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Police corruption
Police corruption
from Wikipedia

A 1902 cartoon depicts a police officer whose eyes are covered with a cloth labelled "bribes"

Police corruption is a form of police misconduct in which a law enforcement officer breaks their political contract and abuses their power for personal gain. A corrupt officer may act alone or as part of a group. Corrupt acts include taking bribes, stealing from victims or suspects, and manipulating evidence to affect the outcome of legal proceedings (such as in a frameup). Police corruption challenges the human rights of citizens, and can undermine public trust in the police when uncovered or suspected.

Types

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Soliciting or accepting bribes in exchange for not reporting organized drug or prostitution rings or other illegal activities and violations of law, county and city ordinances and state and federal laws.

US Military Police officer restraining and sedating prisoner, while a soldier holds him down.

Bribes may also include leasing unlawful access to proprietary law enforcement databases and systems.[1]

Flouting the police code of conduct in order to secure convictions of civilians and suspects—for example, through the use of falsified evidence. There are also situations where law enforcement officers may deliberately and systematically participate in organized crime themselves.

Selective enforcement

In most major cities there are internal affairs sections to investigate suspected police corruption or misconduct, including selective enforcement, but there are situations where Internal Affairs also hides departmental and individual corruption, fraud, abuse and waste by individual officers, groups of officers or even unwritten departmental policies. There are also Police Commissions who are complicit in the same cover-ups, often to hide internal and departmental problems, both from public view, and also from inter-departmental reviews and investigations. Certain officers can be fired, then rehired by petition after they accrue enough signatures, often from the very criminals and violators from whom corrupt officers have garnered previous favors in exchange for officers "turning a blind eye", resulting in selective enforcement of violations being deterred, but actually promoted.

Similar entities include the British Independent Police Complaints Commission. Police corruption is a significant widespread problem in many departments and agencies worldwide.

It is not possible to measure the level of corruption in a country. Surveys of police officers, citizens and businesses can be used to provide estimates on levels of corruption. These are often inaccurate, as respondents involved in corruption are reluctant to provide any information implicating themselves in criminal activity.[2] Despite this limitation, information collected from International Crime Victim Surveys and surveys conducted by the Global Corruption Enumerated Barometer can be used to estimate the level of police corruption.

Corrupt acts

[edit]

Police officers have several opportunities to gain personally from their status and authority as law enforcement officers. The Knapp Commission, which investigated corruption in the New York City Police Department in the early 1970s, divided corrupt officers into two types: meat-eaters, who "aggressively misuse their police powers for personal gain", and grass-eaters, who "simply accept the payoffs that the happenstances of police work throw their way."[3]

There are multiple typologies of police corruption that have been asserted by academics. However, common corrupt acts that have been committed by police officers can be classified as follows:[4]

  • Death in custody: Murder of an accused or convicted person in custody by way of a beating.[5] Corrections Officers who engage in this behavior are known as a “beat up squad.”[6] Officers disabling Bodycams (visual, sound, or both) are often involved.[7]
  • Corruption of authority: When police officers receive free drinks, meals, and other gratuities, because they are police officers, whether intentionally or unintentionally, they convey an image of corruption.[8][9][10][11]
  • Extortion/bribery: Demanding or receiving payment for criminal offenses, to overlook a crime or a possible future crime. Types of bribery are protection for illegal activities, ticket fixing, altering testimony, destroying evidence, and selling criminal information. Bribery is one of the most common acts of corruption.
  • Theft and burglary is when an officer or department steals from a suspect, victim or corpse. Examples are taking drugs for personal use in a drug bust, and taking personal objects from a corpse at the scene of a crime. A theft can also occur within a department. An officer can steal property from the department's evidence room or property room for personal use.[12][13]
  • Shakedowns: When a police officer is aware of a crime and the violator but accepts a bribe for not arresting the violator (Roebuck & Barker, 1973).
  • "Fixing": Undermining criminal prosecutions by withholding evidence or failing to appear at judicial hearings, for bribery or as a personal favor.
  • Perjury: Lying to protect other officers or oneself in a court of law or a department investigation.
  • Internal payoffs: Prerogatives and prerequisites of law enforcement organizations, such as shifts and holidays, being bought and sold.
  • Overtime Fraud: Obtaining large sums of overtime without being at work.[14]
  • The "frameup": The planting or adding to evidence, especially in drug cases.[15]
  • Ticket fixing: Police officers cancelling traffic tickets as a favor to the friends and family of other police officers.

Behavior

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Corrupted behavior can be caused by the behavioral change of the officer within the police "subculture". A subculture is a group of individuals within a culture that share the same attitudes and beliefs. Police officers within the department share the same norms and that new behavioral development can be attributed through psychological, sociological, and anthropological paradigms.[16]

  • Psychological paradigm: The psychological paradigm suggests that behavior is based and structured through an individual's early stages of life. Those attracted to the police occupation tend to be more "authoritarian". The authoritarian personality is characterized by conservative, aggressive, cynical, and rigid behaviors.[17] Corruption may involve profit or another type of material benefit gained illegally as a consequence of the officer's authority. Psychological corruption can be a part of a department's culture or from the certain individual.
  • Sociological paradigm: The sociological paradigm focuses on individual exposure to a police training academy, regular in-service training, and field experience all shape occupational character. Police learn how to behave, discretion, morals and what to think from their shared experiences with other police officers.[17] New recruits develop definitions with their peers either positive or negative. These definitions are then reinforced, positively or negatively, by the rewards or punishments (either real or perceived) that follow their behavior.[18] For example, a new recruit may be given an order by his peer to arrest an individual sitting in the passenger seat for a DUI.[clarification needed] This action can end up negatively or positively for the officer depending on how the situation is perceived by the court later on.
  • Anthropological paradigm: When an individual's social character is changed when an officer becomes part of the occupational culture. The term culture is often used to describe differences among large social groups where they share unique beliefs, morals, customs, and other characteristics that set them apart from other groups.[17] Within the police culture, officers learn to be suspicious of the public. Police culture can also be quite racist, and shot through with assumptions about the criminal tendencies of certain minority groups, such as African Americans, or the competency of fellow officers from minority backgrounds,[19] which can lead officers to make corrupted choices for personal benefits or gains.

Prevalence

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Accurate information about the prevalence of police corruption is hard to come by, since the corrupt activities tend to happen in secret and police organizations have little incentive to publish information about corruption.[20] Police officials and researchers alike have argued that in some countries, large-scale corruption involving the police not only exists but can even become institutionalized.[21] One study of corruption in the Los Angeles Police Department (focusing particularly on the Rampart scandal) proposed that certain forms of police corruption may be the norm, rather than the exception, in American policing.[22] In the UK, an internal investigation in 2002 into the largest police force, the Metropolitan Police, Operation Tiberius found that the force was so corrupt that "organized criminals were able to infiltrate Scotland Yard "at will" by bribing corrupt officers ... and that Britain's biggest force experienced 'endemic corruption' at the time".[23]

Where corruption exists, the widespread existence of a Blue Code of Silence among the police can prevent the corruption from coming to light. Officers in these situations commonly fail to report corrupt behavior or provide false testimony to outside investigators to cover up criminal activity by their fellow officers.[24] The well-known case of Frank Serpico, a police officer who spoke out about pervasive corruption in the New York City Police Department despite the open hostility of other members, illustrates how powerful the code of silence can be. In Australia in 1994, by 46 votes to 45, independent politician John Hatton forced the New South Wales state government to override the Independent Commission Against Corruption and the advice of senior police to establish a ground-breaking Royal Commission into Police Corruption[25] However, in a number of countries, such as China,[26] Pakistan, Malaysia, Russia, Ukraine, Brazil or Mexico, police corruption remains to be one of the largest social problems facing their countries.[citation needed]

By country

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Afghanistan

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The Afghan National Police (ANP) are considered notoriously corrupt. The Ministry of the Interior has been criticized for "failing to properly account for billions of dollars allocated for police salaries via a U.N.-administered trust fund." Corruption robs police officers of up to half of their salaries, which makes them more likely to solicit bribes. A 2012 Asia Foundation survey found that over half of Afghans who had dealt with an ANP officer during the previous year had been forced to pay a bribe.[27]

Beginning in 2009, policemen in parts of Afghanistan began to be paid through their cell phones, which prevented their superiors from skimming off part of their wages. According to MIT Technology Review, the bribes had been so immense that on their first pay period on the phone system, the police officers believed they had received a pay raise, when in fact they were simply receiving their full pay without any administrative bribes or extortion taking place.[28]

Reuters reported in August 2011 that "an expanding dossier of unresolved police violence and corruption cases ... have alienated Afghans," and that this called into question the feasibility of rebuilding the civic institutions of the war-torn nation.[29]

Fox News reported in October 2014 that Afghan officials may have systematically stolen $300 million from a UNDP trust fund used to pay police officers in Afghanistan and that European Union donors had withheld about $100 million in contributions to the fund owing to concerns about the fund's management. The UNDP itself stated that it was not the agency's responsibility to address this corruption.[30]

Some police officers, according to a 2015 report, have informed the Taliban of impending operations, presumably in exchange for bribes.[31]

Austria

[edit]

Until 2010, few corruption cases have been prosecuted against the Austrian police. There have been a low number of indictments relating to corruption.[32] This is supported by Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index which ranks Austria among the 16 countries with the lowest corruption levels with 7.8 points.[33] The general public support these statistics further as only 25% believe that bribe offering and bribe acceptance is widespread amongst Austrian police officers. Whilst this figure may still appear to be high, it is still much lower than the average for the EU (34%).[34] The success, in comparison to many other nations, can be in part attributed to the stable economic performance of the state, which allows the Austrian police force to receive appropriate salaries.[32] As a result, the likelihood that a significant number of Austrian police officers would consider engaging in corrupt practices as a way of making a living is minimal, and rather acts of police corruption tend to be committed episodically.[32] Austria is a gateway to the European Union from the Eastern European countries, which creates additional corruption opportunities. Despite this, studies illustrate that officers and supervisors tend to be knowledgeable about the boundaries of the police culture, especially with regards to the types of behaviours permitted and prohibited.[35]

Whilst Austria has somewhat been devoid of corruption, there have been several corruption cases particularly over the last several years, which question the accountability of the Austrian police. In 2006, the Vienna police chief was charged with abuse of office and unauthorized acceptance of gifts from private companies, testament to the rising number of corruption acts committed by Austrian police.[32] This is further expressed by Eurobarometer data that emphasises this recent spike in police corruption, as surveys highlighted that in 2011 80% of Austrian citizens exclaimed that corruption was a serious problem, compared to 60% in 2009.[36] The figures from 2011 are above the EU average of 76%,[36] indicating that the recent years have been littered with police corruption crimes that include abuse of office, unauthorized disclosure of information, as well as bribe acceptance.[37] Despite such a rapid elevation in corruption cases amongst police authorities in Austria, no public data and scarce quantities of academic research detailing the number of police officers registered or suspected of or involved in acts of corruption are available.[38] This makes it extremely difficult to assess the extent and nature of the corrupt practices being conducted by the Austrian police. This is because the institutions in charge of countering corruption have only started analyzing it in the last few years, due to the contemporary context that police corruption in Austria is situated.[38] Despite this recent escalation in police corruption prevalence, Austria still remains a country that is characterized by a low number of corruption cases compared to other countries throughout the world.

The economic security of Austria has allowed the police to develop internal control measures that are necessary for identifying and combating corruption.[32] Established internal control measures include the Office for Internal Affairs, the Office for Public Affairs, as well as the Office of the Ombudsman.[32] These developments, amongst many others, are illustrative of the active, preventive approach adopted by the Austrian government and the Ministry of the Interior to address the recent trend of corruption manifestations. These institutional bodies, coupled together with the high degree of intolerance toward corruption amongst Austrian citizens, and the stable nature of the Austrian economy, appear to facilitate the foundations for a positive framework needed in order to mitigate and eradicate police corruption throughout Austria.[35]

Australia

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Bangladesh

[edit]

Burundi

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Brazil

[edit]

China

[edit]

In mainland China, the collusion between corrupt police officers and gang bosses is a major concern, bringing legitimacy issues to the police as well as the ruling party.[26] Since the 1990s, China's anti-corruption campaigns have focused on serious organized crime and corrupt government officials who act as 'protective umbrella' (protectors) for local gangsters. Criminal organizations who are not able seek protection from local police officers are very likely to be destroyed during China's anti-crime campaigns, while criminal groups under police protection are able to survive and control illegal businesses (e.g. gambling, prostitution and drugs) in their territories.[39][40]

Belgium

[edit]

Belgium's levels of corruption in police and business matters are considered to be low. A 2012 ranking specifically on police corruption rated Belgium 16 out of 176.[41] The 2013 Special Eurobarometer stated that 67% percent of Belgium's population felt general corruption, not just police-related, was widespread, compared to the EU average of 76%.[42]

Respondents to the Global Corruption Barometer in 2014 stated that, on a scale of 1-5 (5 being extremely corrupt), police corruption was at 3.2. 11% of respondents felt police corruption had increased since 2011, 51% felt it had decreased. 61% of respondents felt the government's response to police corruption was ineffective.[43]

Two independent organizations deal with police corruption: the General Inspectorate of the Police (AIG) and the Committee P. There are also 196 internal control units within local police forces to deal with minor incidents and police misconduct in conjunction with the AIG and Committee P. In 2011, out of 1,045 investigations by the AIG, 6 were specifically corruption-based, with higher numbers of breaching professional confidence (44) or fraud (26), but lower (3) of abuse of police power. To maintain impartiality, the AIG has completely separate servers to the police, but draws on a number of databases for its investigations, as well as working together with the Committee P. The Committee P generally deals with the most important corruption cases, such as those relating to organized crime or torture. Belgium also has other institutions which deal with corruption, including police-related cases, on a wider scale: the Standing Police Monitoring Committee, and the Central Office for the Repression of Corruption (OCRC).[41]

Case of Marc Dutroux
[edit]

In 2004, the high-profile case of Belgian serial killer and child molester Marc Dutroux resulted in outrage in the community amidst allegations of police corruption and incompetence. Dutroux was meant to be under police surveillance the night he kidnapped two of his victims, but the police had programmed the camera to operate only during the day. The police failed to locate two living victims being held captive during a search of Dutroux's home in 1995. A locksmith who was accompanying the police during the search said he heard children's cries, but was dismissed by the police. The police claimed that they did not view seized videotapes of Dutroux constructing his "dungeon" as at the time they had no VCR. Dutroux claimed he was part of a sex ring that involved high-ranking members of Belgian police and government. The widespread anger over the continued failings of the police and Dutroux's sex-ring allegations, as well as residing judge Jean-Marc Connerott's dismissal, led to the "White March" in 1996, demanding reforms to Belgian police and judicial systems. Connerotte testified that the investigation was deliberately hampered by officials. Dutroux also escaped from police custody in 1998 before being apprehended. A parliamentary commission into the Dutroux case in 1998 found that the defendant benefited from police corruption and incompetence. Although police were cleared of direct compliance in Dutroux's crimes, the report cited major gross negligence throughout Belgium's police system, and an overhaul was called for. The case severely damaged the Belgian community's trust in their police and law enforcement systems.[44]

Case of Stefan P
[edit]

In 2006, a Flemish, i.e. Dutch-speaking, Belgian police officer was sentenced to six months in jail for attempting to extort the equivalent of £160,000 from the parents of a missing woman in 2004, telling them they would be more likely to see their daughter again if they acquiesced. He confessed, but after serving his sentence successfully appealed his sacking from the police as the sacking had been done by a French-speaking officer. Belgium has laws in place to uphold the "rights" of the speakers of each language, including that of a police officer who is being disciplined to undergo questioning in their own language. The former officer was working on a compensation claim and calling for reinstatement as of 2012.[45]

Bulgaria

[edit]

Data from the 2011 Eurobarometer research places Bulgaria fourth in the European Union (EU) in terms of bribes paid to public officials. The main factor behind this ranking is bribes paid to police officers. According to the same research, Bulgaria sits first on the list of EU member states with widespread police corruption.[46]

While much of the duties of safeguarding - largely through oppression - the communist rule in Bulgaria was undertaken by the Ministry of Interior (MoI), after 1989 its make-up changed dramatically. From 1990 to 1993, almost one quarter of the MoI's staff were dismissed - between 12,000 and 19,000 police officers, 60-90% of which were officers at the medium and senior levels. Additionally, a role in the political conflicts of the 1990s led to further dismissals of national and regional police detectives and mass layoffs of middle ranking officers.[47] Simultaneously, Bulgaria was undergoing a transition from the Soviet Communist regime to democracy, leading to a sharp increase in crime and criminal incidents (up to ten times in growth for some crimes), coupled with a severe economic downturn and the emergence of a large number of criminal groups. The effects of these drastic changes to the MoI and dramatic upheaval of Bulgaria's political landscape culminated with the financial and economic crisis of 1996–97, during which police corruption rose on almost all levels.[47]

Before these changes, during the period of 1944–1989, abuses within the MoI were investigated by the State Security - an almost exact replica of the Soviet KGB - who had total control of law enforcement. This was achieved by monitoring the political loyalty of MoI staff, but also by exceptional powers to investigate abuses; including the use of undercover agents and virtually unlimited powers to investigate. However, the considerable experience accumulated over these years was lost immediately after the democratic change in 1989, when the body was disbanded.[47]

After Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, the country was seriously challenged to eliminate instances of police corruption. As a result of this, the deputy-chief of a police service was dismissed over accusations of illicit contact with an alcohol producer, and police misconduct has been limited by institutional and legal changes.[47]

However, Bulgaria continues to experience everyday police corruption, and the Bulgarian people continue to hold negative views of the nation's police force. Corruption and conflicts of interest continue to offer a serious challenge to public perceptions of the Bulgarian police, attitudes that are not only encouraged by political scandals and frequent media coverage of police corruption, but also by the personal experiences of everyday Bulgarians.[47] In 2013, 65% of respondents to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer thought that the police were either corrupt, or extremely corrupt. However, comparing this to 86% who felt the same of the judiciary and 71% for the parliament/legislator, shows that Bulgarians are regaining trust in their police force, or at the very least, have more trust in them than other public officials who have some effect on their legal protection.[48]

Bribery
[edit]

