Hubbry Logo
Operation ToralOperation ToralMain
Open search
Operation Toral
Community hub
Operation Toral
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Operation Toral
Operation Toral
Operation Toral
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Operation Toral
Part of Resolute Support Mission in the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)
RAF Puma helicopter of 33 Squadron deploying flares whilst on Operation Toral in Afghanistan, 14 December 2015.
Location
Afghanistan
Objectivetraining, advising and assisting the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces
Date1 January 2015 – 8 July 2021
Executed byUnited Kingdom United Kingdom
OutcomeOperational failure
Fall of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan due to Taliban victory
Casualties3 (non-combat) killed

Operation Toral was the codename for the British presence within Afghanistan post-2014 as part of NATO's Resolute Support Mission. UK forces had two major tasks: training and mentoring Afghan Forces, and providing force protection for NATO advisors via the Kabul Security Force/Kabul Protection Unit.[1]

The operation drew to a close on 8 July 2021 with the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from the country. However, British troops were subsequently redeployed under Operation Pitting in August 2021 to evacuate British nationals and staff following the 2021 Taliban offensive.[2]

Background

[edit]
Main article: Operation Herrick

Operation Herrick was the codename under which all British operations in the War in Afghanistan were conducted from 2002 to the end of combat operations in 2014. It consisted of the British contribution to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and support to the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

In December 2012 Prime Minister David Cameron announced that 3,800 troops—almost half of the force serving in Helmand Province—would be withdrawn during 2013[3] with numbers to fall to approximately 5,200.[4] The UK ceased all combat operations in Afghanistan and withdrew the last of its combat troops on 27 October 2014.[5][6] Between 2001 and 24 July 2015 a total of 454 British military personnel have died on operations in Afghanistan.[7][8]

History

[edit]
Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, the Yorkshire Regiment in a Foxhound, providing over watch security for the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) 10-year graduation ceremony. 23 November 2017.

Air Force Times reported that On 11 October 2015, An RAF Puma MK2 helicopter, carrying 9 crew and passengers, crashed as it was landing at NATO's Resolute Support Mission HQ in Kabul, after colliding with a .58 inch tether line of a Persistent Threat Detection System intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance blimp on the southwest edge of the compound.[9] Forces.net reported that 5 were killed (Flight lieutenant Alan Scott of 33 Squadron, and Flight lieutenant Geraint Roberts of 230 Squadron RAF and 3 US Servicemen) and 5 more were injured.[10]

A sniper team from 2nd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment providing overwatch security for the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) 10 year graduation ceremony, which was held at their Kabul facility. 23 November 2017.

The BBC reported that on 11 October 2015, a convoy of British military vehicles in Kabul was hit by a Taliban IED, at least 2 civilians (a woman and a child) were injured, there were no British casualties. The Taliban claimed the attack was in retaliation for airstrikes in Kunduz that had killed civilians and doctors (marking the first time British troops had been targeted in Kabul since British combat forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 2014), officials in Kabul said it was a suicide bombing.[11]

Forces.net reported that during the Taliban attack on the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul on 20 January 2018, members of 2nd Battalion the Yorkshire Regiment, assisted by members of the Australian Army and the Oklahoma National Guard, evacuated 43 international civilians from the hotel.[12]

In July 2018, the Independent reported that following a request for reinforcements by President Donald Trump, the British government would deploy an additional 440 British troops to Afghanistan in a non-combat role of training and assisting Afghan forces, bringing total up to 1,100; the deployment began in August.[13]

The BBC reported that a paratrooper from 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment died in Kabul on 22 February 2020 due to a "non-battle injury".[14]

On 15 April 2021, Sky News reported that British troops in Afghanistan would begin their withdrawal in the following month, alongside other NATO allies.[15]

Operation Toral ended on 8 July 2021, however a small number of personnel remained in the country for diplomatic support.[16] Alongside NATO partners, the UK had trained 5,000 Afghan cadets, including 330 women, at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA). The withdrawal was carried out logistically across the armed forces, with the RAF alone making 50 flights, some of which involved the transportation of Puma helicopters. The Puma helicopters had airlifted 126,000 passengers and moved 660,000 kg of freight during their deployment.[16]

In August 2021, following the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan and an ensuing Taliban offensive, the UK redeployed troops to the country to facilitate the evacuation of British nationals and staff under Operation Pitting.[2]

Roulements

[edit]

The below list doesn't include support elements or individual augmenters from the three Services, such as personnel who have been assigned to specific Staff Officer roles in HQ Resolute Support Mission.

Soldier from the Household Cavalry aiming his rifle whilst deployed on Operation Toral, 24 September 2018.

