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Missouri Plan
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The Missouri Plan (originally the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, also known as the merit plan, or some variation) is a method for the selection of judges. It originated in Missouri in 1940 and has been adopted by many states of the United States. Similar methods are used in some other countries.

Under the Plan, a non-partisan commission reviews candidates for a judicial vacancy. The commission then sends to the governor a list of candidates considered best qualified. The governor then has sixty days to select a candidate from the list. If the governor does not make a selection within sixty days, the commission makes the selection.

At the next general election after the completion of one year's service, the judge must stand in a retention election. If a majority votes against retention, the judge is removed from office, and the process starts anew.[1] Otherwise, the judge serves out a full term.

As of 2016, 38 states have a form of merit-based selection and retention method for some or all judges.[2] Twenty-five states have a nominating commission to screen all candidates of the state courts of last resort.[2] Eight states have commissions which fill interim vacancies on the highest courts.[2] Twenty states utilize retention elections for judges who wish to serve on highest state courts beyond their initial term.[2]

Nonpartisan judicial commissions under the Plan

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Under the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, a nonpartisan judicial commission reviews applications, interviews candidates and selects a judicial panel. For the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, the Appellate Judicial Commission makes the selection. It is composed of three lawyers elected by members of the Missouri Bar (the organization of all lawyers licensed in this state), three citizens selected by the governor, and the chief justice, who serves as chair. Each of the three geographic districts of the Court of Appeals must be represented by one lawyer and one citizen member on the Appellate Judicial Commission.

Each of the circuit courts in Clay, Greene, Jackson, Platte, and St. Louis Counties, and the city of St. Louis has its own circuit judicial commission. These commissions are composed of the chief judge of the court of appeals district in which the circuit is located, plus two lawyers elected by the bar and two citizens selected by the governor. All of the lawyers and citizens must live within the circuit for which they serve the judicial commission.

History and spread of the plan

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In line with other reforms urged during the Progressive Era, legal scholars put forth ideas in the first decades of the 1900s to reduce or remove the role of politics in the selection of judges, particularly circuit judges with responsibilities over the day-to-day work of the courts. An example of this advocacy is the merit selection program urged by Albert M. Kales in his work Unpopular Government in the United States (1914).[3]

Support for merit selection increased due to the perceived corruption of urban political bosses. Missouri voters adopted the system by initiative petition in November 1940 after several very contentious judicial elections, which were heavily influenced by the political machine of Tom Pendergast.[1] Most associate and circuit judges are elected. However, the state constitution requires such judges in Jackson County (Kansas City) and the city of St. Louis to be selected under the nonpartisan system.[4] Similarly, the voters in Clay and Platte counties (parts of Kansas City), St. Louis county, and Greene County (Springfield) have elected to appoint such judges under the nonpartisan system.[5] After Missouri adopted this method for selecting judges, several other states adopted it, either in full or in part.[1] The plan was put forth by a committee chaired by Luther Ely Smith, "founder" of the Gateway Arch National Park.[6]

The Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan has served as a model for thirty-four other states that use merit selection to fill some or all judicial vacancies.[7] 23 states use the method or a variant for the state supreme court.[8]

Criticism

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The Missouri Plan is not without critics. There are several alternative ways of filling judicial posts that are used in other states. These include direct elections (either partisan or non-partisan), election by the state legislature, or appointment by the governor with advice and consent of the state senate. Missouri had previously used all of these methods before adopting the Nonpartisan Court Plan in 1940.[citation needed]

Excessive influence of attorneys

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Better Courts for Missouri has argued that flaws in the current plan give elite trial lawyers too much control over judicial selection. According to the organization's executive director, "they are a small, insular group who have their interests. They have a lot to add to the process, but we don't think they should dominate the process - (and they) are in no way accountable to Missourians."[9]

Professor Stephen Ware of the University of Kansas wrote about the Missouri Plan, "As the bar is an elite segment of society, states that give lawyers more power than their fellow citizens are rightly described as elitist."[10] Ware continued:

...even commission systems have democratic legitimacy insofar as members of the nominating commission are appointed by popularly elected officials. Democratic principles are violated, however, when members of the commission are selected by 'a minority of the persons, i.e. lawyers in their area'. This, of course, is the core of the Missouri Plan – allowing the bar to select some of the commission and then declining to offset that bar power with confirmation by the senate or other popularly elected body. And it is this core that deprives the Missouri Plan of democratic legitimacy.[10]

Low diversity of the Commission

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Elbert Walton, a disbarred lawyer and former Missouri State legislator, believed that the plan had a negative effect on African Americans. "It is unfair that lawyers elect judges ... It disenfranchises people and it especially disenfranchises black people."[11] At a press conference in February, 2008, Walton accused Missouri Bar President Charlie Harris, an African-American,[12] of ignoring the Missouri Plan's effect on black people. Walton noted that no African American had ever been elected to one of the Missouri Bar's three slots on the Appellate Judicial Commission, though many have been appointed judges, and suggested that Mr. Harris "ought to be ashamed of himself" for supporting such a plan.[13]

Governor Phil Bredesen of Tennessee has criticized that state's version of the Missouri Plan for similar reasons.[14] Despite criticisms from elected politicians such as Walton and Bredesen, no published research or data suggests that Missouri Plan states have less judicial diversity compared to non-Missouri Plan states.

