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Convoy ON 154
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Convoy ON 154
Convoy ON 154 (alternatively Convoy ON(S) 154 or Convoy ONS 154) was a North Atlantic convoy of the ON convoys which ran during the battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War. It was the 154th of the numbered series of merchant ship convoys Outbound from the British Isles to North America. It came under attack in December 1942 and lost 13 of its 50 freighters; one U-boat was sunk.
As western Atlantic coastal convoys brought an end to the second happy time, Admiral Karl Dönitz, the Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU, commander in chief U-boats) shifted focus to the mid-Atlantic to avoid aircraft patrols. Although convoy routing was less predictable in mid-ocean, Dönitz anticipated that the increased numbers of U-boats being produced would be able to search for convoys. Only 20 per cent of the 180 trans-Atlantic convoys sailing from the end of July 1942 until the end of April 1943 lost ships to U-boat attack.
The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed to a four-rotor Enigma (Shark to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read Luftwaffe W/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. In November 1942 the diversion of U-boats to North-West Africa against Operation Torch reduced losses on Atlantic convoys but world losses rose to 721,700 long tons (733,300 t) the worst month of the war. Only two U-boat s were sunk in November. In mid-December GC&CS began to break the four-rotor enigma messages. Having broken one Shark cypher in mid-December, the delay in breaking them was serious and on 25 December, no settings had been found for the last six days. From 25 December to 1 January 1943 traffic was read quickly.
The German Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the Kriegsmarine Marinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British ships and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, B-Dienst read signals from the Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones. B-Dienst broke Combined Naval Cipher No. 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1942. By coincidence, the British lost access to the Shark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra.
The ships departed Liverpool on 18 December 1942 and comprised 50 merchant ships, in ballast or carrying trade goods. The convoy commodore was Vice Admiral (Retd.) Wion de Malpas Egerton in Empire Shackleton. The convoy sailed in twelve columns of three or four ships each. The convoy formation was five miles (8 km) wide and 1.5 miles (2.4 km) long. Convoy ON 154 was a slow convoy, made up of ships that could manage 8 kn (15 km/h; 9.2 mph) at best. Slow convoys were particularly vulnerable, as their speed was matched by the submerged speed of the U-boats and was just half their surface speed, thus making it easier for a wolfpack to form around it. In the North Atlantic were the U-boat wolfpacks Ungestum with 13 boats and Spitz with 11 boats, on patrol in the Mid-Atlantic gap, where Allied air cover was unable to reach. A third pack, Falke acted as a reserve but attacked Convoy HX 219 instead.
The ocean escort for Convoy ON 154 was the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) Mid-Ocean Escort Force Group C-1, led by Lieutenant-Commander Guy Windeyer in the River-class destroyer HMCS St. Laurent. The group comprised the Flower-class corvettes HMCS Battleford, Chilliwack, Kenogami, Napanee, and Shediac. The Town-class destroyer HMS Burwell had mechanical defects, did not sail and was not replaced with another destroyer. RCN ships generally suffered from overwork compared to their Royal Navy equivalents, and were more likely to be un-modernized. Convoy ON 154 included the convoy rescue ship Toward, the oiler Scottish Heather and the French-crewed 2,456 GRT special service vessel HMS Fidelity. Fidelity was armed with four 4 in (100 mm) guns, four torpedo tubes and a defensive torpedo net. She carried the landing craft LCV-752 and LCV-754, two Kingfisher floatplanes and the Motor Torpedo Boat MTB 105.
The winter of 1942–1943 turned out to be the worst in the Atlantic for thirty years. In November, convoys were routed further south than usual, which took them away from the air cover from northern bases, when Allied Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft were not grounded by the weather. Convoy ON 154 was routed south towards the Azores to avoid the winter storms and remained distant from escort support groups for longer than usual. U-662 reported the convoy on 26 December. That night U-356 torpedoed the leading ships from two of the starboard columns. Empire Union was hit at 01:40, Melrose Abbey was hit ten minutes later. Both British freighters sank at about 02:30. Toward rescued 63 survivors from the first ship and 47 from the second. In a second attack, U-356 torpedoed the Dutch freighter Soekaboemi at 04:10 and the British freighter King Edward at 04:15. King Edward sank within three minutes. U-356 was detected by the escorts and was sunk with no survivors following depth charge attacks by St. Laurent, Chilliwack, Battleford and Napanee. At dawn, Toward rescued 25 men from King Edward and assisted Napanee, recovering all but one of Soekaboemi's crew, the ship remaining afloat when abandoned at 07:30.
U-225 began stalking Scottish Heather as she refuelled some of the escorts 15 nmi (28 km; 17 mi) astern of the convoy on the afternoon of 27 December. U-225 was twice driven off by Chilliwack before hitting the oiler with a torpedo in a third approach at 20:40. The ship was temporarily abandoned but the second mate re-boarded her with ten men and sailed the ship out of the danger zone. At dawn he returned and pattern-searched for lifeboats. The oiler returned to England independently after recovering all of her crew.
