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Great Depression
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The Great Depression was a severe global economic downturn from 1929 to 1939. The period was characterized by high rates of unemployment and poverty, drastic reductions in industrial production and international trade, and widespread bank and business failures around the world. The economic contagion began in 1929 in the United States, the largest economy in the world, with the devastating Wall Street crash of 1929 often considered the beginning of the Depression. Among the countries with the most unemployed were the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Germany.
The Depression was preceded by a period of industrial growth and social development known as the "Roaring Twenties". Much of the profit generated by the boom was invested in speculation, such as on the stock market, contributing to growing wealth inequality. Banks were subject to minimal regulation, resulting in loose lending and widespread debt. By 1929, declining spending had led to reductions in manufacturing output and rising unemployment. Share values continued to rise until the October 1929 crash, after which the slide continued until July 1932, accompanied by a loss of confidence in the financial system. By 1933, the U.S. unemployment rate had risen to 25%, about one-third of farmers had lost their land, and 9,000 of its 25,000 banks had gone out of business. President Herbert Hoover was unwilling to intervene heavily in the economy, and in 1930 he signed the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act, which worsened the Depression. In the 1932 presidential election, Hoover was defeated by Franklin D. Roosevelt, who from 1933 pursued a set of expansive New Deal programs in order to provide relief and create jobs. In Germany, which depended heavily on U.S. loans, the crisis caused unemployment to rise to nearly 30% and fueled political extremism, paving the way for Adolf Hitler's Nazi Party to rise to power in 1933.

Between 1929 and 1932, worldwide gross domestic product (GDP) fell by an estimated 15%; in the U.S., the Depression resulted in a 30% contraction in GDP.[1] Recovery varied greatly around the world. Some economies, such as the U.S., Germany and Japan started to recover by the mid-1930s; others, like France, did not return to pre-shock growth rates until later in the decade.[2] The Depression had devastating economic effects on both wealthy and poor countries: all experienced drops in personal income, prices (deflation), tax revenues, and profits. International trade fell by more than 50%, and unemployment in some countries rose as high as 33%.[3] Cities around the world, especially those dependent on heavy industry, were heavily affected. Construction virtually halted in many countries, and farming communities and rural areas suffered as crop prices fell by up to 60%.[4][5][6] Faced with plummeting demand and few job alternatives, areas dependent on primary sector industries suffered the most.[7] The outbreak of World War II in 1939 ended the Depression, as it stimulated factory production, providing jobs for women as militaries absorbed large numbers of young, unemployed men.
The precise causes for the Great Depression are disputed. One set of historians, for example, focuses on non-monetary economic causes. Among these, some regard the Wall Street crash itself as the main cause; others consider that the crash was a mere symptom of more general economic trends of the time, which had already been underway in the late 1920s.[3][8] A contrasting set of views, which rose to prominence in the later part of the 20th century,[9] ascribes a more prominent role to failures of monetary policy. According to those authors, while general economic trends can explain the emergence of the downturn, they fail to account for its severity and longevity; they argue that these were caused by the lack of an adequate response to the crises of liquidity that followed the initial economic shock of 1929 and the subsequent bank failures accompanied by a general collapse of the financial markets.[1]
Overview
[edit]The economic picture at the beginning of the crisis
[edit]After the Wall Street crash of 1929, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped from 381 to 198 over the course of two months, optimism persisted for some time. The stock market rose in early 1930, with the Dow returning to 294 (pre-depression levels) in April 1930, before steadily declining for years, to a low of 41 in 1932.[10]
At the beginning, governments and businesses spent more in the first half of 1930 than in the corresponding period of the previous year. On the other hand, consumers, many of whom suffered severe losses in the stock market the previous year, cut expenditures by 10%. In addition, beginning in the mid-1930s, a severe drought ravaged the agricultural heartland of the U.S.[11]
Interest rates dropped to low levels by mid-1930, but expected deflation and the continuing reluctance of people to borrow meant that consumer spending and investment remained low.[12] By May 1930, automobile sales declined to below the levels of 1928. Prices, in general, began to decline, although wages held steady in 1930. Then a deflationary spiral started in 1931. Farmers faced a worse outlook; declining crop prices and a Great Plains drought crippled their economic outlook. At its peak, the Great Depression saw nearly 10% of all Great Plains farms change hands despite federal assistance.[13]
Beyond the United States
[edit]At first, the decline in the U.S. economy was the factor that triggered economic downturns in most other countries due to a decline in trade, capital movement, and global business confidence. Then, internal weaknesses or strengths in each country made conditions worse or better. For example, the U.K. economy, which experienced an economic downturn throughout most of the late 1920s, was less severely impacted by the shock of the depression than the U.S. By contrast, the German economy saw a similar decline in industrial output as that observed in the U.S.[14] Some economic historians attribute the differences in the rates of recovery and relative severity of the economic decline to whether particular countries had been able to effectively devaluate their currencies or not. This is supported by the contrast in how the crisis progressed in, e.g., Britain, Argentina and Brazil, all of which devalued their currencies early and returned to normal patterns of growth relatively rapidly and countries which stuck to the gold standard, such as France or Belgium.[15]
Frantic attempts by individual countries to shore up their economies through protectionist policies – such as the 1930 U.S. Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act and retaliatory tariffs in other countries – exacerbated the collapse in global trade, contributing to the depression.[16] By 1933, the economic decline pushed world trade to one third of its level compared to four years earlier.[17]
| United States | United Kingdom | France | Germany | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Industrial production | −46% | −23% | −24% | −41% |
| Wholesale prices | −32% | −33% | −34% | −29% |
| Foreign trade | −70% | −60% | −54% | −61% |
| Unemployment | +607% | +129% | +214% | +232% |
Course
[edit]
Origins
[edit]While the precise causes for the occurrence of the Great Depression are disputed and can be traced to both global and national phenomena, its immediate origins are most conveniently examined in the context of the U.S. economy, from which the initial crisis spread to the rest of the world.[19]
In the aftermath of World War I, the Roaring Twenties brought considerable wealth to the United States and Western Europe.[20] Initially, the year 1929 dawned with good economic prospects: despite a minor crash on 25 March 1929, the market seemed to gradually improve through September. Stock prices began to slump in September, and were volatile at the end of the month.[21] A large sell-off of stocks began in mid-October. Finally, on 24 October, Black Thursday, the American stock market crashed 11% at the opening bell. Actions to stabilize the market failed, and on 28 October, Black Monday, the market crashed another 12%. The panic peaked the next day on Black Tuesday, when the market saw another 11% drop.[22][23] Thousands of investors were ruined, and billions of dollars had been lost; many stocks could not be sold at any price.[23] The market recovered 12% on Wednesday but by then significant damage had been done. Though the market entered a period of recovery from 14 November until 17 April 1930, the general situation had been a prolonged slump. From September 1929 to 8 July 1932, the market lost 85% of its value.[24]
Despite the crash, the worst of the crisis did not reverberate around the world until after 1929. The crisis hit panic levels again in December 1930, with a bank run on the Bank of United States, a former privately run bank, bearing no relation to the U.S. government (not to be confused with the Federal Reserve). Unable to pay out to all of its creditors, the bank failed.[25][26] Among the 608 American banks that closed in November and December 1930, the Bank of United States accounted for a third of the total $550 million deposits lost and, with its closure, bank failures reached a critical mass.[27]
The Smoot–Hawley Act and the Breakdown of International Trade
[edit]
In an initial response to the crisis, the U.S. Congress passed the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act on 17 June 1930. The Act was ostensibly aimed at protecting the American economy from foreign competition by imposing high tariffs on foreign imports. The consensus view among economists and economic historians (including Keynesians, Monetarists and Austrian economists) is that the passage of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff had, in fact, achieved an opposite effect to what was intended. It exacerbated the Great Depression[28] by preventing economic recovery after domestic production recovered, hampering the volume of trade; still there is disagreement as to the precise extent of the Act's influence.
In a 1995 survey of American economic historians, two-thirds agreed that the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act at least worsened the Great Depression.[29] According to the U.S. Senate website, the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act is among the most catastrophic acts in congressional history.[30]
Many economists have argued that the sharp decline in international trade after 1930 helped to worsen the depression, especially for countries significantly dependent on foreign trade. Most historians and economists blame the Act for worsening the depression by seriously reducing international trade and causing retaliatory tariffs in other countries. While foreign trade was a small part of overall economic activity in the U.S. and was concentrated in a few businesses like farming, it was a much larger factor in many other countries.[31] The average ad valorem (value based) rate of duties on dutiable imports for 1921–1925 was 25.9% but under the new tariff it jumped to 50% during 1931–1935. In dollar terms, American exports declined over the next four years from about $5.2 billion in 1929 to $1.7 billion in 1933; so, not only did the physical volume of exports fall, but also the prices fell by about 1⁄3 as written. Hardest hit were farm commodities such as wheat, cotton, tobacco, and lumber.[32]

Governments around the world took various steps into spending less money on foreign goods such as: "imposing tariffs, import quotas, and exchange controls". These restrictions triggered much tension among countries that had large amounts of bilateral trade, causing major export-import reductions during the depression. Not all governments enforced the same measures of protectionism. Some countries raised tariffs drastically and enforced severe restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, while other countries reduced "trade and exchange restrictions only marginally":[33]
- "Countries that remained on the gold standard, keeping currencies fixed, were more likely to restrict foreign trade." These countries "resorted to protectionist policies to strengthen the balance of payments and limit gold losses." They hoped that these restrictions and depletions would hold the economic decline.[33]
- Countries that abandoned the gold standard allowed their currencies to depreciate which caused their balance of payments to strengthen. It also freed up monetary policy so that central banks could lower interest rates and act as lenders of last resort. They possessed the best policy instruments to fight the Depression and did not need protectionism.[33]
- "The length and depth of a country's economic downturn and the timing and vigor of its recovery are related to how long it remained on the gold standard. Countries abandoning the gold standard relatively early experienced relatively mild recessions and early recoveries. In contrast, countries remaining on the gold standard experienced prolonged slumps."[33]
The gold standard and the spreading of global depression
[edit]The gold standard was the primary transmission mechanism of the Great Depression. Even countries that did not face bank failures and a monetary contraction first-hand were forced to join the deflationary policy since higher interest rates in countries that performed a deflationary policy led to a gold outflow in countries with lower interest rates. Under the gold standard's price–specie flow mechanism, countries that lost gold but nevertheless wanted to maintain the gold standard had to permit their money supply to decrease and the domestic price level to decline (deflation).[34][35]
Gold standard
[edit]
Some economic studies have indicated that the rigidities of the gold standard not only spread the downturn worldwide, but also suspended gold convertibility (devaluing the currency in gold terms) that did the most to make recovery possible.[37]
Every major currency left the gold standard during the Great Depression. The UK was the first to do so. Facing speculative attacks on the pound and depleting gold reserves, in September 1931 the Bank of England ceased exchanging pound notes for gold and the pound was floated on foreign exchange markets. Japan and the Scandinavian countries followed in 1931. Other countries, such as Italy and the United States, remained on the gold standard into 1932 or 1933, while a few countries in the so-called "gold bloc", led by France and including Poland, Belgium and Switzerland, stayed on the standard until 1935–36.[citation needed]
According to later analysis, the earliness with which a country left the gold standard reliably predicted its economic recovery. For example, The UK and Scandinavia, which left the gold standard in 1931, recovered much earlier than France and Belgium, which remained on gold much longer. Countries such as China, which had a silver standard, almost avoided the depression entirely. The connection between leaving the gold standard as a strong predictor of that country's severity of its depression and the length of time of its recovery has been shown to be consistent for dozens of countries, including developing countries. This partly explains why the experience and length of the depression differed between regions and states around the world.[38]
German banking crisis of 1931 and British crisis
[edit]The financial crisis escalated out of control in mid-1931, starting with the collapse of the Credit Anstalt in Vienna in May.[39][40] This put heavy pressure on Germany, which was already in political turmoil. With the rise in violence of National Socialist ('Nazi') and Communist movements, as well as investor nervousness at harsh government financial policies,[41] investors withdrew their short-term money from Germany as confidence spiraled downward. The Reichsbank lost 150 million marks in the first week of June, 540 million in the second, and 150 million in two days, 19–20 June. Collapse was at hand. U.S. President Herbert Hoover called for a moratorium on payment of war reparations. This angered Paris, which depended on a steady flow of German payments, but it slowed the crisis down, and the moratorium was agreed to in July 1931. An International conference in London later in July produced no agreements but on 19 August a standstill agreement froze Germany's foreign liabilities for six months. Germany received emergency funding from private banks in New York as well as the Bank of International Settlements and the Bank of England. The funding only slowed the process. Industrial failures began in Germany, a major bank closed in July and a two-day holiday for all German banks was declared. Business failures were more frequent in July, and spread to Romania and Hungary. The crisis continued to get worse in Germany, bringing political upheaval that finally led to the coming to power of Hitler's Nazi regime in January 1933.[42]
The world financial crisis now began to overwhelm Britain; investors around the world started withdrawing their gold from London at the rate of £2.5 million per day.[43] Credits of £25 million each from the Bank of France and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and an issue of £15 million fiduciary note slowed, but did not reverse, the British crisis. The financial crisis now caused a major political crisis in Britain in August 1931. With deficits mounting, the bankers demanded a balanced budget; the divided cabinet of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's Labour government agreed; it proposed to raise taxes, cut spending, and most controversially, to cut unemployment benefits 20%. The attack on welfare was unacceptable to the Labour movement. MacDonald wanted to resign, but King George V insisted he remain and form an all-party coalition "National Government". The Conservative and Liberals parties signed on, along with a small cadre of Labour, but the vast majority of Labour leaders denounced MacDonald as a traitor for leading the new government. Britain went off the gold standard, and suffered relatively less than other major countries in the Great Depression. In the 1931 British election, the Labour Party was virtually destroyed, leaving MacDonald as prime minister for a largely Conservative coalition.[44][45]
Turning point and recovery
[edit]
In most countries of the world, recovery from the Great Depression began in 1933.[8] In the U.S., recovery began in early 1933,[8] but the U.S. did not return to 1929 GNP for over a decade and still had an unemployment rate of about 15% in 1940, albeit down from the high of 25% in 1933.
There is no consensus among economists regarding the motive force for the U.S. economic expansion that continued through most of the Roosevelt years (and the 1937 recession that interrupted it). The common view among most economists is that Roosevelt's New Deal policies either caused or accelerated the recovery, although his policies were never aggressive enough to bring the economy completely out of recession. Some economists have also called attention to the positive effects from expectations of reflation and rising nominal interest rates that Roosevelt's words and actions portended.[47][48] It was the rollback of those same reflationary policies that led to the interruption of a recession beginning in late 1937.[49][50] One contributing policy that reversed reflation was the Banking Act of 1935, which effectively raised reserve requirements, causing a monetary contraction that helped to thwart the recovery.[51] GDP returned to its upward trend in 1938.[46] A revisionist view among some economists holds that the New Deal prolonged the Great Depression, as they argue that National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 and National Labor Relations Act of 1935 restricted competition and established price fixing.[52] John Maynard Keynes did not think that the New Deal under Roosevelt single-handedly ended the Great Depression: "It is, it seems, politically impossible for a capitalistic democracy to organize expenditure on the scale necessary to make the grand experiments which would prove my case—except in war conditions."[53]
According to Christina Romer, the money supply growth caused by huge international gold inflows was a crucial source of the recovery of the United States economy, and that the economy showed little sign of self-correction. The gold inflows were partly due to devaluation of the U.S. dollar and partly due to deterioration of the political situation in Europe.[54] In their book, A Monetary History of the United States, Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz also attributed the recovery to monetary factors, and contended that it was much slowed by poor management of money by the Federal Reserve System. Chairman of the Federal Reserve (2006–2014) Ben Bernanke agreed that monetary factors played important roles both in the worldwide economic decline and eventual recovery.[55] Bernanke also saw a strong role for institutional factors, particularly the rebuilding and restructuring of the financial system,[56] and pointed out that the Depression should be examined in an international perspective.[57]
Role of women and household economics
[edit]Women's primary role was as housewives; without a steady flow of family income, their work became much harder in dealing with food and clothing and medical care. Birthrates fell everywhere, as children were postponed until families could financially support them. The average birthrate for 14 major countries fell 12% from 19.3 births per thousand population in 1930, to 17.0 in 1935.[58] In Canada, half of Roman Catholic women defied Church teachings and used contraception to postpone births.[59]
Among the few women in the labor force, layoffs were less common in the white-collar jobs and they were typically found in light manufacturing work. However, there was a widespread demand to limit families to one paid job, so that wives might lose employment if their husband was employed.[60][61][62] Across Britain, there was a tendency for married women to join the labor force, competing for part-time jobs especially.[63][64]
In France, very slow population growth, especially in comparison to Germany continued to be a serious issue in the 1930s. Support for increasing welfare programs during the depression included a focus on women in the family. The Conseil Supérieur de la Natalité campaigned for provisions enacted in the Code de la Famille (1939) that increased state assistance to families with children and required employers to protect the jobs of fathers, even if they were immigrants.[65]
In rural and small-town areas, women expanded their operation of vegetable gardens to include as much food production as possible. In the United States, agricultural organizations sponsored programs to teach housewives how to optimize their gardens and to raise poultry for meat and eggs.[66] Rural women made feed sack dresses and other items for themselves and their families and homes from feed sacks.[67] In American cities, African American women quiltmakers enlarged their activities, promoted collaboration, and trained neophytes. Quilts were created for practical use from various inexpensive materials and increased social interaction for women and promoted camaraderie and personal fulfillment.[68]
Oral history provides evidence for how housewives in a modern industrial city handled shortages of money and resources. Often they updated strategies their mothers used when they were growing up in poor families. Cheap foods were used, such as soups, beans and noodles. They purchased the cheapest cuts of meat—sometimes even horse meat—and recycled the Sunday roast into sandwiches and soups. They sewed and patched clothing, traded with their neighbors for outgrown items, and made do with colder homes. New furniture and appliances were postponed until better days. Many women also worked outside the home, or took boarders, did laundry for trade or cash, and did sewing for neighbors in exchange for something they could offer. Extended families used mutual aid—extra food, spare rooms, repair-work, cash loans—to help cousins and in-laws.[69]
In Japan, official government policy was deflationary and the opposite of Keynesian spending. Consequently, the government launched a campaign across the country to induce households to reduce their consumption, focusing attention on spending by housewives.[70]
In Germany, the government tried to reshape private household consumption under the Four-Year Plan of 1936 to achieve German economic self-sufficiency. The Nazi women's organizations, other propaganda agencies and the authorities all attempted to shape such consumption as economic self-sufficiency was needed to prepare for and to sustain the coming war. The organizations, propaganda agencies and authorities employed slogans that called up traditional values of thrift and healthy living. However, these efforts were only partly successful in changing the behavior of housewives.[71]
World War II and recovery
[edit]
The common view among economic historians is that the Great Depression ended with the advent of World War II. Many economists believe that government spending on the war caused or at least accelerated recovery from the Great Depression, though some consider that it did not play a very large role in the recovery, though it did help in reducing unemployment.[8][72][73][74]
The rearmament policies leading up to World War II helped stimulate the economies of Europe in 1937–1939. By 1937, unemployment in Britain had fallen to 1.5 million. The mobilization of manpower following the outbreak of war in 1939 ended unemployment.[75]
The American mobilization for World War II at the end of 1941 moved approximately 10 million people out of the civilian labor force and into the war.[76] This finally eliminated the last effects from the Great Depression and brought the U.S. unemployment rate down below 10%.[77]
World War II had a dramatic effect on many parts of the American economy.[78] Government-financed capital spending accounted for only 5% of the annual U.S. investment in industrial capital in 1940; by 1943, the government accounted for 67% of U.S. capital investment.[78] The massive war spending doubled economic growth rates, either masking the effects of the Depression or essentially ending the Depression. Businessmen ignored the mounting national debt and heavy new taxes, redoubling their efforts for greater output to take advantage of generous government contracts.[79]
Causes
[edit]Attempts to return to the Gold Standard
[edit]During World War I, many countries suspended their gold standard in varying ways. There was high inflation from WWI, and in the 1920s in the Weimar Republic, Austria, and throughout Europe. In the late 1920s there was a scramble to deflate prices to get the gold standard's conversation rates back on track to pre-WWI levels, by causing deflation and high unemployment through monetary policy. In 1933 FDR signed Executive Order 6102 and in 1934 signed the Gold Reserve Act.[80]
| Country | Return to Gold | Suspension of Gold Standard | Foreign Exchange Control | Devaluation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | April 1925 | December 1929 | — | March 1930 |
| Austria | April 1925 | April 1933 | October 1931 | September 1931 |
| Belgium | October 1926 | — | — | March 1935 |
| Canada | July 1926 | October 1931 | — | September 1931 |
| Czechoslovakia | April 1926 | — | September 1931 | February 1934 |
| Denmark | January 1927 | September 1931 | November 1931 | September 1931 |
| Estonia | January 1928 | June 1933 | November 1931 | June 1933 |
| Finland | January 1926 | October 1931 | — | October 1931 |
| France | August 1926 – June 1928 | — | — | October 1936 |
| Germany | September 1924 | — | July 1931 | — |
| Greece | May 1928 | April 1932 | September 1931 | April 1932 |
| Hungary | April 1925 | — | July 1931 | — |
| Italy | December 1927 | — | May 1934 | October 1936 |
| Japan | December 1930 | December 1931 | July 1932 | December 1931 |
| Latvia | August 1922 | — | October 1931 | — |
| Netherlands | April 1925 | — | — | October 1936 |
| Norway | May 1928 | September 1931 | — | September 1931 |
| New Zealand | April 1925 | September 1931 | — | April 1930 |
| Poland | October 1927 | — | April 1936 | October 1936 |
| Romania | March 1927 – February 1929 | — | May 1932 | — |
| Sweden | April 1924 | September 1931 | — | September 1931 |
| Spain | — | — | May 1931 | — |
| United Kingdom | May 1925 | September 1931 | — | September 1931 |
| United States | June 1919 | March 1933 | March 1933 | April 1933 |
Keynesian vs Monetarist view
[edit]

The two classic competing economic theories of the Great Depression are the Keynesian (demand-driven) and the Monetarist explanation.[82] There are also various heterodox theories that downplay or reject the explanations of the Keynesians and monetarists. The consensus among demand-driven theories is that a large-scale loss of confidence led to a sudden reduction in consumption and investment spending. Once panic and deflation set in, many people believed they could avoid further losses by keeping clear of the markets. Holding money became profitable as prices dropped lower and a given amount of money bought ever more goods, exacerbating the drop in demand.[83] Monetarists believe that the Great Depression started as an ordinary recession, but the shrinking of the money supply greatly exacerbated the economic situation, causing a recession to descend into the Great Depression.[84]
Economists and economic historians are almost evenly split as to whether the traditional monetary explanation that monetary forces were the primary cause of the Great Depression is right, or the traditional Keynesian explanation that a fall in autonomous spending, particularly investment, is the primary explanation for the onset of the Great Depression.[85] Today there is also significant academic support for the debt deflation theory and the expectations hypothesis that – building on the monetary explanation of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz – add non-monetary explanations.[86][87]
There is a consensus that the Federal Reserve System should have cut short the process of monetary deflation and banking collapse, by expanding the money supply and acting as lender of last resort. If they had done this, the economic downturn would have been far less severe and much shorter.[88]
Mainstream explanations
[edit]
Modern mainstream economists see the reasons in
- A money supply reduction (Monetarists) and therefore a banking crisis, reduction of credit, and bankruptcies.
