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Lanco Infratech (Lagadapati Amarappa Naidu and Company Infratech) was a large Indian conglomerate that became insolvent in 2017.[1][2] It was involved in construction, power, real estate, and several other segments. One of the first Independent Power Producers (IPP) in India, in 2011 it became the largest private power provider in India.[citation needed]

Key Information

History

[edit]

Lanco was founded by Lagadapati Amarappa Naidu and his nephew Lagadapati Rajagopal, who was a member of 15th Lok Sabha representing Vijayawada from Indian National Congress. Lanco Infratech was created in 2006 to consolidate the 1960-founded Lanco Group's diverse operations under one brand.[2] Initial growth was driven by large contracts primarily in construction. Later, other infrastructure areas such as power generation, transportation were also added. In 2017 the company became insolvent.[3]

Former major operational power plants

[edit]

Major Power Projects under construction were:

  • 2 × 660 MW extension of Lanco Amarkantak Power Limited
  • 2 × 660 MW Lanco Vidarbha Thermal Power Limited
  • 2 × 660 MW Lanco Babandh Power Limited
  • 4 × 125 MW Lanco Teesta Hydro Power Pvt Ltd
  • 2 × 76 MW Lanco Mandakini Hydro Energy Pvt Ltd
  • Turnkey EPC for 100MW solar thermal project for KVK Energy in Rajasthan.
  • Complete EPC for a 75 MW crystalline technology-based PhotoVoltaic solar power project in Dhule, Maharashtra, for Maharashtra State Power Generation Co Ltd Mahagenco.[5]

Real estate

[edit]

In 2012, Lanco Infratech obtained around 100-acre (0.40 km2) of land through bidding by the Andhra Pradesh government at ₹ 4.27 crore per acre for its ₹ 5,500 crore township project in Manikonda in Western Hyderabad.[6]

Panorama showing Manikonda and Lanco Hills under construction in 2012
  • LANCO Hills High-rise complex
    LANCO Hills High-rise complex
  • LANCO Hills captured from Chitrapuri colony road
    LANCO Hills captured from Chitrapuri colony road

Debt restructuring

[edit]

In December 2006, the company won a large contract citing collaboration with Singapore firm Globeleq.[7][8] In 2007, after winning the bid for the 1000 MW Anpara-C power plant, Lanco requested that the power output be re-negotiated. Some competing firms protested[9] since the re-negotiation made the initial bidding meaningless. However, Lanco managed to retain the Anpara project.[10]

In June 2013, Lanco had won a contract for setting up two 300 MW power plants in Gujarat. However, the contract was cancelled in October 2013, when the company failed to put up the 10% guarantee required in the contract. [11] By July 2013, the company had filed for debt restructuring, citing a business slowdown.[12] In September,[when?] it was revealed that the company had reduced its workforce by nearly half.[13]

Repeatedly tarnished by charges of corrupt practices[7][9][14][15][16][17] the company ran into financial trouble and filed for corporate debt restructuring[18] in July 2013.[19][20] In late 2017 the company faced insolvency proceedings, with the National Company Law Tribunal suspending the board.[21][22]

Liquidation

[edit]

In August 2018, Hyderabad bench of National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) ordered the liquidation of Lanco Infratech.[23][24][25][26]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Lanco Infratech

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Lanco Infratech Limited was an Indian infrastructure conglomerate primarily engaged in services for power projects, as well as power generation, , natural resources development, and property development. Incorporated on 26 March 1993 as Lanco Constructions Limited in , it formed part of the Lanco Group, which originated in 1960 through a transport initiated by three brothers. The company achieved notable scale in the power sector, commissioning projects such as the 368 MW Lanco Kondapalli power plant in 2000 and positioning itself among India's top private power developers with over 2,000 MW capacity by the early . It also developed like totaling 163 km and urban projects, including the LANCO Hills residential and commercial complex in Hyderabad. However, aggressive expansion through debt-financed acquisitions and bids for large power projects led to mounting financial strain amid regulatory changes, fuel supply disruptions, and economic slowdowns. By 2017, Lanco Infratech faced insolvency with debts exceeding operational revenues, prompting admission to corporate insolvency resolution processes under India's Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. ordered its liquidation in August 2018 after resolution efforts failed, with proceedings continuing into 2025 under appointed liquidators. This outcome highlighted vulnerabilities in India's sector, where high leverage and dependency on policies amplified risks from project delays and non-performing assets. ![LANCO Hills High-rise complex][center]