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Convoy ON 154
Convoy ON 154 (alternatively Convoy ON(S) 154 or Convoy ONS 154) was a North Atlantic convoy of the ON convoys which ran during the battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War. It was the 154th of the numbered series of merchant ship convoys Outbound from the British Isles to North America. It came under attack in December 1942 and lost 13 of its 50 freighters; one U-boat was sunk.
As western Atlantic coastal convoys brought an end to the second happy time, Admiral Karl Dönitz, the Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU, commander in chief U-boats) shifted focus to the mid-Atlantic to avoid aircraft patrols. Although convoy routing was less predictable in mid-ocean, Dönitz anticipated that the increased numbers of U-boats being produced would be able to search for convoys. Only 20 per cent of the 180 trans-Atlantic convoys sailing from the end of July 1942 until the end of April 1943 lost ships to U-boat attack.
The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts. By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed to a four-rotor Enigma (Shark to the British). By mid-1941, British Y-stations were able to receive and read Luftwaffe W/T transmissions and give advance warning of Luftwaffe operations. In November 1942 the diversion of U-boats to North-West Africa against Operation Torch reduced losses on Atlantic convoys but world losses rose to 721,700 long tons (733,300 t) the worst month of the war. Only two U-boat s were sunk in November. In mid-December GC&CS began to break the four-rotor enigma messages. Having broken one Shark cypher in mid-December, the delay in breaking them was serious and on 25 December, no settings had been found for the last six days. From 25 December to 1 January 1943 traffic was read quickly.
The German Beobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of the Kriegsmarine Marinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to help Kriegsmarine ships elude British ships and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941, B-Dienst read signals from the Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones. B-Dienst broke Combined Naval Cipher No. 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1942. By coincidence, the British lost access to the Shark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra.
The ships departed Liverpool on 18 December 1942 and comprised 50 merchant ships, in ballast or carrying trade goods. The convoy commodore was Vice Admiral (Retd.) Wion de Malpas Egerton in Empire Shackleton. The convoy sailed in twelve columns of three or four ships each. The convoy formation was five miles (8 km) wide and 1.5 miles (2.4 km) long. Convoy ON 154 was a slow convoy, made up of ships that could manage 8 kn (15 km/h; 9.2 mph) at best. Slow convoys were particularly vulnerable, as their speed was matched by the submerged speed of the U-boats and was just half their surface speed, thus making it easier for a wolfpack to form around it. In the North Atlantic were the U-boat wolfpacks Ungestum with 13 boats and Spitz with 11 boats, on patrol in the Mid-Atlantic gap, where Allied air cover was unable to reach. A third pack, Falke acted as a reserve but attacked Convoy HX 219 instead.
The ocean escort for Convoy ON 154 was the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) Mid-Ocean Escort Force Group C-1, led by Lieutenant-Commander Guy Windeyer in the River-class destroyer HMCS St. Laurent. The group comprised the Flower-class corvettes HMCS Battleford, Chilliwack, Kenogami, Napanee, and Shediac. The Town-class destroyer HMS Burwell had mechanical defects, did not sail and was not replaced with another destroyer. RCN ships generally suffered from overwork compared to their Royal Navy equivalents, and were more likely to be un-modernized. Convoy ON 154 included the convoy rescue ship Toward, the oiler Scottish Heather and the French-crewed 2,456 GRT special service vessel HMS Fidelity. Fidelity was armed with four 4 in (100 mm) guns, four torpedo tubes and a defensive torpedo net. She carried the landing craft LCV-752 and LCV-754, two Kingfisher floatplanes and the Motor Torpedo Boat MTB 105.
The winter of 1942–1943 turned out to be the worst in the Atlantic for thirty years. In November, convoys were routed further south than usual, which took them away from the air cover from northern bases, when Allied Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft were not grounded by the weather. Convoy ON 154 was routed south towards the Azores to avoid the winter storms and remained distant from escort support groups for longer than usual. U-662 reported the convoy on 26 December. That night U-356 torpedoed the leading ships from two of the starboard columns. Empire Union was hit at 01:40, Melrose Abbey was hit ten minutes later. Both British freighters sank at about 02:30. Toward rescued 63 survivors from the first ship and 47 from the second. In a second attack, U-356 torpedoed the Dutch freighter Soekaboemi at 04:10 and the British freighter King Edward at 04:15. King Edward sank within three minutes. U-356 was detected by the escorts and was sunk with no survivors following depth charge attacks by St. Laurent, Chilliwack, Battleford and Napanee. At dawn, Toward rescued 25 men from King Edward and assisted Napanee, recovering all but one of Soekaboemi's crew, the ship remaining afloat when abandoned at 07:30.
U-225 began stalking Scottish Heather as she refuelled some of the escorts 15 nmi (28 km; 17 mi) astern of the convoy on the afternoon of 27 December. U-225 was twice driven off by Chilliwack before hitting the oiler with a torpedo in a third approach at 20:40. The ship was temporarily abandoned but the second mate re-boarded her with ten men and sailed the ship out of the danger zone. At dawn he returned and pattern-searched for lifeboats. The oiler returned to England independently after recovering all of her crew.
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