Hubbry Logo
Farm Credit SystemFarm Credit SystemMain
Open search
Farm Credit System
Community hub
Farm Credit System
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Farm Credit System
Farm Credit System
Farm Credit System
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

The Farm Credit System (FCS) in the United States is a nationwide network of borrower-owned lending institutions and specialized service organizations. The Farm Credit System provides more than $373 billion (as of 2022)[1] in loans, leases, and related services to farmers, ranchers, rural homeowners, aquatic producers, timber harvesters, agribusinesses, and agricultural and rural utility cooperatives. As of 2021, the Farm Credit System provides more than 45% of the total market share of US farm business debt.[2]

Congress established the Farm Credit System in 1916 to provide a reliable source of credit for farmers and ranchers,[3] by making loans to qualified borrowers at competitive rates and providing insurance and related services.

Authority and oversight

[edit]

Congress established the Farm Credit System as a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) when it enacted the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916. Current authority is granted by the Farm Credit Act of 1971. The Farm Credit System is considered the first GSE chartered by the United States.

The Farm Credit Administration (FCA), an agency of the federal government created in 1933, provides regulatory oversight for the Farm Credit System. The Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation (FCSIC), established by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, insures the timely repayment of principal and interest on FCS debt securities.

Wholesale system banks

[edit]
Farm Credit Bank (and Agricultural Credit Bank) charter territories

Farm Credit Bank (FCB)

[edit]

Three Farm Credit Banks (FCBs) provide loan funds to 50 Agricultural Credit Associations (ACAs) and one Federal Land Credit Association (FLCA). In turn, ACAs make short-, intermediate-, and long-term loans, while FLCAs make long-term loans, to farmers, ranchers, producers and harvesters of aquatic products, rural residents for housing, and certain farm-related businesses.

The three FCBs are:

There is also one Agricultural Credit Bank, with the authority of a FCB (and a Bank for Cooperatives):

FCBs were created on July 6, 1988, in 11 of the 12 then-existing Farm Credit System (FCS) districts, by merging the Federal Land Bank (FLB) and the Federal Intermediate Credit Bank (FICB) in each of those districts. Those mergers were required by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987.

Bank for Cooperatives (BC)

[edit]

A Bank for Cooperatives (BC) provides lending and other financial services to farmer-owned cooperatives, rural utilities (electric and telephone), and rural sewer and water systems. A BC is also authorized to finance U.S. agricultural exports and provide international banking services for farmer-owned cooperatives.

CoBank is an Agricultural Credit Bank (ACB) and has the authority of a Farm Credit Bank and a BC. The last standalone BC, the St. Paul Bank for Cooperatives, merged into CoBank on July 1, 1999.

Retail lending associations

[edit]
A map of the United States divided into numerous (56) districts, differentiated by colors, which are grouped by shades indicating the Farm Credit Bank or Agricultural Credit Bank district to which it belongs.
Agricultural Credit Association (and two Federal Land Credit Association) charter territories

Agricultural Credit Association (ACA)

[edit]

An Agricultural Credit Association (ACA) is the result of the merger of a FLBA or a FLCA and a PCA and has the combined authority of the two institutions. An ACA obtains funds from a FCB or an ACB to provide short-, intermediate-, and long-term credit to farmers, ranchers, producers and harvesters of aquatic products, and to rural residents for housing. An ACA also makes loans to these borrowers for basic processing and marketing activities, and to farm-related businesses. All ACAs operate with a parent-subsidiary structure, with the ACA as the parent and a wholly owned PCA and FLCA as subsidiaries.

Federal Land Credit Association (FLCA)

[edit]

The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 authorized an FCS bank to transfer its direct-lending authority for long-term mortgage loans to a FLBA. These Associations are designated as FLCAs. Unlike a FLBA, a FLCA owns its loan assets. An FLCA obtains funds from an FCS bank to make and service long-term mortgage loans to farmers and ranchers, and to rural residents for housing. An FLCA also makes loans to these borrowers for basic processing and marketing activities, and to farm-related businesses. Most present-day FLCAs are now subsidiaries of ACAs. Only nine FLCAs operate independently.

Funding institutions

[edit]

Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation

[edit]

The Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation issues a variety of Federal Farm Credit Banks Consolidated Systemwide Debt Securities (Farm Credit Debt Securities) on behalf of the Farm Credit System Banks with a broad range of maturities and structures.

Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac)

[edit]

The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac) is a government-sponsored enterprise with the mission of providing a secondary market for agricultural real estate and rural housing mortgage loans.

Historical institutions

[edit]

There are several institutions that have been authorized by law but which have been subsumed by other institutions, which usually retain their authority.

FCS Financial Assistance Corporation

[edit]

Created by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 and chartered in 1988, the Assistance Corporation provided capital to the FCS by purchasing preferred stock from FCS institutions that received financial assistance authorized by the FCS Assistance Board. The Assistance Corporation provided approximately $1.26 billion before its authority to raise additional funds expired on December 31, 1992.

Following statutory requirements, the Assistance Corporation repaid its obligations in June 2005 and received a final audit in September 2005. After determining that the Assistance Corporation had completed its statutory mission, complied with applicable laws and regulations, and operated in a safe and sound manner, the FCA Board canceled the charter of the Assistance Corporation as of December 31, 2006.

Federal Intermediate Credit Bank (FICB)

[edit]

The Agricultural Credits Act of 1923[4] provided for the creation of 12 FICBs to discount farmers' short- and intermediate-term notes made by commercial banks, livestock loan companies, thrift institutions, and, beginning in 1933, Production Credit Associations. On July 6, 1988, 11 of the 12 then-existing FICBs merged with the Federal Land Banks in their respective districts to form Farm Credit Banks. The mergers were required by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987. The last remaining FICB, the FICB of Jackson, merged with the FCB of Columbia, which has since been renamed AgFirst Farm Credit Bank on October 1, 1993.

1921 newspaper ad for loans to farmers available under the program

Federal Land Bank (FLB)

[edit]

The Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 provided for the establishment of 12 FLBs to provide long-term mortgage credit to farmers and ranchers, and later to rural homebuyers.[3] On May 20, 1988, the FLB of Jackson was placed in receivership and liquidated. On July 6, 1988, the 11 remaining FLBs merged with the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks in their respective districts to form Farm Credit Banks. The mergers were required by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987.

Federal Land Bank Association (FLBA)

[edit]

An FLBA was a lending agent for a Federal Land Bank and later the Farm Credit Bank and the Agricultural Credit Bank. FLBAs originated and serviced long-term mortgage loans to farmers and ranchers, and to rural residents for housing. FLBAs did not own the loan assets but originated loans on behalf of the Federal Land Banks/FCS banks with which they were affiliated. As of October 1, 2000, there are no longer any FLBAs in the FCS. They either merged with Production Credit Associations to form ACAs or became direct-lender Federal Land Credit Associations when Farm Credit Banks transferred their authority to make long-term mortgage loans to their affiliated FLBAs.

Production Credit Association (PCA)

[edit]

The Farm Credit Act of 1933 authorized farmers to organize PCAs to deliver short- and intermediate-term loans to farmers and ranchers, and to rural residents for housing. A PCA also makes loans to these borrowers for basic processing and marketing activities, and to farm-related businesses. A PCA obtains funds from an FCS bank to lend to its members. PCAs own their loan assets. All present-day PCAs are now subsidiaries of ACAs.

1980s agricultural crisis

[edit]

In the 1980s, the United States faced a major farm crisis. With low crop prices, and the value of farm land falling, many farmers were unable to service their debts. This severely affected the Farm Credit System, which experienced losses of $2.7 billion in 1985.[5] Investor confidence in FCS bonds declined, with increased spreads over U.S. treasury debt. The federal government responded by amending the Farm Credit Act of 1971 in 1985 and 1986, and then enacting the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 to help strengthen the FCS.[6]

Criticism

[edit]

The Farm Credit System and a number of FCS banks have faced criticism of their practices. In March 2016, the FCS Funding Corporation disclosed that 45.5% of total FCS taxpayer-subsidized loans outstanding as of year-end 2015 had been borrowed by only 4,458 borrowers.[7] Critics, such as the American Bankers Association, also charge that FCS banks only make large loans (more than $1 million) and are making loans with tax-exempt earnings that have almost nothing to do with farming, such as to Verizon Communications and Cracker Barrel; defenders justified CoBank ACB loans to Verizon and Frontier Communications because they provide landline voice service, Internet and wireless access and other services to rural areas.[8]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Farm Credit System

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Farm Credit System (FCS) is a federally chartered network of borrower-owned lending institutions that provides credit and related to agricultural producers, ranchers, farmer-owned cooperatives, rural homeowners, and agribusinesses across the and . Established by the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 as the nation's oldest , it was created to fill gaps in private credit markets for rural America, enabling long-term loans at competitive rates through access to capital markets without full U.S. government guarantees. The System's structure consists of four regional Farm Credit Banks, which raise funds and provide wholesale lending, and approximately 55 local associations that deliver retail loans within defined territories, all under the regulatory oversight of the independent . As the largest U.S. agricultural lender, the FCS holds about 45% of total farm debt outstanding, supporting roughly 46% of the nation's agricultural production through a diversified portfolio geographically spread across all 50 states. While the FCS has demonstrated resilience by repaying all federal assistance provided during the 1980s farm debt crisis—totaling around $4 billion in aid authorized by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987—its tax-exempt status and GSE funding advantages have sparked ongoing debates over competitive distortions with taxable commercial banks, which argue that such privileges enable into non-farm lending.

