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TACA Flight 110
TACA Flight 110
TACA Flight 110
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TACA Flight 110 was a scheduled international flight operated by TACA International Airlines, traveling from San Salvador to New Orleans, with a stopover in Belize City. On May 24, 1988, the flight encountered severe thunderstorm activity on its final approach to New Orleans International Airport. As a result, the brand new Boeing 737-300 suffered flameout in both engines, but the pilots made a successful emergency landing on a grass levee adjacent to NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility, with no one aboard sustaining more than a few minor injuries, and with only minor hail damage to the intact aircraft. Following an on-site engine replacement, the jetliner took off from Saturn Boulevard, a road which had previously been an aircraft runway at Michoud. The aircraft was subsequently repaired and returned to service until it was finally retired in 2016.[1]

Key Information

Flight history

[edit]

The aircraft involved in the incident was a Boeing 737-3T0 with the tail number N75356 and serial number 23838.[2]

The captain of the flight was Carlos Dárdano.[3] At 29 years of age, Dárdano had amassed 13,410 flight hours, with almost 11,000 of these as pilot in command. Earlier in his career, he had lost an eye to crossfire on a short flight to El Salvador, where civil war was raging at the time.[4] The first officer, Dionisio Lopez (48), was also very experienced, with more than 12,000 flight hours logged. Additionally an instructor pilot, Captain Arturo Soley, was in the cockpit on the flight, monitoring the performance of the new 737.

The flight proceeded normally for most of its duration. Originating from San Salvador's Comalapa International Airport, it took off from Belize City's Philip S. W. Goldson International Airport on May 24, 1988, and flew over the Gulf of Mexico toward the Louisiana coast.[5]

Incident

[edit]
Hail damage to the nose of the aircraft

Investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) revealed that as the Boeing 737-3T0 aircraft was in descent mode from FL 350 (about 35,000 feet or 11,000 metres) on final approach to its destination in preparation for their impending arrival at New Orleans International Airport, the pilots noticed substantial thunderstorm activity visible ahead and on their onboard weather radar and noticed areas of light to moderate precipitation in their path, depicted as green and yellow areas, as well as "some isolated red cells" indicative of heavy precipitation to both sides of their intended flight path. They attempted to fly in between two intense red weather cells visible on their radar.[6]

The flight entered overcast clouds at FL 300 (about 30,000 feet or 9,100 metres), with the pilots selecting "continuous ignition" and turning on engine anti-ice as a precaution to protect their turbofan engines from the effects of precipitation and icing, either of which is capable of causing a flameout, where the engines lose all power. Despite flying a route between the two areas of heavy precipitation shown on radar, they entered an intense thunderstorm and encountered heavy torrential rain, hail, and turbulence.

A few minutes later, as the aircraft was descending through 16,500 feet (5,000 m), both CFM International CFM56 turbofan engines experienced a flameout, which resulted in the loss of all generated electrical power, leaving the jet gliding powerlessly with neither engine producing thrust or electrical power. Both engines' thrust levers were set at their flight-idle power setting in preparation for landing just before the flameout occurred. The auxiliary power unit (APU) was started as the plane descended through 10,500 feet (3,200 m), restoring electrical power and hydraulics.

While attempts to "windmill re-start" the engines using the airflow generated by the plane's descent were unsuccessful, the pilots were eventually able to reignite them by following the standard restart procedure, using the main engine starters, which were powered by the APU. However, shortly after being restarted, neither engine produced more than idle power and did not spool up to a point where it was producing meaningful thrust, much less high thrust. Attempts to advance the throttles only resulted in overheating of the engines, so the pilots shut down both engines to avoid a catastrophic engine fire. First Officer Lopez transmitted a Mayday call over the radio, but despite the New Orleans air traffic controllers' assistance by offering vectors to a closer airport at Lakefront, it was too far.

At this point the pilots scouted the area and contemplated their options for a crash-landing on the swampy wetland, as no runway was reachable with the remaining altitude and airspeed. As the aircraft descended through the lower layer of storm clouds, the pilots initially decided to ditch in the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway with the flaps and gear retracted. Dárdano lined up with the canal in an industrial area east of the airport and stretched the glide, to try to have it glide the longest possible distance without stalling while First Officer Lopez went through the ditching checklist, and configured the aircraft for a water landing.