- Insufficient demand from the private sector and insufficient fiscal spending (Keynesians).
- Passage of the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act exacerbated what otherwise might have been a more "standard" recession (both Monetarists and Keynesians).[29]
Insufficient spending, the money supply reduction, and debt on margin led to falling prices and further bankruptcies (Irving Fisher's debt deflation).
Monetarist view
[edit]


The monetarist explanation was given by American economists Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz.[89] They argued that the Great Depression was caused by the banking crisis that caused one-third of all banks to vanish, a reduction of bank shareholder wealth and more importantly monetary contraction of 35%, which they called "The Great Contraction". This caused a price drop of 33% (deflation).[90] By not lowering interest rates, by not increasing the monetary base and by not injecting liquidity into the banking system to prevent it from crumbling, the Federal Reserve passively watched the transformation of a normal recession into the Great Depression. Friedman and Schwartz argued that the downward turn in the economy, starting with the stock market crash, would merely have been an ordinary recession if the Federal Reserve had taken aggressive action.[91][92] This view was endorsed in 2002 by Federal Reserve Governor Ben Bernanke in a speech honoring Friedman and Schwartz with this statement:
Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of the Federal Reserve. I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression, you're right. We did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again.
The Federal Reserve allowed some large public bank failures – particularly that of the New York Bank of United States – which produced panic and widespread runs on local banks, and the Federal Reserve sat idly by while banks collapsed. Friedman and Schwartz argued that, if the Fed had provided emergency lending to these key banks, or simply bought government bonds on the open market to provide liquidity and increase the quantity of money after the key banks fell, all the rest of the banks would not have fallen after the large ones did, and the money supply would not have fallen as far and as fast as it did.[95]
With significantly less money to go around, businesses could not get new loans and could not even get their old loans renewed, forcing many to stop investing. This interpretation blames the Federal Reserve for inaction, especially the New York branch.[96]
One reason why the Federal Reserve did not act to limit the decline of the money supply was the gold standard. At that time, the amount of credit the Federal Reserve could issue was limited by the Federal Reserve Act, which required 40% gold backing of Federal Reserve Notes issued. By the late 1920s, the Federal Reserve had almost hit the limit of allowable credit that could be backed by the gold in its possession. This credit was in the form of Federal Reserve demand notes.[97] A "promise of gold" is not as good as "gold in the hand", particularly when they only had enough gold to cover 40% of the Federal Reserve Notes outstanding. During the bank panics, a portion of those demand notes was redeemed for Federal Reserve gold. Since the Federal Reserve had hit its limit on allowable credit, any reduction in gold in its vaults had to be accompanied by a greater reduction in credit. On 5 April 1933, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 6102 making the private ownership of gold certificates, coins and bullion illegal, reducing the pressure on Federal Reserve gold.[97]
Keynesian view
[edit]British economist John Maynard Keynes argued in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money that lower aggregate expenditures in the economy contributed to a massive decline in income and to employment that was well below the average. In such a situation, the economy reached equilibrium at low levels of economic activity and high unemployment.
Keynes's basic idea was simple: to keep people fully employed, governments have to run deficits when the economy is slowing, as the private sector would not invest enough to keep production at the normal level and bring the economy out of recession. Keynesian economists called on governments during times of economic crisis to pick up the slack by increasing government spending or cutting taxes.
As the Depression wore on, Franklin D. Roosevelt tried public works, farm subsidies, and other devices to restart the U.S. economy, but never completely gave up trying to balance the budget. According to the Keynesians, this improved the economy, but Roosevelt never spent enough to bring the economy out of recession until the start of World War II.[98]
Debt deflation
[edit]
Irving Fisher argued that the predominant factor leading to the Great Depression was a vicious circle of deflation and growing over-indebtedness.[99] He outlined nine factors interacting with one another under conditions of debt and deflation to create the mechanics of boom to bust. The chain of events proceeded as follows:
- Debt liquidation and distress selling
- Contraction of the money supply as bank loans are paid off
- A fall in the level of asset prices
- A still greater fall in the net worth of businesses, precipitating bankruptcies
- A fall in profits
- A reduction in output, in trade and in employment
- Pessimism and loss of confidence
- Hoarding of money
- A fall in nominal interest rates and a rise in deflation adjusted interest rates[99]
During the Crash of 1929 preceding the Great Depression, margin requirements were only 10%.[100] Brokerage firms, in other words, would lend $9 for every $1 an investor had deposited. When the market fell, brokers called in these loans, which could not be paid back.[101] Banks began to fail as debtors defaulted on debt and depositors attempted to withdraw their deposits en masse, triggering multiple bank runs. Government guarantees and Federal Reserve banking regulations to prevent such panics were ineffective or not used. Bank failures led to the loss of billions of dollars in assets.[101]
Outstanding debts became heavier, because prices and incomes fell by 20–50% but the debts remained at the same dollar amount. After the panic of 1929 and during the first 10 months of 1930, 744 U.S. banks failed. (In all, 9,000 banks failed during the 1930s.) By April 1933, around $7 billion in deposits had been frozen in failed banks or those left unlicensed after the March Bank Holiday.[102] Bank failures snowballed as desperate bankers called in loans that borrowers did not have time or money to repay. With future profits looking poor, capital investment and construction slowed or completely ceased. In the face of bad loans and worsening future prospects, the surviving banks became even more conservative in their lending.[101] Banks built up their capital reserves and made fewer loans, which intensified deflationary pressures. A vicious cycle developed and the downward spiral accelerated.
The liquidation of debt could not keep up with the fall of prices that it caused. The mass effect of the stampede to liquidate increased the value of each dollar owed, relative to the value of declining asset holdings. The very effort of individuals to lessen their burden of debt effectively increased it. Paradoxically, the more the debtors paid, the more they owed.[99] This self-aggravating process turned a 1930 recession into a 1933 great depression.
Fisher's debt-deflation theory initially lacked mainstream influence because of the counter-argument that debt-deflation represented no more than a redistribution from one group (debtors) to another (creditors). Pure re-distributions should have no significant macroeconomic effects.
Building on both the monetary hypothesis of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz and the debt deflation hypothesis of Irving Fisher, Ben Bernanke developed an alternative way in which the financial crisis affected output. He builds on Fisher's argument that dramatic declines in the price level and nominal incomes lead to increasing real debt burdens, which in turn leads to debtor insolvency and consequently lowers aggregate demand; a further price level decline would then result in a debt deflationary spiral. According to Bernanke, a small decline in the price level simply reallocates wealth from debtors to creditors without doing damage to the economy. But when the deflation is severe, falling asset prices along with debtor bankruptcies lead to a decline in the nominal value of assets on bank balance sheets. Banks will react by tightening their credit conditions, which in turn leads to a credit crunch that seriously harms the economy. A credit crunch lowers investment and consumption, which results in declining aggregate demand and additionally contributes to the deflationary spiral.[103][104][105]
Expectations hypothesis
[edit]Since economic mainstream turned to the new neoclassical synthesis, expectations are a central element of macroeconomic models. According to Peter Temin, Barry Wigmore, Gauti B. Eggertsson and Christina Romer, the key to recovery and to ending the Great Depression was brought about by a successful management of public expectations. The thesis is based on the observation that after years of deflation and a very severe recession important economic indicators turned positive in March 1933 when Franklin D. Roosevelt took office. Consumer prices turned from deflation to a mild inflation, industrial production bottomed out in March 1933, and investment doubled in 1933 with a turnaround in March 1933. There were no monetary forces to explain that turnaround. Money supply was still falling and short-term interest rates remained close to zero. Before March 1933, people expected further deflation and a recession so that even interest rates at zero did not stimulate investment. But when Roosevelt announced major regime changes, people began to expect inflation and an economic expansion. With these positive expectations, interest rates at zero began to stimulate investment just as they were expected to do. Roosevelt's fiscal and monetary policy regime change helped make his policy objectives credible. The expectation of higher future income and higher future inflation stimulated demand and investment. The analysis suggests that the elimination of the policy dogmas of the gold standard, a balanced budget in times of crisis and small government led endogenously to a large shift in expectation that accounts for about 70–80% of the recovery of output and prices from 1933 to 1937. If the regime change had not happened and the Hoover policy had continued, the economy would have continued its free fall in 1933, and output would have been 30% lower in 1937 than in 1933.[106][107][108]
The recession of 1937–1938, which slowed down economic recovery from the Great Depression, is explained by fears of the population that the moderate tightening of the monetary and fiscal policy in 1937 were first steps to a restoration of the pre-1933 policy regime.[109]
Common position
[edit]There is common consensus among economists today that the government and the central bank should work to keep the interconnected macroeconomic aggregates of gross domestic product and money supply on a stable growth path. When threatened by expectations of a depression, central banks should expand liquidity in the banking system and the government should cut taxes and accelerate spending in order to prevent a collapse in money supply and aggregate demand.[110]
At the beginning of the Great Depression, most economists believed in Say's law and the equilibrating powers of the market, and failed to understand the severity of the Depression. Outright leave-it-alone liquidationism was a common position, and was universally held by Austrian School economists.[111] The liquidationist position held that a depression worked to liquidate failed businesses and investments that had been made obsolete by technological development – releasing factors of production (capital and labor) to be redeployed in other more productive sectors of the dynamic economy. They argued that even if self-adjustment of the economy caused mass bankruptcies, it was still the best course.[111]
Economists like Barry Eichengreen and J. Bradford DeLong note that President Herbert Hoover tried to keep the federal budget balanced until 1932, when he lost confidence in his Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon and replaced him.[111][112][113] An increasingly common view among economic historians is that the adherence of many Federal Reserve policymakers to the liquidationist position led to disastrous consequences.[112] Unlike what liquidationists expected, a large proportion of the capital stock was not redeployed but vanished during the first years of the Great Depression. According to a study by Olivier Blanchard and Lawrence Summers, the recession caused a drop of net capital accumulation to pre-1924 levels by 1933.[114] Milton Friedman called leave-it-alone liquidationism "dangerous nonsense".[110] He wrote:
I think the Austrian business-cycle theory has done the world a great deal of harm. If you go back to the 1930s, which is a key point, here you had the Austrians sitting in London, Hayek and Lionel Robbins, and saying you just have to let the bottom drop out of the world. You've just got to let it cure itself. You can't do anything about it. You will only make it worse. ... I think by encouraging that kind of do-nothing policy both in Britain and in the United States, they did harm.[112]
Heterodox theories
[edit]Austrian School
[edit]Two prominent theorists in the Austrian School on the Great Depression include Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek and American economist Murray Rothbard, who wrote America's Great Depression (1963). In their view, much like the monetarists, the Federal Reserve (created in 1913) shoulders much of the blame; however, unlike the Monetarists, they argue that the key cause of the Depression was the expansion of the money supply in the 1920s which led to an unsustainable credit-driven boom.[115]
In the Austrian view, it was this inflation of the money supply that led to an unsustainable boom in both asset prices (stocks and bonds) and capital goods. Therefore, by the time the Federal Reserve tightened in 1928 it was far too late to prevent an economic contraction.[115] In February 1929 Hayek published a paper predicting the Federal Reserve's actions would lead to a crisis starting in the stock and credit markets.[116]
According to Rothbard, the government support for failed enterprises and efforts to keep wages above their market values actually prolonged the Depression.[117] Unlike Rothbard, after 1970 Hayek believed that the Federal Reserve had further contributed to the problems of the Depression by permitting the money supply to shrink during the earliest years of the Depression.[118] However, during the Depression (in 1932[119] and in 1934)[119] Hayek had criticized both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England for not taking a more contractionary stance.[119]
Hans Sennholz argued that most boom and busts that plagued the American economy, such as those in 1819–20, 1839–1843, 1857–1860, 1873–1878, 1893–1897, and 1920–21, were generated by government creating a boom through easy money and credit, which was soon followed by the inevitable bust.[120]
Ludwig von Mises wrote in the 1930s: "Credit expansion cannot increase the supply of real goods. It merely brings about a rearrangement. It diverts capital investment away from the course prescribed by the state of economic wealth and market conditions. It causes production to pursue paths which it would not follow unless the economy were to acquire an increase in material goods. As a result, the upswing lacks a solid base. It is not real prosperity. It is illusory prosperity. It did not develop from an increase in economic wealth, i.e. the accumulation of savings made available for productive investment. Rather, it arose because the credit expansion created the illusion of such an increase. Sooner or later, it must become apparent that this economic situation is built on sand."[121][122]
Marxist
[edit]Marxists generally argue that the Great Depression was the result of the inherent instability of the capitalist mode of production.[123] According to Forbes, "The idea that capitalism caused the Great Depression was widely held among intellectuals and the general public for many decades."[124]
Inequality
[edit]
Two economists of the 1920s, Waddill Catchings and William Trufant Foster, popularized a theory that influenced many policy makers, including Herbert Hoover, Henry A. Wallace, Paul Douglas, and Marriner Eccles. It held the economy produced more than it consumed, because the consumers did not have enough income. Thus the unequal distribution of wealth throughout the 1920s caused the Great Depression.[125][126]
According to this view, the root cause of the Great Depression was a global over-investment in heavy industry capacity compared to wages and earnings from independent businesses, such as farms. The proposed solution was for the government to pump money into the consumers' pockets. That is, it must redistribute purchasing power, maintaining the industrial base, and re-inflating prices and wages to force as much of the inflationary increase in purchasing power into consumer spending. The economy was overbuilt, and new factories were not needed. Foster and Catchings recommended[127] federal and state governments to start large construction projects, a program followed by Hoover and Roosevelt.
Productivity shock
[edit]It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the [productivity, output, and employment] trends we are describing are long-time trends and were thoroughly evident before 1929. These trends are in nowise the result of the present depression, nor are they the result of the World War. On the contrary, the present depression is a collapse resulting from these long-term trends.
The first three decades of the 20th century saw economic output surge with electrification, mass production, and motorized farm machinery, and because of the rapid growth in productivity there was a lot of excess production capacity and the work week was being reduced. The dramatic rise in productivity of major industries in the U.S. and the effects of productivity on output, wages and the workweek are discussed by Spurgeon Bell in his book Productivity, Wages, and National Income (1940).[129]
Effects by country
[edit]
The majority of countries set up relief programs and most underwent some sort of political upheaval, pushing them to the right. Many of the countries in Europe and Latin America, that were democracies, saw their democratic governments overthrown by some form of dictatorship or authoritarian rule, most famously in Germany in 1933. The Dominion of Newfoundland abandoned its autonomy within the British Empire, becoming the only region ever to voluntarily relinquish democracy. There, too, were severe impacts across the Middle East and North Africa, including economic decline which led to social unrest.[130][131]
Argentina
[edit]Decline in foreign trade hit Argentina hard. The British decision to stop importing Argentine beef led to the signing of the Roca–Runciman Treaty, which preserved a quota in exchange for significant concessions to British exports. By 1935, the economy had recovered to 1929 levels, and the same year, the Central Bank of Argentina was formed.[132] However, the Great Depression was the last time when Argentina was one of the richer countries of the world, as it stopped growing in the decades thereafter, and became underdeveloped.[133]
Australia
[edit]
Australia's dependence on agricultural and industrial exports meant it was one of the hardest-hit developed countries.[134] Falling export demand and commodity prices placed massive downward pressures on wages. Unemployment reached a record high of 29% in 1932,[135] with incidents of civil unrest becoming common.[136] After 1932, an increase in wool and meat prices led to a gradual recovery.[137]
Canada
[edit]
Harshly affected by both the global economic downturn and the Dust Bowl, Canadian industrial production had by 1932 fallen to only 58% of its 1929 figure, the second-lowest level in the world after the United States, and well behind countries such as Britain, which fell to only 83% of the 1929 level. Total national income fell to 56% of the 1929 level, again worse than any country apart from the United States. Unemployment reached 27% at the depth of the Depression in 1933.[138]
Chile
[edit]The League of Nations labeled Chile the country hardest-hit by the Great Depression, because 80% of government revenue came from exports of copper and nitrates, which were in low demand. Chile initially felt the impact of the Great Depression in 1930, when GDP dropped 14%, mining income declined 27%, and export earnings fell 28%. By 1932, GDP had shrunk to less than half of what it had been in 1929, exacting a terrible toll in unemployment and business failures.
Influenced profoundly by the Great Depression, many government leaders promoted the development of local industry in an effort to insulate the economy from future external shocks. After six years of government austerity measures, which succeeded in reestablishing Chile's creditworthiness, Chileans elected to office during the 1938–58 period a succession of center and left-of-center governments interested in promoting economic growth through government intervention.
Prompted in part by the devastating 1939 Chillán earthquake, the Popular Front government of Pedro Aguirre Cerda created the Production Development Corporation (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción, CORFO) to encourage with subsidies and direct investments – an ambitious program of import substitution industrialization. Consequently, as in other Latin American countries, protectionism became an entrenched aspect of the Chilean economy.
China
[edit]China was largely unaffected by the Depression, mainly by having stuck to the Silver standard. However, the U.S. silver purchase act of 1934 created an intolerable demand on China's silver coins, and so, in the end, the silver standard was officially abandoned in 1935 in favor of the four Chinese national banks'[which?] "legal note" issues. China and the British colony of Hong Kong, which followed suit in this regard in September 1935, would be the last to abandon the silver standard. In addition, the Nationalist Government also acted energetically to modernize the legal and penal systems, stabilize prices, amortize debts, reform the banking and currency systems, build railroads and highways, improve public health facilities, legislate against traffic in narcotics, and augment industrial and agricultural production. On 3 November 1935, the government instituted the fiat currency (fapi) reform, immediately stabilizing prices and also raising revenues for the government.