Historical Development

Origins and Legislative Foundations (1916-1920s)

The rural credit crisis in the early 20th century stemmed from commercial banks' reluctance to extend long-term loans to farmers, who required financing for land improvements and equipment amid volatile commodity prices and seasonal cash flows. These institutions typically offered short-term credit at interest rates often exceeding 8 percent, with maturities under one year, leading to frequent renewals, balloon payments, and high foreclosure risks during downturns. To address this structural gap, Congress enacted the Federal Farm Loan Act on July 17, 1916, signed into law by President Woodrow Wilson, establishing a cooperative lending system tailored to agriculture's long-term capital needs. The legislation created the Federal Farm Loan Board to oversee operations and authorized twelve Federal Land Banks (FLBs), each serving a geographic district covering the continental United States, alongside local National Farm Loan Associations (NFLAs) as borrower-owned entities that originated and serviced mortgages. FLBs were capitalized through stock purchases by NFLAs, with each association required to subscribe shares equivalent to 5 percent of its loan volume; the banks then issued collateral-trust bonds secured by these mortgages to raise additional funds from investors. The federal government committed to purchasing up to 20 percent of each FLB's stock if farmer subscriptions fell short, providing initial stability without direct lending, though this role diminished as private capital dominated. Loans were capped at 50 percent of appraised farm value, with terms from five to forty years at rates around 4 to 5 percent, enabling farmers to refinance high-cost private debts and invest in productivity-enhancing assets. The first FLB charter was issued on March 1, 1917, followed by rapid formation of over 1,000 NFLAs by 1918, reflecting farmer demand despite initial hesitancy over federal involvement. This structure causally reduced borrowing costs and extended maturities, stabilizing farm balance sheets by mitigating rollover risks inherent in commercial lending. Early adoption accelerated post-World War I, with FLB loans outstanding reaching substantial volumes by the mid-1920s as farmers shifted from private lenders, capturing a growing share of the expanding mortgage market amid rising values. By 1929, the system had facilitated over $1.9 billion in outstanding loans, underscoring its role in channeling capital to before the Depression exposed broader economic vulnerabilities. Recognizing gaps in short-term financing for crops and , passed the Agricultural Credits Act on March 4, 1923, establishing twelve Federal Intermediate Credit Banks (FICBs) co-located with the FLBs to discount eligible agricultural notes and provide direct loans to cooperatives with maturities of six months to three years. Each FICB received $5 million in government-subscribed capital and issued debentures up to ten times that amount, enabling discounts of paper from production credit associations and banks at rates competitive with urban markets. This expansion complemented the FLBs by addressing needs, further insulating farmers from private credit contractions through diversified, district-based intermediation.

Expansion Amid Economic Challenges (1930s-1940s)

The , marked by plummeting farm incomes and widespread bank failures, prompted Congress to enact the Farm Credit Act of 1933 on June 16, which centralized the Farm Credit System under the newly created (FCA) and expanded its lending authority to address acute credit shortages. This legislation consolidated the existing Federal Land Banks for long-term loans and Federal Intermediate Credit Banks for intermediate-term needs, while introducing Production Credit Corporations to provide short- and intermediate-term operating loans through local Production Credit Associations, thereby covering the full spectrum of agricultural financing previously fragmented across private and federal entities. Additionally, the Act established 12 regional Banks for Cooperatives to finance farmer-owned , , and cooperatives, operationalized starting in 1934 to support collective efficiencies amid individual farm distress. These measures responded causally to the Depression's credit contraction, where private lenders curtailed operations, leaving farmers unable to refinance debts or fund production; by 1934, the System had processed 500,000 loans totaling $1.25 billion, filling the vacuum left by retreating commercial banks. To avert , the federal government assumed responsibility for the System's bond obligations, issuing federally backed securities through the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation created under the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of May 1933, which refinanced distressed mortgages at reduced interest rates and extended maturities. Empirical data indicate this intervention restructured approximately one-fifth of all outstanding U.S. farm mortgages within 18 months, averting foreclosures that had surged due to debt burdens exceeding farm values by up to 50% in some regions; for instance, over 40,000 restructuring applications were filed in early 1933 alone, preserving farm ownership and stabilizing rural economies. The System's in agricultural credit grew substantially from pre-Depression levels below 10% to dominating short- and long-term lending as private institutions failed en masse, though this expansion introduced inefficiencies, including politicized loan approvals influenced by local political pressures rather than purely economic viability, as evidenced by higher default rates in some subsidized programs compared to market-driven alternatives. During , the Farm Credit System played a pivotal role in financing expanded agricultural output to meet wartime demands, providing loans for increased production of food and fiber essential to Allied efforts, with Production Credit Associations advancing funds for seeds, equipment, and labor amid labor shortages and . Banks for Cooperatives extended credit to processing entities scaling up for military needs, contributing to a near-doubling of U.S. farm output between 1940 and 1945 despite resource constraints. This period underscored the System's utility in directed economic mobilization but also highlighted ongoing challenges from earlier politicization, where credit allocation sometimes prioritized output quotas over long-term farm sustainability, leading to post-war adjustments in lending practices.

Post-War Reforms and Independence (1950s-1970s)

The Farm Credit Act of 1953 restructured the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) as an independent federal agency, severing its ties to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) that had been established in 1939, with the aim of fostering greater operational autonomy and accountability akin to private financial institutions. Signed into law by President on August 6, 1953, the legislation created a 13-member Federal Farm Credit Board to oversee the system and facilitated the retirement of remaining government capital in federal land banks, thereby increasing borrower ownership and reducing direct fiscal reliance on the . This separation addressed prior criticisms of bureaucratic overlap and political influence in credit decisions, though the system's bonds retained an implicit federal guarantee through among institutions. Subsequent legislation in the and built on this foundation by modernizing operations and broadening lending scope to adapt to evolving agricultural needs. The Farm Credit Act of 1961 streamlined administrative processes and enhanced access to short- and intermediate-term credit through production credit associations, responding to post-war and consolidation trends in farming. The more comprehensive Farm Credit Act of 1971 recodified prior statutes, authorizing loans for rural housing (including non-farm homes), operations, and aquatic producers, while raising loan-to-value limits on from 65% to 85% of appraised value. These expansions reflected congressional intent to diversify beyond pure agricultural production credit, supporting rural without full , yet they maintained FCA's regulatory role to mitigate risks from extended lending authorities. Amid a post-war agricultural boom driven by technological advances and export demand, the system underwent consolidations via mergers of local associations and banks to improve and scale, particularly in the . Loan volumes expanded markedly, from $4.4 billion outstanding in 1960 to $10.5 billion in 1970 and $26.8 billion by 1979, reflecting increased borrower leverage and in farm debt amid rising land values and input costs. While these reforms curtailed overt subsidies and promoted self-funding through bond markets, the retained federal backstop for system-wide obligations arguably understated risks, as institutions prioritized volume growth over stringent in a favorable economic cycle.

Path to Full Borrower Ownership and Pre-Crisis Changes (1980s)

The Farm Credit Act of 1971 restructured the Farm Credit System (FCS) into a framework where borrowers were required to purchase equivalent to the lesser of $1,000 or 2% of their amount, thereby establishing them as partial owners of local associations. This legislation initiated the phase-out of government-held capital in federal land banks, production credit associations, and banks for cooperatives, with provisions for retiring such at as borrower equity accumulated. By mandating borrower participation in through ownership and electing board members, the Act shifted control from federal oversight toward , reducing direct U.S. government equity while preserving the System's ability to issue joint-and-severally liable bonds with implicit market confidence derived from its federal charter. Amendments in the Farm Credit Act of 1980 further advanced borrower autonomy by broadening lending authorities to include non-farm rural enterprises and encouraging loans to young, beginning, and small farmers, which expanded the portfolio beyond traditional agriculture. These changes granted associations greater flexibility in loan underwriting and operations, diminishing regulatory constraints on interest rates and credit standards prior to the mid-1980s farm downturn. By the early 1980s, the retirement of remaining government stock was largely complete, achieving full borrower ownership across FCS institutions and eliminating federal capital contributions, though the System retained government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) status for bond issuance without explicit taxpayer guarantees. The ownership transition coincided with rapid loan portfolio expansion, driven by the agricultural boom, with FCS outstanding s growing from approximately $20 billion in 1970 to around $48 billion by 1980, representing nearly 31% of total U.S. debt. Borrower-controlled boards, incentivized to maximize lending volumes for refunds and growth, pursued aggressive extension amid rising values and input costs, often without sufficient diversification or . This structure, lacking external equity holders or direct fiscal backstops, amplified incentives for risk concentration in and operating s, setting the stage for vulnerabilities as prices and export demand softened in the early . Local association independence in portfolio decisions, while enhancing responsiveness to members, contributed to uneven across districts, with early nonperforming indicators emerging by 1982-1983 amid debt-to-asset ratios climbing above 20%.