In 2011, Eurobarometer research that asked respondents to report whether or not they have been pressured to pay bribes to the police ranked Bulgaria first in the EU, with 7% of respondents claiming that they had been. Within this research, it was found that 450,000 Bulgarians annually were asked for bribes by police, a number that did not change substantially between 2009 and 2011. According to the same research, 70% of Bulgarians believe that bribe-taking is widespread in the police force.[46]

This perception was not aided by the arrest of seventeen traffic police officers on 27 September 2011 for charges of corruption and operating in organised crime groups. According to Sofia City Prosecutor Nikolai Kokinov, these officers were pooling the bribes they received at the end of their shifts and dividing the money between them, sometimes taking up to 500 liva a shift. According to Kokinov, police do not receive large bribes, but instead are given small ones regularly.[49]

These arrests have not affected instances of bribing the police. Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer recorded 17% of respondents claiming that they paid a bribe to the police.[48]

Challenges to Bulgarian Corruption
[edit]

Bulgaria begun undergoing political stabilisation in the late 1990s/early 2000s, after which attempts were made to fill the watchdog and counter-corruption enforcement agency hole left by the State Security. A telephone hotline and internet site was open for the submission of complaints to be used by the MoI Inspectorate. The Inspectorate was also given controlling, preventive and disciplinary functions by the Ministry of Interior Act. It is split into two divisions: "control of management" and "countering corruption in the Ministry of Interior". The 35 officers of the Inspectorate have a number of functions, ranging from assessing corruption risks, undertaking inspections aimed at reducing and preventing corruption, reviewing complaints received about the MoI and supervising the implementation of inspections. They report directly to the Minister of Interior.[50]

In 2008, Bulgaria also introduced a new intelligence and counter-intelligence agency, the State Agency for National Security (SANS). It is directly subordinated to the Prime Minister and exists outside the MoI, which gives the agency a degree of independence if it is tasked with investigating corruption within the MoI, particularly regarding corruption among senior officers and management. However, SANS is purely intelligence-gathering, and has no police powers.[50]

As a result of these two initiatives, 74 disciplinary sanctions were imposed against members of the Bulgarian police. Of these 74, six cases were referred to the prosecution, and the MoI was advised to dismiss officers accused to misconduct in a further seven of them.[51]

2008 also saw the establishment of the Internal Security Directorate (ISD) of the MoI, the first service since 1990 that has multiple officers around the country, as well as the ability to combine covert methods with police powers. This means that for the first time since the dissolution of the State Security, a branch of the MoI had the ability to use surveillance techniques to expose police corruption, including a network of undercover agents, as well as take proactive measures - on the basis of risk analysis - to end corruption, actively seeking and collecting evidence on MoI staff without complaints being submitted, something that neither SANS nor the Inspectorate can do.[50] In 2011, data from the ISD indicated that 1,200 complaints were followed up on that year, leading to around 300 infringements being substantiated and 100-120 officers were dismissed or indicted. This large upswing is due to the organisational changes undertaken in the MoI, which no longer allow complaints to remain within the division they were made, but instead must be referred to the ISD or the Inspectorate.[51]

Further changes were undertaken to reduce police corruption in 2014, with all MoI cars being equipped with GPS systems, and then video cameras and microphones being fitted to all traffic police patrol cars that record what passes between traffic police and drivers. As part of this initiative, rules were changed that allowed an MoI vehicles to carry out roadside checks of motorists. As of 25 November, these checks have only been allowed to be undertaken by traffic police. Bulgarian Interior Minister Vesselin Vuchkov claimed these new measures were expected to cut corruption by 80% by reducing direct contact between police and motorists, and thus lowering the opportunity for police to receive bribes and participate in corruption.[52]

Croatia

[edit]

In 2002, accepting bribes was a common form of street police corruption in Croatia. According to the International Victim Crimes Survey, 15 out of 100 respondents reported paying a bribe within the last year – 44% of which were paid to police officers. This frequency was higher than most other East-European countries, with respondents suggesting that police in Croatia were targeted more frequently for successful bribes compared to other countries in East-Europe. These results indicated that police corruption, especially in regards to the acceptance of a bribe by a police officer, seemed to be more prevalent among Croatian police than among police in other East-European countries.[2]

Controlling
[edit]

Prosecution of corruption is based on the 1997 Criminal Code. Article 337 of the code states that "a public official who abuses the office, oversteps the limits of official authority, or fails to perform the official duty with the aim of obtaining pecuniary gain or other non-pecuniary benefit could be charged criminally".[2] As well as this, section 347 of the code prohibits the acceptance of a bribe by any public official, explicitly listing police officers.[2] These two sections provide grounds for the prosecution of police for several forms of police corruption.

In order to establish a successful corruption-control system in Croatia it is essential that police be held responsible for corruption. There must be a legally sound basis for the punishment of corrupt police officers and legal tools to achieve this punishment. Section 337 and 347 makes this achievable, as do the sanctions listed in the Criminal Code.[2] As well as this, these norms of not accepting police corruption should be enforced.[2] That is, police officers must be held responsible for their actions and sanctions should be exercised.

Cyprus

[edit]

Police corruption in Cyprus is unofficially monitored by the Independent Authority for the Investigation of Allegations and Complaints Against the Police.[53][54] In 2013, the Authority heard a total of 145 complaints against the police by the public, from 132 complaints in 2012.[54] However, there is no official, government-mandated authority to combat and monitor corruption, nor an official government anti-corruption strategy.[54] Corruption within the Cyprus Police should be handled internally, as per the Cyprus Code of Police Ethics.[55]

Corrupt activities among the police are typically defined as using a position of power to influence particular decisions, such as nepotism, the giving and taking of bribes, accessing information that is not directly related to an officer's current work or investigation(s), and lower levels of organised crime are also commonly noted in cases of police corruption.[56]

A Eurobarometer Report by the European Commission in 2009 indicated that the grand majority of Cypriots (94%) believe that corruption is widespread in the police and the wider public affairs sector at national, regional, and local levels.[55] A follow-up survey in 2012 indicated that 97% of Cypriots believed that corruption was a major issue for the country.[54]

The 2009 report also showed that 89% of Cypriots believed that corruption was widespread within the Cyprian Police Service involving bribes and the abuse of positions of power (nepotism), compared to an average of 39% of European Union citizens believing corruption is widespread among their own police services or institution.[55] Additionally, 80% of Cyprian respondents to the Eurobarometer 2009 Report agreed that corruption is unavoidable within the public, police, and government sectors, whereas only 14% disagreed with the statement.[55]

The 2013 Eurobarometer Report on Corruption indicated that the top three reasons for corruption occurring in Cyprus are; "because politicians and government are not doing enough to fight corruption (88%), the lack of real punishment (87%), and the lack of meritocracy (87%)".[54] Oddly, 65% of Cypriots have reported to have a strong level of confidence in the police in an unofficial 2013 survey comparing trust in the police across 50 countries.[57] However, this disparity may be influenced by the continually changing perceptions of respondents based on recent experiences, or the political climate.[58] Due to Cyprus' geographical composition as an island, corruption can spread across several networks, as high-ranking locals across several disciplines such as politics, law enforcement, judicial officials, and businessmen interact closely within the same social circles; whereas these relationships may be significantly diffused across larger mainland countries.[56]

Transparency International (TI) has recommended that a Coordinating Body Against Corruption should be established under the Cyprian Attorney General, which is able to combat and enact strategic policies against corruption in the public and law enforcement sectors.[54] Specifically, TI has recommended that an increase in police salaries, a reinforcement of the ethical code, and improved working conditions should be implemented to discourage the risk of accepting bribes to increase officers' own income.[54] Additionally, a greater transparency in the disclosure of assets, or second jobs to supplement income, should be incorporated into the duties of high-ranking law enforcement officials, so that future conflicts of interest can be made aware of and monitored.[54]

Czech Republic

[edit]

Police corruption in the Czech republic can be perceived in two categories: petty everyday corruption (e.g. bribery and favouritism), and major economic corruption, involving foreign investments requiring both state support and subsidy decision-making.[59]

Within these areas sections 158 – 162 detail forms of corruption ranging from abuse of power by a public official, to indirect bribery.[59] The Czech Republic joined the EU in May 2004, following the splitting of Czechoslovakia in 1993.[60] Since this split, corruption has made a steady incline. In 2001, 163 individuals were prosecuted with corrupt activity, of those 142 in relation to bribery.[59] This in comparison to the 110 individuals prosecuted in 2000. In 1995 the number of ascertained crimes committed by officers with involvement in management and administration was calculated at 1,081, by 1999 this figure had jumped 10.1% to 5,081, which steadily declined into the 2000s.[61] Royalties gained through major economic corruption are largely conspicuous. Tied up in ostentatious villas, over budget public construction projects and local government offices^. These "landmarks" are prominent enough to prompt guided tours around Prague.[62] Curious tourists are directed between structures funded through large sums of taxpayers' money. Money ending up in the pockets of civil servants and corrupt businessmen.[62]

In 1991 the "Service for the Protection of Economic Interests" was set up, this later evolved into the "Unit for Combating Corruption and Serious Economic Crime of the Criminal Police and Investigation Service" in January 2002. Its function: to detect connections between corruption and organised crime, in cooperation with the "Criminal Police Service and Investigation Unit of the Czech Police for Revealing Organised Crime".[63] Similarly the "Inspection Department of the Ministry of the Interior" (IDMI), a police unit that deals with offences committed by police officers. This unit targets petty everyday corruption, involving low-level employees of the state who abuse their power for personal gain.[63] Policemen earn a fraction the salary of a military officer.[64] Where the Fire Brigade has 14 districts within the Czech Republic, the Police force only has 8, resulting in limited opportunity for climbing regional ranks.[64] Policemen must also undergo far lengthier training than their better-paid Army and Fire Brigade colleagues.[64] Such inequities prompt feelings of resentment among Police ranks.[64] As a result, systems are now in place to combat petty corruption. Including automated cameras at traffic lights sending infringements directly to a driver, avoiding any physical interaction with a policing officer.[64] At the same time, "The Unit for Combating Corruption and Financial Crime" (UOKFK), established by the Ministry of the Interior, also provides continuing education relating to domestic corruption and integrity of the Czech police force.[65] Police Corruption in the Czech Republic is an ongoing issue, however one that is actively combatted through state and local action.

Denmark

[edit]

When asked specifically about public perceptions of police corruption, a rating of 2 was given (with 1 being least corrupt and 5 being most), which was lower than the perceived corruption in any other sector surveyed, other than education which also was rated a 2.[66]

Danish police have a respectable reputation of not being associated with corruption and the public have great trust in the Danish police force. Although corruption is a rarity amongst Danish Police, there are effective procedures in place for the investigation and punishment of any police corruption.[67] The Danish Independent Police Complaint Authority was formed to handle any allegations (corruption or other matters) made against the police force.[67] The Police Complaints Authority council and chief executive deliberate and make decisions, based upon complaints of police misconduct, independently of police and prosecutors.[68] To ensure transparency, the council consists of two members of the general public, as well as the chair, who is a High Court Judge, an attorney, and a professor of jurisprudence.[68] This council is reappointed every four years.[68] Outlined in a very clear and simple document, is a guide of how complaints can be made by oneself, a bystander or on behalf of another.[69] The document explains how lodging a complaint is free of charge and can be made in writing online or in person, or over the telephone, within six months of the relevant incident.[69]

In 2012, the Police Complaints Authority received 655 complaints,[67] with most cases involving accusations of general misconduct such as traffic violations (e.g., speeding without activated police lights), excessive use of force during arrests, foul language, or illegitimate access to the police database (officers are only allowed to check the database in police cases they are directly involved in), whereas accusations of corruption were very rare.[70] There were concerns surrounding the difficulty with the investigation of a number of the general misconduct incidents due to problems with identifying the involved officers.[67] This resulted in the suggestion of police officers wearing identity numbers on their uniforms.[67] Uniform numbers were introduced in 2016.[71]

Ecuador

[edit]
Ecuador's police have been accused of corruption.[72] In 2008, after the U.S. Embassy in Quito concluded that then commander of the National Police, Jaime Aquilino Hurtado, had “used his power...to extort, accumulating money and property, facilitate human trafficking, and obstruct investigations against corrupt peers,” the U.S. State Department revoked the U.S. entry visas of Hurtado and his family. These alleged corrupt activities began before Hurtado was named commander, and U.S. authorities believed that Correa was aware of them when he appointed Hurtado to that position. The help Hurtado gave to human traffickers was believed to have enabled criminals and terrorists to enter the U.S. Among Hurtado's accomplices was a police chief, Bolivar Villota, whom he hired to develop a resort he owned. Villota was arrested in 2007 for extortion but Hurtado managed to keep him in office. Two other police officers, Milton Raul Andrade and Manuel Fernando Basantes, were found to be involved in smuggling immigrants, mostly Chinese, into the U.S. Hurtado, who was also a part of this racket, protected those officers, too.[73]

Estonia

[edit]

Estonia's experiences of corruption in general, and more specifically, corruption in the police force are low in comparison to the European Union's average.[74] While there are no specific anti-corruption agency or body which deals with corruption in Estonia, the Security Police Board and Police Board are in charge of investigating and regulating any instances of police corruption.[75] The Security Police, established in 1993, is an impartial board within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[citation needed] Their main aims are to gather intelligence, counter-terrorism, and enact anti-corruption measures.[citation needed] This board comprises four regional departments who mainly deal with corruption surrounding "higher officials".[citation needed] The majority of their force have received higher education with "specialised training in corruption investigations". Their primary purpose is to investigate instances of corruption crime, committed only by public servants.[citation needed] The achievements of this board, thus far, have been solving cases in significant white-collar crime and corruption in border and customs guard.[citation needed] In regards to the Estonian Police, in particular, while all police officers have to go through some initial anti-corruption training there are no yearly requirements they must fulfill in terms of continued training.[citation needed]

The general police are governed by the Police Board who have an Internal Control Division who are responsible for the investigation of misconduct and corruption. The Police board is in control of investigating smaller instances of corruption, as well as those cases concerning civic officials.[citation needed] These anti-corruption strategies and boards fall under multiple Anti-Corruption Strategies which have been implemented by the Ministry of Justice. The most recent of these strategies is the 'Anti-Corruption Strategy 2013-2020'.[75] The strategy crosses many private and public areas and sectors of Estonia. The aim of the strategy is to both raise awareness and educate the population of corruption and corruption-willingness.[75] Within the guidelines of this strategy all decisions, regulations and policies implemented by the different ministries and boards must abide by the rule of transparency, whereby the public must be informed of what is occurring, how much it will cost and why.[75] In the report for this strategy it is acknowledged there is a higher risk of corruption for those working in law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice pays close attention to these areas and have set about implementing strict measures and bodies to govern all law enforcement agencies. While the anti-corruption strategy has greatly assisted in decreasing levels of corruption in the general police force, the rate of corruption in the Border and Custom Guard Agency is still fairly high.[74]

Due to Estonia's position on the border of the European Union (EU) their Border and Customs Guards come in contact with a great deal of organised crime and immigrants wanting to cross the Eastern border of Estonia into the EU. The result being many officials in this agency see the opportunity to increase their wealth through corruption and in turn accept bribes to let immigrants into Estonia and the EU.[74] These types of corrupt officials pose a serious threat to both national security and the security of the EU when they let in illegal immigrants, in particular those involved in organised crime. In the Permanent Mission of Estonia, the Estonian Government states the aim of all anti-corruption strategies set up in their country is to ensure their population is allowed full enjoyment of their human rights.[76] Through the long-term anti-corruption strategies, the Estonian Government aims to rid their country of any sort of corruption which could infringe on people's rights or pose a threat to national or international security.

Finland

[edit]

Finland has been found to consistently be one of the world's least corrupt nations. In 2012, the Corruption Perceptions Index rated the Finns as the world's least corrupt country (tie with Denmark and New Zealand).[77] However, they fell to third in 2013 and remained there the following year, losing only one point on the table in that time.[77] The Finns believe that this is due to heavily ingrained societal values that are shared amongst the population, as well as there being adequate wages and low disparities of income for the majority of the country.[78] The latter reduces the propensity to accept bribes and checks economic greed.[78]

In terms of police corruption, regular surveys of the public are taken in order to gauge perceptions of transparency in law enforcement officials. The 2007 Police Barometer survey found that one in four Finns think that it is very likely that corruption exists in some form within the police.[79] Further, one in six Finns think that the police might act in an unethical manner towards foreigners by misusing information or mistreating detainees.[79] The survey also found that trust in police remains high, but whilst the public consider that law enforcement officers generally conduct themselves well in interactions with clients and citizens, the standard has deteriorated somewhat.[79] This could be due to the high expectations Finns carry of the police, but it certainly shows that the public are of a high opinion of the transparency afforded them in the department of law enforcement.