Lopez spotted a grass levee to the right of the canal, and suggested that the emergency landing be attempted there. Dárdano agreed and, using sideslip to reduce speed while dropping the altitude necessary to reach the narrow grass levee, successfully carried out an emergency landing of the crippled plane. The levee stands on the grounds of the NASA Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in eastern New Orleans, near the Intracoastal Waterway's confluence with the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet.[6]

Investigation and aftermath

[edit]
Engine turbine damage from TACA Flight 110

NTSB investigators determined that the aircraft had inadvertently flown into a level 4 thunderstorm and that water ingestion had caused both engines to flame out, during descent with lower engine RPM, despite them being certified to meeting Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) standards for water ingestion. The aircraft suffered mild hail damage, and its right-side (number 2) engine was damaged from overheating.[6]

The landing site of TACA 110

To avoid similar problems in the future, the engine manufacturer, CFM International, modified the CFM56 engine by adding a sensor to force the combustor to continuously ignite under heavy rain or hail conditions.[citation needed] Other modifications were made to the engine nose cone and the spacing of the fan blades to better deflect hail away from the engine core. Also, additional bleed doors were added to drain more water from the engine.

Return to service

[edit]
The aircraft involved, operating with Southwest Airlines in 2010

Initially, it was planned to remove the wings and transport the airplane to a repair facility by barge, but Boeing engineers and test pilots decided to perform an engine change on site. The aircraft was towed from the levee to the nearby NASA facility, fueled to the minimum amount needed and departed from Saturn Boulevard, a roadway built atop the original World War II-era runway.[6][7][8] Following takeoff, the 737 flew to Moisant Field, where further maintenance work was performed.

It continued service for Southwest as N697SW until December 2, 2016, when it was retired and placed into storage at Pinal Airpark.[1][9]

Media

[edit]

The flight was featured in an episode of the TV show Mayday with the title "Nowhere to Land"; the episode is from season 11, episode 11.[10]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

TACA Flight 110

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from Grokipedia
TACA Flight 110 was an international passenger flight operated by TACA International Airlines on May 24, 1988, traveling from , , to New Orleans, , , with an intermediate stop in Belize City, Belize. During descent for approach to New Orleans International Airport, the Boeing 737-300 (registration N75356) encountered a severe Level 4 , resulting in both CFM56-3B1 engines flaming out due to ingestion of and at approximately 16,500 feet. The flight crew executed a successful dead-stick on a 6,000-foot-long grass near the , about 20 miles east of the airport, with the aircraft sustaining only minor damage and all 45 occupants (38 passengers and 7 crew members) surviving without serious injuries. The (NTSB) investigated the incident under docket FTW88IA109 and determined the probable cause to be the dual engine from water ingestion, exacerbated by inadequate engine design and (FAA) standards for rain and conditions at the time. Contributing factors included the crew's inability to restart the engines via windmilling or methods, as well as limitations in the aircraft's for detecting severe cores. In response, the FAA issued emergency Airworthiness Directive 88-14-06 on June 14, 1988, mandating operational restrictions such as prohibiting use in moderate or heavy and requiring engine modifications to enhance water ingestion tolerance, including changes to the spinner profile and variable bleed valve doors. These updates culminated in revised requirements under 14 CFR §33.78 in 1998, improving engine rain and ingestion performance across the industry. The aircraft was repaired on-site and ferried back to service on June 6, 1988, after a test flight.