Governance and Oversight

Role of the Farm Credit Administration (FCA)

The Farm Credit Administration (FCA) operates as an independent agency within the executive branch of the U.S. government, established under the Farm Credit Act of 1985 to oversee the Farm Credit System (FCS) without engaging in direct lending activities. Its primary mandate focuses on ensuring the safety and soundness of FCS institutions, which include banks and associations serving agricultural and rural borrowers, through regulatory examination rather than deposit insurance or securities market supervision typical of agencies like the FDIC or SEC. This independence, solidified post-1985 reforms amid the farm debt crisis, allows the FCA to prioritize tailored oversight of the FCS's unique borrower-owned structure, where institutions return profits to members via rather than maximizing returns. Core functions encompass chartering and licensing FCS entities, promulgating capital adequacy rules aligned with the cooperative model, and conducting annual safety and soundness examinations using the Financial Institution Rating System (). The FIRS assigns composite ratings from 1 (strongest) to 5 (weakest) across six components—capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to —with over 96% of FCS banks and associations receiving a 1 or 2 rating as of mid-2025, reflecting broad institutional stability. Enforcement mechanisms include formal actions under section 5.65 of the Farm Credit Act, such as cease-and-desist orders or civil money penalties, with public notices issued for violations; however, such actions remain infrequent, numbering fewer than a dozen annually in recent years, underscoring effective compliance amid the system's $400 billion-plus loan portfolio. Unlike the FDIC's emphasis on deposit or the SEC's market disclosure mandates, FCA accommodates the FCS's funding via joint bonds and its mission-driven focus on long-term agricultural credit, imposing co-op-specific requirements like borrower stock purchases and distributions. This tailoring supports autonomy in operational decisions by borrower boards but has drawn critiques for perceived laxity in curbing non-farm lending expansions, which some argue dilute the system's original agricultural mandate and heighten competitive risks without proportional risk-weighting adjustments. Community banking groups, for instance, contend that FCA oversight inadequately addresses into rural infrastructure or non-ag sectors, potentially exposing cooperatives to broader economic volatilities despite strong FIRS outcomes. These tensions highlight a causal : rigorous preserves soundness but can constrain the self-governing flexibility inherent to cooperatives, prompting ongoing debates over balancing regulatory stringency with industry-driven .

Evolution of Regulatory Independence and Accountability

The Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985 restructured the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) as an independent , explicitly separating it from the Farm Credit System institutions it oversees to enable arm's-length regulation and mitigate prior conflicts where the regulator was intertwined with supervised entities. This reform vested FCA management in a dedicated board, empowered it to enforce safety and soundness standards—including removal of directors or officers for unsafe practices—and aligned with broader post-crisis efforts to restore financial discipline after the System's near-collapse, which had necessitated over $4 billion in federal assistance by 1986. The shift addressed empirical weaknesses in pre-1985 oversight, where integrated governance contributed to lax risk management amid the 1980s farm debt surge, with System nonperforming loans peaking at 25% of portfolios by 1986. Subsequent legislation, such as the Farm Credit Banks and Associations Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, refined this independence by authorizing mergers among System banks and associations to enhance operational efficiency while mandating assessments of borrower impacts, thereby balancing regulatory autonomy with accountability to . These changes permitted limited joint-stock conversions for certain associations, transitioning from pure cooperative models to hybrid structures with external investor capital, which aimed to diversify funding sources but retained FCA approval to safeguard core borrower-owned principles. By 1996, the Farm Credit System Reform Act further empowered functions via Farmer Mac, underscoring a trajectory toward self-sustaining oversight detached from direct USDA control. Empirical indicators of evolving accountability include the elimination of direct federal appropriations for FCA operations post-1985, with the agency now funded solely through assessments on System institutions—totaling approximately $50 million annually in recent budgets—reducing taxpayer exposure but preserving congressional influence via statutory mandates. However, an implicit backstop persists, as evidenced by crisis-era infusions and the System's GSE-like status, where bonds lack explicit guarantees yet benefit from perceived support, leading to costs 20-50 basis points below comparable private agricultural lenders. This dynamic has drawn criticism for fostering , as independence facilitates efficiency gains—such as streamlined capital standards—but enables risk underpricing relative to fully private banks, with studies noting heightened lending during booms on marginal collateral due to bailout expectations. Such risks materialized in the downturn, where regulatory detachment post-reform has arguably improved resilience yet not fully eliminated incentives for excessive exposure in volatile cycles.

Organizational Structure

Wholesale Banks and Their Functions

The wholesale banks of the Farm Credit System (FCS) consist of four regional institutions—AgriBank, AgFirst Farm Credit Bank, , and (operating as an Agricultural Credit Bank)—which serve as intermediate funding providers to affiliated retail associations across the . These banks, owned cooperatively by their associations, focus on supplying liquidity and capital rather than engaging in to ultimate borrowers such as farmers or rural businesses. Post-mergers, this structure has consolidated from historical configurations, enabling efficient capital allocation to support agricultural and rural credit needs without retail-level borrower interactions. Farm Credit Banks (FCBs) primarily fund associations for short- and intermediate-term operating loans, long-term financing, and related rural by purchasing or discounting eligible loans from associations, thereby providing them with immediate . This discounting process allows associations to originate loans to end-users while transferring funding obligations to the banks, which manage wholesale risk through capital markets access and inter-bank coordination. In risk-sharing arrangements, banks may retain portions of loan exposure or participate in association-originated credits, promoting diversified credit delivery while adhering to statutory capital and leverage requirements overseen by the Farm Credit Administration. For instance, as of June 30, 2025, system-wide accruing loans supported by these mechanisms totaled approximately $436 billion, reflecting the scale of wholesale intermediation. CoBank, as the sole Agricultural Credit Bank, extends these functions to agricultural cooperatives, aquatic producers, and rural utilities, financing cooperative operations, processing facilities, and export activities through direct wholesale lending or loan participations. Unlike pure FCBs, CoBank's incorporates traditional Banks for Cooperatives mandates, emphasizing equity investments and term loans tailored to structures, with assets contributing to the system's total exceeding $556 billion as of mid-2025. These banks do not hold deposits but raise funds via tax-exempt bonds issued through the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation, ensuring liquidity flows to associations without retail deposit-taking dependencies. The wholesale orientation distinguishes these banks by prioritizing systemic provision, development, and financial oversight for associations, rather than individualized borrower assessments or servicing. Empirical data indicate that FCB loan discounts and participations enable associations to extend over 45% of total U.S. , underscoring the banks' pivotal role in scaling agricultural amid varying economic conditions. This fosters capital , with banks maintaining core capital ratios above regulatory minima to absorb potential association-level risks.

Retail Associations and Direct Lending

The retail associations of the Farm Credit System (FCS) consist primarily of Agricultural Credit Associations () and Federal Land Credit Associations (FLCAs), which serve as the borrower-facing entities responsible for originating and servicing the majority of loans. ACAs provide short-, intermediate-, and long-term credit to eligible farmers, ranchers, rural homeowners, and agribusinesses, focusing on operating loans for production needs such as , , and operating expenses. FLCAs specialize in long-term loans, retaining ownership of these assets while borrowing funds from affiliated Farm Credit Banks to finance farm purchases, expansions, and rural . As of January 2025, the FCS comprises 55 borrower-owned associations, down from higher numbers due to ongoing consolidations that have reduced the total from 72 in 2020. These associations handle over 90% of the FCS's total volume, which exceeded $370 billion as of late 2024, making them the primary conduit for delivery to agricultural borrowers across the system's districts. Borrower ownership is structured through mandatory stock purchases, typically the lesser of $1,000 or 2% of the amount, which grants voting and patronage refunds based on association profits, aligning incentives toward long-term borrower retention over short-term . The model emphasizes customized terms tailored to agricultural cycles, including flexible repayment schedules and variable rates tied to production risks, facilitated by the structure that distributes surplus earnings as patronage refunds—effectively reducing borrowers' net interest costs below nominal rates charged. Empirical data from FCS operations show this model supports sustained lending during downturns, with net interest margins averaging 2.41% in , lower than the 3.52% for agricultural banks, reflecting efficiencies from scale and GSE access but also prompting critiques. banks and industry groups argue that FCS , enabled by exemptions and implicit backing, undercuts market rates and distorts , potentially crowding out private lenders in rural markets and increasing if associations prioritize volume over risk-adjusted returns. Despite such concerns, the model's borrower-centric has empirically facilitated credit access for underserved segments, including young and beginning farmers, with targeted programs contributing to FCS's overall agricultural debt market share of approximately 46% in 2023.