Political interference

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The Wall Street Journal wrote "If the recent slugfests have proven anything, it's that Missouri's courts are every bit as hung up in politics as they are in other states. The difference is that in Missouri the process happens behind closed doors."[15]

Similarly, Professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick of Vanderbilt University has argued that politics are undoubtedly a part of judicial selection in Missouri Plan states, writing, "In short, I am skeptical that merit selection removes politics from judicial selection. Rather, merit selection may simply move the politics of judicial selection into closer alignment with the ideological preferences of the bar."[16] Fitzpatrick notes that "…if we are willing to accept the notions that lawyers care about the outcomes of judicial decisions and that these outcomes are correlated with judges' ideological preferences, then we might expect merit commissions to select judges who share the ideological preferences of the bar rather than those of the public."[16]

Tennessee governor Phil Bredesen has made similar complaints. He remarked, "I think [the nominating commissioners] have been vastly too political in their selection process. And what they are supposed to do is give you the best candidates in the ideal world."[17]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Missouri Plan

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from Grokipedia
The Missouri Plan, formally the Nonpartisan Court Plan, is a merit-based judicial selection process in which a bipartisan commission of lawyers and lay citizens evaluates applicants, nominates typically three qualified candidates to the based on character, , and legal , and the appoints one to fill the vacancy, with the then serving a one-year probationary term before facing a noncompetitive "yes/no" retention election by voters at the end of full terms thereafter. Originating in , where voters adopted it via in 1940 to counter entrenched exemplified by the machine's influence over elections, the system applies to the state's appellate courts and trial courts in major urban circuits including , Kansas City, Clay, Platte, and Greene counties. The plan balances executive appointment with merit screening and periodic public veto power through retention votes, which historically result in high approval rates for incumbents but enable rare removals for perceived or unfitness. Adopted in whole or part by roughly two-thirds of U.S. states for appellate or judges, it represents a hybrid reform intended to curb partisanship and special-interest capture prevalent in pure elective or legislative systems. Proponents credit it with fostering and competence by prioritizing professional evaluation over electoral fundraising or ideological appeals, as reinforced in by a 2008 addition of evaluations informing voters. Critics, however, argue it entrenches unaccountable elite control—particularly through lawyer-heavy commissions that may reflect bar associations' prevailing views—diverging from direct and enabling insulation from electoral consequences for controversial rulings, prompting repeated Republican-led challenges in to shift toward governor-nominated appointments with senate confirmation. Empirical comparisons yield mixed findings: while some analyses link merit systems to marginally higher quality metrics like bar exam or citation rates, broader studies find no consistent edge in or decision uniformity over elected judiciaries, with retention elections exerting limited discipline akin to effects.

Overview of the Selection Process

Core Mechanism and Steps

The Missouri Plan, formally known as the Nonpartisan Court Plan, employs a process for judges, combining nonpartisan judicial nominating commissions, gubernatorial appointment from a shortlist, and periodic public retention elections to balance expertise, executive input, and voter accountability. This system aims to prioritize qualifications such as legal , , , and over partisan or electoral popularity. It applies statewide to the Missouri Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, as well as to circuit and associate circuit judges in designated urban jurisdictions including Jackson, Clay, Platte, Greene, and counties and city. The process initiates upon a judicial vacancy, such as from , , or term expiration. The relevant nominating commission—either the Missouri Appellate Judicial Commission for appellate courts or local circuit commissions—publicly solicits applications from qualified attorneys meeting statutory criteria, including bar membership and minimum practice years. The commission, comprising a mix of lawyers elected by the bar, lay citizens appointed by the , and sometimes a presiding , reviews applications, conducts public interviews, and evaluates candidates on merit without partisan considerations. It then forwards a panel of three nominees to the , selected strictly based on professional competence and ethical fitness. The governor must appoint one nominee within 60 days; failure to do so empowers the commission to make the appointment directly. The appointee assumes the bench immediately and serves an initial probationary period of at least one year. Following this, the judge faces a noncompetitive retention at the next , where voters decide by simple majority "yes" or "no" whether to retain based on performance evaluations often provided by bar associations surveying attorneys, jurors, and litigants. If retained, the judge serves a full term—12 years for appellate positions or 6 years for circuit judges (4 years for associate circuit)—after which another retention vote occurs. Rejection triggers a new vacancy and restarts the nomination cycle. This sequence ensures commissions filter for merit while allowing gubernatorial within vetted options and ultimate power, with historical showing retention rates exceeding 90% since implementation, indicating broad voter approval of commission-selected candidates.

Scope of Application in Missouri

The Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan applies statewide to all appellate judges, encompassing the seven judges of the and the 28 judges across the three districts of the Missouri Court of Appeals. This includes vacancies filled through by respective judicial commissions, gubernatorial appointment from a panel of three to five nominees, and subsequent yes/no retention elections after initial terms of 12 years for judges and 10 years for Court of Appeals judges. At the trial court level, the plan governs selection for circuit judges and associate circuit judges exclusively in designated urban circuits with higher caseloads and populations, including the 16th Circuit (Jackson County, encompassing Kansas City), the 21st Circuit ( County), the 22nd Circuit ( City), the 6th Circuit (parts including Clay and Platte Counties), and the 31st Circuit (Greene County, encompassing Springfield). In these circuits, commissions nominate candidates based on merit criteria such as legal experience, integrity, and judicial temperament, with governors appointing from the list and judges facing retention votes after six-year terms for circuit judges and four-year terms for associate circuit judges. This targeted application, established under Article V of the as amended in and subsequent statutes, covers approximately 45% of Missouri's circuit judgeships while excluding smaller rural circuits, where partisan elections select circuit judges and nonpartisan elections select associate circuit judges. The plan's scope reflects a hybrid judicial selection system designed to balance merit-based appointment with voter accountability in high-volume jurisdictions, avoiding elections for appellate roles to insulate them from partisan pressures. As of 2024, this framework has been consistently applied without major constitutional changes, though retention elections occur for all covered judges at staggered intervals aligned with their terms.