British Army[17][18]

Royal Air Force

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Operation Toral

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Operation Toral was the codename for the United Kingdom's non-combat military deployment to from 2015 to 2021, serving as the British component of 's to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces in sustaining independent operations against insurgency. Involving around 1,000 to 1,100 personnel at peak strength, the mission emphasized mentoring at key institutions such as the Afghan National Army Officer Academy, where British instructors trained approximately 5,000 cadets, including 330 women, in leadership and tactical skills. UK forces also maintained responsibilities through the Security Force, providing rapid-response capabilities to defend advisors and infrastructure in the capital against terrorist threats, with units held at five minutes' notice to react. This advisory role represented a shift from prior engagements, aiming to build Afghan self-reliance, though the rapid disintegration of trained forces during the underscored challenges in achieving enduring capacity. The operation formally ended in July 2021, transitioning British involvement to non-military humanitarian and diplomatic support amid the withdrawal.

Context and Background

Transition from ISAF Combat Operations

The United Kingdom formally ended its combat operations in Afghanistan on 26 October 2014, with the handover of the last British base, Camp Bastion in Helmand Province, to Afghan control, concluding Operation Herrick under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This pivot shifted British involvement from direct engagement against Taliban insurgents to a non-combat advisory capacity, aligning with NATO's broader transition plan that anticipated the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) taking lead responsibility for nationwide security by the end of 2014. Over the preceding 13 years of combat deployments since 2001, UK armed forces had suffered 457 fatalities, the majority occurring during peak fighting in Helmand between 2006 and 2011, underscoring the high human cost of efforts to stabilize the region and disrupt al-Qaeda networks. The rationale for this drawdown rested on empirical metrics of ANSF growth, with Afghan army and police forces expanding from near-zero in 2001 to approximately 350,000 personnel by 2014, enabling claims of operational readiness for independent action. However, causal factors such as systemic within ANSF ranks—evident in ghost soldier payrolls, equipment diversion, and leadership graft—fostered dependency on foreign and air support, eroding long-term sustainability despite numerical achievements. and UK decisions were also influenced by domestic political pressures post-2014 Afghan elections, fiscal constraints amid austerity measures, and the strategic assessment that prolonged combat yielded against an adaptive . This transition presaged Operation Toral, the UK's advisory mission commencing in early 2015 as part of NATO's Resolute Support, reducing troop levels from several thousand in combat roles to focused mentoring teams while prioritizing over offensive operations. Early indicators of ANSF fragility, including high attrition rates and uneven territorial control, highlighted that inflated readiness figures masked underlying institutional weaknesses, setting the stage for subsequent adjustments in advisory commitments.

Integration into NATO Resolute Support Mission

The NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) commenced on 1 January 2015, succeeding the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) whose combat operations concluded on 28 December 2014. RSM operated as a non-combat endeavor, authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2189 adopted on 12 December 2014, with the primary aim of training, advising, and assisting the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to enable them to assume full responsibility for national security. The United Kingdom integrated its military contributions into RSM through Operation Toral, the designated codename for British forces participating in the mission starting in 2015. UK's deployment under Toral involved approximately 1,100 personnel, primarily based in Kabul, where they supported operations at the Resolute Support Headquarters and provided force protection for NATO personnel. This integration aligned with broader NATO commitments established at the 2012 Chicago Summit, where Allies affirmed a post-2014 advisory and training mission to sustain Afghan security capabilities beyond the ISAF era. Subsequent reinforcement came at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, where NATO leaders pledged to extend RSM beyond 2016 via a flexible, regionally focused model, ensuring coordinated multinational support and preventing premature unilateral withdrawals by member states. The UK's adherence to these frameworks underscored its role in maintaining alliance cohesion amid the shift from combat to capacity-building in Afghanistan.

Objectives and Mandate

Mentoring Afghan National Defense and Security Forces

The primary objective of mentoring under Operation Toral was to enhance the self-sufficiency of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) through advisory support at institutional, ministerial, and operational levels, focusing on , , and professional military education rather than direct involvement. UK personnel, as part of NATO's (RSM), provided high-level mentorship to Afghan security ministries and led efforts at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) in , training over 1,000 officers annually in tactics, leadership, and staff functions to build a cadre capable of independent command. This institutional focus aimed to address foundational deficiencies, such as limited officer education, by embedding advisors to transfer skills in planning and sustainment, though Afghan internal challenges like and high attrition rates constrained long-term efficacy. UK mentors emphasized practical expertise in areas like counter-improvised explosive device (IED) tactics and sustainment, drawing from prior operational experience to advise on equipment maintenance and threat mitigation without engaging in combat operations. RSM rules of prohibited NATO advisors from direct fighting, instead prioritizing Afghan-led actions to foster ownership and reduce dependency, with UK forces contributing around 850-1,100 personnel dedicated to these non-combat roles by 2017-2018. Despite these mechanisms, data from oversight reports highlighted persistent ANDSF shortfalls in and personnel retention, attributable to systemic issues including widespread and inadequate domestic funding rather than solely external mentoring gaps. Efforts included and programs integrated into officer , aiming to elevate basic educational standards required for operational roles, though comprehensive metrics on improvements remained limited amid ongoing challenges like a 3rd-grade threshold for recruits. By 2020, UK-led teams at ANAOA facilitated the transition of responsibilities to Afghan instructors, marking a in skill transfer, yet underlying causal factors such as deficits in Afghan institutions ultimately undermined sustained self-sufficiency.