Background

Flight and Route

TACA International Airlines, a Salvadoran carrier established in 1931 and specializing in regional services across Central America with extensions to the United States, operated Flight 110 as part of its regular international network. The airline, headquartered in San Salvador, provided connectivity for passengers traveling between key hubs in the region and major U.S. destinations, emphasizing efficient short- to medium-haul routes. The flight followed a scheduled itinerary originating at Comalapa International Airport in San Salvador, El Salvador, with an en route stop at Philip S. W. Goldson International Airport in Belize City, Belize, before continuing to its final destination at New Orleans International Airport in Louisiana, USA. This routing covered approximately 752 nautical miles from Belize City to New Orleans, operating under an instrument flight rules (IFR) plan typical for such overwater segments across the Gulf of Mexico. The segment from Belize departed at 10:55 CDT on May 24, 1988, following an earlier departure from San Salvador that morning. Aboard the flight were 38 passengers and 7 crew members, totaling 45 occupants, all accounted for prior to departure. Pre-flight briefings included general awareness of en route weather conditions, with forecasts noting the potential for thunderstorms over the —a common seasonal hazard in the area during late spring. However, the crew did not receive updated convective SIGMETs or center weather advisories that had been issued for the region.

Aircraft and Crew

The aircraft operating TACA Flight 110 was a Boeing 737-3T0, registered as N75356 and powered by two CFM56-3B-1 high-bypass engines. This variant featured advanced avionics and a stretched compared to earlier 737 models, accommodating up to 149 passengers in a single-class configuration. The CFM56-3B-1 engines were certified to meet (FAA) standards for water ingestion under 14 CFR Part 33, with testing confirming their capacity exceeded regulatory requirements; however, at the time of certification, hail ingestion was not specifically addressed beyond general criteria. Manufactured in 1988 as the 1,505th produced, N75356 completed its on January 26, 1988, before being leased to TACA International Airlines and entering service on May 10, 1988—approximately two weeks prior to the incident. With only a brief operational history and 81 total hours, the aircraft had undergone routine checks in accordance with manufacturer guidelines and showed no pre-existing mechanical issues. The flight deck crew included Captain Carlos Dardano, aged 29, who held an airline transport pilot certificate with a type rating and had logged 13,410 total flight hours, nearly 11,000 of which were as pilot-in-command. First Officer Dionisio Lopez, the pilot monitoring, was equally seasoned with more than 12,000 flight hours, including substantial experience on the 737. Accompanying them was Captain Arturo Soley, a TACA instructor pilot observing the crew's performance during the sector. The cabin was staffed by four s, led by senior flight attendant Myrna Rosales, responsible for passenger safety and service. Prior to departure from , the crew completed standard pre-flight procedures, including duty time compliance and a meteorological briefing that indicated possible convective activity over the , though no deviations were noted in their preparations.

The Incident

En Route Events

TACA Flight 110 departed from Philip S. W. Goldson International Airport in , , at 10:55 Central Daylight Time on May 24, 1988, following an en route stopover from its origin in , . The departure and initial climb were uneventful, with the Boeing 737-300 ascending to a cruising altitude of 35,000 feet ( 350) over the en route to New Orleans International Airport. Approximately two hours into the flight, the crew initiated descent from 35,000 feet in preparation for arrival at New Orleans, passing through 30,000 feet while entering airspace controlled by in the Gulf of Mexico region. During the descent, reaching around 16,500 feet by approximately 12:45, the flight crew observed severe weather on the onboard , identifying a level 4 cell characterized by intense echoes indicating , , and ahead on the intended path. Visual confirmation of the storm's proximity was noted through the , showing building cumulonimbus clouds, while displayed isolated red cells to the left and right of the flight path. To minimize deviation from the assigned route and maintain schedule, the elected to penetrate the cell directly rather than diverting around it, activating continuous ignition and anti-ice systems in anticipation of . The aircraft entered the at approximately 16,500 feet and 300 knots .

