but recognition remains constitutive for de jure privileges, reflecting realist assessments of power over idealistic legalism.[34]Internal Sovereignty
![Frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan][float-right] Internal sovereignty refers to the supreme authority of the state to exercise undivided control over its territory, population, and internal affairs, encompassing the exclusive right to legislate, adjudicate, and enforce laws without subordination to competing internal powers.[26] This concept presupposes the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force, enabling it to maintain order and resolve disputes internally.[35] Jean Bodin introduced a foundational definition in Les Six Livres de la République (1576), describing sovereignty as "the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth" vested in the sovereign, which cannot be divided or alienated and holds supremacy over all subjects and institutions within the realm.[10] Bodin's formulation emphasized indivisibility to prevent factionalism, arguing that any sharing of sovereign marks would undermine the commonwealth's stability.[36] Thomas Hobbes advanced this idea in Leviathan (1651), contending that internal sovereignty must be absolute to escape the violent "state of nature," where rational self-interest breeds endless war; through a social contract, individuals transfer rights to an indivisible sovereign—be it a monarch, assembly, or other form—who wields unchecked power to enforce peace.[37] Hobbes viewed this internal absolutism as causal to civil order, warning that divided authority invites dissolution, as evidenced by the English Civil War (1642–1651).[37] Max Weber provided a sociological refinement in 1919, defining the modern state by its successful claim to the monopoly of legitimate violence within a territory, shifting focus from normative absolutism to empirical capacity for internal domination.[35] This de facto dimension highlights that internal sovereignty requires not only legal supremacy but also bureaucratic efficacy and societal acquiescence to prevent challenges from non-state actors. In federal arrangements, such as the United States under the Constitution (1787), internal sovereignty appears divided between central and constituent units, with each exercising authority in delineated spheres; however, the federal government's paramount powers in areas like defense and commerce preserve an overarching internal hierarchy.[38] True erosion occurs through internal strife, as in Somalia's state collapse post-1991, where warlords fragmented the central monopoly on force amid clan rivalries, resulting in de facto internal anarchy until partial reconstitution via federalism in 2012.[39] Such cases demonstrate that internal sovereignty's maintenance demands continuous enforcement against centrifugal forces, with empirical data from conflict zones showing correlations between weak monopolies and elevated violence rates.[40]External Sovereignty
External sovereignty denotes a state's independence from external authorities, encompassing its freedom to conduct international relations without subordination to other states or supranational entities.[41] This concept emphasizes the absence of higher coercive power over the state's foreign affairs, distinguishing it from internal sovereignty, which pertains to supreme authority within its territory and over its population.[42] In political theory, external sovereignty is thus the relational aspect of state power, enabling autonomous decision-making in diplomacy, treaties, and defense.[2] Central elements include sovereign equality, non-intervention, and the capacity for independent international engagement, as codified in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter, which affirms the equal rights of states in international relations.[26] Under customary international law, exemplified by the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, external sovereignty requires a state's ability to enter relations with other states, alongside effective control over territory—though recognition by others solidifies this status. These principles underpin mutual non-interference, prohibiting one state from exercising dominion over another's external competencies.[43] Recognition plays a pivotal role, as external sovereignty often depends on acknowledgment by the community of states, functioning analogously to legal validation in domestic systems.[1] Declaratory theories posit that sovereignty inheres in factual independence, while constitutive views argue recognition confers legal personality; empirical practice blends both, with de facto control enabling initial interactions but formal recognition securing enduring equality.[44] In contemporary terms, external sovereignty manifests in rights to territorial integrity and self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, though it faces practical limits from collective security mechanisms or economic interdependencies. Violations, such as unauthorized interventions, undermine this sovereignty, as seen in historical cases like the 2003 Iraq invasion, where lack of UN Security Council authorization highlighted tensions between unilateral action and collective norms.[43]Historical Evolution
Ancient and Classical Sovereignty