Founding and Early History

Establishment and Founders

Lanco Infratech Limited was incorporated on 26 March 1993 as a under the Companies Act, with its in Hyderabad, , initially classified under activities (U45200TG1993PLC015545). The company was founded by , a mechanical engineer and technocrat from , who established it as part of the broader Lanco Group's diversification from earlier and contracting ventures into formal infrastructure development. Rajagopal served as the founder chairman, guiding the entity's early focus on civil projects amid India's . Key family members, including Rajagopal's brothers L. Madhusudhan Rao (vice chairman at the time) and G. Bhaskara Rao (director), played foundational roles in operations and strategic direction, leveraging the group's prior experience in trucking and contracting that dated to 1960 under ancestral family enterprises. In 2002, Rajagopal transitioned to active as a , prompting Madhusudhan Rao to assume executive chairmanship while maintaining the family's controlling stake. This leadership continuity supported initial growth, with the company achieving early milestones in highway and building contracts before broader sector expansions.

Initial Construction Projects

Lanco's entry into construction occurred in 1980 through Uma Maheshwar Rao and Company, which executed projects primarily in and . These early efforts marked the group's shift from transportation services—where it had grown a fleet of 100 trucks by 1976 serving regional construction firms—to direct involvement in works. By the mid-1980s, Lanco had amassed equipment including 150 trucks, eight excavators, ten bulldozers, and 15 drilling machines, enabling it to handle prestigious assignments in the same states. The company's capabilities expanded further in 1986 with the acquisition of S.V. Contractors, boosting its execution capacity in infrastructure development. Annual turnover reached ₹25 by 1990, reflecting steady growth in civil construction prior to diversification into power generation. The formalization of construction operations came with the incorporation of Lanco Constructions Limited on March 26, 1993, in , initially focused on and civil works before renaming to Lanco Infratech Limited in 2000. Early projects under this entity built on the group's prior experience, emphasizing delivery in regional , though specific contract details from this period remain limited in public records. This foundation positioned Lanco as a key player in India's emerging private-sector construction landscape during the 1990s economic liberalization.

Business Expansion and Operations

Entry into Power Sector

Lanco Infratech, originally established as a construction firm in 1993, began diversifying into power generation in the mid-1990s amid India's of the energy sector, which encouraged private participation as Independent Power Producers (IPPs). The company's first major step was securing allotment for the Kondapalli gas-based power project in in 1996, followed by signing a (PPA) with the state electricity board in 1997. This 368 MW dual-fuel ( and ) plant at Kondapalli, near , represented Lanco's inaugural venture into thermal power production and was commissioned in 2000 after overcoming delays related to fuel supply and financing. The project operated under a build-own-operate model, selling power primarily to the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board, and positioned Lanco among early private entrants in India's power market, which had previously been dominated by state utilities. Entry into the sector aligned with national policies promoting IPPs through incentives like tax holidays and guaranteed returns, though Lanco faced initial challenges including gas allocation uncertainties from the Krishna-Godavari basin. By leveraging its (EPC) expertise from civil projects, Lanco self-executed much of the development, reducing costs and building operational know-how for future expansions. This move diversified revenue streams beyond construction contracts, with power assets contributing to long-term stability amid fluctuating infrastructure demand.