European African colonies
[edit]The sharp fall in commodity prices and the steep decline in exports hurt the economies of the European colonies in Africa and Asia.[139][140] The agricultural sector was especially hard-hit. For example, sisal had recently become a major export crop in Kenya and Tanganyika. During the depression, it suffered severely from low prices and marketing problems that affected all colonial commodities in Africa. Sisal producers established centralized controls for the export of their fibre.[141] There was widespread unemployment and hardship among peasants, labourers, colonial auxiliaries, and artisans.[142] The budgets of colonial governments were cut, which forced the reduction in ongoing infrastructure projects, such as the building and upgrading of roads, ports, and communications.[143] The budget cuts delayed the schedule for creating systems of higher education.[144]
The depression severely hurt the export-based Belgian Congo economy because of the drop in international demand for raw materials and for agricultural products. For example, the price of peanuts fell from 125 to 25 centimes. In some areas, as in the Katanga mining region, employment declined by 70%. In the country as a whole, the wage labour force decreased by 72,000 people, and many men returned to their villages. In Leopoldville, the population decreased by 33% because of this labour migration.[145]
Political protests were not common. However, there was a growing demand, that the paternalistic claims be honored by colonial governments to respond vigorously. The theme was, that economic reforms were more urgently needed than political reforms.[146] French West Africa launched an extensive program of educational reform, in which "rural schools", designed to modernize agriculture, would stem the flow of under-employed farm workers to cities where unemployment was high. Students were trained in traditional arts, crafts, and farming techniques and were then expected to return to their own villages and towns.[147]
France
[edit]
The crisis affected France a bit later than other countries, hitting hard around 1931.[148] While the 1920s saw growth at a strong rate of 4.43% per year, during the 1930s rate fell to only 0.63%.[149]
The depression was relatively mild: unemployment levels peaked at less than 5%, the fall in production was at most 20% below the 1929 output. France also had no major banking crisis.[150]
However, the depression had drastic effects on the local economy, and partly explains the February 6, 1934 riots and even more the formation of the Popular Front, led by SFIO socialist leader Léon Blum, which won the elections in 1936. Ultra-nationalist groups also saw increased popularity, though democracy prevailed into World War II.
France's relatively high degree of self-sufficiency meant the damage was considerably less than in neighbouring states like Germany.
Germany
[edit]

The Great Depression hit Germany hard. The impact of the Wall Street crash forced American banks to end the new loans that had been funding the repayments under the Dawes Plan and the Young Plan. The financial crisis escalated out of control in mid-1931, starting with the collapse of the Credit Anstalt in Vienna in May.[40] This put heavy pressure on Germany, which was already in political turmoil with the rise in violence of national socialist and communist movements, as well as with investor nervousness at harsh government financial policies,[41] investors withdrew their short-term money from Germany as confidence spiraled downward. The Reichsbank lost 150 million marks in the first week of June, 540 million in the second, and 150 million in two days, 19–20 June. Collapse was at hand. U.S. President Herbert Hoover called for a moratorium on payment of war reparations. This angered Paris, which depended on a steady flow of German payments, but it slowed the crisis down, and the moratorium was agreed to in July 1931. An international conference in London later in July produced no agreements, but on 19 August, a standstill agreement froze Germany's foreign liabilities for six months. Germany received emergency funding from private banks in New York as well as the Bank of International Settlements and the Bank of England. The funding only slowed the process. Industrial failures began in Germany, a major bank closed in July, and a two-day holiday for all German banks was declared. Business failures became more frequent in July, and spread to Romania and Hungary.[42]
In 1932, 90% of German reparation payments were cancelled (in the 1950s, Germany repaid all its missed reparations debts). Widespread unemployment reached 25%, as every sector was hurt. The government did not increase government spending to deal with Germany's growing crisis, as they were afraid that a high-spending policy could lead to a return of the hyperinflation that had affected Germany in 1923. Germany's Weimar Republic was hit hard by the depression, as American loans to help rebuild the German economy now stopped.[151] The unemployment rate reached nearly 30% in 1932.[152]

The German political landscape was dramatically altered, leading to Adolf Hitler's rise to power. The Nazi Party rose from being peripheral to winning 18.3% of the vote in the September 1930 election, and the Communist Party also made gains, while moderate forces, like the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, and the People's Party lost seats. The next two years were marked by increased street violence between Nazis and Communists, while governments under President Paul von Hindenburg increasingly relied on rule by decree, bypassing the Reichstag.[153] Hitler ran for the Presidency in 1932, and while he lost to the incumbent Hindenburg in the election, it marked a point during which both Nazi Party and the Communist parties rose in the years following the crash to altogether possess a Reichstag majority following the general election in July 1932.[152][154] Although the Nazis lost seats in November 1932 election, they remained the largest party, and Hitler was appointed as Chancellor the following January. The government formation deal was designed to give Hitler's conservative coalition partners many checks on his power, but over the next few months, the Nazis manoeuvred to consolidate a single-party dictatorship.[155]
Hitler followed an economic policy of autarky, creating a network of client states and economic allies in central Europe and Latin America. By cutting wages and taking control of labor unions, plus public works spending, unemployment fell significantly by 1935. Large-scale military spending played a major role in the recovery.[156] The policies had the effect of driving up the cost of food imports and depleting foreign currency reserves, leading to economic impasse by 1936. Nazi Germany faced a choice of either reversing course or pressing ahead with rearmament and autarky. Hitler chose the latter route, which, according to Ian Kershaw, "could only be partially accomplished without territorial expansion" and therefore war.[157][158]
Greece
[edit]The reverberations of the Great Depression hit Greece in 1932. The Bank of Greece tried to adopt deflationary policies to stave off the crises that were going on in other countries, but these largely failed. For a brief period, the drachma was pegged to the U.S. dollar, but this was unsustainable given the country's large trade deficit and the only long-term effects of this were Greece's foreign exchange reserves being almost totally wiped out in 1932. Remittances from abroad declined sharply, and the value of the drachma began to plummet from 77 drachmas to the dollar in March 1931 to 111 drachmas to the dollar in April 1931. This was especially harmful to Greece, as the country relied on imports from the UK, France, and the Middle East for many necessities. Greece went off the gold standard in April 1932, and declared a moratorium on all interest payments. The country also adopted protectionist policies, such as import quotas, which several European countries also did during the period.
Protectionist policies coupled with a weak drachma and the stifling of imports allowed the Greek industry to expand during the Great Depression. In 1939, the Greek industrial output was 179% that of 1928. These industries were for the most part "built on sand", as one report of the Bank of Greece put it, as without massive protection, they would not have been able to survive. Despite the global depression, Greece managed to suffer comparatively little, averaging an average growth rate of 3.5% from 1932 to 1939. The dictatorial regime of Ioannis Metaxas took over the Greek government in 1936, and economic growth was strong in the years leading up to the Second World War.
Iceland
[edit]Iceland's post-World War I prosperity came to an end with the outbreak of the Great Depression. The Depression hit Iceland hard, as the value of exports plummeted. The total value of Icelandic exports fell from 74 million kronur in 1929 to 48 million in 1932, and was not to rise again to the pre-1930 level until after 1939.[159] Government interference in the economy increased: "Imports were regulated, trade with foreign currency was monopolized by state-owned banks, and loan capital was largely distributed by state-regulated funds".[159] Due to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, which cut Iceland's exports of saltfish by half, the Depression lasted in Iceland until the outbreak of World War II (when prices for fish exports soared).[159]
India
[edit]How much India was affected by the Great Depression has been debated. Historians have argued that it slowed long-term industrial development.[160] Apart from two sectors – jute and coal – the economy was little-affected. However, there were major negative impacts on the jute industry, as world demand fell and prices plunged.[161] Otherwise, conditions were fairly stable. Local markets in agriculture and small-scale industry showed modest gains.[162]
Ireland
[edit]Frank Barry and Mary E. Daly have argued that:
- Ireland was a largely agrarian economy, trading almost exclusively with the UK at the time of the Great Depression. Beef and dairy products comprised the bulk of exports, and Ireland fared well relative to many other commodity producers, particularly in the early years of the depression.[163][164][165][166]
Italy
[edit]

The Great Depression hit Italy very hard.[167] As industries came close to failure they were bought out by the banks in a largely illusionary bail-out—the assets used to fund the purchases were largely worthless. This led to a financial crisis peaking in 1932 and major government intervention. The Industrial Reconstruction Institute (IRI) was formed in January 1933 and took control of the bank-owned companies, suddenly giving Italy the largest state-owned industrial sector in Europe (excluding the USSR). IRI did rather well with its new responsibilities—restructuring, modernising and rationalising as much as it could. It was a significant factor in post-1945 development. But it took the Italian economy until 1935 to recover the manufacturing levels of 1930—a position that was only 60% better than that of 1913.[168][169]
Japan
[edit]The Great Depression did not strongly affect Japan. The Japanese economy shrank by 8% during 1929–31. Japan's Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo was the first to implement what have come to be identified as Keynesian economic policies: first, by large fiscal stimulus involving deficit spending; and second, by devaluing the currency. Takahashi used the Bank of Japan to sterilize the deficit spending and minimize resulting inflationary pressures. Econometric studies have identified the fiscal stimulus as especially effective.[170]
The devaluation of the currency had an immediate effect. Japanese textiles began to displace British textiles in export markets. The deficit spending proved to be most profound and went into the purchase of munitions for the armed forces. By 1933, Japan was already out of the depression. By 1934, Takahashi realized that the economy was in danger of overheating, and to avoid inflation, moved to reduce the deficit spending that went towards armaments and munitions.
This resulted in a strong and swift negative reaction from nationalists, especially those in the army, culminating in his assassination in the course of the February 26 Incident. This had a chilling effect on all civilian bureaucrats in the Japanese government. From 1934, the military's dominance of the government continued to grow. Instead of reducing deficit spending, the government introduced price controls and rationing schemes that reduced, but did not eliminate inflation, which remained a problem until the end of World War II.
The deficit spending had a transformative effect on Japan. Japan's industrial production doubled during the 1930s. Further, in 1929 the list of the largest firms in Japan was dominated by light industries, especially textile companies (many of Japan's automakers, such as Toyota, have their roots in the textile industry). By 1940 light industry had been displaced by heavy industry as the largest firms inside the Japanese economy.[171]
Latin America
[edit]Because of high levels of U.S. investment in Latin American economies, they were severely damaged by the Depression. Within the region, Chile, Bolivia and Peru were particularly badly affected.[172]
Before the 1929 crisis, links between the world economy and Latin American economies had been established through American and British investment in Latin American exports to the world. As a result, Latin Americans export industries felt the depression quickly. World prices for commodities such as wheat, coffee and copper plunged. Exports from all of Latin America to the U.S. fell in value from $1.2 billion in 1929 to $335 million in 1933, rising to $660 million in 1940.
But on the other hand, the depression led the area governments to develop new local industries and expand consumption and production. Following the example of the New Deal, governments in the area approved regulations and created or improved welfare institutions that helped millions of new industrial workers to achieve a better standard of living.
Netherlands
[edit]
From roughly 1931 to 1937, the Netherlands suffered a deep and exceptionally long depression. This depression was partly caused by the after-effects of the American stock-market crash of 1929, and partly by internal factors in the Netherlands. Government policy, especially the very late dropping of the Gold Standard, played a role in prolonging the depression. The Great Depression in the Netherlands led to some political instability and riots, and can be linked to the rise of the Dutch fascist political party NSB. The depression in the Netherlands eased off somewhat at the end of 1936, when the government finally dropped the Gold Standard, but real economic stability did not return until after World War II.[173]
New Zealand
[edit]New Zealand was especially vulnerable to worldwide depression, as it relied almost entirely on agricultural exports to the United Kingdom for its economy. The drop in exports led to a lack of disposable income from the farmers, who were the mainstay of the local economy. Jobs disappeared and wages plummeted, leaving people desperate and charities unable to cope. Work relief schemes were the only government support available to the unemployed, the rate of which by the early 1930s was officially around 15%, but unofficially nearly twice that level (official figures excluded Māori and women). In 1932, riots occurred among the unemployed in three of the country's main cities (Auckland, Dunedin, and Wellington). Many were arrested or injured through the tough official handling of these riots by police and volunteer "special constables".[174]
Persia
[edit]In Iran, then known as the Imperial State of Persia, the Great Depression had negative impacts on its exports. In 1933 a new concession was signed with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.[175]
Poland
[edit]Poland was affected by the Great Depression longer and stronger than other countries due to inadequate economic response of the government and the pre-existing economic circumstances of the country. At that time, Poland was under the authoritarian rule of Sanacja, whose leader, Józef Piłsudski, was opposed to leaving the gold standard until his death in 1935. As a result, Poland was unable to perform a more active monetary and budget policy. Additionally, Poland was a relatively young country that emerged merely 10 years earlier after being partitioned between German, Russian, and the Austro-Hungarian Empires for over a century. Prior to independence, the Russian part exported 91% of its exports to Russia proper, while the German part exported 68% to Germany proper. After independence, these markets were largely lost, as Russia transformed into USSR that was mostly a closed economy, and Germany was in a tariff war with Poland throughout the 1920s.[176]
Industrial production fell significantly: in 1932 hard coal production was down 27% compared to 1928, steel production was down 61%, and iron ore production noted an 89% decrease.[177] On the other hand, electrotechnical, leather, and paper industries noted marginal increases in production output. Overall, industrial production decreased by 41%.[178] A distinct feature of the Great Depression in Poland was the de-concentration of industry, as larger conglomerates were less flexible and paid their workers more than smaller ones.
Unemployment rate rose significantly (up to 43%) while nominal wages fell by 51% in 1933 and 56% in 1934, relative to 1928. However, real wages fell less due to the government's policy of decreasing cost of living, particularly food expenditures (food prices were down by 65% in 1935 compared to 1928 price levels). Material conditions deprivation led to strikes, some of them violent or violently pacified – like in Sanok (March of the Hungry in Sanok 6 March 1930), Lesko county (Lesko uprising 21 June – 9 July 1932) and Zawiercie (Bloody Friday (1930) 18 April 1930).
To adapt to the crisis, Polish government employed deflation methods such as high interest rates, credit limits and budget austerity to keep a fixed exchange rate with currencies tied to the gold standard. Only in late 1932 did the government effect a plan to fight the economic crisis.[179] Part of the plan was mass public works scheme, employing up to 100,000 people in 1935.[177] After Piłsudski's death, in 1936 the gold standard regime was relaxed, and launching the development of the Central Industrial Region kicked off the economy, to over 10% annual growth rate in the 1936–1938 period.
Portugal
[edit]Already under the rule of a dictatorial junta, the Ditadura Nacional, Portugal suffered no turbulent political effects of the Depression, although António de Oliveira Salazar, already appointed Minister of Finance in 1928 greatly expanded his powers and in 1932 rose to Prime Minister of Portugal to found the Estado Novo, an authoritarian corporatist dictatorship. With the budget balanced in 1929, the effects of the depression were relaxed through harsh measures towards budget balance and autarky, causing social discontent but stability and, eventually, an impressive economic growth.[180]
Puerto Rico
[edit]In the years immediately preceding the depression, negative developments in the island and world economies perpetuated an unsustainable cycle of subsistence for many Puerto Rican workers. The 1920s brought a dramatic drop in Puerto Rico's two primary exports, raw sugar and coffee, due to a devastating hurricane in 1928 and the plummeting demand from global markets in the latter half of the decade. 1930 unemployment on the island was roughly 36% and by 1933 Puerto Rico's per capita income dropped 30% (by comparison, unemployment in the United States in 1930 was approximately 8% reaching a height of 25% in 1933).[181][182] To provide relief and economic reform, the United States government and Puerto Rican politicians such as Carlos Chardon and Luis Muñoz Marín created and administered first the Puerto Rico Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA) 1933 and then in 1935, the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA).[183]
Romania
[edit]Romania was also affected by the Great Depression.[184][185]
South Africa
[edit]As world trade slumped, demand for South African agricultural and mineral exports fell drastically. The Carnegie Commission on Poor Whites had concluded in 1931 that nearly one-third of Afrikaners lived as paupers. The social discomfort caused by the depression was a contributing factor in the 1933 split between the "gesuiwerde" (purified) and "smelter" (fusionist) factions within the National Party and the National Party's subsequent fusion with the South African Party.[186][187] Unemployment programs were begun that focused primarily on the white population.[188]
Soviet Union
[edit]The Soviet Union was the only major socialist state in the world and had very little international trade. Its economy was not tied to the rest of the world and was mostly unaffected by the Great Depression.[189]
At the time of the Depression, the Soviet economy was growing steadily, fuelled by intensive investment in heavy industry. The apparent economic success of the Soviet Union at a time when the capitalist world was in crisis led many Western intellectuals to view the Soviet system favorably. Jennifer Burns wrote:
As the Great Depression ground on and unemployment soared, intellectuals began unfavorably comparing their faltering capitalist economy to Russian Communism. Karl Marx had predicted that capitalism would fall under the weight of its own contradictions, and now with the economic crisis gripping the West, his predictions seem to be coming true. By contrast Russia seemed an emblematic modern nation, making the staggering leap from a feudal past to an industrial future with ease.[190]
The early years of the Great Depression caused mass immigration to the Soviet Union, including 10,000 to 15,000 from Finland and thousands more from Poland, Sweden, Germany, and other nearby countries. The Kremlin was at first happy to help these immigrants settle, believing that they were victims of capitalism who had come to help the Soviet cause. However, by 1933, the worst of the Depression had come to an end in many countries, and word had been received that illegal migrants to the Soviet Union were being sent to Siberia.[191] These factors caused immigration to the Soviet Union to slow significantly, and roughly a tenth of Finnish migrants returned to Finland, either legally or illegally.[191]
Spain
[edit]Spain had a relatively isolated economy, with high protective tariffs and was not one of the main countries affected by the Depression. The banking system held up well, as did agriculture.[192]
By far the most serious negative impact came after 1936 from the heavy destruction of infrastructure and manpower by the civil war, 1936–39. Many talented workers were forced into permanent exile. By staying neutral in the Second World War, and selling to both sides[clarification needed], the economy avoided further disasters.[193]
Sweden
[edit]By the 1930s, Sweden had what America's Life magazine called in 1938 the "world's highest standard of living". Sweden was also the first country worldwide to recover completely from the Great Depression. Taking place amid a short-lived government and a less-than-a-decade old Swedish democracy, events such as those surrounding Ivar Kreuger (who eventually committed suicide) remain infamous in Swedish history. The Social Democrats under Per Albin Hansson formed their first long-lived government in 1932 based on strong interventionist and welfare state policies, monopolizing the office of Prime Minister until 1976 with the sole and short-lived exception of Axel Pehrsson-Bramstorp's "summer cabinet" in 1936. During forty years of hegemony, it was the most successful political party in the history of Western liberal democracy.[194]
Thailand
[edit]In Thailand, then known as the Kingdom of Siam, the Great Depression contributed to the end of the absolute monarchy of King Rama VII in the Siamese revolution of 1932.[195]
Turkey
[edit]The Great Depression came at a time when the relatively newly established Turkish state was still reforming its economic policy following the end of the Ottoman era. As the depression began, the country's trade deficits saw an increase and the Turkish lira significantly lost value. Turkey's economy was predominantly agrarian, thus the fall in demand which caused a fall in export prices of many goods affected the country's economy badly. As a result of the depression, the government, which had been following increasingly more liberal economic policies up until then, started opting for more statist policies.[196]
United Kingdom
[edit]
The world depression broke at a time when the United Kingdom had still not fully recovered from the effects of the First World War more than a decade earlier. The country was driven off the gold standard in 1931.