Variations and Exceptions

The Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan applies selectively within the state's judiciary, creating inherent exceptions for courts outside its designated scope. It governs for all seven justices, seventeen Court of Appeals judges across three districts, and circuit judges in urban jurisdictions including Jackson County (Kansas City area), Greene County (Springfield), Clay and Platte Counties (Kansas City suburbs), and the City of , where local voters approved its adoption. In contrast, the majority of Missouri's forty-six circuit courts—predominantly rural—and all associate circuit courts, which handle preliminary matters like small claims and misdemeanors, rely on partisan elections for six-year terms, with governors filling vacancies via temporary appointments subject to election. This hybrid structure reflects the Plan's origins as a targeted for high-profile urban and appellate benches perceived as vulnerable to political influence, rather than a statewide mandate. Variations arise in commission composition and nomination tailored to court level. The statewide Appellate Judicial Commission, comprising five members (three selected by the supreme court—two laypersons and one —and two elected by the bar), handles appellate and vacancies with a panel of three nominees. Local circuit commissions in adopting jurisdictions mirror this balance but operate independently, with non-lawyers appointed by the and elected by local bar associations, enabling jurisdiction-specific adaptations while preserving merit criteria. Procedural flexibility exists if fewer than three qualified candidates emerge, allowing commissions to submit two nominees, though governors must appoint from the list without independent additions. Further exceptions pertain to administrative roles and lower courts. Presiding judges in multi-judge circuits are elected by peer circuit judges for renewable two-year terms, bypassing the commission and gubernatorial process to facilitate internal . Municipal judges, numbering over 600 across cities and villages, fall outside the Plan entirely, with selection dictated by local charters—typically mayoral appointment, council confirmation, or nonpartisan —prioritizing municipal over state merit standards. Circuits may also petition to adopt or revert from the Plan via voter , as Greene County did in 1970 and County in 1972, introducing potential dynamism absent in uniformly elective systems. These deviations underscore the Plan's partial implementation, balancing merit safeguards against electoral accountability in less urban contexts.

Historical Development

Origins in Response to Political Corruption (Pre-1940)

In the early 20th century, Missouri's judicial selection shifted toward partisan elections following the 1848 constitutional amendment influenced by Jacksonian Democracy, which prioritized popular sovereignty but exposed courts to political pressures. By the 1930s, this system facilitated widespread corruption, particularly under the influence of Kansas City Democratic boss Thomas J. Pendergast, whose machine controlled local and state politics through vote-buying, patronage, and intimidation. Pendergast's organization, dominant from the 1920s to the late 1930s, extended to the judiciary by sponsoring candidates loyal to the machine, resulting in courts packed with unqualified or politically beholden judges rather than those selected for merit. For instance, between 1918 and 1941, only two Missouri Supreme Court judges achieved re-election, reflecting high turnover driven by partisan machinations rather than judicial performance. A pivotal unfolded in the mid-1930s when Pendergast, angered by a ruling adverse to his interests—specifically a decision upholding a lower court's invalidation of fraudulent voting records in his favor—targeted Justice Henry Deppe for defeat in the 1938 election. Despite Lloyd C. Stark's support for Deppe, Pendergast's machine mobilized resources to back opponent Harry Truman's ally, illustrating how electoral politics subordinated to boss control. This episode, amid broader revelations of Pendergast's and leading to his 1939 federal conviction, eroded public confidence in elected judges, as courts appeared as extensions of corrupt political networks rather than impartial arbiters. Empirical evidence of systemic issues included documented vote-buying in judicial races and the machine's dominance over gubernatorial appointments, which further entrenched . Reform momentum built through the Missouri Bar Association, inspired by national critiques like Roscoe Pound's 1906 address decrying elective judiciaries for prioritizing politics over competence. In response to Pendergast-era abuses, bar leaders in the late drafted a proposal involving nonpartisan commissions to nominate qualified candidates, aiming to insulate judges from electoral while preserving via retention votes. This framework emerged from first-hand observations of machine-driven judicial hacks, with reformers arguing that empirical failures of elections—evidenced by low incumbency success and scandal-plagued benches—necessitated a causal shift toward qualification-focused processes to restore public trust. The proposal gained traction as Pendergast's downfall exposed the judiciary's vulnerabilities, setting the stage for voter approval in 1940.

Adoption via Constitutional Amendment (1940)

In response to widespread dissatisfaction with partisan judicial elections dominated by political machines in urban areas like and Kansas City, reformers pursued a to implement a nonpartisan merit selection system. The initiative process was utilized to bypass the legislature, gathering sufficient signatures—equivalent to 8% of the prior gubernatorial vote in two-thirds of —to qualify the measure for the . On November 5, 1940, voters approved the amendment, known as the Nonpartisan Selection of Judges Court Plan, by a plurality of approximately 90,000 votes. This made the first state to enshrine such a hybrid merit-selection and retention system in its , replacing direct partisan elections for appellate judges with a process involving nonpartisan commissions to nominate candidates for gubernatorial appointment, followed by yes/no retention referendums. The amendment's adoption reflected public demand for judicial independence amid prewar political scandals, though opponents argued it diminished democratic accountability by shifting influence to bar associations and commissions. Implementation began promptly, with the Missouri Supreme Court tasked with initial oversight, and the plan's framework prohibiting judges from engaging in partisan politics to safeguard impartiality. Subsequent retention elections in 1942 affirmed the system's early viability, as voters retained appointees without significant opposition.