In ancient Mesopotamia, dating back to the Sumerian period around 3000 BCE, kingship was conceptualized as a divine institution descended from heaven to impose order on chaotic humanity, with the king serving as the gods' earthly steward rather than a fully divine being himself.[45][46] The Sumerian King List, compiled around 2100 BCE, portrays kingship as transferred among cities by divine will, legitimizing the ruler's authority to enforce laws, maintain irrigation systems critical for agriculture, and lead military campaigns, though ultimate sovereignty resided with the patron deities like Enlil.[47] This model emphasized the king's role in mediating between divine command and human society, with rituals such as the substitute king rite during eclipses underscoring the fragility of monarchical power when omens threatened the ruler's mandate.[48] In ancient Egypt, from the unification under Narmer around 3100 BCE, sovereignty was embodied in the pharaoh as a living god, incarnating Horus in life and Osiris in death, wielding absolute authority over the Two Lands through divine right to ensure cosmic harmony (ma'at).[49][46] Pharaohs maintained control via a centralized bureaucracy, temple priesthoods, and military, with sovereignty justified by myths like the Sed festival renewals every 30 years, which ritually reaffirmed the ruler's vitality and legitimacy against potential challenges.[50] This divine kingship integrated political, religious, and economic power, as the pharaoh owned all land and redistributed resources, fostering stability across dynasties despite periodic invasions and internal strife.[51] Classical Greek sovereignty emerged with the polis system around 800 BCE, where independent city-states like Athens and Sparta exercised autonomous authority over their territories, unbound by higher overlords, reflecting geographic fragmentation into coastal and island polities.[52] In Athens, following Cleisthenes' reforms in 508 BCE, sovereignty shifted toward popular elements through the ecclesia, where male citizens directly legislated and elected officials, embodying a proto-democratic control over magistrates though limited by exclusion of women, slaves, and foreigners.[53] Spartan sovereignty, conversely, rested in a dual monarchy checked by ephors and a gerousia oligarchy, prioritizing military collectivism over individual rule.[54] In the Roman Republic, established after expelling the last king Tarquinius Superbus in 509 BCE, sovereignty was vested in the populus Romanus, exercised through assemblies (comitia) for legislation and elections, alongside the Senate's advisory and financial oversight, distributing power to prevent monarchical tyranny.[55] Magistrates like consuls held imperium—supreme military and judicial command—but for fixed terms, with mechanisms like the tribunate protecting plebeians, reflecting a mixed constitution balancing patrician and popular elements.[53] The transition to empire under Augustus in 27 BCE concentrated sovereignty in the princeps, who amassed de facto absolute authority through control of legions and provinces, while maintaining republican facades, marking a shift toward personal rule akin to Hellenistic monarchies.[56]Medieval and Feudal Conceptions
In medieval Europe, following the fragmentation of Carolingian authority after the Treaty of Verdun in 843, political power devolved into a decentralized feudal system characterized by personal bonds of fealty rather than centralized sovereignty. Lords granted fiefs—lands held in conditional tenure—to vassals in exchange for military service, counsel, and homage, forming a hierarchical network where authority was relational and reciprocal rather than absolute. This structure, prominent from the 9th to 13th centuries, distributed effective control among local magnates, with kings often functioning as primus inter pares (first among equals) rather than unchallenged sovereigns, as evidenced by the frequent need for royal assemblies like the English Great Council or French assemblées de barons to secure consent for major decisions.[57][58] Feudal conceptions emphasized dominium (proprietary lordship over land and persons) intertwined with imperium (public jurisdiction), but these were not exclusive to any single entity; overlapping claims by secular lords, ecclesiastical institutions, and imperial figures created a pluralistic order. For instance, vassal oaths bound individuals personally to overlords, allowing subinfeudation where lesser lords owed allegiance upward while wielding autonomous power downward, leading to fragmented jurisdictions as seen in the patchwork of principalities within the Holy Roman Empire by the 11th century. This diffusion arose causally from the 8th-9th century Viking, Magyar, and Saracen invasions, which eroded central defenses and incentivized localized knightly levies over imperial armies.[59][57] The Church asserted a parallel spiritual sovereignty, deriving from divine hierarchy and papal supremacy doctrines articulated in Gratian's Decretum (c. 1140), which posited the pope as ultimate arbiter over temporal rulers in matters of faith and morals. Conflicts such as the Investiture Controversy (1075–1122), culminating in the Concordat of Worms in 1122, illustrated this tension, where emperors like Henry IV sought to appoint bishops for political control, only to yield to papal veto after excommunication and the Walk to Canossa in 1077. Medieval canonists like Hugh of St. Victor distinguished potestas (coercive power) from iurisdictio (judicial right), allowing clerical exemption from secular courts while subordinating kings to natural law, thus preventing unqualified absolutism.[60][59] Theoretical foundations in this era, as explored by figures like Marsilius of Padua in Defensor Pacis (1324), rejected universal papal monarchy in favor of popular consent for secular rule, reflecting feudal realities where sovereignty resided in communities (universitas) rather than indivisible persons. Yet, practical sovereignty remained de facto, limited by custom (consuetudo) and magnate resistance, as in the Magna Carta of 1215, which curtailed King John's prerogatives through baronial enforcement mechanisms. This era's conceptions thus prioritized contractual reciprocity and layered authorities over the exclusive, territorial monopoly later formalized in Westphalian terms.[57][59]Reformation and Westphalian Origins (1648)