The world financial crisis began to overwhelm Britain in 1931; investors around the world started withdrawing their gold from London at the rate of £2.5 million per day.[43] Credits of £25 million each from the Bank of France and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and an issue of £15 million fiduciary note slowed, but did not reverse the British crisis. The financial crisis now caused a major political crisis in Britain in August 1931. With deficits mounting, the bankers demanded a balanced budget; the divided cabinet of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald's Labour government agreed; it proposed to raise taxes, cut spending and most controversially, to cut unemployment benefits by 20%. The attack on welfare was totally unacceptable to the Labour movement. MacDonald wanted to resign, but King George V insisted he remain and form an all-party coalition "National Government". The Conservative and Liberals parties signed on, along with a small cadre of Labour, but the vast majority of Labour leaders denounced MacDonald as a traitor for leading the new government. Britain went off the gold standard, and suffered relatively less than other major countries in the Great Depression. In the 1931 British election, the Labour Party was virtually destroyed, leaving MacDonald as prime minister for a largely Conservative coalition.[197][45]
The effects on the northern industrial areas of Britain were immediate and devastating, as demand for traditional industrial products collapsed. By the end of 1930 unemployment had more than doubled from 1 million to 2.5 million (20% of the insured workforce), and exports had fallen in value by 50%. In 1933, 30% of Glaswegians were unemployed due to the severe decline in heavy industry. In some towns and cities in the north east, unemployment reached as high as 70% as shipbuilding fell by 90%.[198] The National Hunger March of September–October 1932 was the largest[199] of a series of hunger marches in Britain in the 1920s and 1930s. About 200,000 unemployed men were sent to the work camps, which continued in operation until 1939.[200]
In the less industrial Midlands and Southern England, the effects were short-lived and the later 1930s were a prosperous time. Growth in modern manufacture of electrical goods and a boom in the motor car industry was helped by a growing southern population and an expanding middle class. Agriculture also saw a boom during this period.[201]
United States
[edit]
Hoover's first measures to combat the depression were based on encouraging businesses not to reduce their workforce or cut wages but businesses had little choice: wages were reduced, workers were laid off, and investments postponed.[202][203]
In June 1930, Congress approved the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act which raised tariffs on thousands of imported items. The intent of the Act was to encourage the purchase of American-made products by increasing the cost of imported goods, while raising revenue for the federal government and protecting farmers. Most countries that traded with the U.S. increased tariffs on American-made goods in retaliation, reducing international trade, and worsening the Depression.[204]
In 1931, Hoover urged bankers to set up the National Credit Corporation[205] so that big banks could help failing banks survive. But bankers were reluctant to invest in failing banks, and the National Credit Corporation did almost nothing to address the problem.[206]

By 1932, unemployment had reached 23.6%, peaking in early 1933 at 25%.[208] Those released from prison during this period had an especially difficult time finding employment given the stigma of their criminal records, which often led to recidivism out of economic desperation.[209] Drought persisted in the agricultural heartland, businesses and families defaulted on record numbers of loans, and more than 5,000 banks had failed.[210] Hundreds of thousands of Americans found themselves homeless, and began congregating in shanty towns – dubbed "Hoovervilles" – that began to appear across the country.[211] In response, President Hoover and Congress approved the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, to spur new home construction, and reduce foreclosures. The final attempt of the Hoover Administration to stimulate the economy was the passage of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act (ERA) which included funds for public works programs such as dams and the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in 1932. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was a Federal agency with the authority to lend up to $2 billion to rescue banks and restore confidence in financial institutions. But $2 billion was not enough to save all the banks, and bank runs and bank failures continued.[202] Quarter by quarter the economy went downhill, as prices, profits and employment fell, leading to the political realignment in 1932 that brought to power Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Shortly after President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was inaugurated in 1933, drought and erosion combined to cause the Dust Bowl, shifting hundreds of thousands of displaced persons off their farms in the Midwest. From his inauguration onward, Roosevelt argued that restructuring of the economy would be needed to prevent another depression or avoid prolonging the current one. New Deal programs sought to stimulate demand and provide work and relief for the impoverished through increased government spending and the institution of financial reforms.
During a "bank holiday" that lasted five days, the Emergency Banking Act was signed into law. It provided for a system of reopening sound banks under Treasury supervision, with federal loans available if needed. The Securities Act of 1933 comprehensively regulated the securities industry. This was followed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which created the Securities and Exchange Commission. Although amended, key provisions of both Acts are still in force. Federal insurance of bank deposits was provided by the FDIC, and the Glass–Steagall Act.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act provided incentives to cut farm production in order to raise farming prices. The National Recovery Administration (NRA) made a number of sweeping changes to the American economy. It forced businesses to work with government to set price codes through the NRA to fight deflationary "cut-throat competition" by the setting of minimum prices and wages, labor standards, and competitive conditions in all industries. It encouraged unions that would raise wages, to increase the purchasing power of the working class. The NRA was deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1935.

These reforms, together with several other relief and recovery measures, are called the First New Deal. Economic stimulus was attempted through a new alphabet soup of agencies set up in 1933 and 1934 and previously extant agencies such as the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. By 1935, the "Second New Deal" added Social Security (which was later considerably extended through the Fair Deal), a jobs program for the unemployed (the Works Progress Administration, WPA) and, through the National Labor Relations Board, a strong stimulus to the growth of labor unions. In 1929, federal expenditures constituted only 3% of the GDP. The national debt as a proportion of GNP rose under Hoover from 20% to 40%. Roosevelt kept it at 40% until the war began, when it soared to 128%.
By 1936, the main economic indicators had regained the levels of the late 1920s, except for unemployment, which remained high at 11%, although this was considerably lower than the 25% unemployment rate seen in 1933. In the spring of 1937, American industrial production exceeded that of 1929 and remained level until June 1937. In June 1937, the Roosevelt administration cut spending and increased taxation in an attempt to balance the federal budget.[214] The American economy then took a sharp downturn, lasting for 13 months through most of 1938. Industrial production fell almost 30% within a few months and production of durable goods fell even faster. Unemployment jumped from 14.3% in 1937 to 19.0% in 1938, rising from 5 million to more than 12 million in early 1938.[215] Manufacturing output fell by 37% from the 1937 peak and was back to 1934 levels.[216]
Producers reduced their expenditures on durable goods, and inventories declined, but personal income was only 15% lower than it had been at the peak in 1937. As unemployment rose, consumers' expenditures declined, leading to further cutbacks in production. By May 1938 retail sales began to increase, employment improved, and industrial production turned up after June 1938.[217] After the recovery from the Recession of 1937–38, conservatives were able to form a bipartisan conservative coalition to stop further expansion of the New Deal and, when unemployment dropped to 2% in the early 1940s, they abolished WPA, CCC and the PWA relief programs. Social Security remained in place.
Between 1933 and 1939, federal expenditure tripled, and Roosevelt's critics charged that he was turning America into a socialist state.[218] The Great Depression was a main factor in the implementation of social democracy and planned economies in European countries after World War II (see Marshall Plan). Keynesianism generally remained the most influential economic school in the United States and in parts of Europe until the periods between the 1970s and the 1980s, when Milton Friedman and other neoliberal economists formulated and propagated the newly created theories of neoliberalism and incorporated them into the Chicago School of Economics as an alternative approach to the study of economics. Neoliberalism went on to challenge the dominance of the Keynesian school of Economics in the mainstream academia and policy-making in the United States, having reached its peak in popularity in the election of the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the United States, and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom.[219]
Literature
[edit]And the great owners, who must lose their land in an upheaval, the great owners with access to history, with eyes to read history and to know the great fact: when property accumulates in too few hands it is taken away. And that companion fact: when a majority of the people are hungry and cold they will take by force what they need. And the little screaming fact that sounds through all history: repression works only to strengthen and knit the repressed.
The Great Depression has been the subject of much writing, as authors have sought to evaluate an era that caused both financial and emotional trauma. Perhaps the most noteworthy and famous novel written on the subject is The Grapes of Wrath, published in 1939 and written by John Steinbeck, who was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for the work, and in 1962 was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. The novel focuses on a poor family of sharecroppers who are forced from their home as drought, economic hardship, and changes in the agricultural industry occur during the Great Depression. Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men is another important novella about a journey during the Great Depression. Additionally, Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird is set during the Great Depression. Margaret Atwood's Booker prize-winning The Blind Assassin is likewise set in the Great Depression, centering on a privileged socialite's love affair with a Marxist revolutionary. The era spurred the resurgence of social realism, practiced by many who started their writing careers on relief programs, especially the Federal Writers' Project in the U.S.[221][222][223][224] Nonfiction works from this time also capture important themes. The 1933 memoir Prison Days and Nights by Victor Folke Nelson provides insight into criminal justice ramifications of the Great Depression, especially in regard to patterns of recidivism due to lack of economic opportunity.[209]
A number of works for younger audiences are also set during the Great Depression, among them the Kit Kittredge series of American Girl books written by Valerie Tripp and illustrated by Walter Rane, released to tie in with the dolls and playsets sold by the company. The stories, which take place during the early to mid 1930s in Cincinnati, focuses on the changes brought by the Depression to the titular character's family and how the Kittredges dealt with it.[225] A theatrical adaptation of the series entitled Kit Kittredge: An American Girl was later released in 2008 to positive reviews.[226][227] Similarly, Christmas After All, part of the Dear America series of books for older girls, take place in 1930s Indianapolis; while Kit Kittredge is told in a third-person viewpoint, Christmas After All is in the form of a fictional journal as told by the protagonist Minnie Swift as she recounts her experiences during the era, especially when her family takes in an orphan cousin from Texas.[228]
Naming
[edit]The term "The Great Depression" is most frequently attributed to British economist Lionel Robbins, whose 1934 book The Great Depression is credited with formalizing the phrase,[229] though Hoover is widely credited with popularizing the term,[229][230] informally referring to the downturn as a depression, with such uses as "Economic depression cannot be cured by legislative action or executive pronouncement" (December 1930, Message to Congress), and "I need not recount to you that the world is passing through a great depression" (1931).

The term "depression" to refer to an economic downturn dates to the 19th century, when it was used by varied Americans and British politicians and economists. The first major American economic crisis, the Panic of 1819, was described by then-president James Monroe as "a depression",[229] and the most recent economic crisis, the Depression of 1920–21, had been referred to as a "depression" by then-president Calvin Coolidge.
Financial crises were traditionally referred to as "panics", most recently the major Panic of 1907, and the minor Panic of 1910–11, though the 1929 crisis was called "The Crash", and the term "panic" has since fallen out of use. At the time of the Great Depression, the term "The Great Depression" was already used to refer to the period 1873–96 (in the United Kingdom), or more narrowly 1873–79 (in the United States), which has retroactively been renamed the Long Depression.[231]
Other "great depressions"
[edit]The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the breakdown of economic ties which followed, led to a severe economic crisis and catastrophic fall in the standards of living in the 1990s in post-Soviet states and the former Eastern Bloc,[232][233] which was even worse than the Great Depression.[234][235] Even before Russia's financial crisis of 1998, Russia's GDP was half of what it had been in the early 1990s.[235]
Comparison with the Great Recession
[edit]The worldwide economic decline after 2008 has been compared to the 1930s.[236][237][238][239][240]
1928 and 1929 were the times in the 20th century that the wealth gap reached such skewed extremes;[241] half the unemployed had been out of work for over six months, something that was not repeated until the late-2000s recession. 2007 and 2008 eventually saw the world reach new levels of wealth gap inequality that rivalled the years of 1928 and 1929.
See also
[edit]- Causes of World War I
- Causes of World War II
- Cities in the Great Depression
- Economic collapse
- Entertainment during the Great Depression
- International relations (1919–1939)
- Interwar France
- Involuntary unemployment
- List of economic crises
- List of the Great Depression-era outlaws
- Timeline of the Great Depression
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Further reading
[edit]Global
[edit]- Brendon, Piers. The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s (2000) comprehensive global economic and political history; 816pp
- Davis, Joseph S. The World Between the Wars, 1919–39: An Economist's View (1974)
- Garraty, John A. The Great Depression: An Inquiry into the causes, course, and Consequences of the Worldwide Depression of the Nineteen-Thirties, as Seen by Contemporaries and in Light of History (1986) online
- Garside, W.R. ed. Capitalism in crisis: International responses to the Great Depression (1993), essays by experts
- Grossman, Mark. Encyclopedia of the Interwar Years: From 1919 to 1939 (2000). 400 pp. worldwide coverage
- Hall Thomas E. and J. David Ferguson. The Great Depression: An International Disaster of Perverse Economic Policies (1998)
- Hodson, H.V. Slump and Recovery, 1929–37: A Survey of World Economic Affairs (Oxford UP, 1938). online
- Kehoe, Timothy J. and Edward C. Prescott. Great Depressions of the Twentieth Century (2007)
- League of Nations. World Economic Survey 1935–1936 (1936) online
- Rees, Goronwy. The great slump: capitalism in crisis, 1929–33 (1970) online, Marxist.
- Rothermund, Dietmar. The Global Impact of the Great Depression (1996)
- Woytinsky, Wladimir. The Social Consequences of the Economic Depression (International Labour Office, 1936). Statistics of major economies; not online.
Europe
[edit]- Aldcroft, Derek H. "Economic Growth in Britain in the Inter-War Years: A Reassessment." Economic History Review, 20#2, 1967, pp. 311–26. online
- Ambrosius, G. and W. Hibbard, A Social and Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe (1989)
- Broadberry, S. N. The British Economy between the Wars (Basil Blackwell 1986)
- Feinstein. Charles H. The European Economy between the Wars (1997)
- James, Harold. The German slump : politics and economics, 1924–1936 (1986) online
- Kaiser, David E. Economic diplomacy and the origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France and Eastern Europe, 1930–1939 (1980)
- Konrad, Helmut and Wolfgang Maderthaner, eds. Routes Into the Abyss: Coping With Crises in the 1930s Archived 24 January 2020 at the Wayback Machine (Berghahn Books, 2013), 224 pp. Compares political crises in Germany, Italy, Austria, and Spain with those in Sweden, Japan, China, India, Turkey, Brazil, and the United States.
- Psalidopoulos, Michael, ed. The Great Depression in Europe: Economic Thought and Policy in a National Context (Athens: Alpha Bank, 2012). ISBN 978-960-99793-6-8. Chapters by economic historians cover Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Austria, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. table of contents Archived 13 March 2017 at the Wayback Machine
- Tipton, F. and R. Aldrich, An Economic and Social History of Europe, 1890–1939 (1987)
United States and Canada
[edit]- Dickstein, Morris. Dancing in the dark : a cultural history of the Great Depression (2009) online
- Helping the Homeless Man: Activities and Facilities of the Central Registry for Homeless Single Men. ca. 1933–1934. 18 photographic prints (1 box). At the Labor Archives of Washington, University of Washington Libraries Special Collections.
- Galbraith, John Kenneth, The Great Crash, 1929 (1954), popular online
- Goldston, Robert, The Great Depression: The United States in the Thirties (1968)
- Kennedy, David, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (2000)
- McNeese, Tim, and Richard Jensen. The Great Depression 1929–1938 (Discovering U.S. History) (2010) online, for middle schools.
- Mitchell, Broadus. Depression Decade: From New Era through New Deal, 1929–1941 (1947), 462 pp., thorough coverage of the U.S. economy online
- Reis, Ronald A. The Great Depression and the New Deal : America's economy in crisis (2011) for secondary schools. online
- Safarian, A. E. The Canadian economy in the Great Depression (2009) online
- Washington Women's Heritage Project Records: Ethel P. Storey Oral History Interview (13/20). 1985. 4 sound cassettes; papers. Storey discusses the Great Depression and hardships of early life, abortion, childbearing and motherhood. At the Labor Archives of Washington, University of Washington Libraries Special Collections.
- Young, William H. The Great Depression in America : a cultural encyclopedia (2007) online
Other areas
[edit]- Brown, Ian. The Economies of Africa and Asia in the Inter-war Depression (1989)
- Drinot, Paulo, and Alan Knight, eds. The Great Depression in Latin America (2014) excerpt
- Latham, Anthony, and John Heaton, The Depression and the Developing World, 1914–1939 (1981).
- Shiroyama, Tomoko. China during the Great Depression : market, state, and the world economy, 1929–1937 (2008) online
Focus on economic theory or econometrics
[edit]- Bernanke, Ben. "The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Approach" Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking (1995) 27#1 pp 1–28 online
- Eichengreen, Barry J. Hall of mirrors : the Great Depression, the great recession, and the uses-and misuses-of history (2015), leading economist compares economic decline after 1929 and after 2008. online
- Eichengreen, Barry. Golden Fetters: The gold standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939. 1992.
- Eichengreen, Barry, and Marc Flandreau. The Gold Standard in Theory and History (1997)
- Friedman, Milton, and Anna Jacobson Schwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (1963), monetarist interpretation (heavily statistical)
- Glasner, David, ed. Business Cycles and Depressions (Routledge, 1997), 800 pp. Excerpt
- Grinin, L., Korotayev, A. and Tausch A. eds. Economic Cycles, Crises, and the Global Periphery (2016).
- Haberler, Gottfried. The World Economy, money, and the great depression 1919–1939 (1976)
- Kehoe, Timothy J. and Edward C. Prescott, eds. Great Depressions of the Twentieth Century (2007), essays by economists on the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Italy and on tariffs; statistical
- Kindleberger, Charles P. The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (3rd ed. 2013) online
- Madsen, Jakob B. "Trade Barriers and the Collapse of World Trade during the Great Depression", Southern Economic Journal, (2001) 67#4 pp. 848–68 online at JSTOR.
- Markwell, Donald. John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace (Oxford University Press, 2006).
- Mundell, R.A. "A Reconsideration of the Twentieth Century", American Economic Review 90#3 (2000), pp. 327–40 online version
- Richardson, H. W. "The Basis of Economic Recovery in the Nineteen-Thirties: A Review and a New Interpretation." Economic History Review, 15#2 (1962), pp. 344–63. online; focus on United Kingdom.