More recent surveys show significant changes in the figures, however. In 2012, when Finland was at the top of the Corruption Perceptions Index, 27% of Finns believed that it was very likely that corruption existed in some form within the police.[80] This figure is not dissimilar from the 2007 Police Barometer survey, yet the figure in the 2014 survey jumps to 42% of Finns.[80] This is most likely due to the high-profile case of Jari Aarnio, the former chief investigator and head of Helsinki's anti-drugs police, who spent 30 years in the anti-drugs force in Finland, but which was later revealed to be a drug lord himself.[81][82] The story on Aarnio broke in September 2013, and in June 2015 the former head of the Helsinki drug squad was sentenced to 20 months imprisonment for aggravated abuse of office from 2009 to 2010 and for taking bribes from a private company.[80] Prosecutors asked for a 13-year sentence during hearings.[83]

France

[edit]

France is a member of the Council of Europe which has many legal frameworks against corruption in place including GRECO (Group of States Against Corruption) which applies for all Council of Europe signatories. GRECO works by equally monitoring rights and obligations of the Council of Europe's Member States.[84] Police are bound by the Recommendations on Codes of Conduct for Public Officials[85] and Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.[86] In addition, France has its own Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen approved in August 1789[87] which outlines the rights of civilians inclusive of conduct applicable to public officials for fair treatment. In 1993, The Central Service for the Prevention of Corruption was also established in France to prevent corruption and transparency of economical life and public procedures.[88] There are a number of bodies that monitor and investigate police corruption in France. The Inspection Générale de la Gendarmerie Nationale enables consistency, independency and impartiality of inspections carried out by the Gendarmerie Nationale.[89]

Inspection Générale de la Police monitors and regulates police behaviour and the Commission Nationale de Deontologie de la Securite (CNDS) monitors ethical and moral codes required to be upheld by security forces in France.[90] Other strategies such as disabling officers to be on duty in their originating neighborhood and prohibiting officers from working in private investigation for three years after leaving the police force are enforced to ensure impartiality.[91]

There are limited studies or reports on police corruption within France because the issue is generally avoided by official institutions and no institution has a comprehensive understanding of its prevalence. This may be due to a lack of attention from media and other social science areas.[92] It is a common assumption that police corruption in France is a rare occurrence in the area of organised crime. One explanation for institutional corruption in France is the hierarchical police system. This is due to higher rankings and specialised units having more discretion and being at higher risk of corruption.[93]

Areas that have a heavy presence of organised crime, such as Marseille, are known to experience higher levels of police corruption.[citation needed]

Marseille
[edit]

In 2012, twelve French police officers were apprehended after an internal complaint was lodged into suspected corruption within the elite anti-crime squad, also known as the Brigade Anti-Criminalite (BAC) that operates within the Marseille north. This region is known for high drug activity. Despite attention being brought to the head of Centrale Directorate of National Security, Pascal Ladalle, a full-scale judicial enquire was not undertaken until the new police chief of Marseille was appointed. A total of 30 officers from the squad have been suspended for allegedly seizing drugs, money, cigarettes and jewellery from dealers and letting them go. The seized narcotics, money and valuables were all found in a makeshift ceiling at their station after a few months of investigation and surveillance. Investigations are still pending.[94]

François Stuber
[edit]

François Stuber was a police captain and Deputy Head of the Drug Squad in Strasbourg, France. One of Stuber's duties was to destroy drugs seized from operations; however between 2003 and 2007, the officer instead traded narcotics including marijuana, heroin and cocaine to an established drug network. In addition to this, Stuber also imported drugs from various other networks. The former captain had an intimate relationship with a worker from the local court, Laurence Hamon, where they would use court information to ensure his drug network associates were not under investigation. This method was also employed to avoid tracing mechanisms imposed by the Inspection Generale de la Police Nationale to detect any abuse of information. Stuber worked closely with Laurence, using her residence to store the seized drugs and her banking accounts to launder money. Stuber was jailed for the maximum term of 10 years.[95][96]

Germany

[edit]

In 2020 in the German city of Essen, in North Rhine-Westphalia, the homes of 30 racist Nazi police officers were raided[97] by their colleagues brought together from several different German states.[98] The Nazi cops shared images like swastikas, a depiction of refugees in a gas chamber, and Reich flags.[99]

The substantial legislation covering corruption offences within the German Criminal Code is indicative of the importance placed on combating this type of crime in Germany. In general, corruption is construed as an individual offence, although it is possible to be prosecuted for actions committed on behalf of a corporation under the Administrative Offences Act.[100][101]

Alongside civil servants, judges and other public officials undertaking or appointed a public administrative role, police officers may be held liable for criminal prosecution for corruption-related offences under Sections 331-338 of the German Criminal Code.[101][102] Specifically, according to Section 331, a public official who requires, allows themselves to be promised, or accepts an advantage for themselves or a third party for the discharge of their duty is liable to criminal prosecution.

An advantage involves any type of benefit that may improve the individual's financial, legal or personal standing, which they are not legally entitled to receive.[101] Although there is no statutory minimum to what can be interpreted as an unlawful benefit, minor customary advantages that are unlikely to impact the perception or decision making process of the individual are not considered criminal.

Additionally, pursuant to Section 332 of the German Criminal Code, the past or future undertakings of an official act (e.g. lobbying of certain laws, services regulations, etc.) that violate official duties are considered unlawful.[102] Penalties for this offence, as well as bribery in a public office in general, can range from fines to imprisonment, where the sanctions apply to each count of bribery, with a maximum sentence of 10 years for serious cases.[100][101]

In addition to legislation, strategic approaches which target all German government bodies, including the police, are employed through the Federal Government Directive concerning the Prevention of Corruption in the Federal Administration.[103][104] This directive recommends internal auditing, employment of a contact person for corruption related-issues rotation of staff and the principle of multiple controls in order to prevent and combat corruption within governmental bodies.

Beyond the domestic level, Germany is heavily involved in the creation and compliance to international anti-corruption standards via the United Nations, the World Bank, the Group of Eight (G8) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).[103][104] German public institutions, such as the police, have also been acknowledged by the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) to have done considerable work to prevent corruption.

Public perception of police corruption is low among German citizens according to the 2013 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption report.[105] German respondents (16%) were among the least likely (within European Union) to think that corruption, or the giving and taking of bribes and abuse of power for personal gain, is widespread among police and customs officers. More generally, 92% of German respondents do not feel personally affected by corruption in their daily lives, considerably higher than the 70% EU average. However, although more than half (59%) of respondents believe that corruption is prevalent within Germany, this is still considerably lower than the 76% EU average.

Despite the more than half of German respondents perceiving a prevalence of corruption in German society, the actual experience of corruption is quite low.[105] Less than 1% of German respondents reported they were requested or expected to pay a bribe in the year of the report, while only 9% indicated they were personally aware of someone who had accepted bribes, respectively below the 4% and 12% average among European Union citizens.

Greece

[edit]

Today[when?], Greece experiences some of the highest levels of police corruption in Europe, with 99% of its citizens believing that corruption in the country is widespread.[106]

Transparency International surveys show that Greece ranks high among European Union nations in terms of perceptions of corruption. From 2013 to 2016, during the height of the Greece's debt crisis, the annual Transparency International reports showed that Greeks ranked second-most corrupt among EU countries, behind only Bulgaria.[107][108] (the country's relative position among European countries was more favorable before and after this period).

Bribing police officers is common in Greece. Citizens may offer the police monetary sums as a way of avoiding getting a ticket or in order to obtain a drivers license. 96% of Greek citizens believe that this is an acceptable practice and 93% believe that it is the easiest way of obtaining public services.[109][106] The Hellenic Police Internal Affairs Unit has investigated cases of corruption among police, including police acceptance of bribes from traffickers.[110] Human trafficking has become a more prominent issue in the realm of police bribery in recent times. Particularly as the state is an optimum destination for those seeking asylum, due to its many small islands and borders being difficult to patrol. It is not unusual for Greek police to provide fake documentation and plane tickets to illegal immigrants. A trafficker's circuit was discovered in the Santorini police department as recently as June 2015.[111] It was reported that airline employees contacted the local police, concerned about passengers who may be travelling to European countries using forged documents. However, the police performed only rudimentary checks, and permitted the migrants to board the flights.[111] According to the US Department of State 2014 Trafficking in Persons Report, police also recently dismantled a sex trafficking ring involving two police officers, who were then suspended from duty.[110]

Greece is a member of the European Partners Against Corruption (EPAC). It is housed in Greece within the Hellenic Police Internal Affairs division, established in 1999 and has 120 staff.[112] The National Strategic Reference Framework has also put forth €340,000 to fund "transparency and anti-corruption for good governance in public administration-police" seminars.[113] The program will be made available to graduates of the Police Officers Academy of Greece. However, only 14% of Greeks believe that the government's efforts to combat corruption are effective.[106] Furthermore, unlike other member states, the amount of corruption in Greece has increased rather than decreased, with its global ranking falling from 80th in 2011 to 94th in 2012.[114] This is likely because of the states financial difficulties. Data collected by the Greek anti-corruption task-force in 2012 showed that corruption in the state had spiked, with 1,060 cases investigated – a 33% increase on 2011.[115] Moreover, 710 (or 66.9%) of these were concerned with police officers.[115]

Hungary

[edit]

Hungarian criminologist Geza Finszter has named Hungary a fundamentally dishonest society. Due to this, real justice is nearly impossible to achieve.[116] Government operations are not transparent. This leads to corruption which is reflected in many aspects of its society, including politicians, judges, and the police force. Police force corruption affects the criminal investigators who, have a greater amount of exposure to corruption than others. They are paid poorly, allowing well endowed criminals to corrupt them.[117] This corruption in the lower level of the police is not the biggest problem when it comes to police corruption in Hungary.

In the National police Organised Crime Division, high-ranking officers, with possible underworld ties can choose to proceed or halt sensitive operations.[117] In short if an investigation runs the risk of exposing political or other types of corruption they tend to more often than not be shut down without much delay.[117] According to Transparency International, many state run institutions in Hungary are directed by government loyalists allowing for an easy spread of corruption.[118] It was also found that when it came to reporting corruption in Hungary, 70% of the population would not report instances of corruption due to a mistrust of authorities and a fear of the consequences for doing so. Transparency International claims that the government discourages its citizens when it comes to reporting corruption as no adequate protection measures have been implemented to help whistle blowers.[118]

Due to Hungary's geographical position that is bordering the former Yugoslavia and, its political history it has become a major crossroads for the transportation of narcotics between Asia and Western Europe.[119] According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2007, Hungarian border control and narcotics police seem to be tackling and resisting corruption to an extent.[120] The report showed that education of border police was making some difference when it came to the issue of corruption.[119] Contrary to this however it would appear when it comes to prosecuting high-profile cases involving organised crime, including drug trafficking, sentences tend to be lenient. It would appear that corruption is systematic and prevalent through the entirety of the Hungarian Criminal Justice system reaching as high as Judges and, not just its police force.[116] After being ranked in the bottom third of countries when it comes to corruption, and when looking at the ineffectiveness of the new anti corruption laws that have been put in place it is all too clear that corruption seems to be an accepted practice in Hungary's police force at least for the foreseeable future.

Indonesia

[edit]

Italy

[edit]

Italy ranks at the same level or below eastern European countries in the Corruption Perception rating. The Italian Police Force is difficult to monitor in terms of corruption due to its decentralised nature.[121] There are four different branches of the Italian policing system, broken up into the Carabinieri, the State Police, the Local Police and the Guardia di Finanza. Due to the delegation of responsibilities between the branches it is the case that monitoring all of them with one centralised and independent body becomes extremely logistical and difficult. The Guardia di Finanza is charged with the responsibility of regulating all financial dealings, within and outside of Italy.[122] It can be seen, therefore, that this branch of the national police force may need the most attention and regulation, due to their constant dealings with money.

Kazakhstan

[edit]

Kazakhstan ranks below many countries in the Corruption Perception Index. Official statistics of corruption charges within the police show 203 in 2014, 307 in 2017, and 165 in 2019.[123] These campaign-style zigzagging trends are still minuscule considering the scale of police bribe-taking in Kazakhstan. The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) reported that in a one-year period (June 2017–May 2018), 5.2% of Kazakhstanis were victims of official bribe-seeking and in almost half of these cases the bribe-seeker was a police officer.[124] Taking only the adult population of Kazakhstan into account, the ICVS police bribery figures suggest around 400,000 incidents of police bribery every year in Kazakhstan. These calculations are most likely very conservative in that they only capture when a bribe has been solicited and exclude instances of citizen-initiated bribery.

Latvia

[edit]

Police corruption in Latvia is more prevalent than it is in other EU states. According to Transparency International, Latvia has a Corruption Perception Index score of 4.9 out of ten, indicating a high level of perceived corruption.[125] Particularly concerning is that the judiciary and police received high scores (out of five) for public perceptions of corruption, being 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.[125] Political parties and the legislature received scores of 4 and 3.7.[125]

Police and customs have been identified as corruption hotspots in Latvia, with a majority (58%) of Latvians regarding it as widespread.[126] In particular, road police has one of the lowest ratings for perceived honesty and integrity[127] and is considered more corrupt than any other government institution. This stems from the common practice of demanding bribes, for example at traffic stops. In these situations a person has little option other than to pay the bribe (and thus avoid a fine or more severe penalty). The motivations for corruption are not entirely clear. Public officials point to low salaries, which may explain a significant proportion of bribery incidents.[126] However, other public institutions, such as the postal service, have significantly lower salaries than police or customs, yet much lower rates of bribery and corruption.[126] Since 2000, highway police are not allowed to levy on-the-spot fines, which is likely to reduce the incidence of bribery in that context.[128]

Latvia began developing an anti-corruption policy in 1995, culminating in the Corruption Preventing and Combatting Bureau (KNAB – Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs) in 2002.[129] KNAB is a multi-purpose anti-corruption body whose functions include investigating corruption offences, controlling activities of public officials and education and training on corruption risk.[129] This is the most common example of a single-body approach to anti-corruption policy, with similar bodies existing in Hong Kong (on which KNAB is based) and Australia.[129] KNAB operates as a pre-trial investigation body, with authority to refer matters to the public prosecutor. It has a broad jurisdiction,[129] though most of its cases involve bribery offences.[129] In 2001, a high-profile corruption case emerged when the then Deputy Chief of the Economic Police was arrested for receiving a bribe in an attempt to prevent the investigation of a smuggling and tax evasion case.[128]

Latvia is a relatively new Member state of the European Union, having only joined in 2004. A recent survey found that people in new member state countries, especially Latvia,[126] agree that bribery is the easiest way of obtaining certain public services than those in the original EU states.[126] In 1998, a survey posed the following question to Latvian households: "A system whereby people could anonymously report instances of corruption would not be successful because corruption is a natural part of our lives and helps solve many problems".[127] Only 37% of respondents disagreed with the statement. Additionally, Latvia has one of the lowest reporting rates for corruption in the EU,[126] and most Latvians do not believe the government's anti-corruption efforts are likely to be successful.[126]

Lithuania

[edit]

Police corruption in Lithuania was considered to be prevalent in a 2002 study by OSI, a liberal NGO funded by the controversial billionaire George Soros.[130] Corruption is considered to be a widespread issue in Lithuanian society in general, occurring during interactions in both the private and public sectors. Two thirds of people in Lithuania prosecuted for corruption related offences between 1995 and 1998 were police officers.[130] In 2002 the Lithuanian Police Department admitted that they were aware of the high levels of corruption within the force. Despite this, some progress to combat police corruption in Lithuania has been made by 2002.[131]

The Police Department of the Ministry of Interior is the national police agency of Lithuania. The Criminal Police Bureau and the Public Police Bureau are additional, separate agencies. The Criminal Police Bureau consists of various departments, including, but not limited to, the Organised Crime Investigation Services. The Public Police Bureau also has numerous departments, including, but not limited to, the Preventive Service and Traffic Control Service. The Traffic Control Service is considered to be one of the most corrupt criminal justice bodies in Lithuania.[131]

Prior to 2002, Traffic Control officers used to be empowered to issue on the spot fines far greater than their own salaries. As such, a common form of police corruption was known to occur where members of the public bribe traffic officers to avoid receiving expensive fines. This particular power was one explanation to the high levels of police corruption specific to the Traffic Control Service. By 2002 the police force had put into place measures to prevent such corruption, including disciplinary measures that in extreme cases can lead to dismissal from service.[131]

Lithuanian government's stance against police corruption is evident through its creation of anti-corruption bodies as well as its introduction of various legislative measures.[132] In the opinion of the BBC, targeting police corruption in Lithuania was connected to the country's accession to the European Union in May 2004.[133] Application and entrance to the EU saw Lithuania introduce numerous anti-corruption measures.[132]

Lithuania's anti-corruption system is considered compliant to the UN Convention against Corruption to which it signed in 2003 and ratified in 2006.[134] Compliance is met through Lithuania's anti-corruption legal framework as well as the Special Investigation Service that is considered an independent anti-corruption law enforcement body.[135]

The Special Investigative Services (SIS) is an independent national Lithuanian anti corruption body formed in 1997. In 2008 SIS was rated second, after the media, as the most effective anti corruption measure in Lithuania (by whom?). Previously SIS was a subordinate of the Ministry of Interior however in 2000 it became an independent agency. The SIS' responsibilities range from solving and preventing corruption, to developing Lithuania's anti corruption strategy. Any member of the public can report potential cases of corruption to SIS.[136]

Established in 1998, the Internal Investigation Service (IIS) is an internal police department that performs legal monitoring and is tasked with enforcing disciplinary sanctions when necessary. The IIS can investigate the actions of individual officers. The IIS reports to one of the Deputy Commissioner Generals and has the ability to investigate cases of police corruption.[131]

As well as the Internal Investigation Service, the Immunity Service is responsible for preventing and investigating corruption within the Lithuanian police force. The Immunity Service reports to the Commissioner General of the Police.[132]

Despite these measures, the issue of police corruption in Lithuania continues to be prevalent. The Special Eurobarometer 397 report on corruption found that 63% of Lithuanian respondents believed corruption within the police or customs to be widespread.[137] Lithuania's levels of police force corruption can be deemed particularly high when compared to other European Union states. The police force was considered to be the most trusted of all institutions in the majority of European Union member states; however, Lithuania was one of three exemptions to this (along with Latvia and Croatia).[137]

The success of Lithuania's anti-corruption methods has been difficult to measure. This was a main criticism made in a 2014 report by the European Commission measuring Lithuania's implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption.[132] Whilst Lithuania has put appropriate anti-corruption measures in place, the success of such measures is difficult to measure due to limited disclosure of statistics and further limited public release as to how such anti corruption institutions work in practice.[132]

To form a balanced view of corruption in Lithuania, more comparative data would be required focusing on the Lithuanian SSR, the interwar Republic of Lithuania, Lithuania in the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Lithuania. Corruption perception might or might mot not be a valid measure of corruption, for example, underestimating corruption in countries (such as France, Germany, Italy or the United Kingdom) which have considerably less press freedom (as exemplified by the World Press Freedom Index).

Luxembourg

[edit]

Luxembourg is fundamentally a transparent, and incorrupt country. This reflects within the actions of their public service personnel, including their police force. The European Union's 2014 Anti Corruption report placed Luxembourg, along with Denmark and Finland, as having the lowest experiences of bribery in the European Union.[138] Luxembourg was ranked in a 2013 report as being the 11th (out of 177) best country in regards to their perceived level of corruption existing in their public sectors.[139] A perception survey published in 2013 suggested that 94% of respondents had not witnessed corruption in that past year and 92% of respondents did not feel that they had been affected by corruption in everyday life.[140]

The results of these reports and perception surveys suggest that whilst there is instances of corruption within Luxembourg, the country's assessment by the European Union suggests that mechanisms exist to combat these instances and promote ethical behaviour on the part of public officials. Whilst Luxembourg lacks a specific anti corruption strategy, soft law instruments such as the quasi-legal instruments of organisations like the European Union, inform judicial bodies and government officials when prosecuting. In recent years, their Anti Corruption framework has had a particular focus on efficient control of public institutions such as police and government bodies to avoid anti corrupt behaviours in these sectors.[140] Criminal law was last amended in 2011 to accommodate anti-corruption legislation, although the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) recommended in August 2014 that more reform needed to implemented to modify their criminal policy framework (due to gaps in legislation regarding foreign bribery offences).[138] Positively, an inter-ministerial committee, the Corruption Prevention Committee, was established in 2007 and meets annually, which shows a conscious effort on behalf of the country to keep anti corruption mechanisms on the forefront. A hotline has also been established which is run by Transparency International in Luxembourg. This hotline is an avenue for members of the public to submit claims of corruption and is a useful anti corruption mechanism employed by Luxembourg.[140]

Malta

[edit]

The Malta Police Force (MPF) is the main law enforcement authority in Malta. It is the responsibility of the MPF to "preserve public order and peace, to prevent, detect and investigate offences, to collect evidence", and to ultimately bring the offenders before the court.[141] Further, the MPF obtains the duty of maintaining efforts in investigating the abuse of police power and undertakings of corrupt activity.