Force Protection and Enabling Functions

UK forces under Operation Toral contributed to for NATO personnel and assets in through dedicated elements such as the Advisor (AFP) and Quick Reaction Force (QRF), integrated into the broader Kabul Security Force framework. The QRF operated on 24/7 standby, maintaining a five-minute notice-to-move capability to respond to emergencies including , civil unrest, or attacks on advisors. AFP teams conducted escorted movements for advisors across , utilizing armored vehicles like Ridgback for patrols and intelligence gathering to mitigate risks from persistent low-level threats. These functions emphasized base security at key sites, such as , and coordination with allies like Danish forces for rotational duties. Enabling activities encompassed intelligence sharing with and Afghan partners to enhance , alongside support for protocols in response to incidents. The protective mandate was strictly limited to the Kabul area, avoiding provincial engagements to prioritize advisor safety given ongoing vulnerabilities in Afghan National Defense and Security Forces control over peripheral regions. Threats, while infrequent, included occasional and required rapid QRF deployments for casualty extraction and stabilization, as documented in operational responses during rotations such as Op Toral VIII in 2019. This focus ensured mission viability without reverting to combat operations, aligning with NATO's non-combat Resolute Support posture post-2014.

Operational Timeline

Inception and Build-Up (2015-2017)

Operation Toral commenced in 2015 as the United Kingdom's contribution to NATO's (RSM), which launched on January 1, 2015, following the conclusion of combat operations in December 2014. The mission shifted focus to training, advising, and assisting Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) under the newly stabilized government of President , who assumed office in September 2014. Initial UK deployments emphasized establishing advisory teams in key locations such as , with up to 500 personnel committed to non-combat roles including mentoring and . The RSM operated under a troop ceiling of approximately 13,000 personnel from allies and partners, reflecting a deliberate reduction from prior combat levels while prioritizing capacity-building for Afghan forces amid ongoing equipment and logistical shortfalls. Early efforts under Operation Toral integrated roulement cycles to sustain advisory presence, with forces providing specialized support such as aviation detachments to bolster capabilities, including transport and training amid persistent maintenance challenges. These initial phases adapted to the post-combat environment by embedding advisors within Afghan units to enhance and sustainment skills. By 2017, the build-up phase aligned with the ' strategic review under President Trump, which endorsed a conditions-based approach and prompted to expand RSM to around 16,000 troops to counter resurgence and support ANDSF development. UK contributions during this period facilitated training for thousands of ANDSF personnel, focusing on officer academies and specialized units, though exact figures for UK-specific trainees remained integrated within broader efforts. This period marked foundational adaptations, including enhanced force protection measures in to enable safe advisory operations despite elevated security threats.

Sustained Operations and Adjustments (2018-2020)

In June 2018, following the ' decision to end the troop drawdown in and request additional contributions, the announced an increase of approximately 440 personnel to its Operation Toral commitment, raising the total to around 1,100 by early 2019. This adjustment aimed to counter territorial gains and sustain advisory efforts amid escalating insurgent attacks on Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The additional troops primarily bolstered the UK-led Security Force, enhancing for advisors in the capital. Throughout 2018-2020, Operation Toral maintained a focus on mentoring ANDSF units, with adjustments emphasizing aviation support via the Toral Aviation Detachment operating Puma HC2 helicopters for intra-Kabul transport of NATO personnel and equipment. These helicopters, based at , facilitated over 126,000 passenger movements and 660,000 kg of freight by mission end, underscoring logistical continuity despite preliminary US- talks in beginning in July 2018. Training mandates remained non-negotiable, even as ANDSF casualties mounted, with Afghan officials reporting record losses exceeding 20,000 security personnel killed between 2014 and 2018 alone, reflecting persistent offensives. By late 2020, troop numbers adjusted downward to 850, mirroring reductions tied to negotiations, yet core advisory functions persisted to build ANDSF capacity against ongoing insurgent pressure. This period highlighted causal links between reinforcement and temporary stabilization efforts, though rejection of direct Afghan government talks sustained high violence levels.