Expansion to Other States and National Influence

Following its implementation in Missouri via in 1940, the Missouri Plan emerged as a for merit-based judicial selection amid widespread concerns over partisan elections and influence in state judiciaries. Advocacy from groups like the American Judicature Society propelled its diffusion, positioning it as a nonpartisan alternative emphasizing qualifications over electoral popularity. By the mid-20th century, states began adapting the model, with adopting a similar system in 1956 as the first to follow Missouri's lead. Over subsequent decades, the plan's core elements—nomination by independent commissions, gubernatorial appointment from a shortlist, and periodic retention elections—spread to additional jurisdictions, often in response to scandals or reform movements targeting judicial politicization. As of 2024, 21 states plus the District of Columbia utilize assisted appointment variants for their supreme courts, including , , , , and ; broader application to intermediate appellate or trial courts occurs in 22 states and the District of Columbia. More than 30 states overall have incorporated some form of merit selection, covering roughly two-thirds of the nation for selecting at least certain judges, though with modifications such as legislative approval in states like or limited scope to appellate levels in others like . Nationally, the Missouri Plan has shaped debates on , serving as a benchmark endorsed by legal organizations for prioritizing merit and insulating judges from pressures inherent in elections. Its framework influenced proposals for hybrid systems, such as performance evaluations integrated into retention processes, as seen in evolutions like Missouri's 2008 O'Connor Judicial Selection Plan update. Despite this reach, adoption has not been uniform, with resistance in states favoring direct elections or pure gubernatorial appointments, reflecting ongoing tensions between accountability and expertise in judicial governance.

Structure and Function of Judicial Commissions

Composition and Appointment of Commission Members

The Missouri Plan establishes nonpartisan judicial commissions to nominate candidates for judicial vacancies, with distinct compositions for appellate courts and certain circuit courts. For vacancies on the or the Courts of Appeals, the Appellate Judicial Commission consists of seven members: the of the serving as chairperson, three attorneys elected by members of The Missouri Bar, and three non-attorneys appointed by the governor. The three attorney members and three non-attorney members each represent one of Missouri's three congressional districts, ensuring geographic diversity, and serve staggered six-year terms to limit any single governor's influence. The 's role as chairperson lasts for the duration of their tenure as . Circuit-level commissions, which handle nominations for circuit judges in designated urban areas such as City, Jackson County (Kansas City), and others specified in the Constitution, comprise five members: the chief judge of the relevant court of appeals district as chairperson, two attorneys elected by The Missouri Bar from that circuit, and two non-attorneys appointed by the governor from residents of the circuit. These members also serve staggered terms, typically six years for attorneys and non-attorneys, with the presiding judge's term aligned to their judicial position. No more than four members of any commission, including the chairperson, may belong to the same , enforcing a nonpartisan balance as mandated by Article V, Section 25(d) of the Constitution. Appointments emphasize merit and independence, with bar-elected attorneys required to be licensed to practice in Missouri and non-attorneys selected without formal legal qualifications beyond residency. Vacancies on commissions are filled by the original appointing body—the Missouri Bar for attorneys or the for non-attorneys—for the remainder of the unexpired term. Commissions convene as needed to review applications, conduct interviews, and submit a list of three to five qualified nominees to the within 60 days of a vacancy notice, without public disclosure of deliberations to protect candidate evaluations. This structure, adopted via in 1940, aims to blend professional legal expertise with public representation while insulating the process from direct partisan control.

Nomination Procedures and Criteria

The nonpartisan judicial commissions responsible for nominations under the Missouri Plan—such as the Missouri Appellate Judicial Commission for appellate courts or circuit-level commissions for specified courts—initiate the process upon notification of a vacancy. These commissions publicly solicit applications from qualified attorneys, reviewing submitted materials to identify candidates meeting basic statutory eligibility, including licensure to practice law in , U.S. citizenship, and residency requirements varying by court level (e.g., at least five years of practice for circuit judges). Commissions evaluate applicants through a merit-based assessment emphasizing qualifications over political affiliations or campaign contributions. Key criteria include character, relevant judicial or legal , strengths, legal and reasoning abilities, , and judicial , with input from peer judges on skills and suitability. Background checks and public interviews—required for many circuit commissions—are employed to verify and competence, ensuring nominees demonstrate a strong legal reputation without reliance on partisan connections. After deliberations, governed by rules established under oversight and subject to open-meetings laws, the commission submits a shortlist of three nominees deemed the most qualified to the . This panel must consist of individuals the commission judges capable of performing judicial duties effectively and independently; the appoints one within 60 days, or the commission's top choice fills the role by default.