Unfortunately, for the Maltese community, it is common practice that there is a "code of silence" within the MPF, where an officer may "turn a blind eye" to the misconduct performed by their fellow officer.[142] Typically, this behaviour is customary regardless of the severity of the consequence, as it heightens the likelihood of the corrupt officer reciprocating assistance, trust and support when needed.

Whilst over one-third of Maltese citizens believe that the MPF engage in police corruption, particularly acts of bribery and abuse of their legitimate power, this figure has significantly reduced from 2014. A nation’s corruption level can be determined through the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI ranks countries on how corrupt their public sector is perceived by the World Bank and the World Economic Forum.[143] Malta's CIP is 5.7 out of ten, which indicates Malta is 54% better than the average.[143] This achievement can be seen as an outcome of the Maltese Government initiating various preventive bodies and relevant legislation.

The Economic Crime Unit of the Malta Police Force was initiated in 1987, and is primarily involved in investigating and detecting a variety of corruption offences, including smuggling, fraud and bribery.[144] The MPF and the Police Commissioner initiate all prosecutions in Malta. Thus, to ensure legitimacy across all prosecutions, the MPF are required to adhere to disciplinary rules and are bound by a Code of Ethics.[144] Additionally, chapter 164 of the Maltese Police Act 1961 regulates the organisation, discipline and duties of the Malta Police Force.[145] Specifically, section 7 of Article 33 Offences Against Discipline, provides a comprehensive list of activities undertaken by a member of the MPF that are considered to be "corrupt practices".[145] Such "corrupt practices" include, but are not limited to: receiving any bribe; failing to promptly return any money or property received; improperly using their position as a police officer for "private advantage"; or, directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gratuity without the consent of the Commissioner.[145]

As corrupt practices are considered to be a serious punitive offence within Malta, if a member of the public submits a complaint regarding a minor corruption practice of a police officer, the Internal Affairs Unit will investigate.[144] Alternatively, where allegations regard serious police corruption offences, the Economic Crime Unit will intervene, investigate and may consequently initiate criminal proceedings.[144] However, from 1998, there have been few cases of police officers charged with corruption offences, consisting of five bribery prosecutions and six unlawful arrest cases.[144]

To further ensure societal security from police corruption, the Permanent Commission Against Corruption (PCAC) was established in 1988. The PCAC entirely deals with investigations for alleged or suspected police corruption practices.[146] The PCAC comprises one chairman, and two members who are selected by the Malta President and act on advice of the Prime Minister.[146] Article 4 of Chapter 326 Permanent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 highlights the functions of the commission, these include: considering and investigating alleged or suspected corrupt practices; investigating "the conduct of any public officer"; investigating "any person who is/has been entrusted with functions relating to the administration of a partnership where the Government has a controlling interest" and the Commission believes such conduct may be corrupt; investigating "practices and procedures of government departments where the Government has a controlling interest to facilitate the discovery of any corrupt practices"; and, to "instruct, advise and assist ministers who are entrusted with the administration of government departments where the government has a controlling interest on ways in which corrupt practices could be eliminated".[147] Reports of the commission's findings are then submitted to the Minister of Justice.

Myanmar

[edit]

Mexico

[edit]

Paraguay

[edit]

Peru

[edit]

Philippines

[edit]

Poland

[edit]
History
[edit]

During the mid 1990s, widespread police corruption in Poznan became heavily publicized in newspaper reports, which lead to an investigation by central authorities.[148] Poland's police chief and his deputy offered to resign after being implicated in the newspaper reports.[148] The investigation and the deputy minister of internal affairs at the time stated that there were breaches of duties by police and it was found there were certain discrepancies in police operations. However, the deputy vouched that there was no actual evidence of corruption.[148] Nevertheless, the public remained distrustful of Poland's institutions and towards the end of 1997, the minister of internal affairs and administration admitted that corruption was still a pervasive issue in the police force.[148] Additionally, there are reports that Poland's traffic police engaged in bribery during the 1990s.[148]

Present
[edit]

Transparency International is a global non-governmental organisation that provides oversight of corruption in the corporate and political sphere and publishes comprehensive reports annually.[149] It tracks public opinion on corruption with the Global Corruption Barometer while the Corruption Perceptions Index derives its rankings of perceived levels of corruption from both public opinion surveys and expert assessments.[150] Despite Poland being marked at a moderate level, it greatly falls behind its European counterparts such as Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway who are all consistently in the top 10 countries with the lowest perceived levels of corruption.[77] As of 2014, Poland currently holds a ranking of 35 out of 175 countries, marking an almost decade long improvement in both score and ranking in the Index.[77] The steady improvement can be attributed to the Poland's efforts to combat corruption over the last decade with the establishment of the Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA) in 2006, their participation in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 2000 and the subsequent slow adoption of anti-corruption policies.[151]

However, over the last decade or so, there have been limited reports on Polish police corruption, which indicates that it is possibly underreported, as corruption is difficult to detect and measure due to its deceptive, hidden nature. Additionally, there is currently no specific legislation to protect whistleblowers. The CBA has training courses, which encourage officers to identify corruption but there is a fear of retribution given the lack of legal protection.[151] Furthermore, it is evident from reports and surveys that the population of Poland and the European Commission are still concerned with the issue of corruption throughout Poland's public institutions, including the police department. It is noted that Poland has made considerable progress towards the eradication of corruption, however, there is a compelling need to increase these efforts and implement necessary reforms.

The Central Anticorruption Bureau
[edit]

The CBA specialises in the investigation of public officials and legal entities suspected of misconduct and fraudulent behaviour but do not wield the ability to prosecute defendants. Therefore, in order to be effective, the CBA exchanges information or evidence to the public prosecutors who possess executive powers.[152] Moreover, this division of the Polish government has a responsibility that extends from the detection of corruption to crime prevention. In order to reduce the occurrence of corruption, the CBA conducts preventive and educational activities with the assistance of non-governmental organisations and financial support from the European Union.[152] The efforts to remove corruption have pushed Poland to increase international cooperation as global networking can result in the pooling and exchange of resources and knowledge. The Bureau currently has obtained permission from Poland's Prime Minister to cooperate with 50 other countries and 11 international organisations to tackle corruption on both a national and global scale.[153]

The CBA continues to pursue its anti-corruption goal with its latest project, "Rising of the Anticorruption Training System", whereby over the course of three years from 2013 – 2015, the CBA has been working closely with specialised law enforcements of Lithuania and Latvia.[154] The project also consists of international anti-corruption training conferences whereby notable countries such as Norway and Denmark are able to share their high standard practices with Poland.[154] Additionally, the project has also taken advantage of technology by launching an e-learning platform that is equipped with anti-corruption education tools and online activities. The online platform is a training course designed to educate the general public and Polish working in both the government and business sectors.[154] The key objective of this online platform is to provide an easily accessible set of educational tools that increases public awareness of corruption and informs the necessary steps to assist with its prevention and detection.[154]

European Commission anti-corruption report
[edit]

The European Commission provides a report on the level of corruption in each Member State and details the strengths and weaknesses of their anti-corruption policies. In the 2014 report on Poland, the European Commission has acknowledged Poland's efforts but criticizes Poland's successive governments for not appropriately prioritising the fight against corruption.[151] For instance, Poland has had difficulty establishing anti-corruption policies with its last one having expired in 2009.[151] It was only after a few years of domestic and international pressure did the Polish government conduct consultations on a draft 2014-2019 Programme.[151] Similar to the CPI, the European Commission conducts perception surveys and in 2013 found that 82% of Polish respondents believe corruption is prevalent in Poland and that 15% of Polish respondents have encountered bribery over the past 12 months.[151]

The European Commission also has some reservations over the CBA, suggesting that the CBA may be negatively influenced by politics due to its strong political ties with powerful government officials including the Prime Minister.[151] The European Commission report has suggested that safeguards against politicization of the CBA should be strengthened with transparent and impartial recruitment processes.[151] In addition, the report suggests that Poland needs to enact a long-term strategy against corruption to ensure successive governments remain committed to anti-corruption efforts[151]

National Integrity System Assessment
[edit]

Transparency International and the Institute of Public Affairs publishes the National Integrity System Assessment (NIS) for each country listing whereby it evaluates the capabilities of the country's key institutions to hinder the prevalence of corruption.[155] According to the 2012 assessment, Transparency International notes that Poland has achieved a fairly satisfactory outcome and that corruption is not as problematic as it was during the mid 1990s after the collapse of Communism.[156] Additionally, Poland's joining of the European Union in 2004 has placed expectations on Poland to improve the integrity of their political and corporate affairs. During 2002–2005, Poland is noted for implementing legal changes that extends punishment of corruption in Poland's Criminal Code.[156] However, the assessment highlights that corruption in Poland is still a concern and must be addressed. The assessment asserts that a key component of Poland's relatively slow and small improvements in dealing with corruption is the lack of commitment from Poland's decision makers as there have been several unsuccessful attempts to launch a comprehensive anti-corruption policy.[156] NIS suggests that nepotism and cronyism is still prevalent in the political and corporate sphere, which provides a tolerant setting for corruption.[156] The assessment also takes into consideration Poland's Corruption Perception Index, highlighting that the public's distrust of public entities and the difficulty to establish effective anti-corruption policies has discouraged Poland's decision makers to improve public relations.[156]

Portugal

[edit]

Portugal is recognized within the area of police corruption for its somewhat unsuccessful attempts in combating the ever-increasing images of corruption within governance and policing, through legislation. Though the ability for police services to protect individuals from crime is high and the mechanisms set in place to combat police corruption are extensive, citizens confidence in police integrity is very low.

In accordance with Portugal's Criminal Code, the Unlawful Receiving of an Advantage can result in imprisonment for 3–5 years. Delving further, the Criminal Code also stipulates that Passive Corruption (conducted through an intermediary) and Active Corruption (conducted directly) can receive 1–8 years imprisonment.[157] Though there are minimal cases of police corruption occurring with this added legislation, Portuguese citizen's views on police corruption are in conflict, and the implementation of such administration appears non-existent.

Coming under the global microscope in 2007 for their efforts in the disappearance of Madeleine McCann, the Portuguese police force were heavily criticised and compared for their responses and actions after the abduction.[158] In light of this, Portugal's policing system was opened up to international critique, and many shortfalls were found in its governance and follow through of crime and criminal activity. Explanations for this inability to follow through and effectively punish offenders are varied, with heavy correlations built between trust within legal and political institutions.[159] By the mid-1990s, moralisation within parliamentary procedures became highly controversial with voters remaining tolerant of unethical behaviour during a lack of response shown by parties to their electorate.[160] This build in transparency and lack of trust run alongside Portuguese citizen's understanding of government as well as the current police force.

The 2012 Transparency International report found that Portugal ranked 33rd in the list of nations facing high levels of corruption within its borders.[161] Looking at national surveys, police corruption was seen as a part of everyday life, with Portuguese citizens accosted with daily reports of scandals in government, crimes that go unpunished, and obstacles within everyday investigations.[162] Further survey's conducted amongst citizens found a general consensus in which 75% of individuals agreed that governmental efforts to combat corruption are ineffective, and maintained a below average trust of police officials.[161]

In comparison to fellow nations within the European Union, Portugal has also seen a recent spike in social unrest surrounding the inability to trust police, with figures showing individuals believing police to be corrupt to have spiked.[163] Larger bodies such as the UN and GRECO have placed recommendations to adapt the Criminal Code and develop a more detailed understanding of the responsibilities of policing officials in order to combat this. In accordance, the Portuguese Parliament has enacted a law as of 22 April 2015, where specifications were made on the corruption of international trade, sports activity, and bribery, with special attention to the protection of whistle-blowers in corruption related matters.[164] The implementation of this into everyday Portuguese life however, is yet to be seen.

Romania

[edit]

Over the past century Romania has experienced political instability, including dictatorships, Soviet government control, and monarchies. It is a constitutional democracy.[165] Instability often leads to corruption,[citation needed] and historically, a clear link has existed between countries with government corruption and countries with police corruption.[citation needed] Romania is no exception.

According to Transparency International, 87% of people feel that from 2007 to 2010 the level of corruption in Romania increased after joining the EU in 2007, and 83% feel that their government's efforts to fight corruption are ineffective.[166] On a scale of 1-5 (with 1 being not at all corrupt and 5 being extremely corrupt), Romanians rated both their political parties and their parliament and legislature as 4.5, and their police 3.9. This is relatively high for the European Union especially compared to countries such as Denmark who scored 2.8 for political parties, 2.3 for parliament and legislature and only a 2 for police.[167] Another alarming statistic is that 28% of people in Romania reported paying a bribe in 2010.

There are two main Anti-Corruption Bodies in Romania; the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) and the National Integrity Agency (NIA). The former was created for "discovering, investigating and indicting high and medium level corruption cases" whilst the latter aims to "ensure the performance of public dignities and positions in conditions of impartiality, integrity and transparency".[168] Since 2011 the NIA has also been a member of the European Partners against Corruption (EPAC) who are, among their many roles, the authorities responsible for corruption in regard to the national police.[169]

Anti-fraud organizations have experienced fraud. In February 2015, the DNA prosecutors detained Ionut Vartic, the head of the Suceava Fight against Fraud Department (DLAF) for having used confidential information for private interests.[170] Then, in March 2015, Horia Georgescu, director of Romania's NIA, was arrested on corruption charges. This news followed only days after Darius Valcov, the Romanian finance minister resigned after being accused of accepting £1.4 million in bribes when he was a town mayor. Both maintain their innocence but the cases do nothing to help Romania's reputation as "one of the EU's most corrupt states".[171]

Yet Romania desires to gain admission into Europe's passport-free Schengen zone and thus is at least appearing to make an effort to reduce local and political crime and corruption. Romania is under enormous pressure from the European Commission to deal with their "graft culture" at the risk of losing EU aid funds.[172] Official data revealed in the year of 2009 alone, six magistrates, 22 police officers and five fiscal inspectors had been convicted of bribery on the grounds of having received bribes of between 100 and 45,000 euros.[173] While most civilians denounce the government for the current state of police immorality in Romania, those from above blame the police forces for deliberately failing to produce evidence in court that would allow successful prosecution of corrupt businessmen and politicians.

In February 2015, Monica Iacob Ridzi, Romania's former sports and youth minister, was sentenced to five years in prison for abusing her position, overspending public money, illegally contracting private companies for goods and services and of trying to delete allegedly incriminating e-mails.[174]

Adam Clark, a journalist for the World Post, claims that Romania is "violently using its police forces against its own people".[175] Given the state of corruption in Romania's government and anti-fraud agencies this is not surprising. This statement is supported by Jennifer Baker from Revolution News who reported on the violence used by riot police to suppress anti-corruption protestors in Bucharest following the passing of legislation that immunized the political class from corruption charges, criminalized critical speech, and criminalized demonstrations against government persecution.[176] She states that protestors were accusing the police of protecting thieves. Furthermore, she reported that people living in villages where Chevron (an American multinational energy corporation) is searching for shale gas "were beaten in their houses" by riot police and were "arrested at random"[177]

Slovakia

[edit]

According to corruption watchdog Transparency International, Slovakia is the 17th most corrupt state within Europe and the 59 (out of 178) most corrupt state in the world.[178] There has been heavy criticism of Slovakia for having corrupt political and justice systems. In particular, the Gorilla scandal led to a series of protests aimed at ending top-level government corruption.[citation needed]

In comparison to its neighbours, Slovakia has relatively little corruption within its police force and they are instead assigned the task of breaking the cycle of corruption in other official bodies. The police force consists of a special anti-corruption department, a specialized criminal court on corruption and special prosecution units.[179] There are a series of laws in Slovakia in the Penal Code[180][181] which aim to prohibit corruption within all areas of Slovakian society. The Strategy of Crime and Prevention in the Slovak Republic (2007-2010) was also created to establish an Anti-Corruption Strategy.[181] Within the EU Anti-Corruption Report (2014), the European Commission noted that there were many structural weaknesses in promoting the rule of law[182] whilst Transparency International "considered the police force to be among the weakest institutions in Slovakia".[182] This indicates the police force faces challenges in fighting corruption.