The Protestant Reformation, initiated by Martin Luther's Ninety-Five Theses in 1517, fundamentally challenged the universal authority of the Papacy and the Holy Roman Emperor over religious matters in Europe, thereby elevating the role of territorial rulers in ecclesiastical governance. This shift undermined medieval conceptions of overlapping jurisdictions, where spiritual and temporal powers coexisted, and instead promoted the principle that princes held sovereignty within their domains, including over faith—a doctrine later encapsulated in cuius regio, eius religio (whose realm, his religion).[61] The Reformation's fragmentation of Christendom into Catholic and Protestant polities intensified confessional rivalries, as evidenced by conflicts like the Schmalkaldic War (1546–1547), which demonstrated the practical assertion of princely autonomy against imperial centralization. These tensions culminated in the Peace of Augsburg (1555), which temporarily resolved religious disputes within the Holy Roman Empire by affirming that each prince could determine the official religion of his territory, excluding Calvinism at the time and barring subjects from private dissent.[61] However, the exclusion of Calvinists and ongoing enforcement issues fueled further instability, leading to the Defenestration of Prague on May 23, 1618, which ignited the Thirty Years' War—a conflict that engulfed much of Central Europe and involved major powers like Sweden, France, and the Habsburgs.[62] The war, characterized by shifting alliances and proxy battles between Protestant and Catholic forces, resulted in profound demographic catastrophe, with estimates indicating a population decline of 20–30% in the Empire's territories due to battle, famine, and disease.[63] The Peace of Westphalia, comprising treaties signed on October 24, 1648, in the Westphalian cities of Münster (for Catholic parties) and Osnabrück (for Protestant ones), concluded the war and the Eighty Years' War between Spain and the Dutch Republic.[8] Key provisions included formal recognition of the independence of the Swiss Confederation and the United Provinces of the Netherlands, the extension of Augsburg's religious settlement to encompass Calvinism alongside Lutheranism and Catholicism, and the affirmation of rulers' exclusive jurisdiction over internal religious affairs without external interference.[63] France received Alsace, Sweden gained Pomerania and bishoprics in northern Germany, and the Holy Roman Empire's emperor was stripped of authority to enforce religious uniformity, effectively decentralizing power to over 300 semi-sovereign territories.[62] Westphalia's treaties codified territorial sovereignty as the supreme, indivisible authority of states within fixed borders, prioritizing non-intervention in domestic matters—particularly religion—over universal Christian norms or imperial oversight, thus laying foundational norms for the modern state system.[8] This framework arose causally from the Reformation's erosion of supranational religious authority and the exhaustion of prolonged warfare, which rendered confessional unity untenable and necessitated pragmatic recognition of de facto autonomies to prevent recurrence. While Jean Bodin's Six Books of the Republic (1576) had earlier theorized absolute sovereignty, Westphalia internationalized it through binding diplomacy, though scholars note it balanced sovereignty with compensatory mechanisms like indemnities and alliances rather than establishing unqualified state absolutism.[64] The system's endurance stemmed from its alignment with the era's causal realities: fragmented polities seeking stability amid ideological exhaustion.[65]Enlightenment Absolutism and Nationalism
Jean Bodin formalized the concept of sovereignty in his 1576 work Six Books of the Commonwealth, defining it as the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth, indivisible and held by the sovereign who recognizes no superior.[3] This absolutist framework emphasized the sovereign's supremacy over laws and subjects, influencing later thinkers amid the religious wars of the era. Thomas Hobbes advanced this in Leviathan (1651), arguing that to escape the chaotic state of nature, individuals surrender rights to an absolute sovereign whose authority prevents civil war through undivided power.[66] Hobbes's model justified monarchical absolutism as a rational necessity for order, contrasting with fragmented feudal authorities post-Westphalia. Enlightened absolutism emerged in the 18th century, where monarchs like Frederick II of Prussia (r. 1740–1786), Joseph II of Austria (r. 1765–1790), and Catherine II of Russia (r. 1762–1796) adopted Enlightenment rationalism—reforms in administration, law, and economy—while retaining absolute control.