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Pacifying Police Unit
Pacifying Police Unit
Pacifying Police Unit
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Composition of a unit of the Polícia Pacificadora (UPP), here on the occasion of the ceremony for the change of command of the units

The Pacifying Police Unit (Portuguese: Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, also translated as Police Pacification Unit), abbreviated UPP, is a law enforcement and social services program pioneered in the state of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, which aims to reclaim territories, most commonly favelas, controlled by gangs of drug dealers. The program was created and implemented by State Public Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame, with the backing of Rio Governor Sérgio Cabral. The stated goal of Rio's government is to install 40 UPPs by 2014. By May 2013, 231 favelas had come under the UPP umbrella.[needs update] The UPP program scored initial success expelling gangs, and won broad praise. But the expensive initiative expanded too far, too fast into dozens of favelas as state finances cratered, causing a devastating backslide that enabled gangs to recover some of their lost grip.[1]

UPP sought to implement "community-oriented policing" (in contrast to militarized policing).[2] According to one study, the effectiveness of UPP depended a lot on how preexisting criminal gangs were organized in any given territory.[2] In territories where criminal gangs effectively reduced violence and maintained order, UPP's presence was seen as undesirable by the community.[2] However, in territory where gangs did not restrain crime and violence, UPP officers were perceived by the community as legitimate.[2]

Background

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For decades, many of Rio de Janeiro's favelas have been controlled by gangs of armed drug traffickers. Beginning with the first UPP that was implemented in Santa Marta in 2008, many of Rio's major favelas have received pacifying police forces.[3] For decades, Rio has seen a cycle of police raiding favelas, having shootouts with traffickers, and then withdrawing again. And also part of the cycle were frequent wars between different traffickers, leading to more shootouts, endangering the lives of the people living in many of these favelas.

The favelas chosen for the UPP program have previously not paid for public utilities but would have to pay fees to whatever criminal organization controlled the area; this often leads to a recurrence of extortion and tax evasion.

Therefore, the concept for the UPP (which was given even more impetus once Rio was chosen to host the FIFA World Cup and the Summer Olympic Games) was finally put into action as a first-step solution to deal with the urban cycle of violence.

Implementation

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Before a UPP is established in a favela area, gang leaders are driven out by Rio's elite police battalion, BOPE, who search for heavy weaponry and drug caches (during this stage, and thereafter, there is an effort to encourage residents to report criminal activity to an anonymous phone number managed by Rio's government called Disque Denúncia).[4] The inauguration of a new UPP is timed with the exit of BOPE from the area and the replacement of hundreds of newly trained policemen, who work within the particular area of favelas as a permanent police force.

As of September 2013, 34 UPPs have been established within Rio de Janeiro with the stated goal of Rio's government to install 40 UPPs by 2014. Some UPPs, such as for that for Rocinha, only cover the territory of one specific favela, while other UPPs such as Manguinhos or Jacarezinho, also each cover smaller favela communities under their administrative umbrella.[5]

Other favelas that now have UPPs include Cidade de Deus, Dona Marta, and Morro da Babilônia. In general, where the UPPs have been implemented, violent crime has fallen dramatically, while property values have increased.[6]

Results

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Because the favelas with UPPs had formerly been controlled by armed drug traffickers for more than twenty-five years, the fear of retribution, which was a mainstay of the "law of the traffickers", is slow to die. For instance, in April 2012 when a drug trafficker who had formerly controlled the favela of Mangueira was shot and killed during a police operation in Jacarezinho (before the area had received its own UPP), others from the same criminal faction ordered businesses to close their doors early in Mangueira — which they did. This despite the fact that Mangueira has a permanent pacification police force as part of its own UPP.[7] A similar occurrence of businesses closing their doors early in Mangueira because the traffickers ordered it occurred in February 2013.[8]

In May 2012, Beltrame acknowledged that armed criminals had migrated from parts of Rio that have a large police presence due to areas with less police and no UPPs, such as nearby Niterói, across the bay.[7][9] Beltrame has stated however that he believes based on analysis of crime data that only gang leaders higher in the hierarchy could reestablish in other favela communities (without UPPs); and that lower level traffickers have a much harder time integrating into other geographic areas.[10]

While the favela areas under pacification have seen improvements, the concentration of criminals has increased in other parts of Rio de Janeiro that don't have the direct benefits of permanent pacification police forces actively patrolling the neighborhoods. Among these are the Baixada Fluminense, Niterói, and certain neighborhoods in the North Zone.[11]

It was obvious early on that criminals fled particular favelas before BOPE entered. Previously, when police had attempted to encircle a favela to arrest and kill traffickers in surprise attacks, large-scale shootouts would ensue, and innocent residents were caught in the crossfire.

PMERJ arrive to reinforce the UPP in Rocinha after gunfire.

While more high-profile gang leaders (also referred to in Rio's media as "traffickers") have been forced to leave favelas now administered by UPP police forces, their familial connections remain. Also, gang members from other favelas who are of the same faction as residents under UPPs, still coordinate and visit each other.[12] Exemplifying this point, one of Rio's newspapers reported on 9 July 2012 that groups of criminals fired upon police in different locations within the Complexo do Alemão on the same day that military forces completed their final withdrawal from the area.[13]

There is a well known history of police abuse and corruption in Rio de Janeiro, and for years this only added fuel to the war between drug traffickers controlling Rio's favelas and the police.[14]

In recent years there have been concerted efforts under Secretary Beltrame to root out corrupt police; and this is the very reason that the community policing of the favelas under the UPP program are staffed by new recruits coming straight from the UPP police academy.[13]

Beltrame has stated that the main purpose of the UPPs is more toward stopping armed men from ruling the streets than to put an end to drug trafficking. A 2010 report by the World Organization Against Torture (OMCT) did note the drop in the homicide rate within Rio de Janeiro's favelas.[15]