- Romer, Christina D. "The Nation in Depression", Journal of Economic Perspectives (1993) 7#2 pp. 19–39 in JSTOR Archived 3 July 2016 at the Wayback Machine, statistical comparison of U.S. and other countries
Great Depression
View on GrokipediaOverview
Definition and Chronology
The Great Depression was a profound economic contraction originating in the United States that expanded globally, marked by substantial reductions in output, employment, and trade from 1929 through the early 1940s. In the U.S., it commenced with the cessation of postwar economic expansion in August 1929, followed by the stock market collapse in October, leading to a cumulative decline in real GDP of approximately 30 percent by 1933, a 45 percent drop in industrial production, and deflation exceeding 25 percent. Unemployment surged to 24.9 percent of the workforce in 1933, affecting over 12.8 million individuals, while thousands of banks failed, eroding savings and credit availability.[1] [8] The chronology unfolded in phases: an initial recession in late 1929 transitioned into deepening deflation and financial instability through 1930–1932, with successive banking panics culminating in the widespread suspension of operations in early 1933. U.S. gross national product had fallen by nearly half from peak to trough, and international trade volumes contracted by two-thirds amid protectionist policies. Recovery initiated after March 1933 with banking reforms and fiscal measures, yielding annual GDP growth averaging 9 percent from 1933 to 1937, though a recession in 1937–1938 interrupted progress, and sustained expansion required wartime production mobilization starting in 1941.[1] [8] Globally, the Depression's timeline mirrored the U.S. pattern, with Europe experiencing acute distress by 1931 due to reparations, war debts, and gold standard rigidities, while commodity-dependent nations like Australia and Canada saw output declines exceeding 10 percent annually in the early 1930s. The crisis persisted variably across regions until World War II's demands restored industrial capacity and employment, underscoring the Depression's decade-long duration as the most protracted downturn in industrialized history.[1]Scale and Key Metrics
The Great Depression involved unprecedented economic contraction in the United States, with real gross domestic product (GDP) falling by 29 percent from 1929 to 1933, marking the deepest decline in modern U.S. history.[2] This downturn persisted beyond the initial trough, with full recovery not occurring until the military mobilization preceding World War II in the late 1930s. Unemployment reached a peak of 25 percent in 1933, affecting approximately 13 million workers out of a labor force of about 52 million.[2][9] Industrial production, as measured by the Federal Reserve's index, experienced a sharp collapse during the early 1930s, reflecting reduced manufacturing output and capacity utilization amid falling demand.[10] Wholesale prices plummeted by 32 percent, while consumer prices declined by 25 percent over the same period, exacerbating debt burdens through deflationary pressures.[2] Banking instability compounded the crisis, with thousands of failures eroding public confidence and credit availability; between 1930 and 1933, widespread panics led to the closure of nonmember banks outside the Federal Reserve System, which numbered nearly 16,000 at the onset.[11] Globally, the Depression's impact was substantial though less uniform, with estimates indicating a worldwide GDP contraction of approximately 15 percent from 1929 to 1932, driven by interconnected trade and financial linkages.[12] The following table summarizes key U.S. metrics:| Metric | Value | Period/Source |
|---|---|---|
| Real GDP Decline | 29% | 1929–1933[2] |
| Unemployment Peak | 25% | 1933[2] |
| Consumer Price Decline | 25% | 1929–1933[2] |
| Wholesale Price Decline | 32% | 1929–1933[2] |
Global Dimensions
The Great Depression propagated internationally through financial contagion, collapsing trade networks, and rigid monetary constraints under the gold standard, transforming a U.S.-centric downturn into a synchronized global contraction. World industrial production halved from 1929 to 1932, while international trade volumes declined by more than 50%, as demand evaporated and protectionism surged.[5] The U.S. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, enacted June 17, 1930, elevated average tariffs to nearly 60% on dutiable imports, eliciting retaliatory barriers from Canada, Europe, and others, which further constricted commerce—U.S. exports to Europe fell 61% by 1933.[13][14] In Europe, war debts, reparations, and gold outflows amplified vulnerabilities. Germany's industrial output dropped to 53% of 1929 levels by 1932 amid banking collapses like the Credit-Anstalt failure in Austria on May 11, 1931, triggering contagion; unemployment exceeded 30%, fostering political extremism.[5] The United Kingdom suspended gold convertibility on September 21, 1931, devaluing the pound by 30% and enabling monetary easing that spurred recovery—GDP bottomed in 1931 and grew 4% annually thereafter. France clung to gold until 1936, enduring deflation and output contraction of 15% by 1936, as high interest rates defended reserves at the expense of domestic demand.[15] Countries abandoning gold earlier, such as those in 1931, registered industrial production gains of 20-30% by 1935, outperforming gold adherents by sustaining deflationary traps.[16] Beyond Europe, commodity-dependent regions suffered acutely from price collapses—global raw material indices fell 50-70%—yet responses varied. Latin American exporters like Brazil and Argentina saw GDP plummet 20-30% initially, prompting de facto devaluations and import-substitution industrialization; Brazil's coffee valorization scheme destroyed 80 million bags to prop prices, aiding stabilization by 1933.[17] Japan, quitting gold on December 13, 1931, devalued the yen 50%, boosting exports and averting deeper slump; real GDP expanded 8.5% in 1933 alone via deficit spending and Manchurian ventures, achieving full employment by mid-decade.[18] In Asia and Africa, agrarian price dives induced famines and unrest, though colonial ties buffered some core areas; overall, peripheral economies recovered via exchange flexibility, underscoring gold standard adherence as a transmission vector rather than mere synchronization.[19]Prelude to Crisis
Post-World War I Economic Patterns
The United States economy, which had expanded rapidly during World War I due to wartime production demands, faced a sharp contraction upon the war's end in November 1918. Industrial output peaked in mid-1920 before declining amid reduced government spending and the end of European demand for American goods. Real output fell by approximately 8.7 percent during the recession, with factory employment dropping by 30 percent by autumn 1920. Wholesale prices plummeted by about 15 percent, reflecting severe deflationary pressures as wartime inflation reversed. Unemployment rose to around 12 percent, and stock prices declined by 47 percent over the 18-month downturn.[20][21][22] Policymakers under President Warren G. Harding responded with fiscal restraint, slashing federal spending by nearly 50 percent between 1920 and 1922, and the Federal Reserve maintained tight monetary policy to curb inflation inherited from the war era. No large-scale stimulus or bailouts were implemented, allowing for rapid liquidation of malinvestments in sectors like agriculture and manufacturing, where wartime price supports had distorted production. This approach facilitated a swift recovery; by 1922, industrial production surged 26 percent, automobile output jumped 63 percent, and unemployment returned to pre-recession levels by 1923. The episode highlighted the economy's capacity for self-correction through deflation and wage adjustments, contrasting with prolonged interventions seen later.[23][24] Globally, post-war patterns were marked by massive debts and reparations that sowed seeds of instability. The U.S. emerged as a net creditor, holding $10 billion in Allied war loans, while European nations grappled with reconstruction costs and Germany's obligation to pay 132 billion gold marks in reparations under the Treaty of Versailles. Protectionist policies proliferated, with tariffs rising in response to competitive pressures, hampering trade recovery. Many countries, including Britain and France, delayed returning to the gold standard or did so at pre-war parities, leading to overvalued currencies and persistent inflationary tendencies that masked underlying imbalances. The U.S., returning to gold convertibility promptly in 1919, achieved price stability but accumulated gold reserves that strained international liquidity. These dynamics created a fragile credit structure reliant on American loans to service European debts, setting the stage for interconnected vulnerabilities.[25][24]1920s Boom: Credit Expansion and Imbalances
The U.S. economy expanded rapidly during the 1920s, with real gross national product (GNP) growing at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent from 1920 to 1929, and per capita GNP advancing 2.7 percent annually.[24] This period, known as the Roaring Twenties, featured productivity surges in manufacturing driven by electrification—reaching 70 percent of factories by 1929—and assembly line innovations, boosting output in automobiles, where 60 percent of families owned cars by decade's end, and electrical appliances.[24] Commercial banks supported this growth through aggressive credit extension, shifting into installment loans for consumer durables, urban real estate mortgages, and securities underwriting, which amplified liquidity and investment.[24] Credit metrics underscored the boom's artificial stimulus. The ratio of private credit to GDP climbed from 2.43 in 1913 to 4.08 by 1929, while mortgage debt tripled from $8 billion to $27 billion.[26] Consumer debt relative to personal income doubled to over 9 percent by 1929, reflecting widespread borrowing for automobiles and homes.[26] Federal Reserve policies, holding discount rates low after the 1920-1921 contraction, enabled this surge, but channeled much credit into speculation; brokers' loans ballooned, allowing stock purchases on 10 percent margins and propelling the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 63 in August 1921 to 381 in September 1929.[26][27] Sectoral disparities revealed underlying fragilities. Agriculture, plagued by wartime overexpansion and mechanization, endured collapsing prices—farm products fell 53.3 percent in 1920-1921—with real net income per farm plunging 72.6 percent that year and aggregate farm incomes halving from $22 billion in 1919 to $13 billion by 1929.[24][28] Manufacturing productivity outpaced agriculture, but real wages for farmworkers declined amid the decade's prosperity, while skilled urban workers saw gains of 5.3 to 8.7 percent from 1923 to 1929.[24] Nonresidential construction spending rose 56 percent from 1920 to 1929, peaking above $5 billion annually, diverting resources into potentially malinvested areas and exacerbating income inequality as capital gains accrued to stock market participants.[26][24] These imbalances, propped by credit-fueled distortions rather than balanced productivity gains, heightened systemic risks.[26]Stock Market Bubble and Crash of October 1929
The U.S. stock market bubble of the 1920s stemmed from widespread speculation fueled by optimistic economic prospects and readily available credit. Share prices surged as the Dow Jones Industrial Average climbed from 63 points in August 1921 to a peak of 381 points on September 3, 1929, reflecting a sixfold increase over eight years.[27] This rise was amplified by the proliferation of margin accounts, allowing investors to purchase stocks with borrowed funds, often leveraging up to 90% of the value, which encouraged excessive risk-taking and inflated asset prices beyond underlying corporate earnings.[29] Investment trusts and holding companies further expanded leverage, drawing in retail investors previously sidelined from direct equity participation.[30] Federal Reserve policies contributed to the bubble's formation through low interest rates in the mid-1920s, which facilitated credit expansion, though the central bank raised discount rates in 1928 and 1929 to curb speculation, tightening liquidity and sowing seeds of reversal.[31] By midsummer 1929, approximately 300 million shares were held on margin, heightening vulnerability to downturns as brokers issued margin calls amid eroding collateral values.[29] The bubble burst in October 1929, initiating a sharp contraction. On October 24, known as Black Thursday, panic selling overwhelmed the New York Stock Exchange, with a record 12.9 million shares traded as prices plummeted, prompting major bankers to intervene by purchasing select stocks to stabilize the market temporarily.[27] The New York Federal Reserve supported this effort by buying government securities and easing discount window lending to inject liquidity.[27] Selling intensified over the weekend, leading to Black Monday, October 28, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell nearly 13%, erasing significant paper wealth.[27] The following day, Black Tuesday, October 29, saw another 12% drop, with over 16 million shares exchanged in frenzied trading, marking one of the highest volume days in exchange history up to that point and culminating in losses estimated at $14 billion in a single session.[32] By mid-November, the Dow had declined about 40% from its September peak, signaling the end of the speculative era and contributing to broader economic contraction through wealth destruction and reduced confidence.[27]Deepening of the Depression
Initial Recession and Deflationary Pressures
The stock market crash of October 1929 triggered a sharp contraction in economic activity, initiating a recession that deepened into the Great Depression. Consumer spending slowed and inventories of unsold goods accumulated even before the crash, but the market plunge shattered business and public confidence, leading to abrupt reductions in investment and durable goods purchases. Industrial production, which had peaked in July 1929, declined by 37 percent by December 1930 as firms liquidated excess capacity and cut output in response to falling demand. Unemployment rose rapidly from 3.2 percent of the labor force in 1929, reflecting layoffs in manufacturing and construction sectors hardest hit by the downturn.[33] Real gross domestic product contracted by approximately 8.5 percent in 1930 alone, with declines concentrated in capital goods and consumer durables.[34] These developments stemmed from a classic business cycle contraction amplified by the psychological impact of the crash, which prompted deleveraging and precautionary saving amid uncertainty. Deflationary pressures emerged as prices adjusted downward to excess supply and weakened aggregate demand. Wholesale prices fell by over 10 percent between late 1929 and mid-1930, increasing the real burden of existing debts and discouraging new borrowing or spending.[35] This price level decline, initially driven by reduced velocity of money and inventory drawdowns rather than immediate monetary contraction, created a feedback loop where falling revenues led to wage cuts and further demand suppression.[1] While some recovery signs appeared in mid-1930, such as stabilizing production, persistent deflation eroded profitability and perpetuated the recessionary spiral.[1]Banking Crises and Systemic Failures
![Crowd outside the failed Bank of the United States] The banking crises during the Great Depression unfolded in waves of panics, beginning in late 1930, as depositor confidence eroded amid economic contraction and asset deflation. The first major panic erupted after the failure of the Caldwell investment group on November 7, 1930, which controlled numerous banks in the South and Midwest; this triggered runs on affiliated institutions in Nashville, Knoxville, and Louisville, leading to 1,352 bank suspensions in 1930 alone.[11] By 1931, failures escalated to 2,294 banks, exacerbated by international financial strains and further domestic runs, particularly in the interior states where unit banking—restricting branches—amplified vulnerability to localized shocks.[36] A pivotal event was the collapse of the Bank of the United States on December 11, 1930, the largest U.S. bank failure to date with $200 million in deposits, which intensified fears among immigrant and working-class depositors and spread contagion despite the bank's solvency issues stemming from real estate loans. Systemic failures compounded the crises: the absence of deposit insurance fueled self-fulfilling runs, as depositors withdrew funds en masse, converting deposits to currency and contracting the money supply by up to 30% from 1929 to 1933. The Federal Reserve's inadequate response—failing to serve as lender of last resort by discounting sufficient assets or injecting liquidity—allowed panics to persist, prioritizing gold reserve maintenance over stabilizing the banking system.[11][37] The 1931-33 panics saw continued surges, with 1,453 failures in 1932 and over 4,000 suspensions in early 1933, culminating in a nationwide crisis that prompted President Roosevelt's banking holiday on March 6, 1933, closing all banks temporarily. These failures wiped out savings for millions, deepened deflationary pressures, and transmitted distress globally via gold outflows and trade disruptions, as failed banks curtailed lending and credit intermediation essential for recovery. Empirical analysis attributes much of the severity to policy inaction rather than inherent insolvency alone, with non-member state banks hit hardest due to limited Fed access.[38][39] Reforms like the FDIC in 1934 later mitigated such runs by insuring deposits up to $2,500 initially.[36]Collapse of International Trade: Smoot-Hawley and Retaliation
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, enacted on June 17, 1930, substantially raised U.S. import duties on more than 20,000 goods, increasing the average tariff rate on dutiable imports from approximately 40% to nearly 60%.[13] [40] Sponsored by Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis C. Hawley, the legislation aimed to shield American agriculture and manufacturing from foreign competition amid declining domestic prices following the 1929 stock market crash.[41] Despite opposition from over 1,000 economists who warned of retaliatory measures and reduced trade, President Herbert Hoover signed the bill into law, arguing it would revive prosperity.[13] Prior to the act's passage, international trade volumes had already begun contracting due to the global recession, with U.S. exports declining from $5.24 billion in 1929 to $3.84 billion in 1930.[42] However, Smoot-Hawley accelerated the downturn by provoking widespread retaliation from trading partners. Canada, the United States' largest export market, responded within weeks by imposing countervailing duties on 16 U.S. products, including automobiles and steel, and later redirecting trade toward the British Empire.[43] European nations followed suit: France raised tariffs on U.S. automobiles and other goods, while Italy, Spain, and Switzerland enacted similar barriers, collectively targeting American agricultural and industrial exports.[44] These beggar-thy-neighbor policies fragmented global markets and compounded the trade collapse. U.S. exports plummeted further to $1.65 billion by 1933, a drop of over 60% from 1929 levels, while real U.S. exports fell nearly 50% between 1929 and 1933 amid a 30% contraction in gross national product.[42] Worldwide, the value of merchandise trade shrank to less than 40% of its 1929 peak by 1932, with volumes in industrialized countries declining by about 30% from 1929 to 1932, though quantitative assessments indicate Smoot-Hawley alone accounted for only a portion of the import collapse, as falling incomes and deflationary pressures played larger roles.[45] [46] The tariff war underscored the interdependence of post-World War I economies under the gold standard, where protectionism transmitted deflationary shocks across borders. Retaliatory measures not only curtailed U.S. market access but also exacerbated domestic banking strains in creditor nations reliant on export surpluses, contributing to currency devaluations and further trade barriers by 1932.[43] Economic analyses, including those from the National Bureau of Economic Research, affirm that while Smoot-Hawley did not initiate the Depression's trade contraction, its escalation of reciprocal barriers intensified the global spiral, reducing efficiency and amplifying unemployment in export-dependent sectors.[47][46]Monetary and International Factors
Federal Reserve Policy Errors
The Federal Reserve's policy responses following the October 1929 stock market crash exacerbated the economic downturn through a series of passive and contractionary measures. Rather than expanding liquidity to counteract the initial recession, the Fed maintained tight monetary conditions, including raising the discount rate from 5% in late 1929 to 6% by early 1930, which discouraged borrowing and contributed to credit scarcity.[48] This approach stemmed from concerns over stock market speculation and adherence to the real bills doctrine, which limited open market operations and viewed non-commercial lending as inflationary.[49] As banking panics erupted in late 1930, the Fed failed to serve as an effective lender of last resort, allowing over 9,000 banks to fail between 1930 and 1933 and permitting the money supply (M1) to contract by approximately one-third, from $26.6 billion in 1929 to $17.3 billion by 1933.[3] Economists Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued in their 1963 work A Monetary History of the United States that this contraction was not inevitable but resulted from the Fed's inaction during waves of panics, which eroded public confidence and led to hoarding of currency and reduced bank lending.[50] The Fed's decentralized structure, with regional banks prioritizing local concerns over national stability, further hampered coordinated intervention, such as insufficient open market purchases to offset reserve drains.[11] In 1931, amid Britain's abandonment of the gold standard and gold outflows from the U.S., the Fed raised the discount rate sharply from 1.5% to 3.5% in October to defend dollar convertibility, prioritizing gold reserves over domestic economic support.[3] This move intensified deflationary pressures, as higher rates amid falling prices increased real interest burdens on debtors and discouraged investment. Empirical analyses, including simulations based on Friedman and Schwartz's data, suggest that stabilizing the money supply could have limited the decline in nominal GDP to around 10% rather than the observed 46% from 1929 to 1933.[51] Critics like Allan Meltzer have noted that while the Fed avoided outright errors in judgment, its rigid commitment to gold standard rules and incomplete understanding of monetary transmission mechanisms amplified the crisis.[49] These policies contrasted with potential alternatives, such as aggressive liquidity provision akin to the Bank of England's actions pre-1931, which might have mitigated panic contagion. The Fed's errors, rooted in doctrinal conservatism and institutional limitations, transformed a severe recession into the prolonged Great Depression by undermining the banking system and contracting credit availability.[7]Gold Standard Constraints and Transmission Mechanisms
The gold standard, which pegged currencies to fixed quantities of gold and required convertibility at par values, imposed strict constraints on monetary policy during the interwar period by limiting central banks' ability to expand the money supply independently of gold reserves.[52] To defend parities amid capital flight or trade imbalances, policymakers were compelled to raise interest rates or pursue deflationary measures, such as contracting credit, which exacerbated economic downturns rather than countering them.[53] This rigidity prevented the elastic monetary responses needed to offset banking panics and falling output, as seen in the United States where Federal Reserve adherence to gold convertibility contributed to a 30% contraction in the money stock between 1929 and 1933.[52] Transmission mechanisms operated through balance-of-payments adjustments: deficits triggered gold outflows, forcing importing countries to sterilize inflows or deflate domestic economies to restore equilibrium, thereby propagating deflation and contraction internationally.[54] U.S. deflationary shocks, amplified by banking failures and Federal Reserve inaction, were relayed via these channels; for instance, gold inflows to the U.S. from Europe in 1931–1932 drained reserves elsewhere, compelling higher interest rates in countries like Germany and prompting credit squeezes that deepened the global slump.[55] France's overvaluation and gold hoarding after stabilizing its franc in 1928 further tightened world liquidity, as its central bank accumulated nearly 20% of global monetary gold by 1932, starving other economies of reserves and intensifying the need for contractionary policies abroad.[52] Empirical evidence underscores these dynamics: nations that suspended gold convertibility earlier experienced faster recoveries, with industrial production rising an average of 7% annually post-abandonment compared to stagnation under adherence.[15] Britain, exiting on September 21, 1931, and devaluing the pound by about 30%, saw GDP growth resume by 1932, while gold bloc adherents like France and the Netherlands, clinging to parities until 1936, endured prolonged deflation and output losses exceeding 10% below trend.[56] Cross-country regressions confirm that gold standard adherence prolonged depressions by 1–2 years on average, as fixed rates synchronized policy errors across borders rather than allowing unilateral easing.[57] This pattern held despite varied domestic conditions, isolating the standard's role in channeling U.S.-originated shocks—such as the 1929 stock crash and subsequent banking collapses—into synchronized global declines in trade and investment.[54]European Crises: Germany 1931 and Britain 1931