Withdrawal and Closure (2021)

The withdrawal of UK forces under Operation Toral proceeded in coordination with NATO's Resolute Support Mission drawdown, which commenced on 1 May 2021 following the US-Taliban agreement stipulating a full foreign troop exit by 31 August 2021. The UK Ministry of Defence formally announced the operation's closure on 8 July 2021, marking the end of its advisory and training mandate after six years of rotations supporting Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). By mid-July, the majority of British personnel had been evacuated, with a flag-lowering ceremony conducted by the Light Dragoons on 24 June 2021 to symbolize the mission's wind-down. A small residual contingent of military personnel remained temporarily post-closure to facilitate embassy support and the transition to non-combat diplomatic engagement, distinct from the subsequent emergency evacuation under . This phased exit aligned with allied timelines but unfolded amid accelerating territorial gains, which by late June 2021 had captured key districts and provincial capitals, exposing underlying ANDSF fragilities such as desertions and logistical dependencies on enablers. Subsequent inquiries attributed the rapid ANDSF collapse—manifesting fully after Kabul's fall on 15 August 2021—to NATO's collective underestimation of these vulnerabilities despite extensive mentoring efforts, including insufficient contingency planning for the abrupt severance of air support and advisory roles that had propped up Afghan operations. The Toral closure thus represented the termination of direct and enabling functions, shifting focus to remote aid amid the Taliban's unchecked momentum.

Deployed Forces and Rotations

Personnel Composition and

Operation Toral involved approximately 1,000 to 1,100 British personnel deployed primarily in , focusing on advisory and force protection roles within NATO's . The headquarters was established at , integrating elements from the , , and specialist units to support mentoring of Afghan National Defense and Security Forces while ensuring operational security. The core ground component centered on the Kabul Security Force (KSF), a multinational unit led by British troops from formations such as 16 Air Assault Brigade, providing for advisors across key sites in . This included elements equipped with protected mobility vehicles like the , alongside engineers for infrastructure support and medical teams for casualty care, reflecting a balanced tailored to non-combat advisory priorities rather than large-scale . Aviation assets from the Joint Helicopter Command formed a dedicated detachment, operating RAF Chinook and Puma helicopters for intra-theater and rapid response, enabling the sustainment of dispersed advisory teams without reliance on Afghan air capabilities. This multi-service structure, unique to Toral's posture, emphasized among battalions, RAF aircrews, and joint enablers, with peak deployments reported around 1,100 personnel in periods of heightened advisory demands.

Roulement Cycles and Unit Contributions

Operation Toral utilized six-month roulement cycles to sustain British contributions to NATO's Resolute Support Mission, enabling sequential brigade elements to rotate while preserving operational continuity from 2015 to 2021. These rotations, numbering approximately ten major cycles, drew primarily from units under 16 Air Assault Brigade and the 3rd (United Kingdom) Division, with each deployment focusing on force protection tasks such as securing key sites in Kabul. The structured handovers between outgoing and incoming forces minimized disruptions to NATO advisory efforts and Afghan partner engagements. Specific unit contributions varied by cycle to address evolving security requirements. For example, during Op Toral IX from 8 November 2019 to 9 May 2020, the 2nd , The Regiment deployed as part of the Kabul Security Force, providing rapid-response capabilities including quick reaction forces for threat mitigation in urban environments. In a later rotation commencing around October 2020, the 2nd , The contributed infantry elements to maintain patrol and protection duties amid heightened insurgent activities. Similarly, the 1st , served as the lead battlegroup during Op Toral 7 in 2018-2019, emphasizing armored and dismounted operations within the perimeter. These rotational inputs ensured a consistent British presence of 500 to 1,100 personnel per cycle, adapting specialized skills like airborne mobility and to support NATO's non-combat mandate without overlapping static force structures. Internal assessments noted that the roulement approach effectively balanced experience retention across deployments, though variations in unit readiness were managed through pre-deployment .

Core Activities

Training and Advisory Efforts

UK personnel in Operation Toral delivered institutional training programs at key Kabul facilities, including the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA), where they mentored over 5,000 Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) cadets in and core military competencies, encompassing 330 female trainees. These efforts prioritized skill transfer in sustainment and institutional capacity over frontline tactics, aligning with NATO's objectives to foster self-reliance. Embedded advisors integrated directly with ANDSF units and headquarters staffs, offering hands-on guidance to enhance , logistics maintenance, and equipment handling proficiency. For instance, mentors supported technical training in aviation sustainment, contributing to Afghan capabilities in helicopter operations amid broader advisory roles. This approach emphasized practical, first-line sustainment to address ANDSF dependencies on coalition support, though persistent internal factors such as payroll discrepancies—exemplified by unsubstantiated personnel rosters inflating force strengths—limited full absorption of transferred expertise. Metrics from UK-led courses indicated structured progression, with thousands of ANDSF personnel completing mentorship cycles focused on verifiable technical and outcomes, though comprehensive graduation data remained operationally classified or unreleased publicly. Successes included incremental improvements in Afghan unit self-sufficiency in select domains, as evidenced by joint exercises demonstrating applied advisory inputs.