Engine Failure and Emergency Response

During the descent into New Orleans on May 24, 1988, TACA Flight 110 encountered conditions, leading to the simultaneous flameout of both CFM56-3B1 engines immediately upon entering the . The failure resulted from the ingestion of and excessive water, causing a complete loss of and a rapid deceleration of the aircraft from its descent speed. The flight crew, consisting of Captain Carlos Dardano, First Officer Dionisio Lopez, and instructor pilot Captain Arturo Soley, promptly executed the dual engine failure . They activated continuous ignition on both engines and initiated the (APU) startup to provide essential electrical power, which successfully came at around 10,600 feet. Attempts to restart the engines began with windmilling procedures using airflow from the descent, followed by starter-assisted cross-bleed air methods; while the engines relit, they failed to produce more than idle power, and advancing the throttles caused exhaust gas temperature (EGT) exceedances beyond safe limits. To avert additional damage, the shut down both engines. Shortly after the failure, First Officer Lopez transmitted a mayday call to New Orleans approach control, declaring an due to the loss of both engines and requesting vectors to the nearest at New Orleans International Airport, located about 7 miles from their position. Air traffic controllers provided vectors and priority handling, though the crew assessed the airport as potentially unreachable given their altitude and glide profile. With all propulsion lost, the Boeing 737-300 entered an unpowered glide, descending from approximately 16,500 feet over roughly 9 minutes while maintaining airspeeds of 200 to 220 knots. The crew preserved control through aerodynamic maneuvering, despite the secondary loss of engine-driven hydraulic systems, which reduced but did not eliminate flight control effectiveness via the and electric pumps.

Levee Landing

As the aircraft glided powerless toward the New Orleans area, the flight crew ruled out ditching in the surrounding waterways or attempting a landing at New Orleans International Airport due to insufficient altitude and speed margins. Instead, First Officer Dionisio Lopez identified a grass-covered flood control adjacent to the in eastern New Orleans as a potential landing site, noting its relatively flat, 6,060-foot-long by 120-foot-wide surface bordered by a drainage canal. Captain Carlos Dardano concurred, aligning the Boeing 737-300 for an improvised touchdown on the levee, which measured approximately 4,000 feet in usable length for the . The crew configured the aircraft with landing gear extended but flaps retracted to maintain control at higher speeds during the dead-stick descent. At approximately 12:55 CDT, the 737 touched down gear-down on the grassy levee at a location near 30°00′37″N 89°55′42″W, executing a wheels-in-contact slide to dissipate energy. The aircraft decelerated over about 2,500 feet of grass before veering into the adjacent mud, where it came to a complete stop without fire or explosion; prior hail damage to the nose radome and engines was the primary structural impact, with the fuselage remaining intact. Following the stop, the initiated a rapid evacuation using the overwing exits and slides, completing it within minutes amid light rain. Of the 38 passengers and 7 crew members aboard, none sustained serious injuries, though some reports note minor cuts and bruises from the evacuation process; official records confirm zero fatalities or serious harm. The successful improvised landing on the highlighted the crew's adept site selection and execution under extreme conditions.

Investigation

NTSB Inquiry Process

Following the of TACA International Airlines Flight 110 on May 24, 1988, the (NTSB) assumed the role of lead agency in the investigation, with participation from the (FAA) and as the aircraft manufacturer. The NTSB's involvement ensured a coordinated examination of the incident, drawing on expertise from these entities to assess the sequence of events without prejudging outcomes. The investigation was formally launched on May 25, 1988, the day after the incident, with initial on-site examination of the wreckage at the landing site near New Orleans International Airport. Investigators conducted a detailed of the , including structural damage and system components, before the engines were removed and transported to a (CFMI) facility for specialized testing. This timeline allowed for preservation of evidence, culminating in the release of the NTSB factual report on September 7, 1990. Key methods employed included analysis of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) to reconstruct actions and aircraft performance during the flight. data from the (NOAA) was integrated with records to map the environmental conditions encountered. Additionally, interviews with the flight provided insights into operational decisions and . The scope of the inquiry centered on human factors influencing crew responses, meteorological conditions along the flight path, and compliance with engine certification standards under adverse weather scenarios. This multifaceted approach aimed to thoroughly document all relevant variables, including engine behavior during testing, to inform a comprehensive understanding of the event.

