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Mid-Atlantic gap
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Mid-Atlantic gap
The Mid-Atlantic gap is a geographical term applied to an undefended area of the Atlantic Ocean during the Battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War. The region was beyond the reach of land-based RAF Coastal Command anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. This resulted in many merchant shipping losses to U-boats. The gap was eventually closed in May 1943, as growing numbers of Very Long Range Liberators (VLR) and escort carriers became available and as basing problems were solved.
The RAF Coastal Command was assigned responsibility for antisubmarine warfare (A/S or ASW) patrol when it was created in 1936. It was equipped only with small numbers of short-ranged aircraft, the most common being the Avro Anson (which was obsolete by the start of the Second World War) and Vickers Vildebeest (which was obsolete) for a time, shortages of aircraft were so severe, "scarecrow patrols" using Tiger Moths were employed. RAF Bomber Command routinely got higher priority for the best, longest-ranged aircraft. Only as Bomber Command converted to four-engined aircraft did Coastal Command receive the castoffs, such as Vickers Wellington medium bombers, which had adequate range for ASW patrols. Coastal Command's motley assortment of Ansons, Whitleys and Hampdens were unable to carry the standard 450 lb (200 kg) depth charge; that needed Wellingtons or Sunderlands. (The other aircraft capable of carrying it, the Avro Lancaster, was Bomber Command's crown jewel.[clarification needed])
Coastal Command's prize was the Consolidated Aircraft Liberator GR.I, commonly called the VLR Liberator or just VLR. The Liberator B.I proved too vulnerable for bombing missions over Europe but had excellent range and payload, ideal for ASW. Priority for these was the U.S. Navy for reconnaissance operations in the Pacific, where their long range were equally valuable, but where they generally carried out missions of lower priority than those of Coastal Command.
VLRs were of particular importance in times when Bletchley Park was unable to read Kriegsmarine Enigma (Ultra). When Convoy ON 127 was attacked by the U-boat U-584 on 11 September 1942, there was one VLR in 120 Squadron overhead. Fifteen U-boats converged on Convoy ON 131, only to meet aircraft and Coastal Command sank two, while in protecting Convoy ON 136, the 120 Squadron VLRs sank U-597 on 12 October 1942. Even then, VLRs proved invaluable in co-operation with shipborne high-frequency direction finding (HF/DF). Defending Convoy SC 104, VLRs guided by HF/DF drove off three shadowing U-boats on 16 October. They bettered the performance on 29 October, for Convoy HX 212, driving off five and seven on 6 November around Convoy SC 107. "...[T]he apparent inadequacy Newfoundland-based air support was highlighted by the early interception of SC 107 and the resultant bitter and costly battle." This led RAF to belatedly move a number of Coastal Command squadrons.
The nine Liberator GR.Is operating over the Atlantic of 120 Squadron based in Iceland, were a worry to Admiral Karl Dönitz, who was Befehlshaber der U-Boote. As a measure of how valuable they were, after patrols off Canada were added in 1942, only one ship was lost in convoy. Even in mid-1942, Coastal Command only had two squadrons of Liberators and B-17 Flying Fortresses, and at the first sign of Coastal Command success against U-boats, Arthur Harris sought to have their aircraft diverted to Bomber Command to attack German cities.
After Convoy SC 118, Professor Patrick Blackett, Director of the Admiralty Operational Research Section, made several proposals, including diverting VLRs from Bomber Command to Coastal Command. "Despite the strength of Blackett's case, the Admiralty (not to mention the Air Ministry, Bomber Command, and the Americans) believed for some time yet that it could not afford to reduce the air offensive in the Bay of Biscay or to abandon the bombing of German bases by the RAF." "The number of VLR aircraft operating in the North Atlantic in February [1943] was only 18, and no substantial increase was made until after the crisis of March." Nor were night air patrols, recognized as necessary, initiated until the autumn of 1943.
Bomber Command did not refuse entirely to offer assistance against U-boats. From 14 January to May 1943, they flew 7,000 sorties against the U-boat pens in Lorient, Brest, and St. Nazaire, at a cost of 266 aircraft and crews. They accomplished no damage to the pens nor the submarines within them. Coastal Command strength never reached 266 VLRs.[citation needed] Raids against German U-boat building yards had similarly disappointing results.
Aircraft also had an important indirect role by preventing the formation of wolf packs. They limited the places U-boats could attack in safety, and (by reducing the ability of shadowing U-boats to find and track convoys) made shipping harder to find, thereby reducing losses. This also helped the convoy escorts, by enabling them to deal with one U-boat at a time. Despite a willingness of Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft to fly in (perennially bad) conditions off the Grand Banks Coastal Command would never have attempted, U-boats could trail convoys beginning very soon after departure from Halifax. Without air-to-surface-vessel (ASV) radar, the almost "perpetual fog of the Grand Banks also allowed pack operations to penetrate within a couple of hundred miles of Newfoundland, while aircraft patrolled harmlessly above", and made visual detection impossible.