[67] These rulers centralized sovereignty in the state, using reason to strengthen executive power rather than delegate it, as seen in Frederick's Anti-Machiavel (1740), which professed benevolence under absolutist rule.[68] Such practices reinforced sovereignty as the monarch's domain, yet introduced merit-based governance that subtly eroded divine-right justifications. Enlightenment ideas also seeded nationalism by shifting sovereignty toward the collective will of the people or nation. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Social Contract (1762) posited sovereignty as residing in the general will, an indivisible expression of the community's rational consensus, challenging monarchical absolutism while risking majoritarian tyranny.[16] Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) emphasized cultural and linguistic Volksgeist, promoting organic national identities that underpinned self-determination claims.[69] The French Revolution (1789–1799) operationalized these, declaring national sovereignty via the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), where power derived from the nation, not the king, fostering centralized republican states and inspiring 19th-century unification movements in Germany and Italy.[70] This evolution linked absolutist state-building with nationalist fervor, prioritizing unified national sovereignty over dynastic or imperial fragmentation.Imperialism, World Wars, and Decolonization (19th-20th Centuries)
The era of high imperialism in the late 19th century saw European powers extend their sovereign claims over vast non-European territories through military conquest, unequal treaties, and diplomatic agreements that disregarded indigenous political structures. During the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, representatives from 14 states, including Britain, France, Germany, and Portugal, established rules for claiming African territories, requiring "effective occupation" as proof of sovereignty while excluding African rulers from deliberations, resulting in the partition of the continent into spheres of European control by 1914, where formal colonies and protectorates covered approximately 90% of Africa's landmass.[71] This expansion reframed sovereignty as a Eurocentric legal construct, enabling metropoles to assert exclusive authority over resources and populations, often reducing local entities to administrative subordinates rather than independent sovereigns. Similar dynamics unfolded in Asia, with Britain consolidating control in India via the 1858 Government of India Act, which transferred sovereignty from the East India Company to the Crown, and France establishing protectorates in Indochina by 1887. World War I profoundly disrupted imperial sovereignty, precipitating the dissolution of multi-ethnic empires and the emergence of nation-states predicated on ethnic self-determination. The collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires by 1918 led to the creation of nine new sovereign states in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as delineated in the Treaty of Versailles (1919) and associated pacts like Saint-Germain and Trianon.[72] These treaties renounced imperial claims to colonies, transferring them as League of Nations mandates—Class A mandates in the Middle East, such as Iraq and Syria, granted nominal sovereignty under Allied oversight—while Article 22 of the Versailles Treaty justified this as a transitional step toward self-rule, though in practice it preserved external influence. The war's total mobilization also intensified internal sovereignty challenges, as states like Britain and France centralized control over economies and societies, foreshadowing post-war fiscal strains that undermined colonial retention. By 1920, the number of independent states had risen to about 50, reflecting a shift toward national over dynastic sovereignty. World War II accelerated decolonization, eroding the capacity of exhausted European powers to maintain overseas sovereignty amid ideological pressures for self-determination and superpower opposition to imperialism. The Atlantic Charter of 1941, jointly issued by the United States and United Kingdom, affirmed the right of peoples to choose their governments, influencing post-war independence movements despite initial Allied wartime reliance on colonial resources. Following the war, between 1945 and 1960, over three dozen states in Asia and Africa achieved independence, including India and Pakistan in 1947, Indonesia in 1949, and 17 African nations in 1960 alone, often through negotiated transfers or unilateral declarations amid weakening metropolitan control and rising nationalist insurgencies.[73] The United Nations Charter (1945), particularly Chapter XI on non-self-governing territories, institutionalized decolonization by obliging administering powers to promote progressive autonomy, leading to a surge in UN membership from 51 in 1945 to 127 by 1970 as former colonies asserted sovereign equality. This process transferred formal sovereignty to new states but frequently exposed internal fragilities, such as ethnic conflicts and economic dependencies, challenging the absolutist assumptions of undivided authority.[74]Post-1945 International Order