The European banking crisis of 1931 originated with the collapse of Austria's Creditanstalt bank on May 11, 1931, which exposed massive losses from bad loans and triggered deposit withdrawals across Central Europe.[58] This failure stemmed from Austria's postwar economic vulnerabilities, including heavy reliance on short-term foreign funding and exposure to failed industrial investments, amplifying the transmission of the U.S.-originated Depression through gold standard linkages and capital flows.[59] The crisis rapidly spread to Germany, where interconnected banking systems and similar dependencies on American loans—halted after 1929—led to liquidity strains.[60] In Germany, the crisis intensified in June 1931 with runs on major banks, culminating in the failure of Danatbank on July 13, 1931, one of the country's largest universal banks handling about 15% of commercial deposits.[61] German authorities responded by declaring a bank holiday on July 14, imposing strict capital controls, and suspending gold convertibility on July 15 to stem outflows, which had drained reserves amid deflationary pressures and unemployment reaching 28% by mid-1931.[62] These measures, while halting immediate collapse, deepened the contraction: industrial production fell by over 40% from 1929 peaks, and GDP declined by approximately 25% by 1932, as credit froze and international trade evaporated under retaliatory tariffs.[61] The Reichsbank's adherence to gold standard rules prior to suspension constrained monetary expansion, exacerbating deflation and bank insolvencies that wiped out nearly half of banking assets.[63] The German turmoil pressured Britain, already strained by reparations, war debts, and a overvalued pound tied to gold at prewar parity, leading to speculative attacks on sterling in September 1931.[64] Foreign withdrawals accelerated after Germany's controls, as investors feared contagion; Britain's gold reserves dropped from £170 million in 1929 to under £100 million by September, while budget deficits from unemployment benefits and naval expenditures eroded confidence.[65] On September 21, 1931, the new National Government suspended gold convertibility, devaluing the pound by about 30% against the dollar, which halted reserve losses and enabled interest rate cuts from 6% to 2% by 1932.[66] This departure facilitated a swifter recovery than in gold-adherent nations, with GDP bottoming in 1931 and exports rebounding due to competitiveness gains, though unemployment lingered above 20% into 1933.[67] The crises underscored gold standard rigidities in transmitting deflationary shocks, prompting further abandonments and contributing to global fragmentation.[57]Theoretical Explanations of Causes
Monetarist Analysis: Money Supply Contraction
Monetarists, led by economists Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, argue that the Great Depression's depth and duration stemmed primarily from a massive contraction in the U.S. money supply, which the Federal Reserve failed to counteract. In their seminal work A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, they documented that the money stock—comprising currency and demand deposits—fell by approximately one-third, from $26.6 billion in August 1929 to $17.3 billion by March 1933.[68] This decline exceeded that of any prior U.S. economic downturn and amplified deflationary pressures, reducing nominal income and asset values while exacerbating debt burdens.[1] The contraction originated from a vicious cycle of banking panics and liquidity shortages. Between 1930 and 1933, over 9,000 banks failed, representing about one-third of all U.S. banks, as depositors shifted holdings to currency amid fears of insolvency.[68] This hoarding reduced the money multiplier, as banks held excess reserves and curtailed lending; currency in circulation rose relative to deposits, further contracting the broad money supply by nearly 30% from late 1930 to early 1933.[1] Monetarists contend the Fed, established partly to serve as a lender of last resort, neglected this role by not injecting reserves through open market operations or discount window lending, instead allowing the monetary base to stagnate or decline in key periods.[3] Friedman and Schwartz emphasized that the Fed's passivity turned a manageable recession into a depression, as the money supply drop directly correlated with output collapse—real GNP fell 30% from 1929 to 1933—and severe deflation, with prices dropping 25-30%.[3] They rejected real factors like productivity shocks as primary causes, attributing the transmission via reduced spending and credit availability; empirical studies, including vector autoregressions on historical data, have supported a causal link from money to output during this era, though debates persist on the exact channels.[7] The Fed's adherence to the real bills doctrine and gold standard constraints contributed to inaction, prioritizing short-term liquidity over systemic stability.[1] Recovery began only after monetary expansion under the Roosevelt administration, including the abandonment of the gold standard in 1933 and subsequent reflation, which restored money growth and ended deflation by 1934. Monetarists view this as validation: had the Fed expanded money supply aggressively from 1930, the Depression's severity could have been mitigated, akin to milder contractions in prior panics.[3] Critics, including some Keynesians, argue sticky wages and demand deficiencies amplified effects independently, but monetarist evidence highlights the Fed's policy errors as avoidable and central.[7]Austrian Business Cycle Theory: Malinvestments from Credit Expansion
The Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT), developed by economists such as Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, posits that business cycles originate from central bank-induced credit expansion, which distorts price signals and leads to malinvestments—allocations of resources into unsustainable projects that would not occur under genuine market conditions.[69][70] In this framework, artificially low interest rates, resulting from fractional-reserve banking amplified by central bank policy, mimic an increase in voluntary savings but instead fuel excessive investment in time-intensive, capital-heavy sectors like construction and durable goods production, elongating the economy's production structure beyond consumer preferences.[69][71] This misallocation creates an illusory boom, as resources are diverted from consumer goods toward higher-order capital goods, but the expansion proves untenable when credit growth slows, revealing the absence of real savings and triggering a corrective bust characterized by liquidation of errors and reallocation.[69][72] Applied to the 1920s United States, ABCT attributes the decade's prosperity to Federal Reserve policies that expanded credit through open-market purchases of acceptances and low discount rates, maintaining real interest rates below natural levels despite postwar recovery.[73][72] Under Governor Benjamin Strong, the Fed aimed to stabilize the gold standard internationally by aiding Britain's return in 1925, which involved keeping U.S. rates low (around 3-4% for call money in mid-decade) and increasing member bank reserves by over 50% from 1921 to 1929, fueling a credit boom that bypassed broad price inflation due to productivity gains but manifested in asset bubbles.[73][72] This expansion directed investments toward radial deepening—overbuilding in automobiles (production rose from 1.5 million units in 1921 to 4.8 million by 1929), residential construction (peaking at 937,000 units in 1925), and industrial capacity—creating malinvestments disconnected from underlying savings rates, which remained stable at around 5-7% of income.[73][74] The 1929 stock market crash marked the onset of the bust phase, as credit contraction exposed the imbalances, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average plummeting 89% from its September peak by July 1932, initiating widespread liquidation of unprofitable projects and bankruptcies in overleveraged sectors.[73] Austrian analysts like Murray Rothbard argue this was not an exogenous shock but the inevitable correction of the prior decade's distortions, where Fed-fueled speculation had inflated stock values to 33 times earnings by 1929, far exceeding fundamentals.[73][75] Hayek, in works from the 1920s onward, similarly identified the U.S. boom as a monetary overexpansion driving unsustainable investment, warning that suppressing the ensuing depression through further intervention would prolong maladjustments rather than allow market-driven reequilibration.[76][77] Empirical proxies for malinvestment, such as the surge in capital goods output (up 70% from 1921-1929) outpacing consumer durables, support this view, as the bust revealed excess capacity in steel and machinery, with industrial production falling 46% by 1932.[73][75] Critics of ABCT contend that the 1920s credit growth was moderate relative to GDP (broad money M2 rose about 60% over the decade) and question the theory's emphasis on interest rate signals over real factors like technological shifts, yet Austrian proponents counter that the qualitative distortion—favoring long-term over short-term production—better explains the clustered errors in specific sectors than aggregate metrics alone.[74][75] The theory underscores that the Great Depression's depth stemmed not merely from the bust but from subsequent policy errors impeding liquidation, such as Hoover's wage rigidities and the Fed's initial inaction followed by contraction.[73]Keynesian Perspective: Aggregate Demand Shortfall
Keynesian economists posit that the Great Depression stemmed fundamentally from a precipitous decline in aggregate demand, which curtailed production and engendered persistent underemployment despite available labor and capital. In this view, the economy entered a state of equilibrium below full employment, where output is determined not by supply constraints but by the level of total spending—comprising consumption, investment, government expenditure, and net exports. John Maynard Keynes, in his 1936 work The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, argued that classical economics erroneously assumed automatic market clearance toward full employment; instead, rigidities such as sticky wages and prices, coupled with fluctuations in investor confidence ("animal spirits"), prevented self-correction.[78][79] The 1929 stock market crash exemplified the trigger for demand insufficiency, as it eroded household wealth by approximately $30 billion (equivalent to about $500 billion in 2023 dollars), prompting reduced consumption through the wealth effect. Investment spending, sensitive to expectations of future profitability, collapsed from $16.1 billion in 1929 to $1.4 billion by 1932, exacerbating the downturn via the multiplier effect: an initial drop in spending leads to income losses for recipients, who then curtail their own expenditures, amplifying the contraction. Keynesians highlight how this dynamic manifested empirically, with U.S. real GDP plummeting 29% from 1929 to 1933 and industrial production falling 47%, outcomes they attribute to deficient demand rather than supply-side disruptions.[80][81] Further reinforcing the perspective, Keynesians invoke the paradox of thrift, whereby heightened saving inclinations—rational amid uncertainty—collectively diminish demand, as unspent income fails to circulate. This mechanism, they contend, prolonged the slump despite deflationary pressures that should have theoretically stimulated spending under classical models. Proponents like Alvin Hansen extended this analysis postwar, arguing that secular stagnation from demographic trends and investment opportunities amplified demand shortfalls, though empirical validation remains debated among economists favoring monetary explanations.[82][78] To counteract demand deficiency, Keynes advocated countercyclical fiscal policy, including deficit-financed public works and tax cuts to elevate spending directly and indirectly through multipliers estimated at 1.5 to 2 in Depression-era contexts. Such interventions, absent in the early Hoover administration's balanced-budget orthodoxy, were partially realized under Roosevelt's New Deal from 1933, though Keynesians critique their scale as insufficient until wartime mobilization. This framework underscores aggregate demand's primacy in short-run fluctuations, influencing subsequent macroeconomic policy despite critiques that it overlooks long-term supply dynamics and inflation risks.[80][83]Heterodox Views: Inequality, Productivity Shocks, and Marxism
Some heterodox economists, drawing on underconsumption theories, have posited that rising income inequality in the 1920s contributed to the Great Depression by suppressing aggregate demand. Proponents argue that the top 1% of income earners captured approximately 24% of total U.S. income by 1928, up from 18% in 1918, while wages for the bottom 90% stagnated relative to productivity gains, leading households to increase debt and reduce consumption as a share of income.[84] This view, echoed in certain post-Keynesian analyses, suggests that overproduction outpaced effective demand, exacerbating the 1929 downturn, though critics contend it overlooks evidence of stable or rising consumption propensity among lower-income groups prior to the crash and fails to explain why inequality did not trigger earlier crises.[85] Alternative heterodox perspectives emphasize productivity shocks as a primary driver, aligning with real business cycle models that attribute economic contractions to exogenous declines in total factor productivity rather than monetary or demand factors. Research indicates that negative productivity shocks accounted for roughly two-thirds of the output drop in the U.S. and international economies during the early 1930s, with measured total factor productivity falling by about 20% between 1929 and 1933 due to factors like sectoral reallocations and technological disruptions in agriculture and manufacturing.[86] These shocks, proponents claim, propagated deflation and unemployment by shifting the economy along a neoclassical production frontier, though empirical challenges persist, including difficulties reconciling observed labor hoarding with pure supply-side explanations.[87] Marxist interpretations frame the Great Depression as an inevitable outcome of capitalism's internal contradictions, particularly the tendency of the rate of profit to fall amid overaccumulation and overproduction. Analysts in this tradition argue that the 1920s boom, fueled by credit expansion and uneven capitalist development post-World War I, led to a crisis of disproportionality by 1929, where industrial capacity exceeded solvent markets, resulting in a sharp profit squeeze—U.S. corporate profits plummeted 80% from 1929 to 1932—and mass unemployment as capital sought to restore profitability through deflation and wage cuts.[88] This perspective highlights the unplanned anarchy of production under private ownership, with the Depression validating Marx's prediction of periodic crises resolving contradictions only temporarily via destruction of capital, yet it has been critiqued for underemphasizing contingent policy failures and over-relying on long-run tendencies without precise timing mechanisms.[89]Government Interventions and Their Outcomes
U.S. Policies Under Hoover and Roosevelt
President Herbert Hoover initially pursued policies emphasizing voluntary cooperation between government, business, and labor to stabilize the economy without direct federal relief. In late 1929, he convened conferences urging industrial leaders to maintain wages and employment levels amid falling demand, securing pledges for $1.8 billion in private construction spending for 1930.[90] However, these efforts faltered as deflation and unemployment intensified, with industrial production dropping sharply. Hoover also supported limited public works, such as the Hoover Dam project initiated in 1930, but federal spending remained constrained relative to the crisis scale.[91] A pivotal Hoover policy was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, signed on June 17, 1930, which raised average duties on dutiable imports by about 6 percentage points, prompting retaliatory tariffs from trading partners and contributing to a 66% collapse in global trade volume by 1933.[41] [40] Federal government spending rose under Hoover from $3.1 billion in fiscal year 1929 to $4.7 billion by 1932, financed partly by tax increases including the Revenue Act of 1932, which doubled income tax rates and introduced new levies on dividends and estates.[92] In response to banking failures exceeding 9,000 by 1932, Hoover established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) on January 22, 1932, authorizing $2 billion in loans initially to banks, railroads, and agricultural agencies, marking a shift toward direct federal credit intervention.[93] Despite these measures, GDP contracted by 8.5% in 1932, and unemployment reached 24.9%.[90] Upon taking office in March 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt implemented the New Deal, a series of programs for relief, recovery, and reform. The "Hundred Days" Congress passed the Emergency Banking Act on March 9, 1933, following a national banking holiday declared on March 6, which temporarily halted withdrawals and facilitated federal inspections to reopen solvent banks; this was supplemented by the Glass-Steagall Act creating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure deposits up to $2,500.[94] Agricultural policies included the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of May 1933, which paid farmers to reduce production, boosting farm prices by 50% by 1936 but raising food costs for consumers. Industrial recovery efforts featured the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of June 1933, establishing the National Recovery Administration (NRA) to set industry codes for wages, prices, and output, which covered 95% of manufacturing but was ruled unconstitutional in 1935 for delegating legislative power.[95] The NIRA's wage floors, averaging 20-50% above market levels in covered sectors, correlated with reduced employment in those industries per empirical studies.[96] Fiscal expansion accelerated, with federal spending surging from 4% of GDP in 1933 to 10% by 1936, funded by deficits; public works under the Public Works Administration (PWA) and Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) employed over 3 million by 1935.[97] Yet, real GDP per adult remained 27% below 1929 levels by 1939, and unemployment averaged 17.2% through the decade, with recessions in 1937-1938 attributed by some analyses to policy-induced uncertainty and rigidities rather than fiscal contraction alone.[98] [97]International Responses and Protectionism
![Senators Reed Smoot and Willis Hawley, proponents of the 1930 tariff act]float-right The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, enacted on June 17, 1930, substantially raised U.S. import duties on over 20,000 goods, with average tariffs increasing by approximately 20 percent, aiming to shield domestic agriculture and industry from foreign competition.[13][40] This legislation prompted swift retaliatory measures from major trading partners, including Canada, which imposed counter-tariffs on U.S. exports such as automobiles and agricultural products, and European nations that elevated barriers on American goods.[41] These responses initiated a cascade of protectionist policies worldwide, contracting international commerce amid already faltering demand. Global trade volumes plummeted by roughly two-thirds in value between 1929 and 1933, a decline exceeding the drop in world output and attributable in part to escalating tariffs and quotas that fragmented markets.[99] In Britain, long adherent to free trade, the economic crisis prompted abandonment of the gold standard in September 1931 and a pivot to protectionism; the Import Duties Act of 1932 introduced a general 10 percent tariff on non-empire imports, while the Ottawa Agreements later that year established imperial preference systems favoring Commonwealth trade, reducing reliance on external partners.[100] France maintained high tariffs averaging 34 percent on British exports, alongside quotas and currency devaluation efforts to preserve domestic industries, though these measures insulated rather than revived growth.[101] Germany, facing hyperinflation's aftermath and reparations burdens, intensified import controls and bilateral barter agreements by 1931, curtailing trade with deficit countries and fostering autarkic tendencies that presaged later Nazi policies.[102] Such fragmented responses, while politically expedient for protecting employment in specific sectors, amplified deflationary pressures and obstructed recovery by diminishing export markets and resource efficiencies, as empirical analyses indicate protectionism deepened the transnational transmission of the downturn.[44][47]Critiques of Intervention: Prolongation vs. Mitigation Debates
Economists associated with the Austrian School, such as Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard, contended that government interventions under Presidents Hoover and Roosevelt interfered with the necessary market adjustments following the 1929 crash, thereby prolonging the Depression by preventing the liquidation of malinvestments and distorting price signals. Hoover's policies, including exhortations to businesses to maintain nominal wages and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation's loans to banks and firms starting in 1932, aimed to stabilize the economy but resulted in real wage rigidity, with average hourly earnings rising 17% from 1929 to 1933 while prices fell 25%, exacerbating unemployment by discouraging hiring. These measures, in the Austrian view, extended the downturn by sustaining unprofitable enterprises and delaying resource reallocation, as evidenced by industrial production remaining 45% below 1929 levels by 1933. Real business cycle theorists Harold Cole and Lee Ohanian formalized this prolongation argument in their 2004 analysis, estimating that New Deal policies, particularly the National Industrial Recovery Act (NRA) of 1933—which enforced industry-wide codes fixing prices and wages—reduced competition and raised real wages by up to 25% above market-clearing levels, accounting for about half of the output shortfall from 1933 to 1939.[103] Their dynamic general equilibrium model showed U.S. GDP in 1939 at 27% below a counterfactual trend absent these interventions, with unemployment persisting at 17-20% due to cartel-like restrictions that mimicked monopoly pricing and labor monopsony power, policies invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1935 but whose effects lingered. Similarly, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933 paid farmers to reduce output, destroying 10 million acres of crops and 6 million pigs in 1933 alone, which artificially propped up prices but deepened scarcity and farm foreclosures, contributing to rural distress without accelerating recovery. Critics of the prolongation thesis, often aligned with Keynesian frameworks, argue that interventions mitigated human suffering and laid institutional foundations for eventual recovery, pointing to the New Deal's relief programs like the Civilian Conservation Corps (employing 3 million by 1940) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (restoring banking confidence after 9,000 failures in 1933).[104] Proponents such as Christina Romer have emphasized that fiscal multipliers from public works spending, though modest at 0.5-1.0, cushioned demand shortfalls, with industrial production rising 57% from March 1933 to July 1933 following the banking holiday and gold standard suspension. However, these defenses face empirical challenges: the 1937-1938 recession saw GDP drop 18% and unemployment rise to 19% after partial policy reversals, including reduced WPA spending from $4.4 billion to $1.4 billion, suggesting interventions sustained fragility rather than robust growth, as pre-New Deal economies like 1920-1921 recovered swiftly without such measures.[104] The debate hinges on counterfactuals, with prolongation advocates citing faster recoveries in countries like Britain (which abandoned gold in 1931 and cut spending) versus the U.S., where GNP per capita remained below 1929 levels until 1939, attributing delays to policy-induced distortions over monetary failures alone. Mitigation claims often rely on qualitative relief metrics but struggle against quantitative models showing interventions halved potential employment gains, underscoring a causal tension between short-term stabilization and long-term adjustment.Path to Recovery
Monetary Reforms: Devaluation and Reflation
Several nations abandoned the gold standard during the early 1930s, enabling currency devaluation and monetary reflation to counter deflationary pressures. In the United Kingdom, the government suspended gold convertibility on September 21, 1931, leading to a approximately 30% depreciation of the pound sterling against the U.S. dollar.[15] This policy shift altered expectations from continued deflation to moderate inflation, facilitating a robust recovery by mid-1932, with real GDP growth accelerating and unemployment beginning to decline after peaking at around 22%.[105] Empirical analysis indicates that the devaluation boosted exports and employment, particularly in manufacturing and export-oriented sectors, contributing to Britain's faster recovery compared to countries adhering to the gold standard.[106] In the United States, adherence to the gold standard prolonged deflation until President Franklin D. Roosevelt's interventions in 1933. Following a banking crisis, Roosevelt declared a nationwide bank holiday on March 6, 1933, and on April 19, 1933, issued an executive order prohibiting gold exports and suspending dollar convertibility into gold, effectively abandoning the gold standard.[107] The subsequent Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 1934, devalued the dollar by 41%, raising the official price of gold from $20.67 to $35 per ounce, which transferred value from gold holders to the Treasury and permitted monetary base expansion.[107] This revaluation, combined with gold inflows from devaluation-induced capital flight and European instability, increased U.S. gold reserves by over 70% between 1933 and 1936, enabling the Federal Reserve to expand the money supply after years of contraction. Reflationary effects materialized rapidly, with wholesale prices rising 15% in the six months following the April 1933 suspension, ending the deflationary spiral.[108] Industrial production surged from an index of 58 in March 1933 to 110 by July 1933, and real GNP grew by 10.8% in 1933 alone, marking the onset of recovery.[109] Studies attribute this turnaround to heightened inflation expectations and fiscal-monetary coordination, which reduced real debt burdens and stimulated investment and consumption, contrasting with slower recoveries in gold bloc nations like France.[110] While some analyses emphasize gold inflows as exogenous drivers, the devaluation policy framework was instrumental in converting deflationary expectations into expansionary ones, supporting monetary easing without immediate inflationary excess.[111]Fiscal Experiments and New Deal Programs