Role of the Governor and Bar Associations

In the Missouri Plan, the plays a pivotal role in the judicial appointment process by selecting a from a list of three nominees submitted by the relevant nonpartisan judicial commission, ensuring the executive branch's input while limiting unilateral power through the commission's merit-based screening. For appellate vacancies on the or Courts of Appeals, the must make the appointment within 60 days of receiving the nominations from the Appellate Judicial Commission; failure to do so results in the commission itself filling the position. Similarly, for vacancies in jurisdictions governed by the plan—such as City and County, Jackson County, Clay and Platte Counties—the appoints from the nominees provided by the circuit judicial commission. This mechanism, established by in , aims to incorporate gubernatorial discretion grounded in the commission's vetted candidates, with historical data showing governors typically appointing from the list without frequent overrides. The also influences commission composition by appointing non- (layperson) members, fostering a balance against potential lawyer dominance. The seven-member Appellate Judicial Commission includes three laypersons—one from each of Missouri's three geographic appellate —appointed by the to six-year staggered terms. Circuit judicial commissions, consisting of five members each, feature two laypersons appointed by the alongside two lawyers and the chief judge of the relevant appeals . These appointments prevent any single from controlling a majority, as terms are staggered and no more than one layperson per serves concurrently on the appellate body. Bar associations, particularly the integrated Missouri Bar, contribute by electing lawyer members to the commissions, embedding professional legal expertise in the nomination process. For the Appellate Judicial Commission, the Missouri Bar elects three lawyers—one per appellate district—to six-year terms, ensuring representation from practicing attorneys without gubernatorial veto. Circuit commissions likewise include two lawyers elected by the Missouri Bar, selected through processes governed by Missouri Supreme Court rules, such as petitions and elections among bar members. This election mechanism, dating to the plan's adoption, leverages the bar's collective knowledge of judicial qualifications, with special elections held as needed to fill vacancies, as occurred on June 4, 2025, for multiple circuits. Critics note this structure grants significant influence to the legal profession, potentially prioritizing bar insiders over broader public input.

Purported Advantages and Empirical Support

Promotion of Judicial Merit and Independence

The Missouri Plan promotes judicial merit by establishing nonpartisan nominating commissions that evaluate candidates based on professional qualifications, experience, and , rather than political affiliations or campaign fundraising. These commissions, composed of lawyers, non-lawyers, and judges, screen applicants and forward a short list of three to five nominees to the governor, who must appoint from that panel without additional veto power over the selections. This process, first implemented in via on November 5, 1940, was designed to prioritize competence over , drawing from Progressive-era reforms aimed at curbing in elective systems where judges often relied on party machines for nomination. The has endorsed merit selection principles akin to the Missouri Plan since 1937, arguing they yield higher-caliber jurists by institutionalizing objective criteria. Judicial independence is advanced through structural safeguards that limit executive dominance and electoral pressures. Commission terms are staggered to prevent any single from controlling a majority of appointments, as seen in Missouri's appellate judicial commission where gubernatorial appointees serve limited durations. Subsequent retention elections, held after an initial term (typically one year for trial judges and full terms for appellate), allow voters to approve or remove judges without partisan opponents or campaign expenditures, theoretically insulating decisions from short-term political incentives. Proponents, including legal scholars, contend this hybrid insulates judges from the fundraising and ideological signaling demands of competitive elections, fostering rulings based on law rather than swings. Historical evidence supports reduced overt partisanship post-adoption, with experiencing fewer reversal rates for political favoritism compared to pre-1940 elective scandals. Empirical studies provide mixed but indicative support for these aims. Event history analyses show merit selection adoption correlates with stronger legal professions and path-dependent reforms in states seeking to enhance judicial quality, with 24 states applying it to courts of last resort by the 1970s, reflecting perceived efficacy in merit promotion. Ideological voting data from (2012–2021) reveal moderate gubernatorial influence, with appointed judges showing less partisan divergence (difference score of 0.1289) than in purely executive-dominated systems, suggesting partial success in balancing with . However, retention elections have not fully eliminated sensitivity to public preferences in decision-making, as evidenced by strategic shifts in rulings near election cycles. Overall, while direct comparisons of judge quality remain sparse, the plan's design and diffusion indicate it mitigates some electoral distortions without proven inferiority to alternatives.

Empirical Studies on Decision Quality and Impartiality

Empirical evaluations of decision quality under merit selection systems like the Missouri Plan have produced conflicting results. A study of supreme court judges from 1947 to 1994, using forward citations of judicial opinions as a measure of , found that shifts from partisan elections to merit selection increased citation rates for post-reform judges, indicating higher- decisions less influenced by partisan pressures. This metric, validated against independent assessments of opinion influence, suggests merit processes select for more impactful judicial output compared to partisan contests. In contrast, an analysis of 2,919 appealed cases in from to mid-2014 revealed lower reversal rates for decisions by elected judges than merit-selected ones, with elected judges exhibiting an 87.3% affirmation rate versus 80.7% for merit-selected, translating to a 4.6 higher probability of affirmation after controlling for case and judge factors. Using multivariate models, this challenged assumptions of inherent superiority in merit systems for performance metrics like error reduction. Regarding impartiality, peer-reviewed research consistently shows that elected judges in partisan or nonpartisan systems rule in favor of campaign contributors' interests at statistically significant rates, with one nationwide study of cases finding such effects in decisions involving donor-linked parties. Merit selection mitigates this by limiting demands, as commissions screen candidates without large-scale campaigns, potentially enhancing neutrality toward special interests. However, internal analyses of merit commissions indicate partisan influences persist in nominations and choices, with ideological alignment to the appointing affecting selections, though direct links to biased rulings remain underexplored empirically. Bar associations' dominant role in commissions—often comprising a of members—raises concerns of elite legal , but quantitative studies on resulting decisional are scarce, with available pointing to qualified selections tempered by and partisan skews in the process rather than overt ideological distortion in outcomes. Overall, while merit systems appear to curb donor-driven partiality evident in elections, they do not eliminate political elements, and broader ideological effects require further rigorous testing beyond selection-stage proxies.