Other indicators

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A survey that was conducted among Rio's favela residents in July 2012 (where UPP's have been implemented) showed that there has been a reduction in the number of violent crimes and deaths. Other crimes that previously went unreported in favelas are now showing up in the crime statistics such as theft, domestic violence, and rape.[14] Other results of the survey showed that people felt more free to discuss previously taboo topics such as street violence and illegal drug activity, but many are still intimidated to speak out, fearing that the UPP measure is only temporary.[14]

Unemployment is reportedly quite low in some South Zone favelas such as Pavão-Pavãozinho, (in Copacabana) where the unemployment rate was reported as 5% in July 2012, compared with neighborhoods in the North Zone where life is often more difficult, where the median income is 34.4% less than in pacified favelas in the South Zone. In the South Zone favela of Chapéu Mangueira, (near Rio's famous beaches) 92.2% of residents own a cell phone.[16]

Journalists within Rio studying ballot results from the 2012 municipal elections observed that those living within favelas administered by UPPs distributed their votes among a wider spectrum of candidates compared to areas controlled by drug lords or other organized crime groups or gangs such as milícias.[17]

Violence

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On 23 July 2012, the first police officer to die in a UPP administered favela was shot and killed by criminals within the Nova Brasília area of the Complexo do Alemão. At the time of the shooting, the female officer, 30-year-old Fabiana Aparecida de Souza, who had only been on the force a few months, was at a small UPP station within the favela, when the building was shot at by 12 assailants and she was hit in the abdomen by a rifle bullet. Ten minutes before this occurred, eight assailants shot at two officers patrolling the Pedra do Sapo part of the Complexo, but nobody was injured.[18]

The previous week, police were patrolling the area of Fazendinha within the Complexo when they were attacked two different times. In one of the incidents, a grenade was thrown which exploded near their patrol car.[19] (As a result of the attack resulting in the death of the police officer, an additional 500 UPP police officers were assigned to the Complexo, raising the total number to 1,800 officers working within that particular community).[20]

UPPs in Rio de Janeiro

[edit]
Date UPP established Unit (Unidade) UPP name Neighborhood (Bairro) Zone within Rio
2 December 2013 36ª UPP Camarista Méier Méier (UPP includes communities of Camarista Méier, Cachoeira Grande, Santa Terezinha, Nossa Senhora da Guia, Morro do Céu Azul, Pretos Forros, Ouro Preto and Outeiro) North Zone
2 December 2013 35ª UPP Lins Lins de Vasconcelos (UPP includes Lins, Encontro, Bacia, Cotia, Amor, Barro Vermelho, Barro Preto, Vila Cabuçu, Dona Francisca and Cachoeirinha) North Zone
September 2013 34ª UPP Parque Arará/Mandela Benfica (Formerly part of UPP Manguinhos,[21] the area of the UPP comprises Parque Arará and Comunidade do Mandela) North Zone
May 2013 33ª UPP Cerro-Corá Cosme Velho (Area of UPP includes communities of Cerro-Corá, Guararapes, Vila Cândido, Coroado and Júlio Otoni) South Zone
12 April 2013 32ª UPP Barreira and Tuiuti São Cristóvão (UPP area is Barreira do Vasco and Tuiuti) Centro
12 April 2013 31ª UPP Caju Caju (UPP includes communities of Clemente Ferreira, Chatuba, Parque Alegria, Vila dos Mexicanos, Vila Boa Esperança, Vila Tiradentes, Ladeira dos Funcionários (also known as Vila São Sebastião, Cantinho do Céu or Vila dos Sonhos), Nove Galo (also known as 950 or Parque da Conquista), Quinta do Caju, Manilha, Parque Vitória and Parque Nossa Senhora da Penha) North Zone
16 January 2013 30ª UPP Jacarezinho Jacaré (UPP includes Tancredo Neves, Pica-Pau Amarelo, Vila São João, Xuxa, Marlene, Vila Viúva Claúdio, Marimbá, Jacarezinho, Carlos Drummond de Andrade and Vila Jandira) North Zone
16 January 2013 29ª UPP Manguinhos Manguinhos (Area of UPP includes Manguinhos, Vila Turismo, Parque João Goulart, Parque Carlos Chagas (or Varginha), Parque Oswaldo Cruz (or Amorim), CHP2 (or Vila União), Conjunto Nelson Mandela, Higienópolis, Vila São Pedro and Vitória de Manguinhos (or Cobal) North Zone
20 September 2012 28ª UPP Rocinha Rocinha (Area of UPP includes Rocinha, Bairro Barcelos, Largo do Boiadeiro, Vila Verde, Curva do S, Cachopinha, Cachopa, Dioneia Almir, Vila União, Cidade Nova, Rua Um, Rua Dois, Rua Três, Rua Quatro, Portão Vermelho, Vila Laboriaux, Vila Cruzado, 199, Faz Depressa, Vila Vermelha, Capado, Terreirão, Macega, Roupa Suja and Parque da Cidade) South Zone
28 August 2012 27ª UPP Vila Cruzeiro Penha (UPP includes Vila Cruzeiro, Cariri and Mira) North Zone
August 2012 26ª UPP Parque Proletário Penha (UPP includes communities of Parque Proletário, Vila Proletária da Penha and Laudelino Freire) North Zone
June 2012 25ª UPP Chatuba Penha (Area of UPP includes the communities of Chatuba, Parque Proletário do Grotão, Caixa d’água, Caracol and Laudelino Freire) North Zone
27 June 2012 24ª UPP Fé/Sereno Penha (UPP area includes Fé, Sereno, Paz, Frei Gaspar and Maturacá) North Zone
30 May 2012 23ª UPP Alemão Complexo do Alemão (Area of UPP includes Morro do Alemão, Pedra do Sapo, Morro da Esperança, Armando Sodré and Areal) North Zone
11 May 2012 22ª UPP Adeus/Baiana Bonsucesso (Area of UPP includes Morro do Piancó and the communities of Itararé and Horácio Picoreli) North Zone
18 April 2012 21ª UPP Nova Brasília Bonsucesso (Area of UPP includes Nova Brasília, Ipê Itararé, Mourão Filho, Largo