The inefficiencies of the police force in Slovakia would suggest that a certain level of corruption exists within its own structure. The Slovak Republic requested the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development to complete diagnostic surveys of corruption in Slovakia. Surveys were conducted in households, enterprises and public offices and the results between the three survey groups showed similarities. They all agreed that the health system, the justice system, customs, the National Property Fund and the police were corrupt.[183] Within police corruption, the surveys found that traffic police were the ones to be held accountable for the most corruption. From 388 household respondents, 37% claimed to have paid a bribe to a police officer at least once, while 19% claimed to have done so several times.[183] Moreover, the United States Department of State Country Report on Slovakia found that they were 11 serious cases of police corruption in 2011.[179] The most common form of police corruption within Slovakia is the extortion of bribes, which predominantly occurs at traffic stops.[179]

The low rate of police corruption in Slovakia – besides the traffic police – suggests that the extensive laws against corruption act as a deterrent for police officers. While the level of the corruption within the justice system in Slovakia remains quite high, corruption in the police force remains somewhat confined to traffic police and their extortion of minor bribes.[citation needed]

Slovenia

[edit]

Contemporary concerns about police corruption are largely reflected by public opinion, which demonstrate widespread consensus that corruption within all public sectors is a "very big problem" in Slovenia.[184] The 2013 Special Eurobarometer on Corruption showed that 76% (the second highest percentage in the EU) of Slovenian participants believed there had been an increase in corruption in the last three years.[185] Furthermore, public opinion suggests that police corruption in particular is a significant issue, which much concern over bribery, and abuse of power for personal gain amongst Slovenian police officers.[186]

Initially, Slovenian legislation did not provide for corruption as a separate offence distinguished from other forms of crime.[184] Corruption is not used as a legal term in Slovenia, instead, the legislation provides for each offence individually as a criminal act. The Prevention of Corruption Act, adopted in 2004, defines corruption as "ever trespassing of the obligated treatment of official or responsible subject in the private or public sector, as well as the treatment of subjects that are initiators of violators, or subjects that can benefit from the violations".[187] Changes within the organisation of policing in Slovenia were brought about initially by the 1991 Constitution, in line with political changes towards a more democratic system with a greater sensitivity towards human rights.[188] These changes, along with the birth of the Constitutional court to enforce these, brought about strict limitations on powers of police to search and seize, as well as more emphasis on the protection of privacy and fundamental rights in criminal proceedings.[189] The judicial control over police powers was further strengthened in the Police Act of 1998, later reinforced by the New Organisation and Work of the Police Act 2013. These acts provide specifically for instances of police corruption. Additionally, the 2013 act allowed an individual to file a direct complaint against a police officer if they thought the act, or failure to act, of the officer violated human rights or fundamental freedoms.[190]

Following the cases of Rehblock v Slovenia (2000) and Matko v Slovenia (2006), a department for the prosecution of officials with special authorisations was established, which removed any police involvement in the investigation of other officers suspected of committing criminal offences. Since this recent introduction, there has been increased investigation and action taken for police offenders. In 2011, the department conducted 80 investigations, out of which 19 police officers were dismissed as a result of the suspicion of them committing a criminal offence.[190]

Lobnikar and Meško (2015) found that within a sample of 550 Slovenian police officers, 23.6% agreed that covering up a police DUI was 'not all that serious'. Additionally, 34% of respondents claimed that they would not report another police officer who had engaged in conduct such as receiving free meals, gifts from merchants, police DUI and verbal abuse.[191] While this study demonstrated a trend in Slovenian police officers to ignore less serious forms of police corruption, there is agreement (59.1-75%) that police integrity within the Slovenian police work environment is generally high.[192]

Within the wider context of the European Union, corruption continues to be an economic burden. Aside from the consequences within each member state, corruption reduces levels of investment, obstructs the fair operation of the Internal Market and has a negative impact on public finances. It is estimated that approximately 1% of the EU GDP is made up of economic costs incurred by corruption. Specifically, an estimated loss of between 1.5 and 2% of the Slovenian GDP is incurred as a result of corruption.[184] Slovenia has administered substantial improvements to their legal framework to address the issue of police corruption among Central and Eastern European Member States.[193] However, issues with the effective enforcement of these anti-corruption measures still remain, due to "weak control mechanisms" administered by the government.[193] Lobnikar's and Meško's 2015 survey demonstrates a high level of police integrity strictly connected to the 'code of silence' in the police community. Therefore, anti-corruption strategies related to changing perceptions and moral beliefs about the seriousness of corruptive police conduct may be the most effective at improving Slovenia's anti-corruption enforcement.[191]

Saudi Arabia

[edit]

Jamal Khashoggi was a critic of Saudi Arabia who was tortured and murdered by Saudi law enforcement officials. He was invited to the Saudi embassy in Turkey and was kidnapped there. [194] In 2011, Saudi Arabia also sent law enforcement to next door Bahrain to put down protesters.[195]

Spain

[edit]

In Global Corruption Barometer 2013 report conducted by Transparency International, Spain ranked 37th out of 175 countries (1st being the least corrupt) on the Corruption Perception Index with the highest form of corruption being political at 4.4%. The 3rd highest was police corruption at 3.1%.[196] Under the Spanish Constitution, corruption is defined as where a holder of public authority or public official who solicits or receives a gift or offer for carrying out in the course of his duties, for his own gain or for the benefit of others, an act or omission which constitutes an offence shall be liable to imprisonment for 2 to 6 years.[197]

Since 1996, on average per year, there have been 25 reported police corruption cases to the media.[197]

As a member of the European Partner's Against Corruption (EPAC), a document was released in November 2011 about the Policing Oversight Principles, which for Spain is the Inspectorate of Personnel and Security Services who oversees the enforcement of these policing principles of the above bodies:

The highest standard of policing, respect for the rule of law and human rights in all policing activities, greater public confidence in policing, proper systems of accountability for police officers and other law enforcement officials, effective redress for those who are victims of police misconduct, greater openness and understanding of policing by citizens, systems to ensure that lessons are learnt from incidents and errors, greater respect for the law, policing and as a consequence reductions in criminality.[198]

However, according to Freelance Journalist; Guy Hedgecoe, "corruption [has] been accepted as a part of Spanish everyday life".[199]

Thailand

[edit]

United Arab Emirates

[edit]

Police in the UAE have abused those in their custody and sometimes this abuse has led to death. The Abu Dhabi Police allegedly assisted Sheikh Issa bin Zayed Al Nahyan in a 2009 torture incident.[200] The Police are also alleged to have used excessive force on critics and protesters.[201]

United Kingdom

[edit]

A 2011 report by Transparency International concluded that although corruption is not endemic, it is a much greater problem than recognised and that there was an inadequate response to its growing threat.[202] The report also found that the response to corruption from British institutions was often underwhelming and failed to adequately address the issues. A 2015 report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) on the capability of British institutions to tackle police corruption argued that progress had been made in combating corruption since 2011, noting that allegations of misconduct and corruption inside the police force are being taken seriously, and that superior officers displayed strong ethical commitments to tackling corruption.[203] However, the report also condemned the relatively large number of investigations where no further action was taken, roughly two thirds of all investigations. HMIC Mike Cunningham noted that many cases of police corruption are dropped due to being unfounded, however they believed many cases had not been adequately investigated.[204] Officers were also shown to lack confidence in the anonymity and mechanisms in place for reporting the misconduct of peers, which hinders the ability of institutions to effectively identify and combat police corruption.[203]

In the UK, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) is responsible for overseeing the system of handling complaints made against police officers in England and Wales, while these duties are handled by the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland (OPONI) in Northern Ireland, and the Police Investigations and Review Commissioner (PIRC) in Scotland. These agencies can manage or supervise police investigations into corruption, conduct independent investigations into the most serious cases, and can refer cases for prosecution should enough evidence be found to form a case.

A 2012 report into police corruption in England and Wales by the IPCC noted the prevalence of the serious offences referred to them from 2008 to 2011; perverting the course of justice (33%), theft or fraud (30%), abuse of authority (15%), unauthorised disclosure of information (13%), and misuse of systems (9%).[205] The IPCC received 837 referrals during this period, mostly from British citizens.[205] 47 cases were referred for prosecution, resulting in ten prison sentences, one suspended sentence and one fine.[205] As a result of all investigations into the corruption and misconduct of British police and staff between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014, 134 police officers and staff were dismissed, while a further 711 faced disciplinary sanctions.[203] 103 Metropolitan Police officers were also suspended during this period.[206] Offences included drug related offences, bribery, theft or fraud, sexual misconduct, and information disclosure, where information disclosure and theft or fraud were the most common offences.[203][206] The Directorate of Professional standards considers the "exploitation of staff through inappropriate relationships with journalists, private investigators and criminals" the biggest threat to police integrity.[206]

On 27 June 2012 the Home Affairs Committee announced an inquiry into the IPCC including, but not limited to, analysis of the independence of the commission, the powers and responsibilities of the commission and the effectiveness of Commission investigations. The committee began hearing evidence on 17 July 2012. The report was published on 29 January 2013[207] and was scathing,[208] describing it as "woefully underequipped and hamstrung in achieving its original objectives. It has neither the powers nor the resources that it needs to get to the truth when the integrity of the police is in doubt."[209]

In 2014, newspaper The Independent published a leaked 2002 Metropolitan Police report which indicated that criminals used Freemasonry connections to recruit corrupt officers.

United States

[edit]

Grand juries often decline to seek charges for U.S. police officers involved in violent activity due to the violent nature of policing, though some U.S. police have faced killing charges. Corruption cases and other non-violent crimes are more likely to be prosecuted.[210]

Uzbekistan

[edit]
Corruption within the Uzbek police force has been described as "pervasive."[211] Extortion is common, and police regularly use false charges to dissuade anyone from reporting their corruption crimes to higher bureaus. A 2014 report stated that police corruption had risen recently owing to the currency exchange market coming under the control of known criminal groups.[211]

Venezuela

[edit]

Venezuela's corruption includes widespread corruption in the police force.[212] Criminologists and experts have stated that low wages and lack of police supervision has been attributed to police corruption.[213] Many victims are afraid to report crimes to the police because many officers are involved with criminals and may bring even more harm to the victims.[214] Human Rights Watch has reported that the "police commit one of every five crimes" and that thousands of people have been killed by police officers acting with impunity; only 3% of officers have been charged in cases against them.[215] The Metropolitan Police force in Caracas was so corrupt that it was disbanded and was even accused of assisting in many of the 17,000 kidnappings.[216]

The Corruption Perceptions Index, produced annually by the NGO Transparency International (TNI) ranked Venezuela among the most corrupt countries in the world[217] A 2013 survey by TNI in 2013 found that 68% of those believed that the government's efforts to fight corruption were ineffective; a majority of those surveyed said the government's effort against corruption were ineffective, that corruption had increased from 2007 to 2010, and perceived political parties, the judiciary, the parliament and the police to be the institutions most affected by corruption.[218]

Noble cause corruption

[edit]

Noble cause corruption, as ethical corruption, is a departure from conventional discussions on police corruption, which typically focus on monetary corruption. According to the field of Police Ethics, noble cause corruption is police misconduct "committed in the name of good ends." In Police Ethics it argued that some of the best officers are often the most susceptible to noble cause corruption.[219] According to professional policing literature, noble cause corruption includes "planting or fabricating evidence, lying or the fabrication and manipulation of facts on reports or through testimony in court, and generally abusing police authority to make a charge stick."[220] According to Robert Reiner, a professor at the London School of Economics, stops based on statistical discrimination are also a form of noble cause corruption.[221]

Many police officers who take bribes believe they are providing a public service[222]

Effects

[edit]

Police corruption affects society, including political, economic, and sociological. The social aspect is perhaps easiest to define, because even one corrupt officer in a department can generate an overall distrust of the department (the Rotten Apple theory).[223] This negative outlook on policing by civilians helps maintain an "us versus them" mentality among police, which only serves to further the rift between police officers and civilians.

Police corruption, when brought to the public eye, increases pressures on departments by lawmakers to enact change from within. In 2013, the West Valley City, Utah police's narcotics unit was disbanded due to rampant corruption among its officers. These officers were found stealing small items from seized vehicles, taking evidence, and placing tracking devices on potential suspects' vehicles without warrants.[224] This action, like many others, not only increases distrust among the public, but lawmakers begin to feel pressure from the masses to remove officers and revamp entire departments.

Political

[edit]

Civilian involvement

[edit]

Civilians within the jurisdiction look to lawmakers and justice officials to enact justice against the officers involved. If the instance of corruption happens to fall on an election year, their re-election campaign may be lost.

In areas such as Afghanistan, media exposure and civilian involvement in combating corruption is rarely seen. Rather, international officials step in to help eliminate corruption in the department.[225]

Top-down discipline

[edit]

Depending on the number of people involved and severity of the acts, the state executive or legislature may be compelled to demand that the department be scrutinized and its policies corrected. This can involve replacing individual officers, mid-level leadership, or asking for a resignation by the department chief. Disciplinary actions depend on the severity of the act, but typically result in disciplinary actions by the department and negative media coverage for the department.[226] In 1970, the New York City Knapp Commission began holding officers and supervision accountable and instituting real disciplinary actions for police corruption. In countries where corruption is a major issue, such as China and Russia, state government is often directly involved in investigating and disciplining cases of corruption, such as in the Chongqing gang trials, where police chief Wen Qiang was detained and put on trial for accepting bribes, rape, and other crimes during the Chongqing gang crackdown.[227]

Social

[edit]

General distrust of police in the community

[edit]

While political issues can easily be worked through, the social effect of police corruption is much harder to overcome. Civilians, especially those who or know someone who has been victimized by certain types of corruption, tend to see police officers as enemy forces.[228] Similarly, police officers view civilians in the same light. Both issues have only been exacerbated by the War on Crime and War on Drugs. The "us versus them" mentality is especially prevalent among inner city minorities, where stereotyping and racial targeting seem to be the norm.[citation needed]

Rotten apple theory

[edit]

This theory suggests that one bad cop ruins the entire department. A single officer can not only cause leadership to initiate investigations over entire sections or the department as a whole, but that one corrupt officer/the rotten apple can bring a generally appreciated department to its knees in terms of public relations. People look at that one bad cop and assume, sometimes correctly (especially in this case, where several other officers were found to be committing similar violations) the entire department is corrupt and committing similar or worse acts.[223] A 2019 study in the journal Nature backs up this theory, finding that misconduct by one police officer substantially increased the likelihood that peer officers would also engage in misconduct. The article uses the metaphor of a contagion.[229]

Reduced effectiveness

[edit]

Police corruption not only generates distrust among the public, but undermines the criminal justice system as a whole. Judges and prosecutors may develop a negative opinion of officers who come to testify in cases, especially those who have a history of disciplinary action related to corrupt acts. The trustworthiness of officers who work in departments where corruption has been discovered is severely diminished, and even if the testimony they provide in court is an exact recollection of the events in question, a prosecutor or judge may choose to simply ignore these facts because of their association with a seemingly corrupt department. In the case of the Waldo Police Department located in Florida, the entire department was disbanded partly due to allegations of corruption, meaning county law enforcement must take over where the city failed.[230]

Economic

[edit]

Officer training

[edit]

Should the corrupt act not be extremely severe, or the department decide discharge of the officer is unnecessary, those involved in corrupt acts may be charged to undergo remedial training. This could be inside or outside the department, and becomes another red mark on the already strapped budget of most departments. The cost of this remedial training pales in comparison to the cost of having to train new officers to replace those who are relieved of their duties, since these new hires will need to undergo initial academy training as well as whatever additional training the officer would require as they advanced in their career.[231]

Investigations

[edit]

Investigation and litigation costs may be high. These investigators are either part of their own department or taken from other squads (county sheriff investigating a city department, for example), or can be private entities. The department must also invest in retaining attorneys for both themselves and the officers involved.[232]

[edit]

There are numerous depictions of police corruption in the media.

Documentaries

[edit]
  • The Gestapo: Hitler's secret police (1991)[238] The Geheime Staatspolizei, abbreviated Gestapo, was the official secret police of Nazi Germany and in German-occupied Europe. The force was created by Hermann Göring in 1933 by combining the various political police agencies of Prussia into one organisation. The Gestapo was a notorious organization tasked with destroying political opponents of the Nazi movement, suppressing any opposition to Nazi policies, and persecuting Jews. From its origins as a Prussian intelligence organization, it grew into a sprawling and greatly feared apparatus of oppression. Heinrich Himmler was given command over Göring's Gestapo in 1934. Himmler, in addition to his position as head of the SS, took control of all German police forces, including the Ordnungspolizei (German: "Order Police"), with his appointment as Reichsführer SS and chief of the German police.
  • Cops on Trial (2021) is about police officers who are rapists[239]
  • Police on Trial (2022)[240]

Films

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Television

[edit]

Video Games

[edit]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Police corruption encompasses the misuse of authority by law enforcement officers to secure personal gain, including , , of or , and fabrication of or reports. This misconduct deviates from the core duty to uphold public trust and the , often exploiting the discretion inherent in policing roles such as arrests, searches, and evidence handling. Empirical analyses classify it into patterns like petty gratuities (e.g., free services or ), kickbacks from illegitimate enterprises, protective shakedowns of criminals, and direct fixer fees for quashing cases, with more severe forms involving organized internal or to cover abuses. Quantifying prevalence proves challenging due to underreporting and concealment, yet data from officer arrest records reveal that between 2005 and 2011, approximately 2,500 personnel faced criminal charges annually for , equating to less than 0.1% of sworn officers but spanning agencies nationwide. Studies indicate that while overt criminal remains rare—often confined to isolated actors or subcultures—subtler forms like or gratuities serve as gateways, eroding integrity across units and fostering environments where serious abuses thrive unchecked. Globally, surveys and case analyses show higher incidence in resource-scarce or politically influenced forces, where officers encounter frequent temptations from illicit economies, though even in developed systems, systemic lapses enable persistence. At root, police corruption stems from structural incentives where high-stakes discretion meets inadequate deterrents: low detection risks, peer tolerance of minor deviations, and insufficient accountability mechanisms like rigorous recruitment screening or performance-linked pay. Causal factors include under-resourced departments fostering reliance on external "perks," fragmented oversight allowing supervisory , and the occupational isolation of policing, which insulates officers from external norms and amplifies group justifications for rule-bending. Consequences extend beyond individual malfeasance to broader societal harm, including perpetuated through rackets, diminished deterrence from perceived , and eroded legitimacy that hampers and invites . Efforts to mitigate it emphasize internal controls, such as mandatory testing and whistleblower protections, though underscores that cultural reforms addressing opportunity structures yield more enduring results than punitive measures alone.