Following Franklin D. Roosevelt's inauguration on March 4, 1933, the New Deal introduced a series of fiscal experiments characterized by substantial increases in federal spending and the creation of numerous government agencies aimed at providing relief, recovery, and reform. Real federal outlays rose from 5.9 percent of 1929 real GDP in 1933 to nearly 11 percent by 1939, reflecting a shift toward deficit financing to stimulate economic activity.[112] The national debt increased from $22 billion in 1933 to $33 billion by 1936, funding programs that employed millions through public works and direct relief.[113] Major initiatives included the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), established in March 1933, which provided jobs for over 3 million young men in conservation projects by 1942; the Public Works Administration (PWA), launched under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in June 1933, which allocated $3.3 billion for infrastructure like dams and highways; and the Works Progress Administration (WPA), created in 1935, employing 8.5 million people on projects including roads, schools, and arts programs until 1943. Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933 sought to raise farm prices by paying farmers to reduce production, while the National Recovery Administration (NRA), also under NIRA, imposed industry codes to set wages and prices, though it was declared unconstitutional in 1935. The Second New Deal from 1935 featured the Social Security Act, establishing unemployment insurance and old-age pensions, and the Wagner Act bolstering labor unions.[114] These programs temporarily reduced unemployment from 24.9 percent in 1933 to 14.3 percent by 1937, but a recession in 1937-1938 pushed it back to 19 percent, with full recovery only occurring during World War II mobilization.[115] Empirical analyses, such as that by economists Harold Cole and Lee Ohanian, argue that New Deal policies like the NRA's cartelization distorted labor and product markets by elevating real wages above market-clearing levels and reducing competition, accounting for about 60 percent of the persistent output gap between actual and trend GDP from 1933 to 1939.[116] Their model estimates these interventions prolonged the Depression by roughly seven years relative to a counterfactual without such distortions.[117] While proponents credit the New Deal with stabilizing banking via the FDIC (1933) and providing essential relief, critics contend the fiscal expansions crowded out private investment and failed to address underlying structural issues, as evidenced by sluggish private sector growth and repeated downturns despite rising public expenditure.[112]World War II's Economic Mobilization
The United States' economic mobilization for World War II, accelerating after the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, transformed the lingering Depression-era economy through unprecedented government-directed industrial expansion and labor absorption. Federal defense expenditures escalated from $1.7 billion in fiscal year 1939 (1.4% of GDP) to $12.8 billion in 1941 and peaked at $98.7 billion in 1945 (37.5% of GDP), funded largely by deficit spending and war bonds.[118] This shift reoriented factories from civilian to military production, with output of aircraft rising from 6,000 in 1939 to 96,000 in 1944, ships from negligible to over 5 million tons annually by 1943, and tanks from zero to 29,000 in 1943 alone.[118] Labor mobilization complemented industrial efforts, drafting 10 million men into the armed forces between 1940 and 1945 while creating 17 million new civilian jobs, drawing women and minorities into the workforce en masse.[119] Unemployment plummeted from an annual average of 14.6% in 1940 to 9.9% in 1941, 4.7% in 1942, 1.9% in 1943, and a low of 1.2% in 1944, reflecting near-full employment as idle resources were directed toward war needs.[115] Real GDP grew at annual rates exceeding 15% from 1942 to 1944, doubling from $124.5 billion in 1939 (in 1929 dollars) to approximately $223 billion by 1945, driven by wartime demand that outstripped pre-Depression peaks achieved in 1937.[118] While this mobilization empirically resolved Depression indicators like high unemployment and output gaps through aggregate demand stimulus via fiscal outlays, it relied on coercive measures including wage-price controls, rationing of consumer goods, and suppressed private investment, which fell as a share of GDP.[118] Corporate profits after taxes doubled from 1939 to 1945, yet per capita consumption stagnated until postwar demobilization, underscoring that wartime "prosperity" prioritized military over civilian welfare.[119] Economists debate whether this validates deficit spending as a recovery tool or merely masked underlying distortions, with some heterodox views attributing sustained growth to prewar monetary reflation rather than war alone.Empirical Evidence on Recovery Drivers
Real gross domestic product (GDP) in the United States bottomed out in 1933 at approximately 66% of its 1929 peak, then expanded at an average annual rate of 8.5% from 1933 to 1937, recovering to about 105% of pre-Depression levels by 1937. Unemployment, which reached 25% in 1933, declined to 14% by 1937, indicating substantial labor market improvement prior to major World War II mobilization.[120] These trends suggest recovery drivers activated around 1933, coinciding with the abandonment of the gold standard and subsequent monetary expansion rather than sustained fiscal outlays or wartime production, which accelerated only after 1940.[121] Econometric analysis by Christina Romer attributes nearly all observed output growth from 1933 to 1942 to increases in aggregate demand driven primarily by monetary policy changes, estimating that monetary expansion raised real GNP by a factor sufficient to explain the recovery without relying on fiscal multipliers exceeding unity. Specifically, the devaluation of the dollar by about 40% following the Gold Reserve Act of January 1934 facilitated reflation, with money supply (M1) growing from $19.2 billion in 1933 to $30.8 billion by 1937, correlating strongly with industrial production rises of over 50% in the same period.[120] Cross-country evidence supports this, as nations exiting the gold standard earlier, such as the United Kingdom in 1931, experienced faster recoveries; U.S. industrial production lagged until post-1933 devaluation, after which it outpaced gold bloc countries adhering to fixed exchange rates.[121] Fiscal interventions under the New Deal, while increasing federal spending from 5.9% of 1929 GDP in 1933 to 11% by 1939, showed limited causal impact on recovery according to vector autoregression models, with multipliers estimated below 1 and some programs inducing uncertainty that deterred private investment.[122] For instance, National Industrial Recovery Act codes, intended to boost wages and prices, correlated with output stagnation in affected sectors, suggesting supply-side distortions outweighed demand stimulus.[123] The 1937-1938 recession, triggered by Federal Reserve reserve requirement hikes and New Deal spending cuts, further underscores monetary contraction's role in halting progress, as output fell 18% and unemployment rose to 19% despite prior fiscal buildup. World War II mobilization from 1941, raising government spending to 43% of GDP by 1944, eliminated remaining unemployment slack but did not initiate recovery, as pre-war GDP had already surpassed 1929 levels; wartime controls, including price ceilings and rationing, masked underlying distortions rather than fostering organic growth, with postwar demobilization yielding sustained expansion absent such interventions.[124] Productivity data reinforce that endogenous factors like monetary stabilization, not exogenous shocks like war, drove the 1933-1937 upturn, with total factor productivity growth averaging 2.5% annually post-reflation.[125] Overall, empirical correlations and counterfactual simulations prioritize monetary reflation over fiscal or military drivers, highlighting policy-induced demand restoration as the core mechanism.[120]Country-Specific Impacts
United States
The Great Depression profoundly impacted the United States economy, initiating with the stock market crash on October 29, 1929, known as Black Tuesday, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped nearly 12 percent amid trading of over 16 million shares. From its peak of 381 points in September 1929, the Dow declined sharply, reaching a low of 41 points by July 1932, erasing much of the speculative gains from the 1920s boom.[27] Real gross domestic product contracted by 29 percent between 1929 and 1933, reflecting a collapse in industrial production and consumer spending.[2] Unemployment surged to a peak of 25 percent in 1933, affecting approximately 15 million workers and leading to widespread joblessness, particularly in manufacturing and construction sectors.[2] Banking instability exacerbated the downturn, with banking panics triggering runs that resulted in over 9,000 bank failures between 1930 and 1933, equivalent to about one-third of all U.S. banks and wiping out depositors' savings without federal deposit insurance. This financial chaos contracted the money supply, deepened deflation—which saw consumer prices fall 25 percent—and hindered credit availability for businesses and households.[2] Agricultural regions faced compounded distress from falling commodity prices and environmental catastrophe; farm incomes plummeted as wheat and cotton prices halved, while the Dust Bowl droughts and dust storms from 1930 to 1936 eroded topsoil across 100 million acres in the Great Plains, displacing over 2.5 million people in migrations like the "Okie" exodus to California.[126] Social consequences included the proliferation of shantytowns dubbed Hoovervilles, reliance on soup kitchens, and increased urban poverty, with families resorting to makeshift housing and charitable aid amid federal relief efforts that proved insufficient under President Hoover's administration.[1] Rural depopulation accelerated as foreclosures claimed one-third of farms, and urban industrial cities like Detroit and Chicago saw factory closures and breadlines. Despite some recovery signs post-1933 banking reforms, per capita income remained 25 percent below 1929 levels by 1939, underscoring the Depression's protracted grip until wartime mobilization.[2]Germany
Germany's economy, still recovering from the 1923 hyperinflation and reliant on short-term loans under the Dawes Plan, faced acute vulnerability when the 1929 Wall Street Crash triggered a withdrawal of American capital. Short-term foreign credits, totaling around 13 billion Reichsmarks by 1928, evaporated as U.S. banks recalled funds, leading to a liquidity crisis and multiple bank failures, including the collapse of the Darmstädter und Nationalbank in 1931. Industrial production plummeted by approximately 40% between 1929 and 1932, while gross domestic product contracted by 15.7%. Unemployment exploded from 1.5 million at the end of 1929 to over 6 million by early 1933, representing nearly 30% of the workforce, with full-time employment dropping from 20 million to 11.5 million workers. Wages declined by 39% in the same period, exacerbating widespread poverty and social unrest.[127][128][129] Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, appointed in March 1930, responded with deflationary austerity measures, including sharp cuts to wages, salaries, pensions, and unemployment benefits, alongside tax increases to balance the budget and service war reparations. These policies, intended to restore fiscal credibility and avert inflation reminiscent of 1923, instead intensified the contraction by suppressing demand and prolonging deflation, which doubled unemployment figures and fueled political polarization. Brüning's reliance on emergency decrees bypassed the Reichstag, eroding democratic legitimacy as centrist coalitions fractured; the Nazi Party's vote share surged from 2.6% in 1928 to 37.3% in July 1932 elections, capitalizing on economic despair. The Social Democrats and Communists gained initially but lost ground to the Nazis' promises of radical change, amid street violence and a breakdown in parliamentary governance. Historians note that Brüning's orthodox approach, while avoiding devaluation, amplified the Depression's severity compared to countries pursuing expansionary policies.[130][131] Following Adolf Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on January 30, 1933, the Nazi regime implemented aggressive reflation through public works programs, such as the Reichsarbeitsdienst and Autobahn construction, financed via deficit spending and mechanisms like Mefo bills to circumvent balanced-budget constraints. Rearmament, violating the Treaty of Versailles, absorbed labor into arms production, while policies excluding women from the workforce and mandating conscripted service further reduced official unemployment rolls. These measures halved unemployment to 2.5 million by 1935 and near zero by 1938, alongside modest GDP growth averaging 8-10% annually from 1933-1936, though real wages stagnated and living standards were propped by suppressed consumption and autarkic trade controls. Economic historian Adam Tooze attributes this "miracle" to state-directed investment prioritizing military buildup over sustainable civilian recovery, setting the stage for aggressive expansionism. While effective in restoring employment, the model relied on plunder from annexed territories by 1938 and suppressed dissent, illustrating how Depression-era desperation facilitated totalitarian consolidation.[132][133]United Kingdom
The United Kingdom experienced a severe but relatively contained economic contraction during the Great Depression, with gross domestic product falling sharply by approximately 5.5% between 1929 and 1931, driven by declining exports, industrial output, and investment amid global trade disruptions.[106] Unemployment surged from about 1.1 million in 1929 to over 3 million by late 1932, representing roughly 22% of the insured workforce, with particularly acute impacts in export-dependent heavy industries like coal, steel, shipbuilding, and textiles in northern England, Scotland, and Wales.[134][135] These figures reflected structural vulnerabilities from Britain's return to the gold standard at pre-war parity in 1925, which had overvalued the pound and eroded competitiveness, exacerbating the downturn when global demand collapsed after the 1929 Wall Street crash.[65] In response to a banking crisis and speculative attacks on the pound, the Labour government collapsed in August 1931, leading Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald to form a National Government coalition with Conservatives and Liberals on 24 August 1931, which implemented initial austerity measures including 10% cuts to unemployment benefits and public sector wages to balance the budget and defend the currency.[136] Despite these efforts, reserves drained rapidly, forcing suspension of the gold standard on 21 September 1931; the pound immediately depreciated by about 25-30% against gold-backed currencies, enabling the Bank of England to pursue expansionary monetary policy with interest rates cut to 2% by 1932, fostering cheaper credit and stimulating domestic demand.[15][137] This devaluation boosted net exports by improving price competitiveness—exports rose 20% in real terms by 1933—and correlated with a decline in unemployment, as the exchange rate adjustment directly reduced joblessness by an estimated 5-7 percentage points through trade channels.[106] Fiscal and trade policies shifted toward protectionism after the 1931 election landslide for the National Government. The Import Duties Act of February 1932 imposed a 10% tariff on most imports (except food from the Empire), while the Ottawa Agreements, negotiated at the Imperial Economic Conference from July to August 1932, established preferential tariffs among Britain and its dominions, reducing duties on intra-Empire trade by up to 50% in some cases and redirecting about 40% of British exports toward Commonwealth markets by the mid-1930s.[138] These measures, combined with low interest rates, spurred a housing boom—over 2.5 million homes built between 1931 and 1939—and recovery in light industries, with GDP growth averaging 3-4% annually from 1932 to 1937, outpacing the United States.[139] Unemployment fell to around 1.5-1.8 million by 1937, though regional disparities persisted, with the industrial north lagging behind the consumer-driven south.[15] Social hardships fueled protests, including hunger marches by the National Unemployed Workers' Movement and the introduction of a stringent means test in 1931 that reduced benefits for those with assets or family support, affecting over a million claimants.[135] The Jarrow Crusade in October 1936 exemplified northern despair, as 200 unemployed shipyard workers marched 280 miles to London with a petition signed by 11,000 locals, highlighting 70% unemployment in Jarrow after steelworks closures, though the government offered no special aid beyond general rearmament plans.[140] Rearmament from 1936, prompted by rising geopolitical tensions, further aided recovery by absorbing labor into defense industries, reducing unemployment below 10% by 1939 without the deflationary rigidities that prolonged slumps elsewhere.[136] Overall, Britain's exit from gold and policy pivot to devaluation and mild protectionism enabled swifter stabilization than gold-adherent nations, underscoring the causal role of monetary flexibility in mitigating depression-era contractions.[15][106]France
France initially weathered the initial waves of the Great Depression better than many industrial peers due to its large gold reserves and conservative monetary policy, but by 1931 the downturn intensified with a sharp contraction in exports from 52 billion francs in 1929 to 20 billion in 1932 (in current prices).[141] Industrial production declined starting in June 1930, accompanied by falling consumer prices, marking the onset of deflationary pressures.[142] The economy's average annual GDP growth slowed to 0.63% in the 1930s from 4.43% in the 1920s, reflecting prolonged stagnation rather than acute collapse.[143] Adherence to the gold standard until September 1936 enforced deflationary orthodoxy, delaying recovery as France resisted devaluation amid balance-of-payments strains and gold outflows.[144] [145] Unemployment peaked in winter 1934–1935 and summer 1936 at levels below 5%, milder than in the United States or Germany, with no systemic banking collapse but localized credit crunches from 1930 to 1932.[141] [146] Industrial output fell by up to 20% from 1929 peaks, concentrated in export-dependent sectors.[143] Political fragmentation exacerbated economic rigidity, with short-lived governments prioritizing fiscal austerity over reflation. The Popular Front coalition, led by Léon Blum and elected in May 1936, responded with labor reforms including a 40-hour workweek, two weeks' paid vacation, and collective bargaining mandates, fueled by widespread factory occupations.[147] [148] These supply-side measures, akin to U.S. New Deal cartels, aimed to raise wages and purchasing power but triggered inflation, capital flight, and strikes, undermining export competitiveness.[148] [149] Devaluation of the franc on September 26, 1936, ended gold convertibility, enabling monetary expansion and partial recovery, though social turmoil and policy reversals under subsequent governments limited gains until World War II mobilization.[150] [151] Gold reserves had dwindled 37% by December 1936 from pre-devaluation levels, highlighting the unsustainability of prior defenses.[152] The episode underscored how rigid exchange commitments amplified deflationary spirals, with empirical evidence linking gold bloc persistence to deeper, longer contractions compared to earlier abandoners.[57]Canada
Canada's economy contracted sharply during the Great Depression, with gross national product falling by more than 40% by 1933.[153] Real GDP declined by over 10% in both 1931 and 1932, reaching a low point in 1933 before modest recovery began in 1934.[154] Unemployment surged to approximately 27-30% of the labor force by 1933, remaining above 20% through much of the decade and exceeding 12% until the onset of World War II mobilization in 1939.[155][156] The downturn stemmed from Canada's heavy reliance on commodity exports, particularly wheat, whose global prices collapsed amid overproduction and reduced demand; prairie farmers faced compounded devastation from prolonged drought and dust storms starting in 1929, leading to soil erosion, crop failures, and the abandonment or loss of nearly 750,000 farms by the late 1930s.[157] These environmental shocks, exacerbated by monoculture farming practices on marginal lands, created a "Dust Bowl" analogous to the American Midwest, displacing populations and deepening rural poverty in Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Manitoba.[158] Under Prime Minister R.B. Bennett's Conservative government (1930-1935), initial responses emphasized protectionism, including sharp tariff increases in 1930 to shield domestic industries, though these measures curtailed international trade and failed to revive exports.[159] The Unemployment and Farm Relief Act of 1931 allocated $28 million for direct aid to the jobless and agricultural sectors, supplemented by federal transfers to provinces for relief, but municipal and provincial funding shortfalls limited effectiveness.[160] Bennett established transient relief camps in 1932 for single unemployed men, employing them in remote forestry and infrastructure projects to reduce urban unrest, though conditions were harsh and strikes ensued.[161] Facing political pressure, Bennett introduced "New Deal" reforms in January 1935, including bills for unemployment insurance, minimum wages, a 48-hour workweek, and progressive taxation, modeled partly on U.S. initiatives; however, most were invalidated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council or lacked implementation before the 1935 election defeat.[162] The Liberal government of William Lyon Mackenzie King, elected in 1935, pursued limited fiscal expansion and constitutional amendments to enable federal intervention, but economic recovery remained sluggish, hampered by balanced-budget orthodoxy and provincial resistance.[163] Provincial experiments, such as Alberta's Social Credit measures under William Aberhart (1935 onward), attempted debt relief and price controls but faced legal challenges and mixed outcomes.[164] Sustained rebound occurred only with wartime production demands; national unemployment insurance was enacted in 1940, alongside industrial mobilization that absorbed labor and boosted output.[165] The Depression thus exposed structural vulnerabilities in Canada's export-dependent, agrarian economy, prompting postwar commitments to social safety nets while underscoring the limits of domestic policy absent global demand recovery.[153]Australia and New Zealand
Australia's export-dependent economy, centered on wool, wheat, and other primary commodities, began contracting in 1928 amid falling global prices, with the 1929 Wall Street crash intensifying the downturn through halted overseas lending and collapsed terms of trade. Real GDP fell by about 10 percent in 1930-31, while national income declined by roughly one-third over the period. Unemployment surged from 10 percent in mid-1929 to a peak of 32 percent in mid-1932, with factory output dropping nearly 10 percent in 1929-30 alone.[166][167][168][169] Federal and state leaders responded with the Premiers' Plan in June 1931, endorsing deflationary orthodoxy: 20 percent reductions in public works spending, 10 percent wage cuts across sectors, increased taxes, and conversion of short-term internal debt to longer terms to achieve balanced budgets and creditor confidence. Critics, including some economists, contended these measures deepened contraction by suppressing demand, though defenders credited them with averting default on external obligations. New South Wales Premier Jack Lang's rival "Lang Plan," proposing suspension of overseas interest payments and debt repudiation, was deemed unconstitutional and led to his removal by the Governor in May 1932.[170][171] Signs of recovery emerged in 1932-33, driven primarily by Australia's devaluation of the pound by approximately 30 percent in December 1931—preceding sterling's abandonment of gold—which enhanced export competitiveness and supported rural incomes as wool and wheat prices rebounded modestly. Complementary tariffs raised effective protection rates, shielding manufacturing, while limited fiscal expansion via loan-funded works followed. Unemployment declined steadily but remained above 20 percent until 1935, with pre-Depression employment levels not restored until World War II mobilization. Empirical analyses attribute much of the upturn to devaluation and protection over initial fiscal restraint.[172][170] New Zealand, similarly vulnerable to commodity export slumps in dairy, meat, and wool, saw exports contract 45 percent from 1929 to 1931 and national income fall 40 percent, amplifying deflation and bank strains. Unemployment estimates peaked at 15-30 percent in 1933, with official rates around 12-15 percent understating totals as many registered for relief work under punitive conditions, including remote labor camps. High pre-existing public debt, exceeding 170 percent of GDP, constrained options amid frozen overseas capital inflows.[173][174][175] The United-Reform coalition under Prime Minister George Forbes pursued austerity from 1930, slashing wages by up to 20 percent, trimming civil service pay, and funding relief via ad hoc public works and sustenance allowances that prioritized family men but fostered unrest, including riots and the Unemployed Workers' Movement demanding better aid. No centralized unemployment insurance existed, leaving local bodies overburdened.[176][177] The Labour Party's landslide victory in November 1935 shifted policy toward reflation: Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage's administration reversed wage cuts, enacted a 40-hour workweek, guaranteed minimum family benefits, and launched expansive public works, state housing, and social security via the 1938 Social Security Act, financed partly by progressive taxation and Reserve Bank credit. These interventions boosted domestic demand and employment, coinciding with export recovery, though sustained growth awaited wartime demands; unemployment fell below 10 percent by 1938.[178]Japan