Gamboa, Cabão, Joaquim de Queiroz, Loteamento, Prédios, Jardim Guadalajara, Aterro I and Aterro II)

North Zone
18 April 2012 20ª UPP Fazendinha Inhaúma (Area of UPP includes Fazendinha, Relicário, Palmeirinha, Morro das Palmeiras, Vila Matinha, Parque Alvorada, Te Contei, Rua Um and Casinhas) North Zone
18 January 2012 19ª UPP Vidigal Vidigal (Area of UPP includes Vidigal and Chácara do Céu) South Zone
3 November 2011 18ª UPP Mangueira São Cristóvão Mangueira, and Benfica (Area of UPP includes the communities of Mangueira, Morro do Telégrafo, Parque Candelária, Vila Miséria, Bartolomeu Gusmão, Marechal Jardim, Buraco Quente, Minhocão and Parque dos Mineiros) North Zone
17 May 2011 17ª UPP São Carlos Estácio and Rio Comprido (Area of UPP includes Morro do São Carlos, Querosene, Mineira, Zinco, Azevedo Lima, Clara Nunes and Favela do Rato) Centro
25 February 2011 16ª UPP Escondidinho/Prazeres Santa Teresa (UPP area includes Morro dos Prazeres, Escondidinho, Vila Elza, Augusta de Sá, Favelinha and Vila Anchieta) Centro
25 February 2011 15ª UPP Coroa, Fallet and Fogueteiro Rio Comprido (UPP area includes Morro da Coroa, Morro do Fallet, Fogueteiro, Vila Santa Bárbara, Luiz Marcelino, Eliseu Visconti, Unidos de Santa Teresa, Vila Pereira da Silva and Amigos do Vale) Centro
28 January 2011 14ª UPP São João, Matriz and Quieto Engenho Novo (UPP area includes Morro do São João, Morro da Matriz and Morro do Quieto) North Zone
30 November 2010 13ª UPP Macacos Vila Isabel (Area of UPP includes Morro dos Macacos, Pau da Bandeira, Parque Recanto do Trovador and Parque Vila Isabel) North Zone
30 September 2010 12ª UPP Morro do Turano Tijuca, Rio Comprido (Area of UPP includes communities of Turano, Bispo, Pantanal, Parque Rebouças, Chacrinha, Matinha, 117, Liberdade, Pedacinho do Céu, Paula Ramos, Acomodado, Santa Alexandrina, Rodo and Sumaré) North Zone
17 September 2010 11ª UPP Salgueiro Tijuca (Area of UPP includes Morro do Salgueiro and Coréia) North Zone
28 July 2010 10ª UPP Andaraí Andaraí (Area of UPP extends until Grajaú and includes the communities of Nova Divineia, João Paulo II, Juscelino Kubitschek, Jamelão, Morro de Santo Agostinho, Borda do Mato, Arrelia and Rodo.) North Zone
1 July 2010 9ª UPP Formiga Tijuca (Morro da Formiga) North Zone
7 June 2010 8ª UPP Borel Tijuca (Area of UPP includes the communities of Morro do Borel, Buraco Quente, Chácara do Céu, Casa Branca, Indiana, Catrambi, Morro da Cruz and Bananal) North Zone
25 April 2010 7ª UPP Providência Santo Cristo, Gamboa and Saúde (Area of UPP includes Morros da Providência, Vila Mimosa, São Diogo, Moreira Pinto, Conjunto Vila Portuária and Pedra Lisa) Centro
14 January 2010 6ª UPP Tabajaras/Cabritos Copacabana, Botafogo (Area of UPP includes Ladeira dos Tabajaras, Morro dos Cabritos, Pico do Papagaio, Nova Mangueira (in Botafogo) and Morro da Saudade South Zone
23 December 2009 5ª UPP Pavão-Pavãozinho Copacabana, Ipanema (UPP area includes Pavão-Pavãozinho, Cantagalo e Vietnã) South Zone
10 June 2009 4ª UPP Babilônia and Chapéu-Mangueira Leme (UPP Area includes Morro da Babilônia, Chapéu-Mangueira) South Zone
18 February 2009 3ª UPP Batan Realengo (UPP Area includes Batan, Vila Jurema, Jardim Água Branca, Vila Nova, Itaporanga and Duarte Coelho) West Zone
16 February 2009 2ª UPP Cidade de Deus Cidade de Deus (UPP area includes Cidade de Deus, Quadras, Apartamentos, Caratê, Beirada do Rio, Jardim Novo Mundo, Rua Davi, Banca da Velha, Coroado, Sítio da Amizade, Moisés, Praça da Bíblia, Pantanal, Santa Efigênia, Moquiço, Efraim, Vila Nova Cruzada, Vila da Conquista and Jardins do Amanhã) West Zone
28 November 2008 1ª UPP Santa Marta Botafogo (UPP area encompasses Dona Marta also known as Santa Marta) South Zone

See also

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References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Pacifying Police Unit

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The Pacifying Police Units (Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora, UPP) are a Brazilian program initiated by the Rio de Janeiro state government in December 2008 to reestablish state authority in long controlled by drug trafficking organizations through the deployment of specialized, community-oriented police outposts rather than sporadic military-style invasions. The strategy, first applied in the , involved elite units like BOPE conducting initial clearances followed by permanent occupation by trained focused on proximity policing, violence reduction, and coordination with to foster community integration and diminish criminal influence. At its peak, the program encompassed up to 38 units serving approximately 1.5 million residents with around 9,000 officers, achieving notable declines in and rates in pacified areas according to empirical evaluations. However, implementation revealed limitations, including rises in non-violent crimes like , persistent police abuses such as and excessive force, inadequate investment in socioeconomic development, and vulnerability to criminal counteroffensives, which eroded initial gains and prompted program scaling back by the late 2010s. Despite these challenges, the UPP model influenced discussions on urban security reforms in , highlighting the trade-offs between short-term territorial control and the need for broader institutional and social reforms to sustain peace in high-crime environments.