Funding and Secondary Market Entities

The (Farmer Mac), established by Title VII of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-233), began operations in 1988 to create a for agricultural mortgages, rural housing loans, and certain rural utility loans. As a federally chartered (GSE) regulated by the Farm Credit Administration, Farmer Mac purchases eligible loans from agricultural lenders, including Farm Credit System institutions, securitizes them into mortgage-backed securities, and guarantees timely payment of principal and interest to investors. This process provides to primary lenders by converting illiquid whole loans into tradable securities, enabling risk transfer and supporting increased without tying up capital. In 2024, Farmer Mac achieved a record business volume of $29.5 billion, delivering $7.0 billion in and lending capacity to agricultural and rural markets. Its GSE status facilitates access to capital markets at lower costs due to investor perceptions of implicit support, though this has raised questions about market distortions and exposure in analyses of GSE operations. Complementing Farmer Mac's secondary market functions, the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation serves as the fiscal agent for the Farm Credit System's four banks, managing the issuance of system-wide securities to fund agricultural lending. Established under Farm Credit System regulations, it coordinates the sale of bonds and notes in national and international markets on a joint-and-severally liable basis among the banks, ensuring efficient funding aggregation and investor disclosure. By centralizing issuance, the Funding Corporation enhances system-wide , allowing banks to meet borrower demand while maintaining high ratings for securities backed by the diversified agricultural portfolio. This structure supports secondary market activities indirectly by providing stable wholesale funding sources that enable banks to originate eligible for Farmer Mac securitization.

Operational and Financial Mechanisms

Lending Products and Borrower Model

The Farm Credit System (FCS) provides specialized lending products designed for agricultural producers, rural cooperatives, and related , including short-term operating loans for needs such as seeds, feed, and equipment; long-term loans for farmland purchases, improvements, and ; and financing for agricultural cooperatives involved in , , or exporting farm products, provided more than 50% of the cooperative's business derives from farmer-owned inputs. These products extend to rural utilities and , such as loans for , , and telecommunications projects serving agricultural areas, as well as export financing through entities like . Unlike general commercial banking, FCS loans emphasize sector-specific risks, offering flexible terms like seasonal repayments aligned with crop cycles and longer amortizations to match agricultural cash flows. FCS institutions operate as borrower-owned cooperatives, requiring eligible customers—primarily farmers, ranchers, and rural producers—to purchase Class B stock or participation certificates equivalent to a small of their amount, typically granting one vote per borrower regardless of stock holdings to promote democratic . This structure returns net earnings to borrowers via refunds, distributed proportionally to each member's average balance and interest paid, which effectively lowers the net borrowing cost; for instance, a 1% on an 8.5% reduces the effective rate to 7.5%. As of year-end 2023, the System serviced 1,054,939 outstanding to approximately 1 million active borrowers, capturing 45.8% of total U.S. farm debt. The borrower-ownership model aligns lender incentives with long-term agricultural sustainability, enabling credit extension for cyclical, high-risk farming operations where profit-maximizing often demand higher returns or collateral, thus filling market gaps in patient capital for land stewardship and production resilience. Empirical dominance in farm debt share underscores this effectiveness, as FCS prioritizes sector expertise and borrower retention over quarterly earnings pressures. However, the shared interests between owners and borrowers can distort , fostering potential leniency in to sustain membership and distributions, which may elevate non-performing loans relative to arms-length commercial lending disciplined by external shareholders. This dynamic supports underserved rural borrowers but requires robust internal controls to mitigate from reduced profit-driven scrutiny.

Funding Through Bonds and Capital Markets

The Farm Credit System's wholesale banks raise funds primarily through the issuance of joint debt securities by the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation, which acts on behalf of the five Farm Credit Banks to access capital markets efficiently. These securities include discount notes, floating-rate bonds, fixed-rate bonds, and medium-term notes, issued daily in various maturities ranging from overnight to 30 years, with denominations starting at $1,000 for bonds. This centralized mechanism allows the System to pool liquidity needs and issue uniform obligations backed by the collective strength of the banks' loan portfolios, rather than individual bank debt. The Funding Corporation's debt benefits from the Farm Credit System's (GSE)-like status, which provides exemptions from Securities and Exchange Commission registration requirements and state and local taxes on interest income, enhancing marketability and reducing issuance costs compared to private corporate issuers. Although lacking an explicit U.S. guarantee, the securities receive high ratings—currently AA+ from Fitch, Aa1 from Moody's, and AA+ from S&P—tied to perceptions of support and the System's insurance by the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation, resulting in yields empirically lower than those of comparable corporate bonds by 20-50 basis points historically. This cost advantage stems from a 20% risk weighting under standards and investor confidence in the System's agricultural focus and regulatory oversight, enabling cheaper pass-through funding to borrowers despite no direct taxpayer subsidy. As of August 31, 2025, the System's outstanding insured debt exceeded $459 billion, reflecting a 30% increase since 2021 driven by expanded lending volumes. Complementing this debt funding, the System's capital base—approximating $50 billion in 2025—is derived from and mandatory stock purchases by borrowers, providing equity cushions without reliance on external equity markets. This hybrid model supports stable, low-cost credit to but introduces potential systemic risks, as market perceptions of implicit government backing could transmit funding stress to taxpayers in a severe , akin to precedents in other GSEs.

Risk Management, Capital Standards, and Financial Resilience

The Farm Credit Administration (FCA) establishes minimum capital requirements for Farm Credit System (FCS) institutions under 12 CFR Part 628, including a common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio of 4.5 percent, a ratio of 6 percent, a total capital ratio of 8 percent, and a tier 1 leverage ratio of 4 percent, with additional buffers and permanent capital standards to ensure adequacy. FCS institutions typically maintain ratios well above the minimum thresholds, often exceeding 7 percent, supported by unallocated and other core components to absorb potential losses. Post-2008 reforms incorporated into FCA oversight, with institutions required to conduct scenario-based assessments of credit, market, and liquidity risks under varying economic conditions, including commodity downturns, as outlined in FCA guidance emphasizing robust enterprise-wide programs. In the second quarter of 2025, the FCS reported combined of $1.94 billion, reflecting stable earnings amid agricultural sector pressures, with delinquency rates on remaining low at under 1 percent despite slight increases tied to softening farm incomes. This financial resilience stems from a diversified portfolio across commodities such as cash grains (14.4 percent) and rural (13.6 percent), which mitigates concentration risks and supports stability during economic cycles, though the system's heavy exposure to leaves it vulnerable to price volatility and input cost fluctuations. Regulatory proposals have raised concerns about potential weakening of controls; in , the FCA proposed increasing the appraisal exemption threshold for loans from $250,000 to $1 million, a change criticized by banking associations for risking inadequate collateral valuation and exposing the to higher losses in downturns. Similarly, in , analysts noted deteriorating credit quality, with non-performing assets rising as a of total loans, signaling early pressures from buildup that tested the 's provisioning adequacy. These episodes underscore the balance between operational flexibility and prudent standards in maintaining FCS resilience.

The 1980s Farm Debt Crisis

Macroeconomic Causes and Agricultural Downturn

During the , persistent high eroded real interest rates, encouraging aggressive farm expansion and land speculation amid a commodity price boom driven by global demand surges, including the 1972 Soviet grain deal and oil shocks that elevated input costs but also export values. This environment fueled a rapid increase in farm borrowing, with total farm debt rising from $29 billion in 1970 to $71 billion by 1979, while overall farm debt expanded by over 66 percent from 1971 to 1980 as leveraged purchases capitalized on appreciating asset values. Farmland prices, often used as collateral, inflated accordingly, creating a bubble sustained by expectations of perpetual growth in agricultural exports and domestic demand. The reversal began in the early 1980s under Chairman Paul Volcker's aggressive anti- measures, which implemented tight targeting growth over interest rates, driving the above 19 percent by mid-1981 and the to 21.5 percent. These hikes, while curbing double-digit , imposed crippling real interest burdens on variable-rate farm loans, exacerbating debt service costs amid already elevated leverage. Concurrently, the resulting appreciation of the U.S. dollar—strengthening significantly from its 1980 lows—reduced the competitiveness of American agricultural exports, as higher foreign-currency prices dampened demand from key markets; U.S. ag exports, which had surged to over $40 billion in 1981, subsequently stagnated and declined amid global economic slowdowns. These macroeconomic pressures precipitated a severe agricultural downturn, with nominal net farm income plummeting 58 percent from its 1973 peak of $34.4 billion to $14.3 billion in 1983, and real farmland values declining 29 percent from 1980 to 1984, reaching up to 47 percent evaporation by 1986 in some metrics. Farm debt-to-asset ratios spiked from 16.2 percent in 1980 to 22.2 percent by 1985, amplifying risks as cash flows failed to cover obligations, leading to widespread defaults and over 5,000 failures between 1982 and 1987. This cascade reflected not isolated policy errors but the bursting of debt-fueled asset inflation against a backdrop of reversed global fundamentals.