Major Power Plants and Capacity

Lanco Infratech developed and operated several gas- and -fired power plants as part of its expansion into the power sector, achieving a total operational capacity of 3,460 MW by the early , primarily with some gas-based assets. The company's portfolio focused on supercritical and subcritical units, sourcing from domestic mines and gas via pipelines, though many projects faced delays due to fuel supply issues and financial strain post-2013. Key operational plants included:
Plant NameLocationCapacity (MW)Fuel TypeNotes
1,476Developed in phases; fully operational by 2012, supplied via pipeline.
600 (2×300)CoalUnits commissioned 2010–2013; later acquired by in 2024 amid Lanco's insolvency.
Anpara C 1,200 (2×600)CoalOperational since 2012; subcritical units awarded via competitive bidding.
1,200CoalOperational; imported coal-dependent, reflecting Lanco's early supercritical technology adoption.
These assets contributed to Lanco's peak generation before financial distress led to asset sales and proceedings starting in 2017, with capacities verified through project-specific engineering data rather than aggregated corporate claims. Additional projects like (1,320 MW under ) were stalled and not factored into operational totals.

Infrastructure and Real Estate Developments

Lanco Infratech engaged in (EPC) services for various infrastructure projects, including , roads, and urban developments under build-operate-transfer (BOT) and other public-private partnership models. The company executed multiple national projects, such as the six-laning of the 81 km Bangalore-Hoskote-Mudbagal stretch on NH 4 and the 82 km Neelamangla-Devihalli stretch on NH 48 in , achieving financial closure for these BOT toll projects. In , Lanco secured a Rs 1,000 crore contract in for the two-laning with paved shoulders of the Aligarh-Kanpur section of NH 91 from km 140 to 418.16 on a toll basis, including repair, widening, and reconstruction of 3 major and 29 minor bridges. Another road project involved similar two-laning enhancements announced in January 2013. The Lanco Limited asset, part of these highway initiatives, underwent corporate insolvency resolution, with the approving its transfer to Kalyan Toll Infrastructure in May 2021. In real estate, Lanco developed Lanco Hills, a large-scale integrated mixed-use township in , Hyderabad, spanning 84 acres with 12 towers rising up to 35 floors and comprising 1,392 luxury apartments and villas starting from 1,195 square feet. The project featured residential 3BHK units, high-end amenities, and commercial office spaces designed to accommodate up to 75,000 occupants, positioning it as a premium development in the Gachibowli-Manikonda corridor. By September 2017, amid financial pressures, Lanco announced its exit from , designating Lanco Hills as its final major venture in the sector.

Financial Growth and Challenges

Revenue Peaks and Expansion Strategy

Lanco Infratech experienced its revenue peak in the ending March 2013, with consolidated net sales reaching approximately ₹13,725 , driven primarily by the commissioning of thermal power plants and execution of (EPC) contracts in the sector. This marked a significant increase from ₹9,457 in FY2010, reflecting a exceeding 20% in the preceding years, fueled by operational ramp-ups in power assets totaling over 2,000 MW by that period. Subsequent years saw a decline, with revenues dropping to ₹10,417 in FY2014 amid delays in project completions and rising input costs. The company's expansion strategy centered on aggressive capacity addition in the power sector, targeting a total generation portfolio of 15,000 MW by 2015 through investments estimated at ₹35,000 crore, emphasizing thermal and supercritical coal-based plants. This involved strategic bidding for government projects, such as the 1x660 MW supercritical unit at Ennore Thermal Power Station, and phased expansions like the 750 MW addition at the Kondapalli plant in Andhra Pradesh announced in 2009. Lanco financed this growth via a mix of equity infusions, debt from banks, and internal accruals from EPC revenues, while diversifying into solar energy and international opportunities to mitigate domestic regulatory risks. The approach prioritized vertical integration, consolidating construction, power development, and real estate under a single entity post-2006 reorganization to capture synergies across the value chain. This debt-leveraged model enabled rapid scaling from a construction-focused firm in the to a multi-gigawatt power player by the early , with EPC order books peaking at over ₹20,000 supporting inflows from project milestones. However, execution challenges, including fuel supply constraints and cost overruns, began eroding margins even at highs, as evidenced by EBITDA growth lagging in FY2011-13. The strategy's emphasis on thermal power aligned with India's energy demand surge but exposed the firm to sector-specific volatilities like import dependencies.