Findings and Probable Cause

The (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of the dual engine flameout on TACA Flight 110 was water ingestion resulting from an in-flight encounter with an area of very and . A contributing cause was the inadequate design of the and the () water ingestion standards, which did not account for the waterfall rates expected in moderate or higher intensity thunderstorms. The engines met FAA requirements for ingesting up to 4% water by weight relative to the engine's airflow, but the severe conditions exceeded this threshold, with liquid water content estimated at 25-30 grams per cubic meter—equivalent to a rainfall rate of approximately 30 inches per hour. Contributing environmental factors included the aircraft's penetration into the core of a level 4 without deviation, characterized by heavy , , and . The thunderstorm's intensity produced returns ranging from green to red, including a "radar shadow" that misleadingly suggested a navigable path. ingestion was particularly damaging, as the ice particles entered the core more efficiently than alone, overwhelming the compressors and leading to after about 30 seconds of exposure at around 16,500 feet. Post-flameout examination of the engines revealed buildup in the sections, resulting from the rapid freezing of ingested and under the low-temperature conditions. Restart attempts using windmilling were unsuccessful due to the high concentrations of and disrupting ; subsequent starter-assisted relights ignited the combustors but failed to accelerate to speed, causing excessive temperatures and further damage that necessitated shutdown. The saturation in the engine cores prevented sustained operation, highlighting vulnerabilities in the CFM56 design under extreme precipitation loads. The NTSB found no evidence of human error, concluding that the crew's actions— including activation of anti-ice systems, ignition, and emergency procedures—were appropriate given the sudden and severe circumstances of the encounter.

Aftermath and Legacy

Aircraft Recovery and Modifications

Following the emergency landing on May 24, 1988, an on-site assessment by Boeing and General Electric technicians revealed that the damage to the Boeing 737-300 (registration N75356) was limited primarily to the engines and minor hail impacts, with no structural failure of the airframe resulting from the off-airport touchdown. The aircraft sustained mild hail damage to the nose and cockpit area, while the number 2 (right) engine showed significant overheating damage, and the number 1 engine had lesser flameout-related issues; the fuselage experienced scraping along the lower sections during the slide on the grassy levee, and the nose landing gear showed minor stress but remained intact. The aircraft was towed from the levee to the adjacent , where initial repairs focused on replacement to prepare for a ferry flight rather than disassembly and barge transport. Technicians from and (a partner in , the manufacturer) replaced the damaged right on-site, while the removed was shipped to a facility in , , for detailed teardown and overhaul analysis. The scraping and nose gear were addressed with minor repairs at the facility, confirming the airframe's overall integrity and airworthiness for limited flight. On June 6, 1988, after minimal refueling with approximately 5,500 pounds of fuel, the repaired aircraft conducted a successful 17-minute flight to New Orleans International Airport (MSY), taking off from a makeshift on Saturn Boulevard—a former World War II-era airstrip adjacent to the Michoud facility—with a takeoff roll of about 1,200 feet. At MSY, further comprehensive inspections and repairs were performed, including overhaul of the remaining engine components at a facility and patching of the and nose gear at a maintenance site to ensure full certification. This process demonstrated the feasibility of recovering a wide-body jet from such an unconventional landing site with targeted interventions. The aircraft returned to service with TACA International Airlines later in 1988 and operated without incident until March 1989, when it was transferred to Aviateca. It subsequently served (April 1991, registration N319AW), Morris Air (January 1993, registration N764MA), and (March 1995, registration N697SW), accumulating over 28 years of additional flight operations. N697SW was withdrawn from use on December 2, 2016, and stored at in , where it was ultimately scrapped in 2017, highlighting the aircraft's remarkable post-incident longevity.

Aviation Safety Improvements

The incident involving TACA Flight 110 highlighted vulnerabilities in engine performance during , prompting the (FAA) to mandate enhanced certification testing for the CFM56 engine series. In response to findings of inadequate water and hail ingestion standards, the FAA revised 14 CFR § 33.78 in 1998 to incorporate more rigorous rain and hail ingestion tests, calibrated to a 1x10⁻⁸ probability storm encounter rate, distinguishing hail's solid impact from liquid water effects. This update, supported by Advisory Circular 33.78-1, required manufacturers to demonstrate engine tolerance under extreme precipitation conditions beyond prior benchmarks. To address operational risks exposed by the dual engine , the FAA issued Airworthiness Directive (AD) T88-13-51 on June 14, 1988, mandating a minimum fan speed of 45% N1 (low-pressure spool) and ignition switch activation to the FLIGHT position during moderate to severe , while prohibiting autothrust use and emphasizing avoidance of thunderstorm cores. These protocols reinforced guidance on utilizing onboard for timely deviations, reducing inadvertent penetration of hazardous by . Training programs for flight crews were enhanced post-incident to include scenarios simulating dual engine failure in , with a focus on interpretation, including limitations like radar shadows that can mask intensity. practices were integrated to improve decision-making under stress, drawing from the effective coordination demonstrated by the TACA crew during the emergency glide and restart attempts. The event contributed critical data on hail ingestion effects, influencing iterative improvements in Boeing 737 engine nacelle designs, such as the adoption of conical spinners, cutback splitters, and enlarged variable bleed valve doors on CFM56 engines to enhance hail deflection and water drainage. These modifications were formalized in AD 91-02-10, issued February 11, 1991, and applied to subsequent 737 models for greater resilience in adverse weather.