FCS Exposure, Losses, and Systemic Strain

The Farm Credit System's loan portfolio stood at approximately $61.5 billion in outstanding loans as of 1986, representing a significant portion of agricultural lending amid the deepening . Nonaccrual loans reached $7.6 billion that year, comprising about 12 percent of the total portfolio, while high-risk loans further elevated vulnerability, with projections indicating nonperforming assets could climb to 11-15 percent by the end of 1987 under varying scenarios. This exposure was exacerbated by the system's heavy concentration in agricultural debt, where declining farm incomes and asset values amplified default risks across its borrower base. Cumulative net losses for FCS institutions exceeded $4 billion from to , with $2.7 billion recorded in —the largest annual deficit for any U.S. at the time—and an additional $1.9 billion in , driven primarily by provisions for loan losses and erosion of earnings from nonperforming assets. Projections for added $1.2 billion to $2.3 billion in further losses, pushing totals above $5 billion over the three years and depleting capital reserves across multiple districts. At least nine major banks, including eight Federal Land Banks, resorted to revolving assistance programs by early to avert , while widespread mergers reduced the number of associations from over 1,000 in the to under 250 by the mid-1990s, reflecting forced consolidations of failing entities. The ownership structure, where borrowers held equity stakes, fostered and under-reserving for risks, as institutions prioritized leniency toward owner-clients over rigorous discipline, delaying accruals and capital infusions amid legal disputes over loss allocations. This internal dynamic intensified systemic strain, with high servicing costs on outstanding bonds—projected at $24.9 billion over five years at elevated rates—threatening confidence and potentially disrupting broader agency markets if surpluses eroded by early 1987. Spillover effects rippled to rural commercial banks, where shared exposure to distressed agricultural borrowers amplified pressures, underscoring the FCS's role in magnifying sector-wide vulnerabilities despite its intended insulation.

Government Bailout, Legislative Reforms, and Long-Term Implications

The Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985 reorganized the system's governance by streamlining administrative structures and authorizing internal capital transfers among institutions to address emerging financial weaknesses, though these measures proved insufficient to avert deepening insolvency. Subsequent legislation, the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, authorized up to $4 billion in federal financial assistance to stabilize distressed Farm Credit System (FCS) entities, channeled through the newly created Farm Credit System Financial Assistance Corporation (FAC). This aid took the form of Treasury-guaranteed bonds issued by the FAC, with funds loaned to viable institutions for recapitalization and to facilitate mergers or liquidations of failing ones, marking a direct taxpayer intervention to prevent systemic collapse. The 1987 Act also promoted structural reforms, including the consolidation of Federal Intermediate Credit Banks (FICBs) into broader Farm Credit Banks (FCBs) to enhance operational efficiency and funding capacity across districts. It established the Farm Credit System Assistance Board to oversee the aid program's implementation until its termination on December 31, 1992, and separated the Farm Credit Administration (FCA) from direct system control, granting it greater independence as a safety-and-soundness regulator akin to other federal financial overseers. These changes enabled aggressive , with numerous associations merging to reduce redundancies and rebuild capital bases strained by nonperforming loans. By the early 1990s, the capital infusions had restored the FCS's viability, enabling institutions to retire distressed debt and resume lending as agricultural conditions improved, with system-wide capital ratios strengthening sufficiently to support private capital reinvestment. Proponents of the argued it preserved critical credit availability to rural economies, averting broader agricultural contraction and maintaining market stability during recovery. Critics, however, highlighted enduring risks from the government's implicit sponsorship, contending that the precedent fostered by signaling potential future rescues, which could incentivize excessive risk-taking and distort competition with unsubsidized private lenders. This tension underscored ongoing debates over GSE-like entities, where taxpayer backing arguably lowers funding costs but embeds contingent liabilities, as evidenced by the FCS's reliance on federal guarantees to access capital markets at favorable rates post-crisis.

Achievements and Economic Impact

Provision of Stable Credit to Agriculture

The Farm Credit System (FCS), established under the Federal Farm Loan Act of July 17, 1916, addressed longstanding deficiencies in private agricultural credit markets by providing access to long-term real estate loans, which commercial banks largely avoided due to the inherent volatility and illiquidity of farm assets. Prior to the FCS, farmers often relied on short-term, high-interest loans from local merchants or companies, limiting investments in land and equipment essential for sustained productivity. Over the subsequent century through 2025, the system has delivered credit consistently across economic fluctuations, including the , post-World War II expansions, and commodity booms and busts, thereby stabilizing farm operations where private lenders might retract amid downturns. By year-end 2024, FCS institutions held $269.16 billion in outstanding farm loans, including $187.95 billion in and $81.21 billion in non- categories, accounting for approximately 46% of total U.S. agricultural . This scale reflects the system's mandate to prioritize , with delinquency rates on accruing loans remaining low at 0.55% as of March 31, 2025—below typical agricultural delinquency levels of around 1% in comparable periods—demonstrating effective risk underwriting tailored to farming cycles. Such performance stems from specialized expertise in agricultural valuation and borrower equity requirements, enabling sustained lending volumes even as private competitors adjust portfolios based on broader market signals. FCS credit provision has empirically supported structural efficiencies in U.S. , financing the consolidation of smaller holdings into larger, mechanized operations that boosted yields and competitiveness; for instance, early Production Credit Associations under the system correlated with increased input use and output per acre in adopting regions. This stability, however, derives causally from federal sponsorship, which underpins joint-and-several liability among institutions and implicit backstopping, allowing credit flows that pure market mechanisms might curtail during risk-averse phases. Without such structural supports, private lending gaps could persist, though the sponsorship also introduces dependencies on policy continuity for long-term reliability.

Contributions to Rural Development and Underserved Borrowers

The Farm Credit System (FCS) has extended credit to young, beginning, and small farmers as part of its statutory mission to support agricultural entrants and smaller operations, with institutions reporting 150,156 loans totaling $33.1 billion to such U.S. producers in 2024. This represented nearly 58% of all loans originated that year by loan count, though volume data indicate smaller average loan sizes for these borrowers compared to established operations. As of 2022, approximately 17.9% of FCS loans by count went to young farmers under 35 (9.7% by volume) and 25.1% to beginning farmers with less than 10 years of experience, highlighting a numerical emphasis on entry-level producers despite lower proportional funding relative to larger borrowers. Beyond direct farm lending, FCS associations have financed rural utilities and , providing loans for projects such as systems, distribution, and cooperatives that serve underserved rural areas where participation is limited due to higher perceived risks and lower profitability. As of March 2023, rural utility borrowers formed a portion of FCS's $377 billion total portfolio, enabling capital access for maintenance and expansion of essential services in remote communities. This lending fills gaps left by private markets, as FCS's status allows lower-cost funding that supports long-term infrastructure viability without relying on taxpayer subsidies for operations. Empirically, FCS credit has aided underserved borrowers in regions with retreating presence, where data show higher reliance on lenders for small-scale and rural utilities; however, portfolio analyses reveal concentration risks, with a majority of volume directed toward mid- to large-scale operations rather than purely small farms. The borrower-owned model promotes sustained relationships and tailored financing, potentially enhancing loyalty and access for young farmers facing collateral shortages, though it may incentivize volume-driven lending over strict in competitive rural markets. These efforts align with FCS's in stabilizing rural economies, yet independent assessments question the depth of reach for the most marginalized small producers amid overall system growth favoring established entities.

Empirical Measures of Success and Market Share

The Farm Credit System's asset base expanded steadily in the years leading up to 2023, with average earning assets reaching $470.7 billion after a 6.7% increase that year, reflecting robust portfolio growth amid favorable agricultural conditions. Prior to this period, total assets and loans had grown at annual rates exceeding 6% over multi-year spans, driven by demand for agricultural and rural financing. This trajectory underscores the System's capacity to scale operations without relying on external recapitalization since the restructuring. In terms, the FCS commanded 45.9% of total U.S. outstanding at the end of 2022, an increase from 45.3% the prior year, positioning it as the dominant provider in the sector. For , a key component of agricultural lending totaling $335 billion that year, the System's share stood at 49.1%, surpassing commercial banks' 31.9% portion. These figures highlight the FCS's entrenched role relative to competitors, supported by its structure and long-term borrower relationships.
CategoryFCS Share (2022)Commercial Banks Share (2022)
Total Farm Business Debt45.9%Not specified
Farm Real Estate Debt49.1%31.9%
Financial resilience post-1980s is marked by sustained stability, with no institution failures or systemic losses requiring intervention after the 1987 bailout and subsequent reforms. Capital-to-assets ratios have remained robust, at 14.8% as of recent quarters, exceeding regulatory minimums and buffering against sector volatility. Additionally, the System's program returns profits to eligible borrowers proportionally to their loan usage, distributing hundreds of millions annually across associations—for instance, $140 million from one major entity in 2024—effectively reducing net borrowing costs and aligning incentives with member success. This mechanism has operated consistently, with refunds varying by performance but reinforcing borrower loyalty without diluting capital reserves.