Debt Accumulation and Leverage

Lanco Infratech's accumulation accelerated during its aggressive expansion in the power and sectors from the mid-2000s onward, with borrowings primarily capital-intensive projects such as thermal power plants and acquisitions. Long-term rose to 22,152 INR by the ending 2012 (FY12), supported by incremental borrowings of 13,357 INR that year alone to finance capacity additions and needs. This growth was driven by low-interest availability and optimistic projections for power , though it exposed the company to risks from execution delays, supply shortages, and regulatory hurdles. Leverage intensified as debt outpaced equity growth, with the climbing to 6.0 in FY12 and further to 8.5 in FY13 amid additional of 3,341 INR. Projections at the time anticipated even higher ratios of 14.8 for FY14 and 23.0 for FY15, reflecting planned capex for ongoing projects despite stretched cash flows and a lengthening cycle. By August 2013, the group's consolidated had swelled to approximately 40,000 INR, leading lenders to mandate a group-wide recast to mitigate default risks from interconnected subsidiaries.
Fiscal YearDebt/Equity Ratio
FY126.0
FY138.5
FY14 (est.)14.8
FY15 (est.)23.0
Sustained high leverage strained debt servicing, as interest expenses increased 130% from FY10 to FY13 while rose only 14%, underscoring causal pressures from rising global interest rates, project cost overruns, and inadequate power purchase agreements. These factors, compounded by economic slowdowns post-2008, rendered the leverage model untenable without asset or operational turnarounds, which proved insufficient to curb accumulation.

Corporate Insolvency and Restructuring

Onset of Financial Distress

In early 2012, Lanco Infratech began experiencing liquidity pressures, exemplified by its subsidiary Power Ltd failing to make a scheduled quarterly repayment of Rs 90 due on January 15. This missed payment highlighted emerging constraints amid aggressive expansion and delays in power project commissioning. By October 2012, CARE downgraded Lanco Infratech to the 'D' category, signifying default, due to the company's inability to meet obligations on time. These events marked the initial phase of financial distress, driven by a combination of slowing economic growth in , rising interest rates, and execution delays in coal-based power plants that strained revenue generation against mounting interest expenses. The company's debt burden, which had ballooned to over 40,000 across group entities by mid-2013, amplified vulnerabilities as lenders grew wary of further exposure. In response, Lanco initiated formal in July 2013 under the Corporate (CDR) mechanism for Rs 7,500 in loans, citing macroeconomic headwinds that impaired project viability and inflows. Lenders approved a CDR package in December 2013 covering Rs 7,700 , incorporating measures like debt extension and interest rate concessions, though this provided only temporary relief as underlying operational challenges persisted.

Debt Restructuring Efforts

In July 2013, Lanco Infratech initiated a corporate (CDR) process for approximately Rs 7,500 in debt, citing economic slowdowns that delayed project completions and revenue inflows. The company projected that financial pressures would persist for 18 to 24 months, with the restructuring aimed at enabling ongoing projects to reach operational status and stabilize cash flows. By December 2013, a of 27 banks approved the of Rs 8,000 in loans to Lanco Infratech, marking one of the largest such deals in the quarter and extending repayment terms while converting portions into equity to ease immediate strains. This CDR package, negotiated over the latter half of 2013, included concessions on interest rates and moratoriums, reflecting banks' efforts to avoid defaults amid the company's aggressive expansion in power and sectors. Subsequent efforts in 2016 involved lenders acquiring a 60% equity stake in exchange for continued support, as Lanco negotiated further recasts and sought strategic investors to infuse capital. As part of these measures, the company planned to divest assets like the 1,200 MW Anpara power project, transferring Rs 5,150 crore in standalone to a new special-purpose vehicle to clean its and attract buyers. However, these repeated restructurings drew scrutiny, with advocacy groups like Moneylife Foundation urging the to probe potential irregularities in the frequent concessions granted to the Lanco group. Despite these initiatives, the efforts failed to avert proceedings initiated by banks in 2017.