Evidence from Retention Elections

In states utilizing the Missouri Plan or similar merit selection systems with retention elections, empirical data indicate exceptionally high retention rates, which proponents cite as evidence that the process selects competent judges who sustain public trust without succumbing to short-term political pressures. Between 1964 and 2006, across ten states employing retention elections, 6,306 judges appeared on ballots, with only 56 (less than 1%) failing to secure retention. In Missouri itself, no state supreme court justice has ever been defeated in a retention election since the system's adoption. More recent figures reinforce this pattern: from 2008 onward, 152 of 155 (98%) justices facing retention in relevant states were retained, outperforming the 90% incumbent win rate (176 of 196) in contested elections across other selection methods. Yes-vote margins in these elections have consistently exceeded 75% over the past several decades, with historical averages ranging from 69% in 1990 to 85% in 1964, and mean affirmative support holding above 75% in the decade prior to 2007. Such outcomes are argued to demonstrate the 's effectiveness in fostering , as defeats remain rare and typically tied to extraordinary controversies rather than routine political accountability—evident in isolated cases like the 2010 , where three justices lost retention following a decision, but no comparable mass ousters have occurred in . Proponents, including state court analyses, attribute these high retention levels to the merit-focused nomination process, which prioritizes qualifications over partisanship, thereby yielding judges whose performance aligns with voter expectations of and competence. This contrasts with higher turnover in partisan or nonpartisan contested elections, where ideological campaigns more frequently influence results.

Criticisms and Counterarguments

The Missouri Plan's judicial nominating commissions typically include a majority or significant portion of members selected by state bar associations, granting these professional organizations substantial influence over screening and nomination. For the Appellate Judicial Commission in , three of the seven members are lawyers elected by The Bar, one from each congressional district, while the appoints three non-lawyers and the Supreme Court appoints a as chair. This structure empowers bar associations, which represent a self-selected elite segment of the , to shape the pool of nominees before gubernatorial review, often prioritizing aligned with bar-endorsed criteria such as professional experience and temperament over broader societal perspectives. Critics contend that this reliance on bar-selected lawyers fosters , as the wields disproportionate authority in a process ostensibly designed for , sidelining input from non-lawyers and the general electorate. describes Missouri Plan states as "elitist" for granting lawyers greater power relative to lay citizens, with commissions functioning as insulated bodies that reinforce professional norms rather than democratic . Empirical analysis of merit selection systems reveals that bar-dominated commissions tend to nominate candidates whose ideologies mirror the bar's, which empirical studies link to more liberal voting patterns in areas like , where judges in merit-selected states rule against defendants at higher rates than in elected systems—suggesting an embedded favoring plaintiff-oriented (often trial lawyer-aligned) outcomes. This dynamic, opponents argue, entrenches legal elites' preferences, as bar associations historically advocate for expansive judicial interpretations that align with their members' economic interests, such as robust liability doctrines. Further scrutiny highlights the bar's role in perpetuating influence through trial lawyer networks, which dominate certain commissions and nominations, leading to accusations of undue sway over judicial impartiality. In , reform proposals in the 2000s and sought to reduce bar-appointed seats from four to fewer, citing evidence that such configurations amplify factional legal interests over neutral merit. Proponents of elective alternatives, including analyses from conservative policy groups, assert that this lawyer-centric model consolidates power among unelected administrators, rendering the judiciary less responsive to public values and more beholden to professional guilds. While defenders claim bar involvement ensures expertise, detractors counter that it violates democratic principles by allowing a minority profession—lawyers comprise less than 1% of the —to vet and effectively pre-approve judges without direct electoral checks.

Insufficient Public Accountability and Insulation from Electorate

Critics of the Missouri Plan argue that its structure inherently limits direct public influence over judicial selection, thereby fostering insufficient accountability to the electorate. Under the system, judicial nominating commissions—composed primarily of lawyers and non-lawyer appointees selected by the and bar associations—operate with closed deliberations, excluding public input in the vetting and shortlisting of candidates. This process, intended to prioritize merit over politics, results in selections dominated by legal elites rather than reflecting broader voter preferences, as commissions often reflect the ideological leanings of the organized bar, which tends toward progressive views despite Missouri's conservative electorate. For instance, an analysis of Missouri Supreme Court nominees since 1995 found that 87 percent had donated predominantly to Democratic candidates, even as the state consistently supported Republican presidential and gubernatorial candidates. The plan's retention elections, held after an initial term, provide a nominal check but fail to deliver meaningful in practice. These yes/no votes on incumbent judges occur without opponents, leading to overwhelmingly affirmative outcomes; national data on merit selection states, including , show incumbents retained approximately 99 percent of the time, with removal rates near zero due to low voter awareness, minimal campaigning, and lack of incentives for judges to engage the public. In specifically, no appellate judge has been ousted via retention election since the plan's adoption in 1940, insulating jurists from electoral consequences for controversial rulings, such as those diverging from public sentiment on issues like or property rights. This dynamic, proponents of elective systems contend, severs the judiciary from democratic feedback loops present in partisan or nonpartisan elections, where judges must actively court voter support and face direct competition. Furthermore, the system's reliance on bar associations for commissioner appointments exacerbates insulation, as these groups prioritize professional norms over public oversight, often shielding judges from for performance issues. Reform efforts, such as and ballot initiatives to replace the Missouri Plan with elections, highlighted voter frustration with this "secrecy and lack of ," though they failed amid opposition from legal establishments. While defenders claim retention provides periodic review without partisan taint, empirical patterns suggest it functions more as than robust , allowing judges to operate with minimal responsiveness to shifting public priorities.