Logistics, Aviation, and Support Roles

The Royal Air Force's Toral Aviation Detachment, comprising Puma HC2 helicopters from Nos. 33 and 230 Squadrons based at , delivered critical intra-theatre mobility for forces in . Operating from Hamid Karzai International Airport, these aircraft functioned as an aerial "taxi service," transporting troops, embassy staff, civilians, and equipment across urban, mountainous, and desert terrain while minimizing exposure to ground-based threats. The detachment also maintained standby for in support of 's Security Quick Reaction Force and facilitated morale-boosting deliveries, such as festive mail during periods. This aviation role transitioned from earlier Chinook helicopter support, with Puma HC2s achieving first operational deployment in 2015 after Chinooks were phased out following the end of combat operations. Over six years, the Pumas logged 12,800 flying hours—equivalent to more than 533 continuous days aloft—while carrying 126,000 passengers and 660,000 kilograms of freight, ensuring sustained operational tempo amid Kabul's congested and environmental challenges like . Logistics personnel managed supply chains to prevent advisor isolation, coordinating the distribution of and enabling persistent presence through efficient intra-Kabul movements that complemented broader Resolute Support sustainment efforts. Support functions included engineering for base infrastructure maintenance and medical teams for personnel health, with detachments conducting routine drills and responses to sustain base operations at key sites like . These enablers reduced operational downtime by prioritizing asset availability and rapid resupply, directly bolstering the mission's non-combat advisory framework.

Achievements and Impacts

Capacity Building in Afghan Forces

During Operation Toral, British forces played a leading role in mentoring and training Afghan National Army (ANA) officers at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) in Kabul, contributing to the development of over 5,000 commissioned officers by September 2020, including approximately 6% women who met the same rigorous selection and training standards as male cadets. The UK, alongside NATO partners, established and supported the ANAOA's 48-week program modeled on British military academies, focusing on leadership, technical proficiency, and operational skills, with UK mentors providing specialized instruction in areas such as tactics and command. By 2017, UK-supported training had already enabled the commissioning of more than 3,000 cadets since the academy's first intakes in 2013-2014. These efforts supported the broader growth and sustainment of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), which maintained an assigned strength of approximately 313,000 personnel as of early 2018, enabling Afghan-led operations that reduced advisor exposure to combat. advisors under Toral emphasized professionalization in specialized units, including , where British expertise in counter-insurgency and enhanced Afghan capabilities in high-threat environments, crediting disciplined mentoring for improved tactical proficiency. By 2020, ANDSF assigned forces remained above 280,000 despite attrition challenges, reflecting sustained training impacts that delayed systemic collapse until the 2021 withdrawal. The shift to advisory roles in the , of which Toral was the UK component, correlated with near-zero British fatalities from hostile action after 2015, as Afghan forces assumed primary operational responsibilities bolstered by UK-built capacities in , support, and command structures. These achievements in technical and persisted despite subsequent ANDSF vulnerabilities stemming from internal issues such as and dependency on external funding, factors outside direct UK control during Toral.

Contributions to Regional Stability

Operation Toral contributed to regional stability by enabling Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) to maintain control over key urban centers, particularly , thereby preventing consolidation and reducing the risk of ungoverned spaces that could serve as terrorist launchpads. forces, through advisory roles and the Kabul Security Force, provided force protection for personnel and shared intelligence that mitigated immediate threats, resulting in no successful terrorist attacks originating from targeting the UK during the mission's duration from 2015 to 2021. The mission's emphasis on training and mentoring ANDSF units enhanced their capacity to conduct independent counter-terrorism operations, disrupting plots and denying safe havens to groups like and ISIS-K. UK Ministry of Defence assessments indicate that these efforts trained thousands of Afghan personnel, fostering capabilities that held insurgent advances at bay until the 2021 withdrawal, thus buying critical time for Afghan governance structures to develop amid persistent . In the broader counter-terrorism context, Toral's and support sustained ANDSF operations against transnational threats, contributing to a period of relative stability in NATO-patrolled areas with minimal losses—no UK fatalities from hostile action occurred in the UK-led sectors during this non-combat phase. This contrasts with pre-2015 combat operations, underscoring the stabilizing impact of sustained advisory presence over direct engagement, as evidenced by the absence of major casualties in Kabul-centric operations from 2015 onward.

Challenges, Criticisms, and Controversies

Operational Risks and Security Threats

UK forces deployed under Operation Toral encountered persistent security threats primarily from elements, including attacks such as rocket and mortar strikes on bases in . These incidents prompted multiple alerts between 2015 and 2021, though UK personnel sustained no fatalities from direct combat, with injuries occasionally resulting from evasive actions during events. Insider attacks by Afghan security personnel represented another low-incidence but high-potential risk, necessitating ongoing countermeasures like enhanced vetting and paired patrols to mitigate infiltration threats. Sporadic protests and small-scale unrest near advisory sites added to the operational environment, though these rarely escalated to direct confrontations with advisors. To counter these threats, units maintained Quick Reaction Force (QRF) readiness for rapid response to base attacks or partner force requests, supported by fortified positions and vehicle-mounted patrols using protected mobility assets. Enhanced surveillance measures, including overwatch teams and intelligence sharing with Afghan counterparts, were implemented to detect and deter attempts. These adaptations aligned with broader Resolute Support protocols, emphasizing over offensive operations. National caveats restricted UK personnel to advisory roles with self-defense authority only, limiting proactive engagements against threats and potentially increasing vulnerability during transitions or contested training scenarios, as noted in critiques of NATO mission cohesion. Such constraints, while preserving non-combat mandates, drew assessments that they fragmented allied responses and elevated overall mission risks in a volatile urban setting like .