Liquidation and Resolution

Insolvency Proceedings

On August 7, 2017, the (NCLT) Hyderabad Bench admitted Lanco Infratech Limited to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the , following a petition filed by Limited citing defaults on loans exceeding Rs 4,600 . The tribunal appointed Y. S. Ramakrishna as the interim resolution professional (IRP), who later became the resolution professional (RP) after verification by the Committee of Creditors (CoC). During CIRP, financial creditors submitted claims totaling 45,263 , while operational creditors claimed 5,389 , reflecting the company's substantial debt burden from leveraged expansions in power and projects. The RP invited expressions of interest from potential resolution applicants and received plans, including a revised proposal from Thriveni Earthmovers Private Limited in early 2018, which offered to infuse equity and manage operations. However, the CoC rejected this plan, citing inadequate recovery rates for creditors and viability concerns amid the company's asset impairments and regulatory hurdles in power projects. The 180-day CIRP period expired on May 4, 2018, without an approved resolution plan, prompting the RP to apply to NCLT under Section 33 of the IBC for , as no viable bidder emerged to meet thresholds of at least 66% approval by value. This outcome highlighted challenges in resolving large infrastructure firms with interlinked subsidiaries and project-specific lenders, where asset values had depreciated due to delays and policy shifts in India's power sector.

Liquidation Order and Process

On August 27, 2018, the (NCLT) Hyderabad Bench issued an order directing the of Lanco Infratech Ltd. under Section 33 of the (IBC), after the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP), initiated on August 7, 2017, expired without an approved resolution plan. The Committee of Creditors (CoC) had rejected a revised resolution plan submitted by Thriveni Earthmovers Pvt Ltd., citing inadequate recovery for financial creditors, leading to the mandatory shift to as no viable bids met the threshold during the extended CIRP period. Savan Godiawala, previously serving as the resolution professional, was appointed as the liquidator to oversee the process, with powers to manage the corporate debtor's assets, verify creditor claims, and maximize value through sales. The liquidation commencement followed standard IBC procedures under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, including a public announcement inviting claims by July 20, 2021, after initial delays and extensions due to legal challenges. The process prioritized asset monetization via auctions and private sales to repay creditors in the statutory waterfall order—first secured financial creditors, then workmen dues, unsecured creditors, and others—while preserving the corporate debtor as a where feasible to enhance recoveries. By March 2024, the liquidator continued beneficial liquidation efforts, including approvals for targeted acquisitions of specific assets amid ongoing applications to the NCLT for extensions and procedural approvals, reflecting the protracted nature of disposing complex holdings. No distribution to equity shareholders was anticipated, given the company's admitted debts exceeding ₹45,000 against realizable assets valued far lower.