The United Nations Charter, signed by 50 states on June 26, 1945, and entering into force on October 24, 1945, established the foundational principles of the post-World War II international order, with sovereignty at its core. Article 2(1) declares the organization based on the sovereign equality of all members, while Article 2(4) obliges states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.[75] Article 2(7) further prohibits the UN from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, reinforcing non-intervention as a safeguard for internal sovereignty, subject only to enforcement measures authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII.[76] These provisions reflected a reaction to the aggressive expansions of the Axis powers, aiming to institutionalize state sovereignty as a barrier to total war while enabling collective security. Economic dimensions of the order, laid out at the Bretton Woods Conference from July 1 to 22, 1944, involved 44 allied nations creating the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) to stabilize currencies and finance reconstruction.[77] Participating states committed to fixed exchange rates pegged to the US dollar (itself convertible to gold at $35 per ounce), which curtailed full monetary sovereignty by requiring policy coordination to maintain pegs and access IMF resources. This system promoted interdependence but preserved formal political sovereignty, as membership remained voluntary and states retained ultimate control over domestic fiscal decisions.[78] Decolonization profoundly expanded the roster of sovereign states, aligning with UN principles of self-determination. From 51 original UN members in 1945, membership swelled to 193 by 2023, driven by independence for over 80 former colonies, particularly in Africa and Asia between 1945 and 1960.[79][80] General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), adopted December 14, 1960, declared colonial domination a denial of human rights and urged immediate independence steps, facilitating the transition of territories like India (1947), Indonesia (1949), and numerous African states in the 1960s.) This surge affirmed de jure sovereignty for new entities but often exposed de facto vulnerabilities, as weak institutions and economic dependencies invited external influence.[73] The Security Council's structure, with veto power for its five permanent members (China, France, Russia, UK, US), embeds hierarchy within the equality principle, enabling great powers to block resolutions threatening their interests—Russia has vetoed 153 times since 1946, often on sovereignty-related issues like annexations.[81] This mechanism, inherited from wartime alliances, has preserved order stability by securing buy-in from victors but has stymied action in crises, such as vetoes blocking condemnations of interventions.[82] During the Cold War (1947–1991), bipolar rivalry led to proxy conflicts that tested non-intervention, yet sovereignty rhetoric shielded nascent states from overt recolonization. Post-1991, authorized operations like the 1991 Gulf War coalition (under Resolution 678) upheld territorial integrity, but unauthorized actions, such as the 1999 NATO Kosovo intervention, highlighted persistent tensions between sovereignty and humanitarian imperatives.[83] Overall, the order prioritizes state consent and equality in principle, tempered by realist accommodations for power disparities.[84]Acquisition, Transfer, and Erosion
Traditional Modes of Acquisition
In classical international law, sovereignty over territory was acquired through several established modes derived from Roman private law analogies and state practice, primarily recognized from the 17th to 19th centuries. These included occupation, conquest (or subjugation), cession, prescription, and accretion, each requiring demonstrable intent and effective control to establish title.[85][86] These methods presupposed that territory could be treated as property subject to original or derivative transfer, with sovereignty vesting upon fulfillment of legal criteria such as animus possidendi (intent to possess) and corpus possessionis (actual control).[87] Occupation involved the effective appropriation of terra nullius—land belonging to no sovereign—through discovery followed by continuous and peaceful display of authority. This mode underpinned European colonial expansions, as articulated in the 19th-century Island of Palmas arbitration (1928), where arbitrator Max Huber emphasized that mere discovery without settlement did not suffice; sustained administration was required.[86][88] For instance, the Dutch claim to Palmas Island was upheld due to nearly continuous possession since 1673, overriding a Spanish discovery claim from 1521.[85] Conquest or subjugation entailed the forcible seizure and annexation of territory held by another state, validated by victory in a just war under traditional just war doctrine, followed by formal incorporation. This was a hybrid original-derivative mode, common in antiquity and the early modern era, such as the Roman Empire's expansions or the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453, where effective military control transitioned to administrative sovereignty.[87][85] Until the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and the UN Charter's prohibition on force in Article 2(4) (1945), conquest remained legally efficacious if consolidated, as seen in the U.S. annexation of Mexican territories after the 1846-1848 war via the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.