Debates on Training Effectiveness and Afghan Dependencies

Debates surrounding the effectiveness of Operation Toral's training efforts centered on the tension between demonstrable skill-building achievements and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces' (ANDSF) profound operational dependencies, which were exacerbated by internal Afghan factors such as corruption and eroded morale. While personnel under Toral contributed to 's (RSM) by advising on tactics, leadership, and sustainment—resulting in reported improvements in Afghan special forces units' capabilities, including some trained personnel conducting independent missions—these gains proved fragile against systemic ANDSF vulnerabilities. For instance, Afghan pilots and aircrew trained through RSM frameworks, including inputs, enabled the Afghan Air Force to execute sorties during the final phases of NATO presence, yet this technical proficiency could not compensate for broader institutional failures. The ANDSF's swift disintegration in mid-2021, marked by mass desertions and surrenders rather than battlefield defeats, underscored dependencies on foreign , , and motivation, with siphoning resources equivalent to tens of thousands of ""—fictional personnel inflating rosters to divert salaries and fuel. SIGAR analyses identified as a primary erosive force, noting that discrepancies and undermined far more than deficits, as Afghan forces often lacked the political will to fight amid perceived abandonment following U.S.- agreements that signaled reduced external support. Empirical metrics from RSM progress assessments indicated steady advancements in throughput until 2020, but high attrition rates—exacerbated by unpaid salaries and nepotistic —rendered these moot, attributing shortfalls primarily to Afghan failures over allied advisory limitations. Critics from intervention-skeptical perspectives, often aligned with left-leaning analyses, framed Toral-like missions as a protracted quagmire yielding illusory progress, arguing that external could not instill self-sufficiency in a corrupt system. In contrast, evaluations emphasizing Afghan agency highlighted post-withdrawal leadership collapse under President Ghani, where internal betrayals and deal-making with elements precipitated the fall, absolving non-combat trainers like forces of causal responsibility. -specific controversies emerged in parliamentary proposals for inquiries into the broader involvement, questioning whether policymakers adequately anticipated ANDSF fragility despite Toral's strict advisory mandate, which precluded direct combat or governance reform. These debates, informed by SIGAR's emphasis on endogenous , reinforced that while delivered tactical competencies, enduring dependencies stemmed from Afghan political and cultural internals, not allied execution shortfalls.

External Factors Including COVID-19 Response

Operation Toral encountered external challenges from the pandemic starting in early 2020, necessitating adaptive protocols for approximately 1,000 British troops stationed in as part of NATO's . Medical planning incorporated a "4Ds and 4Cs" framework—encompassing detect, deny, deter, and disrupt threats alongside communicate, coordinate, control, and contain infections—to address occupational health risks and enforce behavior changes such as and hygiene enforcement within constrained operational environments. These measures, aligned with broader directives, included pre-deployment health screenings and on-site testing, enabling effective early-stage containment despite the high transmission risks in Afghanistan's urban settings. Vaccination efforts followed global rollouts, with eligible personnel receiving doses by mid-2021, though primary reliance was on non-pharmaceutical interventions to sustain . No large-scale outbreaks disrupted British contingents, reflecting robust implementation that limited mission interruptions to temporary pauses in some advisory interactions, as seen across Resolute Support where train-advise-assist activities were scaled back but not halted entirely. Beyond the pandemic, equipment integration presented adaptive demands, such as the fielding of the helmet system during September-October 2019 rotations. Feedback from 200 personnel across four sites rated it favorably for comfort on a 5-point , noting improvements over legacy models like the , including a reduced trimline and better support for attachments such as visors and nape guards; users also perceived enhancements in mass distribution despite comparable weight. Supply chain pressures, exacerbated by global effects on , introduced delays in non-essential but were mitigated through prioritized and local sourcing, preserving operational tempo without significant core activity halts. Overall, these factors underscored the operation's resilience, with protocols ensuring continuity in and support roles amid exogenous disruptions.