Japan's return to the gold standard on January 11, 1930, at the pre-World War I parity rate overvalued the yen by approximately 50-60% against major currencies, exacerbating deflationary pressures amid the global downturn.[179] Industrial production declined by only 6% from 1929 levels to its 1931 trough, a milder contraction compared to 47% in the United States or 40% in Germany.[180] Real GDP fell modestly in 1930-1931, with the Showa Depression largely confined to those two years, contrasting with prolonged slumps elsewhere.[181] Agricultural sectors suffered acutely from falling rice prices due to overproduction and poor 1931 harvests, leading to widespread rural bankruptcies, malnutrition, and social distress; farmers' incomes plummeted, prompting some to sell daughters into servitude amid famine-like conditions in regions like Tohoku.[179][182] Urban unemployment rose, though official figures understated it due to limited social safety nets, fueling labor unrest and peasant uprisings that pressured the government toward expansionary measures.[180] On December 13, 1931, Japan suspended gold convertibility under Finance Minister Takahashi Korekiyo, devaluing the yen by 60% against the U.S. dollar and 44% against the British pound, which reversed deflation and enabled monetary expansion through Bank of Japan note issuance.[183] Accompanying fiscal stimulus, including deficit-financed military expenditures and public works, boosted aggregate demand; banknote circulation grew at 7% annually from 1932-1936, supporting 5.9% real GDP growth over the same period.[184] Exports surged post-devaluation, particularly silk and textiles to the United States, aiding industrial recovery; by 1937, industrial production reached 175% of 1929 levels, outpacing Western economies still below pre-Depression peaks.[181] Overall GDP expanded at 6.1% annually from 1930-1937, driven by Takahashi's coordinated devaluation, loose monetary policy, and fiscal activism, which monetized government debt without immediate inflationary crisis.[185][184] Economic recovery intertwined with militarism; rural distress and urban discontent bolstered ultranationalist factions, culminating in the 1931 Manchurian invasion for resource access and the 1932 assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, accelerating army dominance.[180] Takahashi's policies, while effective in ending the slump, financed imperial expansion, setting the stage for wartime economy by mid-decade.[183]Latin America
Latin American economies, predominantly export-oriented and dependent on primary commodities such as coffee from Brazil, beef and wheat from Argentina, oil from Mexico, and copper from Chile, experienced acute shocks from the global demand collapse after the 1929 Wall Street crash. Commodity prices fell sharply, with export values declining by over 50 percent in many countries between 1929 and 1932, exacerbating balance-of-payments crises and depleting foreign exchange reserves. Terms of trade deteriorated as export prices dropped faster than import prices, leading to reduced fiscal revenues and widespread unemployment in export-dependent sectors; real GDP contracted by about 10 percent in Argentina and Mexico from 1929 to 1933, while Chile saw a 37 percent plunge, among the region's most severe.[186][187][188] In response, governments across the region swiftly abandoned the gold standard—often by 1931—to allow currency devaluation, which improved export competitiveness and stemmed reserve outflows. Brazil, for example, cut imports by 75 percent from $416.6 million in 1929 to $108.6 million in 1932, while exports declined less proportionally, enabling a trade surplus that supported recovery; the Vargas administration (seizing power in 1930) subsidized coffee producers by stockpiling and destroying surpluses to stabilize prices. Similar interventions occurred elsewhere: Argentina imposed exchange controls and debt moratoriums in 1931, Mexico nationalized oil resources amid falling revenues, and Chile diversified into state-led mining. These measures reflected a causal shift from export-led growth—previously stimulated by foreign demand—to inward-oriented policies, including high tariffs and quotas to protect nascent industries.[187] This policy pivot laid the groundwork for import substitution industrialization (ISI), prioritizing domestic production of consumer goods to replace imports and conserve foreign currency. Larger economies like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico led in experimentation, with governments investing in infrastructure, utilities, and manufacturing through state enterprises and fiscal incentives; by the mid-1930s, industrial output began rising, contributing to shallower and shorter contractions compared to industrialized nations, as primary export supply elasticities allowed quicker adjustments. However, ISI's early reliance on protectionism fostered inefficiencies and urban-rural imbalances, though it initially boosted employment and output amid global isolation. Recovery accelerated by 1933–1934 as devalued currencies and diversified trade partners mitigated the downturn, underscoring the role of monetary flexibility over rigid adherence to pre-Depression orthodoxy.[189][187]Soviet Union
The Soviet Union's centrally planned economy insulated it from the direct shocks of the global Great Depression, as foreign trade constituted less than 5% of national income in 1928 and declined further amid autarkic policies that prioritized self-sufficiency over market integration.[190] This isolation stemmed from the abandonment of the New Economic Policy in 1928, which had allowed limited private enterprise, in favor of total state control under the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932), aimed at transforming the agrarian economy into an industrial powerhouse through forced resource allocation.[191] Industrial production surged under the plan, with official figures reporting annual growth rates exceeding 20% in heavy sectors like steel, coal, and machinery by 1932, enabling the USSR to emerge as a leading producer of oil, iron ore, and cement by the mid-1930s.[191] Independent estimates adjust these to more modest but still positive rates of 5–7% annual national income growth from 1928 to 1937, contrasting sharply with contractions in Western economies, though such metrics emphasized gross output over per capita consumption or quality adjustments.[192] [193] The Second Five-Year Plan (1933–1937) sustained this momentum, focusing on expanding consumer goods and infrastructure, but prioritized military-related industries amid rising geopolitical tensions. Agricultural collectivization, enforced from 1929 to 1933, underpinned industrialization by consolidating over 200,000 peasant households into state-controlled kolkhozy and sovkhozy, extracting grain surpluses for export to purchase foreign machinery despite domestic shortages.[194] This policy triggered widespread resistance, including the slaughter of livestock—reducing the horse population by 50% and cattle by one-third between 1929 and 1933—and culminated in the 1932–1933 famine, which caused 5–7 million deaths across Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other regions due to requisition quotas, seed confiscations, and export mandates totaling 1.8 million tons of grain in 1932–1933.[195] Grain output fell to 68.4 million tons in 1932 from 83.5 million in 1928, reflecting not only policy-induced disruption but also underlying inefficiencies in coerced labor systems.[191] The Depression indirectly aided Soviet development by drawing skilled labor from the West; for instance, in 1931, Soviet agencies in the United States received over 100,000 applications for 6,000 engineering positions, facilitating technology transfers in sectors like automotive and aviation production.[196] However, growth masked severe human and efficiency costs, including rationing until 1935, urban food shortages, and the Gulag system's expansion to provide forced labor for projects like the White Sea–Baltic Canal, completed in 1933 at the expense of tens of thousands of lives.[191] Soviet propaganda touted immunity to capitalist crises as proof of socialism's superiority, but empirical evidence reveals expansion from a low pre-industrial base via extractive coercion rather than productive innovation, with living standards lagging far behind even depressed Western levels.[192]Long-Term Legacy
Institutional Changes: Banking and Monetary Systems
The collapse of thousands of banks during the early 1930s, with over 9,000 failures between 1930 and 1933 wiping out depositors' savings, prompted major institutional reforms to stabilize the financial system.[39] In the United States, the Banking Act of 1933, signed into law on June 16 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, introduced key changes including the separation of commercial and investment banking activities to prevent speculative risks from affecting depositors.[197] This legislation prohibited commercial banks from underwriting or dealing in securities, aiming to curb the practices that exacerbated the 1929 crash and subsequent panics.[198] A core provision of the 1933 Act was the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as an independent agency to insure deposits up to $2,500 initially, later increased, thereby restoring public confidence and reducing the incidence of bank runs.[199] The FDIC's creation directly addressed the absence of deposit protection that had amplified panics, as evidenced by regional crises in 1930-1931 escalating into a nationwide collapse by early 1933.[38] Prior to this, the Federal Reserve's limited lender-of-last-resort actions under the 1932 Banking Act had proven insufficient to halt the systemic failures.[200] On the monetary front, the Great Depression accelerated the global abandonment of the gold standard, which constrained central banks' ability to expand money supplies amid deflationary pressures. Britain suspended convertibility in September 1931, followed by Nordic countries in late 1931 and the United States in 1933 via Executive Order 6102, which prohibited private gold ownership and devalued the dollar by raising the official price from $20.67 to $35 per ounce under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934.[15] [19] This shift enabled discretionary monetary policies, with countries leaving gold earlier experiencing faster recoveries through currency depreciation and reflation.[201] Internationally, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), founded in 1930 under the Hague Agreements to manage German reparations, evolved into a forum for central bank coordination, facilitating discussions on monetary stability amid the crisis.[202] These changes marked a transition from rigid gold-backed systems to more flexible fiat-oriented frameworks, influencing post-war institutions like Bretton Woods, though the BIS's role during the 1930s was limited by geopolitical tensions. Overall, the reforms emphasized government intervention in banking supervision and monetary control, reducing future panic risks but expanding central authority over credit allocation.[203]Political Realignments and Totalitarianism Risks
![Adolf Hitler at an NSDAP event in Rosenheim][float-right] The Great Depression catalyzed profound political realignments, shifting voter coalitions toward parties promising economic relief and state intervention, while heightening risks of totalitarian regimes in vulnerable democracies. In the United States, the crisis eroded Republican dominance established since the 1920s, culminating in Franklin D. Roosevelt's landslide victory over incumbent Herbert Hoover in the November 8, 1932, presidential election, where Democrats secured overwhelming majorities in Congress for the first time since the Civil War era.[204] This realignment forged a durable Democratic coalition encompassing urban laborers, ethnic minorities, Southern whites, and intellectuals, sustained by New Deal policies that expanded federal welfare and regulatory powers, marking a pivot from laissez-faire traditions without descending into authoritarianism.[204] In Europe, economic collapse undermined liberal democratic institutions, fostering support for radical ideologies that exploited public disillusionment with parliamentary gridlock and austerity measures. Germany's Weimar Republic exemplified these risks: unemployment soared to approximately 30% by 1932, correlating with the Nazi Party's (NSDAP) electoral surge from 2.6% of the vote in 1928 to 37.3% in the July 1932 Reichstag election, enabling Adolf Hitler's appointment as chancellor on January 30, 1933.[205] [206] Austerity policies, including fiscal tightening amid frozen reparations, amplified Nazi gains in Protestant rural districts and among the middle class fearful of communism, as voters prioritized promises of employment and national revival over democratic norms.[207] Historians attribute this trajectory partly to the Depression's exacerbation of Versailles Treaty resentments and hyperinflation legacies, though pre-existing polarization and elite miscalculations also facilitated the totalitarian shift.[208] Elsewhere, similar dynamics propelled authoritarian consolidations: in Italy, Benito Mussolini's fascist regime, entrenched since 1922, leveraged Depression-era hardships to intensify corporatist controls and suppress dissent, while in Spain and Eastern Europe, economic distress fueled civil strife and dictatorships.[209] These cases underscore causal mechanisms where prolonged mass unemployment—exceeding 20% in affected nations—erodes faith in market liberalism and representative government, incentivizing demagogues offering illusory certainties through centralized power, a pattern absent in the U.S. due to its federal resilience and Roosevelt's reformist containment.[210] Empirical analyses confirm that districts with sharper downturns exhibited disproportionate extremist vote swings, highlighting totalitarianism's latent vulnerability in crises absent timely democratic adaptations.[211]Lessons for Modern Policy and Myth Debunking
The Federal Reserve's failure to expand the money supply during the early 1930s exacerbated banking panics and deflation, contracting the money stock by approximately one-third between 1929 and 1933, which transformed a recession into a severe depression.[212] This monetary contraction, rather than the 1929 stock market crash alone, was the primary driver of the downturn's depth, as the crash preceded the recession's onset in August 1929 and synchronized with Federal Reserve tightening.[213] A key lesson for modern central banks is the necessity of aggressive liquidity provision and serving as a lender of last resort to avert systemic bank runs, as demonstrated by the contrasting actions during the 2008 financial crisis where rapid interventions prevented a similar collapse. Contrary to the myth of Herbert Hoover's laissez-faire inaction, his administration pursued significant interventions, including the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932 to lend to banks and businesses, voluntary wage and price controls via conferences with industry leaders, and federal spending increases of 48 percent that funded public works and infrastructure pledges totaling billions from utilities and railroads.[214][215] These measures, intended to stabilize the economy, instead distorted price signals and resource allocation, illustrating a lesson that ad hoc government coordination of wages and production can rigidify labor markets and hinder adjustment.[216] For contemporary policy, this underscores the risks of micro-managing sectoral agreements over flexible market clearing, favoring instead targeted support without broad controls. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, raising duties on over 20,000 imported goods to record levels, provoked retaliatory tariffs from trading partners and contributed to a 66 percent collapse in global trade volume by 1933, though its passage occurred after the Depression's initial contraction and amplified rather than initiated the downturn.[14][217] Empirical analysis indicates tariffs accounted for about 5 percent of U.S. output loss, secondary to domestic monetary failures, debunking claims of it as the singular cause while highlighting the modern imperative to avoid protectionist escalations that compound recessions through reduced exports and higher input costs.[218] Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal policies, particularly the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933 which cartelized industries and enforced above-market wages, prolonged the Depression by an estimated 7 years according to econometric models, as rigidities prevented output recovery to 1929 levels until 1939 despite deficit spending.[219] Real GDP growth averaged only 0.8 percent annually from 1933 to 1939, with unemployment lingering above 14 percent, suggesting fiscal multipliers were low and that wartime mobilization, not New Deal programs, drove full recovery.[220] This challenges the narrative of New Deal efficacy, emphasizing for today's policymakers the pitfalls of industrial codes and wage mandates that suppress employment, and the value of prioritizing monetary easing and deregulation over expansive fiscal interventions with uncertain offsets.[123] Broader lessons include the benefits of international monetary coordination to share recovery burdens, as unilateral devaluations and gold standard adherence deepened global deflation, contrasting with post-2008 G20 commitments that mitigated spillover effects.[221] Additionally, avoiding premature policy normalization—such as the 1937 tightening that induced a recession within the Depression—reinforces the need for sustained expansionary measures until sustained growth is evident.[222] These insights, drawn from monetary histories and counterfactual analyses, prioritize causal mechanisms like liquidity and trade flows over interventionist panaceas often overstated in politically aligned narratives.[104]Historiography and Comparisons
Evolution of Scholarly Interpretations
Early scholarly interpretations of the Great Depression emphasized structural and monetary factors rooted in pre-existing imbalances. Contemporary economists like Irving Fisher, in his 1933 paper "The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions," argued that a combination of over-indebtedness from the 1920s credit boom and subsequent deflation created a vicious cycle: falling prices increased real debt burdens, prompting forced asset sales, further price declines, and contractions in net worth, output, and employment.[223] Austrian School economists, including Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, attributed the downturn to artificial credit expansion by the Federal Reserve in the 1920s, which distorted investment patterns and led to unsustainable malinvestments; they viewed the Depression as a necessary liquidation phase to reallocate resources, warning against interventions that would prolong distortions.[73] The publication of John Maynard Keynes's The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money in 1936 marked a pivotal shift, framing the Depression as primarily a crisis of insufficient aggregate demand due to pessimistic expectations, sticky wages, and liquidity traps, rather than supply-side or monetary rigidities alone.[80] Keynes advocated countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies to boost spending and restore equilibrium, influencing interpretations that downplayed market self-correction in favor of government stabilization. This demand-side view gained prominence during the 1930s, aligning with New Deal policies, though empirical evidence of recovery timing—such as the U.S. economy's rebound coinciding more with monetary reflation post-1933 than fiscal outlays—remained debated.[3] Post-World War II, a Keynesian consensus dominated academic and policy circles through the 1960s, portraying the Depression as evidence of inherent capitalist instability requiring active demand management to avert chronic unemployment; this era's textbooks often attributed causes to underconsumption, wage rigidities, and inadequate private investment, sidelining earlier monetary analyses amid a prevailing view that fiscal multipliers were key to the incomplete 1930s recovery.[224] Challenges emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s with monetarist critiques, notably Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's 1963 A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, which used empirical data to demonstrate the Federal Reserve's failure to act as lender of last resort, allowing bank failures to contract the money supply by approximately one-third between 1929 and 1933, amplifying the initial downturn into a prolonged contraction.[225] Their analysis shifted focus to policy errors in monetary control, arguing that orthodox money stock maintenance could have mitigated severity, as evidenced by correlations between money supply drops and output falls exceeding those in prior panics.[3] Subsequent decades saw diversification, with Austrian perspectives revived in Murray Rothbard's 1963 America's Great Depression, reiterating credit-fueled booms as the root cause and critiquing Hoover and Roosevelt interventions for distorting liquidation.[73] By the 1980s, a partial consensus formed around multiple interacting factors—stock market crash, Smoot-Hawley tariffs, banking fragility, and gold standard constraints—but monetarist evidence underscored central bank inaction as central to propagation, influencing modern central banking doctrines like inflation targeting.[1] Real business cycle models in the 1980s posited supply shocks, yet empirical studies reaffirmed monetary transmission's role, with Fisher's debt-deflation mechanism integrated into analyses of balance sheet recessions.[226] Contemporary scholarship, informed by cliometric data, rejects monocausal narratives, emphasizing empirical validation over ideological priors, though debates persist on intervention efficacy given the Depression's global scope and varied national recoveries.[224]Naming Conventions and Other Depressions
The term "depression" entered economic lexicon in the early 19th century to denote a sustained decline in economic activity, evoking a state of lowered vitality akin to medical depression, and was applied to downturns without the later distinction of milder "recessions," which emerged post-1930s to describe shorter contractions.[227] Prior to the 1930s crisis, all major U.S. economic slumps—regardless of scale—were commonly labeled depressions, reflecting a era when such terms lacked the precise quantitative thresholds used today, such as a 10% GDP drop or multi-year duration.[227] The 1929–1939 downturn earned the qualifier "Great" to underscore its unprecedented depth—U.S. GDP fell by approximately 30% from peak to trough—and longevity, surpassing prior episodes in industrialized economies; this naming gained traction amid the crisis's persistence, with U.S. President Herbert Hoover publicly adopting "depression" by November 1931 to characterize the slump's severity.[228] British economist Lionel Robbins formalized the phrase in his 1934 book The Great Depression, analyzing the event's global scope and critiquing policy responses, which helped cement its usage over alternatives like "Hoover Depression" or mere "Crash of '29".[229] [228] The designation distinguished it from earlier downturns, though contemporaries sometimes invoked "great" hyperbolically for 19th-century events; by the late 1930s, as recovery began, the term solidified in media and scholarly discourse without implying positivity, but rather exceptional magnitude relative to historical benchmarks.[230] Numerous depressions preceded the 1930s event, often triggered by banking panics, speculative bubbles, or monetary contractions, providing context for why the later crisis warranted the "great" prefix through metrics like unemployment peaks exceeding 20% and deflationary spirals unmatched in prior U.S. history.[1]- Panic of 1837 and ensuing depression (1837–1843): Sparked by speculative land bubbles, federal specie circular policies restricting banknotes, and British trade contractions, this led to over 600 bank failures, unemployment rates estimated at 25% in urban areas, and a six-year GDP contraction of roughly 30%, marking one of the longest pre-1930s slumps.[231]
- Long Depression (1873–1879, extending variably to 1896): Initiated by the Panic of 1873 amid railroad overinvestment and European financial strains from the Franco-Prussian War, it featured deflation of 1–2% annually, industrial output drops of up to 20% in affected sectors, and global trade stagnation; contemporaries occasionally dubbed it a "great depression" due to its multi-decade price declines, though real output recovered unevenly.[231][232]
- Panic of 1893 and depression (1893–1897): Driven by railroad failures, silver overproduction eroding gold reserves, and agricultural distress, this caused 500 bank closures, unemployment nearing 18%, and a 15% GDP fall, exacerbating farm foreclosures in the Midwest and South.[231]
Parallels with the Great Recession and Recent Crises
The Great Depression and the Great Recession of 2007–2009 shared origins in financial instability, including asset price collapses and banking sector vulnerabilities, though the latter stemmed from a housing market bubble fueled by subprime lending rather than the stock market speculation of 1929.[233] In both cases, credit contraction amplified the downturn: U.S. real GDP fell by approximately 29% from 1929 to 1933 during the Depression, compared to a 4.3% decline from peak to trough in the Great Recession.[2] Unemployment peaked at over 25% in 1933 versus 10% in October 2009, reflecting similar mechanisms of deleveraging and reduced lending but differing in scale due to the Recession's more contained financial contagion.[234] Deflationary pressures emerged in both, with consumer prices dropping about 25% in the early Depression years and brief deflation in 2009, eroding debt burdens and discouraging spending.[235]| Indicator | Great Depression (1929–1933) | Great Recession (2007–2009) |
|---|---|---|
| Real GDP Decline | ~29% | ~4.3% |
| Peak Unemployment | 25% (1933) | 10% (2009) |
| Duration of Contraction | ~4 years | ~18 months |