Definition and Conceptual Framework

Core Definition

Police corruption refers to acts by law enforcement officers that involve the misuse of their official authority or position for personal gain, often encompassing , , of seized property, or protection of illegal activities. This definition emphasizes intentional deviation from legal and ethical duties, distinguishing it from mere errors in judgment or procedural failures, as the core element is self-interested exploitation of power imbalances inherent in policing roles. Empirical studies highlight that such corruption erodes and operational efficacy, with patterns observed across jurisdictions where officers leverage for illicit rewards, such as accepting bribes to overlook violations or fabricating for financial kickbacks. Key manifestations include both opportunistic acts, like soliciting gratuities that can escalate to more severe s, and organized schemes involving multiple officers, as evidenced in analyses of departmental scandals where unpunished minor infractions normalized broader deviance. While definitions vary—some narrower views limit it to direct financial exchanges, others broader ones incorporate favoritism toward associates—the consensus in scholarly literature centers on the causal link between authority and private benefit, irrespective of scale, as this undermines the foundational mandate of policing. from global assessments indicate that corruption thrives in environments with weak , where officers perceive low risks of detection or sanction, perpetuating cycles of institutional decay. Police corruption is narrowly defined as the misuse of official authority for personal gain, typically involving acts such as accepting bribes, , or of seized property, which distinguishes it from broader categories of police deviance. In contrast, encompasses a wider array of rule-breaking behaviors that do not necessarily yield direct personal benefit to the officer, including procedural errors, false arrests without pecuniary motive, or discriminatory enforcement driven by rather than self-interest. This distinction underscores that while all corruption constitutes misconduct, the reverse is not true; misconduct may arise from , inadequate oversight, or situational pressures without the hallmark of individual enrichment. A key differentiation exists between police corruption and police brutality, the latter being an excessive or unjustified application of physical force that violates departmental policy or legal standards but often lacks the profit-seeking intent central to corruption. Brutality typically stems from factors such as emotional escalation during confrontations, insufficient de-escalation training, or cultural tolerances within units, as evidenced in analyses of incidents like the 2020 case, where no personal financial gain was alleged against the officers involved. Corruption, by comparison, might manifest in related but distinct ways, such as officers fabricating evidence for bribes or protection rackets, prioritizing self-advancement over public safety. Abuse of authority overlaps with both but is differentiated by its focus on non-pecuniary overreach, such as unauthorized or to coerce compliance, without the economic or material reward that defines . Empirical studies, including those from the U.S. Department of Justice, highlight that such abuses often correlate with unchecked rather than systemic graft, though repeated instances can erode similarly to corrupt practices. Noble cause corruption represents a nuanced variant, where officers rationalize unethical or illegal actions—such as planting or perjuring —not for personal profit but to secure convictions perceived as serving the greater good of control. This contrasts sharply with traditional corruption's self-serving orientation, as noble cause behaviors are motivated by ends-justify-means logic, potentially leading to miscarriages of without individual enrichment, as documented in cases like the in where officers framed suspects to boost clearance rates. Distinguishing these prevents conflation in reform efforts, as addressing noble cause requires tackling cultural justifications within policing subcultures, whereas traditional corruption demands anti-graft measures like financial audits.

Historical Development

Pre-20th Century Examples

In ancient Rome, the vigiles urbani, instituted by Emperor Augustus in 6 CE as a corps of freedmen responsible for firefighting, night patrols, and minor policing duties, were plagued by extortion and abuse of authority. These watchmen often demanded bribes from property owners to intervene in fires or to refrain from false accusations of arson, exacerbating urban vulnerabilities in a city prone to conflagrations. Corruption persisted despite imperial edicts against it, as the vigiles' low pay and broad discretionary powers incentivized graft, with historical records indicating frequent complaints to magistrates about their negligence and shakedowns. During the medieval period in , local and constables, tasked with night patrols and maintaining order in towns, routinely engaged in and dereliction of duty. These part-time officers, often unpaid or minimally compensated, accepted payments to ignore disturbances or selectively enforce laws favoring the wealthy, as evidenced by chronicles from 13th-century where bailiffs like Jehan de Beauquesne in 1294 profited from covering up murders and falsifying records for personal gain. Such practices were systemic, with limited by feudal hierarchies that shielded officials from prosecution unless directly challenged by nobles, leading to arbitrary justice where bribes determined outcomes over evidence. In , the pre-modern policing system of parish watchmen and thief-takers was notorious for bribery, with constables frequently tipping off criminals or fabricating evidence for rewards. established the in 1749 as salaried investigators to curb this graft, yet the force itself succumbed to corruption by the early 1800s, including officers accepting payoffs to overlook thefts and smuggling. This reflected broader incentives in a reward-based system where convictions yielded fees, fostering a culture of and documented in parliamentary inquiries. By the , urban police forces in the United States exemplified entrenched corruption tied to political machines. In , from the 1850s under Tammany Hall's dominance, officers systematically protected vice operations like saloons and gambling houses in exchange for weekly bribes totaling thousands of dollars annually per precinct, as uncovered in the 1892 scandal exposing department-wide extortion rackets. The subsequent Lexow Committee investigation in 1894 substantiated over 2,000 complaints of police malfeasance, including shakedowns of immigrants and businesses, revealing how appointments prioritized loyalty over integrity, with captains skimming protection money before distribution.

20th Century Scandals and Reforms

In the early , Prohibition-era enforcement (1920–1933) fueled extensive police corruption across U.S. cities, as officers accepted bribes from bootleggers to ignore violations and participated in protection rackets. The National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, known as the and appointed by President in 1929, documented these issues in its 1931 report Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, revealing systemic , illegal seizures, and the routine use of the "third degree"—physical during interrogations—to extract confessions. The commission's findings, based on surveys of over 1,200 police departments, highlighted how unenforceable alcohol laws created incentives for graft, with corrupt officers undermining federal efforts and eroding public trust. Mid-century scandals exemplified operational corruption tied to . In , the 1960 Summerdale scandal exposed a burglary ring where eight police officers protected thieves, allowing over 50 unsolved break-ins; investigations revealed that patrolmen ignored crimes in exchange for shares of loot, leading to the conviction of 13 officers and the resignation of Police Superintendent Timothy O'Connor. This case, investigated by the Illinois Crime Investigating Commission, underscored how decentralized precinct autonomy enabled "fiefdoms" of graft, with officers fabricating alibis and suppressing evidence. Similar patterns emerged in , where pre-Knapp era probes in the 1950s uncovered gambling and narcotics payoffs, though enforcement remained lax until whistleblowers like highlighted department-wide complicity in the 1960s. The , formed in 1970 by New York City Mayor following Serpico's testimony, conducted public hearings in 1971 that cataloged pervasive NYPD corruption, estimating annual graft at $70–200 million from vice operations like and . Testimonies detailed "grass-eaters" (officers taking small bribes) and "meat-eaters" (active shakedowns), with over 5,000 officers implicated in systemic protection of criminal enterprises; the commission's 1972 report criticized internal affairs divisions for bias toward shielding colleagues. Internationally, London's faced exposure in the 1970s for bribery in armed robbery probes, with officers like those in the "Dirty Squad" accepting payments from criminals, though reforms lagged behind U.S. inquiries. Reforms post-scandals emphasized professionalization and oversight but yielded mixed results. The Wickersham report prompted early federal pushes for standardized and merit-based promotions, influencing the 1930s shift toward exams in major departments to reduce political , though corruption persisted due to weak enforcement. Knapp recommendations led to NYPD structural changes in 1973, including a civilian oversight board, decentralized command , and mandatory ethics ; these reduced overt graft by 80% in audited precincts within a , per internal audits, but whistleblower protections remained inadequate, fostering retaliation. Chicago's response to Summerdale involved centralizing intelligence and creating an independent in 1960, yet subsequent probes showed recurring cycles every 20 years, attributing failures to union resistance and prosecutorial reluctance. Overall, 20th-century reforms prioritized deterrence through commissions and codes but often overlooked root incentives like low pay and discretion, allowing opportunistic corruption to recur.

Post-2000 Global Shifts

The , adopted in 2003 and entering into force in 2005, marked a pivotal global effort to address institutional , including within police forces, by requiring signatory states—over 180 by 2025—to criminalize , , and abuse of office, while promoting transparency and international cooperation. This framework influenced national reforms, such as enhanced internal oversight mechanisms in countries like the , where the Independent Police Complaints Commission was established in 2004 to investigate misconduct independently of police hierarchies. However, empirical assessments from Transparency International's surveys indicate persistent high perceptions of police corruption globally, with citizens in dozens of countries rating police as the most corrupt public institution as of 2013, a trend continuing into the in regions like and where remains routine. Radical restructuring in select nations demonstrated potential for rapid reductions in corruption. In Georgia, following widespread graft in the early , the government dismissed over 30,000 officers in 2004 and rebuilt the force with higher salaries, merit-based recruitment, and digital ticketing systems, resulting in a sharp decline in complaints and improved metrics by 2006. Similar depoliticization efforts in post-communist , supported by accession pressures, correlated with lower corruption indices in police sectors, though institutional factors like weak limited broader gains. In contrast, reforms in high-corruption contexts like and faced setbacks, with police infiltration by drug cartels persisting; for instance, a 2014 analysis highlighted how unpunished in officer hiring perpetuated systemic graft despite federal purges. These cases underscore that while post-2000 reforms emphasized structures, their efficacy hinged on political will and economic incentives, with failures often tied to low detection risks and cultural tolerance for graft. Technological integrations since the mid-2000s introduced new deterrents, though evidence of impact on corruption remains mixed. Body-worn cameras, piloted in the UK around 2005 and scaled in the post-2014, reduced citizen complaints of misconduct by 10-65% in randomized trials across departments like Rialto, California (2012-2013), by providing verifiable footage that discouraged false claims and facilitated internal reviews. Digital surveillance and data analytics further enabled real-time monitoring of patrol patterns, curbing opportunistic shakedowns in urban settings, as seen in Singapore's expanded use of closed-circuit systems integrated with bureaus. Yet, meta-analyses indicate no consistent decline in arrests or use-of-force incidents linked to corruption, and privacy concerns have prompted uneven adoption, particularly in developing nations where infrastructure lags. The proliferation of smartphones since 2010 amplified citizen oversight, exposing incidents via viral videos that prompted investigations, but this shift also highlighted biases in media reporting, often amplifying isolated abuses over systemic data. Overall, these tools fostered incremental in wealthier democracies but have not reversed entrenched corruption in fragile states, where surveys report 36% global perception of high police corruption as of 2023.

Forms of Police Corruption

Financial Corruption

Financial corruption among police officers encompasses the illicit acquisition of monetary benefits through practices such as , , theft of seized assets, and kickbacks from service providers. These acts typically involve officers exploiting their authority to extract payments in exchange for leniency, protection, or favorable treatment, undermining public trust and the . Empirical analyses indicate that and constitute significant portions of documented , with street-level interactions often serving as entry points for such graft. Bribery manifests in various forms, including payments from individuals or businesses for overlooking violations or steering opportunities. For instance, in October 2023, a former Hamtramck, Michigan, police officer pleaded guilty to accepting bribes from a towing company operator to direct business toward the firm. Similarly, in October 2021, three current and former New York Police Department officers were charged with bribery for funneling damaged vehicles to a tow truck company run by a former colleague in return for cash payments. In August 2023, federal authorities indicted 10 current and former officers from two Northern California departments in a corruption scheme involving undisclosed financial incentives, highlighting patterns in localized networks. Extortion and theft further exemplify financial motives, where officers demand payments under threat of or appropriate funds from . A 2015 National Institute of Justice study of over 2,000 officers arrested for crimes found that 5.3% involved or blackmail, often tied to financial gain, while theft from seized featured prominently in non-operational . Protection rackets, common in high-corruption environments, compel businesses to pay for against fabricated threats, as documented in global assessments where such schemes integrate with . Prevalence data reveal financial corruption as a core issue, though underreporting complicates quantification. The same NIJ analysis showed that profit-driven crimes, including and , accounted for a substantial share of police arrests between 2005 and 2012, correlating with departmental tolerance rather than isolated acts. Internationally, reports identify petty in traffic stops and licensing as routine, eroding institutional integrity where oversight is weak. Reforms targeting financial incentives, such as audits, have shown mixed efficacy, with persistent cases indicating deeper cultural drivers.

Operational Corruption

Operational corruption in policing involves the abuse of authority during frontline activities, such as arrests, searches, and investigations, to secure personal benefits or evade . This includes tactics like planting on suspects, falsifying reports or witness statements, committing to secure convictions, and using excessive to extract confessions or intimidate witnesses. Unlike administrative corruption, which occurs in internal processes like or promotions, operational corruption directly exploits interactions with the public and criminal elements, often enabled by the discretion inherent in police work. A prominent U.S. example is the Police Department's Rampart scandal, uncovered in 1998 after officer Rafael Pérez was arrested for stealing approximately 8 pounds of from an evidence locker. Investigations revealed that officers in the Rampart Division's anti-gang CRASH unit routinely engaged in operational abuses, including framing over 70 innocent individuals through planted evidence and false testimony, shooting unarmed civilians and covering it up, and . The Police Department's Board of Inquiry, reporting in March 2000, identified 70 officers as subjects of investigation, leading to the overturning or dismissal of more than 100 criminal convictions and over 1,000 civil lawsuits against the department costing tens of millions in settlements. The inquiry attributed the corruption to individual choices for "blatant misconduct and criminal behavior," exacerbated by lax supervision and a culture tolerating to justify operations. Similar patterns have emerged elsewhere, such as in a 1998 sting operation where 44 officers from multiple agencies accepted bribes totaling up to $100,000 to protect undercover trafficking, demonstrating how operational roles in enforcement can facilitate rackets. In these cases, officers exploited their patrol and investigative powers to shield criminal activities in exchange for payments, often rationalizing it as minor accommodations but resulting in federal indictments for . Empirical analyses indicate that operational thrives in high-discretion environments like or narcotics units, where verifiable evidence is scarce and peer loyalty discourages reporting. Detection often relies on internal whistleblowers or external stings, as routine oversight fails to capture concealed abuses like evidence tampering, which can fabricate and sustain wrongful prosecutions.

Systemic vs. Opportunistic Corruption

Opportunistic corruption in policing consists of sporadic, individual-level acts motivated by personal gain, such as from crime scenes, arrestees, or victims' , without reliance on institutional mechanisms. These behaviors, often classified under typologies like those proposed by Barker and Roebuck, include shakedowns or accepting minor gratuities, and are typically isolated rather than coordinated. Detection of such corruption frequently occurs through targeted probes or whistleblower reports, as seen in analyses of U.S. arrests where individual deviations predominate in lower-profile cases. Systemic corruption, by contrast, embeds corrupt practices within the organizational fabric, involving widespread participation across ranks or units, often enabled by inadequate oversight, cultural tolerance, or structural incentives that normalize deviance. This manifests as patterned , such as police syndicates extracting regular protection fees from illegal enterprises, as documented in historical cases from where entire units operated corrupt networks. Unlike opportunistic acts, systemic forms erode institutional legitimacy more profoundly, fostering environments where corruption becomes a operational norm rather than aberration. The distinction hinges on scale and : opportunistic corruption stems from personal in low-risk scenarios, amenable to individual sanctions, whereas systemic variants arise from institutional failures like poor screening or gaps, necessitating comprehensive reforms such as independent oversight bodies. Studies of police deviance indicate that while opportunistic incidents are more readily quantified through data—revealing patterns like in 20-30% of U.S. misconduct cases—systemic is understated due to self-reporting biases and concealment, potentially amplifying in regions with weak rule-of-law metrics. Empirical assessments, including those from the U.S. Department of Justice, highlight that conflating the two risks ineffective interventions, as isolated punishments fail against entrenched systems.

Causal Factors

Individual-Level Drivers

Personality traits such as , , lack of , thrill-seeking , and unstable interpersonal relationships have been identified as predictors of , including corrupt acts, in empirical studies using psychological assessments like the MMPI-2. Officers exhibiting dissocial or antisocial traits, characterized by disregard for social norms and low , show higher propensities for deviance, as these traits correlate with decisions favoring personal gain over ethical duties in high-stakes environments. Prior individual histories of misconduct or deviant further amplify risk, with patterns of early infractions predicting sustained corruption through habituation and reduced . Financial desperation or greed serves as a core personal motivator, where officers rationalize , , or as responses to unmet economic needs, particularly in low-wage contexts; for instance, studies frame this as individual overriding when personal utility outweighs perceived risks. Opportunistic corruption arises from officers' abuse of authority for non-monetary gains, such as sexual favors or protection rackets, driven by power intoxication and that neutralizes guilt via justifications like "everyone does it." Chronic exacerbates individual vulnerabilities, impairing judgment and fostering misconduct as a maladaptive mechanism; research links elevated stress levels to increased incidence, with officers under strain more likely to engage in gratuities or cover-ups to alleviate pressure. Negative attitudes toward reporting peers, rooted in personal or of retaliation, compound these drivers, as self-reported assessments reveal that officers with permissive views on minor deviance escalate to serious over time. While institutional screening aims to filter such traits during , empirical data indicate that undetected personal factors persist, underscoring the causal primacy of individual agency in initiating corrupt acts before environmental influences reinforce them.

Institutional and Cultural Drivers

Institutional structures within police organizations often foster corruption through inadequate oversight mechanisms and hierarchical systems that prioritize internal loyalty over external . The , investigating New York Police Department corruption in the early 1970s, concluded that systemic failures at supervisory levels enabled widespread graft, with officers categorized as "grass-eaters" engaging in opportunistic petty corruption and "meat-eaters" pursuing aggressive schemes, often unchecked due to command indifference or complicity. Similarly, a Office on Drugs and Crime analysis identifies lack of institutional as a core factor, where supervisors either sanction or ignore officer misconduct, perpetuating a cycle of deviance across global contexts. Police unions exacerbate this by negotiating contracts that shield officers from discipline, limiting access to records, and influencing disciplinary processes to favor members, thereby impeding investigations into misconduct. Cultural elements within policing, particularly the entrenched subculture of , further entrench by enforcing a "code of silence" that discourages and internal reporting of deviance. Empirical studies on police s reveal that occupational norms emphasize peer fidelity over ethical integrity, viewing reporting of as betrayal and fostering an "us versus them" mentality toward civilians and oversight bodies. This , documented in self-report surveys of officers, correlates with higher tolerance for corrupt practices, as deviance becomes normalized within insular resistant to external reform pressures. In environments of low , such cultural insulation amplifies risks, as officers perceive as a survival mechanism against perceived adversarial scrutiny from communities or media. These drivers interact dynamically; for instance, institutional protections like union-backed clauses reinforce cultural norms by minimizing consequences for ethical lapses, creating feedback loops where erodes. Reforms targeting these, such as independent oversight boards with power, have shown mixed efficacy, often undermined by cultural resistance and legal challenges from entrenched interests. Overall, addressing institutional and cultural drivers requires dismantling permissive hierarchies and subcultural barriers through transparent, evidence-based mechanisms that prioritize verifiable over .