Media Coverage

The incident involving TACA Flight 110 garnered significant media attention shortly after its occurrence on May 24, 1988, highlighting the crew's remarkable skill in executing a dead-stick landing on a New Orleans amid a severe . Contemporary coverage in publications emphasized the rarity of the dual engine and the successful outcome for all 45 people on board, portraying it as a testament to pilot expertise under extreme conditions. Television documentaries have extensively featured the event, most notably in the 2012 episode of Air Crash Investigation (Season 11, Episode 11: "Nowhere to Land"), which dramatized the flight's harrowing descent and the captain's one-eyed navigation to safety. Online video analyses have further amplified its story, including a detailed 2021 breakdown by aviation expert Petter Hörnfeldt on the Mentour Pilot YouTube channel, which explored the meteorological factors and crew decisions leading to the "miracle" landing. More recently, a February 2025 upload on the Mayday: Air Disaster channel revisited the heroism of Captain Carlos Dardano and his team, underscoring the incident's enduring lessons in crisis management. Print and digital retrospectives have continued to commemorate the event, such as a 2018 NOLA.com article marking its 30th anniversary, which interviewed locals and detailed the aircraft's recovery from the muddy site near the . A 2022 Simple Flying piece on the 34th anniversary described it as one of 's greatest saves, comparing the pilots' glide to that of the in 1983. No major books have been dedicated exclusively to TACA Flight 110, though it appears in broader compilations of near-misses as an exemplar of human ingenuity in the face of mechanical failure. In public perception, the flight is frequently cited alongside other iconic survivals like the , celebrated for demonstrating the limits of pilot training and aircraft design in averting disaster. This narrative has solidified its status as a " on the ," inspiring discussions on aviation resilience in online forums and media retrospectives.

References

  1. https://www.faa.gov/lessons_learned/transport_airplane/accidents/N75356
  2. https://aviation-safety.net/asndb/326548
  3. https://www.airfleets.net/ficheapp/plane-b737-23838.htm
  4. https://simpleflying.com/34-years-ago-this-week-the-miracle-of-taca-flight-110/
  5. https://simpleflying.com/taca-flight-110-cabin-crew-perspective/
  6. https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19880524-0
  7. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/05/24/The-pilot-of-a-Salvadoran-jetliner-with-41-people/3480580449600/
  8. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-11/NTSB_factual_report.pdf
  9. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-11/NTSB_TACA_Brief.pdf
  10. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2001/01/05/01-347/issuance-of-policy-memorandum-notice-of-compliance-with-the-engine-ingestion-requirements-applicable
  11. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/06/06/Emergency-shortened-flight-is-completed/6569581572800/
  12. https://fearoflanding.com/accidents/guest-post-the-miracle-on-the-levee/
  13. https://avgeekery.com/taca-110-the-boeing-737-miracle-on-the-new-orleans-levee/
  14. https://www.planespotters.net/airframe/boeing-737-300-n697sw-southwest-airlines/eg1jve
  15. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-I/subchapter-C/part-33/subpart-E/section-33.78
  16. https://www.nola.com/archive/may-24-1988-the-day-a-boeing-737-almost-crashed-in-new-orleans-east/article_ac4ba1c6-893a-5e9f-b2c1-90efc449b126.html
  17. https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x8laj2y
  18. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H5UUr9RXfTY
  19. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ALxV0Kk6HU
  20. https://www.amazon.com/Inspiring-Stories-Airplanes-Young-Readers/dp/B0CYR3CJ2Y
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