Aftermath and Legacy

Immediate Post-Withdrawal Developments

Following the conclusion of Operation Toral on July 8, 2021, the intensified their offensive across , capturing key provincial capitals and culminating in the seizure of on August 15, 2021, after President fled the country. The rapid disintegration of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) was precipitated by the withdrawal of advisory support and, critically, the abrupt cutoff of U.S. close air support and , which had sustained ANDSF operations against advances; without these enablers, ANDSF units fragmented due to poor morale, corruption, and inability to hold ground independently. In immediate response, the initiated on August 13, 2021, deploying over 1,000 military personnel to Kabul's International Airport to facilitate the evacuation of British nationals, eligible Afghan allies under the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (), and other vulnerable individuals. This operation airlifted approximately 15,000 people, including around 10,000 Afghans qualifying for relocation, before concluding on August 28, 2021, marking the full end of military operations in . A minimal diplomatic footprint persisted at the British embassy in until the 's advance forced its closure and evacuation in mid-August 2021, with no reported UK military casualties during Toral's final advisory phase but heightened risks to remaining personnel exposed by the ANDSF's collapse and encirclement of the capital.

Strategic Assessments and Lessons Learned

Post-withdrawal evaluations by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) assessed Operation Toral as having bolstered Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) capabilities, enabling them to maintain control over key population centers and delay territorial gains until the drawdown in 2021. During Toral's tenure from 2015 to 2021, advisors trained over 20,000 Afghan personnel in areas such as aviation maintenance and command structures, contributing to a reported reduction in -initiated attacks in urban areas by fostering ANDSF self-reliance in non-combat . However, the rapid ANDSF collapse following the US- Agreement in February 2020—which curtailed Western enablers like —revealed underlying fragilities, as forces captured 65% of district centers by July 2021. Parliamentary inquiries, including the Defence Committee's 2023 report on the Afghanistan withdrawal, critiqued strategic predictions for succumbing to , where assessments overstated ANDSF cohesion and underestimated momentum despite intelligence indicators of and desertions eroding force strength to below 200,000 effective personnel by mid-2021. This misjudgment stemmed from reliance on metrics like trainee numbers rather than causal factors such as pervasive graft, which siphoned $19 billion in aid alone between 2002 and 2020, per contemporaneous audits. The report attributed prediction failures partly to institutional incentives prioritizing positive reporting over candid risk evaluation, echoing broader critiques of Western analytical echo chambers in post-conflict stabilization. Key lessons emphasized prioritizing vetting in partner forces, as unchecked in the ANDSF—manifest in and equipment diversion—undermined training efficacy despite billions invested. Non-combat advisory missions like Toral proved insufficient against asymmetric threats, where shadow governance and hit-and-run tactics exploited ANDSF's motivational deficits without sustained Western combat overwatch. Empirical outcomes validated the causal role of prolonged presence in deterring insurgent consolidation, countering narratives of inevitable failure by demonstrating that phased withdrawals decoupled from verifiable Afghan sustainment accelerated collapse, informing subsequent policy shifts toward conditional aid thresholds. This realism influenced approaches to support, where £7.1 billion in by 2024 prioritized verifiable chains over expansive , avoiding Afghanistan's pitfalls of unanchored capacity transfers.