Origins and Development

Conception and Initial Launch

The Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) were conceived by Rio de Janeiro State Secretary of Public Security José Mariano Beltrame, with support from Governor Sérgio Cabral, as an alternative to the cycle of temporary, high-intensity police raids that characterized prior efforts to combat drug trafficking in favelas. These raids, often led by the elite Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE), typically involved entering communities, engaging armed groups, and withdrawing, which allowed traffickers to reestablish control shortly thereafter. Beltrame's model shifted toward permanent occupation by dedicated Military Police subunits, trained for proximity policing and citizenship-oriented engagement, following initial clearance operations to neutralize immediate threats from organized crime. This approach drew on intelligence assessments identifying over 100 high-violence favelas and aimed to integrate security with longer-term state presence, contrasting with historical repressive tactics dating back to earlier gubernatorial attempts in the 1980s and 1990s. Implementation began with pilot planning in mid-2008, focusing on —a South Zone with strategic visibility due to its hillside location overlooking affluent areas and tourism sites. Preparatory actions included targeted BOPE incursions to dismantle armed factions, enabling the installation of the inaugural UPP on December 19, 2008. The unit comprised 126 officers operating in rotating shifts to maintain 24-hour coverage from fixed posts, emphasizing reduced lethality, community interaction, and intelligence gathering over mass arrests. Beltrame described it explicitly as a "test model" for replication, with initial metrics tracking violence reduction and resident cooperation to refine tactics before broader rollout. Early operations in yielded visible state reclamation, including the removal of heavy weaponry and open-air drug sales, though challenges like officer adaptation to non-confrontational roles emerged immediately. The launch aligned with state priorities amid rising urban violence, setting precedents for subsequent UPPs in adjoining areas like Cidade de Deus by 2009, while formal integration into structures and bonus incentives for personnel were codified the following year.

Political and International Context

The Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) were initiated in 2008 under the administration of Rio de Janeiro Governor Sérgio Cabral of the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), with State Public Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame overseeing implementation as a shift toward "policing with citizenship" to reclaim favelas from organized crime. This policy emerged amid escalating violence in Rio's slums, where drug traffickers had long dominated territories beyond state control, prompting a strategic pivot from purely repressive tactics to sustained occupation by specialized Military Police units following elite BOPE incursions. Federally backed with resources from Brazil's national government, the program aligned with broader efforts to assert state authority in peripheral urban areas, reflecting a political consensus on prioritizing security stabilization over immediate social reforms. The rollout coincided with preparations for international mega-events, including the 2010 FIFA Confederations Cup, 2014 World Cup, and 2016 Olympics hosted in Rio, which intensified pressure on state authorities to demonstrate control over high-risk zones and curb favela-based disruptions that could undermine Brazil's global image. Cabral's administration leveraged UPPs to signal progress in , securing political capital through visible territorial gains, though critics later noted the program's event-driven urgency sometimes overshadowed long-term viability assessments. Beltrame's leadership emphasized coordination between police, , and investments, but relied heavily on state-level political will amid fiscal constraints and resistance from entrenched policing cultures favoring . Internationally, UPPs drew inspiration from Colombia's urban pacification experiences, particularly in and , where Cabral and Beltrame studied anti-cartel strategies during a visit, adapting elements like community-oriented occupation to Rio's context of fragmented gang control rather than monolithic syndicates. This cross-border learning influenced the phased approach—initial invasion, permanent basing, and service integration—but diverged by embedding units within Brazil's structure, avoiding full demilitarization seen in some Colombian models. While no direct foreign funding drove origins, the strategy echoed global discourses on "citizen security" promoted by organizations like the , positioning Rio's efforts within hemispheric debates on balancing force with proximity policing in unequal cities.

Objectives and Operational Framework

Core Goals and Principles

The Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) were designed to reclaim control of favelas and other territories in Rio de Janeiro dominated by , particularly drug trafficking gangs, through permanent occupation and the establishment of . The program's stated objectives included reducing visible manifestations of criminal power, such as armed sentinels and territorial markers, by installing 24-hour police bases in targeted communities to enable proximity policing and prevent the resurgence of gang authority. This approach followed initial incursions by specialized forces like the (BOPE), transitioning to sustained presence by trained units focused on holding ground rather than temporary raids. Core principles emphasized community-oriented policing, with officers receiving specialized training to build resident trust, promote , and facilitate over confrontation. The framework sought to reintegrate favelas into the formal city structure by prioritizing non-lethal interventions, legal compliance, and coordination with to address root causes of disorder, though implementation often prioritized security over immediate socioeconomic integration. Autonomy for UPP commanders was intended to adapt operations to local realities, aligning with broader goals of democratic governance in previously lawless areas. Ultimately, the UPPs aimed to lower violence and criminality metrics by disrupting operations and enabling state authority, with evaluations targeting reductions in homicides and territorial disputes as key indicators of success. This model drew from international proximity policing concepts but adapted them to Brazil's high-violence urban contexts, stressing permanence to sustain pacification beyond event-driven security needs like the 2016 Olympics.