Challenges to Diversity and Alleged Political Subversion

Critics of the Missouri Plan contend that its reliance on nominating commissions, which include a of lawyers selected by the state , perpetuates underrepresentation of racial minorities and women on the bench, as these commissions tend to favor candidates from established legal networks that lack demographic diversity. Missouri's ranks 32nd nationally in overall diversity metrics, with limited racial and gender representation compared to states employing more politically competitive selection methods. Empirical analyses indicate that merit selection systems akin to the Missouri Plan yield lower minority judicial appointment rates than partisan or nonpartisan elections, where voter outreach and campaign dynamics incentivize diverse recruitment to build electoral coalitions. The bar association's dominant role in commission composition exacerbates these issues, as its membership historically skews toward urban, white, male attorneys, limiting the pool of nominees from underrepresented backgrounds and entrenching control over selections. For instance, Missouri's commissions have been classified in categories of high bar influence and , correlating with slower progress toward gender and racial parity on appellate courts relative to gubernatorial appointment systems without strong bar veto power. Proponents of argue this structure discourages applications from diverse lawyers wary of bar-centric vetting processes that prioritize insider credentials over broader merit indicators like ties or varied experience. Allegations of political subversion center on claims that commissions, influenced by the bar's perceived ideological leanings, systematically filter out conservative-leaning nominees preferred by Republican governors, thereby undermining the elected executive's mandate. In 2017, the Missouri Appellate Judicial Commission drew criticism from Republican lawmakers for submitting slates viewed as insufficiently aligned with conservative priorities, prompting renewed legislative pushes to dilute bar control and enhance gubernatorial input. Observers, including those skeptical of bar neutrality, attribute this to a structural where lawyer-majority commissions prioritize candidates exhibiting progressive judicial philosophies, as evidenced by patterns in nominee ideologies that diverge from statewide voter preferences in and rulings. Such subversion claims gain traction from historical bar resistance to reforms aimed at ideological balance, with commissions occasionally rejecting or sidelining nominees based on perceived conservatism, leading to accusations that the plan insulates a left-leaning legal establishment from democratic accountability. Retention elections, intended as a check, rarely challenge these outcomes due to low voter turnout and information asymmetry, allowing appointed judges to retain positions despite alleged mismatches with public sentiment on issues like property rights or sentencing. While bar defenders emphasize nonpartisan merit, empirical retention data shows declining approval rates amid perceptions of elite capture, fueling demands for hybrid systems incorporating direct public or legislative oversight to counterbalance bar influence.

Comparative Failures Relative to Elective Systems

The Missouri Plan's retention elections, intended to provide periodic public oversight, have historically resulted in rejection rates below 1%, rendering them an ineffective mechanism for holding judges accountable compared to contested elections in elective systems, where incumbents face direct competition and can be displaced for unpopular rulings or policy divergences. For instance, over a 25-year period in , only 0.7% of judges faced voter rejection, insulating incumbents from electoral consequences even amid controversial decisions, whereas partisan or nonpartisan elections in other states have seen incumbents defeated at rates exceeding 10% in competitive races. This contrasts with elective systems, which enforce responsiveness to community standards through voter scrutiny, as evidenced by cases where elected judges adjusted sentencing patterns post-election to align with public safety concerns. Empirical analyses indicate no measurable superiority in judicial quality or under merit selection like the Missouri Plan relative to elective methods, undermining claims of enhanced decision-making while forgoing the democratic vetting inherent in elections. Studies from the onward, including those by (1964) and Watson and Downing (1969), found negligible differences in judicial performance metrics such as case reversal rates or sentencing consistency across selection systems, suggesting the Missouri Plan's commission-based screening does not yield empirically verifiable improvements. In elective states, competitive campaigns compel candidates to demonstrate qualifications publicly, fostering transparency absent in opaque nominating commissions, where undisclosed deliberations can perpetuate insider preferences over merit-based public evaluation. The Missouri Plan exacerbates by empowering bar associations and legal professionals—who often exhibit ideological skews toward moderation or liberalism—to dominate candidate slates, sidelining broader electoral dynamics that better reflect diverse electorate preferences in elective systems. Critics, including Republicans in legislative pushes since , argue this structure enables bar veto power over gubernatorial choices, as seen in resistance to conservative nominees despite Republican governorships, a dynamic less prevalent in partisan elections where party primaries and general votes incorporate ideological pluralism. Elective systems, by contrast, distribute influence across and voters, mitigating the risk of from legal elites, whose professional incentives may prioritize institutional continuity over public . This failure is compounded by the Plan's substitution of "bar " for overt electoral , preserving politicization without the corrective force of and opposition campaigns.