Criticisms and Controversies

Distortions from Government Sponsorship and Competition Issues

The Farm Credit System's status as a (GSE) confers tax exemptions and funding privileges that enable it to offer credit at rates below those available from taxable private lenders, thereby distorting agricultural lending markets. Specifically, FCS institutions are exempt from federal and most state/local taxes on income derived from essential activities, including lending, while their debt securities—used to fund operations—are exempt from taxation except for on holders. These advantages reduce FCS's , allowing it to price loans more aggressively than community banks, which bear full tax burdens and rely on deposit funding subject to market . Critics, including the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) and , argue that these GSE privileges create unfair competition, eroding the market share of community banks in agricultural lending. By 2023, FCS held 45.82% of total U.S. agricultural debt, compared to 34.93% for all commercial banks, reflecting a sustained dominance that has squeezed smaller banks' viability in rural areas. ICBA testimony highlights how FCS's tax and funding edges enable predatory-like pricing strategies, undercutting banks and concentrating credit toward larger, lower-risk borrowers rather than the diverse rural clientele served by community institutions. Such distortions incentivize inefficient resource allocation, as subsidized low rates favor expansion over market-driven pricing that might better reflect risks in volatile sectors like farming. Historical complaints of against FCS, investigated by the Farm Credit Administration from 1989 to 1991, were deemed unsubstantiated, yet ongoing critiques persist amid FCS's growth. Proponents counter that these privileges ensure stable rural credit access, but of bank market erosion underscores competitive imbalances that disadvantage efficiency.

Mission Creep into Non-Agricultural Activities

The Farm Credit System (FCS) has faced accusations of through extensions of credit to entities far removed from core agricultural production, such as participation in a to Old Country Store, a chain with minimal direct ties to farming operations. Similarly, in 2016, , a key FCS institution, provided a $725 million loan to Verizon Communications as part of a larger financing package, prompting critics to argue that such deals prioritize commercial diversification over statutory mandates to serve farmers and ranchers. These activities stem from interpretive expansions of FCS charters, which permit lending for rural utilities, infrastructure, and certain non-farm businesses under the guise of supporting agricultural ecosystems, though caps nontraditional syndicated loans at 15% of an individual institution's portfolio to ostensibly maintain focus. More recent instances underscore risks in this expansion, including a 2025 lawsuit filed by Farm Credit Mid-America against Nearest Green Distillery (affiliated with ), alleging default on over $108 million in loans extended for non-farm commercial purposes, including misuse of funds and inaccurate financial reporting. The case, which led to a federal judge ordering in August 2025, highlights elevated delinquency rates in non-agricultural segments, where FCS non-farm loans have exhibited higher default vulnerabilities compared to traditional farm lending amid economic pressures unrelated to commodity cycles. Banking groups like the (ABA) and Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) have cited such examples in 2016 congressional testimony and ongoing advocacy, contending that loose regulatory oversight enables profit-driven pursuits in a structure originally designed for agricultural stability, thereby diluting taxpayer-backed resources intended for underserved farmers. FCS non-farm and rural lending has grown to represent approximately 13-15% of the system's overall portfolio by 2025, reflecting a strategic shift toward broader rural economic support rather than strict adherence to ag-specific . Proponents within the FCS argue this diversification enhances institutional resilience against agricultural volatility, indirectly benefiting farmers by bolstering rural communities and essential to supply chains, as evidenced by sustained system-wide growth to $7.8 billion in 2024 despite sector-specific stresses. However, detractors maintain that such rationale masks competitive advantages from government sponsorship, including tax exemptions, which subsidize ventures like distilleries and telecoms at the expense of the system's foundational mission, potentially eroding focus on small and mid-sized producers who comprise a shrinking share of new originations.

Moral Hazard, Taxpayer Risks, and Bailout Precedents

The Farm Credit System's (FCS) structure as a (GSE) without an explicit federal guarantee nonetheless fosters perceptions of an implicit taxpayer backstop, rooted in the 1980s financial crisis bailout. In response to widespread losses from the agricultural downturn, established the Farm Credit Assistance Corporation in 1987, authorizing up to $4 billion in federal assistance to cover FCS debt obligations and facilitate mergers and restructuring; this aid, funded through Treasury borrowing, exposed taxpayers to direct costs estimated at $1.5 billion initially, with potential for the full amount plus interest if recoveries fell short. Although the FCS eventually repaid principal advances by 2000, the episode demonstrated contingent liabilities, as non-repayment would have shifted burdens to general revenues, establishing a precedent for government intervention in GSE distress akin to later resolutions for and . This historical intervention contributes to by signaling to investors and FCS institutions that may prompt federal rescue, thereby reducing the risk premiums demanded on FCS joint debt securities. Empirical analysis of bond yields reveals FCS debt trades with spreads over Treasuries typically under 1%, reflecting minimal compensation for default risk despite the absence of explicit backing, which contrasts with higher premiums on comparable private agricultural bonds and indicates market pricing of implicit support. Critics, including analyses from the Government Accountability Office, argue this underpricing incentivizes FCS entities to extend credit with insufficient capital buffers or risk assessment, as cheaper funding lowers the effective cost of errors and amplifies pro-cyclical lending—expanding during booms and contracting sharply in downturns, as evidenced by the 1980s overextension into high-risk loans amid low-interest borrowing. Such dynamics parallel broader GSE critiques, where perceived guarantees distort capital allocation and encourage asset bubbles in targeted sectors like . Taxpayer risks persist due to FCS undercapitalization relative to private peers and reliance on system-wide , which totals over $300 billion and lacks diversified equity to absorb shocks without spillover. While proponents view the implicit backstop as essential for agricultural stability—preventing credit crunches that could devastate rural economies—opponents contend it privatizes gains while socializing losses, potentially requiring future bailouts exceeding the scale if correlated farm defaults overwhelm internal reserves, as modeled in stress scenarios by rating agencies. The absence of explicit guarantees post- reforms aims to mitigate but fails to fully dispel market expectations of intervention, perpetuating incentives for risk underestimation and underscoring the causal link between GSE sponsorship and amplified systemic vulnerabilities.

Debates Over Equity Mandates and Reporting Requirements

In discussions surrounding the 2023 Farm Bill and related regulatory proposals, proponents of enhanced equity measures advocated for mandatory collection and reporting of race, , and data by Farm Credit System (FCS) lenders on applicants to promote transparency and address potential disparities in agricultural lending. Such requirements appeared in draft legislation like H.R. 8467, which directed FCS institutions to gather demographic information notwithstanding other laws, aiming to enable oversight of lending patterns akin to (CFPB) Section 1071 rules for data. Advocates, including sustainable agriculture coalitions, argued this would identify and mitigate historical exclusions of minority and women farmers, fostering inclusion without altering core lending criteria. FCS representatives, through the Farm Credit Council, opposed aspects of these mandates, contending they impose excessive compliance costs and administrative burdens without demonstrable benefits, given the system's existing statutory focus on young, beginning, and small (YBS) farmers—who comprise a disproportionate share of underserved borrowers. In 2024, FCS institutions originated 150,156 YBS loans totaling $33.1 billion, representing targeted outreach to new entrants via flexible terms and education rather than demographic quotas or tracking, which FCS leaders described as sufficient for mission fulfillment. They supported bipartisan legislative frameworks for voluntary or streamlined data collection but resisted CFPB's Section 1071 implementation for agricultural lenders, citing duplication with (FCA) reporting and risks to borrower . Critics of the mandates, including FCS stakeholders, warned that compelled demographic reporting could incentivize non-creditworthiness factors in , potentially politicizing decisions and elevating default risks through reverse discrimination pressures or litigation, as seen in past challenges. FCA regulations already require institutions to establish outreach targets based on territorial demographics for YBS lending, but without race- or gender-specific mandates, emphasizing merit-based allocation to maintain . Opponents viewed such requirements as government overreach, arguing they distort market efficiency by prioritizing identity over viability, contrasting with pro-inclusion views that transparency ensures accountability amid documented underrepresentation in farm ownership (e.g., Black farmers holding 1.7% of U.S. farmland in 2017 ). These tensions highlight broader debates on whether equity goals justify intrusive oversight in a GSE structured for risk-managed, agriculture-specific credit.