Pacification Process and Tactics

The pacification process implemented by the Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) in Rio de Janeiro followed a structured sequence designed to reestablish state authority in gang-dominated . It began with a preparation phase involving gathering and selection of target communities, prioritizing smaller or medium-sized where intergang conflicts were less intense to facilitate control. This phase aimed to identify key drug traffickers for targeted arrests or displacement rather than eradicating drug trade entirely. The core tactical operation commenced with an invasion led by the (BOPE), Rio's elite military police squad, employing large-scale assaults to expel or disarm armed groups. For instance, the inaugural UPP in favela on December 19, 2008, involved BOPE clearing drug traffickers, supported by naval and air forces when necessary, resulting in the establishment of state control without subsequent shootouts in that area. These invasions utilized overwhelming force, including coordinated entries and occupations, as seen in earlier precedents like the 2007 Morro do Alemão operation with 1,300 personnel. Following clearance, UPP units—composed of specially trained younger officers—assumed permanent occupation, maintaining a 24-hour presence through fixed bases, foot patrols, and monitoring to prevent resurgence. Officers underwent six months of basic training alongside cadets, supplemented by two weeks focused on and , emphasizing non-confrontational interactions. Ongoing tactics shifted to proximity and community-oriented policing, integrating with social service delivery such as document issuance and utility regularization to foster resident cooperation and reduce marginality. This model sought to enforce laws consistently while building trust, though it retained repressive elements for threats, blending occupation with engagement to sustain territorial control. By 2015, the strategy had expanded to 38 UPPs employing approximately 9,500 personnel across targeted zones.

Implementation and Expansion

Early Deployments in Key Favelas

The inaugural deployment of a Pacifying Police Unit took place in the on December 19, 2008, marking the program's pilot phase in a relatively small community of approximately 7,000 residents located in Rio de Janeiro's South Zone. This installation followed an initial occupation by the (BOPE), which expelled drug traffickers from the area, allowing for the permanent stationing of about 120 officers under the command of Captain Priscilla de Oliveira. The unit established a fixed outpost to maintain continuous presence, focusing on proximity policing rather than temporary raids, as part of a test model to reclaim state authority in gang-dominated territories. Building on this foundation, two additional early units were installed in adjacent South Zone favelas—Babilônia and Chácara do Céu—by February 2009, extending coverage to interconnected hillsides with similar low-to-moderate levels of activity. These deployments similarly involved preemptive BOPE incursions to neutralize immediate threats from traffickers, followed by the erection of community-integrated police stations designed for long-term occupancy. On February 16, 2009, the program advanced to Cidade de Deus, a medium-sized in the West Zone notorious for heavy gang control and depicted in the 2002 film City of God, where around 100 officers were deployed after clearing operations displaced entrenched narcotics networks. These initial expansions prioritized favelas with less inter-gang rivalry, facilitating quicker stabilization through visible state presence and reduced reliance on lethal force post-occupation. By April 2010, the fourth early deployment targeted Providência, Rio's oldest in the city center, timed to coincide with preparations for major international events like the 2010 Confederations Cup and 2016 Olympics; this involved over 200 officers securing the area after BOPE dismantled militia and trafficking strongholds, enabling basic infrastructure improvements alongside policing. The scale escalated with the November 28, 2010, mega-operation in , a sprawling North Zone complex housing over 100,000 residents and long dominated by heavily armed factions of the ; this joint effort mobilized 3,000 , army troops, and federal forces to occupy 13 interconnected favelas, resulting in the capture of weapons caches and the flight or arrest of key traffickers, paving the way for phased UPP installations starting in early 2011. A parallel push in November 2011 addressed , the city's largest single with roughly 200,000 inhabitants straddling affluent neighborhoods in the South Zone; BOPE-led forces, numbering in the thousands, conducted a nighttime on November 13 to seize control from traffickers, uncovering substantial arms and drug stockpiles amid minimal resistance due to prior leader arrests. Formal UPP activation followed in September 2012, deploying over 700 officers across multiple stations to enforce the pacification model in this high-profile, economically vital area. These key early efforts in larger complexes like Alemão and tested the program's limits, requiring coordinated inter-agency operations and temporary military support to overcome fortified defenses, contrasting with the more contained dynamics of prior small-scale rollouts.

Peak Operations and Coverage

The Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) achieved their maximum operational scope between 2013 and 2014, with 37 units installed across Rio de Janeiro's favelas by May 2014. This expansion followed initial deployments in the South Zone, extending to strategically vital North Zone complexes such as and , which were occupied in large-scale operations involving and in November 2010 and January 2011, respectively. By late 2013, the program encompassed approximately 231 communities with around 8,591 officers deployed. At its zenith, UPP coverage included up to 264 favelas, serving an estimated 590,000 residents, representing a significant portion of the city's high-risk urban peripheries. Operations emphasized permanent police bases for proximity policing, with units transitioning from invasion phases—supported by elite BOPE (Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais) incursions—to stabilization and community integration efforts. The program's scale aligned with preparations for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympics, prioritizing security in event-adjacent areas while aiming for broader territorial reclamation from drug trafficking factions like Comando Vermelho and Amigos dos Amigos. Personnel peaked at nearly 10,000 officers across 38 units by mid-decade, enabling 24-hour presence and basic service provision in pacified zones. Despite this footprint, coverage remained uneven, concentrating on 18-20% of Rio's total favelas and excluding militia-dominated territories, which later complicated . The framework relied on sequential phases: intelligence-led assaults, followed by UPP installation for deterrence and rapport-building, though logistical strains from rapid scaling—without proportional social investment—foreshadowed operational limits.