Asset Sales and Stakeholder Impacts

The liquidation process of Lanco Infratech Limited, ordered by the (NCLT) on August 28, 2018, initiated the sale of company assets under Section 33 of the , with Savan Godiawala appointed as liquidator to maximize recoveries for creditors. Admitted claims totaled approximately 50,652 , including 45,263 from financial creditors (primarily banks) and 5,389 from operational creditors such as suppliers and employees. Asset disposals proceeded slowly due to the nature of holdings, including power plants and equipment, with realizations hampered by market conditions and legal challenges. By March 2024, the liquidator had recovered 211.41 , against an estimated overall value of 320 . Notable efforts included auctions for stakes in subsidiaries like Lanco Anpara Power Limited, where lenders valued the asset at 819 , and negotiations for a 1,980 MW stranded thermal power plant, which in December 2022 neared sale to four state-run utilities for approximately $365 million (about 3,000 at prevailing rates), though completion details remain limited in . These sales prioritized secured assets, but piecemeal disposals yielded far below claims, reflecting valuation discounts for distressed . Financial creditors, holding priority under the IBC waterfall mechanism, faced recoveries under 0.5% of admitted amounts based on documented realizations, exacerbating losses from prior high exposure to the sector. Operational creditors and workmen received subordinate distributions, often limited to liquidation estate remnants after secured payouts, leading to substantial haircuts. Shareholders' equity was extinguished upon commencement, resulting in total value wipeout as per IBC provisions. The process inflicted broader stakeholder strain, including employee terminations without full severance recovery and supplier insolvencies from unpaid dues, while signaling systemic risks in leveraged (EPC) firms under IBC scrutiny. Low recoveries underscored causal factors like asset and , contrasting with higher IBC averages in resolved cases, and prompted creditor caution toward similar distressed entities.

Legacy and Analysis

Contributions to Infrastructure

Lanco Infratech developed significant power generation capacity, contributing approximately 3,460 MW of operational thermal, gas, and hydroelectric power plants by the mid-2010s, enhancing India's infrastructure amid growing demand. Key projects included the 1,476 MW Kondapalli Combined Cycle gas-fired power plant in , commissioned progressively from 2007 onward, which supplied electricity to multiple state grids. The company also operationalized the 1,200 MW coal-fired power station in , with Unit 1 commissioned in November 2010 and Unit 2 in April 2011, utilizing imported to support regional power needs. In thermal power, Lanco completed the 600 MW Amarkantak project in , featuring two 300 MW units that began operations around 2010, and the 1,200 MW Anpara station in , with two 600 MW subcritical units commissioned by July 2011. Hydroelectric contributions encompassed the 70 MW Budhil project in , adding to renewable capacity. Smaller assets, such as two 5 MW plants, further diversified output. These facilities, developed through (EPC) expertise, integrated into national grids via power purchase agreements, bolstering baseload supply before financial challenges halted expansion. Beyond power, Lanco executed road infrastructure projects under build-operate-transfer models, including six-laning of the 81 km Bangalore-Hoskote-Mudbagal stretch on National Highway 4 and the 82 km Neelamangla-Devihalli stretch on National Highway 48 in Karnataka, achieving financial closure by 2010 to improve connectivity and logistics. In Uttar Pradesh, the firm undertook two-laning with paved shoulders, bridge repairs, and widening on select sections, such as the Aligarh-Kanpur highway segment valued at ₹1,000 crore, enhancing freight corridors. These efforts, part of a broader EPC portfolio spanning highways and urban civil works, facilitated economic activity despite later asset transfers during restructuring. Renewable initiatives included a 15 MW solar photovoltaic park in Gujarat under the state's Phase I policy, operational by 2012, contributing to early diversification in clean energy infrastructure. Overall, Lanco's projects, initiated from its 1996 Kondapalli allocation, exemplified private sector scaling in India's infrastructure boom, delivering tangible assets like power evacuation lines and enhanced roadways before insolvency proceedings in 2017.