Recent Developments (2000s-2025)

The Farm Credit System demonstrated sustained recovery and growth in the post-2000s period, with total loans reaching approximately $436 billion by mid-2025, up nearly 2% from the prior year amid moderating agricultural expansion. Combined net income for the first half of 2025 totaled $3.90 billion, reflecting stable quarterly earnings of $1.94 billion in the second quarter, supported by a 6.6% rise in net interest income to $3.1 billion for that period. For the full year 2024, net income increased to $7.80 billion from $7.45 billion in 2023, underscoring operational resilience despite broader economic headwinds in agriculture. Loan portfolio growth moderated in 2023 to around 6%, aligning with slower sector-wide agricultural lending amid declining farm incomes and commodity pressures, before stabilizing with modest increases into 2025. Average earning assets expanded 8.7% year-over-year in the second quarter of 2025, driven partly by targeted lending to young, beginning, and small (YBS) producers, where outstanding loans reached $122.8 billion by year-end 2024 following 150,156 originations totaling $33.1 billion. This YBS focus contributed to overall portfolio diversification beyond traditional farm operations into rural utilities and agribusiness, buffering against pure cyclical downturns while maintaining exposure to input cost inflation and volatile crop-livestock markets. Credit quality remained empirically strong, with delinquencies on accruing loans at 0.47% as of June 30, 2025, a slight uptick from 0.36% at year-end 2024 but still indicative of low relative to historical norms. Nonaccrual loans constituted a manageable portion of assets, at about 54% of nonperforming totals, amid rising but contained pressures from elevated production expenses and softer commodity prices. Capital levels grew steadily through 2025's first half, reinforcing the System's capacity to weather cycles, though sensitivity to farm income fluctuations—forecast to rise 29.5% nominally in 2025 to $180.1 billion—highlights ongoing vulnerability without further non-farm revenue streams.

Adaptation to Modern Agricultural Challenges

The Farm Credit System (FCS) has financed producers' implementation of climate-resilient practices, including conservation tillage, enhanced irrigation systems, and cover cropping, to mitigate risks from events such as droughts and floods increasingly documented in U.S. since the 2010s. These loans target operational adjustments that improve and , drawing on that such measures can reduce yield volatility by 10-20% in variable climates, though long-term efficacy depends on regional soil and management factors. The system's associations, like Farm Credit Services of America, emphasize customized financing for without a uniform model, allowing borrowers to select verifiable, farm-specific strategies over prescriptive mandates. Technological adaptation within FCS lending includes support for tools, such as GPS-guided equipment and sensor-based monitoring, which enable variable-rate application of inputs to address climate-induced variability in pest pressures and needs. By 2023, FCS held approximately 46% of U.S. farm debt, facilitating access to these technologies for over 150,000 young and beginning producers annually, though adoption rates vary, with USDA showing only about 25-30% of operations fully integrating precision methods due to upfront costs and challenges. This financing aids causal links between analytics and reduced resource waste, but empirical studies indicate slower lender-wide shifts to "precision lending"—using farm for —with integration still nascent across institutions. The Farm Credit Administration's 2020 Climate Change Adaptation Policy directs system entities to incorporate into , ensuring credit availability amid projections of 5-10% U.S. declines by mid-century from warming trends. However, independent analyses, such as a 2023 Croatan Institute report, critique FCS for lagging in pilots and issuance compared to other GSEs, with recommendations for targeted investments in soil-building practices backed by measurable outcomes rather than broad ESG frameworks lacking rigorous validation. While these adaptations offer opportunities for efficiency gains, excessive regulatory emphasis on unproven metrics risks elevating compliance costs, potentially straining smaller borrowers without corresponding yield or resilience improvements.

Ongoing Policy Debates and Future Outlook

As of late 2025, debates surrounding the reauthorization of the Farm Bill have centered on modernizing agricultural credit programs, with the Farm Credit System (FCS) advocating for expanded authorities to address evolving rural needs while facing pushback against further mission expansion. A coalition led by FCS institutions urged Congress in September 2025 to prioritize a comprehensive Farm Bill that strengthens credit access amid tightening farm finances, including updates to loan limits and guarantees under USDA programs. Critics, including the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA), argue for reforms to refocus FCS on core agricultural lending, limiting non-farm activities and statutory expansions that could distort competition with private banks. These tensions reflect broader concerns over equity mandates, where proposals for enhanced grants and targeted lending to underserved borrowers risk diluting FCS's primary statutory mission, potentially increasing taxpayer exposure without clear empirical benefits to farm productivity. Looking ahead, FCS prospects hinge on agricultural consolidation trends and persistent interest rate pressures, which economists forecast will challenge smaller operations while favoring larger, integrated producers. Farm economist Matt Erickson of Farm Credit Services of America highlighted in early 2025 that ongoing consolidation—driven by scale efficiencies amid volatile commodity margins—could sustain FCS's market share in real estate debt, projected to hold around 49% nationally, but expose vulnerabilities in crop-heavy regions. Elevated interest rates, with farm debt servicing costs rising over 19% annually in recent years, are expected to ease modestly with Federal Reserve cuts but remain a drag through 2026, potentially compressing margins and accelerating exits for marginally financed borrowers. Empirical forecasts from Federal Reserve surveys indicate stable overall FCS financials, supported by its government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) funding advantages, yet heightened sensitivity to trade disruptions and inflation resurgence, as seen in second-quarter 2025 deteriorations in farm credit conditions. The GSE-like status of FCS, providing implicit taxpayer backing and preferential debt issuance, underpins its resilience but perpetuates calls for structural reforms to mitigate . While full remains unlikely given historical bailouts and rural advocacy, policy analysts from banking interests continue to press for congressional limits on FCS's non-agricultural lending to align incentives with statutory intent, potentially stabilizing the system against future fiscal risks. This dynamic suggests a future of incremental adjustments rather than radical overhaul, with FCS positioned to navigate consolidation and rate cycles through diversified portfolios, though external shocks like renewed trade barriers could test its buffered model.