Empirical Outcomes

Crime and Violence Metrics

Following the initial deployments of Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) in 2008, homicide rates in Rio de Janeiro exhibited marked declines correlated with program expansion. Citywide homicides fell by 65% between 2009 and 2014, coinciding with UPP installations in multiple favelas. In the state of Rio de Janeiro, the homicide rate decreased from 42 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2005 to 24 per 100,000 in 2012, representing over a 50% reduction in both absolute numbers and rates, with city totals dropping to 1,209 homicides in 2012. Empirical analyses using difference-in-differences methods on Instituto de Segurança Pública (ISP) data confirmed localized reductions in UPP areas from late 2008 to mid-2011. Homicides declined by 10-25% overall in these zones, with specific favelas like Providência and Macacos seeing drops of 66% and 69%, respectively; robberies decreased by 10-20%, including 59% in areas like São Carlos. UPPs accounted for approximately 14% of the citywide homicide decline and 20% of robbery reductions since mid-2009, though other crime types such as thefts showed less consistent abatement.
MetricPre-UPP (2005-2008)Peak UPP Impact (2009-2014)Post-Peak (2015-2016)
Rio City Homicides~6,000+ annually (est. from rates)65% decline from 2009 baselineReturn to pre-UPP levels by 2016
State Homicide Rate (per 100k)42 (2005)24 (2012)Rising trends post-2015
By 2015, however, and metrics reversed, with rates climbing back to pre-UPP levels by 2016 amid funding shortfalls and operational strains on the program. This uptick contributed to broader state and national surges, though city-specific later showed fluctuations, including a drop to 790 s by 2021 under varied policing strategies.

Socioeconomic and Community Indicators

Property values in favelas targeted by UPPs rose by 5-10% on average between 2008 and 2011, with the policy accounting for approximately 15% of overall price growth in Rio's formal property market during that period. This appreciation disproportionately benefited lower-valued properties, contributing to a reduction in residential price inequality, as evidenced by a decline in the from 0.29 to 0.265 across neighborhoods. Such changes suggest indirect economic gains through enhanced perceived security and market integration, though they primarily reflect capitalization of reduced risks rather than broad growth. Educational outcomes showed modest improvements in UPP-adjacent areas. A difference-in-differences analysis of school data from 2005 to 2015 found that UPP implementation increased 9th-grade math test scores by 3% (0.13 standard deviations), significant at the 5% level, while having no detectable effect on 5th-grade scores. Dropout rates in primary grades (1st to 5th) declined by 50% (0.26 standard deviations) after three years of pacification, likely due to stabilized environments facilitating attendance, though effects were confined to schools within 100 meters of favelas. Health service utilization increased in pacified areas, with indicating higher volumes of procedures at nearby clinics following UPP deployment, attributed to improved access amid reduced violence. However, direct impacts on broader socioeconomic metrics like household , employment rates, or poverty levels remain undocumented in rigorous studies, as UPP focused primarily on without integrated economic interventions; average favela hovered around R$380 monthly pre- and post-pacification in sampled areas, underscoring persistent structural challenges. Community trust in state institutions rose initially, enabling greater service provision, but sustained gains depended on complementary social programs beyond policing.

Independent Evaluations and Studies

A 2012 study by Ignacio Cano, funded by the Development Bank of Latin America and involving statistical comparisons of crime data alongside qualitative interviews, concluded that UPPs significantly reduced lethal violence in intervened favelas, estimating a savings of approximately 60 lives per 100,000 inhabitants annually, primarily due to declines in police killings. Non-lethal crimes such as robberies increased, which the analysis attributed to improved reporting amid weakened gang control rather than rising incidence. Subsequent econometric evaluations have yielded more mixed results. A study utilizing crime data from 37 UPPs covering 830,000 residents, employing difference-in-differences models adjusted for reporting biases via proxies like accident reports, found pacification associated with a 7% reduction in rates and a 29% drop in robberies, but a 66% increase in assaults and an 82% rise in threats. Police killings fell by 15%, with authors positing crime substitution effects from disrupted structures and reduced access as explanations for the heterogeneous outcomes. An impact evaluation from Stanford's King Center for Global Development, analyzing violent death data across favelas, determined that UPPs exerted no statistically significant effect on overall rates within pacified areas, where poor residents continued to experience homicide risks 2-3 times higher than the city's . However, the program correlated with a 60% reduction in police-perpetrated killings relative to counterfactual trends, highlighting a targeted improvement in state force lethality despite broader failures in curbing civilian homicides. Indirect assessments via metrics provide complementary evidence of localized gains. A analysis of birth records linked pacification to a 0.07 standard deviation improvement in birth outcomes, concentrated in the third trimester and driven by a 16.3% increase in visits within UPP boundaries, suggesting enhanced access to services amid reduced interference. No analogous effects appeared outside UPP perimeters or in earlier trimesters, underscoring spatially confined benefits without broader stress reductions. Ongoing , such as Stanford's broader evaluation of over 30,000 violent deaths from 2005-2014, emphasizes heterogeneous reductions across favelas and potential spillover effects to non-UPP zones, though definitive citywide attribution remains challenged by confounding factors like economic pressures and adaptations. These studies collectively indicate initial of extreme but persistent challenges in achieving comprehensive crime suppression, with empirical rigor varying by methodological controls for and temporal dynamics.