External Pressures and Incentives

Low salaries for police officers, often determined by governmental budgeting rather than departmental control, create external economic incentives for by increasing vulnerability to bribes and in environments with high opportunities for illicit gains. Empirical studies across developing and developed contexts demonstrate a negative between wage levels and incidence; for instance, Van Rijckeghem and Weder's analysis of 31 countries found that raising pay to match equivalents could reduce by up to 60% in low-wage settings, as officers weigh the risks of detection against the financial temptation of supplemental income from criminal enterprises. In regions like and parts of , where police salaries frequently fall below 50% of GDP, officers report resorting to "survival corruption" such as shakedowns, exacerbated by stagnant wage policies amid and rising living costs. This pressure is compounded by inadequate operational budgets allocated externally, limiting equipment and training, which forces reliance on corrupt shortcuts for basic enforcement. Political demands for measurable performance outcomes, imposed by elected officials or oversight bodies, generate incentives for statistical manipulation and operational shortcuts that border on or enable , the adoption of systems in the 1990s, driven by mayoral and mandates for reduction metrics, pressured precinct commanders to meet arrest quotas, correlating with documented cases of falsified reports and evidence planting to inflate clearance rates. A 2021 review of quota-driven policing highlighted how such top-down targets, often tied to funding allocations or promotional criteria, foster a culture where officers prioritize volume over accuracy, leading to scandals like the ticketing frauds where officers issued fictitious summonses under productivity mandates. Globally, similar dynamics appear in quota systems in and , where political campaigns promising swift crackdowns translate into executive pressures on forces, resulting in coerced confessions or planted evidence to demonstrate efficacy, as evidenced by reports on performance-based incentives distorting integrity. Policy frameworks emphasizing financial recovery from crime, such as civil programs, externally incentivize departments to prioritize seizures over proportionate enforcement, blurring lines between legitimate policing and profit-seeking. In the U.S., federal equitable sharing laws since allow local agencies to retain up to 80% of forfeited assets from drug-related cases, generating over $2.5 billion from highway stops alone between 2011 and 2018, which critics argue shifts focus toward high-value targets regardless of evidentiary strength, fostering abuses like warrantless seizures from innocent parties. This incentive structure, rooted in the 1980s escalation, has been linked to departmental budget supplementation—e.g., some agencies deriving 10-20% of operating funds from forfeitures—prompting internal audits revealing conflicts where officers prolong investigations for asset accrual rather than resolution. Empirical assessments, including a 2021 study, indicate that jurisdictions with higher forfeiture reliance exhibit elevated complaints of misconduct, as the revenue stream creates perverse incentives detached from crime reduction outcomes.

Prevalence and Data Assessment

Methodological Challenges in Measurement

Measuring police corruption poses significant challenges due to its clandestine and often consensual nature, which evades routine detection and documentation. Official records, such as arrests or convictions of officers, capture only a fraction of incidents, as many acts involve mutual between officers and civilians or internal cover-ups enabled by the "blue wall of silence," where peers withhold information to protect colleagues. This underreporting is exacerbated in environments with weak oversight, where internal investigations may prioritize departmental reputation over thorough probing, leading to systemic undercounting of prevalence. Victimization surveys, which query citizens on encounters with bribe demands or extortion by police, offer an alternative but suffer from recall inaccuracies, , and reluctance to disclose interactions with authorities, particularly in high-corruption contexts where respondents fear retaliation or perceive reporting as futile. For instance, surveys in developing nations often reveal higher rates at police checkpoints than official data suggest, yet even these may underestimate due to normalization of petty corruption or interviewer effects that prompt underdisclosure of sensitive admissions. Cross-national comparisons compound these issues, as varying legal definitions of corruption—ranging from gratuities to organized graft—hinder standardized metrics, while cultural attitudes toward influence willingness to report. Officer-based methods, such as anonymous surveys on attitudes toward misconduct or vignette scenarios presenting hypothetical dilemmas, attempt to gauge propensity indirectly but face validity concerns from and the , where awareness of scrutiny alters responses. Studies employing these, like the Police Integrity Surveys across multiple countries, demonstrate consistency in ranking seriousness of acts (e.g., excessive as less tolerated than in evidence), yet they measure willingness rather than actual incidence, potentially inflating perceived integrity in cohesive forces. Quantitative proxies, including complaint volumes or audit discrepancies in seized assets, provide indirect indicators but are confounded by external factors like levels or for investigations, rendering causal attribution to corruption levels imprecise. In authoritarian regimes or politically polarized settings, data manipulation further distorts measurements, as state-controlled media or agencies suppress exposures to maintain legitimacy, while independent probes risk accusations of . Empirical efforts to triangulate sources—combining surveys with econometric models of efficiency anomalies—yield more robust estimates but demand high-quality, disaggregated data rarely available, underscoring the field's reliance on imperfect proxies that prioritize feasibility over comprehensiveness. Overall, these methodological hurdles result in estimates that likely underestimate true scale, particularly for subtle or "noble cause" variants, impeding policy formulation grounded in accurate baselines.

Global and Regional Patterns

Police corruption exhibits significant global variation, with empirical surveys indicating higher prevalence of petty and in low- and middle-income countries compared to high-income ones, often correlating with lower salaries, weaker institutional accountability, and higher involvement. Transparency International's (GCB) surveys, which measure citizen experiences of bribery demands or payments to public services including police, consistently rank police among the most corruption-prone institutions worldwide, with global averages for those interacting with police showing bribery rates around 20-25% in recent waves, though underreporting is likely due to fear of reprisal. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) analyses link low seizure rates in drug and —such as under 1% of estimated flows intercepted in and —to police complicity, particularly in transit regions where corruption facilitates . These patterns reflect causal factors like economic incentives in under-resourced forces, where officers may view small bribes as survival mechanisms amid , contrasting with rarer but more structured forms in wealthier contexts. The following table summarizes regional bribery prevalence for police based on GCB and affiliated victim surveys among those who interacted with services in the prior 12 months:
RegionBribery Rate (%)YearNotes
272016Highest among public services; perceptions of most/all police corrupt reach 47% in 2019 GCB Africa.
& 242019Police lead in demands; up to 51% overall service in .
232020Varies sharply, e.g., 69% in vs. 0.2% in (2017 data); police top service for bribes.
<10RecentRare reports of ; stronger oversight reduces petty .
In , police corruption manifests prominently through routine bribe demands during stops or investigations, with Afrobarometer's 2023-2024 surveys across 39 countries revealing that only 33% of respondents view police as professional and rights-respecting, while experiences exceed those in other services; UNODC data from highlight military-police collusion in cocaine transshipments, where seized drugs often vanish post-arrest, exacerbating regional instability. Latin America shows similar operational patterns, with LAPOP surveys indicating urban residents face bribe requests at rates over 15%, and GCB data underscoring police as the primary extortion point amid high homicide and gang activity, as seen in Central American cases where high-level officers have been dismissed for ties to narcotics networks. displays heterogeneity, with and reporting elevated rates tied to traffic enforcement and document issuance—e.g., 27% in Pacific islands—while East Asian developed economies like exhibit near-zero petty corruption due to cultural norms and high deterrence, though infiltration persists in transitional states like . In contrast, and feature lower petty bribery but notable systemic issues, such as internal graft or abuse of authority; European GCB-equivalent data show bribery under 10%, attributed to better pay and independent oversight bodies, though lags with higher perceptions in post-communist states. n patterns, per U.S. federal data, emphasize fewer bribe incidents—e.g., under 1% of interactions per complaint logs—but highlight border corruption cases, like U.S. Customs and Border Protection arrests for smuggling facilitation, often linked to incentives rather than economic desperation. These disparities underscore that while developing regions grapple with survival-driven opportunism, developed ones contend with insulated, higher-stakes abuses, with cross-regional UNODC evidence showing 's role in enabling global crime flows regardless of income level.

Empirical Studies on Incidence Rates

A study analyzing arrests of U.S. nonfederal officers from 2005 to 2011 found an overall rate of 0.72 officers per 1,000 sworn officers annually for all criminal offenses, encompassing including . This equates to approximately 1,100 per year across roughly 800,000 officers, though corruption-specific —such as , , and official for personal gain—comprised a subset, often classified under non-violent, profit-motivated crimes. These figures represent detected cases only, as underreporting due to internal cover-ups and investigative barriers likely underestimates true incidence. Internationally, direct quantitative measures remain scarce, with most data derived from victim surveys or perceptions rather than officer-level incidence. Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer, based on household surveys across dozens of countries, reports that 10-20% of respondents in regions like and experienced bribe demands from police in the prior year, indicating higher petty corruption prevalence in low-income settings compared to under 5% in and . A 2023 analysis of African regions linked self-reported police corruption encounters to elevated victimization rates, with corruption-prevalent areas showing 10-15% higher and incidences, suggesting operational impacts but not precise officer involvement rates. Survey-based approaches, such as vignette studies assessing reporting willingness, provide indirect estimates of tolerance linked to incidence. Klockars et al.'s multi-agency surveys in the U.S. and revealed that officers rated serious scenarios (e.g., from scenes) as highly unacceptable, with 80-90% indicating they would , yet lower reporting for minor gratuities correlated with higher perceived departmental tolerance in some forces. These tools highlight cultural variances—e.g., stricter integrity in Scandinavian agencies versus laxer norms in —but do not yield absolute prevalence, as self-reported data risks . Methodological constraints persist across studies: arrest data captures only prosecuted cases, missing undetected graft, while experience surveys conflate petty shakedowns with systemic bribery and overlook officer-side frequency. Peer-reviewed analyses emphasize that true rates may exceed detected figures by factors of 5-10 in opaque environments, based on whistleblower extrapolations and comparative audits, though such multipliers lack universal validation. In high-trust systems like the U.S., empirical evidence points to corruption affecting fewer than 1% of officers annually in detectable forms, contrasting with 20-50% citizen exposure in corrupt-prone global regions.

Noble Cause Corruption

Definition and Rationales

Noble cause corruption in policing denotes the ethical rationalization by officers of misconduct—such as fabricating evidence, perjuring testimony, or violating procedural rights—on the grounds that these actions serve a higher purpose, typically the apprehension or conviction of individuals deemed guilty or the broader protection of society from harm. This concept encapsulates a where the anticipated positive outcome, like enhancing public , is deemed to outweigh the impropriety of the methods employed, effectively inverting the principle that legal processes must remain untainted regardless of ends. Scholars like Michael Caldero and John Crank describe it as arising from an officer's " commitment to make the world a safer place," which, when frustrated by legal constraints or evidentiary shortcomings, prompts deviations justified as necessary for . The rationales underpinning often stem from officers' perceptions of systemic inefficiencies in the apparatus, including lenient sentencing, prosecutorial dismissals, or rules of that purportedly allow dangerous offenders to evade . In high-stakes environments marked by or repeat victimization, officers may view strict adherence to as an obstacle to efficacious policing, fostering a where "ends justify the means" becomes normalized to achieve perceived societal benefits. This justification draws from a utilitarian ethic prioritizing aggregate over individual rights, with proponents arguing that minor procedural shortcuts prevent greater evils, such as unchecked criminality; however, empirical analyses reveal that such practices erode institutional legitimacy without reliably improving outcomes. Critically, these rationales, while rooted in genuine occupational pressures like resource scarcity and public expectations for results, conflate personal moral judgments with legal authority, leading to arbitrary masked as duty. Data from inquiries, such as the 1990s on New York Police Department practices, illustrate how officers invoked "getting the bad guys off the street" to excuse evidence tampering, underscoring a causal disconnect between intent and verifiable efficacy, as corrupted cases often result in overturned convictions and heightened risks. Thus, represents not an aberration but a predictable response to role conflicts between deontological legal mandates and consequentialist policing imperatives, demanding scrutiny of whether the "noble" framing obscures accountability failures.

Historical and Contemporary Cases

One historical manifestation of occurred in the during investigations into IRA bombings in the , where police fabricated evidence and coerced confessions to convict suspects such as the Guildford Four, arrested in 1974 and wrongfully imprisoned until their exoneration in 1989 following revelations of police perjury and withheld evidence. Officers rationalized these actions as essential to halting terrorist attacks that had killed dozens, including the 1974 claiming five lives. The term "" was coined in 1992 by Sir John Woodcock, Chief Inspector of Constabulary, to describe such deviations from procedure justified by the perceived moral imperative to protect public safety from existential threats. In the United States, the LAPD's from 1997 to 1999 illustrated noble cause rationales within the (CRASH) anti-gang unit, where officers like Rafael Pérez admitted to planting drugs, guns, and gang paraphernalia on suspects to fabricate for arrests, aiming to dismantle entrenched networks amid rising that claimed over 1,000 lives annually in during the early 1990s epidemic. Pérez's 1999 plea deal testimony implicated 70 officers in systematic frame-ups, , and cover-ups, resulting in 3,600 vacated convictions, the firing of 45 officers, and a $125 million civil settlement. Analyses attribute this to a departmental culture prioritizing arrest statistics over , with officers viewing ethical shortcuts as warranted to suppress dominance in impoverished neighborhoods. Contemporary instances persist in high-stakes enforcement contexts, such as U.S. departments combating trafficking, where isolated reports document officers falsifying search warrants or evidence chains to expedite dealer prosecutions, defended internally as countering a crisis killing over 100,000 Americans annually as of 2023. In proactive tactics like New York City's stop-and-frisk program, peaked at 685,000 stops in 2011, federal oversight revealed patterns of fabricated to disarm potentially armed individuals in hotspots, with officers citing community protection amid 2010 homicide rates exceeding 500; a 2013 ruling deemed it unconstitutional for disproportionately targeting minorities without yielding proportional reductions. These cases underscore ongoing tensions where performance metrics incentivize bending rules, though empirical reviews question their net efficacy, as vacated convictions erode long-term deterrence.

Ethical and Practical Critiques

, by prioritizing perceived greater goods over procedural integrity, faces ethical scrutiny for subverting the deontological principles underpinning legal systems, where adherence to rules irrespective of outcomes preserves justice's impartiality. Critics argue that such utilitarian rationales foster an arrogance among officers, presuming superior societal judgment that erodes the and invites arbitrary power exercises, as evidenced in analyses of police conduct norms that tacitly endorse illegal actions for ostensibly ends. This approach is deemed a pro tanto moral wrong, corrupting institutional processes and purposes even when intentions align with public safety, as it undermines the ethical imperative for officers to model lawful behavior amid societal lawlessness. From a practical standpoint, noble cause corruption precipitates miscarriages of justice through investigative biases, where sympathy for victims morphs into suspect hostility, prompting evidence fabrication or testimony exaggeration to secure convictions of presumed guilty parties. Empirical assessments link this to systemic failures in police processes, including "process corruption" where wrongful outcomes are knowingly pursued under noble pretexts, contributing to documented wrongful convictions as seen in reviews of errors. Such practices expose agencies to costly constitutional litigation, potentially bankrupting departments via settlements and reforms, while eroding long-term policing efficacy by breeding public distrust and incentivizing further deviance under performance pressures. Critiques further highlight how noble cause rationales, while framed as ends-oriented public safety imperatives, practically amplify cognitive and institutional biases, leading to exaggerated adversarial roles that justify misconduct and hinder accountability. In utilitarian terms, the short-term "wins" of coerced outcomes are outweighed by harms like alienated communities and diminished deterrence, as illegal means compromise evidence reliability and invite reversals through appeals or exonerations. Overall, these dynamics reveal noble cause corruption as self-defeating, transforming purported virtues into vices that weaken the very justice mechanisms it seeks to uphold.

Impacts and Consequences

Effects on Policing Efficacy

Police corruption impairs the core functions of by diverting officer time and resources toward illicit personal gains rather than and detection. Officers engaged in or protection rackets often neglect routine patrols, investigations, and arrests unless compensated, resulting in that favors paying offenders and allows non-paying criminals to operate with . This under-enforcement fosters an environment of heightened criminal activity, as evidenced by cross-country analyses showing that higher incidences of police correlate with elevated crime victimization rates. Empirical studies confirm a direct link between police corruption and diminished policing outcomes. In a of Afrobarometer survey data from 35 African countries spanning 2005–2018, greater exposure to police bribery—measured by the percentage of citizens reporting bribe demands—was positively associated with higher self-reported victimization, even after controlling for broader levels and socioeconomic factors. Similarly, international crime victim surveys indicate that increased police corruption contributes to rising overall levels across nations. These findings suggest that corrupt practices erode deterrence, as potential offenders perceive lower risks of apprehension. High-profile corruption scandals further illustrate operational disruptions. The 1990s Rampart Division scandal in the involved officers framing suspects, stealing cocaine, and conducting unauthorized shootings, leading to over 100 convictions overturned and widespread internal demoralization. In response, heightened oversight and fear of scrutiny prompted a "de-policing" effect, with arrest-to-crime ratios dropping by approximately 40% across LAPD stations following initial reforms in 1998–2000, coinciding with a spike in homicides that criminologists partly attributed to reduced proactive enforcement. Such events not only invalidate prior "successes" tainted by fabricated evidence but also paralyze ongoing operations through resource diversion to internal probes and eroded officer initiative. Internally, corruption undermines unit cohesion and productivity, as honest officers face pressure to participate or risk isolation, while pervasive graft signals that discourages diligent performance. Laboratory experiments modeling corrupt demonstrate that when officers can accept bribes to overlook violations, overall compliance declines, amplifying crime in simulated communities. In contexts, mathematical models show that even low-level corruption hampers coordinated crackdowns, allowing networks to persist and expand. Collectively, these mechanisms reduce clearance rates, inflate unsolved caseloads, and weaken the police's capacity to maintain public order.

Societal and Trust Ramifications

Police corruption undermines public confidence in by fostering perceptions of institutional unaccountability and bias, which in turn diminishes citizen cooperation essential for effective policing. Empirical analyses indicate that direct experiences or observations of corrupt practices, such as bribe-taking or tampering, lead to measurable declines in trust levels. For example, a study examining U.S. state-level data found that increases in corruption, including among police, reduce generalized social trust by reinforcing expectations of self-interested behavior over impartial enforcement. This effect extends beyond targeted institutions, as corruption signals broader systemic failures, eroding faith in rule-of-law mechanisms and encouraging reliance on private security or informal networks. High-profile scandals amplify these ramifications, triggering sharp, immediate drops in public approval. Research on media-covered events demonstrates that even isolated incidents can tarnish overall confidence, with effects persisting if not addressed through transparent investigations. In global contexts, Transparency International's 2020 for revealed that 59% of respondents in surveyed countries expressed little or no trust in police forces amid prevalent reports, correlating with lower willingness to engage authorities. Similarly, Afrobarometer surveys across in 2015 showed police corruption as a primary driver of , despite baseline support for roles, resulting in reduced crime reporting rates estimated at 20-30% in high-corruption locales. Societally, sustained distrust from corruption contributes to cycles of social fragmentation, including vigilantism and parallel justice systems. In Nigeria, empirical assessments link police graft to widespread mob justice, where citizens bypass distrustful institutions, leading to extrajudicial violence in over 1,000 documented cases annually as of 2023. Latin American studies further quantify this, revealing that police corruption victimization erodes interpersonal trust and institutional legitimacy, exacerbating inequality and hindering community cohesion in urban areas with corruption indices above 40% on standardized scales. These dynamics not only perpetuate crime underreporting—potentially inflating unsolved case rates by 15-25% in affected regions—but also polarize societies along lines of perceived favoritism, as seen in post-scandal surveys where minority groups report trust drops exceeding 20 percentage points. Overall, unchecked corruption thus transforms policing from a public good into a perceived threat, weakening the social contract underpinning civil order.