References

  1. https://www.fcsic.gov/about/FAQs_new/the-farm-credit-system
  2. https://www.fca.gov/about/fca-in-brief
  3. https://farmcredit.com/about-us/history/
  4. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/about/2023AnnualReport.pdf
  5. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/current/InvestorPresentation.pdf
  6. https://www.aba.com/advocacy/our-issues/farm-credit-system-competition
  7. https://www.fca.gov/about/history-of-fca
  8. https://www.agribank.com/about/
  9. https://www.farmcreditbank.com/about-us/understanding-farm-credit/
  10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3098/ah.2018.092.4.512
  11. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26290989
  12. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/FRB/pages/1920-1924/25802_1920-1924.pdf
  13. https://www.fca.gov/about/historical-highlights-of-fca-and-the-fcs
  14. https://www.choicesmagazine.org/2005-1/lending/2005-1-03.htm
  15. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/about/FarmCreditAct1933.pdf
  16. https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201333/201333pap.pdf
  17. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/about/2018fcatimeline.pdf
  18. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/farm-credit-act-1953-1100
  19. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-10314/pdf/COMPS-10314.pdf
  20. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/about/Farm_Credit_System_Article_by_Donald_E._Wilkinson_c_._1980_.pdf
  21. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RS21278
  22. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/about/FarmCreditAct1971.pdf
  23. https://www.gao.gov/assets/ggd-94-39.pdf
  24. https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/3962/1980-S80WILKI.pdf
  25. https://www.chicagofed.org/-/media/publications/economic-perspectives/1985/ep-nov-dec1985-part2-irwin-pdf.pdf
  26. https://fee.org/articles/the-farm-credit-crisis/
  27. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/stock/files/the_farm_debt_crisis_and_public_policy.pdf
  28. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/2241
  29. https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-99/STATUTE-99-Pg1678.pdf
  30. https://www.fca.gov/bank-oversight/the-cooperative-way
  31. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-VI/subchapter-A/part-600/subpart-A
  32. https://ww3.fca.gov/news/Lists/News%2520Releases/Attachments/731/NR-25-11-09-11-25.pdf
  33. https://www.fca.gov/bank-oversight/enforcement-actions
  34. https://www.fca.gov/bank-oversight/about-banks-and-associations
  35. https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/advocacy-documents/testimony/19-11-19_agstatement.pdf
  36. https://ibat.org/call-to-action-speak-out-against-farm-credit-expansion/
  37. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/about/ManagementChallenges2023.pdf
  38. https://www.congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/senate-bill/1884
  39. https://drakelawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/kayl.pdf
  40. https://www.gao.gov/assets/ggd-95-19.pdf
  41. https://www.fca.gov/utility-pages/operating-status-at-fca
  42. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ls932
  43. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/farm-credit-system-liquidity-and-access-to-a-lender-of-last-resort/
  44. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/faq.html
  45. https://www.fca.gov/bank-oversight/fcs-directory-map
  46. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/laws/Statutes.pdf
  47. https://raff.missouri.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Riff_Farm-Credit-Financing_Final_02.19.2024.pdf
  48. https://www.gao.gov/assets/d24106646.pdf
  49. https://capitalpress.com/2025/08/20/farm-credit-lenders-strong-despite-credit-quality-deterioration/
  50. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/investorResources/financialHighlights.html
  51. https://reic.uwcc.wisc.edu/farm/
  52. https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2025/06/the-lending-activity-and-performance-of-the-farm-credit-system-and-community-banks-participating-in-agricultural-lending.html
  53. https://ww3.fca.gov/news/Lists/News%2520Releases/Attachments/729/Quarterly%2520report%2520on%2520Farm%2520Credit%2520System%2520Condition.pdf
  54. https://www.fca.gov/bank-oversight/description-of-fcs-institution-types
  55. https://www.fca.gov/utility-pages/glossary
  56. https://assets.fcsamerica.com/m/19a257e83ba268ff/original/2024-FCSAmerica-Annual-Report.pdf
  57. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RS/HTML/RS21278.html
  58. https://extension.msstate.edu/publications/knowing-your-agricultural-lenders-i-farm-credit-system
  59. https://www.icba.org/our-positions-a-z/current-policies/reform-and-refocus-the-farm-credit-system
  60. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46768
  61. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF11595.html
  62. https://www.fca.gov/farmer-mac-oversight/about-farmer-mac
  63. https://www.farmermac.com/about/
  64. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/0901/09010794.pdf
  65. https://www.farmermac.com/wp-content/uploads/2024-Farmer-Mac-Annual-Report.pdf
  66. https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1147&context=fac_articles
  67. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/aboutUs/overview.html
  68. https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2007/April/20070405/R-1238/R-1238_70_1.pdf
  69. https://www.fcsamerica.com/
  70. https://southernagtoday.org/2025/03/17/understanding-patronage-distribution-of-farm-credit-system-association/
  71. https://ww3.fca.gov/news/Lists/News%2520Releases/Attachments/710/NR-24-09-08-08-24.pdf
  72. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajae.12290
  73. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/debtSecurities/overview.html
  74. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/index.html
  75. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-VI/subchapter-B/part-615/subpart-C
  76. https://www.raymondjames.com/wealth-management/advice-products-and-services/investment-solutions/fixed-income/taxable-bonds/government-sponsored-enterprise-debt-securities
  77. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/pdf/public/invest/booklet/debtsecuritiesbooklet.pdf
  78. https://www.fitchratings.com/research/non-bank-financial-institutions/fitch-downgrades-farm-credit-system-to-aa-farm-credit-system-banks-to-a-02-08-2023
  79. https://ratings.moodys.com/ratings-news/443242
  80. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/debtSecurities/fixedRateBonds.html
  81. https://ww3.fca.gov/news/Lists/News%2520Releases/Attachments/733/NR-25-13-10-09-25%2520.pdf
  82. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/serve/public/pressre/finin/report.pdf?assetId=491186
  83. https://www.fitchratings.com/research/banks/farm-credit-system-23-12-2024
  84. https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-VI/subchapter-B/part-628
  85. https://ww3.fca.gov/readingrm/infomemo/Lists/InformationMemorandums/Attachments/297/StressTestingExpectationsInfoMemo.pdf
  86. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/download/AnnualReports/2008AnnualReport.pdf
  87. https://www.farmcrediteast.com/en/about/NewsRoom/press-releases/250801FCSQ22025Financials
  88. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/about/2025AprilQuarterlyReportonFCSCondition.pdf
  89. https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2021/06/farm-credit-watch-potentially-dangerous-change-to-fcs-appraisal-regulations-proposed/
  90. https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2019/12/resolving-the-farm-credit-systems-growing-credit-quality-problems/
  91. https://www.fdic.gov/resources/publications/history-eighties/volume-1/history-80s-volume-1-part2-08.pdf
  92. https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/anti-inflation-measures
  93. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/download/EconomicReports/WhyWeAreNotFacingAnother1980sStyleFarmSectorCrisis.pdf
  94. https://aei.ag/article/2020/11/23/farm-income-during-the-1980s
  95. https://www.farmcrediteast.com/-/media/farm-credit-east/News/2016/Files/gloywidmar-the-farm-financial-situation-final.ashx?la=en
  96. https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/100th-congress-1987-1988/reports/doc13a.pdf
  97. https://www.gao.gov/assets/131019.pdf
  98. https://www.cato.org/cato-journal/fall-1997/financing-corporation-government-sponsored-enterprises-moral-hazard
  99. https://academic.oup.com/jah/article-pdf/64/2/474/2610855/64-2-474.pdf
  100. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/about/2025JuneQuarterlyReportonFCSCondition.pdf
  101. https://publications.iadb.org/publications/english/document/Default-Risk-in-Agricultural-Lending-The-Effects-of-Commodity-Price-Volatility-and-Climate.pdf
  102. https://farmcredit.com/news/farm-credit-continues-delivering-on-mission-to-support-young-beginning-and-small-farmers/
  103. https://ww3.fca.gov/news/Lists/News%2520Releases/Attachments/728/NR-25-10-08-14-25.pdf
  104. https://farmcredit.com/community-engagement/rural-communities/
  105. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/aboutUs/farmCreditSystem.html
  106. https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/322568/files/Updated%2520Manuscript322568.pdf
  107. https://civileats.com/2023/06/05/farm-credit-can-make-or-break-farms-should-it-be-more-equitable/
  108. https://www.icba.org/newsroom/news-and-articles/2023/12/18/farm-credit-system-growth-slows-in-2023
  109. https://www.farmcrediteast.com/en/about/who-we-are/patronage-dividends
  110. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/serve/public/pressre/finin/report.pdf?assetId=472374
  111. https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/advocacy-documents/testimony/icba-testimony-for-hope-on-the-horizon-hearing.pdf?sfvrsn=ee46ef17_1
  112. https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/advocacy-documents/2018-farm-bill-white-paper.pdf
  113. https://ww3.fca.gov/readingrm/infomemo/Lists/InformationMemorandums/Attachments/164/IM_OE_2-11-99_Attachment.pdf
  114. https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/advocacy-documents/testimony/19-11-19_agstatement.pdf?sfvrsn=29892c17_0
  115. https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/critics-says-farm-credit-system-needs-to-be-reined-in/2016/04/11/b3ce0dd2-fb6a-11e5-9140-e61d062438bb_story.html
  116. https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/columns/by-the-numbers/article/2016/08/19/recap-fcs-verizon-loan
  117. https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/news/article/2016/04/15/critics-cite-fcs-mission-creep
  118. https://www.distillerytrail.com/blog/farm-credit-mid-america-files-100m-suit-against-nearest-green-distillery-requests-receivership/
  119. https://www.icba.org/newsroom/news-and-articles/2025/08/05/farm-credit-lender-sues-business-for-failed-nonfarm-loan
  120. https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougmelville/2025/08/18/after-defaulting-on-100-million-in-loans-judge-orders-uncle-nearest-to-give-up-control/
  121. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking-law/banks-ask-congress-for-closer-scrutiny-of-farm-credit-system
  122. https://www.farmcrediteast.com/en/about/NewsRoom/press-releases/250223FCSQ42024Financials
  123. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-01-07-mn-33796-story.html
  124. https://www.fitchratings.com/research/non-bank-financial-institutions/fitch-affirms-farm-credit-system-at-aa-assigns-system-banks-vrs-a-25-01-2024
  125. https://www.reuters.com/article/breakingviews/us-farm-credit-looks-safer-than-houses-idUS2004795867/
  126. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8467/text
  127. https://healfoodalliance.org/farmers-food-and-farm-groups-oppose-partisan-efforts-to-weaken-new-federal-rule-addressing-discrimination-in-agricultural-lending/
  128. https://farmcredit.com/news/farm-credit-joins-other-lenders-to-halt-costly-implementation-of-cfpb-rule/
  129. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/download/Handbook/Regulations.pdf
  130. https://www.fca.gov/bank-oversight/young-beginning-and-small-farmer-lending
  131. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/current/EarningsStatement.pdf
  132. https://www.aba.com/about-us/press-room/press-releases/2024-farm-bank-performance-report
  133. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/about/2025AugYBSBoardPresenation.pdf
  134. https://www.farmcreditfunding.com/ffcb_live/serve/public/pressre/called/report.pdf?assetId=499576
  135. https://www.fcma.com/docs/src/pdf/2025-q2-fcma-quarterly-report.pdf
  136. https://farmcredit.com/issues/financing-climate-smart-agriculture/
  137. https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/08/Climate-Ag-Lending.pdf
  138. https://www.fcsamerica.com/resources/sustainable-agriculture
  139. https://nyfarminsurance.com/post/farm-credit/
  140. https://farmonaut.com/usa/revolutionizing-agricultural-finance-how-farmonauts-technology-boosts-farm-credit-and-rural-growth-in-the-united-states
  141. https://www.fca.gov/template-fca/download/ClimateChangeAdaptationPolicy.pdf
  142. https://croataninstitute.org/news-and-views-template-copy/
  143. https://www.self-help.org/docs/default-source/pdfs/credit-worth-and-soil-wealth-11162023.pdf?sfvrsn=405663da_1
  144. https://www.iatp.org/climate-resilient-racially-just-farm-credit-system
  145. https://texasfarmcredit.com/our-story/news/farm-credit-led-coalition-urges-congress-to-pass-strong-farm-bill/
  146. https://agamerica.com/blog/farm-bill-2025/
  147. https://www.fcsamerica.com/resources/learning-center/economic-market-outlook
  148. https://www.thedailyscoop.com/opinion/high-interest-rates-couldnbsp-reshape-agricultures-future
  149. https://www.kansascityfed.org/agriculture/ag-credit-survey/farm-financial-conditions-continue-to-deteriorate/
  150. https://www.profarmer.com/news/agriculture-news/ag-credit-conditions-worsen-crop-farmers-lower-interest-rates-help-point
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.