Challenges and Controversies

Police Conduct and Corruption

Reports from organizations and have documented persistent misconduct by UPP officers, including excessive and arbitrary detentions. In the , a 2013 incident involving the disappearance of resident Amarildo de Souza after his detention by UPP personnel for questioning about alleged drug ties highlighted systemic issues of and cover-ups, prompting public outrage and federal intervention that resulted in the temporary suspension of the local UPP commander and charges against multiple officers. investigations revealed that UPP deployments often failed to curb underlying patterns of police violence, with officers rationalizing lethal encounters and contributing to over 1,000 extrajudicial killings by Rio's between 2009 and 2015, many in pacified areas where accountability mechanisms proved inadequate. Corruption scandals further eroded the program's credibility, as some UPP units mirrored pre-pacification practices of and with criminals. A notable case occurred in April 2023, when former UPP commander Frederico de Lima Castro was arrested for allegedly receiving weekly bribes totaling around 40,000 reais (approximately $8,600) from the gang in exchange for facilitating drug trafficking operations within pacified territories. Independent analyses attribute such to low officer salaries, inadequate oversight, and the lucrative incentives of favelas' illicit economies, with surveys indicating that resident distrust stemmed partly from perceived UPP involvement in shakedowns and protection rackets. Despite initial efforts to deploy fresh graduates to minimize entrenched graft, shows limited success in reforming conduct, as rates for abuses remained high—fewer than 10% of police killing cases resulted in convictions during the UPP's peak years. These patterns, corroborated across multiple nongovernmental reports, underscore how structural incentives within Rio's militarized policing model perpetuated misconduct, even under the UPP framework designed to prioritize community proximity policing over confrontation.

Gang Resistance and Escalated Violence

The implementation of Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) encountered significant resistance from entrenched drug trafficking gangs, such as and , who employed guerrilla tactics including ambushes from elevated positions and intelligence from local spies to counter police advances. These groups, controlling key favelas prior to UPP deployments, relocated operations to peripheral areas upon announcements of pacification to evade capture while mounting sporadic attacks aimed at destabilizing the units. Initial establishment phases often required elite BOPE incursions, resulting in prolonged firefights, as seen in operations against fortified gang positions. Escalated violence marked the early and ongoing phases of UPP rollout, with Rio's homicide rate increasing 18% in 2013 amid displacement and retaliatory actions. Between January and mid-August 2014, 179 police officers were shot and 49 killed in confrontations linked to resistance in pacified and contested territories. Such incidents included direct assaults on UPP personnel, contributing to a pattern of heightened lethality as traffickers sought to reassert territorial dominance through targeted strikes. In specific favelas like and , gang holdouts led to recurrent shootouts, with power struggles exacerbating civilian exposure to ; for instance, 2017 clashes in between rival factions and underscored persistent resistance despite UPP presence. These events highlighted how pacification provoked intensified conflict rather than immediate submission, as gangs adapted by intensifying tactics against state forces.

Criticisms from Human Rights and Local Perspectives

Human rights organizations have documented cases of , arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killings attributed to UPP officers, arguing that such abuses undermined the program's legitimacy and perpetuated cycles of . In July 2013, Amarildo de Souza, a 42-year-old in , was detained during a UPP stop-and-frisk operation on July 14 and subsequently tortured to death by police using electric shocks and beatings; eleven UPP officers were charged, with several convicted in 2016 for his and concealment of the body. Watch's 2016 investigation into Rio police practices highlighted a "routine disregard" for legal standards in UPP areas, including falsified reports of "acts of resistance" to justify lethal force, based on interviews with over 30 officers and analysis of dozens of cases. Amnesty International has reported patterns of unnecessary and excessive force by UPP personnel against favela residents, including during routine patrols, contributing to a climate of fear rather than pacification. These organizations contend that inadequate oversight and internal corruption within UPP units—such as officers extorting residents or colluding with traffickers—exacerbated violations, with limited prosecutions despite thousands of complaints filed annually to oversight bodies like Rio's Police Ombudsman. From local perspectives, favela residents frequently cite police overreach and mistreatment as key grievances, viewing UPPs as militarized occupations that replaced extortion with state-sanctioned abuse. A 2017 survey of Rio dwellers found that nearly 70% perceived UPPs as failing due to persistent , including arbitrary searches and verbal , though a majority still favored continued police presence over withdrawal. Residents in communities like and have organized protests and hotlines to report incidents, such as the 2014 Popular Committee's dossier documenting over 100 alleged UPP violations in the lead-up to the , including home invasions and claims against female residents. These accounts emphasize a lack of , with UPPs often prioritizing territorial control over addressing resident needs, fostering resentment amid unfulfilled promises of .

Decline and Recent Developments

Factors Contributing to Retrenchment

The retrenchment of Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) in Rio de Janeiro was primarily driven by Rio state's severe fiscal crisis, which began intensifying around 2014 and culminated in a declared state of financial emergency on June 17, 2016. This crisis led to sharp budget cuts, delayed police salaries, and reduced funding for UPP operations and associated social programs, undermining the sustainability of permanent community policing presence. By 2018, these financial constraints contributed to the closure of 12 UPPs and the merger of 7 others, reducing the total from 38 units. Operational challenges exacerbated the fiscal pressures, as UPP expansion into larger and more violent favelas from 2014 onward increased police misconduct, including extrajudicial killings and shootings, eroding community trust and escalating confrontations. Homicide rates in pacified areas, which had fallen by 65% between 2009 and 2014, rebounded to pre-UPP levels by 2016, accompanied by spikes in police lethality and officer deaths around 2017. Inadequate training—limited to just two weeks of community policing after six months of general preparation—failed to instill effective proximity policing, leading to incidents like the documented execution of suspects by UPP officers in March 2017. The absence of robust social services integration further contributed to retrenchment, as promised investments in education, health, and infrastructure in favelas were curtailed by partisan politics and resource shortages after programs shifted from state to municipal control. This left UPPs isolated as security outposts without broader state-building support, fostering resident perceptions of militarization over pacification and growing internal police opposition to the model. Post-2016 political changes, including new gubernatorial priorities emphasizing aggressive anti-crime tactics over sustained UPP occupation, accelerated the drawdown amid resurgent gang control in de-pacified areas.