Economic and Political Costs

Police corruption generates substantial economic costs for governments and taxpayers, encompassing direct expenditures on litigation, settlements, and remedial measures, as well as indirect losses from heightened and diminished economic activity. , public corruption—including acts by law enforcement officials—diverts billions of dollars in annually through mechanisms such as , , and contract rigging that undermine fiscal integrity. Settlements arising from corruption-related misconduct further strain municipal ; for example, taxpayers incurred $142.8 million in payouts over four years ending in 2023 for cases involving repeated violations by 141 officers, many tied to corrupt practices like evidence tampering or protection rackets. Nationally, U.S. cities disbursed over $3 billion in misconduct settlements from 2011 to 2021, with elements such as contributing to a portion of these liabilities that necessitate budget reallocations from public services. Indirect economic repercussions stem from corruption's facilitation of unprosecuted , which elevates victimization rates and associated costs like medical expenses, , and lost wages. Empirical analysis across African countries demonstrates that higher perceived police corruption correlates with increased incidence, particularly affecting personal safety and economic productivity for both genders, thereby amplifying societal welfare losses. In extreme instances, systemic has prompted the outright dissolution of police departments, as occurred in certain municipalities by 2018, incurring costs for temporary service disruptions, taxpayer-funded transitions to state oversight, and long-term reforms that divert resources from core policing. Politically, police corruption undermines institutional legitimacy, fostering public disillusionment that can precipitate electoral shifts, overhauls, or demands for of authority. Exposed scandals often erode support for incumbent administrations, as seen in contexts where corrupt policing enables of state resources, perpetuating failures and reducing voter confidence in law enforcement's role in maintaining order. Such erosion contributes to broader instability, with historical patterns indicating that unchecked correlates with weakened democratic accountability, as political actors exploit or tolerate it to consolidate power, ultimately hindering effective implementation on and . In turn, this dynamic can exacerbate cycles of underinvestment in legitimate institutions, as publics perceive governments as complicit, leading to fragmented political coalitions and heightened polarization over reform measures.

Prevention and Mitigation Approaches

Internal Accountability Mechanisms

Internal accountability mechanisms within police organizations primarily encompass internal affairs (IA) units, disciplinary procedures, supervisory oversight, early warning systems, and codes of conduct designed to detect, investigate, and sanction corruption and misconduct. These structures operate through a chain of command where supervisors monitor officer behavior, IA divisions handle formal complaints and allegations of , , or abuse of authority, and disciplinary processes impose sanctions ranging from reprimands to termination. For instance, IA protocols typically involve intake, classification, investigation, and stages, as outlined in U.S. Department of Justice guidelines. Empirical assessments reveal mixed effectiveness in curbing . In a review of U.S. agencies, only 10.9% of 5,563 allegations were sustained across eight cities studied between 2005 and 2009, indicating frequent dismissals or insufficient in internal probes. Proactive elements, such as early intervention systems tracking officer complaints, have shown potential to reduce future allegations without elevating crime rates, based on analyses of departments implementing data-driven monitoring. However, investigations often yield low substantiation rates due to evidentiary challenges and internal resistance, as seen in the Knapp Commission's 1972 findings on New York Police Department graft, where weak IA oversight enabled systemic payoffs and protection rackets. Significant limitations undermine these mechanisms' capacity to address entrenched corruption. The "blue wall of silence"—an informal code of loyalty among officers—impedes and thorough investigations, with studies identifying peer protection as a primary barrier to reporting corrupt practices like evidence tampering or kickbacks. Internal probes suffer from conflicts of interest, as investigators are often fellow officers lacking full , leading to biased outcomes and public perceptions of opacity; for example, managers may hesitate to expose department-wide issues to avoid reputational damage. In comparative models, purely internal IA systems underperform hybrid approaches incorporating civilian review, which achieved higher sustain rates (e.g., 29.4% in St. Petersburg, Florida's IA/Command/Citizen model). To enhance efficacy, recommendations emphasize integrating limited external elements into internal frameworks, such as civilian participation in reviews for transparency, alongside rigorous and standardized procedures to counter solidarity-driven failures. While internal mechanisms excel in rapid response to isolated incidents via police expertise, their standalone reliance proves inadequate for systemic , necessitating complementary external to bolster deterrence and credibility. External oversight mechanisms for police corruption typically involve entities independent of law enforcement agencies, such as civilian review boards, independent commissions, or court-appointed monitors, designed to investigate allegations, recommend reforms, and enforce without internal departmental influence. These bodies aim to address systemic issues like , evidence tampering, or protection rackets by providing external scrutiny, though their authority varies widely; for instance, many civilian oversight agencies in the United States possess only advisory powers, lacking enforcement or disciplinary authority, which limits their ability to compel testimony or impose sanctions. Historical examples include the , established in 1970 in , which uncovered widespread corruption including "grass-eaters" (officers accepting minor gratuities) and "meat-eaters" (active predators), leading to over 1,000 officer indictments and structural reforms like enhanced internal affairs units. Similarly, the 1994 in New York revealed entrenched corruption networks involving drug theft and falsified evidence, prompting the creation of the Commission to Combat Police Corruption in 1995, which monitors NYPD anti-corruption efforts but retains limited investigative scope. Empirical assessments of these mechanisms indicate mixed outcomes, with structural limitations often undermining effectiveness; a 2015 President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing report found that oversight boards frequently fail to achieve their goals due to inadequate funding, insufficient independence from police unions, and reliance on departmental cooperation for investigations. Studies from 2024 highlight that most U.S. boards can only review completed internal probes rather than conduct original investigations, resulting in sustained rates, as evidenced by persistent scandals in departments like the , where external monitors post-2001 enforced consent decrees but saw recidivism in misconduct patterns. In jurisdictions with stronger models, such as court-supervised monitors in County since 2001, oversight has correlated with reduced use-of-force incidents by 64% from 2002 to 2018, though direct causation for mitigation remains debated due to confounding factors like changes. Internationally, bodies like the Independent Office for Police Conduct in the , established in 2018, handle serious probes independently, investigating over 5,000 cases annually, but face criticism for low conviction rates (under 10% for corruption-related matters as of 2023), attributable to evidentiary challenges and . Legal frameworks complement oversight by establishing statutory prohibitions and prosecutorial tools against police corruption. In the United States, federal statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 242 criminalize willful deprivation of rights under color of law, enabling Department of Justice prosecutions for corrupt acts like evidence fabrication, with over 400 officers charged under this provision from 2005 to 2020. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968), enacted in 1970, has been applied to dismantle organized police corruption rings, as in the 1990s prosecution of Chicago's Disciples-linked officers involved in schemes, yielding convictions and asset forfeitures exceeding $10 million. Consent decrees, negotiated under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (revived post-2021 via ), impose federal oversight on departments with patterns of corruption, as seen in the 2023 DOJ findings against the , mandating reforms like body-camera policies and early intervention systems following the case, with compliance monitored for up to a decade. State-level frameworks vary, with New York Penal Law § 200.00 defining official and , leading to 150+ corruption convictions in the NYPD from 2010 to 2020, though relies on district attorneys often aligned with police unions, potentially diluting rigor. Whistleblower protections under laws like the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (extended to enforcement via 5 U.S.C. § 2303) and state analogs encourage reporting, yet data from the Government Accountability Office (2022) shows retaliation in 40% of police whistleblower cases, underscoring enforcement gaps. Globally, the (UNCAC, ratified by 189 states as of 2023) mandates external audits and independent prosecutions, influencing frameworks in countries like , where the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), established in 1988, has voided over 100 police convictions tainted by since inception. Despite these tools, causal analyses reveal that legal frameworks alone seldom eradicate without complementary cultural shifts, as prosecutorial under-resourcing—e.g., U.S. DOJ's Civil Rights Division handling only 20-30 pattern-or-practice suits since 1994—permits persistence in high-volume departments. Academic sources, often institutionally biased toward expansive oversight narratives, overemphasize procedural legitimacy over empirical reductions in graft, with peer-reviewed meta-analyses confirming modest declines (5-15%) in reported post-framework implementation, primarily in low-corruption baseline contexts.

Evidence-Based Reforms and Outcomes

Body-worn cameras (BWCs) have been implemented in numerous police departments to enhance and deter , including corrupt practices such as evidence tampering or excessive force that could enable cover-ups. A in , found that officers using BWCs generated 60% fewer use-of-force incidents and 17% fewer citizen complaints compared to non-equipped officers, suggesting a potential indirect reduction in opportunities for by increasing scrutiny of interactions. However, a of 70 studies revealed mixed outcomes, with BWCs showing positive effects on complaint reductions in some contexts but no consistent impact on overall rates or specific metrics like . Departments often undermine these benefits through selective footage release or failure to discipline captured violations, limiting long-term anti-corruption efficacy. Structural reforms targeting high-corruption areas, such as traffic policing, have demonstrated measurable reductions in corrupt practices. In , the 2015 creation of a new Patrol Police force involved rigorous , higher salaries, and data-driven performance monitoring, leading to a 20-30% drop in reported incidents and improved public perceptions of integrity within two years, as measured by pre- and post-reform surveys. Similarly, Singapore's establishment of the independent (CPIB) in 1952, coupled with mandatory asset declarations and rotation of officers in vulnerable posts, transformed the from a corruption-plagued entity to one with near-zero tolerance; corruption convictions rose initially due to detection but declined steadily, with Transparency International's ranking among the least corrupt nations by the 2000s. These outcomes highlight the causal role of insulated investigative units and alignments in sustaining reforms, though scalability depends on political will to enforce penalties. Whistleblower protections, when robustly enforced, facilitate internal exposure of corruption but face implementation challenges in policing. A systematic review of police whistleblowing identified retaliation fears as a primary barrier, with only 10-20% of officers reporting observed misconduct due to inadequate safeguards; enhanced legal protections, as in the U.S. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, correlated with increased disclosures in federal agencies but yielded limited uptake in local departments lacking cultural shifts. Empirical data from anti-corruption indices show that countries with strong whistleblower laws, like those mandating anonymous reporting channels, experience 15-25% higher detection rates of public sector graft, yet police-specific applications often falter without complementary training, resulting in persistent underreporting. Civilian oversight boards, intended to monitor internal investigations, have generally underperformed in curbing . Evaluations indicate structural weaknesses, such as limited subpoena power and reliance on police-provided , lead to low substantiation rates (under 10% of complaints upheld) and no significant decline in corruption convictions; a assessment concluded these boards rarely achieve independence, often exacerbating distrust without altering officer behavior. In contrast, data-driven tools, integrated with integrity checks, have shown promise in reallocating resources away from corrupt-prone units; for instance, hotspot analysis in reformed departments reduced opportunistic by 12-18% through targeted audits, though remains preliminary and vulnerable to data biases. Overall, successful reforms emphasize verifiable over procedural optics, with sustained outcomes tied to measurable metrics like conviction rates rather than perceptual surveys alone.

Debates and Perspectives

Perceptions vs. Empirical Reality

Public perceptions of police corruption frequently depict it as a systemic and widespread problem within agencies, often amplified by media emphasis on isolated high-profile scandals. Surveys reveal substantial ; for example, a 2016 Cato Institute poll found that 46% of Americans believe police are generally not held accountable for misconduct, with 64% of sharing this view. High-visibility incidents, such as brutality cases or departmental cover-ups, dominate coverage and foster beliefs in institutional rot, even when such events represent outliers. This sentiment persists despite rebounds in confidence following periods of stability, as dips temporarily after corruption exposures but recovers absent sustained evidence of prevalence. In contrast, empirical measures indicate that documented police corruption remains relatively rare, particularly when benchmarked against the scale of operations. A analysis of arrests from 2005 to 2011 across U.S. agencies identified 6,724 cases involving 5,545 sworn officers, yielding an overall rate of 0.72 arrests per 1,000 officers annually. Within this, profit-motivated —encompassing , shakedowns, and —accounted for 1,592 cases (approximately 24% of total arrests), or roughly 0.28 incidents per 1,000 officers per year, with comprising just 1.2% of all cases. These figures, drawn from official records rather than self-reports, underscore under-detection challenges but affirm that overt affects a small fraction of the estimated 800,000 U.S. officers, concentrated in urban or high-stress environments like New Orleans PD (44.21 arrests per 1,000 officers). The divergence arises partly from reporting biases: mainstream media outlets, often critiqued for left-leaning systemic narratives, prioritize sensational corruption stories over aggregate data on integrity, inflating perceived ubiquity while underreporting successful prosecutions or preventive measures. Academic studies corroborate this gap, noting that exposure to abuse or graft reports strongly predicts negative views, yet local departmental performance exerts weaker influence than national headlines. Globally, patterns hold; Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ranks high-income democracies like the U.S. and U.K. as low-corruption environments overall, with police-specific deviance tied more to opportunity (e.g., drug enforcement) than inherent departmental culture. Thus, while corruption demands vigilance, evidence points to "rotten apples" over barrels, challenging narratives of endemic failure.

Individual vs. Systemic Attribution

The debate over attributing police centers on whether instances primarily arise from individual officers' ethical failings or from broader institutional factors such as departmental cultures, inadequate oversight, and structural incentives that enable or normalize deviant behavior. Proponents of individual attribution, often framed through the "rotten apple" theory, argue that reflects personal choices by a minority of officers who exploit opportunities for gain, while the majority maintain despite similar exposures. Empirical data on supports this view, as criminal arrests of officers for -related offenses remain rare relative to force size; for instance, a comprehensive analysis of U.S. arrests from 2005 to 2007 identified 2,498 cases across approximately 800,000 officers, with non-drug-related comprising only about 12% of those, equating to less than 0.1% annually. Similarly, federal convictions for public involving police numbered 129 in 1993, underscoring that verified cases do not indicate widespread participation. Critics of pure individual attribution invoke "rotten barrel" or "rotten orchard" perspectives, positing that organizational dynamics—such as the "blue wall of silence," supervisory tolerance, or high-discretion environments in vice and narcotics units—can erode ethical standards and facilitate corruption among otherwise compliant officers. The investigation into practices in the early 1970s exemplified this, revealing patterns of passive ("grass eaters") and active ("meat eaters") corruption tolerated by leadership, though it emphasized that a majority of officers rejected such conduct and that systemic issues amplified rather than originated the problem. Peer-reviewed analyses confirm both individual predispositions (e.g., prior deviance) and institutional variables (e.g., lack of ) influence outcomes, but causal evidence prioritizes agency: even in departments with documented cultural failings, participation rates varied widely, with many officers resisting involvement due to personal . Quantitatively, national data refute claims of systemic ubiquity, as corruption hotspots cluster in specific units or locales rather than permeating entire agencies; for example, while scandals like the Rampart case (1990s) involved organized misconduct by a small cadre, they affected fewer than 1% of the department's sworn personnel. Institutional reforms targeting enablers, such as enhanced internal affairs and whistleblower protections, have reduced incidence without overhauling entire structures, suggesting that while systemic factors provide fertile ground in pockets, corruption fundamentally requires individual initiation and persistence. This balanced attribution aligns with first-principles : human actors respond to incentives, but low detection risks and opportunity costs explain variance better than inherent institutional rot, particularly given consistent findings that most officers operate ethically under pressure. Academic and media tendencies to emphasize systemic narratives may stem from reform agendas, yet arrest and conviction metrics indicate individual accountability as the dominant empirical lens.

Role of Media and Political Narratives

Media coverage significantly influences public perceptions of police corruption, often prioritizing sensational high-profile incidents over comprehensive data on prevalence. National media attention to events like the 2020 case has been shown to override local experiences, leading to broader distrust in regardless of departmental performance. Studies indicate that repeated exposure to such coverage increases beliefs in the frequency of misconduct, including corruption, among diverse demographics. This effect persists even as empirical data from sources like the U.S. Department of Justice reveal that substantiated corruption cases represent a small fraction of officers—typically under 1% annually in major departments—suggesting media amplification distorts scale. Disparities in reporting further skew narratives, with traditional outlets disproportionately focusing on cases involving minority victims, framing them as indicative of systemic tied to racial . Analysis of coverage from 2013–2020 found that stories emphasizing brutality or ethical lapses rarely include statistical context, such as the rarity of fatal encounters relative to millions of annual interactions (around 60 million stops or calls), fostering an perception of ubiquity over empirical rarity. Mainstream media's tendency to underreport officer victimization or successful efforts—such as internal affairs resolutions exceeding 90% in some audits—contributes to a one-sided view, where is portrayed as unchecked rather than mitigated by existing mechanisms. Political narratives leverage these media portrayals to advance agendas, often conflating isolated corruption with institutional failure to justify reforms like budget cuts or restructuring. Post-2020, progressive politicians and activists cited amplified coverage to promote "defund the police" initiatives in cities like and New York, correlating with subsequent rises in certain crimes (e.g., homicides up 30% nationally in 2020 per FBI data), though proponents attribute issues to underfunding rather than policy shifts. Conservative critiques, conversely, emphasize data-driven defenses of policing efficacy, arguing that politicized narratives erode deterrence without addressing root causes like low conviction rates for (under 10% of allegations per ). This partisan divergence is evident in surveys showing Democrats more likely to view as systemic (over 60% in Gallup polls post-Floyd), while Republicans prioritize individual accountability, highlighting how narratives prioritize ideological framing over uniform empirical scrutiny. Correcting misperceptions through balanced information can mitigate narrative-driven distrust; experiments providing factual data on police violence reduce overestimated brutality beliefs by up to 20%. Yet, institutional biases in media—evident in selective sourcing from advocacy groups over neutral data—persist, underscoring the need for of outlets' in corruption discourse.

References

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