[86][89] Cession represented a derivative transfer of sovereignty by treaty, typically voluntary but sometimes coerced, from one state to another, extinguishing the prior title upon ratification and possession. Rooted in mutual consent, it was exemplified by the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, where France ceded 828,000 square miles to the United States for $15 million, or the 1867 Alaska Purchase from Russia for $7.2 million, both formalized in bilateral treaties that explicitly conveyed full sovereignty.[90][86] Unlike occupation, cession presumed pre-existing title and required clear intent to relinquish, without need for subsequent effectiveness if the treaty was unambiguous.[89] Prescription, akin to adverse possession in domestic law, allowed acquisition of territory originally held by another state through long-term, uninterrupted, and public exercise of sovereign functions, often without the original owner's protest. This mode addressed evidentiary gaps in title disputes, as in the 1933 case of the Free Zone of the Colonie, where the Permanent Court of International Justice noted prescription's role in stabilizing possession over generations.[88][85] Historical applications included Spain's prescriptive claims to parts of Morocco by the early 20th century, based on centuries of administrative control.[86] Accretion involved the natural, gradual addition of land, such as through river avulsions or coastal sedimentation, automatically extending sovereignty without formal acts, provided the original territory bordered the change. This passive mode, grounded in the principle of uti possidetis, preserved existing boundaries against erosive losses (avulsion) while incorporating stable gains, as clarified in the 1929 arbitral award on the Chamizal Tract between the U.S. and Mexico, attributing sovereignty shifts to Rio Grande channel changes since 1852.[90][89] These modes collectively emphasized effectiveness over mere assertion, reflecting a realist view that sovereignty required tangible control to endure challenges.[87]Transfer and Cession Mechanisms
Cession represents a consensual mechanism under international law whereby one state voluntarily transfers sovereignty over territory to another state, typically through a formal treaty that extinguishes the ceding state's title and vests it in the acquiring state.[91] This mode requires the ceding entity to possess legitimate prior sovereignty, with validity hinging on genuine consent rather than coercion, though historical precedents have occasionally tolerated transfers under duress as settled facts.[92] Upon cession, sovereignty transfers comprehensively, including public property and jurisdiction, but private rights of inhabitants generally persist unless explicitly altered by the treaty.[93] Mechanisms of cession vary by consideration exchanged, encompassing outright sales, territorial swaps, or unconditional gifts, all effectuated via bilateral agreements ratified under domestic procedures of the involved states.[94] Sales involve monetary payment, as in the 1867 Alaska Purchase where Russia ceded 586,412 square miles to the United States for $7.2 million, expanding U.S. territory into the Arctic.[94] Exchanges prioritize strategic reciprocity, exemplified by the 1890 Anglo-German Agreement in which the United Kingdom transferred the Heligoland archipelago to Germany in return for Zanzibar's sovereignty.[91] Gifts or donations, rarer due to fiscal implications, occur without direct compensation, though underlying motives often include alliance-building or debt relief. Post-cession effects extend to inhabitants' nationality, which shifts to the acquiring state's unless treaties provide otherwise, alongside obligations for any pre-existing concessions or debts tied to the territory.[93] In contemporary practice, cessions remain viable but scarce, constrained by post-1945 norms against forcible alterations; the 1997 handover of Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China, pursuant to the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, illustrates a negotiated reversion of leased territory, transferring sovereignty over 1,106 square kilometers without monetary exchange.[91] Such transfers underscore sovereignty's treaty-bound fluidity, yet they provoke scrutiny over long-term stability when public referenda or local consent are absent, as evidenced in disputes over validity under evolving self-determination principles.[95]Erosion through Occupation, Intervention, or Dissolution
Military occupation erodes state sovereignty by imposing foreign authority over territory, suspending the occupied government's exercise of power without formally transferring title, as codified in Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which obligates the occupier to restore and ensure public order and safety while respecting local laws unless absolutely prevented.[96] This temporary suspension, intended to be provisional under international humanitarian law, often involves comprehensive administrative control, including legislative reforms, economic management, and security enforcement, effectively nullifying the sovereign's internal and external competencies during the period.[97] Historical precedents illustrate this dynamic; following Germany's unconditional surrender on May 8, 1945, Allied forces divided and occupied the country into four zones from 1945 to 1949, administering denazification, dismantling military industry, and imposing democratic structures, with full sovereignty restoration for West Germany occurring only in 1955 upon the Paris Agreements' entry into force.