Closures and Policy Shifts Post-2020

Following the resurgence of violence and fiscal constraints that began eroding the UPP program prior to 2020, the Rio de Janeiro state government accelerated closures in the ensuing years. By early 2021, operational challenges including gang counterattacks and reduced funding led to the deactivation of several units, though specific counts for that year were not systematically documented in official releases. In 2022 and 2023, further retrenchments occurred as part of broader security reallocations, with units like those in Andaraí and Prazeres integrated into conventional battalions (BPMs) to free personnel for general patrols. This process released over 1,000 military police officers by August 2024, reflecting a pragmatic response to unsustainable static deployments amid persistent territorial disputes. A major wave of closures culminated on November 12, 2024, when the state government announced the shutdown of 13 UPPs in Rio de Janeiro city, reducing the total from 29 active units to 16. Affected communities included those served by units such as Formiga, who cited the need for a "new operational model" to adapt to evolving threats from organized crime groups like militias and drug factions. Government officials framed these closures as a restructuring rather than abandonment, arguing that outdated UPP structures failed to incorporate modern intelligence and mobility tactics, which had proven insufficient against adaptive criminal networks. Policy shifts post-2020 emphasized transitioning from permanent territorial occupation to integrated, technology-enhanced policing. Under Governor Cláudio Castro's administration, UPP remnants were subsumed under BPM oversight, prioritizing rapid response units and data-driven operations over fixed outposts, which had incurred high costs without proportional long-term crime suppression. This evolution aligned with statewide investments in surveillance tools and elite forces like BOPE for high-risk interventions, acknowledging that proximity policing's initial gains in homicide reductions had dissipated due to insufficient social investment and gang resilience. Critics from civil society noted that such changes risked reverting to pre-UPP patterns of intermittent incursions, potentially exacerbating community distrust, though empirical data on post-closure violence metrics remained pending as of late 2024.

Long-Term Impact and Lessons

Sustained Effects on Security and Governance

The implementation of Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora (UPPs) initially correlated with reductions in certain violent crimes in targeted , including by 10-25% and robberies by 10-20% in neighborhoods near UPP installations, based on from 2008 to 2013. However, rigorous impact evaluations using difference-in-differences methods found no statistically significant additional effect of UPPs on overall rates among favela residents beyond city-wide secular declines of 42% from 2005 to 2013, attributing reductions more to broader factors like and prior policing trends. Police-perpetrated killings decreased substantially, with UPPs averting an estimated 60% increase that would have occurred otherwise, primarily due to initial militarized interventions by BOPE units that weakened drug trafficking organizations. Yet, less lethal crimes rose, including assaults by 66% and threats by 82%, suggesting crime substitution as gangs adapted to disrupted operations without eliminating underlying incentives. These security gains proved transient, eroding after 2016 amid fiscal crises, reduced police funding, and intensified gang resistance, with city-wide homicides reverting toward pre-UPP levels by 2017 and favela violence surging in formerly pacified areas. By 2021, over 4.4 million residents in Rio state lived under dominance, reflecting a to sustain territorial control despite temporary displacements of gang enforcers. Evaluations indicate that without integrated social investments—such as sustained education, , and welfare programs—UPPs could not prevent the reorganization of criminal networks, leading to barricaded s and heightened civilian targeting by 2025. On , UPPs temporarily reasserted state authority, enabling expanded delivery and property value increases of 5-10% in affected areas, which narrowed price inequality by up to 45% of the observed Gini decline through gains in lower-valued properties. This shift reduced gang monopolies on and in select favelas, fostering provisional citizen-police proximity and trust in early phases. Long-term, however, the absence of institutional reforms addressing and underinvestment allowed criminal to rebound, as evidenced by post-2020 escalations in territorial disputes and state retreats from dozens of UPPs, underscoring the limits of proximity policing without broader structural changes. Academic analyses from institutions like Stanford highlight that heterogeneous outcomes—stronger in smaller, less contested favelas—failed to scale, leaving enduring voids in state legitimacy and service provision.

Implications for Urban Policing Strategies

The Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) in Rio de Janeiro illustrated the potential of permanent territorial occupation to reclaim gang-dominated urban enclaves, reducing murders by 7% and robberies by 29% through sustained presence and weapon seizures that weakened criminal hierarchies. This approach marked a departure from episodic, militarized raids toward proximity policing, initially fostering greater state legitimacy and economic activity in intervened favelas, with homicides citywide dropping 65% from 2009 to 2014. However, such strategies must account for crime displacement, as UPPs correlated with a 66% rise in assaults and 82% increase in threats, reflecting how suppressed lethal violence can shift to pervasive, low-level disruptions without complementary measures to deter opportunism. Shortcomings in revealed critical dependencies for efficacy: inadequate specialized —often just two weeks atop six months of general —enabled abuses like extrajudicial killings, eroding trust and prompting resident backlash. The model's overreliance on policing without integrated social programming, such as consistent welfare and investments, failed to mitigate causes like and informal economies, leading to reversals where homicides rebounded to pre-UPP levels by 2016. Evaluations emphasize that urban strategies in high-density, under-governed areas require vetting officers for integrity, fostering accountability mechanisms, and avoiding familiarity that breeds in prolonged occupations. Broader applications for urban policing underscore the limits of security-centric interventions absent institutional overhaul; UPPs' partial successes affirm the value of community-oriented models in restoring order but warn against standalone occupation, as evidenced by the program's scaling to 38 units with 9,500 officers by yet subsequent collapse due to funding gaps and partisan shifts. Effective replication demands multi-agency coordination—pairing police with sustained state services—to prevent substitution effects and ensure durability, prioritizing empirical monitoring of crime typologies over aggregate violence metrics. In contexts of entrenched , hybrid tactics blending intelligence-led operations with social prevention outperform pure enforcement, highlighting causal links between governance voids and recidivist violence.

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