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Mid-Atlantic gap
The Mid-Atlantic gap is a geographical term applied to an undefended area of the Atlantic Ocean during the Battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War. The region was beyond the reach of land-based RAF Coastal Command anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft. This resulted in many merchant shipping losses to U-boats. The gap was eventually closed in May 1943, as growing numbers of Very Long Range Liberators (VLR) and escort carriers became available and as basing problems were solved.
The RAF Coastal Command was assigned responsibility for antisubmarine warfare (A/S or ASW) patrol when it was created in 1936. It was equipped only with small numbers of short-ranged aircraft, the most common being the Avro Anson (which was obsolete by the start of the Second World War) and Vickers Vildebeest (which was obsolete) for a time, shortages of aircraft were so severe, "scarecrow patrols" using Tiger Moths were employed. RAF Bomber Command routinely got higher priority for the best, longest-ranged aircraft. Only as Bomber Command converted to four-engined aircraft did Coastal Command receive the castoffs, such as Vickers Wellington medium bombers, which had adequate range for ASW patrols. Coastal Command's motley assortment of Ansons, Whitleys and Hampdens were unable to carry the standard 450 lb (200 kg) depth charge; that needed Wellingtons or Sunderlands. (The other aircraft capable of carrying it, the Avro Lancaster, was Bomber Command's crown jewel.[clarification needed])
Coastal Command's prize was the Consolidated Aircraft Liberator GR.I, commonly called the VLR Liberator or just VLR. The Liberator B.I proved too vulnerable for bombing missions over Europe but had excellent range and payload, ideal for ASW. Priority for these was the U.S. Navy for reconnaissance operations in the Pacific, where their long range were equally valuable, but where they generally carried out missions of lower priority than those of Coastal Command.
VLRs were of particular importance in times when Bletchley Park was unable to read Kriegsmarine Enigma (Ultra). When Convoy ON 127 was attacked by the U-boat U-584 on 11 September 1942, there was one VLR in 120 Squadron overhead. Fifteen U-boats converged on Convoy ON 131, only to meet aircraft and Coastal Command sank two, while in protecting Convoy ON 136, the 120 Squadron VLRs sank U-597 on 12 October 1942. Even then, VLRs proved invaluable in co-operation with shipborne high-frequency direction finding (HF/DF). Defending Convoy SC 104, VLRs guided by HF/DF drove off three shadowing U-boats on 16 October. They bettered the performance on 29 October, for Convoy HX 212, driving off five and seven on 6 November around Convoy SC 107. "...[T]he apparent inadequacy Newfoundland-based air support was highlighted by the early interception of SC 107 and the resultant bitter and costly battle." This led RAF to belatedly move a number of Coastal Command squadrons.
The nine Liberator GR.Is operating over the Atlantic of 120 Squadron based in Iceland, were a worry to Admiral Karl Dönitz, who was Befehlshaber der U-Boote. As a measure of how valuable they were, after patrols off Canada were added in 1942, only one ship was lost in convoy. Even in mid-1942, Coastal Command only had two squadrons of Liberators and B-17 Flying Fortresses, and at the first sign of Coastal Command success against U-boats, Arthur Harris sought to have their aircraft diverted to Bomber Command to attack German cities.
After Convoy SC 118, Professor Patrick Blackett, Director of the Admiralty Operational Research Section, made several proposals, including diverting VLRs from Bomber Command to Coastal Command. "Despite the strength of Blackett's case, the Admiralty (not to mention the Air Ministry, Bomber Command, and the Americans) believed for some time yet that it could not afford to reduce the air offensive in the Bay of Biscay or to abandon the bombing of German bases by the RAF." "The number of VLR aircraft operating in the North Atlantic in February [1943] was only 18, and no substantial increase was made until after the crisis of March." Nor were night air patrols, recognized as necessary, initiated until the autumn of 1943.
Bomber Command did not refuse entirely to offer assistance against U-boats. From 14 January to May 1943, they flew 7,000 sorties against the U-boat pens in Lorient, Brest, and St. Nazaire, at a cost of 266 aircraft and crews. They accomplished no damage to the pens nor the submarines within them. Coastal Command strength never reached 266 VLRs.[citation needed] Raids against German U-boat building yards had similarly disappointing results.
Aircraft also had an important indirect role by preventing the formation of wolf packs. They limited the places U-boats could attack in safety, and (by reducing the ability of shadowing U-boats to find and track convoys) made shipping harder to find, thereby reducing losses. This also helped the convoy escorts, by enabling them to deal with one U-boat at a time. Despite a willingness of Royal Canadian Air Force aircraft to fly in (perennially bad) conditions off the Grand Banks Coastal Command would never have attempted, U-boats could trail convoys beginning very soon after departure from Halifax. Without air-to-surface-vessel (ASV) radar, the almost "perpetual fog of the Grand Banks also allowed pack operations to penetrate within a couple of hundred miles of Newfoundland, while aircraft patrolled harmlessly above", and made visual detection impossible.
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