Contemporary Impact and Debates

Outcomes and Statistics from Missouri Implementation

Missouri's implementation of the since 1940 has produced consistently high retention rates in nonpartisan retention elections, with judges typically receiving yes votes exceeding 70% on average across appellate and circuit levels. For instance, between the plan's adoption and 2012, fewer than 1% of judges standing for retention were defeated, with notable exceptions including the 1992 ouster of three Kansas City circuit judges amid local allegations and the 2008 non-retention of two circuit judges following citing inefficiency. Recent evaluations, such as those for the 2024 cycle by the , have overwhelmingly recommended retention for eligible judges based on surveys of lawyers and non-lawyers assessing qualities like legal ability and impartiality, with average scores above 80% positive. Empirical studies on judicial performance metrics under the Missouri Plan reveal no clear superiority in decision quality or compared to elective systems. Analyses of rates by higher courts show Missouri supreme and decisions affirmed at rates comparable to those in partisan election states, around 80-85% affirmance overall, without statistically significant advantages attributable to merit selection. A 2009 evaluation by the Show-Me Institute, reviewing objective indicators like citation rates and bar exam performance of nominees, concluded that Missouri's system does not yield statistically higher-quality judges than alternatives, though it avoids some partisan extremes. Broader cross-state , including examinations of state supreme courts, finds elected judges sometimes exhibit lower rates than merit-selected ones, challenging claims of inherent merit-based excellence. Diversity outcomes have lagged, with nominating commissions producing panels dominated by white male candidates from elite urban law firms; for example, data from Missouri commissions indicate that until the , over 80% of nominees were white males, slower than diversification trends in some elective states. Public accountability remains limited by high retention thresholds and low voter engagement, as evidenced by retention election turnout often below 50% of participation, suggesting insulation from electorate pressures except in localized scandals. Limited polling on the plan's effectiveness shows general voter support for retention but little data isolating causal impacts on judicial outcomes, with reform challenges like the 2012 Better Courts initiative failing amid claims of insufficient evidence for .

Recent Reform Proposals and Challenges (2020s)

In late 2024, President Pro Tem-designate Cindy O'Laughlin (R-Shelbina) introduced Senate Joint Resolution 3 (SJR 3), a proposed to replace the Missouri Plan's merit-based appointment process for and Court of Appeals judges with nonpartisan popular elections. Under the proposal, judges would serve six-year terms, with a limit of two consecutive terms, and candidates could declare their views on legal and political issues without pledging outcomes in specific cases. The would be elected statewide, while other judges would be chosen from districts aligned with the appeals courts, preserving a seven-member court. O'Laughlin argued the change would empower voters to select judges aligned with 's conservative values, criticizing the current system as an "insider-driven process" insulated from public accountability. The reform effort gained momentum amid Republican frustrations with recent Missouri Supreme Court rulings, including a 4-3 decision on September 10, 2024, upholding an abortion rights ballot initiative against legislative challenges. Proponents, including O'Laughlin, contended that the Missouri Plan's nominating commissions—dominated by legal elites—enable judges to override voter or legislative intent without sufficient democratic checks. A parallel House proposal, HJR 5 sponsored by Rep. Cathy Jo Loy (R), similarly sought to shift selection methods, reflecting broader legislative interest in curbing perceived judicial overreach during the 2025 session. Opposition emerged swiftly from the legal community and some Republicans, who warned that nonpartisan elections could politicize the , invite high campaign spending—as seen in Wisconsin's 2023 race costing over $45 million—and erode public trust in impartial rulings. Critics like former Judge Michael Wolff argued that direct elections risk transforming courts into partisan battlegrounds, potentially mirroring federal confirmation disputes. Groups such as the of Metropolitan defended the Missouri Plan in , emphasizing its role in minimizing through commission screening and retention votes. Retention elections themselves faced scrutiny in , with Judges Kelly Broniec and Ginger Gooch retained amid debates over their abortion-related votes, highlighting tensions between and public oversight. By early 2025, these proposals intertwined with discussions, as lawmakers eyed judicial selection changes to align courts more closely with legislative priorities on issues like liability limits. However, advancing any requires a two-thirds legislative vote for ballot placement, posing hurdles given intra-party divisions and the plan's entrenched status since 1940. No reforms had passed by October 2025, leaving the Missouri Plan intact but under sustained pressure from accountability advocates.

Broader Implications for Judicial Selection Reform

The Missouri Plan has served as a foundational model for merit selection systems in approximately 24 states, influencing a broader shift away from partisan judicial elections toward processes prioritizing candidate qualifications via nominating commissions. This dissemination, beginning in the mid-20th century, reflects efforts to mitigate the risks of electoral politics, such as pressures and ideological polarization, by vesting initial screening in nonpartisan or bipartisan commissions that forward nominees to governors for appointment. Empirical analyses indicate that such transitions correlate with improved judicial output quality, as measured by forward citations to opinions, suggesting merit-based mechanisms enhance selection of technically proficient jurists over politically attuned ones. However, the Plan's hybrid structure—combining commission vetting with retention elections—highlights persistent tensions in reform debates between judicial independence and democratic accountability. Proponents argue it insulates judges from donor-driven campaigns while allowing public veto through yes/no retention votes, fostering a judiciary less susceptible to short-term political swings. Critics, including conservative reformers, contend that commission dominance by legal elites, often aligned with bar associations, enables undue influence from interest groups like trial lawyers, effectively sidelining voter input and risking ideological conformity insulated from electoral correction. Instances of politicized retention campaigns, such as the 2010 ousters in Iowa over same-sex marriage rulings, underscore how these mechanisms can devolve into de facto referenda on controversial decisions, undermining the intended apolitical buffer. These dynamics have spurred varied reform trajectories nationwide. In states like , gubernatorial pushback against commission opacity has prompted legislative challenges to merit systems, amplifying calls for greater executive or legislative oversight to counteract perceived bar monopolies. Progressive policy groups advocate refining the model by abolishing retention elections in favor of extended terms (e.g., 14-18 years) post-appointment, aiming to bolster independence without perpetual electoral threats, though such proposals risk further entrenching unelected influences. Overall, the Missouri Plan's legacy underscores causal trade-offs in selection design: empirical gains in impartiality and expertise versus potential deficits in responsiveness to , informing ongoing experiments like the IAALS O'Connor Judicial Selection Plan, which seeks to standardize transparent, performance-based evaluations across hybrid systems.

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