Causes of Failure and Broader Implications

Lanco Infratech's arose from aggressive expansion in power and projects during the 2007–2010 boom, leading to debt accumulation exceeding ₹37,526 by 2015, which outpaced revenue generation and asset productivity. The company's portfolio included over 4,700 MW of operational capacity by 2013, but execution faltered due to inadequate fuel linkages for and gas plants, resulting in stalled projects such as 14,305 MW of gas-based capacity and low utilization rates that inflated operational costs. Regulatory delays in approvals, postponed loan disbursements, and high financing expenses compounded liquidity strains, while the lack of firm power purchase agreements (PPAs) left revenues vulnerable to market fluctuations. Post-2012 policy shifts, including reduced viability for merchant power sales and state electricity boards' unpaid dues totaling ₹2,626 , accelerated losses, with the firm reporting a ₹2,260 deficit on ₹7,343 in FY2017 and a negative of ₹466 by March 2015. Over-reliance on debt-financed growth without diversified streams or hedged risks exposed the group to sector downturns, culminating in total liabilities nearing ₹50,000 by 2017. The episode reveals systemic risks in India's sector, where capital-intensive projects amplify leverage vulnerabilities amid shortages, inconsistencies, and execution bottlenecks, often yielding stranded assets like power plants sold at distressed values. Lanco's failed 2017 group resolution under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code exemplifies challenges in unwinding conglomerates, with ten subsidiaries' road and power holdings yielding negligible recovery post-creditor prioritization, leading to by 2018 and underscoring the IBC's limitations for complex entities lacking core viable assets. It signals the imperative for lenders to enforce stricter covenants on security, offtake commitments, and phased , while firms must prioritize operational resilience over rapid scaling to avert similar value erosion in future cycles.

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  53. https://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/lanco-infra-plans-debt-recast/article4960136.ece
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  55. https://m.economictimes.com/industry/indl-goods/svs/metals-mining/consortium-of-banks-recast-lanco-infratechs-rs-8000-cr-debt-biggest-in-quarter/articleshow/27232275.cms
  56. https://ieefa.org/sites/default/files/resources/Lanco-Infratechs-Griffin-Coal-Pty-Ltd_A-Western-Australian-stranded-fossil-fuel-asset_Dec2014.pdf
  57. https://mnacritique.mergersindia.com/news/lenders-gain-control-lanco-infratech-60-per-cent-equity-stake/
  58. https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/lanco-infratech-to-sell-1-200-mw-anpara-power-project-after-restructure-nod-116092700990_1.html
  59. https://www.moneylife.in/article/moneylife-foundation-requests-rbi-to-investigate-frequent-debt-restructuring-of-lanco/36402.html
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  61. https://archive.nclt.gov.in/sites/default/files/old_interm-final_order/hyderabad-2017-other/134.pdf
  62. https://www.ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/21c549c3e3b3a520367efe1c987dac76.pdf
  63. https://nclt.gov.in/gen_pdf.php?filepath=/Efile_Document/ncltdoc/casedoc/3607130000012017/04/Order-Challenge/04_order-Challange_004_171032706627800018065f1851aacf38.pdf
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  65. https://www.firstpost.com/business/nclt-orders-liquidation-of-lanco-infratech-as-creditors-reject-thriveni-earthmovers-revised-resolution-plan-5061481.html
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  67. https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/nclt-orders-liquidation-of-lanco-infratech-appoints-savan-godiawala-as-rp-118082701189_1.html
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  73. https://cfo.economictimes.indiatimes.com/tag/lanco%2Binfratech
  74. https://ibclaw.in/lanco-infratech-ltd-and-anr-v-idbi-bank-ltd-and-ors-nclat-chennai/
  75. https://www.financialexpress.com/business/industry-lanco-infratech-liquidation-bankrupt-epc-firms-under-ibc-feel-heat-1444931/
  76. https://www.fortuneindia.com/long-reads/ibcs-existential-problems/108827
  77. https://lancogroup.com/DynTestformdbe0.html?pageid=4
  78. https://www.power-technology.com/data-insights/power-plant-profile-lanco-kondapalli-combined-cycle-power-plant-india/
  79. https://www.livemint.com/Companies/3MJwTroXN1TQEvQyKPesNL/The-lessons-of-Lanco-Infratech.html
  80. https://www.nbmcw.com/interviews/lanco-infratech-the-most-admired-infratech-enterprise.html
  81. https://m.economictimes.com/industry/indl-goods/svs/construction/lanco-infratech-to-sell-its-roads-business-estimated-to-be-worth-rs-1500-crore/articleshow/13583074.cms
  82. https://www.power-technology.com/data-insights/power-plant-profile-lanco-infratech-limited-solar-park-1-gujarat-solar-policy-phase-i-india/
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