References

  1. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/operation-toral-draws-to-an-end-as-uk-transitions-to-new-phase-of-support-to-afghanistan
  2. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cdp-2021-0174/
  3. https://paradata.org.uk/content/4634380-op-toral
  4. https://www.forcesnews.com/news/five-years-what-are-british-troops-doing-afghanistan
  5. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-ends-combat-operations-in-helmand
  6. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-29776544
  7. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/uk-forces-operations-in-afghanistan
  8. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9298/
  9. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_101469.htm
  10. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2014/856
  11. https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Lessons-Learned/SIGAR-16-58-LL.pdf
  12. https://csis.org/analysis/shaping-ansf-meet-challenges-transition
  13. https://www.gov.uk/government/fields-of-operation/afghanistan
  14. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/afghan-national-security-forces-afghan-corruption-and-the-development-of-an-effective-fighting-force/
  15. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_113694.htm
  16. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2014/12/adoption-of-resolution-on-resolute-support-mission-afghanistan.php
  17. https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-nato-mission/26741978.html
  18. https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/operation-toral-draws-to-a-close/
  19. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87593.htm
  20. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_87601.htm
  21. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm
  22. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133171.htm?selectedLocale=en
  23. https://defencehq.medium.com/the-uk-armed-forces-twenty-years-in-afghanistan-ebc139e8573c
  24. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8292/
  25. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5801/ldselect/ldintrel/208/20810.htm
  26. https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Lessons-Learned/SIGAR-17-62-LL.pdf
  27. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uks-work-in-afghanistan/the-uks-work-in-afghanistan
  28. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-steps-up-uk-commitments-to-nato
  29. https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Lessons-Learned/SIGAR-19-39-LL.pdf
  30. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_179010.htm?selectedLocale=en
  31. https://defencehq.medium.com/force-protection-and-quick-reaction-in-kabul-be3b40e5adae
  32. https://defencehq.medium.com/quick-reaction-force-in-afghanistans-capital-69418f461d92
  33. https://www.royal-irish.com/events/op-toral-viii-afghanistan
  34. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/nato-agrees-launch-of-resolute-support-mission-in-afghanistan
  35. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8043/CBP-8043.pdf
  36. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8043/
  37. https://defencehq.medium.com/toral-aviation-detachment-explained-609678f0df6d
  38. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8292/CBP-8292.pdf
  39. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jul/10/number-of-uk-troops-in-afghanistan-to-rise-ahead-of-nato-summit
  40. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jul/03/2001938620/-1/-1/1/1225-REPORT-JUNE-2018-FINAL-UNCLASS-BASE.pdf
  41. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-bolsters-support-to-nato-mission-in-afghanistan
  42. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/world/asia/afghanistan-security-casualties-taliban.html
  43. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/11/26/british-troop-numbers-afghanistan-fall-fifth-uk-has-mirrors/
  44. https://www.csis.org/analysis/state-fighting-afghan-war-mid-2019
  45. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm
  46. https://www.forcesnews.com/news/afghanistan-britains-operation-toral-mission-ends
  47. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2021/696169/EPRS_ATA%282021%29696169_EN.pdf
  48. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5803/cmselect/cmdfence/725/report.html
  49. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46879/R46879.8.pdf
  50. https://www.joint-forces.com/uk-operations/44881-uk-operation-toral-draws-to-an-end
  51. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34625517/
  52. https://defencehq.medium.com/are-british-soldiers-still-in-afghanistan-heres-three-things-you-need-to-know-e169c515176b
  53. https://www.keymilitary.com/article/afghan-survivors
  54. https://defencehq.medium.com/meet-the-officer-commanding-the-next-infantry-company-deploying-to-afghanistan-f69bba4a259b
  55. https://www.facebook.com/officialtheroyalgurkharifles/posts/1rgr-are-deployed-on-op-toral-7-where-they-are-the-lead-battlegroup-in-the-kabul/2025941457482980/
  56. https://www.joint-forces.com/uk-news/15736-op-toral-more-uk-troops-to-afghanistan
  57. https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/1156/pdf/
  58. https://www.dvidshub.net/image/4120339/kabul-security-forces-conduct-aerial-reaction-force-training-exercise
  59. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS06/20160212/104380/HHRG-114-AS06-Wstate-SopkoJ-20160212.pdf
  60. https://www.dvidshub.net/video/583124/kabul-security-forces-conduct-aerial-reaction-force-training-exercise
  61. https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/our-history/first-deployment-for-puma-mk2/
  62. https://www.forcesnews.com/news/significant-raf-puma-helicopter-detachment-leaves-afghanistan
  63. https://militaryhealth.bmj.com/content/jramc/early/2021/10/08/bmjmilitary-2021-001911.full.pdf
  64. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_177902.htm
  65. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_179010.htm
  66. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/afghan-national-army-officer-academy-celebrates-10th-graduation
  67. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-116.pdf
  68. https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Quarterly-Reports/2020-10-30qr.pdf
  69. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9298/CBP-9298.pdf
  70. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/618a62688fa8f52979b6cc0a/20211105_Enclosure_1_Biannual_UK_Armed_Forces_and_UK_Civilians_Operational_Casualty_and_Fatality_Statistics_1_Jan_06_to_30_Sep_21.pdf
  71. https://securityanddefence.pl/pdf-103234-36122?filename=36122.pdf
  72. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/analysis-insider-attacks-afghanistan-mwi-report/
  73. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/qrf.htm
  74. https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/01/2002348001/-1/-1/1/enhancing_security_and_stability_in_afghanistan.pdf
  75. http://militarycaveats.com/33-the-problem-of-national-caveats-in-nato-operations-around-the-world-1996-2016/
  76. https://english.iob-evaluatie.nl/results/resolute-support
  77. https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/Transcripts/Article/2691935/us-forces-afghanistan-and-resolute-support-transition-of-authority-ceremony-jul/
  78. https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/Reports/Audits-and-Inspections/Evaluation/SIGAR-23-05-IP.pdf
  79. https://www.sigar.mil/Portals/147/Files/News/Speeches/SIGAR_John_Sopko_David_Young_Berlin_Speech_2023-03-02.pdf
  80. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/sigar/sigar-23-16-ip_why-the-afghan-security-forces-collapsed.pdf
  81. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Sopko_Testimony_SIGAR-Hearing.pdf
  82. https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/8/17/why-did-the-afghan-army-disintegrate-so-quickly
  83. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-59230564
  84. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27389815
  85. https://militaryhealth.bmj.com/content/169/5/475
  86. https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/OFS_Q2_Mar2020_0.pdf
  87. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38824829/
  88. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292124000035
  89. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Article/3946091/deconstructing-the-collapse-of-afghanistan-national-security-and-defense-forces/
  90. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/lessons-from-the-collapse-of-afghanistans-security-forces/
  91. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/afghan-resettlement-programme-operational-data/afghan-resettlement-programme-operational-data
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.