[98] Foreign interventions, typically military incursions justified under pretexts like self-defense, regime change, or humanitarian necessity, further erode sovereignty by establishing provisional authorities that supplant national governance, contravening Article 2(4) of the UN Charter's prohibition on threats or use of force against territorial integrity.[99] In Iraq, the U.S.-led invasion commencing March 20, 2003, culminated in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) assuming legislative, executive, and judicial powers from May 2003 until June 28, 2004, when sovereignty was transferred two days early to the Iraqi Interim Government amid ongoing insurgency and reconstruction efforts dictated by external actors.[100] Such interventions, while sometimes framed as liberatory, result in de facto loss of autonomous decision-making, as seen in the CPA's issuance of over 100 orders restructuring Iraq's economy, security apparatus, and legal framework, including privatization mandates and foreign troop immunity, which persisted post-transfer via bilateral agreements.[101] State dissolution represents the ultimate erosion of sovereignty, where the central authority fragments or ceases, redistributing sovereign attributes to successor entities amid internal ethnic, economic, or political fissures often exacerbated by external pressures. The Soviet Union's dissolution on December 26, 1991, following the Belavezha Accords of December 8, 1991, among Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and Mikhail Gorbachev's resignation on December 25, extinguished the USSR's sovereignty, with 15 republics assuming independent status recognized under international law, though initial agreements envisioned a loose Commonwealth of Independent States that failed to preserve unified competencies.[102] Similarly, Yugoslavia's federal sovereignty eroded progressively from 1990, with Slovenia declaring sovereignty on July 2, 1990, and secession on June 25, 1991, triggering a decade of conflict and fragmentation into five successor states by 2008, as ethnic republics invoked self-determination claims overriding federal unity, despite international efforts like the Badinter Commission's arbitration deeming the federation in dissolution but prioritizing territorial integrity for remnants.[103] These cases underscore how dissolution, whether consensual or violent, terminates the original state's monopoly on legitimate force and international personality, redistributing sovereignty unevenly and inviting prolonged instability.[104]Justifications and Theoretical Underpinnings
Natural Law, Divine Right, and Traditional Justifications
In medieval scholastic thought, natural law provided a foundational justification for sovereignty by positing that political authority participates in the eternal divine law, accessible through human reason and oriented toward the common good. Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274), in works such as the Summa Theologica, maintained that rulers hold power as "ministers of God" to enforce just laws derived from natural principles, ensuring societal order and virtue; unjust rule forfeits legitimacy, permitting resistance in extreme cases like tyranny.[105] This framework constrained sovereignty to moral ends, distinguishing it from arbitrary will, and influenced canon law traditions where papal or imperial authority claimed supremacy via rational alignment with universal norms.[106] Unlike later absolutist views, natural law emphasized sovereignty's teleological purpose—promoting human flourishing—over unchecked power, as evidenced in Aquinas's insistence that positive law binds only insofar as it accords with natural equity.[107] The doctrine of divine right of kings, peaking in the 16th and 17th centuries, asserted monarchical sovereignty as a direct delegation from God, rendering the ruler unaccountable to earthly institutions. James VI and I (1566–1625) articulated this in his 1598 essay The True Law of Free Monarchies, analogizing the king's authority to a father's over his household, derived from God's ordinance and immune to parliamentary or popular veto; this countered Calvinist resistance theories amid religious upheavals.[108] Similarly, Robert Filmer's Patriarcha (written c. 1630s, published 1680) traced sovereignty to Adam's primordial dominion, vesting absolute, hereditary power in kings as patriarchal successors, free from contractual limits.[109] Proponents viewed this as stabilizing fractured polities post-Reformation, with sovereignty's indivisibility mirroring divine unity, though critics like Algernon Sidney later highlighted its vulnerability to abuse absent checks.[110] Traditional justifications pre-Enlightenment often blended divine and natural elements with pragmatic origins like conquest, heredity, or feudal compact, legitimizing sovereignty through customary endurance rather than abstract theory. In feudal Europe, lords' overlordship evolved into royal supremacy via oaths and inheritance, justified as divinely sanctioned hierarchies preserving social bonds, as seen in the hierarchical norms of the Corpus Juris Civilis (6th century) revived in medieval glosses.[111] Elective monarchies, such as in the Holy Roman Empire until 1806, relied on noble consensus as a traditional mode, yet subordinated to imperial claims of divine election. These mechanisms prioritized causal stability—averting anarchy through recognized authority—over consent, with sovereignty's validity hinging on effective rule and historical precedence rather than philosophical deduction.[111] Empirical persistence, as in England's transition from Anglo-Saxon witan to Norman conquest validating William I's 1066 rule, underscored that traditional sovereignty derived legitimacy from de facto control ratified by tradition, not inherent rights.[111]Social Contract and Consent-Based Theories
![Frontispiece of Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes][float-right]Social contract theory justifies sovereignty as deriving from a hypothetical agreement among rational individuals to pool their rights and powers into a collective authority, thereby escaping the insecurities of a pre-political state of nature. This framework, developed during the Enlightenment, posits that legitimate political power rests on the consent of the governed rather than divine right or conquest.[112] Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan published in 1651, described the state of nature as a condition of perpetual war where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," compelling individuals to enter a social contract ceding all rights to an absolute, indivisible sovereign who enforces peace and security. Hobbes contended that this sovereign holds unchecked authority, as dividing power would revert society to anarchy, and subjects cannot unilaterally revoke consent once granted.[113][114] John Locke, writing in Two Treatises of Government in 1689, offered a contrasting view emphasizing limited government formed by express or tacit consent to protect natural rights to life, liberty, and property. Locke argued that sovereignty is conditional, with legitimacy sustained only through ongoing consent; if rulers violate the trust by encroaching on rights, the people retain the right to dissolve the government and establish a new one. This consent-based model influenced constitutional limits on sovereign power, as seen in mechanisms like representative assemblies reflecting popular will.[115][116] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in The Social Contract of 1762, advanced popular sovereignty through the concept of the general will, where individuals alienate rights to the community as a whole, not a separate ruler, ensuring laws reflect collective rather than private interests. Rousseau insisted sovereignty is inalienable and indivisible, exercised directly by citizens in small republics via assemblies, with representation distorting true consent; deviations from the general will justify coercion to align individuals with the common good.[117][118] Consent in these theories varies: Hobbesian consent is irrevocable and absolute, Lockean consent allows withdrawal via revolution, and Rousseauian consent demands active participation to realize freedom as obedience to self-imposed laws. Empirically, however, social contracts lack historical attestation as actual events, functioning instead as normative heuristics; studies in evolutionary social science indicate cooperative norms and hierarchies emerged gradually in human groups without formal compacts, suggesting sovereignty's foundations may lie more in emergent social dynamics than deliberate agreements.[119][120]
Realist and Pragmatic Defenses
Realist theory in international relations defends sovereignty as a foundational principle enabling states to navigate an anarchic system where no higher authority enforces order or security. In this view, sovereignty empowers states to prioritize survival by amassing power and deterring threats, as unchecked interdependence risks exploitation by stronger actors.[121] Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau argued that sovereignty underpins the pursuit of national interest defined in terms of power, allowing states to maintain autonomy amid inevitable conflicts driven by human nature's enduring traits.[122] Thomas Hobbes provided an early realist and pragmatic justification in Leviathan (1651), contending that absolute sovereignty—whether vested in a monarch or assembly—is causally necessary to avert the state of nature's chaos, characterized by mutual fear and violence where "the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." By alienating individual rights to a sovereign enforcer of peace, subjects secure protection, a mechanism realists extend to interstate relations where sovereign states act analogously to preserve collective security against external predation.[19] This defense rests on empirical observation of human tendencies toward self-preservation, rendering divided or eroded sovereignty practically untenable as it invites internal discord and vulnerability.[121] Neorealists and offensive realists, such as John Mearsheimer, reinforce these arguments by emphasizing structural anarchy, where states must vigilantly guard sovereignty to maximize relative capabilities and forestall conquest. Mearsheimer posits that survival imperatives compel great powers to view sovereignty not as an abstract right but as a strategic bulwark, critiquing institutional dilutions like humanitarian interventions as masks for power grabs that undermine weaker states' defenses.[123][124] Pragmatic extensions highlight sovereignty's role in enabling decisive internal governance; for instance, autonomous states can align policies with local conditions, fostering stability over supranational mandates that often fail due to mismatched incentives and enforcement deficits.[125] Empirical patterns, such as the persistence of sovereign borders amid failed experiments in pooled authority, underscore this causal efficacy in maintaining order through self-reliant power balances.[121]